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G.R. No.

192896 July 24, 2013

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Incumbent President, GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated September 10, 2009 and Resolution3 dated
July 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying and setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the
Resolution4 dated April 28, 2004 of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COS LAP Case No. 99-500. The
fallo of the assailed COS LAP Resolution reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square meters, now being occupied by the members of the Dream Village
Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be outside of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property.

2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said association are advised to apply for sales patent on their respective
occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau, DENR-NCR, pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.

3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process the sales patent application of complainants pursuant to existing
laws and regulation.

4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the respondents.

SO ORDERED.5

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been
occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively
and notoriously."6 The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered
under a Torrens title,7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal.8 Maricaban covered several parcels of land with a total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay,
and Parañaque.9

Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America (USA) early in the American colonial period,
to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in
the name of the USA to cancel OCT No. 291. 10 The US government later transferred 30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad
Company, for which TCT No. 192 was cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the name of the Manila Railroad Company for
30 has., and the second in the name of the USA for the rest of the Maricaban property. 11

On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1688, and later that year, on September 15, 1914, TCT
No. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 2288, both times in the name of the USA. 12 On December 6, 1956, the USA formally
ceded Fort William Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. 61524, this time in the name of the Republic. 13 On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio,
and reserving them for military purposes. 14

On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable
and disposable15 in the manner provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274 and 730, in relation to the Public Land Act, 16 thus allowing
the sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. 17

On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots
1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition.18
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed19 creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and
accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Section
820 of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9) military
camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus, expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell
the above lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties," 21 specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred
to the BCDA for this purpose,22 and TCT No. 61524 was cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460,
23889, 23890, and 23891, now in the name of the BCDA. 23

Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the National Capital Region (NCR) Security
Brigade, Philippine Army officers’ housing area, and Philippine National Police jails and support services (presently known as Camp
Bagong Diwa); b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the
NCR and respective security units; c) twenty one (21) areas segregated by various presidential proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15
has. as relocation site for families to be affected by the construction of Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that the
boundaries and technical description of these exempt areas shall be determined by an actual ground survey. 24

Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition,
resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents, 25 on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to
seek its assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298
and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept
of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several years," and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and
introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those
transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land
Management Bureau (LMB).

On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended Petition 26 in the COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought
were:

d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable laws;

e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
which is presently being occupied by herein petitioner as within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside the claim
of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVESION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the application of the ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of their
respective lots under the provisions of Acts Nos. 274 and 730. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned the jurisdiction of the COSLAP to hear Dream Village’s
complaint, while asserting its title to the subject property pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that under Executive Order (E.O.) No.
561 which created the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement
of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a
pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire, or a government reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government
property which cannot be the subject of a petition for classification, release or subdivision by the occupants of Dream Village.

In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it called a mediation conference on March 22, 2001, during which
the parties agreed to have a relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP wrote to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office-NCR requesting
the survey, which would also include Swo-00-0001302, covering the adjacent AFP-RSBS Industrial Park established by Proclamation
No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as well as the abandoned Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road).30

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty.
Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:

3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and
inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area actually is
outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring supplied)

COSLAP Ruling
On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly,
outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales
patent, noting that in view of the length of time that they "have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property
in the concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274
and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act." 32

On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP cited the likelihood that the summary eviction by the BCDA of more
than 2,000 families in Dream Village could stir up serious social unrest, and maintained that Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it
to "assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the
large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action," even as Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No. 561 also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for classification, release
and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream Village. Rationalizing that it was created
precisely to provide a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems "in general," the COSLAP invoked as
its authority the 1990 case of Bañaga v. COSLAP, 33 where this Court said:

It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of cases which are "critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action." However, the use of the word "may" does not mean that the COSLAP’s jurisdiction
is merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive Order are clear that the COSLAP was created
as a means of providing a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently
the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished
PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No.
832) were all assumed by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision, being enacted only on September 21, 1979,
cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial Committee of Koronadal on September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect
the decision of the COSLAP which merely affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction.34

In its Motion for Reconsideration35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA questioned the validity of the survey results since it was conducted
without its representatives present, at the same time denying that it received a notification of the DENR verification survey.36 It
maintained that there is no basis for the COSLAP’s finding that the members of Dream Village were in open, continuous, and adverse
possession in the concept of owner, because not only is the property not among those declared alienable and disposable, but it is a
titled patrimonial property of the State. 37

In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDA’s Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that it had due notice of the
verification survey, while also noting that although the BCDA wanted to postpone the verification survey due to its tight schedule, it
actually stalled the survey when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to ensure its presence.

CA Ruling

On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the land’s
history of private ownership and because it is registered under an indefeasible Torrens title 40; that Proclamation No. 172 covers only
Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302,
which also belongs to the BCDA 41; that the COSLAP resolution is based on an erroneous DENR report stating that Dream Village is
outside of BCDA, because Lots 10, 11, and portion of Lot 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the DA42; that the COSLAP was not justified
in ignoring BCDA’s request to postpone the survey to the succeeding year because the presence of its representatives in such an
important verification survey was indispensable for the impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving a highly volatile situation43; that the
COSLAP is a mere coordinating administrative agency with limited jurisdiction 44; and, that the present case is not among those
enumerated in Section 3 of E.O. No. 56145.

The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 provides that it may assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes in "other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude," 46 and the present case is one such problem.

The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the complaint because the question
of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to
determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency,
the BCDA, in contrast to the case of Bañaga relied upon by Dream Village, where the disputed land was part of the public domain and
the disputants were applicants for sales patent thereto.

Dream Village’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate court’s Order48 of July 13, 2010.

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court


On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village interposes the following issues:

IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500, THE HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE IN A
MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT;

THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES HEREIN.49

The Court’s Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.

That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v.
BCDA,50 it was categorically ruled as follows:

First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The c ase of
Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then
Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort
Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim
of ownership or interest in them.51

The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different from the controversy below. There, 20,000
families were long-time residents occupying 98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the
demolition of their houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court
found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of the Republic, which title was in turn cancelled
on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The Court ruled
that the BCDA’s aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled
in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDA’s takeover and management of the
subject lots.52

Dream Village sits on the


abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to delimit the boundaries of the areas
excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423:

Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved

1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986

2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 198753

However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 thereof are inside the area segregated
for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under Proclamation No. 208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 as available for
disposition. For this reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2 of
Swo-13-000298 are declared alienable and disposable. 54

The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10,
11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x x x Dream Village is outside Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13,
SWO-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters. The area is actually is [sic] outside SWO-00-0001302 of
BCDA."55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside of BCDA, completely oblivious that the BCDA
holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio, even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the
abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-
13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the
proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into the Libingan ng
mga Bayani. Dream Village has not disputed this assertion.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the
southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots
would then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d)
of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere
claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south,56making
them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.

While property of the State or any


of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of public dominion and what is patrimonial property:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic,57 it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro
Manila

became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA
law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in
Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of na tional
wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now
alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA
law that they become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion: 58

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." 59

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is
provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable
and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be property of public dominion. 60

Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former Maricaban have been legally disposed to settlers,
besides those segregated for public or government use. Proclamation No. 1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan,
Taguig to serve the needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila; Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by Proclamation No. 172
(1987), declared more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and
disposable; Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo, West
Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open for disposition.

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State, because although declared
alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the
conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. 61Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by
Dream Village has not even begun to run.

Ownership of a land registered


under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.

Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDA’s claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned right-
of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have already established that these lots have not been
declared alienable and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.

Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 62 Section 47 of
P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And, although the registered landowner may still lose his
right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches, 63 nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved laches,
which has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is
based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a
valid claim.64

The subject property having been


expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.

BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream Village’s complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled
that questions as to the physical identity of Dream Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or whether
Proclamation No. 172 has released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are "manifestly beyond the scope of the
COSLAP’s jurisdiction vis-á-vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561,"65 rendering its Resolution a patent nullity and its
pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP’s duty would have been to refer the conflict to
another tribunal or agency of government in view of the serious ramifications of the disputed claims:

In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. It would have been more prudent
if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at
bar. As it is, the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements
contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect."66 (Citation omitted)

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which unfortunately for
Dream Village does not encompass the present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title to Fort
Bonifacio has been transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the
COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over public lands not reserved
or declared for a public use or purpose.

On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to
expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers, streamline and short en
administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other solutions. 67 E.O. No. 305,
issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other
lands of the public domain,68 as well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve
expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve
problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain." 69

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its functions and duties. Section 2 thereof even granted
it quasi judicial functions, to wit:

Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. – The PACLAP shall have the following functions and duties:

1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government agencies and agencies involved in
land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural
minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having
jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon
shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein
involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof;

xxxx

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial
level, if possible. (Underscoring supplied)

On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created the COSLAP to be a more effective administrative body to
provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural
minorities to avoid social unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No. 561 now specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP
can exercise its adjudicatory functions:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement
of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural
minorities of the expense and time consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes
which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

xxxx
Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the seriousness and urgency of the reliefs sought in its
Amended Petition, Dream Village insists that the COSLAP was justified in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in
Longino v. Atty. General,71 it was held that as an administrative agency, COSLAP’s jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically mentioned
in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme Court said:

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically
granted to them by the enabling statutes. x x x.

xxxx

Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the
matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of
the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action.
In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest
jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. 72 (Citation omitted)

The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among them Davao New Town Development Corp. v.
COSLAP,73 Barranco v. COSLAP,74 NHA v. COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino,76 Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan,77 Machado v. Gatdula,78 and
Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo.79

Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 to assume jurisdiction over "other similar
land problems of grave urgency," since the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically
mentioned.80 Following this rule, COSLAP’s jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary
or regulatory interest,81 or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreements, a
timber concessions, or a reservation grants, 82 and where moreover, the dispute is between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; and between
occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.

In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National Railways. The high court rejected COSLAP’s jurisdiction,
noting that the disputed lot is not public land, and neither party was a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation
grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature so
as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. 83

In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws, since "the grant of exclusive and primary
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes
properly cognizable by the DAR."84 Thus, instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred private
respondents’ complaint to the DAR or DARAB. According to the Court:

The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer
upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which
the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Bañaga involved parties with conflicting free patent
applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the
DAR.85

In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private property.1âwphi1 The Supreme court ruled that
COSLAP may resolve only land disputes "involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license
from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant." 86

In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between two local government units, that its decision is
an utter nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void, and all acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.87

In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes involving the ownership of private lands, or those
already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative agencies."88
In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over controversies relating to ownership and possession of private
lands, and thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was held not fatal
to the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy remained available despite the lapse of the period
to appeal from the void COSLAP decision. 89

In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over private lands between private parties, reiterating the
essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can
assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case
to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to
refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties
to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons
and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction
over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to
those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions, or reservation grants.90 (Citations omitted)

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for "interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and
trespassing" over a private parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties were estopped to question COSLAP’s jurisdiction since they
participated actively in the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint that the case actually involved a claim of title
and possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph
2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was there social
tension or unrest present or emergent. 91

In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Bañaga to assert its jurisdiction. There, Guillermo Bañaga had filed a free patent application
with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30 has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent application for the
same property. The opposing claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved by the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it
conduct an investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to exercise jurisdiction over the controversy. The high court
sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but
includes land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.

But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases aforecited, the land dispute in Bañaga was between pri vate
individuals who were free patent applicants over unregistered public lands. In contrast, the present petition involves land titled to and
managed by a government agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose other than for settlement.
Thus, as we have advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem, but it has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3621)

VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,


vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3622)


JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3623)

DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,


vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.

Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623.1

On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. 2

In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands,
described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land
from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in
interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the
fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that
during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that
after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places,
after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in
paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal,
having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their
deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and
Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their
predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural
products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed;
that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed
and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said
lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them.

In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio
of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that
this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that
Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial;
that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and
possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had
openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively
the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894,
and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered
their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and
plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were
enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their
agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old
bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a
result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been
fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration,
now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio
Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.

The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735
had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the
municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of
8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No.
7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations,
which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered
in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on
July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa
Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration
Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March
7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because
the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, tec hnical
descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned
in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning
because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1
appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries
and technical description appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been
notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence,
the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were
filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and
even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over
their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the
year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and
void.3

The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or
parcels, of land described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration,
dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning wit h
respect to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null
and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and b ased on,
Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared valid, to
reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may
be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey
the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants,
their lawyers, their agents and representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of
these cases.

The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.

Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by
publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other
defendants were all declared in default.

On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court on July 20, 1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints.
The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.

On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955
denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26, 1955.

On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant,
among others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains special and
affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-
4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their
complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action;
(4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the
three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in
accordance with law, and the requirements for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant
prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as therein specified.

The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints
were admitted by the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its
answers to the original complaints as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints
consist merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs.4

On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the
cases upon grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a prior judgment; and
(3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the
third ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant
to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the
third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss. 5

After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants
as follows:

A — Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever;

B — Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void
from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;

C — Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the
Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;

D — Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels
of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;

E — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-
40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");

F — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187 (Exh.
"UU" and Exh. 'VV");

G — Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh.
"VV");
H — Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;

I — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;.

J — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; .

K — Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .

L — The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit." 6

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial
was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on
February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or
authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8

Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the following errors:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree
No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:

(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;

(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the Official
Gazette;

(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;

(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.

II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that, therefore,
said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.

III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.

IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss
filed on said grounds.

V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said
ground.

VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.

VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.

VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.

IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these
suits.

As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681
resulting in the issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their
respective complaints...."
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and
void ab initio, having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC
No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because
the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section
41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are
likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parc els of land
described in their respective complaints.

We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and
We find that the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this Court.

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land,
mentioned in said title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and
Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in
Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case
No. 3622 having an aggregate area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No.
3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1. 9 The trial court, in its decision,
states that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit
that the parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 10 It is shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six
parcels of lands involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).

The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta
Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz,
filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey
plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037
square meters. The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land,
docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and
the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the
Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default
against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del
Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23).
November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its
opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads
existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made
subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29,
1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others,
stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain
areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of
the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which
were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree
in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands
that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the
adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided
portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth
(1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.

In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration, on January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1
in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan.

On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of
December 29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz
and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and
ordering that the land applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance
with the decision and the amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the
registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that
the decree of registration be based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land
Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431
was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7,
1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended.
It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters
over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were
published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a
decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and in the notice of
hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in the
aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.

Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names
of the applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio
Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).

1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.

The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio because, according to said court, that title was based
on Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision
of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.

As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate,
and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous lots,
and most of those lots had sold to numerous parties — Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa
Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual and entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the
National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and
others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to
the purchasers of the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original
Certificate of No. 735.

The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire
area included in Parcel 1 — which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire
area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an
area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only
495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over
two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title
No. 785, without any qualification.

The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the
registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended
and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official
Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the cour t to hear and
decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration
Act).

We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in
LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration
when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time
order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be
made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists
in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as
published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all
persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over
the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would
be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is
infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a
portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not
necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.14

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC
No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another
registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended
plan included lands or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the
Survey Division informed the court that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court
of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmendaronlos planos unidos a los mismos
para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.

xxx xxx xxx

POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:

"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales ...."15

On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which
the report We read the following:.

Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pas ado,
el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar:

1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients No. 7680 y a la
1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno
alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales. 16

And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report
of the Chief of the Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied for by the
applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in
LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application
that had been published in the Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order
to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order
the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based.

Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial
court had declared null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña
(59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acuña and others) precisely
upon the ground that during the registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the
original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that
the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in
this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of
recovering from Pascual Acuña and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of
Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that
the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate,
referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of
Rizal. This property was then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8,
1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Or Certificate of Title No. 735. 17The appellants precisely sought to
nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as now
urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the
Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication
of the amended plan, this Court said:

Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void,
and in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for the
amendment of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was without
jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine
Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in the
case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additional land, different from that included in the original survey is
intended to be brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of certain
portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear
that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had been usurped. 18
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña, supra, is not applicable to the three
cases now before this Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel
1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action
was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from
Pascual Acuña and others "certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and
Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte." 19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court
in that case that is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to inc lude land not
previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
registration court to order the registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this
Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before this Court.

The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in
the Decree of Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said parcel is "bigger"
than the area stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree
are not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this
point of the lower court's decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies bet ween the
description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to
render a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a
republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction
upon the Court."20

Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the
application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference
of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the
amended plan there is this increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration
Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey
Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel
1 did not include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance with the order of the
registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno
que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido
estudio de los planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square
meters was already included in the original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate;
and the error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared. We made a careful study and
comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description appearing
in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this
seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made, the
distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter
and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and
to the nearest minute only".21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the
lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official
Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that
this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of
the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.

Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area
of Parcel 1. The appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within the parcels that
they are claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and
was added to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary
in order that the registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square meters
was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation
is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that person had been
deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other
hand, there is the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan
of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by
the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court
to order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan. 22

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the
registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and
described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original
application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far — but
only in so far — as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the
decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title
had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it
concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.23

And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of
27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate
of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not
declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in
declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters
but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The
trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever",
without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that
covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And
not only that. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and
for value by the holder of those transfer certificates of title.

It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about
49.5 hectares), whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must
also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been
acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate
of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer
certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons,
both natural and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens
title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is
so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in
these cases.

Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void is t hat the
description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of hearing of the
original application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of registration,
according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey
plan should have been republished; and because there was no such republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue
the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid
stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its
southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record.

In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:

Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties
of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del
Norte and the Roman Catholic Church.

As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:

PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the
SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock
& Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic Church ...

It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing
that was published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there appear some
differences in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears
that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3,
properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of
registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of
the records, We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of hearing that was
published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at
its southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We find that
parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact
parcels of land that are owned, and had been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680.
This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and
1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration
that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.,
instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No.
17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than those very
parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.

In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery,
while in the decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words "C. W.
Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the
surveyor, who prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time
of the original Survey was already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply
mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the
original survey took place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was decided on March
7, 1914.

Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court."
Evidently, the Court of Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took
into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation
of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original
plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the
correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the
decision of the land registration court was rendered.

In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:

We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of
registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all
plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been
permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in
the certificate of title may be corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved
surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical
descriptions would lead to chaos.

We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are
on the northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from
the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations,
of the lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What
matters is that the lots claimed by the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion
of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No.
17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of
the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained
in the records of these cases.

The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A.
Bonifacio road" and then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the registrat ion
proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded t he
ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding
of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted
as their evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26)
and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West
are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower
court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are
mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part
of the evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating
Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from
the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the
Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic
Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which
form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the
west and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
This finding of the lower court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in
all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original,
as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been
fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the Province of Rizal."24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant
admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate)
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the
parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735. 26The lower court itself, at the earlier part of its
decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623 are found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735"27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel
1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the appellees
asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the
appellees west of this road had never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings and rulings of the
lower court that are patently erroneous.

2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of
registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the
lower court said:

During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and exami ne the
`ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be
Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title,
which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land described in the decree. The sheet containing
the bulk of the description of the lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on
Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land
Registration Law have not been complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of
the Decree and the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... 28

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of
such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act
numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province or
city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book" in
which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this
book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....

The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It
shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability,
it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined
by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.

Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided
in Section forty-one, the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides
that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.

This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by
the register of deeds in the registry. 29

The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office
of the register of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50). 30 We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the
original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.

On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree of
registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree
was received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant
to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court.
The names of the declared owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands covered
by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by
the title are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear
on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the
decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions appearing
on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of
registration.

We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first
page, of this title, as a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is the last
part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the
first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of
the title, is the basis of the lower court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in accordance
with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the
lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40
of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have also noted — and this fact is undenied — that the technical descriptions of Parcels
1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for
a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration
Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not
found on the face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We
agree with the lower court that the transcription of the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or
on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
should not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing
the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of
title contains the full transcription of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated
in the original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied
its construction in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41
of Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed
liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of
Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the
registration book would render null and void the original certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the i nvalidity of a
certificate of title would depend on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds,
or an employee in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision
of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an original
certificate of title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not
promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a
given landed property31; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof
of such title32; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title33; and to decree that land title shall be final,
irrevocable and
indisputable.34

We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render
null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the
lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens
System of registration.

3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever. 35

In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No.
735. We have found that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was based the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land
Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for
registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de
la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of
land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The
records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it that no land which was
not included in the original survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings.
We have found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land
Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of
Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the three cases
now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496,
and that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate of title, what is left
for this Court to decide is whether or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.

Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to recover the ownership and
possession of the six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish their objective
through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of
the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure
the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to
them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that
they claim; and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants named in their
complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim.

It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they
claim.

It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of
another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take
place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful
registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered property in
good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the
person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name. 36

The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration were null and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initioand of no effect. The trial court even
went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R.
Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared
the appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court,
upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any statement, or observation, regarding the status or
situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the
six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.

In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in
annulling Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the six
parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.

But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have
held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular
and that said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registrati on issued
pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing
judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now before
Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition
for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.

Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.37

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an applicants for registration, namely,
Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la
Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the
original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal the parties named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason
y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named
in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants
did not appear, and so they were all declared in default. 38 It had to happen that way because as of the time when the three complaints
were filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already
passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision
lots.

The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason
Entail) which became involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the pendency of the case the properties
of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized,
directed and ordered to execute, upon payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and
assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an order dated
June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the
case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom.40

The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
31997 — which was formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 — clearly indicate that said corporation acquired
its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the
same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c
and 37).

The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the
record that would sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators
of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted,
operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons
or group of persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and interests. Besides,
as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently
approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for
a valuable consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the ti tle that it
transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
also a purchaser in good faith and for value — even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same
Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.

Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant
bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors
in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the
lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an ar ea of
some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land
and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in their names.
Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that
at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili).41 These annotations simply reveal
that when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were
already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising,
and asserting, its proprietary rights over the lands in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 42This is borne
by the statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where these three were pending, as follows:

3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for
sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of
preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment
against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would
annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded
to the Court that the area on which their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by defendant
J. M. & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on which the
house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the Court
requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever damages he may
suffer by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained
of. 43

Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession
at all, would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8,
1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original
certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title
of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June
15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.

It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason
(Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial
receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith.

The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, including the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had purchased the
subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the
transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of
these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these
circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of
Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the
parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in
question, and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision
of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision
of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law. 44 The decision of the lower court would set at
naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for
value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. 45

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three cases now before this Court must fail..

It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which includes the six parcels that are
claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees — or any person, for that matter — had not filed
a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have
adverted to, that decree of registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the
present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be entertained. 46 Neither may the action of the appellees
for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had already prescribed, barred by laches, considering
that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were filed only on
May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land
claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original
registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the
hands parties who were innocent purchase for value. This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was
part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was
issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a
subdivision. Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title
covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., much less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are claimed by the
appellees.47

Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that sai d
appellant is not one of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
— even supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding the validity and ineffectiveness of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the resolution
of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.

(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of
Land Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court
upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796),
where this Court declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming,
either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of title.

We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court in that former case are of
decisive application to these three cases.

On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin,
Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs
of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be
noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original
plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and
Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that
they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint — Jose Alcantara claiming
two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint48 that
each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession
of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use
of armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been
enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the
date of their original certificate of title showed that said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels,
that plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No.
735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned by the
plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of
the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable consideration,
the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled
and the corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:

The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels
are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and continuous possession
and enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants
obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors
had been enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the
removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the
lands in their title, in violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really are
arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against the lawful holder,
especially without formal notice, because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the defendants since the
issuance of their title shows that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it states no of action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained
this motion on the second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but with
new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in the registration proceeding s which
culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed
plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended complaint was denied admission, and the motion
for the reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the appeal.

In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:

Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that
the dismissal of the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and
amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of
registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not
aware, of the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and
that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land
during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served
with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants'
title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The
supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely
by the registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the
registration proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue on the land after registration can not
serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute
possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act).

Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acuña case, supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration
proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree of registration,
in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In
other words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili,
and their successors-in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of
ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.

But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over portions of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case
No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa
Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch)
which are now before this Court on appeal.

In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases had been amended so as to include as
parties plaintiffs all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each
case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil
Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the
complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended
to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint and the common
predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.

In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the
principal ground "that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its
motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action
of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, howev er, denied
the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses
the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another
motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs
had not presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the lower court.49

In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to
the action in these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of action, between
Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.

It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases
on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 50

Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?

In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego
vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).

We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have to determine is whether
between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128
and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order
dated December 18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in them cases
Nos. 3621, 8622 and
3623. 51

We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156
and the decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact
that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were
claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous possession from time immemorial, and
that said lands were wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar,
plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which
they were absolute owners and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that
their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case
No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs. 52 It appears clear to Us that
in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession
of the same parcels of land.

As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand,
and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only
Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were
Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all
surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason
family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case
No. Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find,
however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.

After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who
are the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128),
and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the
considered view that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.

In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended
complaint it was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa
Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when
Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias
Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by
his heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose A.
Alcantara.

In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili
and Pascual Pili had two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their heirs.
Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1)
the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.

It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156;
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156;
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.

It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits
that was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter
and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it
appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff
in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case
No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same
persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to
his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No.
3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623.53

We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.

It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the
complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their
claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso
Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in
their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.

When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that
they were the owners of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and had been
in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido
Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara,
Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso
Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.

Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the
time when the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Registration, which culminated in
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The
records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had filed any opposition to the application for registration in
said LRC 7681, nor did any one of them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that
was issued in said LRC No. 7681.

It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156
should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3621 do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based
on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest — in Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in
interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No.
3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon
the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his
predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest
who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156),
which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to
recover the ownership and possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause
of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any
land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido
Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, which took place on July 8, 1914.

And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and
Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 — the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still the ruling of this
Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the
registration court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these
three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara,
Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127
(Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case
No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest
of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129
(Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case
No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).

(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960) 55, where Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against
J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by
a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio Santiago
had since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when his two
children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of their
predecessor that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children who, together
with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her
co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No.
Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which
they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had
already become
final57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and
possession of the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that
even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate
of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the
registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never
brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application and publication in
the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the
land which included their parcel of land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of their
complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to
desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the
land claimed by them may be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only those lands included in
the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina
Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.

This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs.58Regarding the
contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-
5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title
from the defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:

We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other
heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were
not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority
for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a
previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented in
such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the present case. On the
other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property owned in common.

xxx xxx xxx

But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property
(S.C.G.R. No.
L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in
favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con
el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to
herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.

If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants
herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of action of their
complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must
necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights.

It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not
considered privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this Court
nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex
A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composision con el estado, and
it did not establish the right of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had
based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing
against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even
if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No.
Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil
Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the
plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this
Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and
conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.

Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings
which resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:

(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration
of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration
proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the
ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were
summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims
and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the
certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition,
there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and
very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree
nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed
by them, this Court held:

It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription
was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by
the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred
no title because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).

Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No.
735 which was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are many
other cases where this Court has made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 60

In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court
also erred when it declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them, in these three
cases.61

We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against
the appellees 62, considering, as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay damages in any
form. 63 We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action
against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected
with the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623,
appealed from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169397 March 13, 2007


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RESTITUTO SARMIENTO, represented by his attorney-in-fact, MAGDALENO SARMIENTO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Restituto Sarmiento (respondent) through his brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento (Magdaleno) filed on November 29, 2000
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig, Metro Manila an application for registration 1of a parcel of land, delineated as Lot
535-D under Approved Survey Plan Swo-13-000465 with a total land area of 2,664 square meters and located at Barangay Wawa,
Taguig, Metro Manila (the lot).

Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation under a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob2 dated July 16, 1988 executed by
his father, Placido Sarmiento (Placido), which lot formed part of Lot 535 that was allegedly inherited by Placido from Florentina
Sarmiento (Florentina).

Respondent further claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.3

Together with his application for registration, respondent submitted the following documents:

1. Blueprint copy of the Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13-000465 of Lot 535 as surveyed for Magdaleno Sarmiento, et al; 4

2. Photocopy of Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate;5

3. Technical Description of Lot 535-D;6

4. Owner’s Copy of Tax Declaration No. EL-009-01681 in the name of Restituto A. Sarmiento;7

5. Photocopy of the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988;8 and

6. Special Power of Attorney executed by Restituto Sarmiento appointing Magdaleno Sarmiento as his attorney-in-fact.9

On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor of Taguig who was deputized to assist in the case, filed, as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), an Opposition 10 to respondent’s application for registration. Contending that (1) neither
the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended
by Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1073; 11 (2) respondent’s muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax payment receipts do not
appear to be genuine and do not anyway constitute competent and sufficient evidence of his bona fide acquisition of the lot i n the
concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant
can no longer be availed of by respondent as he failed to file an appropriate application for registration within six months from February
16, 1976, as required under P.D. No. 892;12 and (4) the lot is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
hence, not subject to private appropriation.

At the initial hearing of the application on April 4, 2001, respondent offered and marked in evidence documents proving compliance with
jurisdictional requirements, following which the MeTC issued an order of general default against the whole world, except agai nst the
government.13

After the conclusion of the testimonies of respondent’s brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno14 and adjoining lot owner Rodolfo Sta.
Ana,15 the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through the Assistant Regional Director for Legal Services and
Public Affairs, filed its Report16 dated April 16, 2001 reiterating respondent’s claims as set forth in his application for registration.

The Land Registration Authority, through the Director of the Department of Registration, also filed a report with the MeTC wi th the
information that it was not in a position to verify whether the lot was already covered by a land patent or a previously approved isolated
survey.17
Respondent’s formal offer of evidence18 did not merit comment/opposition from petitioner which in fact waived the presentation of
evidence for the government.19

By Decision20 of May 27, 2002, the MeTC granted respondent’s application for registration. Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the allegations in the application to have been sufficiently established by the applicant’s
evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Betty Sarmiento
and a resident of No. 11, Guerrero Street, Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila over the subject parcel of agricultural land known as Lot 535-
D, MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping under Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13-000465 situated at Barangay Wawa,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, consisting of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters and hereby order the
registration thereof in his name.

After the finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on the said lot, let an order for the issuance of
decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.21

In granting respondent’s application, the MeTC found that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, viz:

The subject lot was a portion of the parcel of land previously declared for taxation purposes in the name of its original owner Florentina
Sarmiento under Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 4995 (Exhibit "N"). Upon the death of Florentina Sarmiento, a portion of said land was
inherited by Placido Sarmiento, the father of the herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, while the other portion went to Placido’s [s]ister
Teodora Sarmiento. On July 16, 1988, Placido Sarmiento transferred the portion of the parcel of land inherited by him from Florentina
Sarmiento to his children, namely: herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Magdaleno Sarmiento and Conigunda Sarmiento by virtue of
a deed denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob" (Exhibits "O" and "O-5"). (TSN, June 16, 2001).

On April 24 and June 25, 1998, Magdaleno Sarmiento, among others, caused the survey of the entire area of the parcel of land x x x
According to the said plan, the said survey is inside alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry (Exhibit "K-2", supra).

The said property was being planted to rice, watermelons, and other vegetables by Florentina Sarmiento and her successors-in-interest
themselves and by their hired helpers for about fifty years (50) years already. It is not tenanted and there are no other persons having
a claim over the said property since the Japanese occupation. The said parcel of land is about two (2) kilometers away from the Laguna
Lake but it gets flooded for about two (2) months during the rainy season and sometimes up to three (3) months if the town proper
(poblacion) of Taguig is itself underwater. (TSN, June 6, 2001). x x x

Applicant Restituto Sarmiento and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject parcel of land continuously,
uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years now. x x x22

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, faulting the MeTC for granting the application despite respondent’s failure to comply with
the mandatory requirement of submitting the original tracing cloth plan in evidence. 23Petitioner advanced that according to the survey
of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), the lot is located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, hence, a
part of the Laguna Lake bed which is incapable of private appropriation. 24

By Decision25 of May 20, 2005, the appellate court held that as the lot was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of the plan and
the technical description, the presentation of the original tracing cloth ceased to become indispensable for the grant of the application.26

The appellate court further held that petitioner’s claim that the lot forms part of the Laguna Lake bed cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal, and even assuming that it was properly raised, the purported ground survey of the LLDA had no probative value since it was
not a certified original copy.27

The appellate court thus affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution28 of August 19, 2005, petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and
it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law. 29
While respondent did not state in his application the statutory basis of his application, it can reasonably be inferred that he seeks the
judicial confirmation or legalization of his imperfect or incomplete title over the lot 30 which he claims to be a riceland.

Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of the means by which public agricultural lands may be
disposed.31

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, 32 provides:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Under the above-quoted provision, an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove that (a) the land forms part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 33

To support its contention that the lot does not form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, petitioner submitted
before the appellate court the technical survey data and topographic map of the LLDA showing that the lot is situated below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters. Since that was the first time petitioner raised the issue, the appellate court correctly glossed
over it, for offending basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.34 In any event, an examination of what purports to be the technical
survey data of the LLDA shows that it is not a certified original copy but a mere photocopy, the veracity and genuineness of which
cannot be ascertained by this Court.

The absence or weakness of the evidence for petitioner notwithstanding, respondent still bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the lot he seeks to register forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the public domain. 35

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center
which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-
B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Menguito v. Republic36 teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the
printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. 37 (Citations omitted; Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

But even assuming that respondent has proven that the lot is alienable, his application would still be denied for failure to comply with
the period of possession requirement.

Originally, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act required applicants to have been in possession and occupation of lands applied for
since July 26, 1894. The law was later amended by Republic Act (RA) 1942 38 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period.39 RA 1942 has, however, already been amended by P.D. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, which requires applicants to
have been in possession and occupation of the lands applied for since June 12, 1945.1avvphi1

At the time respondent filed his application on November 29, 2000, he had only been in possession of the lot for more than 12 years,
following his acquisition of ownership thereof from Placido by Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob40dated July 16, 1988. Respondent seeks to
tack his possession with that of his predecessors-in-interest, however.

From respondent’s evidence, his grandmother Florentina (from whom his father allegedly inherited the lot which was in turn donated to
him) registered the lot for estate tax purposes in 1948. 41

From an examination of this 1948 tax declaration, photocopy of which was marked as Exhibit "N" 42 by respondent, not only does it bear
no number or the number is illegible; the area of the "palayero" (riceland) cannot be determined as what is entered under the column
"Area" is "1-25-48" which apparently stands for June 25, 1948, the date of registration for estate tax purposes. While this tax declaration
names Florentina as the owner, there is a notation after her printed name reading deceased. And it names Lucio and Jose Buenaflor
as the administrators of the lot.

From the other tax declarations, Exhibits "N-1" up to "N-12"43 inclusive, presented by respondent, it appears that Lucio and Jose
Buenaflor acted as the property administrators only until February 17, 1966 when Tax Declaration No. 8842 (Exhibit "N-2"), which was
registered on January 14, 1966, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 8952 (Exhibit "N-3") whereon, for the first time, Placido and
Teodoro Sarmiento were named administrators of the lot. On March 30, 1966, Tax Declaration No. 8952 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 9631 (Exhibit "N-4") on which Placido appears as the owner of Lot No. 535 of which the lot in question forms part.

To this Court, Tax Declaration No. 9631-Exhibit "N-4" does not constitute competent proof of Placido’s title over Lot 535. For one,
respondent failed to prove that Placido is an heir of Florentina. For another, respondent failed to prove the metes and bounds of the
"palayero" allegedly owned by Florentina and that the lot actually forms part thereof.

But even assuming arguendo that, as found by the MeTC, Placido was an heir and inherited Lot 535 from Florentina, respondent still
failed to provide proof, nay allege, that Florentina possessed Lot 535 since June 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2005 and August 19,
2005, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by respondent, Restituto Sarmiento, over Lot
535-D, with a total area of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters situated at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro
Manila is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166577 February 3, 2010

SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO, Petitioners,


vs.
AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the
Decision1 dated December 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed and set aside the Summary
Judgment2 dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 255. Also subject of the present
petition is the CA Resolution3 dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier decision.

A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:

On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title 4with the RTC of
Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas, docketed
as Civil Case No. 95-292.

In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names.5 They further alleged that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT
Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had
made such property its equity contribution in APVC to be developed into a residential subdivision. Attached as annexes to the complaint
were photocopies of:

(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in
the Barrio of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 171,309 square meters;

(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located
in Bo. Tindig na Manga, Las Piñas with an area of 171,309 square meters;

(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located
in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 218,523 square meters; and

(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located
in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 155,345 square meters.

No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.

According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives "appear to have been issued in the
name of Ayala and purport to cover and embrace the Carpo’s property or portion thereof duly covered registered under the already
indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives
of the Carpos’ title."6 The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation
and APVC from doing construction and development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos’ rights.

The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:

(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of
Ayala Corporation and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and issuing a writ of
possession in favor of the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion
thereof being occupied by the said corporations under inherently invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their
names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of the property described therein "including the parcels of land being claimed and occupied
by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable titles"; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly
and severally the amount of ₱100,000 as attorney’s fees plus costs of suit and litigation expenses. 7

On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala
Land, Incorporated (ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas that the title to
the subject property was registered in the name of ALI and not Ayala Corporation.8

On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 and Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended Answer, 10 respectively.

In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the areas
covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos’ claimed property and the dispute pertained only to
the land covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Piñas Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was
derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to LPVI
and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333
as it traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos’ title was derived from OCT No.
8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos’ complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the 1941 decision of this Court
in Guico v. San Pedro11 which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over
the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.

During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT No. T-41262, over the property previously covered by TCT
No. T-5333.12

In the Order13 dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the
case to the RTC of Las Piñas where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the Las Piñas
RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.

On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one ― which of the two (2) titles should be accorded priority.
According to ALI, the parties were relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was
issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the Carpos’ predecessor’s title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly,
the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were "genuine issues and controversies to be
litigated."

In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI’s motion for summary judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition
for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.

In a decision14 dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALI’s petition and ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment. Both
parties moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render
the summary judgment in the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion,
insisted that there were genuine issues in this case that must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution
dated January 12, 1998.151avvphi1

Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CA’s
refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed the CA’s ruling that trial was unnecessary.

In separate minute Resolutions,16 the Court denied both petitions. Both parties’ motions for reconsideration were likewise denied.

Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos’ title superior to that of ALI and
ruling, thus:

Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No.
242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant’s answer reveals that OCT No.
242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration
cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of
being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI,
allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted
with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said
case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and
is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be
rejected."

The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled
that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable
Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).

Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration
Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.

It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333
that the date of survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs’ property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This
means that plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of defendant ALI’s predecessor-in-
interest. The principle of prior registration cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot anymore be the
subject of another survey, and there is already a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the
survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayala’s
predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the approval of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for approval, the
records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land had already been made and approved by the Director
of the Bureau of Lands.

Evidently, Ayala’s claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs’ cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that
cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayala’s answer is its admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of the Bureau
of Lands was submitted in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with
irregularity and therefore void.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and
superior to that of defendant Ayala’s TCT No. T-5333;

(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives
as null and void;

(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

(d) To pay the costs.17

On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution 18 dated May 14, 1999 for failure
to pay the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash
clerk on duty at the RTC Las Piñas. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court a petition for review docketed as
G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALI’s petition meritorious, the Court, in a Decision 19 dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CA’s dismissal
of ALI’s appeal and remanded the same to the CA for further proceedings.

On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas, Branch 255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered as
follows:

(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to be
the VALID title to the subject property;

(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;

(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees’ TCT No. 296463, and any and all titles issued
covering the subject property, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect. 20

The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence,
the instant petition for review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo. 21The Petition contained the following assignment of
errors:

A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE
REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC "RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN ALLEGED "ADMISSION" BY
RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS BASED ON THE
CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID
CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT. 22
Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and setting aside the CA Decision dated December 22, 2003 and
Resolution dated December 16, 2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the RTC’s Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998; or
in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial
court should be reversed and set aside.

Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the controversy

At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its
antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a
land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a
land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367
and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was
grievous and palpable error on the part of the trial court considering that the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No.
296463 had an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the properties in the titles invalidated by the trial court was
799,262 square meters.

It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA ruled that:

On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the plainti ffs/private
respondents. Instead, it alleged:

"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by
ALI’s TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No.
242 (the title from which ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No.
2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx."

This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the property described in private
respondents’ TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit of Jose
Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence and experience, declared under oath:

"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the technical descriptions in their respective titles,
if the lots described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-
5333 of LPVI, and, more previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and
TCT No. 4368, x x x.

‘9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical descriptions found in the plaintiffs’ and ALI’s respective
titles. The standard operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting properties is to study the technical
description in the titles and at the same time, to get all the available survey plans described in the titles for reference.

‘9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs’ title vis-a-vis ALI’s title. Attached
hereto as Annex "G" is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.

‘9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the title of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this
plan that plaintiffs’ claimed property entirely overlaps ALI’s property delineated in TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs’ claimed property (Lot 3,
PSU-56007) is in fact identical to ALI’s lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).

‘9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of ALI’s TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively,
and it is clearly shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs’ claimed property.’"

The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private respondents’ TCT No.
296463 and petitioner’s TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333).23 In addition to the affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner
likewise attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following titles:

xxxx
In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioner’s allegation that their (private respondents’) title, TCT No. 296463
traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242, issued on May
9, 1950. Moreover, the private respondents attached no supporting document to its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx.

xxxx

Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles
are admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to
its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose
title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must be upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted by the parties, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there need not be a
protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents
attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is
true with the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, prescription and laches – which may
likewise be resolved without going to trial. 24(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were
denied with finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CA’s factual finding therein that the only lots whose technical
descriptions overlap are those covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-
41262. There was simply no basis for the trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.

The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-
4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners’ claims with respect to these properties are
already barred by res judicata. In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 25petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted
his purported ownership of these two properties based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number (Psu-56007)
as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty),
ALI’s predecessor in interest,26 is the one with valid title to these properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted
here:

Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in
the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:

1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued
on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and
N-43516, respectively.

2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on
October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.

3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation,
derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.

On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge
Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408."
Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. x x x.

xxxx

In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who
originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the
subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No.
976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar,
as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.

xxxx
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada
Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. x x x.

xxxx

The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by
Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035
"desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not
pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino
Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein.

Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or
twelve years before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate
or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x."27 (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)

We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.

First Assignment of Error

Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by
the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CA’s ruling on this point. It is the CA’s view that the trial court’s
pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the presumption of regularity
that said title enjoys.

We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following portion of the Summary Judgment:

Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No.
242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant’s answer reveals that OCT No.
242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration
cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of
being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI,
allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted
with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said
case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and
is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be
rejected."

The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled
that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable
Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).

Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration
Commissioner and under the law, the same is void. 28

To begin with, a perusal of the defendant’s answer or amended answer would show that, contrary to the trial court’s allusions thereto,
there is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey plan that was duly approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on record to support the trial court’s finding that the survey plan submitted to support
the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration Commissioner and
not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because
the notation "SWO" appeared in the technical description of the said title which was attached to the answer and due to ALI’s failure to
allege in its pleadings that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands.29

It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the
appropriate authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared beside the survey plan number on the face of the title or from a failure
to allege on the part of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval the discussion of the CA on this point:

Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis to
defendant-appellant’s failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It
is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the issuance of such
decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI’s original predecessor-in-interest at the time
the latter sought original registration of the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have carefully
ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of
registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned the title is perfect
and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions, compel a court to
review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed
if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALI’s
failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original
land registration case.

The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied
with the requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the
Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go
beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the certificate of title
to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public
the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further. 30(Underscoring ours;
citations omitted.)

It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
pursuant to land registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives,
including ALI’s TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued.
That is precisely the nature of such a presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:

xxxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all
matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; x x x.

Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna 31:

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was
issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption
of regularity in the performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the
Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v. Enriquez:32
To overturn this legal presumption carelessly — more than 90 years since the termination of the case — will not only endanger judicial
stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility
of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)

The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption
that all the requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey
plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption
who would have the burden to present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.

We cannot accept petitioners’ proposition that they did not have the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of ALI’s title since the
burden of proof purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC.

This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation
that ALI’s title is null and void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners
never alleged the purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALI’s title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALI’s titles
should be declared void for not being derivatives of the Carpos’ title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were relying solely on
the supposed priority of their own title over ALI’s. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its mother
title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint
or in any other pleading filed with the trial court.

Indubitably, in view of the CA’s Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of
which between the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners
themselves are aware, in Realty, it was held that:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate
or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite, 34 we held that "[w]here two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether
wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived."

In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the principle "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time,
Stronger in Right) in this case and found that ALI’s title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.

Second Assignment of Error

Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches.
According to them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of action
did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial court that OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out
by the evidence on record. Verily, the premise upon which petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of their action did not exist.

In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CA’s finding that:

As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before
plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Court’s firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees’ claim is
barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.

Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration
was issued, any action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees’
complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that
plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in
favor of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, must be filed within ten years from the
issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALI’s title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the
ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.

By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the
instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify
OCT No. 242, from which ALI’s title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be clearly
unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the
precise provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:

"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value – The decree of registration shall not be reopened or
revised xxx subject, however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances for value." 35

Third Assignment of Error

The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on
the alleged admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos’ title, as declared by the CA. Specifically, the CA stated as follows:

In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of
plaintiffs-appellees’ title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALI’s statement to be of no moment.

Nowhere in ALI’s statement was there an admission of the validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ title. x x x.

The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the
existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ certificate of title. x x x.36

An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily show that indeed the trial court relied on ALI’s supposed
admission of the existence of Carpos’ title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:

The existence of plaintiffs’ TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been originated from OCT No.
8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and
plaintiffs’ TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as
Annex "G" to defendant ALI’s answer. This admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot therefore
take position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer, and the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto.
Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).

Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No.
242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. x x x. 37

Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted the validity of Carpos’ title with its admission of the said
title’s existence, that is the unmistakable import of the trial court’s statements that ALI’s admission of the existence of Carpo’s title "are
conclusive upon it" and bars ALI from taking a "position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer" followed by the statement that the
trial court is "not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic) any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs." This is yet another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA correctly
pointed out in its own Decision.

Fourth Assignment of Error

As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision in the case of Guico v. San Pedro 38 was binding on the
Carpos as it proceeded to discuss, thus:

In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga,
Parañaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C.
Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALI’s TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No.
41262. Guico’s application was opposed by, among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-
appellees’ title was derived.

It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant case), Lot
10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees’ title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso
Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on
the basis of his Psu-80886.

It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their
predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San
Pedro.

For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an
order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there
must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only
have objections with respect to the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity
of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the instant case. 39

We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the predecessors-
in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the
parties’ respective OCTs were not issued in these persons’ names but rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It
cannot be categorically said that there was identity of parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements
of res judicata, i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CA’s
questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law even without relying on the Guico case.1avvphi1

In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment
of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December
16, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN,
all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of
its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision1 promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming
the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt,
Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-
8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be
issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters
of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned
to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant
died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that
the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants
to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published
in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired
jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: 8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned
in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is
mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper
of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case.
As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a
requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's
counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final
disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule
65.9

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding —

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation,
and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in
a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon
the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory
terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side."
Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements
of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied
with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.

The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.

1. By publication. —

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may
concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale
behind the publication requirement.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of
the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of
a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends
upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the
initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intenti on of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included
such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure
of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or
whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been
ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive
evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for
recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively
invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that
before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given
notice and opportunity to oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires
notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case
at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any
excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority
to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application.19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application
of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171631 November 15, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R.
DELA PAZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’ application for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented
by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land 3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529
(PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square
meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated
plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz
to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-
00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered
by any land patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated
June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said
property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of
land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since
they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They
maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2)
that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel
of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic,
there was no other oppositor to the application.

On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default6 against the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter,
respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.

In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject property. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the
title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with
postal address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-
000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.

After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the
order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that
respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public
and adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to
present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN
THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME
CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.9

In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of
an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.

In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open,
notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985,
1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued
by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents
maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions
of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.

The petition is meritorious.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not
of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse
of discretion.11

In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. 12 These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence. 13

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated
to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 15

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-
00-00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon
City on Jan. 03, 1968.

Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.

In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion
and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable
public domain.

Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the
Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required
by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government
that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by
the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said
plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status
of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls
within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish
that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence
to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.20

Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil

The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies
of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents’
predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March
19, 1939,21 testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to
them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about the same year, he
knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land. 24

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-
interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by
their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show
Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period
of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession
are unavailing and cannot suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish
the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land. 26

Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the
year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties
in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 28

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of
the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R.
dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand
eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.

Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citi zen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the
judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m.
situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then
natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian
citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a
decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the title and possession of herein
applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino
citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124
Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there
shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:

In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its
former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity,
they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in
initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the
same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may
already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main
issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional
prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot
be taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)

Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.

Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue
presented therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately
owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner
of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant
for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.

As found by the trial court:

The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of
title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the
conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied
with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)

Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:

The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the
disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application
for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the
subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over
the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)

The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:

17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979.
However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)

18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD
No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.
And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they
would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared
for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)

The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of
title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and
exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.

As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Regis tration Act, to
wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

As amended by PD 1073:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.

It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law
employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirement s for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at
bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not
only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception,
were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the
disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open
and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by
virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.

At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held
that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains
to the State.

Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the
Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:

(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .

Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act


No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation
for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed
to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application
for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48
[b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(Ther e are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years
of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA,
183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218
SCRA 41 [1993]).

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v.
Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v.
CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of.

In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias
v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced,
private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove
that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A
certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject
parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia
(Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest
Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry
interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).

In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly,
the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.

We disagree.

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed
acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration
court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter
before us on review and we reversed.

This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:

As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish
grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof
that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by
purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title
(Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.

If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could
be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):

. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since t ime
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law.
Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.

. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)

It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by
the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more
than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.

In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable
and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973
Constitution).

. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of
possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession,"
it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v.
Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .

. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly
covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate
among his heirs — in such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when
the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs.
This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no
vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens at the time of their
application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or
possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as
American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.

In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties
and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a
house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register
the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions,
to wit:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which
reads:

Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship
may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:

Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case
of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them
may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an
additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum
areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject.
Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship
remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said
properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof
by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of
transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens
at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.

The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents.
Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:

Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred
under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn
statement showing the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area,
the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the
Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other information as
may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less
implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for
registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185,
before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the
office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration
is yet to be issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land
registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner
that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.

The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban
Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements
thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof
since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the
corresponding decree of registration. 2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia
Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3

Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the
Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired
by the Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These
purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra. 4

In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers,
and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no
decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the
revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely
reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered
a few months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941.

No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and
simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent
proceedings.5

Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently
presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering
the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net

The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action to revive judgment had already
prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decree of
registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision7 dated
24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings
such as land registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first
request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original records in the 1941 case
had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.

In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and
laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment
must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations. 9 It bears noting that the Republic does
not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to
establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.

The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was
cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a
title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was
filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of
land, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after
the judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners'
omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.

Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and
bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land
registration case."12

The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument
that a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was already
"final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that
after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a
civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal. x x x

x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx
that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure
of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the
owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.14

The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was reiterated five (5)
years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al.15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer
for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and
laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar
tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v. Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v.
Ibanez, etc., and Poras17and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent
purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. 19

Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases
has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three
(3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The
doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed,
the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and
educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for
execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final
judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.

We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation
of the current arguments of the Republic.

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in
ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by
a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition
or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a
ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of
registration.

The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final
judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely
because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil
cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:

SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final,
the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree
of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the
judgment and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of
title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon,
the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding
original certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall
be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title
shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of
the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title.
No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of
the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and
the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration
and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance
and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot ou st the
prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal
of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and
the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply
frustrate such goal.

Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become
final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed
by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar
circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and
proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but
with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there
is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no
impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse
if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case.
Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a
thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription
or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.

What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court applied the doctrines of
prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did
they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from
the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the present case.

The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action for land registration, but from a
successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue
that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of
the order of cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed,
the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier.
However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale
provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held interest in the subject property, having
divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this
point, and not on the applicability of the rules of prescription.

Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relating to its pronouncements relating
to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by
the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that
since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of
2005 in the Paderes case.

We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The
property involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other
by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 24 On
the other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already
been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of
prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the
competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor,
and thus denied the petition on that score.

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of
title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated
the laches of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property,
marked by their inability to oppose the other application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5)
-year reglementary period.

Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or
to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of
Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded by
the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part
of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their
right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the
same property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final judgment, with
which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-
extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment
to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25

We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of
the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued
good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land
registration case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by
another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in
stating the obvious.

Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent
attacks to the adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate as res judicata only
after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final decision’s status as res judicata is
the impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to
a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic’s arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central
holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred
by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of
the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she
had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration
albeit still in the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the

Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such
proof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007

ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,


vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L.
DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to
Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.

The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of
November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of
title in favor of the spouses Lirio.

On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title
to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1

The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L.
David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s application
by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had
become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s application on the ground of
res judicata.

After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s
application on the ground of res judicata. 31ªvvphi1.nét

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res
judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of
registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly
surfaced as basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by
respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment passé[d] into extinction." 6

Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.7

The petition fails.

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal
may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.

After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section
39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of
the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)

In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming
the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res
judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of
confirmation and registration.10

The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and
Flora Atienza’s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.

Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA
has not issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management
Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu
Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land Management
Services of

the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special work order. 11

There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land
registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the
sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of
the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings." 12 (Emphasis supplied)

As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]

the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute
the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that
after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the

ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed

by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party
had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a
civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.

SO ORDERED.

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