Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
General Rule: The rules of evidence do not apply in the following cases/proceedings: (Section
4, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
(i) Election cases
(ii) Land registration
(iii) Cadastral proceedings
(iv) Naturalization proceedings
(v) Insolvency proceedings
Exception: By analogy or in a suppletory character whenever practicable and convenient
(Section 4, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Evidence is the medium, means, or tool by which a fact is proved or disproved; while Proof is
the effect or result of evidence, the conviction or persuasion of the mind resulting from a
consideration of evidence.
Example:
In an action for collection of a sum of money filed by A against B, the factum probandum is the
existence of the debt while the factum probans is the promissory note signed by B in favor of
A.
D. Classification of Evidence
C. Kinds of Admissibility
(1) Multiple Admissibility
See cases of: Uniwide Sales vs Ikeda
People vs Yatco
(2) Conditional Admissibility
(3) Curative Admissibility
Curative Admissibility or “fighting fire with fire” applies only if the party against whom
the incompetent evidence is erroneously admitted objected to its admission
D. Competency of Evidence
Evidence is competent when it is not excluded by the rules, law or the Constitution
Various Rules of Exclusion:
(A) Exclusionary Rules under the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution)
(1) Right against unreasonable searches and seizures (Section 2)
People vs Marti
Right against unreasonable searches may be invoked only against the State.
The property illegally seized may be used in evidence against the officer
responsible for the illegal seizure.
Exceptions to the requirement of search warrant:
(i) Plain View Doctrine
Limitations:
(a) Prior Justification for Intrusion - such as warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, and some
other legitimate reason for being present and connected to a
search directed against the accused
(b) Inadvertent Discovery of Evidence – applies when the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but
inadvertently comes across the incriminating object
People vs Musa
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed,
the plain view doctrine cannot provide any basis for further
search
(c) Illegality must be Immediately Apparent to the police that the
items that they observed may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
People vs Musa
There must be a nexus between the item to be seized and the
criminal behavior of the accused
People vs Salanquit
The container must clearly betray its contents, whether by its
destructive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise its
contents are obvious to an observer.
People vs Bollado
Object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the
object was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore, cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view.
Plain view includes plain feel but the illegality must immediately
be apparent
(ii) Waiver or Consented Search
Case Principle:
People vs Damaso
(iii) Stop and Frisk or Terry Search
(iv) Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
(v) Search of Moving Vehicles
(vi) Customs Search
(2) Right to privacy and inviolability of communication (Section 3)
See cases of: Zulueta vs CA
Waterous Drug vs NLRC
(3) Right of person under investigation for an offense or Miranda Rights doctrine (Sec
12)
Rights available:
(i) Right to remain silent
(ii) Right to competent and independent counsel
(iii) Right to be informed of such rights
General Rule: rights cannot be waived
Exception: waiver in writing, signed by the accused, in the presence of counsel
Exception to the exception: right to be informed of such rights cannot be
waived
People vs Baloloy
Right is available only during custodial investigation
RA 7438, People vs del Rosario
Police invitation constitutes custodial investigation
Police line-up not part of custodial investigation as it has not shifted from
investigatory to accusatory stage thus Miranda rights not applicable
People vs Guillermo
Spontaneous statements or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement officers but given in ordinary manner are not covered by the
Miranda doctrine
People vs Paynor
Rights refer only to testimonial compulsion
People vs de Guzman, People vs Lamsing
Miranda doctrine do not cover paraffin tests, photographing
(4) Right against self-incrimination (Section 17)
People vs Malimit
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion but testimonial
compulsion. It does not apply when the evidence sought to be excluded is not
an incriminating statement but an object evidence
Right against self-incrimination does not cover the following:
(i) substance emitted from the body of the accused such as examination for
gonorrhea (US vs Tanting)
(ii) hair samples (Pp vs Rondero)
(iii) DNA samples (Pp vs Vallero, Pp vs Yatar)
(iv) fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin testing (Pp vs Gallarde)
(v) pregnancy test (Villaflor vs Summers)
Right against self-incrimination extends to the following:
(i) compulsion for production of documents, papers, and chattels (Regala
vs Sandiganbayan)
(ii) any attempt to furnish a specimen of the accused’s handwriting in
connection with prosecution for falsification (Beltran vs Samson)
Right may be waived by:
(i) failure to invoke it timely
(ii) taking the witness stand and voluntary testifies in which case he may be
cross-examined and asked incriminating questions on any matter he
testified during direct examination
People vs Judge Ayson
While the accused may testify on his own behalf subject to cross-examination,
he may, while testifying, refuse to answer a specific question the answer to
which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is
being prosecuted
Question is deemed incriminating if it tends to elicit an answer that would
expose the party/witness to possible criminal liability. Thus, if question
relates to a past criminality for which a witness can no longer be prosecuted as
when it has already prescribed or he has already been acquitted or convicted,
or where he has been granted immunity, the right is not available.
How right may be exercised:
(a) Accused in Criminal Case – accused may refuse to take the stand altogether
and need not wait for an incriminating question to be asked; reason: the
purpose for calling him is precisely to incriminate him
(b) Party in Civil Case or Administrative Case – party may invoke the right as
soon as incriminating question will be asked
Exception:
Civil or administrative case partakes of criminal proceedings, the party
may refuse to take the stand altogether (Pascual vs Medical Board of
Examiners, Cabal vs Kapunan)
(c) Witness in any case – right may be invoked when incriminating question is
propounded
(B) Exclusionary Rules under Special Laws
(1) Anti-Wiretapping Act
Exception to Anti-Wire Tapping Law - R.A. No.9372 (The Human Security Act)
Section 7 – The provisions of R.A. No.4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the
contrary notwithstanding, a police of law enforcement official and the
members of his team may, upon order of the Court of Appeals, listen to,
intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic
or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with
the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written
words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association or group of persons or of any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Exception:
Provided, that surveillance, interception and recording shall not be
allowed if the communications are between:
(i) lawyers and clients
(ii) doctors and patients
(iii) journalist and their sources
(iv) confidential business correspondence
(2) Rape Shield Rule (RA 8505, An Act Providing Assistance and Protection to Rape
Victims)
(3) Sexual Abuse Shield Rule (Rule on Examination of Child Witness)
(4) Laws on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
(i) RA 1465, An Act Prohibiting Disclosure and Inquiry into Bank Deposits
(ii) RA 6426, Foreign Currency Deposits Act of the Philippines
(5) Documentary Stamp Tax Laws (Article 201, NIRC)
(6) Anti-Voyeurism Act
(C) Exclusionary Rules under the Rules of Court
(1) Best Evidence Rule
(2) Parole Evidence Rule
(3) Opinion Rule
(4) Character Evidence Rule
(5) Hearsay Evidence Rule
(6) Rules on Disqualification of Witness
(7) Rules on Authentication of Documents
(8) Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the content of the writing/document
(the question is what the document says), the original of the writing/document must be presented.
What is stated in the document cannot be proven by photocopy or oral recollection of a witness.
Republic vs. Imee Marcos-Manotok, et. al., G.R. No.171701, 8 February 2012
This case involves a civil action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth against the heirs of the late
Ferdinant Marcos. To prove that the respondents had interests in various corporations and how
they used dummies in acquiring and operating the businesses, the Republic prensented mere
photocopies f documents, consisting of letters, TSN of proceedings before the PCGG, and affidavit of
witnesses. The Republic did not deny that what should be proved are the contents of these
documents themselves. It is thus imperative to submit the originals that could prove the Republic’s
allegations, without which the Republic could not prove that the respondents collaborated with
former President Marcos and Imelda Marcos and partcipated in the latter’s alleged accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth.
E. Instances when best evidence rule does not apply and the original writing need not be
produced:
(1) if the purpose is not to prove the contents of the writing but only to show that the document
exists, or has been executed or delivered, in such a case, the oral testimony or other secondary
evidence is enough to prove the existence, issuance or delivery of the writing
People vs Tandoy
A photocopy of the marked peso bill is admissible since what is sought to be proved is the
existence of the marked money and not the contents thereof
Pacifico Arceo vs People
A photocopy of the check is admissible in a criminal prosecution for violation of BP 22
because the gravamen of the offense is the act of issuance of a bum check, thus the subejct of
inquiry is the execution or the existence of the check and not its contents
(2) if the writing or document is merely collateral or is connected in some way to the fact in issue,
otherwise known as “Collateral Fact Rule”
(3) if the purpose is to prove a fact that has an existence that is independent of any writing, even
though that fact has been reduced to or evidenced by a writing,
Mayers vs US
A testimony of a witness given in a committee hearing may be proven by the oral testimony
of someone who heard it although the testimony was recorded, thus the presentation of the
transcript of the witness’ testimony is not indispensable
(4) when the terms or contents of the document are not disputed
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company vs Del Monte Motorworks
When the terms/contents of a document are not disputed or are admitted by the parties
(5) waiver
Dela Cruz vs Court of Appeals
Despite non-compliance with the requisites for introduction of secondary evidence, a
secondary evidence, if not objected to, becomes admissible and is as credible as the original
(6) if the subject of inquiry is not the contents of the document, but another matter independent
from the contents of the document.
