1

Subject: Constitutional Law I by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
Date: parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
CASES ON PARTY –LIST
thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.

Step Two. Determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
Facts: distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which
was held with the national elections. Comelec proclaimed 14 party-list the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
representatives which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes. The number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as
number of votes cast for the party-list system.1 However, PAG-ASA follows:
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Number of votes
Constitution, was mandatory. The Comelec then promulgated PAG-ASA’s of first party Proportion of votes of
petition, ordering the proclamation of another 38 respondents who, in -------------------- = first party relative to
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus complete the full 52 party- Total votes for total votes for party-list system
list representatives in Congress even if they had not passed the two party-list system
percent threshold.2
Step Three. Solve for the number of additional seats that the other
Issue(s): qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other No. of votes of
words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
solons be filled up completely and all the time? for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three- party No. of votes of the first party
seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? first party
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is yes, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?
Case digest: Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC
Held: The Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty- Glenn Tuazon, I-A
eight (38) parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a Facts
party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of R.A.  Akbayan and Bayan Muna filed petitions that challenged
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation. As a
Omnibus Resolution 3785, proclaiming 154 orgs and parties
mere implementing body, Comelec which is tasked merely to enforce
for 2001 partylist elections
and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of
 They wanted COMELEC to disqualify groups that are not
Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority.
marginalized or underrepresented from the party list elections
Issues
Ruling:
1. W/N political parties may participate in party list elections.
(1) No. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
2. W/N party list elections are exclusive to marginalized and
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
underrepresented groups.
3. W/N COMELEC’s allowing of non-marginalized and non-
(2) The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
underrepresented groups, as well as political parties to run in
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very
party list elections is a grave abuse of discretion.
essence of "representation." To have meaningful representation, the
Held
elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
 W/R to political parties, they may participate in party list
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the
elections
result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
o ART VI, Sec 5: “PL elections open to NATIONAL,
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat
REGIONAL, and SECTORAL parties/orgs”
to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
o Open up system to political parties that consistently
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure get 3rd or 4th place in district elections – even if they
meaningful local representation. get millions of votes, they can have zero seats for
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's not fielding first-place candidates in district elections
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each o RA 7941, Sec 11: temporarily disqualified top 5
qualified party, organization or coalition. Such three-seat limit ensures political parties from participating in PL elections.
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no This means that they can run otherwise.
single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the o PROVIDED that these political parties represent the
party-list seats, if not the entire House. marginalized and underprivileged
 W/R to exclusivity of PL elections to marginalized and
(3) underrepresented (M&UR) sectors, majority held that it is.
Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions o From statutory construction, language of law clearly
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each forwards INTENT to represent the M&UR sectors
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes  RA 7941, Sec 2: enable election to House
of Representatives by proportional
1
Short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House – 20% of the total number of representation to:
representatives – Section 5 (2) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.  Those belonging to M&UR
2
As provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941 – only those parties garnering a sector
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;

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 Who lack well-defined
constituencies
 Who could contribute to
legislation
 RA 7941, Sec 5: enumerated the M&UR
sectors
o Allowing the super-rich and economically privileged
to run as PL groups defeats purpose of PL elections:
to draw fundamental difference between:
 80% district elections – usually for the
powerful
 20% PL seats – for the M&UR
o Recommendations of SC to COMELEC for screening
PL groups:
 PL groups must show through consti,
articles, etc. that it is for M&UR groups,
and majority of members must be M&UR
 Political parties: not disqualified outright,
but must prove that it is for M&UR groups
 Grounds for disqualification:
 Religious sects
 Advocating violence
 Foreign parties
 Receiving support from foreign
entities
 Violating laws, rules, and
regulations of elections – NOTE:
this is the grounds for
disqualification of non M&UR
groups
 Untruthful statements in petition
 Ceasing to exist for at least 1
year
 Failing to participate in 2
consecutive PL elections OR
failing to get 2% votes for 2
consecutive elections
 PL must be independent from government
 Nominees must comply with the law
 Nominees must belong to the M&UR sects
 Must be able to contribute to legislation
DISSENTING OPINION OF MENDOZA:
 Art VI, Sec 5: PL system for “registered, regional, and sectoral
parties or organization” – no mention of exclusivity to M&UR
sectors
 PL system has two functions
o Enable (but not be exclusive to) M&UR groups to
run for seats
o Give seats to the consistent 3rd and 4th placing
parties that lose in winner-take-all district elections
 Using constitutional commission debates, Monsod proposal (of
P-list, not sectoral system, which appoints reserved seats)
won. The Monsod proposal rejects sectoral system to avoid
problems in choosing which sectors must get sure seats.
 The 3-term provisional appointment of sure seats is already to
compromise to M&UR groups: to allow them to build strength
and strong followings – afterwards, the system is open to all
 Open system allows for marginalized groups and major
political parties to discuss, cooperate, and compromise.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI et al. v. COMELEC
FACTS:
1) Various party lists filed motions for proclamation asking if
there are other party list candidates that should be proclaimed
winners. Answer is based on 8-point guideline and the 4
parameters of Phil party list system.
2) OSG added that proclamation by COMELEC of BUHAY,
COCFED, SANALKAS and PM as well as those who met 2% of
total votes cast are winners.
2
3) Court required OSG and parties to submit respective position
papers. COCOFED and BUHAY were added to 44 who qualified.
4) There is a need now to take up issue on which of parties won
during party list elections.
o ISSUE
HELD:
- Labo v. Comelec and Grego v. Comelec are not applicable
to determination of party list election.
- Yes, the votes cast for disqualified for failure to meet 8-pt
guideline contained in June 26, 2001 decision should be
deducted from total cast for party list system.
RATIO:
1. The disqualified candidates votes will be subtracted from total cast
votes to deem the winners. Labo and Grego cases inapplicable, for they
admit exception not applicable in case at bar.
- In LABO: the 2nd highest who garnered votes is not entitled
to declare elected; however, votes garnered by disqualified party will not
be counted. As a result, the next candidate obtaining higher number of
votes will be elected.
- In GREGO: exception in LABO applies given that the party
who obtained highest number of votes is disqualified and
that the electorate knowingly voted for them would not
be counted.
- IN THIS CASE: language of law is clear (that a vote cast
for a party, sectoral, or coalition not entitled to be voted
shall not be counted). Moreover, the case at bar pertains
to acquisition of a number of congressional seats
depending on total election results, such that 2 nd, 3rd etc.
can be proclaimed depending on compliance with
requirements
2. Subtracting votes garnered by disqualified party list groups from total
votes cats will reduce figures; hence, 2% mark can be easily attained by
marginalized and underrepresented. This strengthens Sec 2 of RA 7941’s
Declaration of Policy
3. Bayan Muna contends that this will result to instability of the system.
On the contrary, Comelec now has a list of those qualified and
disqualified for the future elections & Comelec is guided accordingly for
future canvassing of candidate’s qualification before elections are held.
4. A new tally ranking qualified party list candidates based on percent of
votes obtained compare to total votes cast nationwide.
APPORTIONMENT
Article 6 Section 6 4-A
Tobias v. Abalos
G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
Facts:
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675
also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Manduluyong into a Highly Urbanized City”
- Ronald Zamora the congressman representative sponsored the
bill and then President Ramos signed it to law on Feb 9, 1994
- Petitioners contend the unconstitutionality of RA 7675 on three
specific provisions:
o It contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule. (Bill
enacted made mandaluyong a highly urbanized city
AND the division of the San Juan District)
o It violates Art 6 Sec 5(1) whereas the division of San
Juan and Mandaluyong would exceed the maximum
number of 255 representatives
o It violates Art 6 Sec 5(4) “Section 49 has the effect
of preempting the Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec 5(4) as
aforecited
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- Contentions are DEVOID of merit
Issue:
- W/N RA 7675 is unconstitutional
Ratio:
Ra 7675 is indeed constitutional.
First issue: the statutory conversion of Mandalauyong into a
highly urbanized city of not less than 250,000 indubitably ordains
compliance with the “one city-one representative” proviso. Creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its voncersion but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion.
Issue that there was no census to show that Mandaluyong and
San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000: is not
suffice to strike down the validity of RA No 7675. The said act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of
the minimum requirements. It is not required that all law as emanating
from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws.
The present limit of 250 representatives is not absolute. Due
to the clause “unless otherwise provided by law”.
Contention of Section 49 opf RA 7675 in effect preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts borders on absurdity
as it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PUNO, J.:
Republic Act No. 7854 entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”
was passed. A petitioned was filed by individuals, suing as taxpayers.
Only one was a resident of Makati, while the others were residents of
Ibayo Ususan, Taguig and Metro Manila. They assailed certain sections
of the act unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area of territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
description.
2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the “three consecutive
term” limit for local effective officials.
3. Section 53 a) increases the legislative district of Makati only by
special law, b) increase in legislative district was not expressed
in the title of the bill and c) the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with the Constitution because
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Note: G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H. Osmena as
senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. He assails Section 52 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7854 sections 2, 51, and 52 are
unconstitutional
Held: No they are not
Rationale:
3
1. The delineation of the land area did not change even an inch
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did
not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area
of Makati. Section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality.”
Also, the reason why the land area was not defined by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions was because there
was a territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio under court litigation. They did
not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative
finding of fact which could decide the issue. Out of respect,
legislators felt that they should leave it up to the courts to
decide.
2. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events like Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and
that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig are not also the proper
parties to raise this abstract issue.
3. Same as with the Tobias vs. Abalos case, the Constitution did
not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA
No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative
district
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article 6 of
the Constitution because as of the latest survey in Makati
(1990), census stood at 450,000. Said section provides that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
shall have at least one representative.
In petitioner’s contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated
in the bill, the court ruled that “it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expressed the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to such general subject.
Montejo v. Commission on Elections
Petitioner C. Montejo representing the 1st district of Leyte pleads for the
annulment of section 1 of resolution no. 2736 of the COMELEC
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte on the ground that it violates
the principle of equality of representation
Remedy sought by petitioner: transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his
district to the 2nd district of the province
HELD: Resolution no. 2736 VOID
First inquiry regarding the constitutional power of COMELEC to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district iin
the province of Leyte
Basic powers of respondent COMELEC as spelled out in Article IX of the
constituion
Section 2
The COMELEC is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made
Section 3
X X X or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to atleast 1
member or such number of of members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph 3 section 5 of article VI of the
constitution
Issues that had to be settled before the congressional elections in 1987:
 Whether the members of the House of Representatives be
elected by district or by province
 Who shall undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts
 How the apportionment should be made
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Davide’s 3 options
1. Allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law
2. Empower COMELEC to do the apportionment
3. Let the Commission exercise power by way of an Ordinace
appeneded to the constitution
The Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power
of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power
Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make
minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
Meaning of minor adjustments
Minor, meaning that there should be no change in
the allocations per district.
Section 3 only allowed COMELEC to adjust the number of members and
not municipalities
HELD: Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
ammounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its
resolution no. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan if the 2 nd
district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd
district of leyte.
RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION
PEDRO GALLEGO, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VERRA, respondent.
(No. 4864l. November 24, l941, Philippine Reports, Vol. 73, pp
453)
Petitioner Gallego was elected Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in
December l940 elections. On question of residency requirement, he was
ousted by virtue of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
Petitioner Gallego went to the Supreme Court by way of a
petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. In
his petition, Gallego claimed that he is a native of Abuyog, Leyte, and
later became a school teacher of Abuyog. In 1937, he ran for Mayor but
lost. Thereafter, he went to Mindanao in search of a job, and finally,
found employment as a nurseryman of the Bureau of Forestry in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
During his stay in Bukidnon, he registered himself as an
elector and voted there during the election of Assemblymen in December
l938. He also obtained his residence certificate from the Municipality of
Malaybalay where he stated that he resided in the municipality for one
year and a half.
Petitioner Gallego then returned to his hometown in Abuyog,
Leyte where he again ran for Mayor and won by a margin of 800 votes
during the December 10, l940 election..
ISSUE: Whether or not Gallego had been a resident of
Abuyog for at least one year prior to December 10, l940.
HELD: The term “residence” as used in the election law is
synonymous with “domicile”, which requires a concurrence as follows:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the locality; (2) an intention to
remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must be an ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI and ANIMUS
MANENDI.
In the light of these principles, the facts of this case weigh
heavily against the theory that the petitioner had lost his residence or
domicile in Abuyog. The Court believes that he did not reside in
Malaybalay with the intention of remaining there indefinitely and of not
returning to Abuyog. His departure therefrom after his defeat was
temporary and only for the purpose of looking for employment in
Mindanao.
Petitioner also contends that even assuming that he had lost
his residence or domicile in Abuyog, he reacquired it more than one year
prior to December 10, l940 elections. Petitioner is a native of Abuyog
and he did not lose his domicile of origin. His margin of 800 votes in a
third class municipality could not be disregarded without doing violence
to the will of the people of said town.
4
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
Facts:
- Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte stating her
7 months of residency
- private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, contending that Mrs.
Marcos does not comply with the residency requirement of one year
immediately preceding the elections
- petitioner later amended the certificate of candidacy, stating residency
as “since childhood” and that stating 7 months was an honest mistake.
- COMELEC granted Montejo’s petition, and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner – stating that, “she could not be a
resident of Tacloban since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places”
(in San Juan MM, Batac Ilocos Norte, etc.)
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was a resident
Held: Yes. Residence in election law means domicile – their place of
habitual residence, an individual’s “permanent home” a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return.
Ratio:
- Petitioner had no intention to abandon her domicile of origin. Petitioner
held close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province.
- Domicile is not easily lost, one must demonstrate an actual change in
domicile, bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence, and act to correspond with purpose.
C. Respicio 1A
Aquino v. COMELEC
FACTS:
- Petitioner Aquino was running for representative of 2nd district of Makati
and must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile
- Petitioner indicated in his COC that he is a resident of Concepcion
Tarlac for 52 years preceding the election and that his domicile is
undoubtedly in Concepcion Tarlac
- he leased a condominium in Makati to establish residency but leasing is
weak proof of his intent to acquire permanent residency in Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is eligible to run for representative of
2nd district of Makati, following the terms of residency.
HELD: No, his lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residency requirement as a qualification for candidacy, by
establishing commencement dated his residence. If a perfectly valid
lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot do better. There was no clear and
positive proof of showing successful abandonment of domicile.
Domino v. Comelec
G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
FACTS:
COMELEC disqualified petitioner Juan Domino as a candidate for
representative of the province of Sarangani for lack of the one-year
residence requirement and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner’s prior residence was in Ayala Heights, Q.C. He ran for
representative of the 3rd district of Q.C. in 1995.
Domino claims COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled he did not meet
the 1 year residency requirement.
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ISSUES:
1. W/N the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, in exclusion proceedings, declaring petitioner as resident
of Sarangani and not Q.C. is final, conclusive and binding on
the whole world including the COMELEC. [it appears that
exclusion proceedings refer to a voter’s being excluded from
the list of voters in a certain precinct; Q.C. excluded Domino
from its voter list saying he was a resident of Sarangani]
2. W/N petitioner resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year
immediately preceding 5/11/98 elections.
3. W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of the petitioner. [Discussion of this issue
omitted from the book]
RULING:
1. Domino’s contention that the MTC of Q.C.’s declaring him a
resident of Sarangani and not of Q.C. is final and conclusive
upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained
2. Domino was NOT a resident of Sarangani for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the election
RATIONALE:
1. It is within the MTC’s jurisdiction to exclude Domino from its
voter list but it cannot conclude that therefore, the COMELEC
must recognize Domino as having satisfied the residency
requirement in his certificate of candidacy. It is within the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction under Sec. 78, Art IX of the Omnibus
Election Code to determine if a certificate of candidacy is valid.
2. To successfully effect a change of domicile there must be
animus manendi [intention of remaining] coupled with animus
non revertendi [intention to abandon old domicile]. Domino
did not sufficiently demonstrate this. Although he leased a
house in Sarangani in January 1997, he did not purchase the
home until November 1997.
CITIZENSHIP QUALIFICATIONS
Co vs. House Electoral Tribunal
Facts:
The case is about the citizenship of Jose Ong Jr. who was
elected to represent Northern Samar in Congress. The House
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) already declared Jose Ong Jr.
is a natural born Filipino Citizen. Petitioners question this decision before
the court.
Important facts in Jose Ong Jr.’s history:
1) Jose Ong Jr.’s grandfather, Ong Te, moved to the Philippines
(Samar) from China in 1895 and was able to obtain a
certificate of residence.
2) Jose Ong Jr.’s father, Jose Ong Chuan, was born in China in
1905 and was brought to Samar by Ong Te in 1915.
3) Jose Ong Chuan eventually married a natural born Filipina
named Agripina Lao and bore Jose Ong Jr. in 1948.
4) In 1955, Jose Ong Chuan was declared a Filipino citizen and it
was executed in 1957 (Jose Ong Jr. was 9).
5) Private respondent (Jose Ong Jr.) finished his elementary
education in Samar and went to Manila for his secondary and
college education and eventually passed the CPA board exams.
He also found work in Manila
6) Private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar
and even registered himself and voted there during the 1984
and 1986 elections.
7) Private respondent married a Filipina woman named Desiree
Lim in 1984.
8) He ran for public office and won by a huge margin in the 1987
elections.
5
ISSUES:
Whether or not people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the
1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens
thereby extending the interpretation of the 1973 constitution on the
matter.
Whether or not this provision should be applied retroactively.
HELD:
Private respondent is a natural born Filipino Citizen because of the
following reasons:
1) It was established by Father Bernas that people who elect
Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be
considered natural born.
2) It was also established that the provisions were to be applied
retroactively since it seeks to remedy and inequitable situation
under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino
fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born
Filipinos however people born of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers are not. The provision is therefore curative.
3) Private respondent’s mother was a Filipina and his father was
naturalized when he was 9 years old. This means that he was
already a Filipino and did not have to perform any formal or
written action.
4) Private respondent’s execution of his right to suffrage (#6 of
facts) constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
C. Noel 1-A
Bengzon v. Cruz (2001)
FACTS:
Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural born Filipino citizen and was
born in Tarlac. However, he enlisted himself in the US Marine Corps
without the consent of the country. He took an oath of allegiance to the
US and as a result, lost his Filipino citizenship due to Commonwealth Act
No. 63 Section 1(4) which states:
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, “rendering
service to or
Accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country”...
However, respondent reacquired his Filipino citizenship by means of
repatriation which is under R.A. 2630. He ran and was elected the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengzon by a huge margin.
ISSUE:
 W/N Cruz can still be considered a natural-born citizen due to
his reacquisition of his original citizenship.
 W/N the Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
annulling the decision of the HRET on the petition of Bengzon.
HELD:
Petition was dismissed.
RATIO:
 Commonwealth Act No. 63 discusses the modes of reacquiring
Filipino citizenship. It is either by Naturalization, by
Repatriation, or by direct act of Congress. Repatriation is
considered to be the simplest mode of reacquiring citizenship
for it consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registering the said oath in the Local civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned last decided.
 Respondent Cruz took the said oath and registered the said
oath in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the rules of repatriation.
 As a result, respondent has recovered its original citizenship.
 The Court’s jurisdiction is to check whether or not there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It has no corrective power to annul or correct the
decision of the HRET.
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Dissenting Opinion by J, Sandoval-Gutierrez
 Bengzon is still in violation of Article 6, Section 6 pertaining to
the qualifications of a member of the House of
Representatives. He is still considered a naturalized citizen, not
a natural-born citizen.
 A Natural-born citizen “are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform an act
to acquire or perfect their citizenship.”
TERM AND TENURE
A. Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohmad Al Dimaporo was elected Representative
for Second Legislative District of Lano del Sur. Took his oath on January
1987 and performed rights and duties of his position. On January
15,1990, petitioner files Cert. of Candidacy with COMELEC for Regional
Governor of ARMM, election was scheduled on February 17,1990.
COMELEC informed respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Reps, who then excluded Dimaporo’s name from the Roll of the House of
Reps pursuant of Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner lost the autonomous elections. Sent a letter t the
Speaker, expressing his intention to “resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress.” Failed to regain his seat in
Congress, because this petition was filed on January 31, 1991. Petitioner
alleges that his name was excluded from Roll, he was virtually barred
and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights
and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his
district. Dimaporo admits that he filed for Candidacy, but maintains that
he did not lose his seat as congressman because Sec. 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, therefore is
not applicable to present members of Congress. He further points out
that term of office of Members of the House of Reps, as well as grounds
by which incumbency of said members may be shortened are in the
Constitution (Sec. 2 Article XVIII). Asserts that under expressio unius
etst exclusio alterius, Sec. 67 Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to
constitutional provisions in that it provides for shortening f
congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution.
Petitioner alleges that respondents acted w/o authority, on the
basis that provision of law relied upon by the respondents in excluding
him from the Roll. Respondents’ “administrative act” of excluding his
name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Further
states that his filing of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office, therefore he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat. Petitioner
demands that his rights as duly elected Member of the House of Reps be
recognized.
ISSUES:
 Is Sec. 67 Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 operative under
the present Constitution?
 Could the respondents, by administrative act,
exclude petitioner from the Rolls of the HoR,
thereby preventing him from exercising his functions
as congressman, and depriving him of his rights and
privileges as such?
HELD:
 YES. Respondents contend that Sec. 67 Article IX is still
operative under the Constitution as the voluntary act of
resignation contemplated in said section falls within the term
“voluntary renunciation” of office enunciated in par.2 Section 7
Article VI of the Constitution. Respondents assert that
petitioner’s filing f Candidacy is an act of resignation.
Petitioner’s assumption that the statutory provision is not
operative is not valid. Petitioner failed to discern that rather
than cut short the term of office of officials, the statutory
provision seeks to ensure that officials serve out their entire
term by discouraging them from running for another public
office and hereby cutting their tenure short by making it clear
that if they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their
6
former positions. Filing of candidacy for another office is a
form of voluntary renunciation.
 YES. Respondents were duty bound to strike the name of the
petitioner from the Roll of the HoR, considering the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Sec. 67 Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
As administrative officers, the respondents, upon the
communication of COMELEC of Dimaporo’s filing of Candidacy,
had to abide by their ministerial duties to remove petitioners
name from Roll of HoR.
DECISION:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissenting Opinion, GUTTIEREZ, JR., J:
Believes that respondents have no power to erase from the
Rolls the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign
constituents to represent the in Congress. It is a fundamental
principle in Consti Law that Congress cannot add by statute or
administrative act to the causes of disqualification or removal of
constitutional officers. B.P 881 has no such power when it comes to
constitutional officers. When Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor,
he was not trifling with mandate of the people, he wanted to serve
a greater number in an autonomous, more direct and intimate
manner. VOTE TO GRANT THE PETITION.
Farinas vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
- Section 14 of Republic Act 9006 (a.k.a. The Fair Election Act)
repealed Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Sec. 67
of the said code states that elective officials running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and VP, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Issues:
- W/N the repeal of Sec. 67 of the OEC is embraced in the title
and germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.
- W/N Section 14 of RA 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of
the OEC leaving Sec. 66 which imposes similar limitation to
appointive officials.
- W/N RA 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended in its enactment.
Held
- First issue: Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a rider. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough and should include the general object which the
statutes seeks to effect. Mere details of the statute need not
be included in the title.
- Second issue: Section 14 is not violative of the equal
protection clause of the constitution. The equal protection
clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation when it applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. What the petitioner is trying to say is that elective officials
are given a privilege to for an office other than the one which
he is holding, whereas appointive officials are not given such
privilege. As stated earlier, the equal protection clause does
not apply if the legislature can distinguish one class from
another, in this case the elective officials from the appointive
IA 2008 Digested Cases

officials, and the law should apply to all persons belonging to
such class. The first difference between an elective official and
an appointive official is that the former occupies his office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate while the latter was
designated to office by an appointing authority. Another
difference is that the elective officials are allowed to take part
in political and electoral activities while the appointive officials
are strictly prohibited to take part in any election except to
vote.
- The irregularities concerning the enactment of RA 9006 are
considered as internal rules of Congress. Hence, the Court has
no jurisdiction over the matter. What is important for the Court
regarding the enactment of a law is the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed. (This doctrine is known as the Enrolled Bill
Doctrine)
THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
History of the Provision
63 Phil, 134 (1936)
Facts:
History of the Provision:
- There was such a provision in the 1935 constitution (sec.
4) Composition of which was 3 supreme court justices
and 6 member of the National Assembly to be nominated
my the first and second largest party (3 each).
- the original provision was in the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, “he assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, qualifications of its members,” – taken from the
constitution of the US.
- the Act of congress, 1916, “Senate and HRET will be the
sole judges of the elections, returns and qualifications of
their elective members.
- the applicable provision used to decide on this case is as
follows: “The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting of any of its members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, composed of 3 members elected
by the party having the largest number of votes in the
national assembly, 3 elected by the party having the
second largest number of votes, and 3 justices of the SC
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided by one of the said justices. – October 26, 1934
Remarks for Clarification in Adopting the above-mentioned
provision
- If there is no question about the election of the members,
there is nothing to be judged.
- There is no need to confirm the election – it is not a
constitutional duty.
- Before the member can question the eligibility, he must
go to the Electoral Commission and make the question
before the Electoral Commission.
This provision was long practiced in government:
- 1770 – (1) committee of privileges and elections: to hear
and investigate all questions of this description. (2)
hearing at bar of the house itself.
- 1868 – House of Commons in Englancd, Dominion of
Canada - election contests were heard by the committee
of the House of Commons, Commonwealth of Australia –
contests were heard in house but changed to High
Courts, Grecian Republic and Czechoslovakia Republic
both had Electoral commissions
7
Jurisprudence:
- the creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant
- All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the
expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
- need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission
- The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with
the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it
is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision
(section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
"Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of
members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
- The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature.
- The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution ( Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim.
Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we
concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective.
- the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule
of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
Issue of the Case:
Whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of
the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof
by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935.
Sanchez vs. COMELEC (p.208)
Facts:
During the May 11, 1987 elections, the COMELEC has proclaimed 23
senators only. The people fighting for the 24th position in the Senate are
Augusto Sanchez and Juan Ponce Enrile. On July 25, 1987 Enrile was
leading with 73,034 votes with only 31,000 votes not being counted.
Some voters wrote on their ballots “Sanchez” only. However, these votes
were considered astray since there was also a disqualified candidate by
IA 2008 Digested Cases

the name of Gil Sanchez whose name had not been crossed out from the
COMELEC election returns and other election forms. Hence, a petition for
recount has been filed by the petitioner with the COMELEC.
Issue:
W/N his petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with
the COMELEC may be considered a summary pre-proclamation
controversy falling within the COMELEC’s exclusive jurisdiction or
properly pertains to the realm of election protest falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as “the sole judge
of all contests relation to the election, returns and qualification of the
Senate’s members”.
Held:
The petition of Sanchez is not considered as a pre-proclamation
controversy under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Code. Under the said code,
there must be proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete
or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered
with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain
discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of
which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only
instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to. The case
of Sanchez doesn’t fall under any of these circumstances. The votes that
were considered astray are not incomplete because an election an is
incomplete if there is "omission in the election returns of the name of
any candidate and/or his corresponding votes" (Sec. 234) or "in case the
number of votes for a candidate has been omitted." (Sec. 6, Res. No.
1865) Furthermore, allowing the recount will not be effective and
efficient for the government since the government would want the
results of the elections be proclaimed on the earliest date possible. In
case of terrorism, vote buying and other irregularities, an election protest
should be filed for these matters. As stated earlier, Enrile led by 73,034
votes over Sanchez with only 31,000 votes left unaccounted for, hence,
the Court ordered the COMELEC to proclaim Enrile as the 24 th member of
the Senate.
Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990
Medialdea, J:
Facts:
[Petitioner] Virgilio Robles and [Private Respondent] Romeo Santos were
candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1 st District of Caloocan
City in the last May 11, 1987 Congressional Elections. Robles was
declared the winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an Election protest with [respondent]
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He alleged that
there were electoral frauds and irregularities in the concluded elections
in Caloocan City. He prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in
all the 320 precincts. On Jan 14, 1988, Robles filed an Answer to Santos’
protest alleging the lack of residence of the Protestant (Santos) and the
late filing of the Protest. HRET issued an order on Aug 15, 1988 setting
the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on Sept 1, 1988.
The revision of Ballots for the first 75 precincts was terminated on Sept 7
1988.
Robles filed an “Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision” on Sept 8, 1988, to
which Santos filed a “Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts”
on Sept 12, 1988. Two days after, on Sept 14 1988, Santos again filed
for an “Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest.” In
answer to this, Robles filed yet another “Urgent Motion to Cancel
Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall
Withdrawal,” on Sept 19, 1988. On the same day HRET issued a
Resolution, which granted Santos’ Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard
Withdrawal of Protest. On Sept 20, 1988, Robles filed for another
“Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET Resolution.”
On Sept 22, 1988, HRET suspended the resumption of revision
scheduled for Sept 26, 1988.
On Jan 26, 1989 HRET denied Robles’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Robles then filed an instant petition for a certiorari on Feb 1, 1989. On
8
Feb 9, 1989 Santos filed his Answer through an “Urgent Motion for
Injunction or Restraining Order”; likewise, Robles’ filed Motion for Leave
to Reply on Feb 22, 1989.
Petitioner then filed a Supplementary Petition questioning HRET’s
Resolution on Resumption of the revision of ballots. Robles contends that
HRET lost jurisdiction on the case when it ordered the resumption of the
revision while the Protest was withdrawn (Sept 12, 1988 Protest), and
that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petition was DISMISSED.
Issue:
W/N HRET lost its jurisdiction on the case when it ordered the revision of
the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the
Protest.
Held:
No, “the mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of the tribunal,
does not by itself deprive the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties
but continue until the case is terminated.”
Ratio:
Contrary to the Petitioner’s claim that the “motion to withdraw” was
favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only after the
Protestant filed a “motion to disregard the withdrawal of the protest” did
the HRET resolved the said motion. On this account, the motion did not
have the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the
protest. Hence, the Petitioner’s contention that the tribunal acted with
grave abuse of discretion is dismissed.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent tribunal in enforcing the assailed resolutions, a writ of
certiorari will not issue. The reason behind this is that an electoral
tribunal has specifically been set up in order that any doubt as to
mandate to a public office may be fully resolved concerning the public
will. It is important therefore that the tribunal be allowed to perform its
functions as a constitutional body free of any “technicalities or
procedural play of words.”
Abbas et al., v. Senate Electoral Tribunal (1988)
Facts:
10/9/1987: Petitioners filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election
contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 LABAN coalition
candidates who were proclaimed by Comelec as senators-elect in May
1987 elections
11/17/1987: Petitioners filed with Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members of Tribunal from the hearing and
resolution of case SET Case No. 002-87 because the Senators-Members
are interested parties to the case
Issue: W/N it is possible to permit mass disqualification of Senators-
Members from Tribunal in consideration of public policy and fair play,
and to amend the Tribunal’s Rules to allow contest to be decided by only
3 members of the Tribunal, i.e., the 3 Justices
Decision/Rationale: No, Tribunal’s Rules cannot be amended because it
is quite clear the Constitution intended for the Tribunal to be staffed by
Justices of the Supreme Court (judicial component) and Members of the
Senate (legislative component), and for them to share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. Moreover, in light of 2-1 ratio of Senators to
Justices, it is clear that Senators were not meant to be excluded from
the Tribunal. If disqualification allowed, Tribunal would have to abandon
duty which the Constitution dictates only they can perform. The Tribunal
cannot function without membership of Senators.
Note: The Court, however, qualified its statement saying that a Senator-
Member may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment in the
Tribunal… “Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the
IA 2008 Digested Cases

way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying
is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election
contest.”
157 SCRA 337 (1988) - Lazatin v. Commission on Elections
Facts:
Petitioner (Lazatin) filed a petition attacking the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office,
assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the First
District of Pampanga.
It is alleged that the COMELEC hastily proclaimed petitioner without first
resolving their separate written protests against the Election returns in
Pampanga. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging
that the proclamation of petitioner was illegal and void because the
board simply corrected the returns contested by the petitioner without
waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol,
Buan, Jr., and the petitioner. It was contested that the Instant petition
should be given due course because the proclamation was valid.
The petitioner claims that the House Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. (Sec. 17 Art. 6 of the
1987 Constitution),
Issues:
Whether jurisdiction falls under COMELEC or the House Electoral Tribunal
Held:
The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been
proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties
as Congressman.
For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him
would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered
by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities, and despite the
pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also
addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the
Electoral Tribunal.
168 SCRA 391 (1988) - Lazatin v. House of Electoral Tribunal
Facts:
Prior Case:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for
Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the 1987
elections. Private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election
returns. He brought his case to the Commission on Elections. After a
brief suspension, canvassing continued and thereafter, the petitioner was
proclaimed the winner.
The private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare
petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio, followed by another petition to
prohibit the petitioner from assuming office.
The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition and so the petitioner
assumed office. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared
petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio. The petitioner challenged this
resolution before this Court (GR No 80007). The Court set aside the
COMELEC’s revocation of the proclamation.
On February 8, 1988, the private respondent filed in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an election protest (Case No.
46). Petitioner moved to dismiss this protest on the ground that it had
been filed late, citing Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
9
881). HRET ruled that it had been filed on time, according to Sec. 9 of
the HRET Rules. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Main Case:
This action seeks the annulment of the (1) resolution of the HRET
holding that the protest was filed on time (2) resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
W/N Private respondent’s protest had been seasonably filed.
Held:
The protest of the private respondent was filed on time.
The controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing
of protests.
A. Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code – filed out of time
B. Sec 9 of the HRET Rules – timely filing
Sec 250 applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting
the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional,
provincial or city official. The Omnibus election code has no provision for
the period within which to file election protests in the respective Electoral
Tribunals.
The applicable rule is not the Election Code rule (for cases filed before
the COMELEC) but the Tribunal rule. In fact, Congress may not prescribe
for the Electoral Tribunal a period for filing cases before it. The Tribunal
is the sole judge of election contests with which Congress may not
interfere.
BONDOC VS. PINEDA
G.R. No. 97710
September 26, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner, Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc (NP) and Respondent, Marciano M.
Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for
the 4th District of Pampanga in the1987 election. Pineda was the
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET was composed of
Justices Herrerra (HRET chairman), Cruz and Feliciano, 5 LDP members
(among who was Representative Juanita G. Camasura) and one NP
member.
On October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won by
a margin of 23 votes. Not satisfied with the outcome, the LDP members
demanded a recount, which resulted in an increased lead of Bondoc by
107 votes. LDP member Camasura “consistent with truth and justice and
self-respect” made a conscience vote favoring Bondoc, naturally
infuriating his party-mates. Upon learning this, LDP members plotted to
neutralize the Pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal by expelling Camasura
from the party, consequently relinquishing his position in the HRET. The
Notice of Promulgation of Decision was on March 14, 1991, during which
Bondoc’s proclamation would be formalized. LDP, however, informed
Speaker Mitra and Justice Herrerra that the party had withdrawn the
nomination and rescinded the election of Congressman Camasura to the
HRET. The Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the proclamation of
Bondoc due to this development. Without Camasura’s vote, the decision
lacked the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of the
Rules of Tribunal.
Bondoc filed a petitition for certiorari and prohibition and mandamus on
March 21, 1991 asking the Court to annul the decision of Camasura’s
expulsion ordering him to reaussume his post in the Tribunal and to
prevent the designation of Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in
Camasura’s place.
IA 2008 Digested Cases

Respondent Pineda plead for a dismissal of the petition arguing that the
Congress is the sole authority that nominates and elects its members.
Court ruled in favor of Bondoc. Camasura’s expulsion was declared null
and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution. The Court
declared the cancelled proclamation duly promulgated.
ISSUE:
W/N the House can interfere with the disposition of an election contest
in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse “reorganizing” the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
HELD:
a) NO. The ouster of Camasura was a blatant attempt of LDP to
influence the decision of the HRET by manipulating its membership.
The Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its
constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the
merits of the cases before it. The political factors are blocking the
constitutionally mandated task of the HRET.
The HRET of the Senate and Congress were created by the Constitution
as special tribunals to be the SOLE judge of all contests relating to
returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and as
such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their
own employees, and to supervise and control them, without legislative
interference. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must
be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election
contests is not to be shared with the Legislature NOR the Courts.
Lerias v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 97105 October 15, 1991
Facts:
- Contention between canvass of votes of Mercado and Lerias
for the Representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte in
the 1987 elections
- COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass for the
municipality of Libangon credited Mercado 1,351 votes and
Lerias 1,411 votes
- Ballots of Precints 6, 10 18 and 19 lacked 100 votes each for
Lerias in the tabulation
- Mercado won over Lerias with a difference of 254 votes for the
Representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte
- Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of
the canvass and the proclamation of Mercado, praying that
ballot boxes 6, 10,18 and 19 of Libangon be opened and
recounted
- Lerias filed a motion to suspend the effects of proclamation of
Mercado
- No action taken by the COMELEC, Lerias filed a petition for the
annulment of COMELEC resolution of June 6, 1987 and the
proclamation of Mercado
- Mercado filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the
resolution dated June 6, 1987 had already become final
because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias was ex-
parte and did not stop the running of the period to appeal
therefrom and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for the annulment of the Comelec's June 6, 1987
resolution and the subsequent proclamation of Mercado, she
had abandoned her previous petition with the Comelec
- COMELEC did not want to hear the testimony of the school
teachers present in the precincts in question that the CoC’s
was not authentic
- TRIBUNAL voted (5-4) that Mercado wins
10
Issue:
- W/N Mercado should be proclaimed the winner for the
Representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte
Held:
- Court held that Lerias should be the winner. the decision of
the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner
Rosette Yniguez Lerias is the duly elected representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte
o Considering the indubitable evidence on record the
400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias
should be returned to her. So that in the entire
municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes.
From the original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be
credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793
votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes.
Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in
the counter-protested precincts would be, (wherein
Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority,
or as found by the dissenting members, Lerias won
by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by 20 votes
(dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the
winner.
o In an election contest where what is involved is the
correctness of the number of votes of each
candidate the best and most conclusive evidence are
the ballots themselves
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioner
vs.
HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO,
JR, respondents
(GR No. 118597, July 14, 1995)
Ponente: Francisco, J
FACTS
1992  Congressional candidate Syjuco filed an election protest before
HRET five(5) days after the Makati Board of canvassers proclaimed
petitioner Joker Arroyo the duly elected congressman of the lone district
of Makati.
Syjuco alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of
votes and massive fraud, and sought the recounting of ballots in 1, 292
out of 1, 714 precincts of Makati.
Arroyo filed a counter-protest questioning the residence qualification of
Syjuco. (dismissed by HRET)
Jan 25, 1995  six Representative members and three Justice members
of the Electoral Tribunal annulled Arroyo’s proclamation, declaring Syjuco
as the duly elected Representative
Arroyo set forth an instant petition with the following issues:
Did public respondent HRET commit grave abuse of discretion
in (1) proceeding to decide the election protest based on
private respondent's "precinct level document based
anomalies/evidence" theory; (2) rendering judgment on the
kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the
evidence was procured, and (3) annulling election results in
some contested precincts?
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RULING
Petition is GRANTED. HRET’s majority decision on Jan 25, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
Syjuco has been found guilty of indirect contempt, hereby fined P1,000
to be paid five(5) days from the receipt of this decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not HRET acted with a grave abuse of discretion
RATIO
Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be
the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members.
However, the Court has certiorari jurisdiction to review decisions and
orders of Electoral Tribunals that display a grave abuse of
discretion.
A fair reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission will
reveal that the primary purpose of the commissioners in expanding the
concept of judicial power of this Court by including the duty "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government" is to eliminate the defense of political
questions which in the past deprived this Court of the jurisdiction to
strike down abuses of power by government.
Guerrero v. Comelec
Firstly, who Guerrero is, is not stated in the case, except that he is the
petitioner. Secondly, this is case is merely about who has jurisdiction
over the case. Who ever really won is not an issue.
Facts: Guillermo Ruiz and Rodolfo Farinas both ran for Congress in
Ilocos. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a candidate
for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a
Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Comelec dismissed Ruiz’s petition.
Farinas won the elections and Ruiz filed for a motion for reconsideration
stating that Farinas could not substitute “Chevylle V. Farinas” who
Rodolfo Farinas ran as.
Farinas took his oath as the representative of Ilocos, therefore already a
congressman. Petitioner Guerrero further contends that Comelec should
be held liable instead of Congress because having a defective certificate
of candidacy. Petitioner Guerrero further contends that the HRET
assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid proclamation of the winning
candidate. Where there is shouldn’t have been proclamation at all due to
the lack of certificate of candidacy, therefore Comelec should preside.
Issues: Who has jurisdiction over the case? Comelec or the Congress?
Held: Congress has jurisdiction.
Decision: Article 6 Sec. 17 states that the HRET has sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of House of Representatives. Electoral
contests where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken oath of office has assumed his post; the issue is best
addressed to the Congress. Whether Rodolfo Farinas validly substituted
Chevylle Farinas and whether Rodolfo Farinas became a legitimate
candidate is up to the Electoral Tribunal.
11
PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET) and REP. HARRY ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT MANILA)
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto before the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Harry Angpin within
the 10 day period of private respondent’s proclamation as the
representative of the 3rd district of Manila. They question the eligibility of
the private respondent because he is not considered as a natural-born
citizen and prayed that he be ineligible to hold office and that to
proclaim the candidate other than him who got the highest number of
votes. The petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.
However the HRET issued a Resolution which dismissed the petition for
quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by
its Rules. The petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit and attached
the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration they filed
with the HRET on the same day. The Motion was denied because Rule
32 of the 1998 HRET Rules required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition
to filing fees for quo warranto cases.
Issue:
W/N the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and in refusing to
reinstate the same even after the payment of the required Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit.
Held:
Petition was DISMISSED
Ratio:
In the case of election protests, no period is provided for to
make the cash deposit in the case of petitions for quo warranto.
However, the cash deposit required in quo warranto cases is fixed. It
does not vary nor can it be varied; it is required to be paid together
with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. Thus, when the
required amount of cash deposits does not exceed P75,000.00, the party
concerned must make the deposit within ten (10) days after the filing of
the protest or counter-protest; otherwise, when it exceeds P75,000.00
he is required to make a partial deposit of at least P75,000.00 likewise
within ten (10) days and the balance payable in installments as may be
determined by the Tribunal.
The petitioners filed their petition for quo warranto on May 29,
1998. However, the required cash deposit of P5,000.00 was paid only on
June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition. It was a
delay of 28 days. The HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly
within its jurisdiction in dismissing the petition. It was a judgment call of
the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the
exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as
in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides —
RULE 32. Cash Deposit. — In addition to the fees prescribed in
the preceding Rule, each protestant, counter-protestant or
petitioner in quo warranto shall make a cash deposit with the
Tribunal in the following amounts:
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(1) in a petition for quo warranto, Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos;
.......
(4) if, as thus computed, the amount of the deposit
does not exceed Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos, the same shall be made in full
with the Tribunal within ten (10) days after filing of
the protest or counter-protest;
(5) if the deposit exceeds Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos, partial deposit of at least
Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos shall be
made within ten (10) days after the filing of the
protest or counter-protest. The balance shall be paid
in such installments as may be required by the
Tribunal on at least five (5) days advance notice to
the party required to make the deposit.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. — An
election protest or petition for quo warranto may be summarily
dismissed by the Tribunal without the necessity of requiring
the protestee or respondent to answer if, inter alia:
........
(3) the filing fee is not paid within the period
provided for filing the protest or petition for quo
warranto;
(4) in case of protests where a cash deposit is
required, the cash deposit or the first P100,000.00
thereof, is not paid within ten (10) days after the
filing of the protest;
........
Rule 33 of the Rules likewise provides —
RULE 33. Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. — If a party
fails to make the cash deposits or additional deposits herein
provided within the prescribed time limit, the Tribunal may
dismiss the protest, counter-protest, or petition for quo
warranto, or take such action as it may deem equitable under
the circumstances.
Note:
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is
concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess or jurisdiction, (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper
Sandoval v. HRET
12
Facts
- Petitioner Sandoval and Respondent Oreta were candidates for
the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas
- Sandoval won over Oreta by 19,200 votes
- Oreta filed an election protest to HRET against petitioner
Sandoval for allegal electoral frauds and anomalies in 1,308
precincts in Malabon-Navotas
- The HRET issued summons for service upon petitioner;
however
- 3 days after, the the HRET Process Server, Pacifico Lim served
the summons by substituted service to a certain Gene Maga, a
“maintenance” worker
Issues
- W/N the substituted service of summons was validly effected
on Sandoval? (Meaning, was it OK for the maintenance dude
to act as proxy in the summons)
Held
- No, it was not.
Ratio
- In light of the delicate nature and gravity of the charge of
electoral fraud and anomalies, the HRET Rules of Procedure
must be taken seriously.
- Petitioner should have been given by the public respondent a
fair chance to defend himself and the legitimacy of his election
victory, and file a counterclaim if ever.
Pimentel, et al. v. HRET
NB.
Pimentel, et al., are 5 partylist representatives. This is NOT Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, in case Fr. B asks this.
FACTS
- Petitioners were partylist representatives of the May 1998
elections. TAKE NOTE that they were NOT nominated for seats
in the HRET or the CA.
- They sought to reconfigure the HRET and the CA, according to
the “proportional representation” called for by Articles 6
Sections 17 and 18, because there were no partylist reps in its
present composition.
- The Solicitor General claimed that the complaint filed was
premature, because none of the petitioners proved that they
were selected to represent said partylists as a member of the
HRET or CA.
- Petitioners cited Guingona v. Gonzales to prove that issues of
transcendental importance could not be brushed aside by
technicalities.
ISSUES
- (Procedural) Was the complaint filed premature?
- (Substantial) Were the then-present compositions of both the
HRET and CA unconstitutionally violative of proportional
representation demanded by Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI
of the Constitution?
HELD
- The complaint filed was immature, for lack of locus standi by
the petitioners.
- The compositions of both the HRET and CA were NOT
unconstitutional.
RATIO
- The parties have not proven that they were entitled to, or
were unlawfully deprived of seats in the HRET/CA – thus they
have no locus standi.
- Had congress prevented partylist representatives from running
for the HRET seats, then that would be constitutionally
actionable; however the partylists themselves refrained from
nominating candidates for the HRET/CA.
- Prior recourse must always rest on the House of
Representatives first, unless a grave abuse of discretion
occurs.
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- Finally, the case is moot and academic: new representatives
were elected for the 2001 elections,c hanging the composition
of the House of Representatives.
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
REP. RAUL A. DAZA vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
Facts:
May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned
its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several
political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng
Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL.
Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino Party was
formed from the merging of some members from the PDP-Laban and
Liberal Party. The Commission on Appointments was reorganized and
petitioner Daza (since the Liberal Party only had 17 members left) lost
his seat and Luis C. Singson took it as the additional member from the
LDP. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, and the court issued a temporary restraining
order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent
from serving in the Commission on Appointments.
Petitioner’s claims: Basing the case Cunanan vs. Tan,
- the reorganization of the House representation in the said
body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has
not yet attained political stability.
Respondent’s claims: Also basing on the case Cunanan vs. Tan,
- question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court
- he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent
being the House of Representatives
- nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political
party be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments
*In the Cunanan vs. Tan case, the Nacionalista and Liberal party joined
forces and made the Allied Majority because they wanted to change the
Speaker. Cunanan (of the LP) lost his seat to Tan (of the Allied Majority).
Cunanan won because the Allied Majority was only a temporary
combination but the members were still part of the Nacionalista party.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
2. Whether or not Singson should have a seat since the LDP is
not registered and is not permanent.
3. Whether or not Singson was improperly impleaded. (minor
issue)
Held: Petition dismissed.
1. Yes, it is within court’s jurisdiction.
2. Yes, Singson should have a seat and the LDP is permanent.
3. No, he was not improperly impleaded. It is HIS right to seat
being questioned. (minor issue)
Ratio:
1. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar
because what is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom,
of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments which is not a political question
but a constitutional one. The petitioners were questioning the
13
manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate
in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not
a political question. It is the Court’s authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government = was there a technical
flaw in the designation of the party respondent.
2. On November 23, 1989, the Commission on Elections in an en
banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division
dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for
registration as a political party. So the LDP is registered and is
permanent even though they were formed recently. (at that
time)
Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.
Facts:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to
the House of Representatives of the candidates of diverse political
parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP),
NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan
Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna
Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the
banner of KAIBA.
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by
the Majority Floor Leader, elected from the Majority, eleven out of twelve
congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on
Appointments.
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader,
the House elected Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the
Commission on Appointments, representing the Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino" (LDP)) was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202
members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the
LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker
Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House
Electoral Tribunal. Her request was endorsed by nine congressmen.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives revised the House
majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform
with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP,
with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP.
Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing
the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the
KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be
considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this
Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan,
Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial,
Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission
on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission
violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
Issue: Whether the members of the House in the Commission on
Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation
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from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
Held: Yes they were. Petition is dismissed.
Rationale:
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House.
They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded
out to 80%). Eighty percent of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to
ten members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned
to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment
of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done
"on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's
KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority),
are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be
considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence,
she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least
8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at
least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
The endorsements of the nine congressmen and congresswomen in
favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential
because they are not members of her party and they signed identical
endorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-
Yap.
Guingona Jr. Vs. Gonzales
FACTS:
The case is about the representation, in the Commission of
Appointments, of political parties through the number of Senators
nominated therein. In the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the
number of Senators representing their political parties turned out as
follows:
Political Party Number of Senators Proportional
Membership Elected Members
LDP 15 Senators 7.5
Members 8 Members
NPC 5 Senators 2.5
Members 2 Members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 Senators 1.5
Members 1 Member
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 Senator 0.5 Members
1 Member
Following the provisions of the Constitution, the political
parties agreed to compute the representation this way:
# of Senators of a political party X 12 seats
Total # of Senators elected
14
This resulted to the third column in the table above
(Proportional Membership). Based on this computation, the number of
senators per party nominated in the Commission on Appointments are in
the fourth column of the table, with Senator Romulo as the eighth
member of LDP and Senator Tañada as the sole member of LP-PDP-
LABAN.
This was objected to by Senator Guingona (LAKAS-NUCD) and
Senator Osmeña (NPC). They filed a petition for Prohibition to prohibit
Senate President Neptali Gonzales from recognizing Senators Romulo
and Tañada as representatives of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN respectively.
They claimed that the set-up of the commission was violative of the rule
of proportional representation.
ISSUES:
1) W/N the election of Romulo and Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments is in accordance with Art. 6 Sec.
18 of the Constitution.
2) W/N the Senate acted with grave abuse of discretion in
electing the said Senators
3) W/N a writ of Prohibition should be issued.
HELD:
1) No. It is violative of the rule of Proportional
Representation in Art6 Sec 18.
2) Yes
3) Yes
RATIO:
1) A literal interpretation of the said section in our Constitution
establishes 2 facts in the case at bar. 1) The formula used to
compute for proportional membership in the commission was
agreed to by the members as in line with proportional
representation and 2) as a result of the formula, each party is
entitled to a fraction of a seat in the commission. Electing
Romulo and Tañada thereby giving LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN 8
members and 1 member respectively, is violative of the rule on
proportional representation because it deprives the other
parties, namely NPC and LAKAS-NUCD, of their fractional
membership and it gives the majority party a chance to
impose its will on the hapless minority.
The court stated that the purpose of Sec 18 was to
work as a check on the majority party in order to maintain a
balance in power and assures representation in the
Commission on Appointments of any political party who
succeeds in electing members to the Senate provided that
the number of senators enables it to do so. The court then laid
down two guidelines to follow: 1) In the Senate, a political
party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators
for every seat in the Commission on Appointments. 2) Where
there are more than two political parties represented in the
Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the commission.
Incidentally, the Court also noted that filling the 12
positions in the Commission on Appointments was not
mandatory. The said that the commission may perform its
functions and transact their business even if only 10 senators
are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.
2) The nomination of Romulo and Tañada was done in grave
abuse of discretion because power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, violating
the rule on Proportional Representation.
3) Since the nomination of Romulo and Tañada was violative of
the rule on Proportional Representation and therefore
unconstitutional, a writ of prohibition should be issued. (duh)
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION
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BENGZON, Jr.. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
203 SCRA 767
FACTS: This is a case where defendants Benjamin ”Kokoy” Romualdez
and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, then crony-relatives of deposed
President Marcos, who owned 36 big corporations and by unjustly
enriching themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Upon
assumption of office by Pres. Aquino, she created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to inquire into and sequester
the assets of the corporations.
And before the PCGG could inquire into their assets, petitioner
Arty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners together with the
corporations’ officials and managers had manipulated and employed
devious financial schemes and techniques for the purpose of concealing
and placing the corporations beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the
PCCG. And in order to deceive the PCGG, they also made it appear that
defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his
ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well
intact and being protected by Atty. Bengzon Law firm and some senior
managers who still control and run the affairs of said corporations.
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG filed with
the Sandiganbayan Civil Case against Benjamin Romualdez for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Later, the
complaint was amended several times by impleading other defendants in
the persons of Atty. Bengzon and his law partners and other officials of
the corporations.
While the civil case was pending trial before the
Sandiganbayan, then Senate Minority Floor leader Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech “on a matter of personal privilege” before the Senate
on the alleged take-over of 36 corporations by Ricardo Lopa who was
the brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino. In his privilege speech, Senator
Enrile called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of
Ricardo Lopa for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
During the investigation before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
may “unduly prejudice” the defendants in Civil Case before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Arty. Bengzon likewise refused to testify
invoking his constitutional right to due process and could adversely
affect his rights in the case before the Sandiganbayan. And hence, this
petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order.
ISSUES: W/N this Court can inquire into the motives of the lawmakers
in conducting legislative investigation, much less can it enjoin the
Congress from making inquiries in aid of legislation under the doctrine of
separation of powers.
W/N the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a
“purely private transaction” which is beyond the power of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into.
RULINGS: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. But it does not follow that the three powers are
to be kept separate and distinct to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments. The “allocation of constitutional
boundaries” is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. The Court is thus of considered view that it has jurisdiction
over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope
and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
15
The l987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
house of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section
21, Article VI thereof provides:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected,”
Hence, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute and unlimited.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Section 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Act.”. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out
whether or not the relative of President Aquino, particularly Nr. Ricardo
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of 36 or
39 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. It appears, therefore,
that the contemplated inquiry by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not really
“in aid of legislation” but a matter that appears more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature.
On the second issue, it appears that Senator Enrile did not
indict the PCGG, and secondly, neither Mr. Lopa nor the herein
petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
The filling of a civil case against the respondents before the
Sandiganbayan gives the latter to acquire jurisdiction over the matter. In
short, for the respondent Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct the probe
and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the
Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. It also poses the
possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee
and a judicial tribunal, and the possibility of influence over the judgment
cannot be discounted.
The Court also held that the petitioners may not be compelled
by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it because the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if
pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers
between the legislative and the judicial departments of government,
ordained by the Constitution. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice
that Mr. Ricardo died during the pendency of the case; and therefore,
there is nothing more to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. There being an
intimately related case pending before the Sandiganbayan where the
herein petitioners are impleaded as defendants, the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the
petitioners to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
Art 6 Sec 21(B)
Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon
GR No. 136760 July 29, 2003
(in consolidation with GR No. 138178 Aquilino Pimentel Jr., v. Judge
Majaducon)
Facts:
GR No.136760:
 August 28, 1998 – Sen. Ople’s Resolution 157 (directing
Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct
inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of Def. Sec.
Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers are
organizing a coup to prevent the Estrada administration from
probing alleged fund irregularities in the AFP) and Sen. Sotto’s
Resolution No. 160 (directing the appropriate senate
committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
alleged mismanagement of funds and investment portfolio of
the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System) were
referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on
National Defense and Security.
IA 2008 Digested Cases

 It was held that AFP-RSBS bought lot in General Santos City
from Atty. Nilo Flaviano for P10200/sq.m. Deed of sale
indicated that purchase price was only P3000/sq.m. A
subpoena was issued to Atty. Flaviano to appear before the
committee hearing. Flaviano filed for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and restraining order against the committee in
which the trial court approved. Blue Ribbon filed for motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to
state valid cause of action to the trial court and filed a case
against Judge Majaducon for gross ignorance and violation of
separation of powers
GR No. 138378
 Jan. 13, 1999 – Philippine Star report on the Blue Ribbon’s
filing for petition for certiorari in the previous GR. The news
quoted portions of the petition filed alleging Judge Majaducon
guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures due to
the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction he issued.
 Respondent judge charged for indirect contempt of court Sen.
Pimentel, reporter Echeminada, publisher Maximo Soliven, ed-
in-chief Ramon Farolan and exec. Editor Bobby dela Cruz
saying that the report created an impression that he violated
the separation of powers clause of the Consti and was guilty of
gross ignorance. Pimentel was found guilty of indirect
contempt in which he petitioned here as not guilty for he is not
the one who publicize the news, the complaint mentioned in
the news is with basis and statements pertaining to the judge’s
gross ignorance does not constitute improper conduct
Issues:
1) W/N Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion
with his decisions siding with the respondent
2) W/N judge erred in convicting Pimentel of indirect contempt of
court
Held:
1) THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE of discretion when the respondent
acts in a capricious, whimsical arbitrary or despotic manner in
the exercise of judgment since his order lacks any factual and
legal justification.
Separation of powers means each is prevented from invading the
domain of the other. When the Blue Ribbon served subpoena to
Atty. Flaviano, it did so in pursuant of its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation with the intention of enacting
appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interest of the AFP.
The Bengzon ruling is inapplicable for in that case the inquiry
involves no intended legislation. Also, no court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
2) PIMENTEL IS NOT GUILTY of contempt for he did not caused
the publication in the Philippine Star. Also, complaint against
him is with basis and the phrase “gross ignorance…” is
ordinarily found in admin complaints
RIDERS
Art 6 Sec 25(1A)
Eusebio Garcia v. Hon. Ernesto Mata and Gen. Manuel Yan
* (Eusebio Garcia is a member of the AFP, Ernesto Mata is the Secretary
of National Defense, Manuel Yan is the AFP chief)
Facts:
Petitioner brought an action for “Mandamus and Recovery of Sum of
Money” in the Court of First Instance to compel respondents to
reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP, to readjust
his rank, and to pay all emoluments and allowances due to him from the
time of his reversion to inactive status. The Trial court dismissed the
petition on the grounds that par. 11 of R.A. 1600 is invalid,
unconstitutional and inoperative.
This is a petition for certiorari to review decision of the Court of First
Instance of Q.C. Branch IX in declaring par. 11 of R.A. 1600
16
(“Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year 1956-1957”)
unconstitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative.
Pertinent Details in the Case:
1. R.A. 1600 (enacted on July 11, 1956)
 Par. 11. After the approval of this act, and when
there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the AFP
may be called to a tour of active duty for more than
two years during any period of five consecutive
years… Provided, further that reserve officers
with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active
duty at the time of the approval of this act
shall not be reverted to inactive status…
 During the time of enactment of this Act, the
petitioner already has 10 years, 5 months and 5
days of accumulated commissioned service so he is
exempted from being reverted to inactive status.
This is the basis of petitioner’s argument.
2. Respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance
to the budget in question or to any appropriation item.
According to the respondents. “it was a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against ‘riders’ 3 to the general
appropriation act.” The respondents also argue that, “…the
statutory provision in question refers to security of
reserve officers from reversion to inactive status,
whereas the subject or title of the statute from which
it derives its existence refers to appropriations.” Hence,
it is unconstitutional and should be declared invalid.
Issue: W/N paragraph 11 of R.A. 1600 is constitutional or not and w/n
the petition should be granted.
Held: Paragraph 11 of R.A. 1600 is unconstitutional and hence, having
no legal right, the petition is dismissed.
Ratio: Par. 11 of R.A. 1600 violates Art. VI. Sec. 25 (2) of the 1987
Constitution which states that: No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically
to some particular appropriations therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which
it relates. It also violates Art. VI. Sec. 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
Demetria v Alba
This case is about the petition for prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction of the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
section 44 of the PD No. 1177 or the “Budget Reform Decree of the
1977”
The petition was filed by the members of the Nat’l Assembly/ Batasan
Pambansa representing their constituents as parties w general interest
common to all people of the Philippines as taxpayers whose interests
may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for
3
Rider – a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill. In this case, it is unrelated to the appropriation bill
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 17
argues that Section 10 is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the
Art VIII of 1973 Constitution Par 1 Sec 44 of PD no. 1177 subject matter thereof.

Sec 16(5) No law shall be The President shall have the Issue: W/N P.D. 1987 is unconstitutional according to Art. 6, Sec. 26 of
passed authorizing any authority to transfer any fund, the Constitution: one-subject one-bill clause.
transfer of appropriations appropriated for the different
however the President, the Prime dept, bureaus, offices and Held: Petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE 5 is a
minister the Speaker, the Chief agencies of the executive rider is without merit.
Justice of the Supreme Court and department which are included in
the heads of constitutional the General Appropriations Act to Ruling:
commissions may by law be any program project or activity of Section 10 of the DECREE is reasonably necessary for the
authorized to augment any item in any dept, bureau or office included accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the
the general appropriations law for in the GPA or approved after its regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board
their respective offices from enactment. as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
savings in other items of the foreign to that general subject and title.
respective appropriations Year 1977
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently
Grounds relied upon in the petition complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary
 Sec 44 infringes the fundamental law for authorizing the illegal that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
transfer of public moneys accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
 Sec 44 is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or
objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
are to be made subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the
 Sec 44 allows the president to override the safeguards form and title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
procedure prescribed by the constitution in approving the may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
appropriations general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
 Sec 44 amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
executive object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title
 The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
and the implementation thereof by the budget minister and the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical
treasurer pf the Philippines are w/o or in excess of their authority construction.
and jurisdiction Art 6 Sec 26(B)
Philippine Judges Association VS Prado
1973 Constitution
To afford considerable flexibility in the use of public funds resources the Facts
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of - This is a petition against Hon. Pete Prado, Secretary of the Dept. of
funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another Transportation and Communications and also against the Philippine
item in the appropriation. The leeway granted was thus limited. Postal Corp. to declare Section 35 of RA 7354 unconstitutional
 RA 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
PD No.1177 Corporationm Defining Its Powers, Functions and
Unduly overextends the privilege granted under said section 16(5). It Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds w/o for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.”
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transfers are actually  Sec 35 of RA 7354 repeals all franking privileges authorized
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken. by law except for those provided under the acts mentioned in
this section
It disregards the standards set in the fundamental law amounting to an  franking privilege is the privilege to send mail for free
undue delegation pf legislative powers and likewise goes beyond the - Circular No. 9228 of the Philippine Postal Corporation implements this
tenor thereof Act. It withdraws franking privileges from the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, and the
PD 1177opens floodgates for enactment of unfunded appropriations Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Committee and its
results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for Register of Deeds, along with certain other gov’t offices
budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the
ruling party may well expand public money not on the basis of dev’t Issue
priorities but on political sn personal expendiency (1) Constitutionality of RA 7354 – it embraces more than one subject
(2) It did not pass required readings in both Houses of Congress and
HELD: The instant petition is granted. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD no. 1177 is printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional members before its passage
(3) Discriminatory and encroaches on independence of the Judiciary,
SUBJECT AND TITLE OF BILLS based on the equal protection clause

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board Held

(Sec. 26_A)
Facts: Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of Section 10 of the P.D.
19874, which imposes a tax of 30% of the purchase price or rental rate
for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Petitioner
(1) The title of RA 7354 does not violate the constitutional provision that
the title of the bill may only embrace one subject.
(2) This court will not decide on this issue because it is with their respect
to the Congress as a co-equal government department that they also
respect the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill.

4
P.D. 1987 created the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram 5
industry. Hereunder referring to P.D. 1987.

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(3) This court finds Sec 35 of the RA 7354 unconstitutional as it is
violative of the equal protection clause.
Ratio
(1) The title of RA 7354 does not embrace more than one subject, thus it
is constitutional.
- Purposes of the rule that every bill title shall only embrace one subject:
a. prevent “log-rolling” legislation
b. prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by adding provisions
which have no relation to the title
c. fairly apprise the people of the subject of the legislation
- Where a statute repeals a former clause, the repealing clause is the
EFFECT and not the SUBJECT of the current statute. And what should be
expressed in the title is the SUBJECT and not necessarily the EFFECTS.
By virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to
be expressly included in the title of the said law.
(2) This court shall not decide upon this matter because the enrolled bill
is conclusive upon the judiciary.
- Petitioners claimed that the second paragraph of Sec 35 which states:
“All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed,
except for those provided for under…”
was not included in the House or Senate bill and was only added in the
Conference Committee Report.
- But even though the Conference Committee may only deal w/resolving
differences bet. the two houses (Petitioners claime that Sec 35 was not a
subject of any disagreement bet the two houses, so the Conference
Committee shouldn’t have added to it or amended it.) , such Conference
Committee Report was send back anyway to the Senate and House and
afterwards the bill was enrolled with the signatures of the presiding
officers. THUS, the court may not inquire into this issue because the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the judiciary, as mentioned in Casco VS
Gimenez.
(3) Sec 35 of the RA 7354 violates the equal protection clause.
- While Sec 35 withdrew franking privileges from the Judiciary, it
retained the same for the President, the Vice-Pres, Congress, COMELEC,
and other offices. This court decides that there is no substantial
distinction as to reasonably discriminate against the third major and
equal department of the government.
CONCLUSION:
Sec 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional for violating equal
protection clause.
Art 6 Sec 26 ©
Farinas vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
- Section 14 of Republic Act 9006 (a.k.a. The Fair Election Act)
repealed Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Sec. 67
of the said code states that elective officials running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and VP, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Issues:
- W/N the repeal of Sec. 67 of the OEC is embraced in the title
and germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.
- W/N Section 14 of RA 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of
the OEC leaving Sec. 66 which imposes similar limitation to
appointive officials.
- W/N RA 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended in its enactment.
Held
- First issue: Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a rider. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
18
title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough and should include the general object which the
statutes seeks to effect. Mere details of the statute need not
be included in the title.
- Second issue: Section 14 is not violative of the equal
protection clause of the constitution. The equal protection
clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation when it applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. What the petitioner is trying to say is that elective officials
are given a privilege to for an office other than the one which
he is holding, whereas appointive officials are not given such
privilege. As stated earlier, the equal protection clause does
not apply if the legislature can distinguish one class from
another, in this case the elective officials from the appointive
officials, and the law should apply to all persons belonging to
such class. The first difference between an elective official and
an appointive official is that the former occupies his office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate while the latter was
designated to office by an appointing authority. Another
difference is that the elective officials are allowed to take part
in political and electoral activities while the appointive officials
are strictly prohibited to take part in any election except to
vote.
- The irregularities concerning the enactment of RA 9006 are
considered as internal rules of Congress. Hence, the Court has
no jurisdiction over the matter. What is important for the Court
regarding the enactment of a law is the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed. (This doctrine is known as the Enrolled Bill
Doctrine)
Tan v. Del Rosario (p. 259)
Facts:
Republic Act No. 7496 is entitled “ Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme). HB no. 34314, progenitor of the said RA is entitled “Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of their Profession”. The full text of the title
actually reads: “ An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice
of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended”
Issue: W/N the title of the bill is a misnomer or at least deficient.
Held:
No. The title is not a misnomer and is complete. The intent of the
lawmakers in Sec. 26 of Art. 6 of the Constitution were:
a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the
members of the legislature who favor any one of
unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act,
b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature,
c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of
its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of
the legislation.
The above objectives of the fundamental law were sufficiently met.
Art 6 Sec 21(E)
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455 Aug 25 1994
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Mendoza, J:
*Note: The petitioner here is Arturo M. Tolentino, who is then a Senator.
Aside from Tolentino, there were separate petitions, which will be
included in the discussion of the substantive issue tackled in the case.
Facts:
The case is about various petitions for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716, which is the E-VAT Law.
The purpose of the E-VAT Law is to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Nov 6, 1993 – H. No. 11197, which is the bill seeking to amend the
National Internal Revenue Code, was considered on second reading the
House of Representatives.
Nov 17, 1993 – H. No 11197 was approved on the third and final reading
by the House of Reps.
Nov 23, 1993 – it was sent to the Senate and was later referred to the
Committee on Ways and Means.
Feb 7, 1994 – the Senate Committee submitted it report and
recommending the approval of S. No. 1630, which amends the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Feb 8, 1994 – Senate began consideration of the bill.
March 24, 1994 – Senate finished their debates and approved the bill on
the second reading. During the same day, it also approved the bill on
the third and final reading by a vote 13 affirmative votes and 1
abstention.
April 13, 19, 21 & 25, 1994 – H.No 11197 and S.No 1630 were referred
to the Conference Committee.
April 27, 1994 – House of Reps approved the bill amended by the
Conference Committee.
May 2, 1994 – Senate approved the bill.
May 5, 1994 – The enrolled bill was presented to the President who then
signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716
May 12, 1994 – it was published in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
May 28, 1994 – It took effect, but its implementation was suspended
until June 30 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities.
June 30 1994 – The Court ordered, by a vote of 11 to 4, a temporary
restraining order.
Issues:
I. Procedural Issues:
1. W/N RA 7716 violates the Art 6, Sec 24 of the
Constitution (Origin of Bills).
2. W/N RA 7716 violates Art 6, Sec 26(2) of the Constitution
(Three Reading on Separate Days).
3. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral
Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issue:
1. W/N it violates certain provisions on Claims of
Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection and
Impairment of Contracts in the Bill of Rights (Art 3).Mell
Lantion
Held:
I. Procedural Issues:
1. RA 7716 did not violate Art 6, Sec 24. Petitioners
contended that RA 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in
the House of Reps because it is a result of the
consolidation of the two distinct bills (H.No 11197 and
S.No 1630). For the petitioners, RA 7716 must retain the
essence of H.No 11197 for it to be considered having
originated in the House of Reps.
The Court ruled that the Senate may write a bill on its
whole if it sees that an extensive change is necessary on
the bill passed by the House of Reps. Legislative power is
essentially vested on a Congress, which consists of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Hence, the
Senate is given the power to propose its own version of
19
amendments with respect to bills, which are required by
the Constitution to originate in the House of
Representatives.
2. Petitioners further contend that S.No 1630 did not pass
three reading on separate days, because the second and
third reading of the bill in the Senate were done on the
same day, Mar 24 1994. This was because the President
certified S. No 1639 as urgent, thereby enabling the
Senate to pass the bill on second and third reading on the
same day. However, the Court noted that the certification
of the President is invalid on the grounds that there was
no emergency during that time as the certification is
about the “growing budget deficit”, which is not unusual
in the country.
3. Finally, the petitioners contend that RA 7716 prepared by
the Conference Committee included provisions not found
on either the House Bill or the Senate Bill and that these
provisions were “surreptitiously” inserted by the
Committee.
The Court ruled that the Conference Committee has the
power to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found on either the House Bill or the Senate
Bill so long as the amendments are germane to the
subject of the bill before the committee. This is to
prevent the possible “unending” negotiation and revisions
of both Houses as each may seek modifications of the
compromised bill.
II. Substantive Issue:
1. Petitioners (Cooperative Union of the Philippines,
Philippines Press Institute, Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association) contend that RA 7716 is repressive
of the freedom of speech, press and religion and that the
law is regressive because of the uniform 10% VAT and
that the basic commodities are now taxed at a higher
rate.
On the issue that the law is regressive, the Court ruled
that it is not because it distributes the tax burden to
certain goods and commodities that are within the reach
of the higher income group. And that the basic goods and
commodities have been exempted from the E-VAT. It is
thus equitable. It is directive of the Congress required by
the Constitution to “evolve a progressive system of
taxation.”
As for the other contentions, the Court found them
abstract and hypothetical in form and thus lack merit.
Petitions were therefore DISMISSED.
Art IV Sec 26(1)
Tobias v. Abalos
G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
Facts:
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675
also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Manduluyong into a Highly Urbanized City”
- Ronald Zamora the congressman representative sponsored the
bill and then President Ramos signed it to law on Feb 9, 1994
- Petitioners contend the unconstitutionality of RA 7675 on three
specific provisions:
o It contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule, Art 6
Sec 26(1). (Bill enacted made Mandaluyong a highly
urbanized city AND divided the congressional district
of San Juan/Mandaluyong into 2 separate districts)
IA 2008 Digested Cases

o Because the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
would increase composition of the House of
Representatives, it violates Art 6 Sec 5(1)
o It violates Art 6 Sec 5(4) because in effect it
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts
- Contentions are DEVOID of merit
Issue:
- W/N RA 7675 is unconstitutional
Ratio:
RA 7675 is indeed constitutional.
First issue: Creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of
its conversion but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion.
Liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been adopted
by the court.
Issue that there was no census to show that Mandaluyong and
San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 is not
sufficient to strike down the validity of RA No 7675. The said act enjoys
the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of
the minimum requirements. It is not required that all law as emanating
from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws.
The present limit of 250 representatives is not absolute. Due
to the clause “unless otherwise provided by law”.
Contention of Section 49 opf RA 7675 in effect preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts borders on absurdity
as it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.
ITEM VETO
185 SCRA 329 (1990) – Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Tax Appeals
Facts:
- Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. operates a clubhouse with
lounge, bar and dining room for exclusive use of members and
accompanied guests, charging on a cost-plus-expense basis.
As such, it claims should be exempt from payment of privelege
taxes were it not for the paragraph (3) of Section 191-A of the
Omnibus Tax Law. (below)
- Omnibus Tax Law (R.A. No. 6110), Sec. 191-A. Caterer – A
Caterer’s tax is imposed as follows:
o (1) 3% of gross receipt: on proprietors or operators
of restaurants, refreshment parlos, and other eating
places including clubs, and caterers
o (2) 3% of gross receipts for food or
refreshments and 7% for distilled spirits,
fermented liquors, or wines: on proprietors or
operators of restaurants, refreshment parlos, and
other eating places including clubs, and caterers
where distilled spirits, fermented liquors, or
wines are served. 2 sets of commericla
invoices or receipts shall be separately prepared
and issued.
o (3) 20 % of gross receipts: on proprietors or
operators of restaurants, refreshment parlos, and
other eating places including clubs, and caterers
which are maintained within the premises or
compoud of a hotel, motel, reshouse, cockpit,
race track, jail-alai, cabaret, night or day club,
by means of a connecting door or passage.
 where the establishments are operated or
maintained by clubs of any kind or nature
20
(whether they cater exclusively to
members or not), the keepers of the
establishments shall pay the
corresponding taxes:
- Omnibus Tax Law took effect on September 1, 1969
- Commissioner on Internal Revnue assessed the club fixed
taxes as operators of golf links and restaurants and also
percentage tax (caterer’s tax) for its sale of foods and
fermented liquors/qines for the period covering Sep 1969 –
Dec 1970: P 32,504.96
- Manila Golf and Country Club protested claiming the
assessment to be without basis because paragraph 3 of the
R.A. (or section 42 of the House Bill) was vetoed by then
President Marcos.
Issue: Whether the presidential veto referred to the entire section or
merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipts of operators or
proprietors of restaurants, refreshments parlors, bars and other eating
places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a
hotel, motel or resthouses.
- CTA opined that the President could not veto words or phrases
in a bill but only an entire item. The court doesn’t agree with
the CTA on that, but even assuming it to be so, it would still
be to the favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The
ineffectual veto rendered section 191-A as not having been
vetoed at all.
- But an “Item “in a revenue bill doesn’t refer to an entire
section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the
subject of the tax and the tax rate. (thus the inclusion of
hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket
are items within themselves.)
- Marcos vetoed the inclusion of “hotels, motels, resthouses” in
the 20% caterer’s tax bracket but not to the whole section, on
the ground that the tax would be passed on to the consumin
public and it might restrain the development of hotels which
was essential to the tourism industry. It was clear what Marcos
wanted to veto
Held: Manila Golf and Country Club Inc. is liable for the amount assessed
against it. Section 191-A is valid and enforceable.
Gonzalez v. Macaraig (G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990)
Facts:
Petitioners: as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate and as “substantial taxpayers whose vital interests
may be affected”
Respondents: members of the Cabinet tasked with the implementation
of the General Appropriations act of 1989 and 1990
Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989.
This Bill was approved by the President as Rep. Act. No. 6688 but
Section 55 was vetoed. The Senate filed this Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus which assailed the constitutionality or legality of
the Presidential veto of Section 556.
The President vetoed this because this Section would nullify not only the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President but also that of
other heads of the different branches of Government to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations, even in cases of
urgent need.
Issues:
W/N the veto by the President of Sec 55 (and subsequently, it’s
counterpart: Sec 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill) is
unconstitutional and w/o effect.
6
Section 55: No item of appropriation recommended by the President xxx which has been disapproved or reduced
shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation.
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Held:
The constitutionality of the veto is upheld and the petition is
dismissed.
The arguments of the peitioners’ and their counterarguments are as
follows:
1. The President’s veto power is limited to items and does not cover
provisions.
- Sec 55 and Sec 16 are not provisions in the budgetary term because
these “provisions” do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation, they are not on the face of the bill and they are more of
an expression of congressional policy rather than budgetary
appropriation. Hence, they should be treated as items for the purpose of
the President’s veto power.*
2. The President, when objecting to a provision of an appropriation bill,
cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill
- The restrictive interpretation urged by the petitioners that the President
may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the
Constitutional mandate that a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited
in its operation to some particular appropriation and does not relate to
the entire bill.
3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation
- Conditions or restrictions must exhibit a connection with money items
in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. The test is
appropriateness. Sec 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate
“conditions”. They are actually general law measures more appropriate
for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation.
4. The power of augmentation has to be provided for by law. Therefore
Congress has the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of
that power.
- The Court upheld the validity of the power of augmentation from
savings in the Demetrie v. Alba case.
- Statutory authority has also been granted in the 1973 Constitution [Art
7 Section 16(5)] and in Sec 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, “Budget
Reform Decree of 1977”
Commentary Notes:
Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions – a provision that is
constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out
for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue “item. In other
words, the President may veto riders in an appropriation bill.
This is an “unconstitutional rider”. If the power of augmentation is to be
taken back or restricted, it must be in a separate law.
* HOWEVER, neither Sec 55 nor Sec 16 fit the definition of ANY of the
following terms:
- item
- allowable provision
- condition in the budgetary sense
Art 6 Sec 27(2C)
Philconsa vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
Court is called upon the rule on the conflicting claims of authority
between the Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the powers of
the purse and the sword. The four cases at bench deal with battle of the
President and Congress over control of the national budget. Judicial
intervention is sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the claim
21
that the Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their
respective authorities. Some Senators likewise claim that the President
has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in
the exercise of veto power.
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill (GAB) of 1994 was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17,
1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items
of appropriations in the proposed budget preciously submitted by the
president. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets. Congress presented the said bill to the
President for approval.
On December 30, 1994, the President signed the bill into law and
declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled “AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. (GAA of 1994)” On the same day, the
President also delivered his special Presidential Veto Message, specifying
the provisions of the bill he vetoed on and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
In the case at bar, the Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa),
Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a
writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) article
XLVI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in
Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and
Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article in excess of the P37.9B allocated for
DECS.; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Country Development Fund
P2.97B to be used for countrywide development projects (infrastructure,
purchases of ambulances, computers and other priority projects and
activities). Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of
Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded
by the CDF is an encroachment of the legislature on Executive power.
They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not
involve the making of laws or the repeal or amendment thereof, the only
function given to the Congress by the Constitution. The CDF also
includes a special provision permitting the realignment of allocation for
operating expenses, wherein a member of Congress may realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category
provided the total said allocation is not exceeded. Under the GAA of
1994, the appropriation for the Senates is P472B, the HR is P1.171M.
Petitioners assert Section 25(5) of the constitution that “No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer or appropriations…”
Congress appropriated P86,323,428,000 B for debt service and
appropriated only P37,380,450,000 B for DECS. Petitioners urged that
Congress cannot give debt services the highest priority because under
the Constitution, education should be entitled to highest funding. The
Congress added a Special Provision Article XLVIII (Appropriatons to Debt
Service) of the GAA of 1994 which provides “Special Provisions” dealing
with 1) Use of the Fund and 2) Reporting Requirement (Page 289). The
president vetoed the first special provision, without veoting the
P86,323,428,000 appropriation for debt service in the said article.
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special Provision on
the appropriation of debt service without vetoing the entire amount for
the said purpose.
Petitions with respect to GR No. 113105 were dismissed only in as far as
they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt
service.
Issue:
a) W/N the special provision allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other
expense category is unconstitutional for violating Section
25(5), Article 6 of the Constitution?
b) W/N Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) is
unconstitutional?
c) W/N the President’s veto of the first special provision of
Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) is
constitutional?
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Held:
a) YES.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify
the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation
law. With regard to the CDF, it was Congress itself that
determined the purposes for the appropriation. The Executive
function, on the other hand, is the implementation of the
priority projects specified in the law. The authority given to the
members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects
to be implemented by the President. The President must
examine whether the proposals submitted by the Congress fall
within the specific items of expenditures for which the fund
was set up. Proposals and identifications made by the Congres
are merely recommendatory. The CDF attempts to make equal
the unequal. Prior to the GAA, there was an uneven allocation
of appropriations for the constituents of the members of
Congress. Individual members of Congress are believed to be
more knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given to each project.
While petitioners assert that only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the HR, and not individual members of Congress
are authorized to realign the savings as appropriated, under
the Special Provisions, the members of Congress only
determine the necessity of the realignment in the allotment for
their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do
so because they are the ones who know whether there are
deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that
need augmentation.
b) YES.
While it is true that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
mandates Congress to assign the highest budgetary priority to
education, it does not follow that the
Arroyo, et al. vs. De Venecia
Facts:
In the case at bar, the validity of R.A. 8240 or H. No. 7198 is being
questioned by petitioners based on several grounds. They argue that:
1) (Principal argument) R.A. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House; which embody
the constitutional mandate thereby violating the Constitution
itself. Therefore, RA 8240 is unconstitutional and should be
considered void.
2) These specific rule violations were:
a. The Chair, in submitting the conference committee
report to the House, did not call for yeas or nays
(which should be documented according to the
rules) but simply asked for approval by motion in
order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning
the presence of a quorum. (Rule VIII S 35, Rule
XVII S 103)
b. The fact that the Chair deliberately ignored Rep.
Arroyo’s question and did not repeat Albano’s
motion to approve or ratify violated Rule XIX S 112
(see transcript)
c. The Chair, in refusing to recognize Arroyo and
proceeding to act on Albano’s motion, violated Rule
XVI S 97
d. The Chair violated Rule XX SS121-122, Rule XXI S
123, and Rule XVIII S 109 in suspending the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo’s question, which
is a point of order according to the rules.
The petitioners herein requests the Court to ascertain the above
allegations challenging the constitutionality of the act.
22
Issues:
3) W/N the violations of the rules of the House (if any) constitute
a violation of the Constitution itself? (Which is significant
because if not, the Court would lose its jurisdiction)
4) W/N the violation of the rules of the House would nullify the
RA
Held:
1) The alleged violations of the Rules of the House are merely internal
rules of procedure rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of laws. In these cases, both here and abroad, deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision.
Since the rules violated were the rules that the House itself created, the
Courts have no concern with their observance. The rules are subject to
the modification, revocation or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. The court has no more power to look into internal
proceedings of the House as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions (whether procedural or substantial prejudicial to private
individuals) is shown.
2) Quoting former Chief Justice Fernando:
“…the mere failure to conform to them [internal procedural rules
established by the body] does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure”
Side Issues:
2a) The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the
Members be taken every time the House has to vote except only in the
following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President. Since the situation does not fall among the
exceptions, plus the fact that the votes of the Members by yeas and
nays had already been taken, they would no longer have to take it again.
No violation of the rules
2b) The Chair, in approving the conference committee report, and Rep
Arroyo, in objecting to the motion, spoke simultaneously. Thus the
approval of the motion had already been done, symbolized by the
banging of the gavel. No violation of the rule
2c & 2d) The session was suspended for 39 minutes to allow the parties
to settle the problem. When it resumed at 3:40pm Rep Arroyo did not
object anymore, signifying that a settlement has been made. No
violation of the rule
Transcript:
MR. ALBANO: Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza): Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO: What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO: No, no, no wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want
to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished
sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
the approval of the report, and the Chair called for motion.
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MR. ARROYO: Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: The session is suspended for one minute.
(IT WAS 3:01 P.M.)
(3:40 P.M., THE SESSION WAS RESUMED)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO: Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: The session is adjourned until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(IT WAS 3:40P.M.)
TAXATION
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
July 3, 1992
Facts:
EO 438 imposed, in addition to any their duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty 5% ad valorem. (across the board including oil products)
EO 443 imposed instead of 5% additional duty a 9% additional duty ad
valorem.
- Hearing for interested parties to present their evidence in support to
their position
EO 475 reduced the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from
9% to 5% ad valorem except in the cases of crude oil and other oil
products (9% duty still)
- Tariff Commission submitted to the president a “Report on Special Duty
on Crude Oil and Oil Products.
EO 478 levied in addition to the 9% duty and all other existing ad
valorem duties, a special duty of P0.95 per litre or P151.05 per barrel of
imported oil products
- Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
assailing the validity of EO 475 and 478, and that they are
violative of Art 6, Sec 24.
- Furthermore, petitioner argues that the EO’s in question do
not protect local industries and products for the sake of
national economy or general welfare.
Issue:
W/N EO’s 475 and 478 are unconstitutional and should be not take
action
Held: PETITION DISMISSED, there is explicit constitutional provision in
the same article, sec 28, wherein Congress may authorize the President,
subject to limitations and restrictions as congress may impose… to fix
within specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts…”
Ratio: The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff customs Code of
the Philippines, section 104 of which states that all subsequent
amendments issued under EO’s and PD’s are hereby adopted and form
part of the TCC. The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed
pursuant to sec 401 of TCC shall be subject to periodic investigation of
the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President upon
recommendation of NEDA.
a. the court in not persuaded that the words “protective”
and “protection” are simply not enough to support the
encompassing limitation which the petitioner seeks.
b. petitioner’s singular theory collides with a very practical
fact of which this court may take judicial notice that the
Bureau of Customs which administers the TCC is a
principal traditional generators of governmental revenues
23
c. custom duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if
ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most
commonly, custom duties become public funds have
either or both the generation of revenue and the
regulation of economic or social activity as their moving
purposes.
d. petitioner’s concept which he urges to build into our
constitutional and customs laws is a stiflingly narrow one.
Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City
Facts:
Petitioner System Plus College is a non-profit educational institution
established in 1997. It availed of the property tax exemption on its
buildings but not from the parcels of land that it is renting from its sister
companies (Consolidated Assembly Inc. and Pair Management
Corpration). In 1998, System Plus requested the city government of
Caloocan to exempt it from paying the taxes for the parcels of land that
it is renting from the two sister companies. System Plus said that the
parcels of land being used were actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes, thus they were exempt from paying taxes under
Sec 28 of Article 6 of the Constitution. City Assessor and Administrator,
with the recommendation of the City Legal Officer, denied the request
saying that the parcels of land were owned by Consolidated Assembly.
Therefore, Consolidated Assembly was bound to pay the taxes from the
income received from the rent of the parcels of land used by System
Plus. Consolidated Assembly was not a non-profit organization, and thus,
their income (from the rental of System Plus) was not exempt from tax.
On Februray 1999, Consolidated Assembly “donated” the said parcels of
land to System Plus. Thus, System Plus now owned the land. Caloocan
City again denied the request for exemption saying that:
1) it was an obvious scheme to evade taxes by Consolidated
Assembly and Pair Management
2) the land parcels being sought for exemption from Real
Property Taxes could not be proven as actually, directly and
exclusively used either for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.
Twice denied, System Plus filed a petition for mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. RTC dismissed it. System Plus filed
an instant petition for certiorari and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC when RTC ruled that mandamus does not lie against
Caloocan City as respondent and that System Plus failed to exhaust all
available administrative remedies before seeking mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by not allowing
the mandamus filed by System Plus.
To answer that, we must first answer whether or not System Plus
exhausted all administrative remedies before seeking mandamus.
Held:
System Plus did not exhaust all administrative remedies. After the City
Assessor, the case should have been appealed to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and then the Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
if necessary. Therefore RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion by
not allowing System Plus’ petition for mandamus.
Mandamu sis defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or
which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Central Mindanao University v. DAR
October 22, 1992
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 on the
Riles of court to nullify proceedings and decision on the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to set aside the decision of CA affirming
the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400
hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of CMU
DARAB, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, ordered
400 hectares of CMU land to be subject to segregation according to
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CARP, since the land was not directly, actually and exclusively used for
school sites, because it was leased to Del Monte Philippines.
CMU contends, however, that schools are exempt from the coverage of
CARP, and that land was awarded to them by Pres. Garcia so that in the
future, they may expand like schools in the US such as Michigan State
Univ, Penn State Univ, etc.
Issue: Did the DARAB and CA have jurisdiction as to determining the use
of the land of CMU
Held: No, CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question
and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed
objectives for which the land was given to it by the state. Neither the
DARAB or the Ca has the right to substitute judgement or discretion on
this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that
CMU has no real need for the land.
G.R. No. 124043 October 14, 1998:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG
MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari challenging two Resolutions issued by
the Court of Appeals. Both Resolutions affirmed the Decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA to claim tax exemption on the
latter's income from the lease of its real property.
Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which
conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public,
especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and
charitable objectives.
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of
P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop
owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and P44,259.00 from
parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the
commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private
respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and
interest, for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding
taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on
wages.
Private respondent formally protested the assessment and, as a
supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In
reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.
YMCA filed a petition to the CTA  took out the taxes.
CIR filed a petition to the CA  reversed decision and put back the
taxes.
YMCA filed motion for reconsideration to CA  reversed its decision and
took out taxes again.
CIR petitioned for review on certiorari to SC.
Issue:
Is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by the Young
Men's Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) — established
as "a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation" —
subject to income tax under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
and the Constitution? Did the CA commit reversible error saying they
were tax exempt?
Held:
First question: No. It is not tax exempt. Second question: Yes, they
committed error.
24
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The income derived by
petitioner from rentals of its real property is subject to income tax.”
Ratio:
Court said: “Verba legis non est recedendum. Hence, Respondent Court
of Appeals committed reversible error when it allowed, on
reconsideration, the tax exemption claimed by YMCA on income it
derived from renting out its real property, on the solitary but
unconvincing ground that the said income is not collected for profit but is
merely incidental to its operation. The law does not make a distinction.
The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such income is
derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.”
Is the YMCA an educational institution within the purview of Article XIV,
Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution (exempts educational institutions
from tax)? We rule that it is not. The term "educational institution" or
"institution of learning" has acquired a well-known technical meaning, of
which the members of the Constitutional Commission are deemed
cognizant. 38 Under the Education Act of 1982, such term refers to
schools.
The Court also notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the
proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly
and exclusively used for educational purposes.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Santos
Facts:
Respondent Hon. Apolinario B. Santos ruled in a previous case that EO
No. 470 which imposed a three to ten percent tariff and customs duty on
natural and cultured pearls and precious or semi-precious stones, and
EO No. 273 which imposed a twenty percent excise tax on jewelry,
pearls and other precious stones as INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE
AND EFFECT in so far as the petitioners are concerned. In support of
their petition before the lower court, the petitioners in the previous case
submitted a position paper purporting to an exhaustive study of the tax
rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in comparison to tax
rates levied on the same in the Philippines insofar as petitioners are
concerned. (This study pretty much showed how the Philippine jewelry
manufacturers were at a disadvantage due to the heavy taxes imposed
on jewelry here as compared to other Asian countries.)
In this petition, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Commissioner of Customs jointly seek the reversal of that decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition (talking about the previous case).
Whether the petition states a cause of action or whether the petition
alleges a justiciable controversy between the parties.
Whether or not the questioned statutory provisions affect the
constitutional right of the jewelry manufacturers (in the previous case) to
engage in business.
Whether the issuance of the Mission Order and Letters of Authority is
valid and legal.
Held:
The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject.
The petition states a cause of action and there exists a justiciable
controversy between the parties which would require determination of
constitutionality of the laws imposing excise tax and customs duty on
jewelry.
Questioned statutory provisions do not affect the constitutional right.
Rationale:
It is interesting to note that Judge Santos in his decision did not go as
far as to declare the law in question unconstitutional. However, he
declared the laws to be inoperative and without force and effect insofar
as the [petitioners in previous case] are concerned.
What we see here is a debate on the wisdom of the laws in question.
This is a matter on which the RTC is not competent to rule. “Debatable
IA 2008 Digested Cases

questions are for the legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting issues.” The Court does not deny that
the government tax policy treats jewelry as a non-essential item thus,
taxes it heavily. However, it is not for the Court to annul an act of the
political departments simply because they feel it is unwise or impractical.
The RTC has the power to declare a law unconstitutional but this
authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to
legislative policy.
This Court however, cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of
other countries should be used as a yardstick in determining what may
be the proper subjects of taxation in our own country. It is inherent in
the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation,
and it has been repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a
singling out or one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no
constitutional limitation.”
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Victor Lim
Facts:
The case concerns the conversion of Camp John Hay in Baguio into a
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) similar to what was done to the military
bases in Subic and Clark. On August 16, 1993, private respondents Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), Tuntex Co. Ltd (TUNTEX),
and Asiaworld Internationale Group Inc (ASIAWORLD) entered into a
Memorandum of agreement to develop Camp John Hay into a premier
tourist destination. With the concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Baguio City (SANGGU [uuy, Loyola days]), respondents seeked the
support of President Ramos to declare the camp as a SEZ.
On July 5, 1994, Pres Ramos issued Proclamation No 420 “CREATING
AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY FORMER
CAMP JOHN HAY AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO 7227.” Republic Act 7227, (a.k.a.
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) set out the policy of the
government to find alternative productive uses for the former military
bases under the 1947 USA Military Bases Agreement.
Proc # 24, pursuant to R.A 7227, granted Camp John Hay similar tax
exemptions and other privileges granted to the Subic SEZ (SSEZ).
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory
relief. The court, deciding that the rights of the people living in the
immediate vicinity of the camp in question will be affected by the
proposed SEZ, claimed jurisdiction over the case.
Issues: W/N PP 420, in so far as it grants tax exemptions pursuant to
RA 7227, is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the
President of a power granted only to the legislature.
Held: PP 420 is Unconstitutional. It bases the authority of the President
to grant tax exemptions on RA 7227. Although Camp John Hay is
covered by RA 7227 because the said camp is an extension of the
military bases in the USA Military bases Agreement, RA 7227 only
specifically grants the tax exemptions and privileges to SSEZ and not all
SEZs. (RA 7227 is too long to quote. Its in pp 318-319. The important
thing is that in all sections where it provides tax exemptions or
privileges, the said benefits refer only to Subic Special Economic
Zone).
Establishing that RA 7227 does not authorize the President to grant tax
exemptions to SEZs renders PP 420 unconstitutional, as far as the
sections that provide tax exemptions and privileges to SEZs.
Under Art 6, Sec 28, Par 4 of the constitution, Congress has sole power
of creating tax exemptions by statues although it may delegate this
power, subject to limitations it may provide, to the President as stated in
Art 6, Sec 28, Par 2.
EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Guingona Jr vs. Carague
GR no. 94571, April 22, 1991
Facts: The petitioners are Senators of the Republic of the Philippines
who questioned about the budget consisting of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P 155.3
Billion appropriated under RA No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations
25
for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P
27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service of P86.8
Billion is authorized by PD No. 81. The petitioners sought the declaration
of PD No. 81 as unconstitutional and thus seek to restrain the
disbursement of debt service under the l990 budget.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the appropriation of P86.8 Billion l990 Budget for debt
service is violative of Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution;
2. W/N PD 81, PD 1177 and PD l967 still operative under the
Consitution;
3. W/N it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. On the first issue, the appropriation of P86.8 Billion for debt
service does not violate Section 5, Article XIV of the
Constitution. In support hereof, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the
Constitution provides: All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
The presidential decrees issued by then Pres. Marcos were
intended to cover the payment of principal and interest on all
foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national
government. And thus, the automatic appropriation provides
the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
policies.
2. On the second issue, the legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860
as amended by PD No. ll77 and PD No. l967 is that the amount
needed should automatically set aside to enable the Republic
of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness
in order to maintain the credit standing of the country without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor.
3. On the third issue, Article VI, Section 29(1) of the Constitution
provides: No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the l987 Constitution,
Pres. Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal year l990.
Of the proposed budget of P 233.5 Billion, P 86.8 Billion is set
aside for debt servicing pursuant to PD l967 and RA No. 4860
as amended by PD No. 81.
Thus, the Court finds it as lawful authorizations or
appropriations, unless repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
SPECIAL FUND
JOHN OSMENA v. ORBOS (exec. sec.) GR no. 99886 03-31-93
Facts:
Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was a special account under PD1959
reclassified to “trust liability account.” OPSF serves to reimburse to oil
companies for cost increases due to exchange rate adjustments and
world market price increase. Its was amended (by EO137) so it could
also reimburse possible cost due to underrecovery of companies as result
of reduction of domestic prices (amount of underrecovery determined by
the ministry). By 1991, OPSF has Terminal Balance Deficit of 12.877
billion. To decrease this deficit, the Energy Regulatory Board issued an
order increasing prices of petroleum products to recover fund within 6
mos. Respondents are poised to accept process and pay claims not
authorized under PD1956
Petitioner seeks remedies to the following: (1) unconstitutionality as
PD1959 as a “Trust Account” contrary to Sec29(3) Art. 6
Constitution; (2) PD no.1956 unconstitutional against non-delegability
of legislative powers; (3) illegality of reimbursements to oil companies as
against PD1956; (4) nullity of the order increasing prices of petroleum
products and roll back of prices to levels prior to the increase
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Issue: W/N corrective, prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by
Rules of Court sought by the petitioner is valid.
Held: the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of
the reimbursement of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137
(remedies sought for #3) and DISMISSED in all other respects.
Rationale:
1. PD1959 Constitutional – OPSF is a trust account established to
minimizing frequent price changes (funded by increase in tax collection
through ad valorem or customs duty, lifting tax exemption, additional
amount imposed on products or any resulting peso cost differential).
While funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, OPSF is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law
refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and review of the Commision of Audit. The Court
is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.
2. The Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised.
3. The reimbursement of financing charges is not authorized by
paragraph 2 of § 8 of P.D. 1956, for the reason that they were not
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum
products.
4. The pump rates of gasoline have been reduced to levels below even
those prayed for in the petition.
APPELATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Fabian v. Desierto
September 16, 1998
* (Title from original case: TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and
NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.)
Note: This case is complicated considering that it involves other
laws/rules which are rather “new” (e.g. Rules of Court, RA 6770 or the
Ombudsman Act, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).
Apologies for those who will find this very long since every detail is
important considering Father B’s type of questions. Thanks.
Persons in the case:
 Teresita Fabian – major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation
 Nestor V. Agustin – incumbent District Engineer of FMED (First
Metro Manila Engineering District)
 Eduardo R. Benitez – Graft Investigator who ruled in favor of
petitioner
 Jesus F. Guerrero – Deputy Ombudsman who set aside
Benitez’ resolution
* Hon. Aniano Desierto was not mentioned in the proceedings of the
case
Facts:
Petitioner has appealed to the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents
on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the
motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from
administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him
as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH).
Teresita G. Fabian and Nestor Agustin had an amorous relationship in
the course of which, respondent gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his
office. Later on, when misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents
developed between the two, petitioner tried to end their relationship but
respondent refused to the extent that the latter employed acts of
26
harassment, intimidation and threats. Eventually, petitioner filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for
violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree),
with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of
this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category
of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
Graft Investigator Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. Respondent then filed a
reconsideration and upon the discovery of Benitez, the former’s new
counsel had been his classmate and close associate so he inhibited
himself and the case was transferred to Guerrero who set aside the
order of Benitez and absolved the respondents.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides
that -
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman) when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman
has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its
aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770,
nor to limit the power of review of this Court.
As to Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and consent," petitioner said that section 27 of R.A. 6770 does
not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that
the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rules of
Court 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of
which this Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
But in relation to the foregoing, the private respondent is
correct in observing that the revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court," explicitly states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. -
A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other court whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
question of law which must be distinctly set forth.
(Italics ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court
which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to
restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders
of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments
and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
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formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Issue:
W/N RA 6770 is constitutional or violates Art VI, Sec. 30 of the
Constitution.
Held:
“Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of this Court… As a consequence of our ratiocination that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.”
“WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court
of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the
Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43,
without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or
supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may
deem necessary and proper.”
ADDITIONAL FOR LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Ermita, Cruz, et al
GR 171396, May 3, 2005
Facts:
- Feb 24, 2006 (20th Anniversary of People Power Revolution):
President GMA declares PP 1017 and General Order 5 (GO 5),
implement PP 1017
- PP1017:
o Basis: Art VII, Sec 18 of 1987 Constitution: “The
President… whenever it becomes necessary… may
call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress…
rebellion…” – armed forces were tasked to quell
“acts of terrorism and lawless violence”
o Basis: Art XII, Sec 7: declared State of National
Emergency
o Ratio for declaration: coup threat from extreme left
(CPP-NPA) and right (military adventurists), aligned
with political opposition; media sensationalism;
effect on economy; “clear and present danger” to
public
- Mike Defensor: “Warrantless arrests and take-over of media
facilities [if they endanger “government stability”] may be
implemented.”
- Randy David (UP Prof), Ronald Llamas (Akbayan president), et
al, were violently dispersed and detained without warrant
- The Daily Tribune, Malaya, and Abante were raided and anti-
government articles were confiscated, purportedly to promote
government stability
- March 3, 2006: GMA declares PP 1021, which ended State of
National Emergency
Issues:
- Procedural: Does PP 1021 make consolidated petitions moot
and academic? Do petitioners have legal standing?
27
- Substantive (more important): Can the Supreme Court review
the factual bases of PP 1017? Are PP 1017 and GO 5
unconstitutional?
Held:
- Procedural 1: Petitions are NOT moot and academic
o Issuance of PP 1021 did not end the “justiciable
controversy” – in the eight days, many constitutional
rights were allegedly violated
o Power of judicial review (Art VIII, Sec 1)
- Procedural 2: All petitioners have legal standing (locus standi)
o Normally, “direct injury” test is used for locus standi
o But this is a case of transcendental importance that
affects all Filipinos
- Substantive 1: Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners have
failed to show that PP 1017 has no factual basis at all.
o The SC cannot adjudge is PP 1017 is correct, but it
can adjudge if it was based on facts.
o Solicitor General’s response had already detailed the
Magdalo uprising, military defections, minutes
showing alliance of NPA and military, etc.
- Substantive 2: CONSTITUTIONALITY
o Principle of emergency powers (based on political
theories): the increased discretionary powers of the
Executive must be exercised with as sense of
political responsibility, under effective limitations and
checks
o Re: Claim of overbreadth (where freedom of speech
of third parties are gravely deterred) was REJECTED
by the SC
 This is not a free speech case, but
primarily a conduct case.
 Petitioners have failed to prove (and it is
night impossible to) that third parties not
before the court have been deterred from
free expression
o First challenge: regarding “calling out power”
(calling upon armed forces to suppress lawless
violence) – VALID (based on Art VII, Sec 18)
 “Calling out” armed forces is part of
ordinary police power of executive
 Sequence of graduated powers (from
benign to awesome): 1. calling out, 2.
suspending writ of habeas corpus, 3.
martial law
 Only criterion for “calling out” –
“WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY to
suppress lawless violence, rebellion, etc.”
o Second challenge: regarding “take care power”
(ensuring all laws and decrees promulgated by GMA
will be executed/followed) – PARTIALLY INVALID
 GMA cannot issue decrees; this is a
legislative power.
 The phrase “all laws” is invalid because
only laws pertaining to supressing lawless
violence may be enforced through
emergency powers
o Third challenge: “take over power” (taking over any
private business affecting public interest, i.e., media)
 Executive has prerogative to declare
“State of National Emergency” (Art VII,
Sec 18)
 BUT, in light of this declaration, ONLY
CONGRESS may delegate “emergency
powers” (Art VI, Sec 23) (NB: president
declares the state of emergency, but
congress delegates the emergency powers
– REMEMBER THIS!)
 Congress is the repository of emergency
powers, but they may delegate it to the
executive provided that:
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 There is war or national
emergency
 It is for a limited period only
 It is subject to restrictions by
Congress
 Emergency powers must carry
out national policies of Congress
 THUS, Art XII Sec 17, which talks about
State take-over of private industries with a
public purpose, refers to CONGRESS –
they need to legislate before the Executive
can take over media industries
o Regarding arrest of Randy David, et al:
 The State violated petitioners’ right to be
protected from warrantless arrest and
right to peaceably assemble
 There needs to be CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER before these are abrogated
 The petitioner David was only wearing a
T-shirt bearing “Oust Gloria Now” and was
not doing any dangerous activity
o Regarding standards imposed on media and
warantless search of newspaper offices:
 The State violated right to freedom of
expression and imposed prior restraints on
speech
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERMITA
GR 169777 APRIL 20, 20006
FACTS:
This is a petition questioning the constitutionality of EO 464. The Senate
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to
inquire about the unlawful provisions found in the contract for the North
Rail project and other concerns. These officials issued replies which that
they wouldn’t be able to show up due to other pending matters they
should cater to. This kind of incident was repeated for several times.
This prompted the Senate President to deny the latest decline of Ermita
to show up in Senate. After this, EO464 was declared by the President.
EO464 is as follows:
“ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND
RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,”
which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The
salient provisions of
the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to
implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge
confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason
of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
28
public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the
President and the public official covered by this executive
order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters
which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);
v. Matters affecting national security and public order
(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9
July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive
order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment
of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the
President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All
public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure
prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of
separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and
respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On the same date
wherein EO464 was declared, Senate President Drilon received a copy
thereof from Ermita, mentioning that the officials invited wouldn’t be
able to attend because they don’t have prior consent from the President,
pursuant to EO464. Nonetheless, the inquiry went on and the military
officials who showed up were relieved of their military posts and were
due to Court Marshall. This prompted the petitions filed with the
Supreme Court, alleging that EO 464 is unconstitutional as it violates
certain constitutional provisions.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power to inquire by
Congress?
2. Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information
with regard to public concern?
3. Whether or not the implementation of EO 464 without prior
publication in a newspaper of general circulation constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
HELD:
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To answer the first issue, general powers of inquiry of Congress as well
as the definition of executive privilege should be discussed. General
power of inquiry by Congress is mandated by the Constitution, under
Section 21, Article 6: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied) The power of
inquiry of Congress is grounded to the fact that information is necessity
in legislation. If it is valuable to legislation, executive department officials
can then be called by Congress to answer inquiries.
29
people to information due to public concern. When officials unduly limit
disclosures of information during inquiries in aid of legislation, which are
generally made public, consequentially, the public’s right to information
is being impaired. Thus, it is a consequence of EO 464 that the right to
information of the general public is being impaired.
On the third issue, there was grave abuse of discretion. Even if the order
pertains to officials of the executive department, it is not an excuse for it
not to be published. Indirectly, it affects the general public and thus
general circulation should have been facilitated before its
implementation.

On one hand, the Executive department might invoke the executive

privilege, which is grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers.
Even so, not all information can be under the so-called executive
privilege that the executive department will preclude the power of
inquiry of Congress. To be able to directly answer the first issue, parts of
EO464 should be analyzed individually. With regard to Section 1 of
EO464, it pertains to department heads and unlike Section 3, there is no
need for prior determination if they are under the provisions of EO 464.
Further, Section 1 doesn’t pertain to any information and doesn’t invoke
the executive privilege.

Furthermore, Section 1 is grounded on Article 6, Section 22 of the

Constitution which says: SECTION 22. The heads of departments may
upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the

President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in

executive session Following the intent and meaning of the
abovementioned section, it can be followed that there are two types of
Congressional inquiry—one is the question hour and the other is the
inquiry in aid of legislation. While it is discretionary for executive officials
to show up during question hours, it is mandatory for them to show up
during inquiries in aid of legislation. This power of Congress lies in the
doctrine of separation of powers. This doctrine strengthens the essence
of Congress inquiring with the executive branch, especially in the
performance of its legislative functions. Thus, Section 1 in its face is
valid, though it can only be invoked during inquiries in the question hour,
and not during inquiries for aid of legislation. With regard to Section 2(b)
and 3, the enumeration of public officials that should get prior consent
from the President before appearing in Congress, and those officials by
determination of their heads are covered by executive privilege, is too
broad. It also includes other officials that may be determined by the
President. Such is underlined by executive privilege. In Section 2b,
executive privilege is being misused. It is used in context of persons
wherein it should be in context of information. Even so, it could just be
implied that the persons concerned hold such information. It should be
noted that in Section 2b and 3, there is implied claim of executive
privilege whenever an official invokes EO 464. But accordingly, the claim
of executive privilege shouldn’t be taken lightly. There should be
assertion of this claim as well as basis. Thus, with regard to Section 3
wherein there is no mention of any basis on why such invocation of
executive privilege, it is invalid per se. Furthermore, it should be
invalidated due to the unlawful delegation of authority exercised by
heads of office, when they determine that a certain information falls
under the executive privilege, there is presumption of the President’s
authorization and has the effect of prohibiting an official from showing
up in Congress. Such silent authorization is contrary to the essence of
executive privilege. It is limited to the President to determine if
information is under executive privilege. If he delegates such authority, it
should still be by his order.

On the second issue, there is difference between the right of Congress to

information, which underlies their power of inquiry and the right of the

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