Tat Tvam Asi & Anātman

A Discussion of Ultimate Reality and the Self in Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta

Hinduism

Jared Morningstar

REL–245
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When considering the religious history of South Asia, diversity is an obvious fact to

contend with. Yet, through close examination it may be possible to find a certain degree of

unity within this diversity. Buddhism, a religion that developed as a response to orthodox

Hindu thought, is well known for its rejection of the idea of a self. Indeed, “Buddhism stands

unique in history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self, or Ātman.”1

When considering this central doctrine against the backdrop of Hindu schools such as

Advaita Vedānta, it seems they are irreconcilably opposed. This is due to the fact that

Advaita Vedānta goes so far as to find identity of the individual self, or Ātman, with the

Ultimate Reality, termed Brahman. While this may make it appear as if the religions have

only historical commonalities, when these contrary ideas are considered in light of the

different dimensions of religious thought, the opposition becomes less certain. Within

Mahāyāna Buddhism, the idea of Śūnyatā, or the void, is a metaphysical idea about the

fundamental nature of the world. This doctrine, rather than that of Anātman, allows for

useful comparison to the Vedāntin conception of Brahman. All things considered, the

Mahāyāna conception of Ultimate Reality seems to be pointing at the same fundamental

reality as is expressed in Advaita Vedānta through the idea of Brahman.

In order to proceed in this discussion, it is important to understand what is meant by

Ultimate Reality. This is a prominent idea within comparative religion as well as Perennial

philosophy which deals with the fundamental metaphysical structure that underlies all things.

Ultimate Reality… is at once the Absolute, the Infinite and the Perfect Good and
which contains all the possibilities of manifestation. Beyond being in Itself, It is the
Principle of Pure Being which is the first determination of the Beyond-Being in the
direction of manifestation and creation… Ultimate Reality must possess all the
possibilities including the possibility of negation of Itself which is the world or
manifestation2

1
Walpola Rāhula, What the Buddha Taught​. (Gordon Fraser Gallery, 1967), 51
2
Frithjof Schuon, ​The Essential Frithjof Schuon​. (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2005), 29-30
 2

While this definition is quite complex as well as broad, it highlights some of the important

features to understanding Ultimate Reality. In terms of looking and Indian religion, however,

a more specific definition may be useful. “In the religions of South Asia, including

Buddhism but also the various schools of Hinduism, especially those of Vedānta, a candidate

for ultimate reality is assumed to be eternal in the sense of being stable and unchanging,

unaffected by passing things, and admitting of internal distinctions only with difficulty.”3

The characteristics of being eternal and unchanging in particular are important for best

analyzing the potential for arriving at a reconcilable understanding of Śūnyatā and Brahman.

Within Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is the Ultimate Reality. A few important

characteristics of this vision of Ultimate Reality are the emphasis on non-duality and identity

of the individual self, or Ātman, with Brahman. “Reality or Absolute existence is that which

in principle cannot be cancelled by any experience, because no experience can deny or

disvalue it. Reality is non-dual; it is the level of pure being.”4 Śaṃkara, the chief

philosopher of the Advaita Vedānta Darśana explains Brahman by stating that “The Brahman

exists, eternal, pure, enlightened, free by nature, omniscient, and attended by all power.”5

This description lines up quite well with the definition of Ultimate Reality as explored above.

When considering the identity of the individual self and Brahman, consciousness is the key.

According to the Advaitin examination of this phenomenon, “pure consciousness that is

timeless, unconditioned, undifferentiated, without beginning, and without end.”6 Through

understanding consciousness as an all-permeating and eternal phenomenon, it can be

considered non-different from the Ultimate Reality of Brahman, which also shares these

3
Robert C Neville, "Comparative conclusions about ultimate realities,": 164
4
Bina Gupta. ​An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge, and Freedom​. (New
York: Routledge, 2012), 123
5
Ainslie Thomas Embree, ​Sources of Indian Tradition​. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 314
6
Gupta. ​An Introduction to Indian Philosophy​, 225
 3

characteristics. As individual human existence is characterized by consciousness, the

individual can be identified with Brahman.

