1, Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Petitioner: ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA

Respondent: SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et. al.

Author: Aguilar

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which
may include natural resources. Cruz contends that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution.

Ruling/Ratio: NO.

The provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

2. SECRETARY OF DENR v. YAP

Petitioner: Secretary of DENR
Respondents: Mayor Jose S. Yap, et. al.

Author: Alfonso

Facts:

- This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
 - On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist
zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

- The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code.

Issue: W/N unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable.

Ruling + Ratio:

- No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute.

Republic vs. Lao

Balasta

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN V. RAMOS

Petitioner: La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., et. Al.

Respondents: Victor O. Ramos, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Horacio Ramos, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (Mgb-Denr), Ruben Torres; Executive Secretary,
And Wmc (Philippines), Inc.

Author: Balbastro

Doctrine: Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that
―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
Facts:
- RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942,
or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land
in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

- Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

- In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned
by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending
before the Court of Appeals.

- EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the
foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between
the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

Ruling + Ratio: Unconstitutional

- Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources

- The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into
these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s power of dominium, which is the capacity of the
State to own or acquire property.

- The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to “all natural wealth that may be found in the
bowels of the earth.” Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing
them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its wars against other nations.
Mining laws during the Spanish regime reflected this perspective.

- Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and
saw fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and
to grant patents to private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private
mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from
exploiting minerals within his property. Thus, earlier jurisprudence held that: A valid and subsisting
location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the
United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive possession of
 the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of
the location. x x x x x x.

- Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration
and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.

- Conspicuously absent in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is the provision in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources—by such omission, the utilization of
inalienable lands of public domain through “license, concession or lease” is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.

- Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area—the concession amounts to complete control
by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

- The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

- The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment
by non-Filipinos.

- Thus, the court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the
1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership
to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

- The underlying assumption in all some of the provisions of R.A. No. 7942 is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract; By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited provisions of
R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

- The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

- When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or
connected, must fail with them.
- Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Disposition: Granted. The following are unconstitutional and void:

1. Provisions of RA 7942
(a) Proviso in Sec. 3 (aq) which defines “qualified person”
(b) Section 23 which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said
section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement
(c) Section 33 which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;
(d) Section 35 which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance
agreement;
(e) Section 39 which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to
convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement
(f) Section 56 which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a
financial and technical assistance agreement;
(g) Section 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, Second and Third Paragraphs of Section 81 and Section 90 as they
are dependent on the forgoing provisions

2. All provision of DENR Administrative Order 96-40 which are not in conformity with this Decision

3. Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMC Philippines.

Other note:

RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

- The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional
since the agreement itself is a service contract.
- Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be
produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP
shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.
- These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP
beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Sotto vs Sotto

Petitioner: Vicente Sotto

Respondent: Filemon Sotto

Author: Barba

Facts:
1. Petitioner owner of a lot, alleges that he left Respondent in charge of the lot when he left in Cebu in
1907.
 2. In April 1921, petitioner learned from the Court of First Instance of Cebu that the respondent had
fraudulently obtained registration of the lot in his own name and that a COT (Certificate of Title) has
been issued to the respondent in January 1920

3. As he was in Cebu, petitioner was unable to appear in court during the land registration proceedings to
defend his property rights.

4. Such appearance was has only remedy to recover the property in question.

5. Petitioner wants to annul the decision of CFI and requests for new trial.

6. On the other hand, respondent (by way of a demurrer to the petition) maintains that section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to decisions in land registration proceedings which are
covered by a final decree, hence, it cannot be reopened except for the reasons and in the manner stated
in section 38 of the Land Registration Act.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 513 of the Civil Code of Procedure is applicable to decisions pertaining to Land
Registration acts.

Ruling:
No.

Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is NOT applicable to decisions pertaining to land registration
proceedings covered by a Final Decree. Looking into the brief history of Section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which was mentioned in Section 142 and Section 383 of the Land Registration Act as amended by
Act No. 1108, it can be construed that a final “decree of confirmation and registration” is not a “judgment”
within the meaning of Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure and such decree cannot be reopened under
said Code except for reasons and in the manner stated in Section 38 of the said Act.
The Land Registration Act itself distinguishes between a judgment and the final decree. The decision rendered
by the court is styled a "judgment” while the final "decree of confirmation and registration" cannot be entered
until at least thirty days after such judgment has been rendered and transcribed literally upon the certificates of
title. In this case since a decision pertaining to a land registration proceeding is not a judgment, it shall not be
reopened except by reason of the absence infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgment or decrees under Section 38 of the said act.

Disposition: Demurrer is sustained. Petition is dismissed with costs.

Title: Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590

Plaintiff: CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO

Respondent: N. M. SALEEBY

Author: Cabuso
Doctrine: The real purpose of the torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at the time of registrations
in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
The registration under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not give the owner any
better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the certificate.
In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular interest in
land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who obtained
the second certificate. The decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot
of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration
of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued
the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of
the defendant also included said wall.

