Te v.

Te
G. R. No. 161793
Feb. 13, 2009
Ponente: Nachura, J

Facts:
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te(petitioner) met Rowena Gutierrez Yu-Te(respodent) in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. The two shared similar angsts
towards their families and they formed a certain kind of closeness. Three months after their
first meeting, Rowena asked Edward to elope, but the latter refused. However, Rowena
persisted and Edward finally succumbed to it. They sailed for Cebu using the tickets paid for
by Edward and brought by Rowena. Their money lasted only for a month and despite looking
for a job, they were unable to get one, hence Rowena decided to go back to Manila, while
Edward went back to his home. As the days gone by, Rowena became paranoid and
threatened to commit suicide. Edward went to her uncle’s house in order to make amends
which eventually led to their marriage at a court without applying for a marriage license.
Edward was treated like a prisoner in Rowena’s uncle’s house, where he was not allowed to
go out without company and was frightened by Rowena’s uncle. After a month he was able to
escape to his parent’s house where they hid him and protected him. After a counseling, he
talked to Rowena asking her to live with him at his parent’s house, she refused, telling him
that they should get a place of their own and he should take his inheritance with him. Edward
told Rowena that he was disinherited, to which Rowena replied that it is better for them to
part ways. After four years of separation, Edward applied for nullification of their marriage,
citing psychological incapacity, Rowena did not answer.The clinical psychologist who
examined petitioner found both Rowena and Edward psychologically incapacitated. The
lower court ruled in favor of Edward, but upon appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the
former’s decision sustaining the contention of OSG that there is no sufficient ground and
evidence for nullification of marriage, also the petition did not contain essential marital
obligations that they failed to comply with, hence the requirements in the case of Molina were
not satisfied.

Issue:
Whether or not based on Article 36 of the Civil Code, the marriage was null and void.

Held
Yes. Under Article 36 of the Civil Code, the marriage was null and void due to psychological
incapability. It was held in Republic vs. CA, psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental incapacity and that the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of the
phrase to the most serious cases of personality disorder which is clearly demonstrative of the
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Republic v. CA
GR. No. 108763
Feb. 13, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J

Facts:
Private respondent Roridel Molina filed a verified petition for nullification of marriage with
Reynaldo Molina, to whom she has a son. Her petition alleged that a year after their marriage
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as a husband and a father. He
spent more time with his friends, was dependent on his parents for aid and support, and he
never disclosed their financial status with his wife, these often led to quarrels between
spouses. Reynaldo later lost his job, leaving the all the responsibilities to his wife. A fight
ensued leading to the estranged relationship between them. Roridel stayed at Baguio with her
parents while Reynaldo abandoned them. In his answer Reynaldo admitted that they can no
longer leave with each other, but the cause was Roridel’s incapacity to do her marital
obligations. During the trial, Roridel presented the following evidence: a.) her testimony,
b.)her friend’s testimony, c.) a social worker, d.) Dr. Teresita Hidalgo- Sison. The trial court
and the court of appeals after appeal of petitioner, both rendered a decision in favor of Roridel.
Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not opposing and conflicting interest are equivalent to psychological incapacity as
explained by the Regional Trial Court in its decision.

Held:
No. Opposing and conflicting interest are not equivalent to psychological incapacity. In the
case of Santos vs. CA, the court ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental incapacity and that the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of the
phrase to the most serious cases of personality disorder which is clearly demonstrative of the
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Further,
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." Here the evidence adduced by respondent merely showed
that she and her husband could not get along with each other. The court made a guideline for
the interpretation of the Art. 36, which are as follows:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines should be given great respect by the courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.

Santos v. CA
GR. No. 112019
Jan. 4, 195
Ponente: Vitug, J

Facts:
Leouel Santos filed a petition for the nullification of his marriage with private respondent
Julia Santos, citing Art.36 of the Family Code, nullifying a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. He alleged in his complaint that Julia was psychologically
incapacitated for the failure of the latter to come home after 5years. Julia and Leouel met and
married in Iloilo City. A year after their marriage, Julia gave birth to a baby boy. The family
stayed with Julia’s parents, however the relationship went sour. The couple quarreled a lot
regarding the time when they should live on their own. Julia, due to her work left for U.S.
despite Leouel’s plea to disuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called petitioner
and told him that she will come home after her contract expires, but 5 years has passed and
she still hasn’t. Petitioner alleged that he looked for her in the U.S. but to no avail. In her
answer, respondent opposed the complaint and denied the allegations. After repeated setting
of the pre trial conferences, she filed a manifestation stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence. Both the trial court and court of appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Hence the foregoing petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s contention was correct.

Held:
No. Leoul’s contention stating that the law must be liberally construed was not correct. The
Family code did not define psychological incapacity, however the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee can help in shedding light to its meaning. Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental incapacity and that the intention of the law is to confine
the meaning of the phrase to the most serious cases of personality disorder which is clearly
demonstrative of the utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Further, psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Here the behavior of Julia cannot be considered as a
psychological incapacity hence the dismissal.

Suazo v.Suazo
GR. No. 164493
March 12, 2010
Ponente: Brion, J

Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were only 16 when they first met. After months of courtship, the two
went to Manila together with some friends. After being gone for three days, their parents
decided to look for them and bring them home. Soon after their marriage was arranged and
they were married in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Binan. The two lived together at
Angelito’s parents, wherein only Jocelyn was the one who did the work. She encouraged
Angelito to look for one, however, Angelito never did and instead it bacame a reason for their
quarrel. She later on left Angelito who in return found another woman with whom he
currently resides and now have children with. Ten years after their separation Jocelyn filed for
the nullification of their marriage citing Art. 36 of the Family Code as grounds. Angelito did
not answer the petition or complaint, neither did he submit himself for examination with the
psychologist. The trial court ruled in favor of Jocelyn and cited jurisprudence wherein the
presence of the person in question for psychological examination is not required. The Court of
Appeals on the other hand ruled in accordance with the Marcos vs. Marcos, wherein despite
the number of testimonies and evidence presented by the petitioner, still the marriage was not
declared void, here there are less evidence and testimony involved. Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage

Held:
No. There is no basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code provides
that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely
introduced an abstract concept — psychological incapacity that disables compliance
with the contractual obligations of marriage — without any concrete definition or, at the
very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the
concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should
refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage." Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other
perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting 20 follows Te's lead when it
reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. The evidentiary rule was followed in Ting v. Velez-Ting, pertaining to the use of
professional testimony. Here the court finds Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient.

Tanada v Tuvera GR. No. 63915 April 24, 1995

Ponente: Escolin, J
Facts:
Petitioners invoke the right to information regarding matters of public information. As well as
the principle given by law, that on order for a law to be valid and enforceable it must first be
published in the official gazette. Herein petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents to publish or cause to publish certain presidential decree, letters, general order
and the like. Respondents contend for the dismissal of said petition for lack of legal
personality. Respondents further contend that the requirement of publishing the in the official
gazette is not a condition sine qua non.
Issue:
Whether or not publishing in the Official Gazette is a dispensable requirement.
Held:
No. The requirement of publishing in the Official Gazette is indispensable. Art. 2 of the Civil
Code, provides for publication of laws. The interpretation given by respondent is
in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for
its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. However, the very first clause of
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette . . ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of
a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must rst be ocially and specically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC.

Simon v. Chan and CA

GR. No. 157547
Feb. 23, 2011
Ponente: Bersamin, J
Facts: