EARL ALDWIN S.

YOUNG LAW 2 A

[ GR No. 190482, Dec 09, 2015 ]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. IGMIDIO D. ROBLES +
DECISION

Facts:

During his lifetime, Eduardo Reyes, married to Nenita P. Reyes, was the registered owner of certain
properties located at Barangay Ambiling, Magdalena, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-85055 and T-116506, with areas of about 195,366 and 7,431 square meters (sq. m.),
respectively. He later caused the subdivision of the land covered by TCT No. T-85055 into five (5)
lots.

On April 17, 1997, Eduardo sold the said properties to respondents Igmidio D. Robles et al.

On May 3, 2005, the deeds of absolute sale covering the properties were duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Laguna in the names of respondents under the following TCT
Nos.:1. Igmidio D. Robles - TCT No. T-238504;2. Randy V. Robles - TCT No. T-238305;3. Mary
Krist B. Malimban - TCT No. T-238506:4. Anne Jamaca G Robles - TCT No. T-238507;5. John Carlo
S. Robles - TCT No. T-238503; and6. Christine Anne V. Robles - TCT No. 238502.

On May 26, 2006, petitionerDAR, represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja in her capacity as Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer II (PARO), filed Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Absolute Sale and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. in the above given. It alleged that the deeds of
absolute sale were executed by Eduardo without prior DAR clearance under Administrative Order No.
01-89, series of 1989,[3] in violation of Section 6, paragraph 4[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as amended (CARL).

On September 9, 2006, respondents received a Summons and Notice of Hearing, requiring them to
answer the petition and appear for the initial preliminary conference set on October 10, 2006. Thus,
they filed their Answer and Supplemental Answer to the petition.

On October 10 and 23, 2006, Julieta R. Gonzales and Nenita Reyes, the surviving spouse and the
daughter of Eduardo, respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the subject matter of the case, and that the DAR has no
cause of action against them.

Respondents filed a Manifestation adopting the motion to dismiss filed by Julieta and Nenita, which
followedthe DARAB Provincial Adjudicator issued a Resolution denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit.

Julieta and Nenita filed a motion for reconsideration and respondents, through counsel, manifested
that they are joining the motion for reconsideration filed by Julieta and Nenita.

Respondents filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On May 29, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The three (3) questioned Resolutions of the
PARAD dated 30 November 2006, 7 February 2008 and 26 June 2008 are all REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The DAR's petition for annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles before the
PARAD is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG LAW 2 A

It is very clear that the relief sought by the DAR, annulment of the contracts and cancellation of titles,
would necessarily involve the adjustment/adjudication of the private rights of the parties to the sale,
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB to resolve.[6]
The DAR filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution[7]dated December
2, 2009.

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, the DAR filed a petition for review on certiorariraising the sole issue,
to wit:

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS JURISDICTION OVER

ANNULMENT OF DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE AND THE SUBSEQUENT
CANCELLATION OF TITLES INVOLVING LANDS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION
AND DISPOSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM.

Ruling:

In resolving the sole issue of whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the DAR's petition for
annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles, the Court is guided by the following rules on
jurisdiction laid down in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz. Jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or
waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the
court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the
face of the complaint or petition.

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the
defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or
questions that is the subject of the controversy. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with
the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be
addressed and resolved by the DARAB. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.

In determination for the payment of Just Compensation. Under, Rule II of the said Rules of Procedure,
the DARAB shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or affirm
resolutions, orders, and decisions of its Adjudicators who have primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case: The preliminary administrative determination of reasonable and just
compensation of lands acquired under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 and the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and
administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office
of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances.

Meanwhile, the Regional Trial .Courts (RTCs) have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over
agrarian reform matters.[21] Section 56 of RA 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian
Courts," which are RTCs designated by the Court — at least one (1) branch within each province —
to act as such. As Special Agrarian Courts (SACs), these RTCs have, according to Section 57 of the
same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over "all-petitions for the determination of just
compensation to land-owners" and "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under said act.
EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG LAW 2 A

G.R. No. 150635

September 11, 2008
DR. ROSALINA G. HILARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MODESTO PRUDENTE, CRISANTO PRUDENTE and REMEDIOS PRUDENTE-
PUNO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Dr. Rosalina G. Hilario is the registered owner of an agricultural land with an area of 10.2048 hectares
situated in Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-5757. By
virtue of a Notice of Coverage dated September 1, 1997, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal declared 5.2048 hectares of said parcel of land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. Herein respondents Modesto
Prudente, Crisanto Prudente and Remedios Prudente-Puno, together with Benito Prudente, were
identified as potential farmer-beneficiaries on the basis of their actual and physical possession/tillage
of the subject property.

