Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
respondents
FACTS:
• The spouses Viloria purchased two roundtrip tickets from San Diego, CA to Newark, NJ
on board Continental Airlines.
o The petitioner spouses only agreed to purchase such roundtrip plane tickets
after being informed by Marget Mager, an employee of a travel agency called
“Holiday Travel,” that there were no more available seats at Amtrak, a train
service provider in the US.
o The petitioner requested Mager to reschedule their flight to an earlier date but
was subsequently denied because it was already fully booked. The Vilorias opted
to request for a refund and was also denied because the subject tickets were
clearly non-refundable.
Afterwards, petitioner Spouses made inquiries at a nearby Amtrak station
and found out that there were still available seats and could travel at any
time he pleases.
• When the petitioner spouses returned to the Philippines, they sent a letter to
respondent CAI demanding for a refund alleging that Mager defrauded them into
purchasing the subject tickets.
o Respondent denied the petitioners demand for a refund but instead advised him
that he can take the subject tickets for the re-issuance of new tickets which may
be used as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental ticket.
o The petitioners then tried to have the subject tickets replaced for a single round
trip ticket to LA (costing around $1,8670) which was also denied since the tickets
were non-transferrable.
Petitioners allege that the respondents breached its obligations charging
them $1,8670 for a ticket to LA while other airlines were offering them at
$856.
ISSUE(s):
RATIO/HELD:
1. YES, the SC held that there was a contract of agency between Holiday Travel and CAI.
The essential elements of agency were evident in the case at bar, that since the first and
second element of agency, namely consent and object, were present and that CAI did
not deny the agreement it entered with Holiday Travel whereby the travel agency would
enter into contracts on behalf of CAI with third persons. The third element is also
obtaining in this case because Holiday Travel acted in a representative capacity and that
it is CAI who is bound to the contract of carriage. The fourth element is also satisfied
because CAI did not make allegations that Holiday Travel did not exceed the “scope” of
its authority.
o By virtue of the agreement constituting Holiday Travel as an agent, CAI is
therefore stopped from denying their agent-principal relationship
o The court also cited CIR v. Constantino which distinguished a contract of sale
from a contract of agency:
In an agency, the principal retains ownership and only acts on the
principal’s behalf.
In a contract of sale, the parties intend that the delivery of property
relinquishes title, control, and ownership to the recipient.
• Therefore, CAI as principal is bound by all the obligations contracted by Holiday Travel
as its agent.
2. NO, without presenting evidence that CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel’s
employees or that CAI was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed on CAI for
Mager’s supposed misrepresentation.
RALLOS v. YANGCO
FACTS:
• The defendant, Yangco sent to the petitioner Rallos a letter offering a shipping and
commission agreement for the buying and selling of leaf tobacco and other native
products.
o The terms and conditions stipulated that a commission of 2.5% will be collected
on the amount realized from the sale of the goods shipped among others.
o Defendant Yangco in his letter, introduced to the petitioner Rallos a certain
Collantes whom he (Yangco) has given a special power of attorney who would
act on his behalf.
• Rallos then proceeded to do business with the defendant through the supposed agent,
Collantes. And on February 1909, Rallos sent to Collantes 218 bundles of tobacco for
the total sum of P1,744. Unfortunately, this sum was apparently converted for the
personal use of Collantes.
• Apparently, prior to the sending of said tobacco in February, 1909, defendant Yangco
already severed his relationship with Collante and was no longer acting as his agent
without notifying the petitioner, Rallos.
ISSUE(s):
1. W/N the petitioner acting in good and without knowledge of the termination of the
agency relationship of Yangco and Collantes, can recover from the defendant the sum of
P1,744.
HELD/RATIO:
LITONJUA v. FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
• Petitioner’s version: Alimario and Fisico were brokers who offered to sell to the
petitioner Litonjua the parcels of land owned by the respondents. The brokers told the
petitioners that they were authorized by the respondent Fernandez to offer the
property for sale.
o The petitioners with the two brokers met with respondent Fernandez and
supposedly agreed that the property would be sold for the price of P150 per
square meter or the total sum of P5,098,500.
o They also agreed that the respondent would shoulder the capital gains tax,
transfer tax and expenses for the documentation of the sale. The petitioners and
respondents also agreed that they would meet sometime in December to finalize
the sale.
o It was also agreed upon that the owners of the property would execute a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Fernandez authorizing her to sell the
property in their behalf.
o Only the broker Fisico attended that meeting to inform the petitioners that the
respondents were having trouble with the tenants on the subject parcels of land.
o The petitioners then sent letters to the respondents demanding the property be
executed according to their verbal agreement and to turn over the subject
properties to them within 15 days from receipt of the letter.
