1.

Despite the application of the aberratio ictus rule, the

accused is liable for separate crimes, and not a compound crime if the
bullet that killed that target victim is different from the bullet that killed
the third person, who was hit by reason of mistake of blow. In People vs.
Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015, accused treacherously fired his
gun several times at his target victim. A bystander was also hit by reason
of mistake of blow. Both victims died. Accused is responsible not only for
the death of the target victim but also for the death of the third person,
who was hit by a stray bullet. He is liable for two separate crimes of
murder. Treachery will be appreciated even though one was killed because
of aberratio ictus. But this is not a compound crime since there is no
showing that the victims were killed by single act but several acts. When
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes.

In People vs. Flora and Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000, the
accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of
two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed
by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder (People vs.
Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015).

2. The rules for the application of divisible penalties under Article

64 of RPC in a case where prescribed penalty for the crime committed is
prision mayor are as follows:

a. Aggravating circumstances - Regardless of the number of

aggravating circumstance, the court shall just impose the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period. It shall not impose a greater
penalty than that prescribed by law. For example, the court cannot
graduate the penalty to reclusion temporal because of the presence of
several aggravating circumstances since the imposition of a penalty
greater than prision mayor is prohibited (People vs. Manlolo, G.R. No.
40778, January 26, 1989).

b. No modifying circumstance - When there are neither aggravating

nor mitigating circumstances, prision mayor shall be imposed in its
medium period.

c. One mitigating circumstance - When there is only one mitigating

circumstance, prision mayor shall be imposed in its minimum period.

d. Special mitigating circumstance - When there are two mitigating

circumstances, the penalty next lower than the prescribed penalty of
prision mayor shall be imposed, and that is, prision correccional. Since
the two mitigating circumstances were considered to reduce the penalty,
there is no remaining mitigating circumstance that can be used to apply
the reduced penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period; hence,
prision correccional shall be applied in its medium period (Legrama vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012).

When there are three or more mitigating circumstances, the penalty

next lower than the prescribed penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed,
and that is, prision correccional. Since only two mitigating circumstances
were considered to reduce the penalty, there is/are remaining mitigating
circumstance/s that can be used to apply the reduced penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, supra).

Even if there are four mitigating circumstances, the prescribed

penalty shall not be reduced two degrees lower. In sum, the special
mitigating circumstance will only require the imposition of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law.

e. Offset rule - When both mitigating and aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset
those of one class against the other according to their relative
weight.

If there is/are aggravating circumstance/s remaining after

applying the offset rule, prision mayor shall be applied in its
maximum period.

If there is no remaining modifying circumstance after

applying the offset rule, prision mayor shall be applied in its
medium period.

If there is/are mitigating circumstance/s remaining after

applying the offset rule, prision mayor shall be applied in its
minimum period.

Even though there are two remaining mitigating

circumstances after applying the offset rule, special mitigating
circumstances shall not be considered. To appreciate special
mitigating circumstance for purpose of reducing the penalty, it
is important there is no aggravating circumstance. Thus, the
application of offset rule, which presupposes the presence of
aggravating circumstance exclude the appreciation of the offset
rule.

3. Organized/syndicated crime group is a special aggravating

circumstance. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two
or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. Syndicate
means association of gangsters. The concept of organized/syndicated
crime group contemplates the Yakusa in Japan, Mafia in the United States
of America, Hong Kong Triad, Akyat Bahay Gang, Red Scorpion Gang, etc.

Organized/syndicated crime group presupposes conspiracy among

members of the syndicate to commit a crime for gain. However, although
the existence of conspiracy was established, this circumstance of
organized/syndicated crime group shall not be appreciated in the absence
of proof that the accused were members of a group organized for the
general purpose of committing crimes for gain (People v. Musa, G.R. No.
199735, October 24, 2012).

4. Accused committed homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion

temporal. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense is also present. There are two mitigating circumstances of
confession and voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance
(1968 and 2013 Bar Exams). The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
reduced to prision correccional because of incomplete self-defense
(Article 69). This penalty shall further be reduced to arresto mayor
because of the special mitigating circumstance (Article 64). Since the two
mitigating circumstances were used to reduce the penalty by one degree,
there is no remaining mitigating circumstance that can be used to apply
arresto mayor in its minimum period. Hence, arresto mayor shall be
applied in its medium period, which has a range from 2 months and 1 day
to 4 months (People vs. Legrama, supra). The Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable because the penalty is not more than one year.
Hence, the court may sentence the accused to suffer a straight penalty of
2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor (Pangan vs. Gatbalite, G.R. No.
141718, January 21, 2005).

5. Accused committed homicide, the penalty for which is

reclusion temporal. The privilege mitigating circumstance of
minority is also present. There are two mitigating
circumstances of confession and voluntary surrender and
special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be reduced to prision
mayor because of minority (Article 68). Prison mayor shall be
applied in its maximum period because the accused is a quasi-
recidivist. The special mitigating circumstance of confession
and surrender shall not be appreciated since there is an
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. Applying the
ISLAW, the maximum penalty shall be fixed anywhere within
the range of prision mayor in its maximum period (10 years
and 1 day to 12 years); while the minimum penalty shall be
fixed anywhere within the full range of prision correccional (6
months and 1 day to 6 years), which is the penalty next lower
in degree. Hence, the court may sentence the accused to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as
minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum

6. In 2012 and 1985 Bar Exams, accused, a minor, pleaded guilty to

direct assault with homicide. The penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide, which is the most serious component of this complex crime
(Article 48), shall be reduced to prision mayor because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority (Article 68). Because of the complex
character of the crime, prision mayor shall be applied in its maximum
period although the mitigating circumstance of confession is present
(Article 48). Applying the ISLAW, the maximum penalty shall be fixed
anywhere within the range of prision mayor in its maximum period (10
years and 1 day to 12 years), while the minimum penalty shall be fixed
anywhere within the full range of prision correccional (6 months and 1
day to 6 years), which is the penalty next lower in degree. Hence, the
court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2
years of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as maximum.

7. The modes mentioned in Article 89 of RPC such as death

extinguish the criminal liability of the offender but not the crime itself
(People vs. Henry Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014). By reason
thereof, pardon looks forward and merely abolishes or forgives the
punishment (People vs. Patriarca, Jr., G.R. No. 135457, September 29,
2000). However, there is a special rule on amnesty. Article 89 of RPC
provides that amnesty completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects. Because of this special rule, the Supreme Court in Patriarca
stated that amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself. In sum, amnesty extinguishes not only the criminal
liability but also the crime itself.

Under PD No. 968 as amended by RA No. 10707, final

discharge of the probationer extinguishes his criminal liability.
The intention of the law is to make a mode of criminal
extinction in addition to those listed in Article 89 of RPC.
Since final discharge of the probationer under PD No. 968
merely extinguishes his criminal liability, and not all effects of
the crime, the effect of such discharge is similar to death or
pardon, and not amnesty. In sum, such discharge looks forward
and extinguishes merely the criminal liability and not the
crime itself.

Since the previous crime is not extinguished by the discharge of the

probationer or by pardon, the same shall be considered for purposes of
determining if the accused is a recidivist in committing a second crime,
which is embraced in the same title. On the other hand, since the
previous crime is extinguished by amnesty, the same shall not be
considered for purposes of determining if the accused is a recidivist in
committing a second crime, which is embraced in the same title.

9. Under Section 70 of RA No. 9165, a first time minor offender can

apply for probation for the crime of illegal possession or use of dangerous
drugs even if the penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment. But this
provision is only applicable if the minor is a first time offender, who is
charged with possession or use of dangerous drugs. If the charge is selling
dangerous drugs, the applicable rule is Section 24 of RA No. 9165, which
disqualifies dangerous drug traffickers and pushers for applying for
probations. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as
victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators (Padua vs.
People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008).

To determine whether the accused is eligible or disqualified for

probation, multiple prison terms imposed in one decision in a
consolidated cases involving several offenses should not be added up. The
multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the
terms exceeds 6 years, he is entitled to probation (Francisco vs. CA, G.R.
No. 108747, April 6, 1995; 1997 Bar Exam). The rule on disqualification
by reason of previous sentence will not apply because technically the
accused has no previous sentence where the cases are consolidated.
However, if the multiple prison terms are imposed in different decisions,
his previous sentence will disqualify him to apply for probation if the
penalty imposed is more than 6 months and 1 day of imprisonment or a
fine of more than P1,000.00.

10. Probation suspends the service of principal penalty of

imprisonment and accessory penalty of disqualification (Moreno v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006; Villareal vs. People, G.R. No.
151258, December 01, 2014). However, it does neither affect the civil
aspect of the case (Budlong vs. Palisok, G.R. No. 60151, June 24, 1983)
nor the administrative liability of the accused (Pagaduan vs. CSC, G.R.
No. 206379, November 19, 2014). On the other hand, pardon remits the
principal penalty of imprisonment but not the accessory penalties such as
disqualification unless there is an express remission of such accessory
penalties (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).

11. Criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished

by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The
term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties, while the term "pecuniary penalties" refers to
fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability based
on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action (Villareal v.
People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012);

12. If the main objective is to commit robbery, and homicide and

arson are perpetrated by reason or on occasion thereof, the crime
committed is robbery with homicide while arson shall be integrated into
this special complex crime (People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05,
2016). However, by means of fire shall be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance (U.S. vs. Bulfa, G.R. No. 8468, August 20, 1913).

If the robbers gained possession of the property inside a lumber, and

in the course thereof, a victim was killed the crime committed is robbery
with homicide. Failure to bring out the property from the lumber
compound will not negate the consummation of robbery since inability to
freely dispose the property is not an element of robbery (Peope vs.
Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, April 26, 1990). On the other hand, if the robber
by means of intimidation was demanding money from the victim, who
refused to do so, and as a consequence, the former killed the latter, the
crime committed is attempted robbery with homicide (People vs. Barra,
G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013).

13. In Ysidoro vs. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012, the
mayor, who applied ten boxes of food appropriated for feeding program to
the beneficiaries of shelter assistance program, is liable for technical
malversation. Mayor’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount
diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. Criminal intent
is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is malum
prohibitum, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral
but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law and not
the character or effect thereof that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is
completely irrelevant. Dura lex sed lex.

14. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that the crime of

plunder under RA No. 7080 is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum
in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance
against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts
(Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).

15. A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found

in RPC, while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal
laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under special
laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended (Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001). Similarly, there
may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation (Ysidoro vs. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012).
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala
prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral
in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not
immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by
reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita (Dungo vs. People, G.R.
No. 209464, July 1, 2015). Thus, election offense (dadag-bawas) is malum
prohibitum although it is punishable under special law (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006).

16. Having sexual intercourse through force with a gay, who

underwent gender reassignment, is not rape through sexual intercourse
since the victim is not a woman. Rape through sexual intercourse is not a
gender-free crime. It is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a
woman through force. Neither is this crime instrument or object rape
since the offender used his penis, and not an instrument or object, in
committing the crime. Nor is this crime rape through oral intercourse or
sodomy since the artificial vagina of the victim is not a mouth or anal
orifice. Hence, the crime committed is acts of lasciviousness.
 17. Under Article 423 of the Old Penal Code, death under
exceptional circumstance is committed if the husband surprised his
wife in the act of adultery (en adulterio a su mujer). Adultery under this
Code is committed by a “married woman” who shall have sexual
intercourse with a “man” not her husband. The Revised Penal Code
extended the benefit of the original Article 423 of the Penal Code to both
husband and wife, and for this reason, the phrase "in the act of adultery"
was changed to "in the act of committing sexual intercourse" (Opinion of
Justice Luarel in People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939).
Thus, the phrase "in the act of committing sexual intercourse" in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code should be interpret within the Spanish
context of adulterio, which excludes homosexual intercourse between a
wife and another woman.

18. To be entitled to the benefit of death under exceptional

circumstance, it if important that the husband caught his wife in the very
act of sexual intercourse. If the husband caught his infidel wife after such
sexual intercourse, this exceptional circumstance shall not be considered
(People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939; People vs.
Marquez, G.R. No. 31268, July 31, 1929). Hence, if the husband saw a
video of his wife having sexual intercourse with another man, which
incident was recorded a month ago, killing his wife will not constitute
death under exceptional circumstance since he did not caught her wife in
the very act of sexual intercourse.

