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risch vom Königsberg Kants, vom Leben Kants in dieser Stadt und von seinem
Verhältnis zur Königsberger Umwelt aufgrund der Überlieferung sich sagen
läßt: zur Sprache kommen Abstammung, Familie, Schüler- und Universitätszeit,
das Verhältnis des Philosophen zu einzelnen Zweigen von Kultur und Wissen-
schaft (Naturwissenschaft, Pädagogik, Politik, Künste), zu gesellschaftlichen bzw.
berufsständischen Gruppen (Adel, Juden, Kaufleute), zur Sprache kommen sdiließ-
lich Kants Leben im eigenen Haus und sein Umgang mit seinen Tischfreunden.
Auch die biographisch und geistesgeschichtlich bedeutsamen Nachwirkungen Kants
in Königsberg (und ζ. T. über Königsberg hinaus) werden von Gause im Rahmen
des hier möglichen Umfangs berücksichtigt (Kants Nachfolger, Kant im Urteil
seiner Zeitgenossen, Kants Grabstätte, Die Gesellschaft der Freunde Kants, Kant-
bürsten, Kantbildnisse, Kantehrungen).
Wenn Gauses kleines Buch auch kaum neues Material für die biographische Kant-
forschung erbringt (ob solches überhaupt noch in größerem Umfang zu erbringen
ist, dürfte sehr fraglich sein), so fügt es dodi die schon länger bekannten Resultate
dieser Forschung zu einem neuen lebendigen Bild. Sehr zugute kommen der Kant-
Biographie hierbei die subtilen Kenntnisse, die der Autor durch seine langjährigen
Quellenforschungen zur Stadtgeschichte Königsbergs (deren Frucht das dreibändige
Standardwerk Geschichte der Stadt Königsberg ist) sich erworben hat (vgl. vor
allem das Kapitel „Königsberg zur Zeit Kants").
Auszüge aus Texten Kants am Anfang und am Schluß des Buches vermitteln dem
Leser eine Probe Kantischer Diktion und Denkweise. Besonders zu danken ist
dem Verlag, daß er die Kosten nidit gescheut hat, einen schön gestalteten Bildteil
zu bringen, der mit heute schwer oder nidit mehr zugänglichen Stichen, Zeidi-
nungen, Gemälden und Fotographien das Thema Kant und Königsberg illustriert.
Rudolf Malter, Mainz

Henry E. A l l i s o n : The Kant-Eberhard Controversy. An English translation


together with supplementary materials and a historical-analytic introduction
of Immanuel Kant's On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique of
Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One. Baltimore and
London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 186 pp.

Idealism has always been a dangerously equivocal word in philosophy and is


certainly nowhere more problematic a term than in the context of Kant's "tran-
scendental idealism". Such a subjective idealism forms the core of Kant's response
to the empirical scepticism of David Hume, and has thus been a central theme
in Anglo-American discussions of Kant's succes in establishing the objective
validity of synthetic a priori principles. In fact, the central philosophic purpose
of Professor Allsion's comments throughout The Kant-Eberhard Controversy is
to claim that such an intense preoccupation with Kant's relation to Hume has
so dominated Anglo-American interpretations that several features of Kantianism
often go unnoticed or are misinterpreted. Allison wants to remind us that Kant
also criticized the "dogmatic rationalism" of the Leibnizean-Wolffian school by
means of a complex "empirical realism', and that this concern reveals aspects of
the analytic-synthetic distinction, and the doctrines of pure intuition and sdiema