Turning to the Buddhist doctrine of Anātman, it seems that this idea has a different

function than that of metaphysical conceptions such as those pertaining to Ultimate Reality.

Anātman, more than being a metaphysical idea, is a doctrine which provides framework for

and functions as an ethical doctrine within Buddhist understanding. A famous parable within

Buddhism illustrates how such a prominent doctrine within the religion would be pragmatic

rather than metaphysical in nature. Within the parable, the Buddha is describing how a man

would react upon being shot with an arrow if he took the same position as many do regarding

religious claims. “[The man who was shot says] ‘I will not let this arrow be taken out until I

know the kind of bow with which I was shot; the kind of bowstring used; the type of arrow;

what sort of feather was used on the arrow and with what kind of material the point of the

arrow was made.’ … that man would die without knowing any of these things.”7 This story

offers an allegory for understanding how many Buddhist doctrines function within the

religion. Buddhism, above all else, is concerned with transcending the world of Saṃsāra,

which is fundamentally characterized by suffering. It naturally follows that many of the

doctrines would thus deal with aiding the individual to achieve this goal rather than being

concerned with metaphysical truth. To understand the function of the doctrine of Anātman

in Buddhism, it is important to understand how it fits within the larger framework of the

religion.

While the Buddha does not deny that the experience of an individual self is valid, he

does illustrate the ultimate illusion behind this idea through exploring the self in terms of

aggregates or Skandhas. The Buddha identified five distinct Skandhas which come together

7
Rāhula. What the Buddha Taught​, 14
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to form the appearance of an individual self. These five are matter, sensations, perceptions,

mental formations, and consciousness.8 So while the Buddha does not entirely deny the idea

of a self, he does posit an understanding of the self and constructed rather than essential in

nature. This distinction is important to the point that many of the ethical doctrines in

Buddhism are rooted in the idea of Anātman. Some even claim that “[the false belief in

Ātman] is the source of all the troubles in the world from personal conflicts to wars between

nations. In short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world.”9 This perspective,

which presents clinging to a false view of Ātman as an ethical problem, has a flipside to it.

Namely that “[w]hen we fully embrace the no-self doctrine, there is no longer the deep,

vexing question of how ‘I’ am to properly relate to ‘you.’”10 Looking at these orthodox

commentaries on this doctrine, it seems that, rather than trying to describe a metaphysical

reality, Anātman serves a more pragmatic function within the religion.

If Anātman is not a claim of Ultimate Reality, where does that leave Buddhism?

While the Buddha’s early teachings especially focused more on pragmatic doctrines like that

of Anātman and the Four Noble Truths, as the religion developed, the metaphysics were

systematized. Within the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism, ideas of emptiness were taken to

their extreme to arrive at a conception of Ultimate Reality. This vision of Ultimate Reality

has been termed Śūnyatā and “has been described as the heart of Buddhism.”11 This is far

from a straightforward concept and is often associated with the Buddhist idea of form as

emptiness and emptiness and form. Linguistically the root Śūnya– means void, though it also

is used in mathematics “to signify ‘zero.’”12

8
Rāhula. What the Buddha Taught​, 20
9
Ibid., 51
10
Vishnu Sridharan, "Selfless Ethics: The Equality of Non-Existence,": 632
11
Glyn Richards, "Śūnyatā: objective referent or via negativa?,": 254
12
Shizuteru Ueda, "Emptiness and fullness: Śūnyatā in Mahāyāna Buddhism,": 9
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Pinning down an exact definition for Śūnyatā is very difficult. Indeed, the concept is

described almost exclusively through ​via negativa​ by the preeminent Mahāyāna philosopher

Nāgārjuna. Another important aspect of Śūnyatā is that it transcends dualistic qualification to

the point that it “cannot be classified either as being or as non-being.”13 Yet at the same time

Śūnyatā can be found behind all existent entities. This is because the world is composed of

numerous forms, and when these forms are truly analyzed “as they are in themselves they are

found to be empty.”14 This fact makes Śūnyatā quite difficult to analyze as the concept itself

is a type of form, which means that Śūnyatā itself is also empty – “hence the insistence on

Śūnyatā Śūnyatā, i.e. the emptiness of the very concept of emptiness.”15

The fact that both Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna present non-dualistic conceptions

of Ultimate Reality provides strong evidence that they are in metaphysical agreement.