Petitioner filed a protest to oppose the inclusion of her land in the CARP and the identification of the
respondents and Benito Prudente as farmer-beneficiaries, averring that they were neither tenants nor
occupant-tillers of the subject property. The protest was denied by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) in an Order dated February 3, 1998.

On May 28, 1998, the petitioner filed an action for forcible entry with prayer for preliminary injunction
with the MTC, alleging that the respondents entered the land and committed depredations thereon by
cutting ipil-ipil and bamboo trees and built a house without the knowledge and consent of the
petitioner and over the vigorous objection of her caretaker.

On January 11, 1999, the MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads as follows:

On appeal, the RTC however found that "from the facts, it is clear that there exists an agrarian dispute
between the parties. Consequently, pursuant to Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6557, which reiterates
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform." Thus, the RTC
declared:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Municipal Trial Court is reversed for lack of jurisdiction, and the
case [instead be] forwarded to the Department of Agrarian Reform for proper disposition.

A petition for review was filed with the CA which was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipal Trial Courts have jurisdiction over the Forcible Entry case filed by the
petitioner against the respondent.

RULING:

No, the Municipal Trial Court have no jurisdiction over the forcible entry case filed by the petitioner
against the respondent.
EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG LAW 2 A

The finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, was that the controversy between the parties
pertains to or arises from an agrarian relationship and/or the implementing law thereof. The subject
landholding was placed under the CARP pursuant to a notice of coverage and raised therein was the
issue of identification of the respondents as farmer-beneficiaries of said landholding. Petitioner
protested the identification of the respondents as farmer-beneficiaries made by the MARO which was
denied by the PARO. After the denial of her protest, petitioner filed the ejectment case with the MTC.
Given these undisputed facts, petitioner cannot now impugn the jurisdiction of the DAR or the
DARAB over the controversy considering the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. We take the occasion
to reiterate what has been explained in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian
reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically,
in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts
of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.

Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The pertinent
provision reads:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.

It is of no moment whether a tenancy relationship existed between the parties or whether proof thereof
was adduced by the parties. The case filed with the MTC clearly concerned an agrarian dispute
involving the implementation of the CARP which the petitioner was fully aware of. It was obvious that
the petitioner filed the ejectment suit with the MTC in order to thwart the unfavorable ruling she
obtained from the PARO. Such legal maneuvering cannot be countenanced. We agree with the CA
when it ratiocinated:

Although the case before the agrarian office involves an issue of ownership and the cause of action
subject of this appeal is one of possession, a judgment in the latter would render the declaration made
in the former inutile. The respondents, as potential farm beneficiaries of the CARP would be owners
of agricultural land to which they cannot exercise acts of ownership because the decision by the
municipal trial court would effectively bar them from possession thereof. This absurd situation would
make a mockery of the judicial system by utilizing it to circumvent and evade the policy of the State to
promote social justice for the welfare of the farmers and farm workers, pursuant to the provisions of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This Court can not allow itself to be an
instrument of the petitioner in her adoption of smart, and perhaps, shrewd, legal maneuvering to defeat
and escape the agrarian reform law that was enacted to alleviate the predicament of the landless
farmers.10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53348 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG LAW 2 A

G.R. No. 100091

October 22, 1992
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE
COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE
FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

Facts:
CMU is an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need
for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who
planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the
Philippines.
Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving
for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the
CMU.
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned
grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition
claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims
were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares
to 3,080 hectares.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and
employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and
staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-
how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of
land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use
participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live
in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly
stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or
employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension
and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and
at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation
to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the
Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project
was discontinued. Another project was launched o develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and
promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project
implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
This has the same nature as of the Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision that
there would be no tenant-landlord relationship.
The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not. The non-renewal of the contracts, the
discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation
EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG LAW 2 A

from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated
the filing of the complaint.
DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries
under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable,
compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution
to qualified beneficiaries.
Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants
claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU.

Issue:
Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU, hence, beneficiaries of CARP
Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status
of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP

Held:
First Issue:
We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written
agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlordtenant relationship existed between the CMU
and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the
harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee
and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by
the CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that
no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees,
and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very
responsible position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed
while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the
moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin.
No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants,
cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils.,
Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing
Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking
where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program,
with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said projects were directly connected to the
purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution.
Second Issue:
EARL ALDWIN S. YOUNG LAW 2 A

It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
1. It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
2. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
3. It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
4. It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly
and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental
farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot
production centers.
Third Issue:
DARAB has no jurisdiction. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the
jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More
specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage
of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up
experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.
In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of
the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred
hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to
implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute for
Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are
not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was
without legal authority.