19. In People vs. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987, upon
reaching home, the accused found his wife in the act of sexual intercourse
with the victim. When they noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above
the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. Immediately,
thereafter, the accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City.
Thereafter, he went back to his house with a firearm but he was not able
to find his wife and victim. He proceeded to the mahjong session where
he found the victim playing. Accused fired at the victim three times with
his rifle. The victim died. This is death under exceptional circumstance
although about one hour had passed between the time of discovery of
infidelity and killing. Article 247, in requiring that the accused "shall kill
any of them or both of them... immediately" after surprising his spouse in
the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing
instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. But the killing should have been
actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by product
of the accused's rage.
 20. For purposes of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, death under
exceptional circumstance is not an intentional felony. In People vs.
Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987, according to the Supreme
Court, Article 4 presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. If the
act constitutes death under exceptional circumstances, and not murder,
the accused cannot be held liable for the injuries sustained by third
persons, who were hit by reason of mistake of blow, on the basis of Article
4. Accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries.

21. Section 3 of RA No. 3019 reads: “In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer.” It is
clear then that one may be charged with violation of RA No. 3019 in
addition to a felony under RPC for the same act (Ramiscal, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169727-28, August 18, 2006). Thus, the
offender in addition to violation of Section 3 RA No. 3019 can be held
liable for falsification of document by public official (Suero vs. People,
G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005); or malversation through falsification
of document (Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008) or failure to
render an accounting (Aloysius Dait Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680,
July 7, 2014).

22. The basis of delito continuado principle is the singularity of the

criminal intent or impulse. Hence, this rule does not apply in malum
prohibitum because malice or criminal intent is immaterial. Violation of
BP Blg. 22 is malum prohibitum. Thus, the drawer for issuing several
bouncing checks is liable for violations of BP Blg. 22 as many as there are
checks issued (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001).

Corruption under Section 3 (e) RA 3019 partakes the nature of

malum prohibitum. However, this crime must be committed with criminal
intent since evident bad faith or manifest partiality is an element thereof.
Since criminal intent is material in this crime, the doctrine of delito
continuado, which is based on singularity of the criminal intention, is
applicable. In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, December 2,
1993, En Banc, the several acts of the accused of favoring 32 aliens on
the same period of time in violation of the Anti-Graft Law were considered
as constitutive of one continued crime.

23. The document must contain “narration of facts” and not

“conclusion of law” to commit an act of falsification under paragraph 4 of
Article 171. Conclusion of law is defined as a proposition not arrived at by
any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts
stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts
pleaded (Black’s Law Dictionary). Statement of a candidate in a certificate
of candidacy she was born on March 29, 1931 instead of March 29, 1933,
her true birthday, to make it appear that she was above 23 years old on
the date of election to comply with the 23-years-old requirement is
making an untruthful statement in a narration of fact. This is
falsification. However, statement that she was "eligible" to the office of
municipal councillor based on the belief that the 23-years-old
requirement could be adequately met if she reached 23 years upon
assuming the councillorship is conclusion of law. This is not falsification
(People vs. Yanza, G.R. No. L-12089, April 29, 1960).

24. The local accountable officers under this Code are those who
has possession or custody of local government funds because of the
nature of their functions or has participated in the use or application of
thereof (Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015).
Mayor and treasurer have duty to participate in the release of funds. Their
signatures are needed to disburse municipal funds. No payment can be
effected without their signatures. They had control and responsibility
over the funds; hence, they are accountable officer (Manuel vs. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 08, 2012).

In Panganiban vs. People, G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015, the
Supreme Court ruled that a mayor with respect to cash advance cash
advance for an official travel that he did not undertake is not an
accountable officer since his duty is not to collect money or property
from the public.

However, the application of the Panganiban case must be confined

to cash advance received by a mayor. A public officer with respect to cash
advance for livelihood (People vs. Icdang, G.R. No. 185960, January 25,
2012) or cash advance to buy property (People vs. Devalos, G.R. No.
145229, April 20, 2006) is treated by the Supreme Court as an
accountable officer. Moreover, a mayor with respect to funds in the local
treasury is an accountable officer because he has a duty to participate in
the release thereof (Manuel vs. Sandiganbayan, supra) and he is
responsible for all government funds pertaining to the municipality
(People vs. Panteleon, G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13, 2009).

25. Where the penis of the accused was inserted into and
withdrawn from victim’s vagina three times for purpose of changing
position (People vs. Aaron, G.R. Nos. 136300-02, September 24, 2002) or
two times for purpose of resting for 5 to 10 seconds (People v. Pinic, G.R.
No. 186395, June 8, 2011), the several penetrations motivated by a single
criminal intent to satisfy his lust in violation of single penal provision
(Article 266-A of RPC) constitute a continued crime of rape. But where the
penis of the accused was inserted into and withdrawn from victim’s
vagina three times for purpose of resting for 5 minutes, he satisfied his
lust every time he would withdraw his penis to rest. Since the three
penetrations were motivated by separate three criminal impulses to
satisfy his lust, the delito continuado principle is not applicable, and
hence, he is liable for three separate crimes of rape (People vs. Lucena, GR
No. 190632, February 26, 2014).

26. The elements of syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689 are: (a)
estafa or other forms of swindling under the Revised Penal Code is
committed; (b) it is committed by a syndicate of 5 or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon,"
or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public (People vs. Tibayan,
G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015).

The fact that the entity involved was not a rural bank, cooperative,
samahang nayon or farmers' association does not take the case out of the
coverage of PD No. 1689. The law applies to other corporations or
associations operating on funds solicited from the general public (People
vs. Balasa, G.R. No. 106357, September 3, 1998). Thus, the entity can be
a commercial bank (Galvez vs. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 187919, February 20,
2013).

If the money misappropriated is not solicited from the general

public, the crime committed simple estafa (Hao vs. People, G.R. No.
183345, September 17, 2014). Regardless of the number of the accused,
syndicated estafa is not committed when the offenders are not owners or
employees who used the association soliciting fund from the general
public to perpetrate the crime. In sum, the victims must be general public
such as stockholders and members of the association, and not the
corporation or the association itself; on the other hand, the offenders
must be the owners, employees and members of the association or
corporation, who used this entity to defraud the general public (Galvez vs.
Hon. CA, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013).

27. The similarities and differences among robbery by band,

brigandage and highway robbery/brigandage are as follows:

a. Place of commission - In brigandage, the band is formed to

commit robbery on highways. In highway robbery/brigandage, robbery is
committed on highways. In robbery by band, the place of commission is
not important.

b. Number of Offenders – In brigandage and robbery by band, the

offenders are at least four armed men. However, highway
robbery/brigandage can be committed by as single offender because the
law uses the words “any person” in reference to the offender.

c. Character of the offenders – In brigandage and highway

robbery/brigandage, the offenders are brigands or highway robbers, who
are regularly hanging or roaming on highways and indiscriminately
chancing upon travellers who they can rob or seize for extortion and thus,
to commit these crimes, the commission of robbery must not be an
isolated incident and the victim must be indiscriminate. In robbery by
band, the offenders are not brigands or highway/robbers, and thus, this
crime can be committed even though the commission thereof is an
isolated incident and the victim is pre-determined.

But if the place of commission is not highway, the crime committed

is robbery by band regardless of whether the victim is indiscriminate or
predetermined or the incident is isolated or not.

d. Consummation - In brigandage, formation of at least four armed

men to commit robbery on the highway consummates the crime; in
robbery by band and highway robbery/brigandage actual commission of
robbery is an indispensable element thereof.

e. Presumption - In brigandage, there is a presumption that the

armed men are brigands if one is in possession of an unlicensed firearm.
In highway robbery/brigandage, and robbery by band, there is no rule on
presumption.

28. If the crime is committed by the person without using

the loose firearm, illegal possession of loose firearm shall be
considered as a distinct and separate offense (Section 29, RA
No. 10591). For example, the accused can be prosecuted for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
loose firearm. If the crime is committed by the person with the
use the loose firearm, illegal possession of loose firearm is not
a separate offense. In such a case, the following rules must be
observed:

When loose firearm is used in committing rebellion or

attempted coup d’état, the accused shall be prosecuted for
rebellion or attempted coup d’état, while possession of loose
firearm is absorbed (Section 29, RA No. 10591).
 When loose firearm is used in committing a crime such as
homicide with a graver penalty, the accused shall be
prosecuted for the graver crime (homicide), but the court shall
apply the penalty in its maximum period (Section 29, RA No.
10591). Use of loose firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance (People vs. Salibad, G.R. No. 210616, November 25, 2015)

When loose firearm is used in committing a crime such as

alarm and scandal with a lesser penalty, the accused shall be
prosecuted for the lesser crime (alarm and scandal) but the
court shall impose the penalty prescribed for illegal possession
of use of loose firearm (Section 29, RA No. 10591).

When loose firearm is used in committing a crime with a

penalty, the maximum period of which is equal to that for
illegal possession of loose firearm, the accused shall be
prosecuted for the former with additional penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period. For example, the penalty
prescribed for simple robbery is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. The
penalty for possession of small arm is prision mayor in its
maximum period. The maximum period of the penalty for
robbery is equal to the penalty for possession of small arm. If
this loose firearm is used to commit robbery, the accused shall
be prosecuted for robbery with principal penalty and
additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

An imitation firearm used in the commission of a crime

shall be considered a real firearm and the person who
committed the crime shall be punished in accordance with RA
No. 10519.

29. The term “woman” in violence against woman pertains to a

woman with whom the offender has or had marital, sexual or dating
relationship. Sexual relations refer to a single sexual act which may or
may not result in the bearing of a common child. Dating relationship
refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. But an "away-bati"
or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence.
Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the
two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding (Ang
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010). However, a casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating relationship.

RA No. 9262 covers past relationship because it uses the terms

“former wife” and the past tense “had” in the phrase “a woman with
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship”. Thus,
psychological violence can be committed against an ex-girlfriend by
threatening to spread a picture depicting a naked woman where the face
of the victim was superimposed therein (Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
182835, April 20, 2010). While it is required that the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such
relationship. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as
long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical (or psychological) harm was committed (Dabalos v. RTC, G.R. No.
193960, January 7, 2013).

The phrase “any act or series of acts" in defining violence against

woman means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones (Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, April 20,
2010).

30. Terrorism is perpetrated by a person, who commits a predicate

crime, which creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful (RA No. 9372). Demand by Al Queda against the US government
not to interfere with the affairs of the Muslim is an example of the
element of coercing the government to give in to an unlawful.

The predicate crimes of terrorism are: (1) piracy, (2)

highway robbery, (3) hijacking, (4) rebellion, (5) coup e’tat, (6)
murder, (7) kidnapping and serious illegal detention, (8) crimes
involving destruction, (9) arson, and (10) crime involving
unlicensed firearm and explosives. It also includes violation of Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act and violation of
Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act.

The crime of rebellion or coup d’état is necessarily included in the

charge of terrorism; hence, terrorism and its predicate crime is subject to
the variance rule and double jeopardy.
 When a person has been prosecuted for terrorism in relation to
rebellion or coup d'état, but the evidence merely establish the predicate
crime of rebellion or coup d'état but not the other elements of terrorism
such as coercing the government to give in an unlawful demand, the court
can convict the accused of rebellion or coup d'état. This is in accordance
with the variance rule.

When a person has been prosecuted for terrorism in relation to

rebellion or coup d'état, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for rebellion or coup d'état (Section 49 of RA No. 9372). Rebellion and
coup d'état are predicate crimes of terrorism. Hence, the latter absorbs
the former.

As a rule, the period within which a person detained for terrorism or

conspiracy to commit terrorism must be delivered to judicial authorities
is 36 hours in accordance with Article 125 of RPC since the penalty of 40
years of imprisonment prescribed for is equivalent to afflicted penalty.

If the apprehending police or law enforcement officers fail to deliver

the terrorist suspect within the period of 36 hours, they are liable for
delay in the delivery of detained person under Article 125 of RPC.

However, as a result of surveillance and examination of bank

deposits, the Anti-Terrorism Council may authorized in writing any police
or law enforcement personnel to take custody of a person charged with or
suspected of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. With this
written authority, the police or law enforcement personnel may arrest or
take custody the terrorist suspect and delivers him to the proper judicial
authority within a period of three (3) days therefrom without incurring
any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons
notwithstanding Article 125 of RPC to the contrary (Section 18 of RA No.
9372).

If the apprehending police or law enforcement officers fail to deliver

the terrorist suspect within the period of 3 days as required by Section 18
of RA No. 9372, they are liable for failure to deliver suspect to the proper
judicial authority under Section 20 of the same law.

In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may

be detained for more than three (3) days provided that the apprehending
officer must obtain a written approval from official of a Human Rights
Commission, or judge, or justice of the Sandiganbayan or the Court of
Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or
law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the
residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place
where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said
officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel
concerned within five (5) days after the date of the detention of the
persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three (3) days after
the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or
threat is not established, shall be released immediately (Section 19 of RA
No. 9372).

31. In People vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012, the
poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The sale was aborted
when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The
crime committed is attempted sale.

In People vs. Tumulak, G.R. No. 206054, July 25, 2016, accused
intended to sell ecstasy and commenced by overt acts the commission of
the intended crime by showing the substance to a police officer. Showing
a sample is an overt act of selling dangerous drugs since it reveals the
intention of the offender to sell it to the poseur-buyer. More importantly,
the only reason why the sale was aborted is because the police officers
identified themselves as such and placed accused under arrest - a cause
that is other than her own spontaneous desistance. Accused was
convicted of attempted sale of dangerous drugs.

In People vs. Burton, G.R. No. 114396, February 19, 1997, the
accused came from a hotel in Parañaque, where he stayed before he
checked in at the NAIA and was bound for Sydney, Australia. At the
departure area of the airport, authorities discovered dangerous drugs in
the two pieces of luggage of the accused. It was held that it is apparent
that he wanted to bring the prohibited drug from Parañaque to Sydney.
However, because he was not able to pursue his trip, he should be
considered only to have attempted to transport the prohibited drug to
Sydney.

In People vs. Dimaano, G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016, the
accused, who was caught in possession of dangerous drugs at the
departure area of Manila Domestic Airport was also convicted of
attempted transportation of dangerous drug. However, in People vs.
Jones, G.R. No. 115581, August 29, 1997, the accused was also caught in
possession of dangerous drugs at the departure area of NAIA, and yet, he
was convicted of consummated transportation of dangerous drugs. At any
rate, the penalty prescribed for transportation of dangerous drugs is the
same as that for attempted transportation of dangerous drugs.

The accused cannot be convicted of attempted transportation of

dangerous drugs where he was caught in possession thereon inside his
car, which is not in transit. The theory of the prosecution that there is
clear intent to transport the drug is speculative (San Juan v. People, G.R.
No. 177191, May 30, 2011).

32. To be held liable for estafa in relation to the Trust Receipt Law,
the accused must have the obligation to turn over the proceeds of sale of
the entrusted goods, or return the unsold goods to the entruster, but he
has violated this undertaking. Thus, the offender must have acquired the
goods for resale, and not for consumption. In this case, the accused is not
an importer or retail dealer, but one who received the goods to be used for
the fabrication of steel communication towers. Hence, the transaction
between the accused and the bank is simple loan, and not trust receipt.
Failure to perform obligation under this loan agreement is neither estafa
through misappropriation nor a violation of the trust receipt law. To rule
otherwise is to violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment
by reason of non-payment of debt (Ng vs. People, G.R. No. 173905, April
23, 2010; Colinares and Veloso vs. CA, G.R. No. 90828, September 5,
2000; Yang vs. People, G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013).

33. The obligation of the entrustee under the trust receipt

agreement is to turn over to proceeds of sale of the entrusted goods, or
return the unsold goods to the entruster. Violation of this undertaking
constitutes estafa in relation to the trust receipt law. Thus, turning over
the proceeds of sale (Bank of Commerce vs. Serrano, G.R. No. 151895,
February 16, 2005) or turning over the unsold goods is a defense in
violation of trust receipt law. On the other hand, the obligation of the
entrustee-debtor under the letter of credit is to pay the bank the amount
owing to it. Returning the unsold goods covered by trust receipt to the
bank is not a compliance with the obligation under the letter of credit.
Hence, the turning over of the unsold goods to the bank is a defense in a
criminal case for estafa in relation to the trust receipt law but not in a
civil case for recovery of the amount covered by letter of credit. The bank
did not become the real owner of the unsold goods, which were turned
over by the debtor. The bank merely acquired security title over them for
obligation under the letter of credit. The debtor remains the owner of the
unsold goods and holds it at his own risk (Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia
and America, G.R. No. L-78671, March 25, 1988).