168633-2013-Abbott Laboratories Phils. v. Alcaraz

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 192571. July 23, 2013.]
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE,

EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUT-MISA, TERESITA C.
BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G. ALMAZAR , petitioners, vs . PEARLIE ANN F.
ALCARAZ , respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated December
10, 2009 and Resolution 3 dated June 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101045 which pronounced that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz
(Alcaraz) was illegally dismissed from her employment.
The Facts
On June 27, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the
publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Medical and Regulatory
Affairs Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager) who would: (a) be responsible for drug
safety surveillance operations, sta ng, and budget; (b) lead the development and
implementation of standard operating procedures/policies for drug safety surveillance
and vigilance; and (c) act as the primary interface with internal and external customers
regarding safety operations and queries. 4 Alcaraz — who was then a Regulatory Affairs
and Information Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another
pharmaceutical company like Abbott) — showed interest and submitted her application on
October 4, 2004. 5
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the above-mentioned
position which was an item under the company's Hospira A liate Local Surveillance Unit
(ALSU) department. 6 In Abbott's offer sheet, 7 it was stated that Alcaraz was to be
employed on a probationary basis. 8 Later that day, she accepted the said offer and
received an electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbott's Recruitment O cer, petitioner Teresita
C. Bernardo (Bernardo), con rming the same. Attached to Bernardo's e-mail were Abbott's
organizational chart and a job description of Alcaraz's work. 9 IDSaEA
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which stated, inter
alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning
February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. The said contract was also signed by Abbott's
General Manager, petitioner Edwin Feist (Feist): 1 0
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
Dear Pearl,
After having successfully passed the pre-employment requirements, you are

hereby appointed as follows:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Position Title : Regulatory Affairs Manager
Department : Hospira
The terms of your employment are:
Nature of Employment : Probationary
February 15, 2005 to August 14,

Effectivity :
2005
Basic Salary : P110,000.00/month
It is understood that you agree to abide by all existing policies, rules and
regulations of the company, as well as those, which may be hereinafter
promulgated. TaCSAD
Unless renewed, probationary appointment expires on the date indicated subject

to earlier termination by the Company for any justifiable reason.
If you agree to the terms and conditions of your employment, please signify
your conformity below and return a copy to HRD.
Welcome to Abbott!
Very truly yours,
Sgd. EDWIN D. FEIST

General Manager
CONFORME:
Sgd. PEARLIE ANN FERRER-ALCARAZ
During Alcaraz's pre-employment orientation, petitioner Allan G. Almazar (Almazar),

Hospira's Country Transition Manager, briefed her on her duties and responsibilities as
Regulatory Affairs Manager, stating that: (a) she will handle the staff of Hospira ALSU and
will directly report to Almazar on matters regarding Hopira's local operations, operational
budget, and performance evaluation of the Hospira ALSU Staff who are on probationary
status; (b) she must implement Abbott's Code of Good Corporate Conduct (Code of
Conduct), o ce policies on human resources and nance, and ensure that Abbott will hire
people who are t in the organizational discipline; (c) petitioner Kelly Walsh (Walsh),
Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate
supervisor; (d) she should always coordinate with Abbott's human resource o cers in the
management and discipline of the staff; (e) Hospira ALSU will spin off from Abbott in early
2006 and will be o cially incorporated and known as Hospira, Philippines. In the interim,
Hospira ALSU operations will still be under Abbott's management, excluding the technical
aspects of the operations which is under the control and supervision of Walsh; and (f) the
processing of information and/or raw material data subject of Hospira ALSU operations
will be strictly con ned and controlled under the computer system and network being
maintained and operated from the United States. For this purpose, all those involved in
Hospira ALSU are required to use two identi cation cards: one, to identify them as
Abbott's employees and another, to identify them as Hospira employees. 1 1 IcESaA
On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa (Misa), Abbott's Human

Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an explanation of the
procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees and further indicated
that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given
copies of Abbott's Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and
Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence Orientation Modules (Performance
Modules) which she had to apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.
12
Abbott's PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a probationary

employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice:
rst on the third month and second on the fth month from the date of employment. The
necessary Performance Improvement Plan should also be made during the third-month
review in case of a gap between the employee's performance and the standards set. These
performance standards should be discussed in detail with the employee within the rst
two (2) weeks on the job. It was equally required that a signed copy of the PPSE form
must be submitted to Abbott's Human Resources Department (HRD) and shall serve as
documentation of the employee's performance during his/her probationary period. This
shall form the basis for recommending the con rmation or termination of the probationary
employment. 1 3
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had
disciplinary problems. Thus, she would reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior
such as non-observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect of Abbott
o cers. However, Alcaraz's method of management was considered by Walsh to be "too
strict." 1 4 Alcaraz approached Misa to discuss these concerns and was told to "lie low" and
let Walsh handle the matter. Misa even assured her that Abbott's HRD would support her in
all her management decisions. 1 5
On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting immediate
action on the staff's performance evaluation as their probationary periods were about to
end. This Alcaraz eventually submitted. 1 6
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner Cecille Terrible (Terrible),
Abbott's former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding staff performance
standards. In the course thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-mail sent
by Walsh to some staff members which essentially contained queries regarding the
former's job performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh's action was the normal process of
evaluation. Terrible said that it was not. 1 7
aHECST
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh and Terrible where she
was informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of
Regulatory Affairs Manager. 1 8 Thereafter, Walsh and Terrible requested Alcaraz to tender
her resignation, else they be forced to terminate her services. She was also told that,
regardless of her choice, she should no longer report for work and was asked to surrender
her o ce identi cation cards. She requested to be given one week to decide on the same,
but to no avail. 1 9
On May 17, 2005, Alcaraz told her administrative assistant, Claude Gonzales
(Gonzales), that she would be on leave for that day. However, Gonzales told her that Walsh
and Terrible already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that Alcaraz already
resigned due to health reasons. 2 0
On May 23, 2005, Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo personally handed to Alcaraz a
letter stating that her services had been terminated effective May 19, 2005. 2 1 The letter
detailed the reasons for Alcaraz's termination — particularly, that Alcaraz: (a) did not
manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective
rapport with them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain the
knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing and article review
which were necessary for the proper performance of her duties. 2 2 On May 27, 2005,
Alcaraz received another copy of the said termination letter via registered mail. 2 3 ECTSDa
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus, led a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its o cers, namely, Misa,
Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist. 2 4 She claimed that she should have already
been considered as a regular and not a probationary employee given Abbott's failure to
inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her engagement as
required under Article 295 2 5 of the Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that while
her employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary status, the
same did not indicate the standards on which her regularization would be based. 2 6 She
further averred that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her
when: (a) they threatened her with termination; (b) she was ordered not to enter company
premises even if she was still an employee thereof; and (c) they publicly announced that
she already resigned in order to humiliate her. 2 7
On the contrary, petitioners maintained that Alcaraz was validly terminated from her
probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her
regularization which were made known to her at the time of her engagement. 2 8
The LA Ruling
In a Decision dated March 30, 2006, 2 9 the LA dismissed Alcaraz's complaint for
lack of merit.
The LA rejected Alcaraz's argument that she was not informed of the reasonable
standards to qualify as a regular employee considering her admissions that she was
briefed by Almazar on her work during her pre-employment orientation meeting 3 0 and that
she received copies of Abbott's Code of Conduct and Performance Modules which were
used for evaluating all types of Abbott employees. 3 1 As Alcaraz was unable to meet the
standards set by Abbott as per her performance evaluation, the LA ruled that the
termination of her probationary employment was justi ed. 3 2 Lastly, the LA found that
there was no evidence to conclude that Abbott's o cers and employees acted in bad faith
in terminating Alcaraz's employment. 3 3
Displeased with the LA's ruling, Alcaraz led an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). DTcACa
The NLRC Ruling

On September 15, 2006, the NLRC rendered a Decision, 3 4 annulling and setting
aside the LA's ruling, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 March 2006 [sic]
is hereby reversed, annulled and set aside and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding respondents Abbot [sic] and individual respondents to have
committed illegal dismissal;
2. Respondents are ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to
her former position without loss of seniority rights immediately upon receipt
hereof;
3. To jointly and severally pay complainant backwages computed
from 16 May 2005 until nality of this decision. As of the date hereof the
backwages is computed at
Backwages for 15
a. - PhP1,650,000.00
months
b. 13th month pay - 110,000.00

————————
TOTAL PhP1,760,000.00
==========
4. Respondents are ordered to pay complainant moral damages of