Non-duality by definition is non-different and without internal or external distinctions,

meaning that it is very difficult to make an argument that one conception of a non-dualistic

Ultimate Reality is any different than any other. While Mahāyāna thinkers would be hesitant

to label Śūnyatā as non-dualistic, (as even saying that much confines the concept to a specific

understanding, which goes against the idea of the void – which is unqualifiable in its essence)

this reluctance regarding the language is not because the term itself is inaccurate in this

specific case but rather that language itself fundamentally falls short of dealing with Śūnyatā.

Considering language as that which points at an object rather than being a perfect resolution

model of the object, it seems that the idea of an explicitly non-dualistic conception of

Ultimate Reality such as Brahman and Śūnyatā are ultimately pointing to the same

phenomenon. Regardless of if these two traditions explicitly consider themselves

13
Richards. "Śūnyatā,”: 253
14
Ibid., 251
15
Ibid., 254
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non-dualistic, “both Madhyamaka and Advaita Vedānta deny that ultimate reality can be

understood in a dualistic manner.”16 That being said, it is still important to address

particularities of each tradition for a final analysis.

Consciousness is something which is discussed by both Advaita Vedānta and

Mahāyāna extensively. How they understand it differs greatly, however. While Advaita

takes consciousness to be the Ultimate Reality and to have identity with Brahman, the

Buddhist thinkers understood it in terms of the five aggregates. Within this framework,

consciousness is the fifth and final aggregate. This perspective on consciousness takes it as

“a reaction or response which has one of the six faculties… as its basis, and one of the six

corresponding external phenomena… as its object.”17 In this Buddhist understanding,

consciousness manifests itself in relation to the world of forms rather than being a purely

eternally existent phenomenon. Reading this in light of Śūnyatā, one could say that it is

because of the emptiness of the self (Anātman) that consciousness can manifests therein.

Another important point to address is the understanding of Nirvāṇa within the

Buddhist context. Much of the same language that is used around Śūnyatā is also employed

to give an account of Nirvāṇa. Often referred to as unconditioned, “Nirvāṇa is beyond all

terms of duality and relativity. It is therefore beyond our conceptions.”18 Nirvāṇa is

sometimes even directly equated with Śūnyatā through employing the term emptiness

– specifically, “transcendental wisdom and emptiness are non-different.”19 This

understanding of Nirvāṇa is obviously something that transcends the Buddhist conception of

the aggregate of consciousness, as consciousness is specifically described as dependent upon

externalities, while Nirvāṇa is unconditioned and not dependent on anything outside of itself.

16
Richard King, "Early Advaita and Madhyamaka Buddhism: the case of the Gaudapādīyakārikā,":
̣ 69
17
Rāhula. What the Buddha Taught​, 23
18
Ibid., 43
19
Richards. "Śūnyatā,”: 254
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Describing the exact nature of Nirvāṇa in Buddhism is no easy task and has been a

much deliberated topic within the religion. Considering Nirvāṇa in the light of the doctrine

of Anātman, seeming contradictions arise. As if there is fundamentally no self, who is it that

experiences Nirvāṇa? It is obvious that Nirvāṇa is not a phenomenon that manifests via the

Skandhas, yet it is undeniable that Nirvāṇa exists in some sort of relation to the person. As if

there was no connection, there would be no achieving of Nirvāṇa – no cessation of suffering

and no egress from Saṃsāra. Yet when this distinction of Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra is read in the

context of Śūnyatā, one sees that they are ultimately the same reality. Nirvāṇa (blowing out;

emptiness) is Saṃsāra (the world; form) and Saṃsāra is Nirvāṇa. When this is taken into

account, it is understood that there is not some tangible obstacle between an individual and

Nirvāṇa, but rather there exists simply personal delusions that keep a person from

recognizing reality for what it is. Indeed, “Nirvāṇa is definitely no annihilation of self,

because there is no sef to annihilate. If at all, it is the annihilation of the illusion, of the false

idea of self.”20 When illusion is broken down and one recognizes the reality of form in

emptiness and emptiness in form, one achieves Nirvāṇa.