On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted
to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall
in the registered title of each of said parties.

The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD:

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the
defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not
appear and oppose it

Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself.
Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to
have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles under the
Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions
like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original
certificate to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to
hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The
record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the
land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore
made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as
well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

Capitol Subdivision Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental

Plaintiff-appelant: Capitol Subdivision Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental

Defendant-appellee: Province of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963

Author: Jay T. Dedicatoria

Facts:

Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of Negros Occidental, the
possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of said lot by the defendant. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however,
set aside by the Supreme Court, which, likewise, ordered the case remanded to the lower court "for further
trial", after which another decision was rendered by said court of first instance dismissing plaintiff's complaint
and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant.
Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares, originally registered
in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the
aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares for the sum of P300,000, payable installments, as set forth in the deed
of sale. On March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose Benares to the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74. On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged
the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, including said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 6295, covering Lot 378.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including
Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. On November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to
Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the
condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain in the Bank. Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares
transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the
installments due to the Bank. Hence, on September 29, 1949, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of
absolute sale to the plaintiff and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.

Issue: WON the defendant had acquired the lot in question in the expropriation proceeding.

Ruling:
The evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378,
which must be held, therefore, to be the exclusive property of plaintiff herein. Several circumstances indicate
that the expropriation had not been consummated.

The entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication. There
was an absence of of a deed of assignment in favor of the province as regards to Lot 378.

The property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. could not have been expropriated without the
intervention of the Milling Company.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the bank promising to sell the hacienda to Benares was explicitly stated
that some particular lots had been expropriated by the provincial government of Negros Occidental.

Director of Lands vs. Santiago

Author: FABI

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of the respondent Judge, and
mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The
petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporation’s application for registration.

On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A
copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director
of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent
IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to
Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area
stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago.

On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of
general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the
applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the
lands in favor of the respondent corporation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to appear at the
initial hearing was excusable, and that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however
denied.

ISSUE:

WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of
respondent corporation,
2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,
3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.;

HELD:

Yes. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporation’s application for
registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is
registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the
respondent corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.

It appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject
lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria
Garcia herself. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the
same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were
submitted. Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as required by law.

More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of Section 48,
paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public
domain. It appears from Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject
lands…were forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.

Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent Garcia
and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over
the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on
October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.

VDA de Barroga vs. Albano

Author: Fenis

Facts:

CFI of Ilocos Nortte adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta
Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the decree of registration did not issue except
until after the lapse of 14 years or so. It was only after 24 year that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino’s name.
1970-after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in Aquino’s favor, the
children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual, appellant, brought suit against the children and heris of Delfina Aquino,
appellees.

Barroga et.al: had been in possession of Lot 98211 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; they prayed
that Delfina Aquino’s title be voided and cancelled and that a new title be made out in their names.
Delfina Aquino’s title encroached upon a 4-sq m portion of an adjoining lot 9822, belonging to Cesar Castro
filed complaint in intervention for the recovery thereof.

CFI: Dismissed Barroga and Padaca’s complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4 sq m portion
overlapped by Aquino’s title.
The familiar doctrine of res judicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga and Padaca’s suit for
recovery of Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding
affirming Aquino’s ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the former’s predecessor-in-interest,
Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral
court was one “against a specific thing” and therefore “conclusive upon the title of the thing.”

On August 8,1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel Albano, et.al. for a
writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821. Writ of possession dated of August 28,1975 was issued. Again
Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano et.al.

They filed a Motion to Nullify Order to lift writ of execution issued and to revoke writ of possession issued.
Their argument: as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for
writ of possession.

Issue: Whether or not they can be ejected?

Held:

Yes.

The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from
the date of registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings of previous
jurisprudence. It also declared that the segregation of the 4 sq m portion from lot 9821 and its restoration as
integral part of lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos’ right to the writ of possession, which was the
appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case.

Conformably with the established axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of the opinion, the appellees must
be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over lot 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration ad
vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Aquino; the writ may correctly be
enforced against the appellant, Barroga and Padaca, as successor’s-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a
party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Aquino as the owner of the
land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many
years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral
case or their successors-in-interest. The appellant, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy
long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

REPUBLIC (DPWH) VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES BAUTISTA AND VALENTINA MALABANAN

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines (DPWH)
Respondent: Heirs of Sps. Bautista and Valentina Malabanan
Author: Felix
Topic: Determination of Market Value for Expropriation

Doctrine: Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an expropriation court
may, after hearing, accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment in accordance therewith.

Facts:
- Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a 1,893-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy.
Bulacnin North, Lipa City. The Respondents are their children.

- The petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), acquired a 36-square meter portion of the lot for use in the STAR (Southern
Tagalog Arterial Road) Tollway project.

- Later on, DPWH offered to purchase an additional 1,155 square meters of the lot at P100.00 per square
meter to be used for the Balete-Lipa City Interchange Ramp B, but the spouses Bautista refused to sell.

- Republic filed a Complaint with the RTC of Lipa City for the expropriation of the said 1,155-square
meter portion (the subject portion).

- In an Order of Expropriation, the trial court condemned the subject portion for expropriation and
constituted a panel of commissioners, consisting of the Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of
Lipa City, for the purpose of ascertaining just compensation.

- On Republics Opposition, the trial court appointed a third commissioner in the person of Nimfa
Martinez-Mecate (Mecate), who is the DPWH special agent for Road Right-of-Way for Region IV-A.

- The Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds thus concluded that the just compensation should be
within the range of P1,960.00 and P2,500.00 per square meter.

- On the other hand, Mecates Commissioners Report recommended that the reasonable value for
agricultural, orchard, and sugar land is P400.00 per square meter, and P600.00 per square meter for
residential and commercial land.

- The trial court rendered its Decision, fixing just compensation for the subject portion, including all its
improvements, at P1,960.00 per square meter. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA. The CA
affirmed the appealed decision.

- The Republic argued that the CAs reliance on the Joint Commissioners Report is erroneous because the
said report failed to consider all factors prescribed by law specifically Republic Act No. 8974 in
determining just compensation.

Issue/s: W/N the reliance by the RTC and CA on the Joint Commissioners’ Report is erroneous

Ruling+Ratio:

No
- The petitioner failed to consider that the courts are not bound to consider the standards under Section 5
of RA 8974 in determining just compensation.

- The exact wording of the said provision is that, in order to facilitate the determination of just
compensation, the courts “may” consider the standards stated in Section 5 of RA 8974.

- The word “may” in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion.

- In the absence of a finding of abuse, the exercise of such discretion may not be interfered with. The
Court finds no such abuse of discretion

- Mecates Commissioners Report evidently failed to consider factors other than the value of the subject
portion as reflected in the tax declarations, the BIR zonal valuation, and its classification as an
agricultural land.

- To make matters worse, Mecate based her Report on the 1998 Appraisal Committee Report of the Lipa
City Appraisal Committee, which is clearly obsolete and does not reflect 2004 property values.

- The Complaint for expropriation was filed in 2004; thus, just compensation should be based on 2004
valuations.

- Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

Disposition: The petition is DENIED. The assailed October 31, 2007 Decision and January 11, 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85751 are AFFIRMED.

Heirs of Malabanan v Republic

Lampa

TITLE: AVERIA vs CAGUIOA (1986)

PETITIONER: TOMAS AVERIA, JR.

RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, in her capacity as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA PADILLO
Author: Manzano

TOPIC: Section 2, PD No. 1529

Doctrine: Under Sec 2, PD 1529, it eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for "original
registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions."

FACTS: The complaint stemmed on the decision rendered by the respondent court regarding the hearing of
registration proceedings of a deed of sale. The petitioner refused to participate in the said hearing, alleging that
the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Section 112
of Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act." Despite of the absence of the petitioner during the
hearing, the respondent court still rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the
evidence presented by the private respondent in the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondent court, based on the argument that the lower court
had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as
required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.

ISSUE:
whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the
ground of an antecedent contract to sell.

HELD:

Yes. Since this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property
Registration Decree, under Sec 2, PD 1529, it eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting
merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
"original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." Consequently Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited
jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or
none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now
authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial
issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.

Disposition: the decision of the respondent court dated September 23, 1983, is set aside. Let a new trial of
Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record No. 202, Lot No. 2810-B, Lucena Cadastre, MC No. 374-82, be held,
at which the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the opportunity to be heard.

ARCEO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner: Virginia Franco Vda. De Arceo

Respondents: CA

Topic: Grant of Title – Venue

Doctrine: The trial courts has the authority to act not only on applications for ‘original registration” but also
“over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising from such applications or petitions.”

Facts:
The spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of 4 parcels of unregistered land
located in Pulilan, Bulacan. They had one son, Esteban. Abdon died in 1953, Escolastica in 1942, and
Esteban in 1941. Esteban sired Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco
with whom he fathered 6 children and are the petitioners of this case against Jose’s siblings.

In October (Or September) 1941, the spouses Arceo executed a deed of donation on the said parcels of
land in favor of Jose, while in August 1950, they executed another deed of donation to Jose on the same
parcels of land. Said donations were executed inter vivos. However, in October 1941 the spouses Arceo
 executed a deed of donation to ALL GRANDCHILDREN including Jose, thereby revoking the two
previous donations.

On 12 January 1972, Petitioners filed with the Cadastral Court an application for the 4 lots under the
strength of the donations initially executed by Abdon and Escolastica. Respondents contested the
petition on the strength of the last donation executed. The Cadastral Court dismissed the petition and
distributed the land based on intestate succession, CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Cadastral Court had no jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of
property.

Ruling and Ratio:

No, the Cadastral Court has jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of property.

Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
act. The PRD “has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by Act 497 when acting merely as a Cadastral court.” Such
amendment conferred upon the trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for ‘original
registration” but also “over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.”

Likewise, where the issues of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration,
the Cadastral Court has jurisdiction over it.

Disposition:
The decision of the CA is set aside.

SM PRIME HOLINGS v MADAYAG

Petitioner: SM PRIME HOLDINGS (AIA)

Respondent: ANGELA MADAYAG
Author: Masangcay

Doctrine: It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and
contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a
court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.
23 It may, therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.
In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a va

Facts:
- Respondent filed before the RTC Urdaneta an application for registration of a parcel of land located in
Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta. Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan from the Land
Management System of the DENR.

- Meanwhile, the petitioner asked the DENR for the cancellation of the survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the
new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001. Acting on
this matter, DENR advised the petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR
could properly act on the same.

- The RTC grants the Motion to Suspend Proceedings ruling that the survey plan is one of the mandatory
requirements in land registration proceedings, the RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of
the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition for land registration

- On appeal it was reversed by the CA.ruling that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR
should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine
all questions arising from an application for registration

ISSUE: W/N RTC is correct in supending the proceedings on the aforementioned ground

RULING: NO.

While the petitioner posits that it is only the DENR who has the authority to decide on the validity of the survey
plan, the land registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property
overlaps the petitioner’s properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.

DE LOS ANGELES V. SANTOS (1964)

Petitioner: Leonor de los Angeles, et al.

Respondents: Isidro O. Santos, et al.
Author: Mercado

Facts:
- On Nov. 21, 1959 an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid San Mateo Rizal
was filed in CFI by Leonor and seven co-applicants. Among other things, it alleged that “applicants are
owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land.”

- Initial hearing was on May 27, 1960 where general default was issued except as against the Director of
Lands claiming that the subject land is a portion of the public domain, Province of Rizal asserting public
easement and 11 private oppositors, one of them is Julio Hidalgo.

- On July 10, 1960, Hidalgo filed a written opposition claiming that they are the lawful owner of the
subject parcels of land for having acquired homestead patents over them.

- On July 25, 1961 a “report was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner dismissing the
case with regard Lot 11 as it was previously patented on June 12, 1961 in the name of Julio Hidalgo.
- Subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for
registration of title thereto could be divested of such jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act-- NO.

Ruling + Ratio: NO.

- The Director of Lands’ jurisdiction and administrative supervision and executive control extend only to
lands of public domain and not to lands already of private ownership.

- If petitioners’ averment on Nov. 21, 1959 that they are the owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
subject lands, it could result that upon the issuance of the homestead patent to Hidalgo on June 12, 1961,
lot 11 was no longer a public land.

- Since the existence or non-existence of applicant’s registerable title to lot 11 is decisive of the validity of
nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot, the court a quo’s jurisdiction in the land
registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead patent’s issuance.

- Proceedings for land registration are in rem whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead patent are
not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land
as far as courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned.

Dispositon: Set aside the orders appealed from and remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.

Bureau of Forestry vs CA 1987

Petitioners: BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO

Topic: Venue

Doctrine: Please see the ruling of the Court in Bold Letters.

Facts:

Four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo were the subject of an application for registration by
Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land.

The Director of Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-
in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems,
and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30
years prior to the filing of the application.

The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain
specific portions of the lands are mangrove swamps and are within Timberland which are considered property
of the public domain.

The trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of
respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Director of Forestry is correct in classifying the lands as needed for forest purposes and
hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.

Held:

Yes. Said forest land was already declared and certified by the Director of Forestry (in 1956) before the original
applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it (in 1961). As a general rule, timber or forest
lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. It is the
Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of
licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code).

That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau
of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land,
approved by the President on March 7, 1958. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
which was lifted from Act No. 2874 the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and
not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President.

Martinez vs CA
Pasion

DOCTRINES: Land registration court may not adjudge title over non-registerable land - Land Registration
Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of
the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant.
Right of State to recover non-registerable land does not prescribe.—The right of reversion or reconveyance to
the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe.

FACTS:
 Petitioners Spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez (Petitioners) are the present registered owners
of 2 parcels of land in Lubao Pampanga. Both are fishponds, the 2nd is the subject matter of
controversy.
 The said fishpond was originally secured with a ‘titulo real’ in 1883 by a certain Montemayor which
was inherited by his successors-in-interest who subsequently sold it to a certain Garcia in 1914 who
enclosed it with dikes. After the Pacific war in 1924, the dikes were re-opened and Garcia
subsequently applied for the registration of both parcels of land to the CFI, it was granted.
Eventually the said parcels of land were sold to other persons until it reached Petitioner Spouses.
 Petitioners sought the help of the Committee on Rivers and Streams to rule the subject property was not
a public river but a private fishpond pursuant to its registered Torrens title and to restore their
exclusive possession to it. Committee ruled in favor of Petitioners.
  4 years after, Secretary of Public Works and Communications (Secretary), under the authority of R.A.
2056, ordered the petitioners to demolish the dikes. Petitioners filed an injunction suit against the
Secretary through the CFI. Injunction granted.
 CA reversed the CFI, it held the subject property as a public river based on the evidence showed that
the said parcel of land has been covered with water since time immemorial thus part of the public
domain as adduced by the evidence presented by the Secretary.
 Petitioners escalated the case to the SC contending the previous decree of registration of the Land
registration courts (CFI) to the subject land is one that cannot be attacked under the principle of
indefeasibility of Torrens title.

ISSUE: Whether the previous rulings of the CFI (Land registration court) were valid and hence the subject land
has been properly registered thereby the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens title applies?

WON principle of indefeasibility of Torrens title applies

RULING:

No, the previous rulings of the CFI were not valid thus the indefeasibility of Torrens title in this case does not
apply.

Although Sec 38 of RA 496, Land registration act (LRA) , provides that a decree of registration through the
Land registration court expressly makes a decree of registration absolute and indefeasible, it is subject to
exemptions stated in Sec 39 of the said Act one of which is liens/claims/rights arising under laws of the
Philippines.

In this case, the land was proven to be part of the public domain in the evidence adduced by the Secretary, thus
the right of the state to recover non-registerable land exists. Thereby the indefeasibility of Torrens title does not
apply in this case. Further the SC held that Land registration courts cannot adjudge title over non-
registerable lands (i.e. Public navigable rivers, properties parts of the public domain).

REPUBLIC v. CA (1998)

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation
Author: Plan

Doctrines:

When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction,
but only for application.

A notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of
land.
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently
issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it.

Facts:

- In 1957, RA 1899 was approved which authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered
cities and municipalities.

- In 1958, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of 300 hectares of
foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation
contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was authorized the
Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain
terms and conditions.

- Petitioner filed a Complaint questioning subject agreement with RREC

- CFI issued an order refraining further reclaiming and committing acts of dispossession.

- CFI dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to the CA

- In 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP")
signed a Contract for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which contract included
the reclamation and development of areas covered by the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC.

- PD 1085 was passed which transferred to the Public Estate Authority (PEA) the rights and obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP

- CA dismissed the appeal

- Pasay City and RREC presented a MR of such Decision of the CA, contending, among others, that
RREC had actually reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them. There was even an annotation of
lis pendens on the certificates of title.

- In1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) filed a Petition in Intervention, theorizing that it
has a direct interest in the case being.

Issue:
1. W/N the said Ordinance was valid? – NO.
2. W/N Pasay City and RREC had actually reclaimed a portion of land? – NO.

Held:
1. (Statcon) When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Ordinance No 21 is null and void. It violated R.A 1899 when it
unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the intent of the law, and
against the recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands".
2. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said lots is of no
moment. It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the absolute ownership
thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of the action did not really warrant the issuance of a
notice of lis pendens.

Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real properly, the
plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said
notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser,
or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

A notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of
land. In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not counterclaim for
the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.

What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether
fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it.

Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of
title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding instituted in accordance with law.

Hence, in this case, Pasay City and RREC cannot claim any awards for the “actually reclaimed Fifty-Five (55)
hectares.” There was no ample proof of any reclamation. Moreover, the annotation cannot does not vest title to
them. They did not even counterclaim the said titled lots in the main case.

Disposition: Petition granted. Writ of injunction previously issued was made permanent. Notice of lis pendens
is cancelled.

Other Notes: *sorry guys, not really sure about this. Hindi masyado related sa venue at medyo malabo ang
case. Haha
ALVAREZ V. PICOP

Petioner: Heherson Alvarez substituted by Elsea Gozun as Secretary of DENR

Respondent: PICOP Resources Inc
Topic: Venue- Grant of Title
Author: Daniela

Facts:
• Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines Resources Inc. (PICOP) filed with the DENR an
application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA).

• Middle of the processing of the application, PICOP refused to attend meetings with the DENR.

• Filed a petition for Mandamus in RTC against DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez. It seeks the issuance
of a priviledged writ of mandamus to compel DENR Sec. Alvarez to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA
to PICOP.

• RTC Granted the petition for Mandamus and ordered DENR Sec to issue an IFMA, pay a sum of P10
Million pesos until IFMA is issued.

• DENR Sec Filed a Motion for Reconsideration was denied and granted the issuance of the writ of
mandamus or preliminary injunction, no mention of payment of 10 Million.

• DENR Filed a Notice to Appeal CA affirmed RTC’s ruling deleted the granting of harvesting of the raw
materials pulp and P10 Million.

• Both filed a petition for review, it was consolidated CA’s Ruling Granting Petition for Mandamus is
Reversed and set aside and petition assailing the lifting of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favour
of Secretary of Environment and natural Resources is Dismissed on the ground of Mootness.

Issue:

Whether or not PICOP was able to prove either of the two things it needed to prove it is entitled to a writ
of Mandamus. First that the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non impairment clause
and if it specifically enjoins the government to issue the IFMA.

Ruling + Ratio:

NO.

• PICOP relied on the 1969 Document or the Presidential Warranty approved by then President Marcos in
favour of its predecessor in interest Bislig Bay Lumber Company Inc. In its summary for Petition of
Mandamus, PICOP stated that DENR Secretary impaired the obligation of contract and violating the
Constitution by refusing to respect it’s tenurial rights, peaceful enjoyment of the area and exclusive right
to collect, cut and remove saw timber and pulpwood.

• In another case Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, it states that the 1969 Document is just a
reassurance to PICOP that the government uphold the terms and conditions of its TLA and guarantees its
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood
Processing complex. It cannot be considered as a contract within the purview of the non impairment
 clause, because it is only a collateral undertaking of its rights under the timber license.

• In the case of IFMA, the evaluation is specifically mandated in Sec 3 of DAO No. ((-53 which involves
the exercise of discretion and judgement on the part of DENR SEC and cannot be compelled by Petition
for Mandamus to issue it.

Disposition: Motion for Reconsideration is Denied.

Other Notes:
• It refused to exhaust all administrative remedies by not appealing the illegal non issuance of the IFMA
to the Office of the president, stating that it falls to the exception- petition is patently illegal and
derogation of the constitutional rights of petitioner against non impairment. And abuse of discretion by
the DENR Sec.

• Petitions for Mandamus are governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Section 3 of which provides:
“SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.”

• IFMA, as defined by DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53,16 is— “[A] production-sharing
contract entered into by and between the DENR and a qualified applicant wherein the DENR grants to
the latter the exclusive right to develop, manage, protect and utilize a specified area of forestland and
forest resource therein for a period of 25 years and may be renewed for another 25-year period,
consistent with the principle of sustainable development and in accordance with an approved CDMP,
and under which both parties share in its produce.
• Section 9 of this DAO No. 99-53:
• “Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants.—The applicants for IFMA shall be: (a) A Filipino citizen of legal
age; or, (b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under
Philippine laws. However, in the case of application for conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic
conversion after proper evaluation shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such
intention prior to the expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, that the TLA holder has showed
satisfactory performance and have complied in the terms of condition of the TLA and pertinent rules and
regulations.”
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC v. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC (2003)

Topic: Ownership and Certificate of Title

Petitioners: Heirs of CLEMENTE Ermac

Respondents: Heirs of VICENTE Ermac, Heirs of Urbano Adolfo, Heirs of CLIMACO Ermac
Author: Reyes

Doctrine: Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate
of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance
to a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons
not named in the certification, or that it may be held in trust for another person.

Facts:

Lot No. 666 originally belonged to CLAUDIO Ermac. Upon Claudio’s death, his children (Esteban, Pedro and
Balbina) inherited and partitioned the subject lot. The siblings requested Esteban to have their respective title
over the lot be registered, but the latter failed to do so. Instead, it was Esteban’s son, CLEMENTE, who applied
for registration of the whole lot solely in his own name.

Despite CLEMENTE’s registration and certificate of title, he did not disturbed or claimed ownership over the
portions of lot occupied by his uncle, aunt and relatives during his lifetime.
However, it was herein petitioners HEIRS OF CLEMENTE Ermac who filed an action for ejectment against the
occupants of the lot on the basis of the certificate of title obtained by CLEMENTE Ermac.

Issue:
Whether the the original certificate of title issued in the name of CLEMENTE Ermac vested him and his heirs,
now herein petitioners, the ownership over the lot.

Ruling:

NO. The petitioners claim over the portion of lot is based solely on the certificate of title in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest CLEMENTE. They claim that said title is indefeasible and incontrovertible under
Section 32 of PD 1529 because the period of one year upon its issuance have already lapsed.

In resolving the case, the Court settled that: ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title.
Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. Its issuance to a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certification, or that it may be held in trust for another
person.

Further, the incontrovertability of certificates of title does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a
remedy. More so, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.

In this case, the petitioners claim of ownership is based solely on a certificate of title which was discovered to
be registered in fraud of the other heirs of CLAUDIO Ermac (herein respondents). Thus, considering the above-
mentioned doctrine, the petitioners shall not be considered as having been vested with ownership over the lot.

Disposition:
Heirs of CLEMENTE Ermac cannot be considered as owners of the lot based solely on the certificate of title in
the name of its predecessor-in -interest because the other heirs of the original owner, CLAUDIO, also have a
share in the ownership of the subject lot.

Other Notes:
Although tax declarations and other tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute
strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.

REPUBLIC VS IGLESIA NI CRISTO

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAÑO MANALO

Author: Valencia

Doctrine: The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.

Facts:

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre. On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni
Cristo (INC), represented by Eraño G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title
before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-
1-001047, the technical description of subject lot, the Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate, Tax Declaration No.
(TD) 508026 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale executed by Bernardo
Bandaguio in favor of INC.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the
Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INC’s application.

The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was certified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v. Herbieto,13 it argues that prior to said date, the subject
lot remained to be of the public dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of private appropriation, and,
consequently, INC and its predecessors-in-interest’s possession and occupation cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights and "any period of possession prior to the date when the lot was classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession."

Respondent INC counters that the Court has already clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Naguit
case), in which we held that what is merely required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is that the "property sought to be registered [is]
already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed."

ISSUE: W/N INC has the right to register the lot in question.
HELD and Ruling:

YES. INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot.

It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that
their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May
16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.

It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the parties’
contradictory positions.

Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable, and
possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of
possession. This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for there can be no perfection of title when the
declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made after June 12, 1945, since the
reckoning of the period of possession cannot comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.

In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the
reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the
property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration of title is filed.

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic (Malabanan), the Court upheld Naguit and abandoned the stringent
ruling in Herbieto.

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there
is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective
halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and
Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which
the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupation––from Sabuco, including those
of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC––had been in the concept of owners: open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses.
Chavez vs. PEA (2002)

Petitioner: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ

Respondent: PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

Doctrine:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and
territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in
lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the
foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." Article 339 of the Civil Code of
1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.

Facts:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands." Also, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

Moreover, President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that
"All future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."

While President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title, in
the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

Then, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement "JVA”with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding, which was approved by President Fidel V. Ramos.

Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report.
Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3)
the JVA itself is illegal.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. Thus, the Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary
to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.

The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between
PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. Petitioner Chavez, as a taxpayer,
filed the instant Petition. One of the contentions of the petitioner that the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations.

Issue: WON the stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

RULING + Ratio: Yes

The amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still
submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas
form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the
State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the
sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the
only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural
lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then
can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.

Moreover, in this case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly
government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of
title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or
certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with
PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold
to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public
ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership
previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the
registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. The registration of lands of the
public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.

Oh Cho v Dir of Lands

Zabarte
FACTS:

 Oh Cho is appealing from the rejection of his application based on disqualification as alien (Chinese) from
acquiring lands of the public domain.
 He had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application
for registration on January 17, 1940
 ISSUE: W/N Oh Cho entitled to decree or registration of the lot.

HELD: NO.
 GR: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the
public domain
 Exception: in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño v. Insular Government) - not
applicable since only from 1880
 His immediate possesor failed to comply with the condition precedent to apply for the registration of the
land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894 so what was transferred to Oh Cho is
merely possesory right which cannot ripen to ownership by prescription (aliens disqualified to own by
prescription)

o GR: All lands are acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant.
o EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since time immemorial.
o Application for decree of registration is a condition precedent to acquisition of title. Non-compliance gives rise
to mere possessory right.
o An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public domain by prescription.

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly,
continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this
land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was
an alien.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not Oh Cho had title

o Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for the
same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with
by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what
was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by
prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

Diaz vs. Republic

Aguilar

Facts:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration for the third time of the resolution of the Supreme Court
denying the petition for review led by petitioner Florencia Diaz. The petitioner led an application for registration of a
vast tract of land in the Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked% developed
and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously publicly and adversely for more than &'
years opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military
reservation. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain prior to this case the Supreme Court
already ruled in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes that the property was inalienable as it formed part of
a military reservation and the existence of a Possessory/information Title registered in the name of a certain +election
adilla2 which the respondent in the sited case anchored its claim on the land% was not province/ ruled in favour of the
petitioner 3pon appeal% the C4 ruled in favour of the republic. Subsequently encouraged the parties to reach an
amicable settlement on the matter the parties entered into one. However (S) backed out from the settlement and
informed the C4 that the trace$ of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation ruled in favour
of the republic petitioner moved for reconsideration and assailed the decision of 6ustice +Mendoza saying that
+Mendoza should have inhibited himself when the case reached C4 since he was also the assistance Sol)en
during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings petitioner then led for a review on certiorari
which the SC denied The +, was also denied The petitioner then wants the case referred to the SC
En banc
which was likewise denied SC then issued a directive that no further pleadings would be entertained petitioner then
wrote letters addressed to justice Quisumbing and justice Puno alleging there was miscarriage of justice
and that the petitioner was tempted to go to media regarding the situation

Issue: WON the land in dispute can be registered to the petitioner

Ruling:
The ruling in the case of
Director of Lands vs. Reyes
Is applicable in this case and thus constitutes res judicata. The Supreme Court ruled that in registration cases
led under the provisions of the Public 9and4ct for the #judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title% an
order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes
res judicata not only against the adverse claimant but also against all persons & before the military reservation
was established% the evidence is inconclusive as to possession% for is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested 4s a matter of fact% at the time of the hearing% it was conceded
that approximately 0;%<=> hectares of said land consist of public forest /t is well-settled that forest land is incapable
of registration? and its inclusion in a title% whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the
present Torrens system of registration nullifies the title However it is true that forest lands may be registered
when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner 1upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable% timber and mineral lands2 coupled with
possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest 3nfortunately for the
petitioner% she was not able to produce such evidence 5eroccupation thereof could not have ripened into ownership
of the subject land ; The compromise agreement is null and void The land in question could not have been a
valid subject matter of a contract because being forest land it was inalienable

CARIÑO v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Author: Alfonso

Facts:
- Petitioner, an Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land
as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title
issued for the land when he applied for registration.
- The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription
against the Crown.

Issue:
W/N the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Ruling and Ratio:

No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
- The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”
- There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership

Since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of
jura regalia.

Baguio City vs. Masweng

Balasta

FACTS:

City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures
constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the
Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits
and in violation of Sec 69 of PD No. 705, as amended, PD No. 1096 and RA No. 7279.
 Private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their
ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time
immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated
April 27, 1922 and recommended by the DENR for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest
Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right
of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must
be restrained.

The corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the
occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006.
Consequently, private respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City before the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR). The NCIP-
CAR, on October 16 and 19, 3006, issued 2 TROs and issued Demolition Orders. The petitioners appealed
before the CA, and the latter upheld the NCIP and affirmed the TROs

The government claims that Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as it is
needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the city's
main watershed. Further, they also claim that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main
actions for injunction.

Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private
respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.

As a defense, the private respondents contend that jurisdiction of the NCIP to take cognizance of
and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue
such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies, and that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its
coverage nor does it state that there are no ancestral lands in Baguio City.

ISSUE:

Whether the Busol Forest Reservation is exempted under the IPRA law.

HELD:
No, the provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption from
the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land
rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city's
charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.

The Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents' ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.

Hence, the Busol Forest Reservation remains inalienable as decided in the case ofHeirs of Gumangan v.
Court of Appeals.

CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. EBIo

Petitioner: Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City, Et. Al. Respondents: Mario D. Ebio and his
Children/Heirs
Doctrine: The purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which
the applicant already possessed over the land—registration was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership.
Author: Balbastro

Facts:
- Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an accretion of Cut-
cut creek.

- Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez who gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez.

- Pedro Vitalez continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the accreted property since 1930 per
his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes.

- In 1961, respondent Ebio married Pedro’s daughter and established their home on the said lot upon
Pedro’s advice.

- Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant for the subject
property.

- On 21 April 1987, Pedro Vitalez transferred his rights in the accreted property to Mario Ebio and his
successors-in-interest.

- On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series
of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access
road along Cutcut Creek located in the said barangay.

- Respondents registered their opposition because the proposed road will run traversing the lot occupied
by them. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.

- However, several officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut 8 trees
planted on the lot.

- Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the DILG and
the Office of the Vice Mayor.

- Upon meeting between Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez and respondents, no definite agreement was.

- Then respondents received a letter from city administrator ordering them to vacate the area or be
physically evicted from the property.

- Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. However, The request remained unheeded.

- Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.

- In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted that they have a pending application for the
issuance of a sales patent before the DENR.
- RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents
were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been
granted.
- MR denied. Matter elevated to CA
- CA issued its Decision in favor of the respondents.
- The CA denied petitioners’ MR. Hence, this petition

Issues:
(a) Whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property entitles
them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

(b) Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the
DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?

RULING + RATIO:
(a) YES
- A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive
relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should
not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.

- In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had
occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured
a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on
the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to
declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when
Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land
occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque.

- From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion
can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted
portion.

- Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to
register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is
not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already
possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A
decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
(b) NO
- Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial
proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they
opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales
patent.

- Respondents’ application for sales patent should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may
be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should
 instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which
they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

- Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a
grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land. No one can give what he does not have -
such principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.

Disposition: Petition is DENIED

Wee vs. Mardo

Barba