P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00.
5. Respondents are also ordered to pay attorney's fees of 10% of the

total award. cDCSTA
6. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 3 5
The NLRC reversed the ndings of the LA and ruled that there was no evidence
showing that Alcaraz had been apprised of her probationary status and the requirements
which she should have complied with in order to be a regular employee. 3 6 It held that
Alcaraz's receipt of her job description and Abbott's Code of Conduct and Performance
Modules was not equivalent to her being actually informed of the performance standards
upon which she should have been evaluated on. 3 7 It further observed that Abbott did not
comply with its own standard operating procedure in evaluating probationary employees.
3 8 The NLRC was also not convinced that Alcaraz was terminated for a valid cause given
that petitioners' allegation of Alcaraz's "poor performance" remained unsubstantiated. 3 9
Petitioners led a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated July 31, 2007. 4 0 CHEIcS
Aggrieved, petitioners led with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed
as CA G.R. SP No. 101045 (First CA Petition), alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of NLRC when it ruled that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. 4 1
Pending resolution of the First CA Petition, Alcaraz moved for the execution of the
NLRC's Decision before the LA, which petitioners strongly opposed. The LA denied the said
motion in an Order dated July 8, 2008 which was, however, eventually reversed on appeal
by the NLRC. 4 2 Due to the foregoing, petitioners led another Petition for Certiorari with
the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 111318 (Second CA Petition), assailing the
propriety of the execution of the NLRC decision. 4 3
The CA Ruling
With regard to the First CA Petition, the CA, in a Decision 4 4 dated December 10,
2009, a rmed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the latter did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed.
It observed that Alcaraz was not apprised at the start of her employment of the
reasonable standards under which she could qualify as a regular employee. 4 5 This was
based on its examination of the employment contract which showed that the same did not
contain any standard of performance or any stipulation that Alcaraz shall undergo a
performance evaluation before she could qualify as a regular employee. 4 6 It also found
that Abbott was unable to prove that there was any reasonable ground to terminate
Alcaraz's employment. 4 7 Abbott moved for the reconsideration of the aforementioned
ruling which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 4 8 dated June 9, 2010.
The CA likewise denied the Second CA Petition in a Resolution dated May 18, 2010
(May 18, 2010 Resolution) and ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the execution
of the NLRC Decision. 4 9 Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. SHADEC
While the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the CA's May 18, 2010
Resolution was pending, Alcaraz again moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
before the LA. On June 7, 2010, petitioners received the LA's order granting Alcaraz's
motion for execution which they in turn appealed to the NLRC — through a Memorandum of
Appeal dated June 16, 2010 (June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal) — on the ground that
the implementation of the LA's order would render its motion for reconsideration moot
and academic. 5 0
Meanwhile, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the CA's May 18, 2010
Resolution in the Second CA Petition was denied via a Resolution dated October 4, 2010.
5 1 This attained nality on January 10, 2011 for petitioners' failure to timely appeal the
same. 5 2 Hence, as it stands, only the issues in the First CA petition are left to be resolved.
Incidentally, in her Comment dated November 15, 2010, Alcaraz also alleges that
petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when they led the Second CA Petition pending
the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the CA's December 10, 2009 Decision
i.e., the decision in the First CA Petition. 5 3 She also contends that petitioners have not
complied with the certi cation requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
when they failed to disclose in the instant petition the ling of the June 16, 2010
Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC. 5 4
The Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Court's resolution: (a) whether or not
petitioners are guilty of forum shopping and have violated the certi cation requirement
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; (b) whether or not Alcaraz was su ciently
informed of the reasonable standards to qualify her as a regular employee; (c) whether or
not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment; and (d) whether or not the
individual petitioners herein are liable. CTcSAE
The Court's Ruling

A. Forum Shopping and
Violation of Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the prohibition against forum
shopping is different from a violation of the certi cation requirement under Section 5, Rule
7 of the Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong v. CA, 5 5 the Court explained that:
. . . The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and
the certi cation requirement should by now be too elementary to be
misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certi cation against forum
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum
shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply
with the certi cation requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum
shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of
enforcing them. The former constitutes su cient cause for the dismissal without
prejudice [to the ling] of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and
after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for
direct contempt. . . . . 5 6
As to the rst, forum shopping takes place when a litigant les multiple suits
involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. 5 7 HSATIC
In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the
elements of forum shopping do not exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to
question the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the
Second CA Petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award
pending the resolution of the First CA Petition and the nality of the decision in the labor
dispute between Alcaraz and the petitioners. Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the
Second CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar as the First CA Petition is
concerned. Thus, considering that the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters
and causes of action, there exists no forum shopping.
As to the second, Alcaraz further imputes that the petitioners violated the
certi cation requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court 5 8 by not disclosing
the fact that it led the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC in the
instant petition.
In this regard, Section 5 (b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who
les a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending
case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was led. If there is no such
similar pending case, Section 5 (a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to
declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending.
Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition and those in the June 16,
2010 Memorandum of Appeal led with the NLRC likewise cover different subject matters
and causes of action. In this case, the validity of Alcaraz's dismissal is at issue whereas in
the said Memorandum of Appeal, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution was
in question. Thus, given the dissimilar issues, petitioners did not have to disclose in the
present petition the ling of their June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. In
any event, considering that the issue on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution
had been resolved in the Second CA Petition — which in fact had already attained nality —
the matter of disclosing the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal is now moot and
academic. HCacDE
Having settled the foregoing procedural matter, the Court now proceeds to resolve
the substantive issues.
B. Probationary employment;
grounds for termination.
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure.
However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the
probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of the engagement. 5 9 Thus, the services of an employee who has
been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just
o r (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. 6 0
Corollary thereto, Section 6 (d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code provides that if the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the
reasonable standards upon which the regularization would be based on at the time of the
engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee, viz.:
(d)In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to
the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at
the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the
employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.caEIDA
In other words, the employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when
dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must
make such communication at the time of the probationary employee's engagement. If the
employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a
probationary employee.
Keeping with these rules, an employer is deemed to have made known the
standards that would qualify a probationary employee to be a regular employee when it
has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is expected to do or
accomplish during the trial period of probation. This goes without saying that the
employee is su ciently made aware of his probationary status as well as the length of
time of the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for
instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers. 6 1 Also, in Aberdeen Court,
Inc. v. Agustin, 6 2 it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary employee of the
standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a
manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which there is no
need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same light, an employee's failure to
perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him
constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee's non-regularization.
In this case, petitioners contend that Alcaraz was terminated because she failed to
qualify as a regular employee according to Abbott's standards which were made known to
her at the time of her engagement. Contrarily, Alcaraz claims that Abbott never apprised
her of these standards and thus, maintains that she is a regular and not a mere
probationary employee.
The Court finds petitioners' assertions to be well-taken.
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied
with the above-stated requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that
Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs
Manager prior to, during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her
employment. On this score, the Court nds it apt to detail not only the incidents which
point out to the efforts made by Abbott but also those circumstances which would show
that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her employer's expectations that would, in turn,
determine her regularization: DTCSHA
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job
description for as well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid
position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to Abbott on October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott's December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to
be employed on a probationary status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which
speci cally stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6)
months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott's employment offer, Bernardo sent her
copies of Abbott's organizational structure and her job description through e-mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation where Almazar
informed her that she had to implement Abbott's Code of Conduct and o ce policies on
human resources and finance and that she would be reporting directly to Walsh;
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as part of her
orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott's Code of Conduct and Performance
Modules from Misa who explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance of
probationary employees; she was further noti ed that Abbott had only one evaluation
system for all of its employees; and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another pharmaceutical
company and had admitted to have an "extensive training and background" to acquire the
necessary skills for her job. 6 3 DIcSHE
Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be

doubted that Alcaraz was well-aware that her regularization would depend on her ability
and capacity to ful ll the requirements of her position as Regulatory Affairs Manager and
that her failure to perform such would give Abbott a valid cause to terminate her
probationary employment.
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance
of one's duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a probationary
employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need not be literally
spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be
observed that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of a
management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as Abbott did in this case —
should be respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee like Alcaraz who
was tasked with the vital responsibility of handling the personnel and important matters of
her department.
In ne, the Court rules that Alcaraz's status as a probationary employee and her
consequent dismissal must stand. Consequently, in holding that Alcaraz was illegally
dismissed due to her status as a regular and not a probationary employee, the Court nds
that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision on the premise that
Alcaraz's receipt of her job description and Abbott's Code of Conduct and Performance
Modules was not equivalent to being actually informed of the performance standards
upon which she should have been evaluated on. 6 4 It, however, overlooked the legal
implication of the other attendant circumstances as detailed herein which should have
warranted a contrary nding that Alcaraz was indeed a probationary and not a regular
employee — more particularly the fact that she was well-aware of her duties and
responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the same would lead to her non-
regularization and eventually, her termination.
Accordingly, by a rming the NLRC's pronouncement which is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, the CA committed a reversible error which, perforce, necessitates the
reversal of its decision.
C. Probationary employment;
termination procedure.
A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the
usual two-notice rule does not govern. 6 5 Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code states that "[i]f the termination is brought about by the . . . failure
of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary
employment, it shall be su cient that a written notice is served the employee, within a
reasonable time from the effective date of termination." TIaCHA
As the records show, Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated May
19, 2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein
were the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper evaluation, Abbott determined
that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization considering her lack
of time and people management and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the
performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. 6 6 Undeniably, this written
notice su ciently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause and
manner of Alcaraz's dismissal as a probationary employee under the parameters set by
the Labor Code. 6 7
D. Employer's violation of
company policy and
procedure.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of a su cient ground to terminate Alcaraz's
employment and Abbott's compliance with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is
readily apparent that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed
to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.
Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract between
the employer and employee. In Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger, 6 8 it has been held that: EHaCTA
[E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights in

employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy
statements would create contractual rights in the employee, and, hence,
although the statement of policy is signed by neither party, can be unilaterally
amended by the employer without notice to the employee, and contains no
reference to a speci c employee, his job description or compensation, and
although no reference was made to the policy statement in pre-employment
interviews and the employee does not learn of its existence until after his hiring.
Toussaint, 292 N.W .2d at 892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an
employer establishes an express personnel policy and the employee
continues to work while the policy remains in effect, the policy is
deemed an implied contract for so long as it remains in effect . If the
employer unilaterally changes the policy, the terms of the implied
contract are also thereby changed . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Hence, given such nature, company personnel policies create an obligation on the
part of both the employee and the employer to abide by the same.
Records show that Abbott's PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job
performance of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with
the employee at least twice: rst on the third month and second on the fth month from
the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a Performance
Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge the gap between the
employee's performance and the standards set, if any. 6 9 In addition, a signed copy of the
PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott's HRD as the same would serve as basis for
recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary employment. 7 0
In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in
evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz's
PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE form was
completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance evaluation
discussed with her during the third and fth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott
come up with the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz's
performance with the set company standards. cHATSI
While it is Abbott's management prerogative to promulgate its own company rules

and even subsequently amend them, this right equally demands that when it does create
its own policies and thereafter notify its employee of the same, it accords upon itself the
obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would entail a
disharmonious relationship in the work place for the laborer should never be mired by the
uncertainty of imsy rules in which the latter's labor rights and duties would, to some
extent, depend.
In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz's probationary
employment for her failure to meet the standards required for her regularization, and while
it must be further pointed out that Abbott had satis ed its statutory duty to serve a written
notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own company procedure renders the
termination of Alcaraz's employment procedurally in rm, warranting the payment of
nominal damages. A further exposition is apropos.
Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause
but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.
In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon) , 7 1 the Court pronounced that where the dismissal is
for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights. 7 2 Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay
the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 7 3
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modi ed Agabon in the case of Jaka
Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka) 7 4 where it created a distinction between
procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and those due to an
authorized cause, on the other. ACcHIa
It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of
the Labor Code (now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of his
management prerogative. 7 5 Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an
authorized cause of retrenchment 7 6 — as contradistinguished from the employee in
Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty 7 7 — the Court ordered the
employer to pay the employee nominal damages at the higher amount of P50,000.00.
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka proceed from the
necessity to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of
employees. 7 8 In similar regard, the Court deems it proper to apply the same principle to
the case at bar for the reason that an employer's contractual breach of its own company
procedure — albeit not statutory in source — has the parallel effect of violating the
laborer's rights. Su ce it to state, the contract is the law between the parties and thus,
breaches of the same impel recompense to vindicate a right that has been violated.
Consequently, while the Court is wont to uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid
cause exists, the payment of nominal damages on account of Abbott's contractual breach
is warranted in accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code. 7 9
Anent the proper amount of damages to be awarded, the Court observes that
Alcaraz's dismissal proceeded from her failure to comply with the standards required for
her regularization. As such, it is undeniable that the dismissal process was, in effect,
initiated by an act imputable to the employee, akin to dismissals due to just causes under
Article 296 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to x the amount
of nominal damages at the amount of P30,000.00, consistent with its rulings in both
Agabon and Jaka. cDHCAE
E. Liability of individual
petitioners as corporate
officers.
It is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or
o cers attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation,
or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when
there is a con ict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or
other persons; (b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having
knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith le with the corporate secretary their written
objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the
corporation; or (d) they are made by speci c provision of law personally answerable for
their corporate action. 8 0
In this case, Alcaraz alleges that the individual petitioners acted in bad faith with
regard to the supposed crude manner by which her probationary employment was
terminated and thus, should be held liable together with Abbott. In the same vein, she
further attributes the loss of some of her remaining belongings to them. 8 1
Alcaraz's contention fails to persuade.
A judicious perusal of the records show that other than her unfounded assertions on
the matter, there is no evidence to support the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in
their capacity as Abbott's o cers and employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by
ill will in terminating Alcaraz's services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to resign and not
allowed to enter the workplace does not necessarily indicate bad faith on Abbott's part
since a su cient ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with her termination. On
the alleged loss of her personal belongings, records are bereft of any showing that the
same could be attributed to Abbott or any of its o cers. It is a well-settled rule that bad
faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told,
since Alcaraz failed to prove any malicious act on the part of Abbott or any of its o cers,
the Court finds the award of moral or exemplary damages unwarranted. CHDaAE
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision dated December 10, 2009
and Resolution dated June 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101045 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2006 of
the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Abbott
Laboratories, Philippines be ORDERED to pay respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 on account of its breach of its own company
procedure.
SO ORDERED .
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., see dissent.
Mendoza, J., but concurs with J. Brion in his views on the procedural aspect.
Leonen, J., I join J. Brion in his dissent.
Separate Opinions
BRION , J., dissenting :
The Case
The case in caption was a Second Division illegal dismissal case that the Court en
banc accepted for decision pursuant to Section 3, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. SaAcHE
A. The Issues Posed

The case posed two issues to the Court for resolution. The rst is the manner of
review that the Court should undertake. This is an issue that underlies all the Court's
decision making in light of the various modes of review and essentials that the Rules of
Court require. The second and core issue relates to the merits of the legality or illegality
of the dismissal: whether the Labor Code requirements governing the dismissal of a
probationary employee had been complied with, considered from the prism of the mode of
review and the nature of the decision under review.
B. The Factual Highlights
To brie y summarize the highlights of the case, Abbott Laboratories, Phils.
(petitioner), Cecille A. Terrible, Edwin D. Feist, Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa, Teresita C.
Bernardo, and Allan G. Almazar (individual petitioners) are the employer and its senior
o cials who dismissed respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz from employment within three
(3) months from her engagement. The respondent complained against the petitioners on
the ground that she had been illegally dismissed: (1) she was not informed of the
standards that would govern her as a probationary employee, as required by the law (the
Labor Code) and its implementing rules; (2) the petitioners even violated the company's
own internal rules on the manner of dismissing probationary employees; (3) substantively,
her dismissal was without the required just cause as required by the law and the rules; and
(4) her dismissal was done oppressively and in bad faith. ADHCSE
C. The Rulings Below

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal had been valid but the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor Arbiter; found the dismissal illegal;
and damages and attorney's fees because of the manner the dismissal was effected. The
Court of Appeals (CA) found no grave abuse of discretion and accordingly denied the
Rule 65 petition that the petitioner Abbott brought.
D. The Current Court Rulings
The Ponencia . In the present Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari before this
Court, the ponencia undertook a weighing of the evidence in light of her own view of
how the evidence should be interpreted, and came out with her own ruling for the
grant of the petition.
This Dissent . I vote to dismiss the petition before us as I agree with the decision of
the CA that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in concluding
that respondent had been illegally dismissed from employment .
Discussion of the Issues
I. The Procedural Issue
A. The Preliminary Issue: Manner of Review
A labor case nds its way into the judicial system from the NLRC whose decision is
nal and executory . Finality simply means that the NLRC ruling is no longer
appealable ; the legal intent is to con ne adjudication of labor cases to labor tribunals
with the expertise in these cases and thereby bring the resolution of the case to a close at
the soonest possible time.
When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for that matter) is already nal and
unappealable, the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is through a limited review
on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65 . This has been the mode of review followed
since the Labor Code took effect in November 1974; labor cases were directly brought to
this Court but only on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. 1
In 1998, the Court — in lieu of directly acting on labor cases under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court — opted to change the procedure of review through its ruling in St.
Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission , 2 taking into
account the judicial hierarchy of courts and the growing number of labor cases elevated to
the Supreme Court under Rule 65. The Court resolved that the proper recourse from the
NLRC's nal and executory ruling is to assail the ruling before the CA under Rule 65 .
Thus, the unappealable character of the NLRC ruling (as declared by substantive law) did
not change; only the process of review changed in terms of the court (from the Supreme
Court to the Court of Appeals) to which the labor case can initially be brought. TIcEDC
From the CA ruling, a dissatis ed party has the option to le an appeal with the
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This mode of appeal limits the review to questions of law.
B. Standard of Review of a Labor Case under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
In Montoya v. Transmed, 3 the Supreme Court (the Court), through its Second
Division, clari ed the approach that the CA and this Court should make in the handling of
labor cases, among others, to ensure the prompt handling of these cases and thereby
unclog our dockets. To quote our ruling in Montoya:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA
decision , in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake
under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law
raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have
to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the
basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct . In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a
Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before
it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in
a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA
correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling on the case? 4 [emphases and italics supplied;
citations omitted] DTAESI
Thus, under the Rule 65 review by the CA , Montoya reiterates that the sole ground
or issue allowed is jurisdictional — the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in ruling on the case. To state the obvious, this kind of review
would have made it easier for the CA to handle the case; in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion, it can dismiss labor cases for lack of grave abuse of discretion as we do in this
Court.
From the CA, further recourse is through a Rule 45 review by this Court on
questions of law in accordance with prevailing rulings. The o ce of a petition for review
on certiorari is not to examine and settle factual questions already ruled upon below. In
this review, the Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA's
finding that the NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law .
This manner of review is effectively a supervisory review by the courts that bears
two signi cant characteristics: first, it respects the mandate of the law that the decision
below is nal and is not for the courts to review on appeal for its legal and factual merits;
and second, review by the courts (particularly by the Supreme Court) in the exercise of
their supervisory certiorari jurisdiction is mandated no less than by the Constitution
and is intended to ensure that the deciding entity stayed within the due bounds of its
authority or jurisdiction. 5
Speci cally, in reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
Court's review is limited to:
(1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA's decision in nding the
presence or absence of a grave abuse of discretion . This is done by examining, on
the basis of the parties' presentations, whether the CA correctly determined that at the
NLRC level, all the adduced pieces of evidence were considered; no evidence which should
not have been considered was considered; and the evidence presented supports the NLRC
findings; and
(2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA's
interpretation or application of the law.
In this kind of limited review, the Court avoids reviewing a labor case by re-weighing
the evidence or re-evaluating its su ciency; the task of weighing or evaluation, as a rule,
lies within the NLRC's jurisdiction as an administrative appellate body. aDcHIS
If the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and,
accordingly, dismiss the petition. If grave abuse of discretion exists, then the CA must
grant the petition and nullify the NLRC ruling, entering at the same time the ruling that is
justi ed under the evidence and the governing law, rules and jurisprudence. In our Rule 45
review, this Court must deny the petition if it finds that the CA correctly acted.
In the context of the present case, the CA found no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the NLRC; hence, the CA dismissed the Rule 65 petition
before it. In our own ruling on the Rule 45 petition before us, we should evaluate
the petition in this light, not in the manner that the ponencia did in concluding
for the grant of the petition and ruling in favor of the petitioners.
By so doing, the ponencia undertook a factual appellate review that laid the whole
case open for the detailed examination of every piece of evidence adduced in the case and
for the evaluation of the correctness of the application of the law to the evidence found.
This is a review that a Rule 45 petition does not allow.
II. The Substantive Issues
A. The Respondent's Status of Employment
II.A.1. Standards to determine probationary employment
While the respondent might have been hired as a probationary employee, the
petitioners' evidence did not establish the employers' compliance with the
probationary employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor Code (as
amended) and Section 6 (d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the
Labor Code (as amended) . Thus, the respondent should be considered a regular
employee and the case should be reviewed on this basis. CAETcH
Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 281.Probationary employment. — Probationary employment shall not
exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services
of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the time of his engagement . An employee who is allowed
to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
Further, Section 6 (d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code,
as amended, states:
Sec. 6.Probationary employment. — There is probationary employment
where the employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial period
during which the employer determines his tness to qualify for regular
employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the
time of engagement . [emphasis supplied]
Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
(d)In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make

known to the employee t h e standards under which he will qualify as a
regular employee at the time of his engagement . Where no standards
are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be d eem ed a
regular employee . [emphases ours; italics supplied] CIaHDc
To sum up these provisions, a valid probationary employment requires the

concurrence of two requirements. First , the employer shall make known the reasonable
stand ard (performance standard) whose compliance will render the employee quali ed
to be a regular employee. Second , the employer shall inform the employee of the
applicable performance standard at the time of his/her engagement . Failing in one
or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a probationary employee, should be viewed
and considered a regular employee.
The ponencia apparently fully agrees with the above statement of the applicable law
as it substantially recites the same requirements, including the consequence that upon
failure to comply with these same requirements, "the employee is deemed as a regular and
not a probationary employee." 6 It continues, however, with a twist that effectively negates
what it has stated and admitted about the need to communicate the regularization
standards to the employee, thus:
Keeping with these rules, an employees is deemed to have made known
the standards that would qualify a probationary employee to be a regular
employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what
he is expected to do to accomplish during the trial of probation. This goes without
saying that the employee is su ciently made aware of his probationary status as
well as the length of time of the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in nature,

for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also in Aberdeen
Court, Inc. v. Agustin , it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary
employee of the standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an
employee in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard
to which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same
light, an employee's failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which have
been clearly made known to him constitutes a justi able basis for a probationary
employee's non-regularization. [footnotes from the original, omitted]
IDAESH
Based on these premises, the ponencia then deftly argues that because the duties
and responsibilities of the position have been explained to the respondent, an experienced
human resource specialist, she should have known what was expected for her to attain
regular status.
The ponencia's reasoning, however, is badly flawed.
1st. The law and the rules require that there performance standards
communicated at the time of engagement to the probationary employee. The
performance standards to be met are the employer's speci c expectations of how the
probationary employee should perform.
The ponencia impliedly admits that no performance standards were expressly given
but argues that because the respondent had been informed of her duties and
responsibilities (a fact that was and is not disputed), she should be deemed to know
what was expected of her for purposes of regularization.
This is a major flaw that the ponencia satisfies only via an assumption. The ponencia
apparently forgets that knowledge of duties and responsibilities is different from the
measure of how these duties and responsibilities should be delivered. They are separate
elements and the latter element is missing in the present case.
2nd. The ponencia glosses over the communication aspect. Not only must there be
express performance standards (except in speci c instances de ned in the implementing
rules, discussed below); there must be effective communication. If no standards were
provided, what would be communicated?
3rd. The ponencia badly contradicts itself in claiming that actual communication of
speci c standards might not be necessary " when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for
instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers." The respondent, in the rst
place, was never a maid, cook, driver or a messenger and cannot be placed under this
classi cation; she was hired and employed as a human resources manager, in short, a
managerial employee. Plain and common sense reasoning by one who ever had been in an
employment situation dictates that the job of a managerial employee cannot be self-
explanatory, in the way the ponencia implied; the complexity of a managerial job must
necessarily require that the level of performance to be delivered must be speci ed and
cannot simply be assumed based on the communication of the manager's duties and
responsibilities.
4th. The ponencia also forgets that what these "performance standards" or
measures cannot simply be assumed because they are critically important in this case, or
for that matter, in any case involving jobs whose duties and responsibilities are not simple
or self-descriptive. If the respondent had been evaluated or assessed in the manner that
the company's internal rules require, these standards would have been the basis for her
performance or lack of it. Last but not the least, the respondent's services were terminated
on the basis of the performance standards that, by law, the employer set or prescribed at
the time of the employee's engagement. If none had been prescribed in the rst place,
under what basis could the employee then be assessed for purposes of termination or
regularization? IDSaAH

From these preliminary take-off points in the ponencia's premises, it can
already be discerned that something is badly amiss and skewed in its
appreciation and review of the rulings of the NLRC and the CA. It is an
appreciation that goes beyond what a determination of grave abuse of
discretion requires. It is an evaluation of the adduced evidence based on
externalities beyond the face value of the presented evidence.
In this case, the ponencia simply disregarded the plain import of the
evidence or the lack of it, and ventured into the realm of assumptions to justify
its desired conclusions. In the mathematical realm of problem solving, it
appears to have started from the conclusion and solved the problem backwards
so that the conclusion would fit into its stretched reading of the evidence.
II.A.2. The respondent should be deemed a regular employee
In the context of this case, an initial determination of how the respondent's
employment started and of her legal status at that point is the best starting point in
determining the validity of her dismissal.
The respondent was indisputably initially hired as a probationary employee. This is
not a contested point. The established facts and the applicable law, however, dictate
otherwise from the perspective of law as the petitioners failed to show compliance
with the two requirements of Article 281 of the Labor Code (as amended) and of
Section 6 (d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended).
This was what the NLRC found, leading the CA to conclude that no grave
abuse of discretion intervened in the NLRC's ruling because its ndings were
supported by the evidence on record and by the correctly-chosen applicable law .
In stark contrast, the ponencia's reading, although based on the same legal premises, was
based on shaky assumptions, not on the hard evidence that the tribunals below
appreciated. STcaDI
II.A.2(a). No specific employment standard on record.