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which are not properly appreciated in the English language literature. This "other
side" of Kant's criticism is especially prominent in his 1790 polemic against Johann
August Eberhard, a self-confessed Leibnizean defender of "dogmatism". So, to
correct what he perceives as an imbalance in the literature, Allison offers us the
first English translation of On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique
of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One, the historical
background of the controversy, a summary of the Eberhardian attack, his own
analysis of major issues in Kant's response, along with an appendix of selected
correspondence between Kant and Reinhold on the issue, selections from further
defenses of Kant by Schulze, and additional details of Eberhard's criticism.
Eberhard's central claim was the "basic superiority of the Leibnizean over the
Kantian position, claiming that whatever is true in Kant is already found in
Leibniz, and that wherever Kant differs from Leibniz, he is wrong". Supposedly,
Leibniz had already provided a critique of reason, but yet had also allowed an
extension of knowledge beyond the limits of sensibility. Allison organizes
Eberhard's attack into four main areas. First, it is claimed that Kant delimited
only the conditions for sensible (intuitive) knowledge, not knowledge in general
(with Eberhard always here wrongly equating the Kantian "intuitable" with the
"imageable" (bildlich). From the start, Allison sides with the Kantian position,
charging, as did Kant in the Amphibolies, that such a claim always confuses the
principles of the concepts of things with the principles of things in themselves.
Only this confusion can lead to Eberhard's second major point, his positive argu-
ment for knowledge of the non-sensible by means of the principle of sufficient
reason. Again, Kant charges in his response a confusion between logical and real
principles. He points to Eberhard's own equivocation over whether the principle,
"everything has a ground (Grund)' means that all propositions have a reason, or
all things have a cause. Third, Eberhard extends this last point into a critique
of the Kantian theory of intuition and sensation, of mathematics as founded on
intuition, and against the ideality of space and time. Fourth, and by far the
most important for Allison's concerns, is the attack on the Kantian distinction
between analytic and synthetic judgments. Eberhard claimed that Leibniz had
already discovered whatever there is of value in Kant's famous classification by
distinguishing between judgments which predicate the "essence" or an essential
part of the subject (judgments governed by the principle of non-contradiction),
and those which predicate an attribute which has its "sufficient reason" in the
subject and so can be "deduced" from its concept. If this latter claim holds,
then there can be a logical knowledge which is also, a priori, objectively valid
(since deduced from the real essence of the subject). Pure reason could then
obtain knowledge of things in themselves.
Kant is himself especially concerned to answer this last point, and does so by
insisting that Eberhard begs the question. Eberhard wants to distinguish analytic
and synthetic judgments on the basis of the types of predicates involved, whereas
Kant wants to do so on the basis of the ground for the activity of relating
a predicate to a subject "in the first place". Eberhard's use of attributive
predication leaves totally unclear whether an attribute is analytically or
synthetically predicated of a subject term. No matter how involved the logical
analysis of the subject term, or how complicated the deduction to a predicate, if

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Buchbesprechungen 249

the analysis only unpacks the concept, if we remain within the logical realm, the
judgment is still analytic. Kant thus distinguishes between identical and non-
identical analytic judgments, clarifying his own rather "psychologistic" criterion
in the first Critique.
But aside from its scholarly value, the essential philosophical claims made by
Allison in this book occur in his own interpretation of issues suggested by Kant
in On a Discovery (Chapter III, "Kant's Response"). Besides his general concern
to introduce the details of Kant's empirical realism to the Anglo-American Kant
literature, Allison is particularly concerned with the analytic-synthetic distinction
and the problem of pure intuitions. (Although his Preface mentions in general,
"Anglo-American interpreters and critics", Allison only makes specific critical
comments about Kemp Smith's A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(New York, 1962), Paton's Kant's Metaphysics of Experience (London, 1936),
and Manley Thompson's Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology,
Review of Metaphysics, December 1972, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, pp. 314—343.)
In the former case, he reasons that, since Kant was so insistent in On a
Discovery in claiming that the relation between subject and predicate in analytic
judgments is "logical", that relation in synthetic judgments must be extra-logical,
or what Allison calls, not without ambiguity, a "real relation". In other words,
in a synthetic judgment, "the predicate stands in a real relation to an object".
This would mean, of course, that an intuition is always required in synthetic
judgments, even if a priori. Allison accepts this necessity and argues for it in
support of Moltke Gram's recent thesis that, in synthetic judgments, concepts
are predicated of intuitions, not other concepts (Moltke Gram, Kant, Ontology
and the A Priori (Evanston, Illinois, 1968). And, "since intuitions cannot be
reduced to, or constructed out of concepts, judgments in which the subject expres-
sion refers to intuitions cannot have a predicate which is 'contained in the concept
of the subject'", and the judgment is synthetic in a sense approximating Kant's
original definition.
Allison then claims that this emphasis in On a Discovery reveals that the
question "how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" is the same question as
"how can pure concepts have objective validity?" and that thus the latter is not
a "pre-critical" version of the former (contra Kemp Smith a A Commentary to
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York, 1962), p. 206, 219 ff.). If synthetic
a priori judgments are synthetic by referring to intuitions, then an explanation
of that possibility is also an explanation of how pure concepts (as rules for
synthetic unity) are objective by "having intuitions corresponding to them".
This duality is of a piece with the whole critical duality. Kant must both answer
Hume (the problem of necessary synthetic connection, which leads to tran-
scendental idealism), and Leibniz (the problem of the validity of pure concepts,
which leads to empirical realism, or Kant's Restriktionslehre).
Thus, according to Allison, On a Discovery illuminates the analytic-synthetic
problem by defining syntheticity in terms of a "real relation to the object", and
by suggesting that, in synthetic judgments, concepts are "predicated of intuitions".
There is, though, little discussion by Allison of the actual text of On a Discovery
to support this specific interpretation; it is most often referred to only incidentally.
His remarks are less a commentary than an independent essay arising from certain