Atienza vs. Board of Medicine and Sioson, G.R. No.177407, 9 February 2011
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-
functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. Thus, it is not
necessary to present the originals of the X-Ray Request Form. Besides, the fact sought to be
established by the admission of these exhibits (x-ray request forms) that her “kidneys wree
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of the operation, need not be proved as
it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Tegimenta Chemical vs. Mary Anne Oco, G.R. No.175369, 27 February 2013
The subject of inquiry is not the payroll sheet of Tegeminta rather, the thrust of this case is
the abundance of evidence present to prove the allegation that Oco abandoned her job by
being on AWOL. Consequently, an employer cannot be legally stumped by a payroll sheet, but
must be able to submit testimonial and other pieces of documentary evidence like leave
forms, office memos, warning letters and notices, to be able to prove that the employee
abandoned her work.
Under the foregoing exceptions, where the original writing is not available for one reason or
another,the next best evidence to prove its contents will be the following secondary evidence in this
order:
(1) copy of the writing
(2) another document reciting its contents
(3) testimony of a witness who has read or knows about it
The term “parol” means something “oral”, but for purposes of the rule, it means extraneous evidence
or evidence aliunde, either oral or written, which is outside of the written contract between the
parties.
Parol evidence rule becomes opeative when the issues in the litigation are the terms of the written
agreement.
Parol evidence rule presupposes the existence of a written agreement which is sought to be
modified, altered or varied by extraneous evidence, that is, evidence other than the written
agreement itself. The introduction of evidence which tends to vary the terms of the written
agreement is barred, because whatever is not found in the written agreement is considered waived
and abandoned.(Yu Tek vs. Gonzales)
INSTANCES WHERE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT APPLY:
(1) when the document in dispute is not a contract, like a mere receipt, since the rule presupposes a
written agreement (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals);
(2) when at least one of the parties to the case is not a party to the written agreement, since the rule
applies only to suits between parties to the written contract and their successors-in-interest
(Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals).
This is premised on the basic rule that only parties are bound by the terms of a contract.
However, while parol evidence rule has no application to a stranger to a contract, a person who
claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui may be considered a party to
the contract and therefore he is precluded from introducing oral evidence to vary the terms of a
written contract. Moreover, to preclude the application of the parol evidence rule, it must be
shown that “at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating
in the instrument or the relation established thereby. A beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui
obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the
contract and resist the application of the parol evidence rule(Heirs of Mario Pacres vs. Heirs of
Cecilia Ygona, G.R. No.174719, 5 May 2010)
(3) when the prior or contemporaneous agreement is independent from or not inconsistent with the
terms of a written agreement (Robles vs. Lizarraga Hermanos).
(4) where any of the exception to the parol evidence rule applies, in which case a party may present
parol evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement, if he puts in issue in
his pleadings the following:
(i) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement (Palanca vs.
Wilson & Co.,);
(ii) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties.(Enriquez vs. Ramos; Land Settlement Development Corporation vs.
Garcia);
(iii) the validity of the written agreement, i.e., contracts without consideration or where
consent is vitiated by duress, force and intimidation;
The operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written
agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such
agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when the contract may be void for lack of
consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being
absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the heirs of Alfonso are not
precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement(Heirs of Ureta vs. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No.165748, 14 September
2011)
(iv) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest
after the execution of the written agreement as when , as when the parties
subsequently modified the terms of their original agreement (Canuto vs. Mariano).
Where the adverse party fails to object on time, parol evidence may be admitted by the court to vary,
alter or modify the terms of a written agreement (Willex Plastic Industries Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals)
V. EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS, CONFESSIONS, COMPROMISES AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
Kinds of Admissions:
(a) Judicial Admission (Section 4, Rule 129)
(b) Extra-judicial admission (Section 26, Rule 130)
- Refers to an extra-judicial admission and the admission is against the interest of the
admitter. Thus, self-serving admission is not admissible.
- The rule on extra-judicial admission under Section 26, Rule 130 contemplates of a situation
where the declarant is not in court, but someone who had heard/seen the admission testifies
in court as to the admission made by the declarant. In otherwords, the declarant himself is
not the witness, because the moment the declarant comes forward and testifies and
reiterates in court his extra-judicial admission, then such admission becomes a judicial
admission.
- Since the witness is not the declarant himself, the testimony of such witness, insofar as the
admission made by the declarant is concerned, is necessarilly hearsay, considering that the
witness has no personal knowledge as to the truth or falsity of the admission and the
declarant who is not in the witness stand cannot be cross-examined by the party against
whom the admission is offered in evidence.
- But while an extra-judicial admission is necessarilly hearsay, under Section 26, Rule 130, the
same is admissible against the declarant. The reason why an admission - even if hearsay- is
admissible is that, the declarant is not expected to cross-examine himself. In otherwords, if
what makes an extra-judicial admission hearsay is the absence of oppurtunity of the party
against whom the admission is offered to cross-examine the person who made the extra-
judicial admission, then obviously such reason does not exist in case of an extra-judicial
admission since the person who made the adamission is the same person against whom the
admission is offered in evidence.(Estrada vs. Desierto)
- While the extra-judicial admission under Section 26, Rule 130 is not among those exceptions
to the hearsay rule enumerated under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130, the Supreme Court
categorically ruled in Estrada vs. Desierto that admission under Section 26, Rule 130 is an
exception to the hearsay evidence rule.
- While admission under Section 26, Rule 130 and Declaration Against Interest under Section
38, Rule 130 are both exceptions to hearsay evidence rule, they are distinct from each other.
- The “res inter alios acta rule” presupposes an extra-judicial admission, because the
declarant is not the one testifying in court, and therefore he cannot be cross-
examined by the party against whom the declaration is offered in evidence. It
contemplates of a situation where another person (witness) testifies in court as to the
act, declaration or omission made by a party outside of court. The witness is a person
who claims to have heard or known of the extra-judicial admission made by a party
(declarant). If the declarant himself takes the witness stand and reiterates in court his
extra-judicial admission that he made outside of court, his otherwise extra-judicial
admission becomes a judicial admission and, as such, it is admissible against another
party. The reason is obvious – that other party against whom the admission is offered
in evidence has the oppurtunity to cross-examine the declarant and, therefore, due
process is complied with.
(b) Similar Acts or Previous Conduct Rule (Res Inter Alios Acta Rule of the Second
Branch)
Statement of the rule - Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time.(Section 34, Rule 130)
Reason for the rule: Evidence of similar act s or occurences compels the defendant to
meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense,
raises a variety of relevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the
issues immediately before it. Hence, the evidentiary rule guards against practical
inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevent surprise
or other mischief prejudicial to litigants. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.126713,
27 July 1998).
While evidence of similar acts or previous conduct is inadmissible to prove that the
person did or did not do the same or similar conduct at another time, it is, however,
admissible to prove:
(i) specific intent;
(ii) knowledge;
(iii) identity;
(iv) plan;
(v) system;
(vi) scheme;
(vii) habit;
(viii) custom;
(ix) usage; and the like (Section 34, Rule 130)
General Rule: A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his own perception (Section 36, Rule 130)
The determination of whether an evidence is hearsay or not depends on the purpose for which the
evidence is offered:
a) Hearsay rule applies if evidence is for the purpose of proving the truth of the
assertion/declaration/statement or otherwise offered for hearsay purposes;
b) If the evidence is offered for non-hearsay purposes, regardless of the truth or falsity of the
assertion/declaration/statement, it is not hearsay and therefore admissible
Hence, in order to encourage the witness to do his best with respect to each of these factors, and to
expose inaccuracies which may enter in, the witness shall ideally be required to testify:
a) under oath;
b) in the personal presence of the trier of fact (demeanor evidence); and
c) under cross-examination.
The rule against the hearsay is designed to insure compliance with these ideal condtions and when
one of them is absent, the hearsay objection becomes pertinent.
The rule against hearsay evidence is to preserve the right of the parties to cross-examine the original
persons who have knowledge of the transaction or event.
EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY:
A) DYING DECLARATION (Section 38, Rule 130)
Reasons for admissibility (Pp vs Cerilla, G.R. No. 177147, 28 November 2007):
a) necessity – the declarant’s death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand
and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime.
Allowing admission of a dying declaration, therefore, prevents a failure of justice.
b) trustworthiness – no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation. Point of death is so solemn and awful equal to an oath.
Requisites:
(Pp vs Cerilla, G.R. No. 177147, 28 November 2007; People vs. Salafranca, G.R. No.173476,
22 February 2012; People vs. Dejillo, G.R. No.185005, 10 December 2012):
1) The declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death (not other person’s death), which refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but
also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it.
Thus, statements indicating deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the
reason or motive for the killing, justifying the killing, or indicating the absence of cause for
the act are admissible
2) At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death.
The rule is that, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entertained by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in
point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked at death as certainly impending.
But take note of the ratification doctrine, which states that “a statement made under
circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes
admissible as such if approved or repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all
hope of recovery.” In Pp vs Babiera (52 Phil 97), although the statement in itself is
inadmissible as an ante mortem declaration, in as much as there is nothing to show that at
the time he made it, Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of
death, nevertheless, after having ratified its contents a week later when he was near death
as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he made
ante mortem.
3) The declarant is competent as a witness.
Where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he surived, the
proferred declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declaration made by a child
too young to be a competent witness or by an insane incapable of understanding his own
statements are not admissible. However, the presumption is that, delcarant would have
been competent. (Geraldo and Ariate vs People, G.R. No. 173608, 20 November 2008)
4) The declaration must be offered in any case where the declarant’s death is the subject of
inquiry (Geraldo and Ariate vs People. G.R. No. 173608, 20 November 2008).
Note: The ruling in People vs Cerilla, where the Supreme Court held that the declaration
must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant is a victim, is of doubtful accuracy because Section 37, Rule 130 expressly
provides that dying declaration may be received in any case where the declarant’s death
is the subject of inquiry as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death.
Doctrine of Completeness in relation to dying declaration
(Pp vs De Joya, G.R. No. 75028, 8 November 1991)
- Under this doctrine, a dying declaration must be complete in itself. To be complete, it does
not mean that the declarant must recite everything; it is enough that it be a full expression of
all that the declarant intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
- Reason for the rule: since the declarant was prevented by death or other circumstance from
saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have qualified by the statements which
he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
Pedigree refers to relationship, family genealogoy, birth, marriage, death the date when and
place where these facts occured and names of relatives
Requisites:
1) The declarant must be dead or unable to testify
2) The pedigree is in issue or is relevant thereto
3) The person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or
marriage
4) The declaration must be made before the controversy, i.e. ante litem motam, not only before
commencement of suit, but before any controversy has arisen thereon
5) The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must
be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
This contemplates of a situation where the party claiming (claimant) seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
This applies where the subject of the declaration is the relationship (pedigree) of a
relative vis-a-vis another relative
Requisites:
(People vs. Alegrado)
(i) there must be a controversy in respect to pedigree of any of family members;
(ii) there must be a reputation or a tradition regarding the pedigree of such family member
which existed prior to the controversy;
(iii) the witness testifying as such reputation or tradition must be a member of the same
family as the person whose pedigree is in question.
It refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the
victim or spectator to a crime immediately before, during and after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occassion and there
was no oppurtunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement(People vs. Esoy, G.R. No.185894, 7 April 2010)
The spontaneous statement was made during the startling occurence, or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto. If the statement was not spontaneous, it is not
admissible as res gestae(Talidano vs. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services)
For this exception to apply, the declarant must himself be competent to testify had he
been presented in court, so that if the declarant made a statement not on his own
personal knowledge but based on what he heard from another, the testimony of the
witness who heard the statement uttered by the declarant is not admissible as part of
res gestae. (BAR 2011)
Failure to prove the existence of all the foregoing evidence renders the evidence inadmissible
under hearsay evidence rule (Patula vs. People, G.R. No.164457, 11 April 2012)
Requisites:
(i) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
(ii) such statement is contained in the list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
(iii) such compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation; and
(iv)it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
J. LEARNED TREATIES
Statement of the rule: a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of the matter stated therein.(Section
46, Rule 130)
Reason for the Exception: trustworthiness, it being based on the works of experts.
Published treatise, periodicals or pamphlets on the subject of history, law, science or art are
admissible if:
(i) the court takes judicial notice of them; or
(ii) a witness expert on the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the treatise,
periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.
Requisites:
(i) the witness/deponent is dead;
Tan vs. Court of Appeals
The Supreme Court ruled that subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the present
case or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify,
but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when
the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. Here, the witness in question
were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that prevented them is
cited.Certainly, they do not come within the purview of those “unable to testify”.
(ii) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests;
Manliclic vs. Calaunan
The TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses in the criminal case (who are now
unavailable to testify in the civil case) are not admissible , considering that the
employer was not a party to the criminal case and had no opportunity to cross-
examine these witnesses.
(iii) the former case involved the same subject matter as that in the present case, although on a
different cause of action;
(iv) the former case involved the same issue involved in the present case;
(v) the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness/deponent.
While not one of those enumerated under the Rules of Court as exceptions to hearsay
evidence rule, admission against interest under Section 26, Rule 130 was declared by the
Supreme Court as an exception to hearsay in the case of Estrada vs. Desierto.
M. HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASE (Sec 28, Rules in the Examination of Child
Witness)
Statement of the rule - A statement made by a child witness describing any act or attempted
act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, maybe admitted in
evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to the following rules:
(a) before such hearsay statement maybe admitted, its proponent shall make
known to the adverse party the intention to offer such statement and its
particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object.
(b) if the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party,
require the child to be present at the presentation of the hearsay
evidence/statement for cross-examination.
(c) if the child is unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the
proponent. But his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if corroborated
by other admissible evidence.
The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:
(i) is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be
exposed to severe psychological injury; or
(ii) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
General rule: the testimony of a witness must be given orally (Section 1, Rule 132).
Exceptions:(Section 1, Rule 132)
(i) when witness is incapacitated to speak;
(ii) when questions call for a different mode of answer;
(iii) where the rules allow testimony to be given in affidavit form (such as in cases governed by
the Rules on Summary Procedure)
QUALIFICATIONS OF A WITNESS:
(i) can perceive (observation acquired from personal knowledge)
(ii) and in perceiving, he can make known his perception to others (memory and
communication)
(iii) he must take an oath or affirmation
(iv) must not possess any of the disqualifications imposed by law or the rules.
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF A WITNESS:
(A) Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or insanity(Section 21, Rule 130)
A person incapable of making known his perception to others is disqualified as a witness,
provided the incapacity or insanity must exist at the time of his production for
examination.
Incapacity/insanity at the time of observation of the event that the witness is asked to
testify does not disqualify the witness from testifying so long as he is competent at the time
of his production as a witness, but it affects his credibility.
But under the Rules on the Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No.00-07-SC), every child
is presumed competent. Thus, the party who alleges the contrary must prove that the child
witness is disqualified by reason of his mental immaturity.
Requisites:
(i) must be legally married;
Alvarez vs. Ramirez
Even if the spouses are still legally married but their relationship is already strained,
the marital disqualification rule or spousal immunity does not apply, and therefore,
the wife may testify against his husband. The reason for this rule is that, when the
spouses are already estranged, there is no more domestic peace to preserve.
(ii) the witness-spouse could either be a party to the case or not, but the other spouse must
be a party;
(iii)the testimony may be for or against the party-spouse; and
(iv)the testimony is offered during the marriage, not before and not after its dissolution.
The marital disqualification rule or spousal immunity ceases upon dissolution of the
marriage either by death or other grounds.
(D) Disqualification by Reason of Death or Insanity, otherwise known as the “Dead Man
Statute” or “Survivorship Disqualification Rule” (Section 23, Rule 130)
Purpose of the rule:
(i) to avoid perjury, since the other party is already dead, the temptation on the party of the
surviving party to resort to falsehood is high;
(ii) to level playing field, as the dead party is no longer around to tell his own tale and
refute that of the surviving party.
Requisites:
(i) the defendant in the case is the executor, administrator or a representative of the deceased
or person of unsound mind;
Guererro vs. St. Claire Realty, et al.
The Dead Man Statute does not apply and, therefore, a witness may testify on a fact
which took place prior to the death of the deceased, considering that the defendants
in the case were sued in their personal and individual capacity as buyers of the lot in
question, and not as representatives of the deceased from whom they purchased the
subject lot.
(ii) the suit is upon a claim by the plaintiff against the estate of the deceased person or of
unsound mind.
Conversely, if the estate of the deceased person or the person of unsound mind is
the claimant or counter-claimant, the rule does not apply.
Tongco vs. Vianzon
Dead Man Statute or Survivorship Disqualification Rule does not apply, since the
plaintiff or claimant is the estate of the deceased husband as represented by the
executor and the case for recovery of property is filed against the widow.
Razon vs. IAC
Dead Man Statute or Survivorship Disqualification Rule does not apply, since the
plaintiff or claimant in the case is the estate of the deceased person and the case is
filed against the defendant to recover the shares of stocks belonging to the deceased
now being represented by his estate.
Goni vs. Court of Appeals
Dead Man Statute or Survivorship Disqualification Rule does not apply, because the
witness testified to substantiate the counterclaim of the estate of the deceased
against the plaintiff in the case. Thus, insofar as the counterclaim is concerned, the
estate of the deceased person is deemed to be the claimant, although it is the
defending party insofar as the complaint of the plaintiff is concerned.
(iii) the witness is the plaintiff or the assignor of that party-plaintiff, or a person in whose
behalf the case is prosecuted. If the witness is somebody else, the rule does not apply.
Guerrero vs. Saint Claire Realty
Dead Man Statute or Survivorship Disqualification rule does not apply, since the
witness is an ordinary witness, not the plaintiff nor the assignor of the plaintiff nor
the person in whose behalf the case is prosecuted.
Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf
Dead Man Statute or Survivorship Disqualification Rule does not apply, since the
plaintiff is a Corporation and the witness, although officer of the Corporation, is not
the plaintiff itself.
Privileged Communication:
(A) Marital Privilege Communication
Requisites:
(a) spouses must be legally married.
(b) the case involves communication, oral or written, made during the marriage.
(c) the communication was made confidentially.
Pp vs. Carlos
The letter of the wife addressed to the husband which was seized by the police was
held to be admissible in evidence, because a confidential information which fell to
the hands of a stranger, whether legally or illegally, ceases to be confidential.
Exceptions to the Marital Privilege Communication Rule:
(i) civil case by one against the other;
(ii) criminal case committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
ascendants/descendants.
Either under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court or under Article 215 of the
Family Code, testimonial privilege is not a “disqualification” rule but only a privilege
not to be compelled to testify as a witness. Thus, if the holder of the privilege wishes
to testify, the party against whom his testimony is offered in evidence cannot object.
Generally, evidence of a person’s character is not admissible (Section 51, Rule 130). Reason -
cases should be decided based on the acts or omissions complained of, and not on the character or
personalities of the parties involved.
Correlate this with the “Rape Shield Rule” under R.A. No.8505 otherwise known as “Rape
Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998”, which provides that “In prosecution for
rape, evidence of complainant’s past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her
reputation shall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds that such
evidence is material and relevant to the case”
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent to
the issue of character involved in the case.
(c) Evidence of good character of a witness:
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached (Section 14, Rule 132).
Reason – the good character of a witness is presumed.
X. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE:
(A) Order in the examination of an individual witness (Section 4, Rule 132):
(i) direct examination by the proponent;
(ii) cross-examination by the opponent;
(iii) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(iv) Re-cross examination by the proponent.
(B) Recalling a witness – after the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded,
the witness cannot be recalled without leave of court. The court will grant
or withhold leave as the interest of justice may require (Section 9, Rule
132).
(C) Objectionable questions:
(i) Leading question – a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examiner desires is not allowed (Section10, Rule 132).
Exceptions: A leading question maybe allowed-
(1) On cross-examination;
(2) On preliminary matters;
(3) when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answer from a witness
who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is feeble mind, or deaf-mute;
(4) of an unwilling or hostile witness;
(5) of an adverse party- witness.
(ii) Misleading question – a question which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by
the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated is not
allowed.
(D) Impeachment of adverse party’s witness (Section 11, Rule 132):
A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called by:
(i) contradictory evidence;
(ii) evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad; or
(iii) evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony.
A witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful act, except that the
witness may be proved to have been convicted of an offense by:
(i) by the examination of the witness regarding the fact of prior conviction; or
(ii) by the record of the court decision convicting him of an offense.
(E) Requisites for impeaching the witness of the adverse party by evidence of inconsistent
statement:
(i) the statement must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and the persons present;
(ii) the witness must be asked whether he made such statements;
(iii) and if admits that he did so, then he must be allowed to explain the inconsistency
between his prior statement and his present testimony(Section 13, Rule 132).
(F) A party may not impeach his own witness (Section 12, Rule 132).
Reason: by calling the witness to the stand, the proponent vouches to the credibility and
honesty of his witness.
Exceptions: (Section 12, Rule 132)
(i) if the witness is hostile or unwilling; or
(ii) if the witness is the adverse party or the officer, director, managing agent of a c
orporation or partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Exception:
As long as the evidence has been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and incorporated
in the records of the case, the evidence may still be considered by the court even if not formally
offered (Pp vs. Libnao).
Time to make a formal offer of evidence (Section 35, Rule 132) – the time to make a formal
offer depends on the kind of evidence being formally offered:
(1) If evidence consists of oral testimony of witnesses – the offer must be made at the time the witness
is called to testify.
Query: What is the effect if the witness was allowed to testify without the proponent
making a formal offer of the proposed testimony but the adverse party did
not also object thereto before the witness was able to testify and complete
his testimony?
Answer: The testimony is admissible as the adverse party was deemed to have waived
his right to the objection.
Concepcion Catuira vs. CA
Facts: Catuira was charged with two (2) counts of Estafa for issuing bouncing checks.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant who completed
her testimony without a formal offer having been made. As soon as the prosecution
rested its case, the accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the
testimony of the witness is inadmissible in evidence for lack of formal offer.
Ruling:
(i) The reason for requiring that evidence be formally offered is to enable the court
to rule intelligently on the objection to the questions asked.
(ii) As a general rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and
competency. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the
adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter may object to its
admission. But this is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the
objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence where there is
opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of the objection.
(iii) While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony
when private complainant was called to the witness stand, the accused waived this
procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground
for objection became reasonably manifest the moment with witness was called to
testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent.
(2) Object/documentary evidence – the formal offer must be made after the presentation of a party’s
testimonial evidence or witnesses.
Such offer must be done orally, unless allowed by the court to be made in writing.
Time to make objection (Section 36, Rule 132) – It depends on the kind of evidence being
objected to:
(1) If oral testimony:
(i) objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made
(Catuira vs. CA)
(ii)objection to question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become reasonably manifest.
(2) If object/documentary evidence:
(i) objection to object/documentary evidence offered orally shall be made immediately
after the offer is made;
(ii) objection to object/documentary evidence offered in writing shall be made three (3)
days after notice of the offer, unless a different period is allowed by the court.
Query: What is the effect if an inadmissible object/documentary evidence was not objected
to during its introduction, identification and marking but was objected to during the
formal offer? Does the failure to object during the introduction, identification and
marking constitute a waiver of the privilege to object resulting in the evidence
otherwise inadmissible becoming admissible.
Answer: The object/documentary evidence must be excluded (Macasiray vs. People of the
Philippines).
Reason: Since objection to object/documentary evidence must be made only after the offer is
made and not at any other time, no waiver of the privilege to object shall take place
by the failure to object when the object/documentary evidence was marked,
identified and introduced during the trial, obviously because it was not the proper
time to make objection.
Query: What must an adverse party do when it becomes reasonably apparent in the
course of the examination of a witness that the questions being propounded are of
the same class as those to which objection has been made, whether sustained or
overruled by the court?
Answer: It shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, but it is sufficient to record a
continuing objection to such class of questions (Section 37, Rule 132)
Query: May the court suspend the ruling by simply stating that the “objection is
noted” or that the objection “will be considered when the court resolves the case on
the merits”?
Answer: No, the reservation or holding in abeyance of a ruling on an objection is
disadvantageous and prejudicial to the party interposing the objection. Without the
definite ruling, the party objecting would be left in the dark as to what proper
course of action to take under the circumstances.
Query: What is the remedy of the proponent if his proposed evidence is excluded by
the court?
Answer: The proponent may resort to “Tender of Excluded Evidence” otherwise known as
“Offer of Proof” (Section 40, Rule 132) in the following manner:
(i) if the excluded evidence is object/documentary – by attaching it to making
it part of the records of the case;
(ii) if the excluded evidence is testimonial – by stating for the record the
name and other personal circumstances
of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony.
XII. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS:
For purposes of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
The following are Public Documents: (Section 19, Rule 132)
(i) written official acts or records of official acts of sovereign authorities, official
bodies/tribunals and public officers of the Philippines or foreign country;
(ii) documents acknowledged before a notary public, except wills and testament;
(iii) public records of private documents kept in the Philippines.
A Private Document is one not falling under any of the foregoing enumerations of public
documents.
Query: What needs to be corroborated by corpus delicti, the extra-judicial confession itself
or the testimony of the person who heard the extra-judicial confession?
Answer: What must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of
the person to whom the confession was made, and the corroborative evidence
required is not the testimony of another person who also heard the confession but
the evidence of corpus delicti (People vs. Lorenzo).
Query: Is it required that all elements of the crime charged must be established by
independent evidence apart from the extrajudicial confession?
Answer: Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that every element of the
crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the
confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the
confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the
confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient o justify a conviction independently
of such confession. In other words, the other evidence need not , independently of
the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt (People vs.
Lorenzo).