As the NLRC found (and as con rmed by the CA), no term or provision exists in the
respondent's Employment Contract 7 relating to the performance standard that the
respondent was expected to observe. The Employment Contract, duly presented as
evidence, only proved the terms and conditions of the respondent's employment as therein
indicated, i.e., the position title, the assigned department, the status of employment, and
the period of employment. Beyond these, the Employment Contract did not say anything
more. To be sure, nothing more can be extracted from this piece of evidence except the
facts stated and the inferences by implication from the expressly disclosed information.
Signi cantly, none of these can be characterized or inferred by implication as performance
standards.
The best evidence of what the ponencia did when it saw matters otherwise, is its
own statement: its basis is not what the submitted evidence state but on what she was
"largely impelled" to recognize. To quote the ponencia's own words:
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed
complied with the above requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by
the fact that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and
responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of
her engagement, and the incipient states of her employment. On this score, the
Court nds it apt to detail not only of the incidents which point out to the efforts
made by Abbott but also those circumstances which would show that Alcaraz
was well-apprised of her employer's expectations that would, in turn determine her
regularization:" [emphasis supplied]CTDHSE
The petitioner's other pieces of evidence that the ponencia cited and used to
support its conclusion do not and cannot, however, satisfy the requirement for
performance standards that must be communicated at the time of engagement.
Speci cally, these were the Offer Sheet dated December 7, 2004, and the pre-
employment orientation on the respondent's duty to implement the petitioner's Code of
Conduct, office policies and training program.
The Offer Sheet was designed to inform the respondent of the compensation and
bene ts package offered to her by the petitioner and can in no way be read as a statement
of the applicable probationary employment standard. 8 It was communicated even prior to
engagement when the parties were negotiating, not at the point of engagement as the law
requires.
The pre-employment orientation on the respondent's duty to implement the
petitioner's Code of Conduct, o ce policies and training program likewise cannot be
characterized as performance standards; they simply related to activities aimed at
acquainting and training the respondent on her duties and not for the purpose of informing
her of the performance standards applicable to her. What stands out is that they do not
pertain speci cally to the respondent and the required performance standard
applicable for her quali cation for regular employment ; they related to the staff the
respondent managed and supervised. Additionally, these were all relayed prior to or after
the respondent was engaged by the petitioner.
An important distinction to remember at this point is that the respondent's
knowledge of the duties that her work entailed, and her knowledge of the employer's
performance standard, are two distinct matters separately requiring the presentation of
independent proof. CAIaHS
The requirement of independent proof is found under Article 281 of the Labor Code,
as amended, and its implementing rule that deem an employee to be regular if he/she
was not informed of the performance standard for regularization . Independent
proof is likewise necessary as the law provides an additional ground for terminating a
probationary employment, i.e., when the employee "fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employers[.] " 9
The performance standard contemplated in law may be proven by evidence of how
the employee's performance was intended to be or was, in fact, measured by the
employer. The performance standard may be in the form of a clear set of the employer's
expectations, or by a system of feedbacks (e.g., comment cards) and document evaluation
or performance evaluation and appraisals conducted by the employer.
These were the pieces of evidence that the NLRC, as con rmed by the CA,
did not see in the evidence or in the petitioners' presented case . The ponencia,
unfortunately, glossed over these gaps and omissions in the petitioners' case and chose to
believe, even without evidentiary basis that —
Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances , it cannot,
therefore, be doubted that Alcaraz was well-aware that her regularization would
depend on her ability and capacity to ful ll the requirements of her position as
Regulatory Affairs Manager and that her failure to perform such would give
Abbott a valid cause to terminate her probationary employment. [emphasis
supplied]
From this strained and stretched reading that magically saw the required prescribed
performance standards that — by the factual ndings of the NLRC and the CA — never
existed, the ponencia went on to conclude: DEcSaI
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate
performance of one's duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard
for a probationary employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard
which need not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every
case. In this regard, it must be observed that the assessment of adequate duty
performance is in the nature of a management prerogative which when
reasonably exercised — as Abbott did in this case — should be respected. This is
especially true of a managerial employee like Alcaraz who was tasked with the
vital responsibility of handling personnel and important matters of her
department.
This conclusion, of course, simply extends the magic by using "basic knowledge and
common sense" to dictate the existence of "inherent and implied standards" of a
probationary employee, and even offers a view of "management prerogative" that is
unusual in the given facts of this case. This approach eloquently exempli es what I
mentioned above as the "solving backwards" approach that the ponencia used. TIaCcD
II.A.2(b). No speci c performance standard communicated to the

respondent.
Complementing the requirement for the existence of performance standards is the
required communication of the performance standard to the respondent. Again, nothing
in the records shows that the petitioner ever communicated any performance standard
to the respondent.
The ponencia, in building up a case contrary to what the NLRC and the CA found,
cites the evidence the petitioners point to — the respondent's receipt of copies of the
petitioner's Code of Conduct, Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation, and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules. The NLRC and the CA , looking at the same
pieces of evidence, saw these in a different light as they did not only examine the
documents themselves but went to the extent of examining and appreciating the
circumstances surrounding the respondent's receipt of these documents .
The evidence on record suggests, as the respondent directly testi ed to, that the
cited documents were not given to her for the purpose of complying with the petitioner's
obligation to inform her of the performance standards applicable to her. The documents
were, in fact, given by the petitioner to assist her in monitoring the employees
assigned to her department, i.e., as the documents she must rely on in
conducting the performance evaluations of the staff assigned to her
department . In short, the respondent received the documents because they were
necessary in the discharge of her functions.
From the point of law, compliance with the rst requirement is not also satis ed by
the petitioner's assertion that the respondent knew that only one performance standard
applied to all employees. Notably, the law requires proof that the employer speci cally
made known to her the performance standards applicable to her to enable her to qualify
for regular employment. The required communication must be an effective one if
the law were to be given meaningful substance, not a mere perfunctory
transmission of information .
Faced with these opposing claims, the CA apparently weighed matters in the
respondent's (and effectively in the NLRC's) favor. In this situation of possible equipoise,
the CA did not rule incorrectly from the point of law when it acted as it did. HICEca
Two factors tilt the balance in favor of the legal correctness of the CA's ruling. The
r s t is that the respondent's position (found by the NLRC to be meritorious) was not
without any basis in fact and in law . The s e c o nd is from the latter perspective;
Article 4 of the Labor Code and established jurisprudence hold that any doubt in a labor
situation must be resolved in the employee's favor.
Thus, again, the ponencia's case and its conclusion must fail.
II.A.2(c). Performance standards and the internal procedures for
their evaluation were not applied to the respondent.
I can only agree with one aspect of the ponencia — its admission that Abbott's
internal procedures were not applied to the respondent. I cannot dispute and I fully agree
with the following passages of the ponencia:
Records show that Abbott's PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the
job performance of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and
discussed with the employee at least twice: rst on the third month and second
on the fth month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come
up with a Performance Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge
the gap between the employee's performance and the standards set, if any. In
addition, a signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott's HRD as
the same would serve as basis for recommending the con rmation or termination
of the probationary employment. HAICET
In this case, as it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated

procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that a
signed copy of Alcaraz PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even
shown that a PPSE form was completed to formally assess her performance.
Neither was the performance evaluation discussed with her during the third and
fth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the necessary
Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz performance with the
set company standards.
While it is Abbott's management prerogative to promulgate its own
company rules and even subsequently amend them, this right equally demands
that when it does create its own policies and thereafter notify its employees of the
same, it accords upon itself the obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a
contrary interpretation would entail a disharmonious relationship in the work
place for the laborer should never be mired by the uncertainty of imsy rules in
which the latter's labor rights and duties would, to some extent, depend. 1 0
[footnotes in the original omitted]
Internal processes, however, cannot be dissociated from the substance that the
processes seek to achieve. This is the essence of due process . There is the
requirement for the observance of proper procedures, hand in hand with the substance of
what the law seeks — to level the playing eld between the all-powerful employer and the
vulnerable employee who lies at the mercy of the employer if he or she can be dismissed
on the basis of the latter's whim. This attempt at leveling is the reason for the
requirements for duly disclosed performance standards and their communication to the
probationary employee at the very beginning of the relationship. Reason, experience and
common sense dictate that the substance of the law carry more weight than the process
component so that any violation of the substantive portion is a transgression that mere
obeisance to the process or the recognition of the failure of process, cannot cure. From
this perspective, the laudable quotation above loses its luster. DHCcST
Lusterless or otherwise, the ponencia's admission of Abbott's procedural

inadequacies is not without signi cance in terms of the present case as a whole. Notably,
the above quotation expressly and impliedly admits that no effort at all was ever made for
the conduct of an assessment or evaluation of the respondent's performance; in fact, no
performance evaluation forms appear to have been submitted by the company. The dearth
of evidence on this point (described by the ponencia as a "hiatus of evidence") is
completely consistent with what the ponencia explicitly and impliedly admits from the very
beginning: there was no evidence of any performance standard furnished the
respondent so that the ponencia could only deduce the existence of
performance standards from its assumptions and stretched rationalizations;
much less was there any communication of performance standards qua
performance standards, as this is a matter that was also assumed.
I draw attention, too, to another unusual feature of this case indicating, not only the
omissions that the ponencia already cited, but the implication as well that the respondent
had been singled out for special treatment by the petitioner o cers. At the very least, this
incident indicates that the petitioner did not apply the same standards and processes to
the respondent's work. The petitioner's prescribed procedure was narrated in an earlier
version of the ponencia in this wise:
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner Cecille Terrible
(Terrible), Abbott's former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding staff
performance standards. In the course . . . thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a
printed copy of an e-mail sent by Walsh to some staff members which essentially
contained queries regarding the former's job performance. Alcaraz asked if
Walsh's action was the normal process of evaluation. Terrible said that
it was not . 1 1 (emphasis ours)
This allegation by the respondent in this regard in her pleadings was impliedly
admitted by the petitioner when it failed to offer any refutation. Interestingly, the above
allegation was included in the narration of facts of the Labor Arbiter , the NLRC ,
t h e CA and an earlier version of the ponencia , although they arrived at two (2)
different conclusions. aDSHCc
The respondent's unrefuted allegation was not considered at all in the conclusions
of the Labor Arbiter and of the ponencia. 1 2 On the other hand, the NLRC and the CA
concluded that a different performance standard and evaluation process was applied to
the respondent in light of the circumstances of the case, gleaned from the evidence
submitted. 1 3
In my view, the NLRC and the CA were not without basis in making their conclusion
as the incident, taken together with the facts supported by the available evidence, is vital in
appreciating the nature of the respondent's employment.
Since the respondent, as the incident suggests, was bound by a different set of
standards and procedures, and since no evidence of record existed showing what these
standards were or that the required procedures were observed, the petitioners' theory that
the respondent was informed of, and was evaluated pursuant to, the performance
standards applicable to her position, is effectively negated. This leads to the
conclusion that the respondent, from the beginning, had been a regular
employee as a result of the failure of Abbott's HR processes . A much simpler view,
related this time to the manner of her termination, is that the respondent was simply
differently treated.
B. "Just Cause" for Dismissal Must Exist
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer carries the burden of proving
that the dismissal was for a just cause and with the observance of due process prior to
dismissal. 1 4 The employer has to discharge this burden by clear, accurate, consistent and
convincing evidence; 1 5 in case of doubt, the presumption in the employee's favor under
Article 4 of the Labor Code should apply.
II.B.1. The petitioner had no valid cause to dismiss the respondent's
employment
The respondent was dismissed as she "failed to qualify as regular employee in
accordance with the prescribed standards set by the Company." 1 6 Even granting for the
sake of argument that the petitioner had apprised the respondent of an applicable
performance standard, the evidence failed to show that the respondent did not meet this
standard in a manner and to the extent equivalent to the "just cause" that the law requires.
II.B.1(a). Just cause requirement for employees, whether
probationary or regular.
An important legal point that should not be lost in considering this case is that a
probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a regular employee
under the Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of an
employment . While the strict application of Article 282 of the Labor Code may be relaxed
because the employee is still under probation (so that analogous probationary status rules
may apply), the same essential just cause for dismissal must be present and must be
proven. In other words, probationary employment does not mean that the employee is
under an "employment at will" situation as that phrase is understood in American
jurisprudence. To reiterate, the fact that the respondent was still in her probationary period
of employment did not lessen the burden of proof that the law imposed on the petitioners
to prove the just cause for her dismissal. 1 7 Probationary employees are protected by the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution and they cannot be removed from their
position except only for cause. 1 8 DECSIT
II.B.1(b). The evidentiary status of the just cause for dismissal

In the present case, the evidence did not show the just cause that Article 282 of the
Labor Code requires. No evidence on record showed the commission by the respondent of
any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
On the contrary, the records disclose that the respondent performed her duties
under the guidance of the petitioner's management and worked in line with the tasks
assigned to her. 1 9 The petitioner's allegation of the respondent's "poor performance"
could not have been substantiated considering the lack of any clear performance standard
in evaluating the respondent's work. TaHIDS
II.B.2. The petitioner violated its own procedural requirements in the

performance evaluation
A rst instance when the discussion related to "process" was with respect to the
communication of performance standards . This topic also relates to process, but this
time on the matter of the procedure to be taken in performance evaluation : the
petitioner failed to observe its own procedural requirements in evaluating the
respondent's probationary employment.
The petitioner's prescribed procedure gives probationary employees two (2)
opportunities to meet and qualify for regularization. As mentioned before, the reviews
were aimed at informing the employees of their work performance based on the
petitioner's standard and on how they can improve it to qualify for regularization. For
reasons not disclosed in the records, the prescribed procedure was not followed by the
petitioner in the respondent's case. She was immediately terminated from employment
without having been evaluated and without undergoing the evaluation process under the
petitioner's prescribed procedure.
While the petitioner's failure to observe its own procedures is not disputed in the
ponencia, the implication of Abbott's failure cannot simply be glossed over. Abbott's non-
compliance should be viewed from the point of fairness or lack of it , that attended the
respondent's dismissal. This circumstance should be considered together with the other
circumstances of the case, if only because the petitioner's basic unfairness rendered
doubtful the real cause in the termination of her employment.
In other words, any deviation from the prescribed procedures must be su ciently
explained to remove doubts on the genuineness of the cause of dismissal. In this case, not
only did the petitioner fail to observe its own prescribed procedure; more importantly, it
also failed to provide an explanation on why the prescribed procedure was not
followed in the respondent's case. TcEAIH
Signi cantly, the NLRC appreciated all these in this case and this
appreciation was duly noted and evaluated by the CA. As there was in fact basis
in fact and in law in the NLRC's ndings on this aspect of the case, again the CA
correctly found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's actions.
II.B.3. Violation of the Labor Code's procedural requirements
Additionally, the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural due process of the
Labor Code when it terminated the respondent's employment. The two-written notice
requirement under Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended, was never observed. To quote this provision:
Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice . — In all
cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process
shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as de ned in Article
282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side ;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with

the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee

indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstance[s],
grounds have been established to justify his termination .
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee's
last known address. [emphasis supplied] EIAHcC
The rst notice is complied with when the employee is properly apprised of the
charges brought against him/her so that he/she can properly prepare for his/her defense.
2 0 The second notice is complied with when the employee is informed of the employer's
intention to terminate the employment. 2 1 A formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred,
is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee's right to be heard. In Perez v.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company , 2 2 the Court laid down the following guiding
principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
a) "ample opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful opportunity
(verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges
against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in
a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when
requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary
disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when
similar circumstances justify it.
c) the "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor Code
prevails over the "hearing or conference" requirement in the
implementing rules and regulations.
From the records, the respondent received only one notice and was not given
ample opportunity to be heard before her employment was terminated. The
respondent was not served a rst written notice indicating: (1) the grounds for terminating
her employment; and (2) a directive giving her the opportunity to submit a written
explanation within a reasonable period. Neither was the respondent given the ample
opportunity to be heard as required by law. There was only compliance with the second
notice requirement through the petitioner's letter dated May 19, 2005 which was already a
written notice of termination of employment. 2 3 AHcaDC
In defense of Abbott's failure to observe the two-notice requirement, the ponencia

argues that a different procedure applies when terminating a probationary employee; the
usual two-notice requirement does not govern, citing for this purpose Section 2, Rule I,
Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code.
The ponencia, however, forgets that the single notice rule applies only if the
employee is validly on probationary basis; it does not apply where the employee is
deemed a regular employee for the company's failure to provide and to
communicate a prescribed performance standard applicable to the probationary
employee . The ponencia itself admits that in such a case, the employee would then be a
regular employee. Since the petitioner utterly failed to support by evidence its compliance
with the legal requirements on performance standards, the two-notice requirement for
regular employees must perforce fully apply.
C. The Consequences of the Respondent's Illegal Dismissal
The above analysis shows that the respondent had been illegally dismissed from her
employment. The petitioner failed to show that her dismissal was for a valid cause. The
petitioner also failed to respect the respondent's procedural due process rights under the
law.
As a consequence, the NLRC and the CA, thereafter, correctly ordered the
respondent's reinstatement and the payment of the monetary awards of backwages,
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The CA and the NLRC also
correctly held that the individual petitioners (i.e., the corporate o cers of the petitioner)
should be solidarily liable with the petitioner for the respondent's monetary awards. AECacT
II.C.1. The recoverable reliefs

Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the following awards to an
illegally dismissed employee:
Art. 279. Security of tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause
or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
bene ts or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
"By jurisprudence derived from [the above] provision, separation pay may be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement." 2 4 Under Section 4
(b), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book VI of the Labor Code, separation pay is
awarded, in lieu of reinstatement, to an illegally dismissed employee when reinstatement is
no longer possible, i.e., when the dismissed employee's position is no longer available, or
the continued relationship between the employer and the employee would no longer be
viable due to the strained relations between them, or when the dismissed employee opts
not to be reinstated, or when the payment of separation bene ts would be for the best
interest of the parties involved.

"Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and
reinstatement . The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee
and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages." 2 5
II.C.2. Other awards as a consequence of the damages suffered
In addition to these basic awards, an illegally dismissed employee may also be
awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees . Jurisprudence holds
that moral and exemplary damages are awarded when the illegal dismissal is attended by
bad faith. 2 6 The Court has also ruled that corporate o cers are solidarily liable with the
employer company for the employees' termination of employment done with malice or bad
faith. 2 7
A review of the facts of the case shows ample evidence supporting the petitioner's
bad faith, as shown by the manner in which the respondent's employment was terminated.
The NLRC, in its decision, exhaustively discussed the petitioner's bad faith, as
demonstrated by the actions of the individual petitioners: AEaSTC
The records show that complainant-appellant's dismissal was effected by

individual respondents-appellees in a capricious and high-handed manner, anti-
social and oppressive, fraudulent and in bad faith, and contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. Bad faith and fraud are shown in the acts
committed by respondents-appellees before, during and after complainant-
appellant's dismissal in addition to the manner by which she was dismissed.
First, complainant-appellant was pressured to resign: (1) she was threatened
with termination, which will surely damage her reputation in the pharmaceutical
industry; (2) she was asked to evacuate her Commission and ordered not to
enter the Company's premises even if she was still an Abbott employee; and (3)
individual respondents Ms. Terrible and Ms. Walsh made a public
announcement to the staff that complainant-appellant already resigned even if
in reality she did not. All of which caused complainant-appellant much
humiliation, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation. 2 8
The CA also described in detail the abrupt and oppressive manner in which the
respondent's employment was dismissed by the petitioner:
On May 23, 2005, the private respondent still reported for work since petitioner
Abbott had not yet handed the termination notice to her. However, the security
guard did not allow her to enter the Hospira ALSU o ce pursuant to Ms.
Walsh['s] instruction. She requested Ms. Walsh that she be allowed to enter the
company premises to retrieve her last remaining things in her o ce which are
mostly her personal belongings. She was allowed to enter. However, she was
surprised to see her drawers already unlocked and, when she opened the same,
she discovered that her small brown envelope . . ., white pouch containing the
duplicate keys, and the staff's nal evaluation sheets were missing. The private
respondent informed Ms. Bernardo about the incident. The latter responded by
saying she was no longer an employee of the company since May 19, 2005.
The private respondent reported the matter to the Pasig Police Station and
asked for help regarding the theft of her properties. The Pasig Police incident
report stated as follows: TSHIDa

xxx xxx xxx
When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one SOCO

o cer and staff, named Christian Perez. Kelly Walsh allegedly admitted
that she was the one who opened the drawer and got the green folders
containing the staff evaluations. The Reportee, was told by Kelly Walsh
that her Rolex wristwatch will be returned to her provided that she will
immediately vacate her office.
On the same date, the private respondent's termination letter dated May 19,
2005 was handed to her by Ms. Walsh, Mr. Almazar and Ms. Bernardo. On May
27, 2005, the private respondent received another copy of the said termination
notice via registered mail. 2 9
These explanations for the actions taken show that the NLRC's recognition
of the bad faith was not without basis and was in fact supplemented by the CA
in the appellate court's own confirmatory explanation.
D. Application of the Rule 45 Standard of Review
Under the evidentiary situation that prevailed in this case as described above in
some detail, an expression of wonder cannot be helped, particularly on how the ponencia
could conclude that the CA committed a reversible error when it found no grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC's actions on the case. In contrast with the ndings of the Labor
Arbiter, the ndings and conclusions of the NLRC, as a rmed on a Rule 65 review by the
CA, were based on the law and jurisprudence as properly applied to the established set of
facts and evidence. DSHcTC
First , while the respondent, from the petitioner's standpoint, was hired as a
probationary employee, she was deemed a regular employee pursuant to the clear
provisions of Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 6 (d) of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended. The evidence
adduced failed to show that the petitioner ever apprised the respondent at the time of her
engagement of the standards she must meet to qualify for regular employment.
Second , the respondent's termination from employment had no basis in fact and in
law. Since the records failed to support the petitioner's allegation that the respondent's
alleged poor performance and tardiness were proven by evidence and, in fact, fell within
the enumeration in Article 281 and Article 282 of the Labor Code, reason dictates that the
present petition be denied.
At the risk of repetition, the adduced evidence, in the rst place, did not prove that
the respondent's work failed to comply with the petitioner's performance standard as no
proof of the performance standard applied to the respondent's work was actually
presented. The respondent's employment was also terminated without undergoing any
performance evaluation.
The evidence adduced did not also prove any act of omission under Article 282 of
the Labor Code committed by the respondent. No evidence was presented on the
respondent's actual work so as to determine whether her acts/omissions constituted a
just cause for termination, such as serious misconduct or gross or habitual neglect of duty
or any other analogous cause to the just causes mentioned in the law.
As the records show, neither was there compliance with the respondent's own
internal procedures nor with the law's procedural due process. The respondent was not
served the two-notice required by law before her employment was terminated by the
petitioner.
Third , the NLRC's monetary awards, as a rmed by the CA, were appropriate
consequences of the respondent's illegal dismissal from employment. The payment of the
respondent's backwages and the order of reinstatement were consistent with the
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code. Jurisprudence also provides the award of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, when bad faith is proven in the
termination of employment.
In this case, the bad faith exhibited by the individual petitioners was clearly
established in the records. The individual petitioners' bad faith was demonstrated by the
evidence of how they unfairly effected the termination of the respondent's employment.
The narration of facts of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA shows, among
others, that: (1) the individual petitioners did not follow the petitioner's prescribed
procedure performance evaluation as, in fact, the respondent's work was not evaluated; (2)
the individual petitioners, through their concerted actions, ganged up on the respondent in
forcing her to resign from employment; (3) the individual petitioners pressured the
respondent to resign by announcing her resignation to the o ce staff, thereby subjecting
her to unwarranted humiliation; and (4) they blackmailed the respondent by withholding
her personal possessions until she resigned from employment. HcDSaT
Bad faith can also be inferred from the lack of fairness and underhandedness
employed by the individual petitioners on how they informed the respondent of the
termination of her employment. The records disclose that the respondent was lured into a
meeting on the pretext that her work performance was to be evaluated; she was caught
off-guard when she was informed that her employment had been terminated. Aside from
the abrupt noti cation, bad faith can also be deduced from the fact that the termination
was made immediately effective; the respondent was immediately banned from the
petitioner's premises after she was informed that her employment had been terminated.
To my mind, the NLRC correctly ruled that the individual petitioners were solidarily
liable, together with the petitioner, to pay the monetary awards. The cited circumstances
constitute su cient evidence of their bad faith in terminating the respondent's
employment. Verily, corporate o cers are solidarily liable with the corporation to pay
monetary awards in illegal dismissal cases when their bad faith is established in the
termination of the employment.
III. Conclusion
I close this Dissent with the note that the constitutional protection of security of
tenure is a right enjoyed by every employee. Employment, regardless of the employment
status, may only be terminated for cause and within the procedure prescribed by law and
jurisprudence. A review of the records shows that no reversible error was committed by
the CA in nding the NLRC free from any taint of grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the
respondent's illegal dismissal. This conclusion is what the Court should re ect in its
Decision if it is to discharge in good faith its duty to adjudicate.
HIAcCD
Footnotes
1.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 14-58.