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suggestions offered by Kant. In fact, most of Kant's discussion concerns, not the
status of the relation between subject and predicate, but the transcendental ground,
or the kind of warrant we have for extending our knowledge of the subject
concept. It may be that synthetic judgments are only possible by "relating a
concept to an intuition", but Kant's discussion seems to suggest that that relation
warrants predicating a new Merkmale of a concept, and not that the relation
itself (the relation of a concept to an intuition) is what is asserted in a synthetic
judgment which can somehow predicate a concept of an intuition. This latter
notion is more than a little obscure, only very indirectly supported by On
a Discovery, and leads Allison to speak ambiguously about what he calls a "loose"
sense of Kantian concepts.
But Allison is certainly correct that On a Discovery demonstrates the
"constitutive role" of intuitions in knowledge, even in synthetic a priori know-
ledge, a claim which leads to his interpretation of pure intuitions. Syntheitc
judgments require an extra-logical ground for relating subject and predicate, and
in a priori judgments, this ground must be a pure intuition. But Kant had claimed
that Eberhard was wrong in equating the intuitable with the imageable. Space and
time are only "forms of intuition" and are not themselves determinate images.
Allison's problem is then to explain how space and time as also "pure intuitions",
can be determinate enough to ground an extension of our knowledge; how they
are not just what he calls "indeterminate dispositions" and yet are also not
Eberhard's "images". His strategy (again following Gram) is to equate these pure
intuitions with transcendental schemata. Such schemata "can . . . only be construed
as pure intuitions, while pure intuitions can be regarded as representations of the
necessary and universal characteristics of space and t i m e . . . " . But this inter-
pretation leads again to the same "loose" equivocation between concept and
intuition that was prominent in Allison's earlier discussion of syntheticity in
general. Here Allison claims, on the one hand, that "the schema is not something
extraneous to the concept, but is really the concept itself realized in intuition . . . " .
But, on the other hand, that intuition in whidi the concept is realized had been
defined by Allison in the following way: "A pure intuition qua content of
consciousness is the result of a synthesis according to a priori concepts". A pure
concept must be realized in an intuition (schematized) for there to be synthetic
a priori knowledge, but that pure intuition can only determinately "realize" the
concept if it is already "the result of a synthesis according to a priori concepts".
Or, the concept seems to realize or determine itself. If On a Discovery is helpful
in this way, it is so only in emphasizing the obscurity surrounding both the
doctrines of pure intuition and sdiema in Kant.
In general, though, Allison's comments are most helpful in illuminating Kant's
"realist" criticism of rationalism. The translation is quite good, both faithful
and well written, and the introductory and appendixed materials are intelligently
and concisely presented. R o b e n B P i p p i n > Sarasota/Florida

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