• Fernandez then wrote to the petitioners Litonjua on February 14, 1996. to make
clarifications on the subject matter:
o That she did not agree to shoulder the taxes and expenses. However, she did
make an assurance there were no liens or encmberances nor tenants on the
subject property.
o That she did not agree to meet with the petitioners on December to sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale
o The letter also informed the petitioners that the “changed their minds” and that
the sale would no longer push through. That they would no longer be selling the
property until all problems have been fully settled.
• The petitioners then filed a complaint for specific performance with damages alleging
that there was already perfected contract and that the respondents cannot unilaterally
cancel a perfected contract to sell.
• The respondent then filed her answer stating that she did not accept any offer, thus, no
verbal contract to sell was perfected.
ISSUE(s):
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO, the contract of sale was not perfected contract of sale because it is very clear that
the defendant as seller did not accept the condition set by the petitioner and that she
also categorically denies that she committed to execute the deed of sale as claimed by
the petitioners.
a. The petitioner cannot rely on the offer made by Fernandez offering the subject
land for P150 per square meter or for a total of P5,098,500. This offer cannot
constitute perfection of the contract because Fernandez did not have the
authorization to sell the same. Fernandez only met with the petitioners to hear
their offer since she was only looking for a buyer “on a best offer basis.”
b. Fernandez could not have sold the land because of the emergence of people
who claimed to be tenants on the subject property.
• There was also no evidence on record that the respondents-owners ever authorized
Fernandez to sell their properties. Nor was a Special Power of Attorney granted to
Fernandez by the respondent-owners which would be necessary for Fernandez to be
able to enter a contract with petitioner. Respondent Fernandez also testified to the fact
that she would still have to secure authorizations from her relatives before she could
enter to a contract with the petitioner.
2. NO, the letter Fernandez sent to the petitioner did not constitute as a note or
memorandum within the context of Article 1403(2) under the statute of frauds since it
did not contain the following:
a. All the essential terms and conditions of the sale of the properties
b. An accurate description of the property subject to sale
c. The names of the owners of the property.
FACTS:
• Atanacio, a real estate broker offered to the petitioner Aggabao a property found in BF
Homes Paranaque City registered under the spouses Dionisio and Ma. Elena Parulan.
o On February 2, 1991, the spouses Aggabao together with the broker Atanacio
met with Ma. Elena at the site of the property
o Ma. Elena showed them the following documents: (a) the owners original copy
of TCT No. 63376, (b) a certified true copy of the said TCT and among other
things, a Special Power of Attorney executed by Dionisio Parulan authorizing Ma.
Elena to sell the property.
o The spouses Aggabao then paid Ma. Elena P20k in earnest money and would pay
P130k on Feb. 4, 1991, pay the remaining balance of the bank loan of the
respondents amounting to P650k and make the final payment of P700k once
Ma. Elena turns over the property on March 31, 1991.
• The petitioner spouses along with Atanacio and her husband went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office in Paranaque City and found out that the
TCTs had an annotation for an existing mortgage in favor Los Banos Rural Bank effected
through an SPA executed by Dionisio coupled with a copy of a court order as a security
of a P500k loan.
o The petitioners and Atanacio then next inquired about the said mortgage at the
Los Banos Rural bank. There they met with a certain Atty. Noel Zarate who told
them that the bank asked the Parulans for a court order since the property
involved was conjugal.
• When the final amount of P700,000 was delivered by the petitioners to Ma. Elena, she
could not turn over to the Aggabao spouses all the duplicate copies of the TCTs because
they were in the possession of a relative who was in Hong Kong.
o However, the spouses Aggabao found out that the duplicate owner’s copy were
in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Parulan who also holds an SPA executed by his
brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell the properties.
o The spouses Aggabao and Atty. Parulan met in the Manila Peninsula for
negotiations which fell through because of disagreements over the price for the
duplicate owner’s copy under the custody of Atty. Parulan
o When Atty. Parulan found out that the Aggabao spouses already paid Ma. Elena
in full, Dionisio through Atty. Parulan commenced an action praying for the
decalaration of nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ma. Elena.
• The RTC ruled in favor of Dionisio Parulan and declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma.
Elena was a forgery because it couldn’t have been executed by him since he was out of
the country at the time of the execution of the SPA.
ISSUE(s):
RATIO/HELD:
1. NO, the petitioners cannot be in good faith because they did not exercise due diligence
by thoroughly investigating whether Ma. Elena did actually have the capacity to sell the
conjugal property. The SC stated that buyers of conjugal property must observe two
kinds of diligence, namely:
a. The diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property
b. The diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell
conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
• The spouses did not make the appropriate inquiries about the execution of the SPA and
simply accepted it for what it is. If they made the necessary inquiries, they would have
found out that Ma. Elena and Dionisio had been estranged from each other and were
under de facto separation, negating the existence of an agency between them.
• The ruling found in Veloso v CA is inapplicable in the case at bar because the contested
property in Veloso was exclusive property while in this case it was conjugal property.
Therefore, the spouses Aggabao cannot be held as an innocent purchaser for value.
2. YES, the sale of the conjugal property to the Aggabao spouses is a nullity under Art. 124
of the Family Code.
o Art 124 of the Family Code states that:
“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse.
FACTS:
ISSUE(s):
1. W/N respondent Guevarra acted within his authority as agent for the petitioner
2. W/N respondent Guevarra is entitled to reimbursement for the amounts he paid out of
his personal money in settling the claims of the insured.
RATIO/HELD:
1. NO, The SPA executed by Dominion Insurance Corp. was more of a general power
because the acts enumerated in the SPA were limited only to acts of administration and
NOT of dominion.
o Article 1878 enumerates the instances when a special power of attorney is
required:
To make such payments as are NOT usually considered as acts of
administration
Any other act of strict dominion
o The payment of claims is not an act of administration. The settlement of claims
was not among the stipulations enumerated by the SPA. Therefore, Guevarra did
not act within the scope of authority granted to him by Dominion.
• The authority to settle claims is found in the Memorandum of Management Agreement
which provides that payment for the settlement of claim would come from the revolving
fund or collections and NOT from Guevarra’s personal money.
• Therefore, Guevarra deviated from the instructions of the principal, Dominion Insurance
Corp. by using personal funds to settle insurance claims instead of getting money from
the revolving fund or collection money as per instructions of the principal.
o According to Article 1918, the principal is not liable for the expenses incurred
by the agent in the following cases:
If the agent acted in contravention of the principal’s instructions unless
the latter should wish to avail himself of the benefits derived from the
contract.
2. YES, although the law on agency prohibits Guevarra from obtaining reimbursement, his
right to recover is justified under the general law on obligation and contracts.
o Under Article 1236 of the Civil Code:
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has
paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of
the debtor, he can only recover insofar as the payment has been
beneficial to the debtor.
o Therefore, Guevarra may demand reimbursement from his principal because to
rule otherwise would unjustly enrich Dominion Insurance Corp.
VELOSO v. CA
FACTS:
• Petitioner Veloso was the owner of a parcel of land located in Tondo, Manila. The title
for the said parcel of land was subsequently cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the
name of Aglaloma Escario.
o Veloso then filed an action for annulment and reconveyance of the property
because he never authorized anybody to sell it.
o The transfer of property was allegedly supported by a General Power of Attorney
and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by his wife, Irma Veloso appearing as his
attorney-in-fact.
o Petitioner vehemently denies executing such power of attorney and alleges that
his signature has been falsified.
o Note: The subject property did not belong to the conjugal partnership since he
acquired the property before he married Irma. Therefore, it was his exclusive
property.
• Respondent Escario in her answer contends that she was a buyer in good faith and
denies any knowledge of the alleged irregularity.
o She relied on the General Power of Attorney of Irma Veloso which was sufficient
in form and substance and was duly notarized.
• The RTC ruled in favor of Escario holding that she was an innocent purchaser for value
and that the general power of attorney was valid and sufficient for the purpose. Since
Irma was in the possession of the certificate of title, the RTC applied the principle of
equitable estoppel, Veloso was held to bear the loss for it was he who made the wrong
possible.
ISSUE(s):
1. W/N the General Power of Attorney was valid and sufficient in form and substance.
2. W/N Escario is deemed to be an innocent purchaser of value.
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES, the assailed power of attorney was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized
and as such, it carries evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution.
a. The stipulation found in the General Power of Attorney which authorized the
attorney-in-fact to sell the subject property was sufficient. There was no need to
execute a separate Special Power of Attorney since the General Power of
Attorney already stipulated such power.
What matters is the extent of the powers contemplated upon the agent
or attorney in fact.
Where the power to sell is specific and not merely implied, there can be
no doubt that the attorney in fact may execute a valid sale.
• The SC could not sustain Veloso’s allegations of forgery since mere variance of the
genuine signature he presented cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same
was forged. Forgery cannot be presumed.
2. YES, Escario, relying on the presumption of the valid execution of the General Power of
Attorney and the fact that Irma Veloso had in her possession the title of the property,
there was no reason for Escario not to believe Irma’s authority. Therefore, Escario is
deemed to be an innocent purchaser for value.