Once this is achieved, the reality of Nirvāṇa is no longer simply theoretically true and

existent, but rather has become a personal reality. For the practitioner who is graced with this

achievement, lived reality and even existence itself is defined by Nirvāṇa. As previously

mentioned, Nirvāṇa is an unconditioned reality. Considering this, once Nirvāṇa has been

realized, there is no longer about the individual that conditions its continual existence.

Regardless of if the individual person is conscious or unconscious or perceiving this or

perceiving that, Nirvāṇa is still operating. The Buddha was often asked a question related to

this query: what happens to the enlightened person upon death? The Buddha often simply

20
Rāhula. What the Buddha Taught​, 37
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did not respond to the question, but there was an occasion where he did offer a response,

stating that “no words in our vocabulary could express what happens to an Arahant after his

death… terms like ‘born’ or ‘not born’ do not apply.”21 This description is particularly apt in

relation to Śūnyatā. The Buddha uses similarly unconditional language to describe the reality

for the person who passed on as Mahāyāna thinkers use to describe Śūnyatā in general; this

seems to imply that the individual experience of Nirvāṇa became reintegrated into the

impersonal Ultimate Reality of Śūnyatā at the time of death. In comparison, the Advaitin

conception is that the enlightened individual realizes identity with Brahman upon achieving

Mokṣa and that identity persists even after the physical body (including the mind) fades

away. This is what is expressed through Śankarā’s utterance “I am beginningless and

attributeless.”22 Considering these two ideas of post mortem existence relating to Ultimate

Reality, it seems they both have the same fundamental vision and that the distinction merely

arises due to the fact that they employ different descriptive language. The Buddhists are

reluctant to make reference to a concept self in this discussion for ethical reasons, though the

type of self the Buddhists want to avoid is not what the Advaitins are ultimately trying to

describe with Ātman and Brahman. “The inner Self, which falls outside the scope of what is

comprehended as ‘you,’ is never an ‘object.’”23 This Advaitin conception seems to fit well

with the Buddhist notion of the Skandhas, even. It is rejecting the same sort of lower

resolution realities as found in the aggregates and instead positing something transcendental

as the fundamental reality that is engaged. Considering Ātman further shows this distinction

more explicitly. Śaṃkara states that “although Ātman exists as connected with nothing, it

does not follow that the body and other things are without Ātman, just as, although space is

21
Ibid., 41
22
Śri Śankarācārya, A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śankara. Translated by Sengaku Mayeda.
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), 123
23
Embree ​Sources of Indian Tradition​, 310
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connected with nothing, it does not follow that nothing has space.”24 Reading this in a

Buddhist light, one sees that Śaṃkara’s approach to Ātman in this case is non-different from

Mahāyāna understandings of Śūnyatā. The aggregates, being a type of form, are empty in

essence. Through this, it is found that Śūnyatā is the reality that underlies them. Indeed, if

one simply modifies Śaṃkara’s diction slightly and replaces Ātman​ with ​Śūnyatā​ or N
​ irvāṇa

and ​space​ with ​emptiness​, the end result would not seem out of place within a Mahāyāna text.

All things considered, it appears that the distinctions between Mahāyāna conceptions

of Ultimate Reality and those of the Advaitins stem not from a fundamental disagreement but

rather from linguistic choice as informed by the larger doctrinal structure of the respective

traditions. Rather than being religions attempting to describe different metaphysical realities,

Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna can be better understood as philosophical and religious

systems which have different methodologies of pointing towards the same fundamental

reality. While the Buddhists take issue with the Upaniṣadic claim Thou Art That​ which lies

certain to Advaitin thought, both of these traditions are equally fervent in their assertion of a

fundamental ​That​.

24
Śankarācārya. A Thousand Teachings​, 237
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Gaudapādīyakārikā."
̣ International Journal Of Hindu Studies 2, no. 1 (April 1998):
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