2.Id. at 1040-1054. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
3.Id. at 1139-1140.
4.Id. at 74.
5.Id. at 75-76.
6.Id. at 51-52. Based on Abbott's organizational structure, the Regulatory Affairs Manager was
under the umbrella of Hospira ALSU, a sub-department in Abbott's Hospital Care
Division. ALSU serves as a transition body of Hospira, Inc., a corporation based in the
United States of America, while it is in the process of organization in the Philippines.
Abbott intended to cede the quali ed employees under ALSU to Hospira once the latter
obtained its own legal personality to engage in business in the Philippines.
7.Id. at 165-168. Abbott sent Alcaraz an initial offer sheet on December 1, 2004. The
compensation contained therein was re-negotiated and thus, the increased offer as per
the offer sheet dated December 7, 2004.
8.Id. at 167-168.
9.Id. at 127, 169-172.
10.Id. at 174.
11.Id. at 127-128.
12.Id. at 1042-1043.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 1044.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 1044-1045.
18.Id. at 1045.
19.Id.
20.Id. at 1046.
21.Id. at 1047.
22.Id. at 19-21, 78, and 80-81.
23.Id. at 1047.
24.Id. at 255. See Labor Arbiter (LA) Decision dated March 30, 2006.
25.Formerly, Article 281 of the Labor Code; renumbered pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151.
26.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 267.

27.Id. at 261-262.
28.Id. at 263-267.
29.Id. at 255-274. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
30.Id. at 269.
31.Id. at 270.
32.Id. at 271-272.
33.Id. at 273.
34.Id. at 356-378. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Commissioners Benedicto

Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. (on leave) and Perlita B. Velasco, concurring.
35.Id. at 377-378.
36.Id. at 367.
37.Id. at 368.
38.Id. at 369.
39.Id. at 370-373.
40.Id. at 413-416. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Presiding Commissioner
Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco, concurring.
41.Id. at 417-450.
42.Id. at 1403.
43.Id.
44.Id. at 1040-1054.
45.Id. at 1052.
46.Id.
47.Id. at 1053.
48.Id. at 1139-1140.
49.Id. at 1218.
50.Id.
51.Id. at 1219.
52.Rollo (G.R. No. 193976), p. 30.
53.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 1223-1228.
54.Id. at 1224.
55.433 Phil. 490, 501-502 (2002).
56.Id. at 501-502. (Citations omitted)
57.Republic v. Mangotara , G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56, 173401, 173563-64, 178779
& 178894, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 428, citing NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang ,
499 Phil. 423, 435-436 (2005).

58.Sec. 5. Certi cation against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certi cation annexed thereto and simultaneously led therewith: (a) that he has
not theretofore commenced any action or led any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been led or is pending, he shall report that
fact within ve (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
xxx xxx xxx
59.Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez , G.R. No. 177937,
January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 135, 142.
60.Id.
61.Id. at 145.
62.495 Phil. 706, 716-717 (2005).
63.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1201.
64.Id. at 367-368, 370.

65.Refers to the procedure stated in Article 291 (b) of the Labor Code, as renumbered pursuant
to Republic Act No. 10151, viz.:
Article 291. Miscellaneous Provisions. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to
be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the cause for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if
he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant
to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
xxx xxx xxx

This procedure is also found in Section 2 (d), Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which state:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process
shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as de ned in Article 282 [now, Article
296] of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance
of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
66.Rollo, pp. 78-81.
67.Id. at 1047.
68.170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005).
69.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1052.

70.Id. at 1043.
71.G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
72.Id. at 616.
73.Id. at 620.
74.494 Phil. 114, 119-121 (2005).
75.Id. at 121.
76.Id. at 122.
77.Supra note 71, at 605.
78.Id. at 617.
79.Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
80.Carag v. NLRC, 548 Phil. 581, 605 (2007), citing McLeod v. NLRC, 541 Phil. 214, 242 (2007).
81.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 262, 1046.
BRION, J., dissenting:

1.The following explanation was made in my Rejoinder to Reply (On the manner of reviewing
a Court of Appeals Labor Ruling) that was submitted to the Court En Banc in the course
of the exchanges on this aspect of the case. The explanation distinguished between
appealable cases and those that, while not appealable, can still be reviewed through a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
"For a full understanding of these distinctions, it must be kept in mind that several levels of
review may exist for rulings emanating from the lowest levels of adjudication before
they reach the Supreme Court. The ruling of an inferior court or tribunal (for example, the
Regional Trial Court [RTC]) is rst reviewed by an appellate court (the CA) on questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; the CA decision may then in turn be reviewed
by the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Generally, two types of decisions or rulings may be brought to the appellate courts for
review and decision; the appellate courts' decisions are in turn subject to review by the
Supreme Court.
The first type relates to cases that come to the appellate court by way of appeal (e.g., the
ruling of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction that is appealed to the CA on
issues of facts and law under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). The second type involves
the review by the CA of decisions of inferior courts or tribunals whose rulings, by law ,
are nal and executory ( e.g., the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
[NLRC] that under the Labor Code is nal and executory). This is the review of rulings
that, by law, is not appealable and thus can only be made on limited jurisdictional
grounds .
A CA ruling under the rst type can be challenged by the aggrieved party before the
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Under Rule 45, the review is only on questions of law unless a review of questions
of fact is allowed under the terms established by jurisprudence. This is the case in the
example given above — an RTC ruling that is appealed to the CA on both factual and
legal grounds and which CA decision on appeal is now before the Supreme Court for
further review. This may be the model of a Supreme Court review that the ponente might
have had in mind in asserting that the Supreme Court should be able to undertake a
review of the full range of legal issues before it.
In the second type as exempli ed above, a ruling by the NLRC, although nal and
executory, may be brought to the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, i.e., on a
petition for certiorari, limited to jurisdictional grounds, usually for grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The nal and executory nature of
the NLRC decision under review can best be appreciated when it is considered that the
decision can immediately be implemented unless a temporary restraining order or
injunction is issued by the CA; the Rule 65 mode of review is rendered necessary because
the decision or ruling under review, by law, is already nal. Finality means that the
decision is no longer appealable and may be reviewed only when the ruling is void
because of jurisdictional defects."
2.356 Phil. 811 (1998).
3.G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334.
4.Id. at 342-343.
5.Rejoinder to Reply, supra, at Note 1.
6.Decision, at page 12.
7.Rollo, p. 174.
8.Id. at 77.
9.See Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended.
10.Decision, at pp. 16-17.
11.Pages 4-5 of the ponencia.

12.Ibid.; rollo, pp. 260 and 271.
13.Rollo, pp. 1044-1045.
14.Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 205.
15.Ibid.
16.Rollo, p. 78.
17.Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., 495 Phil. 706, 712 (2005).
18.Ibid.
19.See page 4 of the ponencia.
20.Dolores T. Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 173012, June 13, 2012.
21.Ibid.
22.G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 127.
23.Rollo, p. 78.
24.Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) , G.R. No.
172149, February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 10, 25, citing Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena , G.R.
No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518, 541.
25.Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines , G.R. No. 178524, January 30, 2009, 577
SCRA 500, 507.
26.Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete , G.R. No. 177795, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 110, 141-142.
See also Civil Code, Articles 2208, 2217, 2219 and 2232.
27.MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114787, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA
797, 803.
28.Rollo, pp. 375-376.
29.Id. at 1046-1047.

168633-2013-Abbott Laboratories Phils. v. Alcaraz

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

168633-2013-Abbott Laboratories Phils. v. Alcaraz

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 192571. July 23, 2013.]

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE,

After having successfully passed the pre-employment requirements, you are

The terms of your employment are:

Nature of Employment : Probationary

February 15, 2005 to August 14,

Basic Salary : P110,000.00/month

Unless renewed, probationary appointment expires on the date indicated subject

Very truly yours,

Sgd. EDWIN D. FEIST

Sgd. PEARLIE ANN FERRER-ALCARAZ

During Alcaraz's pre-employment orientation, petitioner Allan G. Almazar (Almazar),

On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa (Misa), Abbott's Human

Abbott's PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a probationary

The NLRC Ruling

b. 13th month pay - 110,000.00

4. Respondents are ordered to pay complainant moral damages of

5. Respondents are also ordered to pay attorney's fees of 10% of the

6. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court's Ruling

Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be

[E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights in

While it is Abbott's management prerogative to promulgate its own company rules

A. The Issues Posed

C. The Rulings Below

Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

xxx xxx xxx

(d)In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make

To sum up these provisions, a valid probationary employment requires the

The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in nature,

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

II.A.2(a). No specific employment standard on record.

II.A.2(b). No speci c performance standard communicated to the

In this case, as it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated

Lusterless or otherwise, the ponencia's admission of Abbott's procedural

II.B.1(b). The evidentiary status of the just cause for dismissal

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

II.B.2. The petitioner violated its own procedural requirements in the

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee

In defense of Abbott's failure to observe the two-notice requirement, the ponencia

II.C.1. The recoverable reliefs

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

The records show that complainant-appellant's dismissal was effected by

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one SOCO

1.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 14-58.

26.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 267.

34.Id. at 356-378. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Commissioners Benedicto

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

64.Id. at 367-368, 370.

xxx xxx xxx

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

69.Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1052.

BRION, J., dissenting:

11.Pages 4-5 of the ponencia.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen