Part II: Requisites for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction

E: USE OF IMPOSABLE PENALTY

People v. Buissan, 105 SCRA 547

Facts:

June 26, 1979, Paterno Santiago, private respondent herein, on

previous complaint of the offended party, Araceli C. Medel was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte with the crime of simple
seduction in an information. Upon arraignment, respondent Santiago pleaded
not guilty, and on the day set for the trial of the case, said respondent moved
to quash the information for "failure to allege lewd design." He filed a formal
Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss the Information on the same. An opposition
was filed by the People of the Philippines and Judge Dimalanes Buissan, one
of the public respondents herein, denied the motion, but remanded the case to
the City Court of Dapitan on the "ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
penalty for Simple Seduction is only Arresto Mayor.

Petitioner People of the Philippines filed its Motion for

Reconsideration alleging that the City Court has no jurisdiction over the case,
but respondent Judge Buissan denied the motion. City Judge Wilfredo C.
Martinez, the other public respondent, assuming jurisdiction of the case, set
the hearing thereof on the merits. Alleging that CFI Judge Buissan acted with
grave abuse of discretion and that their respective orders likewise referred to
above are illegal and void, petitioner People of the Philippines came to this
Court on the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not jurisdiction of a criminal case is determined upon the

imposable penalty? YES.

Ruling:

As respondents themselves admit, in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction

of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after
trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the
trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with
other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or
information constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is
acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is there retained
regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged
in the information.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby

granted. Let the case be returned from the City Court of Dapitan to the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte for trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.
People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 341

Facts:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said
informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders
quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did
not allege facts constituting an offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state
an essential element of the crime.

Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must

allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the
purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness,
public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not
necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum
prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute.
The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is
immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.

Issue:

Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and

substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon”
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9? YES.

Held:

It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a

criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or
information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the
statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order
dismissing the Information filed before him, thus: ... We believe that…
Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country
was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread
lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of
the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the
quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly
weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is
prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the
penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement
of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian
penalty upon the accused.

The petition is DISMISSED.

F. STATUTE APPLICABLE
People vs. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442

Facts:

On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging
private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The
information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise
purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.

The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence.
However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon the
ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's
authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by
the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.

Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City
had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing
the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal
of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the
Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor
General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously
consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter
that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be
given due course.

After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed
to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information
in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law
governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975
and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city
courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding
P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5
April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the
third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore,
the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22
October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.

It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is
properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action,
rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in
accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of
First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty
for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty
which a city court could impose.

The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to
the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in
disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.

In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the
court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a
criminal information. In People v.Purisima,2 the Court stressed that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a

case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the
court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the
extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or
violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the
punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the
complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume
jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)

The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what

may be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the
trial (People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the
law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as
recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347)
constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in
which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence
proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48
O.G. 1330) 5(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is
proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser
penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the
rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of an inferior court.

In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a

criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that
is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court
as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of
First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it
would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case,
for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty
provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period).

Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial
Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad
Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975).
But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and
decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the
commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818
would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing
subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order
dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296

On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue
to Alex B.
Carlos to apply on account or for the value the check described below:
Check No.
:
326317PR
Drawn Against
:
Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of
:
P590,000.00
Postdated
:
February 15, 1988
Payable to
:
Dr. Alex B. Carlos... said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
amount of such check when presented for payment within (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently... dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused
failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make arrangement for full
payment within five (5) banking days after receiving... notice.[2]
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner's non-apprehension
despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.[3] On June 27, 1995, the warrant of
arrest was recalled and set aside[4] after petitioner posted the... required bail. He was
arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[5]
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner
and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the
payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of
the... complainant.[6] However, when the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding,
petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.[7]
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an
investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check
was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his
checking account was opened only... on December 1, 1987.[8] He claimed that private
complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile
supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner
alleged that when the check was... issued sometime in February 1988,[9] complainant
knew that the same was not funded.[10]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a
Decision[11] finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and
sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private
complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full...
payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
court's decision in toto.[12]
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a
guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner's "investment theory". In ruling against
the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called
partnership... venture, Palana's General Merchandising, was registered on December 1,
1987 only in the name of petitioner.[13] The Court of Appeals also held that the act of
lending money does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.
Issues:
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg.
22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Petitioner's argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action[15] and not during the arraignment of the
accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative
of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and... concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:... x x x x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties,... including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction... where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not
more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and
imprisonment [17] at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable
is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the
case.[18] The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the... criminal
action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than
P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the
Metropolitan Trial Court"[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court
of... jurisdiction over petitioner's case. Where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over
such proceedings in another... tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only
apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the... pre-trial stage. Neither from an
express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity.[20] The jurisdiction of the
RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the
Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in...
nature.[21]
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner's conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are
as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for
value; (2) the... accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would... have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that
at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the
check was... presented for payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay the amount of the
check from private complainant but he did not comply with it.[22]
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainant's claim that the check was issued
as a guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioner's "investment theory". The issue as to
whether the... amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned
by private complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a
factual question involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of
credibility, the appellate court will... not generally disturb the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the advantage of
hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which circumstances
carry great weight in assessing their... credibility. In the present case, we see no reason
to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the
amount of the subject check was a loan and not an investment.[23]
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed
that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance,... detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
suffered or undertaken by the other side. Since it was established that petitioner
received money from private complainant in various amounts,[24] petitioner cannot now
claim that... the checks were not issued for value.[25]
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is not a
valid defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to
prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The
gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or... a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The
law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed
by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Considering the rule in mala prohibita... cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has
been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent
are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited
in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor
the terms and... conditions relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To
determine the purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued
will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency... substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and banking
communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to the kind of checks
which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by
means of interpretation or application. What is... important is the fact that petitioner
deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.[27]
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise
immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was...
postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial,
petitioner testified that the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987
and that the check was issued sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced
during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the
accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.[29] In a prosecution... for
violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject check is material since it
forms part of the second element of the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner
knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner... was
prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew
at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to
cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the
same would only... be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner's allegation that private complainant knew that
the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the
subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to
apply for account... or for value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it
that the check is duly covered when presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in
lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to prove or allege that
petitioner is not a... first-time offender.[30] Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of
P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879
dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ordered to pay private... complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value
of the check, with six (6%) percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the
finality of the decision, the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve
percent (12%) interest, from... finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of
imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267

We are confronted with conflicting accounts of the commission of a crime, a reverse

whodunit1 rivaling the murder mysteries of Agatha Christie, in this review of the Court of Appeals’
(CA’s) conviction of accused Wilfredo Cawaling for murder and imposing on him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.2 However, unlike Agatha Christie, we are guided by the test of moral certainty
in ascertaining the guilt of the accused.

This legal poser arose because, after the prosecution presented an eyewitness to the crime
pointing to Cawaling as the perpetrator thereof, the defense offered the testimony of a person,
initially charged with Cawaling in the same Information and who previously pled not guilty to the
crime, confessing that it was he, and not Cawaling, who murdered the victim.

Even the two courts below us parleyed and rendered conflicting decisions. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) partially upheld the defense’s version of the events, rejected the prosecution’s
eyewitness account of the murder and convicted Cawaling only as an accomplice to the offense
of homicide. In stark contrast, the CA found the eyewitness’ testimony credible and convicted
Cawaling of murder.

The following are the long and arduous facts, seen and appreciated from two different
perspectives by the lower courts.

Cawaling was charged with Murder in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 19th day of April, 1987, in sitio Hinulugan, barangay Agcogon, municipality
of San Jose, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspired and confederated with Palti Umambong
whose case was already dismissed after arraignment, did then and there by means of treachery,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a firearm the late ex-vice mayor
Leodegario Capispisan, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal gunshot wounds in different
parts of his body which were the direct and immediately (sic) cause of his instantaneous death,
thus causing damage and prejudice to his family.

Contrary to law.3

The RTC laid out the facts based on the testimonies of the witnesses, to wit:

The forerunner of the case at bench was OD-275, for murder. It was filed on June 24, 1987.
The respondents were Palti Umambong and Wilfredo Cawaling.

The case against Umambong was dismissed on January 25, 1991 on the basis of an affidavit of
desistance.

On February 4, 1991, this Court likewise dismissed the case against Cawaling upon the initiative
of the prosecution.

Four (4) years thereafter, specifically on August 17, 1995, Cawaling was arrested, the case
against him for murder having been revived and accordingly docketed as OD-852.

xxx

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The Prosecution presented three (3) witnesses.

Rommel Brigido, 29 years old, married and a resident of Busay, San Jose, Romblon, testified as
follows:

That witness was with the accused Wilfredo and Palti in coming from the town of San Jose to
barangay Busay.

That they passed by the house of Porferio Bina where they drank the locally fermented "tuba."

Later, he saw accused Wilfredo sitting on a bench under the "talisay" tree on the other side of the
road.

Thereafter, he saw Leodegario, Gloria, Roberto and Leon passing by the road. When Leodegario
got near the bench where Wilfredo was seated, the latter suddenly stood up and pointed his gun
to Leodegario saying "who is brave," and two shots rang out and that there was a handkerchief
covering the gun (t.s.n., p. 4, 8/23/95).

That the distance between Wilfredo and Leodegario was six (6) meters.

Witness, on direct examination, declared that although he was the companion of Wilfredo in
coming from the town, he ran away and that he did not anymore know what happened to
Leodegario (t.s.n., p. 5, supra).

On cross-examination, witness Rommel admitted that he executed and affixed his signature on
an affidavit (Exh. "1" and "1-A") and that the same was executed only on July 27, 1995 narrating
therein the incident that happened [in] April 1987.

Asked as to why witness took a long time before executing the affidavit, he commented that the
case then was dismissed, and that Wilfredo is a dangerous man having recently killed his uncle
Rexinol Brigido.

Rommel elaborated further that he was ten (10) meters away from Wilfredo and also of the same
distance to Leodegario.

Rommel declared that Palti was on a stump of a chainsawed coconut tree and about six (6)
meters away from Wilfredo (t.s.n., p. 13, August 23, 1995).

Palti did not [run] away (t.s.n., p. 15, supra).

When asked what was Wilfredo doing after the shooting of Leodegario, Rommel said that
Wilfredo was going around, "pointing his gun and firing out, causing people to scamper away
(t.s.n., p. 5, August 25, 1995).

On clarificatory questions of the Court, Rommel admitted that "it was only Wilfredo who pointed a
gun towards Leodegario, although Palti was also holding a gun but pointed downward."
Gloria Valentin Capispisan, 34 years old, married and a resident of Busay, San Jose, Romblon,
the second witness for the Prosecution testified thus –

She know(s) Wilfredo since childhood and that the victim Leodegario is her father-in-law.

At about six o’clock in the evening of April 19, 1987 she was near the house of Porferio after
coming from the political caucus at the house of Romy Roldan who was then the OIC Mayor of
San Jose, and a supporter of Natalio Beltran, Jr.

She was in the company of Themestocles Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio, Leon Barrientos,
Roberto Capispisan, Leodegario Capispisan and two others, and that she is the wife of Roberto
Capispisan.

While negotiating the way home she saw Wilfredo seated on a bench along the road about ten
(10) meters away from her and demonstrated that Wilfredo’s hands were on his lap, the left
covered by a handkerchief and the right over the handkerchief.

Wilfredo, according to witness, suddenly stood up and pointed his gun towards Leodegario and "I
heard two shots" with Leodegario falling to the ground on his back (t.s.n. p. 6, 8/24/95).

She attempted to approach Leodegario, her father-in-law but "she saw Palti with a gun" so she
ran away (t.s.n. p. 8, supra).

On question of the private prosecutor whether she saw the gun while Wilfredo was sitting, she
replied that she could not see it because it was covered by a handkerchief.

Asked as to the possible reasons why Wilfredo shot Leodegario, Gloria hinted that her father-in-
law left the SAKADA and secondly, because of politics, the victim being the supporter of Natalio
Beltran, Jr., while Wilfredo was for Manuel Martinez, candidates then for Congressmen.

Likewise, she testified that the case against Wilfredo relative to the incident of 1987 where
Leodegario was the victim was dismissed because of settlement, the accused and Lilia
Capispisan, the wife of the victim, are first cousins.

Queried as to whether the agreed settlement came about, Gloria said that the accused was able
to produce only one-half of the monetary consideration, and that the condition that Wilfredo will
not stay in San Jose, Romblon was not complied with because the latter even ran as barangay
captain and that accused shot and killed the nephew of her father-in-law, Rexinol Brigido and
even pointed the gun to her husband for two (2) times (t.s.n. p. 11, 8/24/95).

In the course of the cross-examination of Gloria she admitted having seen the affidavit of waiver
and desistance (Exh. "2" for the defense).

Gloria testified that before the shooting, she "saw Palti Umambong having a gun" (t.s.n. p. 14,
Ibid).

In the hearing of August 25, 1995, Gloria admitted that she saw Palti when Leodegario was
already dead and that "he chased us."

After the shooting, Gloria testified that she saw Wilfredo [run] after her companions, firing a gun
(t.s.n. p. 7, supra)

Elaborating further, Gloria testified that she "saw Palti who had a gun" and Palti chased her with
a gun on his hand (t.s.n. p. 17, supra) and that Palti was near Leodegario lying on the ground,
about three (3) meters.

On additional cross-examination of Gloria, she admitted that she executed an affidavit, regarding
the incident on May 5, 1987 (Exh. "2" and "2-A" for the defense), while the signatures of the
witnesses on the first and second pages were marked as Exhibit "2-B" and "2-C".

Relative to her affidavit, Gloria narrated in her sworn affidavit that "without any reason he just
shot my father-in-law."
As to why she did not include the name Rommel in her affidavit, she said it was because
Rommel was the companion of Wilfredo (t.s.n. p. 10, 1/12/98)

To establish the presence of Rommel during the incident, Gloria categorically stated that
Rommel was at the side of Wilfredo.

xxxx

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

Palti Umambong, 53 years old, married, farmer, and resident of Hinulogan, San Jose, Romblon
narrated thus –

That it was him who shot and killed Leodegario.

On April 19, 1987, he was in the cockpit of San Jose, and that his fighting cock was pitted
against that being handled by Leodegario.

He bet ₱100.00 and referee Pedro Venus declared his cock as the winner. He demanded his
winning from the one listing the bets but was told that the bettor on the losing side did not pay,
and when he demanded from Leodegario his winning bet, he was told by the latter that he will not
pay because the decision of the referee was unfair (t.s.n., p. 6, 7/17/98).

Leodegario stood up and swung his right arm forward with a clenched fist and because of this
Palti got angry prompting him to go home, but passed by the house of Porferio.

Near the house of Porferio he shot Leodegario because the latter did not pay him.

When he reached the road fronting that of Porferio, he stopped because he was called by
Wilfredo who was seated on a bench beside the road and asked as to what happened in the
cockpit and told the latter that he won except that he was not paid by Leodegario (t.s.n., pp. 11
and 12, supra).

Later on, as witness testified, Leodegario passed by near the house of Porferio and Palti
accosted him and demanded payment, but Leodegario retreated two steps backward and was
getting something from his waist as if drawing a gun and then he shot the victim twice resulting to
Leodegario falling down on his back (t.s.n., pp. 3-4, supra).

After the shooting he walked towards his house, and told his wife that he’d done something
wrong, that is, that he killed a person – a certain Leodegario and that he (witness) will go away.
He looked for a sailboat and found one at Pinamihagan. He hired the sailboat and reached Aklan
(t.s.n., pp. 16, 17, supra).

He stayed in Aklan for three years.

Palti, on redirect and recross examination, testified that he hid his gun before proceeding to the
cockpit and retrieved the same on his way from the cockpit and before he met Wilfredo (t.s.n., p.
34, 8/24/98).

xxxx

Wilfredo Cawaling, 56 years old, married, a resident of Nabas, Aklan, and the accused in this
case testified as follows:

He testified that noontime of April 19, 1987 he was at Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon at the
residence of his sister, Heide Casimero where he took his lunch.

Thereafter, accused went to his parents[’] house at Hinulugan, Busay, San Jose, in the company
of Rommel and Rudy de Villa, and that while walking towards Hinulugan they passed by the
house of Porferio where he bought "tuba." All the time, he was with Rommel except for Rudy de
Villa who proceeded to Busay.
While waiting for the "tuba," Rommel went to the back of the house of Porferio where he played
volleyball together with Ricky and the latters['] brothers.

At the time he was waiting for the "tuba" he saw Palti walking along the road towards the house
of Porferio. Thereafter, he beckoned Palti to come to him and asked him about the cockfight.
Palti informed him that the latter’s fighting cock won but that he was not paid his wining bet
(t.s.n., p. 8, 10/24/98).

That while he was conversing with Palti, he saw Leodegario on the road walking towards them in
the company of Leon. Immediately, Palti turned his back and faced Leodegario and demanded
again his winnings (t.s.n., p. 18, 10/14/98). Thereafter, he heard, Leodegario shouting "bakit ka
makulit" and Palti retort[ed] by saying, "manloloko ka." At this point in time, with Palti pointing his
three fingers to Leodegario, the latter retreated two steps backward and acted as if to draw
something from his right waist which prompted Palti to raise his t-shirt and draw a revolver and
fired at the victim. (t.s.n., p. 19, supra). As a result of which the victim fell down on his back. Leon
who was in the company of the victim ran away after the shooting incident.

And that Rommel who was at the back of the house of Porferio also ran away (t.s.n., p. 22,
10/14/98).

After the incident he stayed in his parents[’] residence at sitio Hinulugan and the following day
the 23rd of May, he returned to Nabas, Aklan where he resides.

Failing to get his visa for Saudi Arabia, accused looked for a job in Manila, and finally worked at a
logging company in Baler, Quezon where he was the operations manager. He worked in that
logging company for almost two years, and after his work was terminated he went back to
Nabas, Aklan.

In 1998 he returned again to Manila. While in the city he received a letter from his father
informing him that he together with Palti were charged of murder before this Court and that there
will be a hearing of their case and so he attended the same.

The case against him was dismissed [in] February 1991 (Exhibit "2") because the complainant,
the wife of the victim, executed an affidavit of waiver (Exhibit "1").

After the dismissal of the case, accused went to Papua, New Guinea and upon his return in 1992
he ran and was elected as barangay captain of Busay, San Jose, Romblon.

In 1995 he ran for mayor but lost the election to Mayor Filipino Tandog. He then filed an election
protest in this Court. On the scheduled hearing of his protest, he was arrested and upon inquiry
with the arresting officer he was told that the dismissed case was refiled, by the same prosecutor
who dismissed the original case.

Accused denied the assertion of Rommel that he shot the victim contending this witness was at
the back portion of the house of Porferio at the time of the incident (t.s.n., p. 30, 10/14/98).

That when Palti confronted Leodegario about the former’s winning bet in the cockfight he was
five (5) meters distant from them and that he not only heard Palti saying "manloloko ka" but
pointed his fingers to the victim.

At that instant, witness continued, the victim withdrew by about two (2) steps and appeared to be
pulling out something.

Thereafter, Palti raised his t-shirt, drew his gun and shot the victim (t.s.n., p. 6, 11/4/98).

Accused could determine the distance of Palti from where he was but Palti’s back was facing
towards him and Leodegario was in front of Palti.

Thereafter, he saw Palti [run] towards Busay and found himself running too in the direction of his
father’s house, also in Busay.4

On the other hand, the findings of fact of the CA are set forth, as follows:
The version of the prosecution is narrated in good detail in the People’s Brief submitted by the
Office of the Solicitor General:

At about six o’clock in the evening of April 19, 1987, at Hinulugan, San Jose, Romblon while on
their way home from the town proper, Wilfredo Cawaling, Palti Umambong and Rommel Brigido
passed-by (sic) the house of Porferia Vina to have a drink of tuba. While drinking tuba,
Leodegario Capispisan, Gloria Capispisan, Roberto Capispisan, Leon Barrientos, Themosticles
Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio and two others came heading toward their direction (pp. 2-4, tsn,
August 23, 1995). When Leodegario Capispisan was about two meters near appellant, who was
seated on the bench by the road, appellant stood up, pointed his gun to (sic) Leodegario and
taunted the latter for his bravery. Thereafter, two (2) gun shots were heard (p. 4, tsn, August 23,
1995). All the while, Brigido was seated on the table fronting the road drinking tuba with the
others. He was about ten (10) meters from the talisay tree where appellant was seated. Palti
Umambong, on the other hand, was standing on the stump of the coconut tree at about six (6)
meters distance from appellant (pp. 7-8, tsn, August 23, 1995). From said distance, he saw
Leodegario step back by about one (1) meter, raising his hand in surrender. Brigido then heard
two (2) gunshots. Brigido also saw Palti Umambong holding a gun but the same was pointed
downward (p. 4, Records; pp. 23-24, tsn, August 23, 1995).

Upon hearing the shots, the people scampered away, including Brigido and Gloria, who also
panicked and ran, leaving appellant and Umambong behind Leodegario Capispisan sprawled on
the ground dead (p. 25, tsn, August 23, 1995; see also pp. 3-8, tsn, August 24, 1995).

The defendant, for his part, understandably presented a different version.

Accused claimed that about four o’clock in the afternoon of April 19, 1987, he left his sister’s
house to go to Barangay Busay together with Rommel Brigido and Rudy de Villa who happened
to pass by his sister’s house on their way to Hinulugan where they also reside; that on their way
to Hinulugan he and Brigido stopped to buy tuba at the house of Porfiria Bina while Rudy de Villa
continued on his way home; that while he was sitting in front of the house of Porfirio Bina, Palti
Umambong came walking along the road and he asked Palti about the cockfight that afternoon;
that Palti told him that he was not paid his winning bet of ₱100.00 by Leodegario when his
(Palti’s) cock won; that Leodegario refused to pay him alleging that the decision of the referee
was unfair; that when he insisted to collect from Leodegario the amount he won, Leodegario got
angry at him and wanted to punch him.

Appellant at this time saw Leodegario and Lean Barrientos walking along the road towards their
direction. When the two came upon them, Palti stopped Leodegario and asked him again to pay
him what he won; that Leodegario remarked "bakit ka makulit?"; that Palti reacted by shouting
"manloloko ka" at the same time pointing a finger at Leodegario.

At this point, Leodegario moved two steps backward and acted as if to draw something from his
waist which prompted Palti to fire his revolver at the victim.

Leodegario then fell down on his back.

The widow and the children of Leodegario Capispisan executed an Affidavit of Waiver and
Desistance dated January 24, 1991 signed by Lilia M. Capispisan and her eight (8) children
praying the authorities concerned "to consider the investigation of the criminal case against
Wilfredo Cawaling, et al., terminated or caused to be terminated."

Accordingly, Judge Cezar R. Maravilla issued the Order dated February 4, 1991 dismissing the
case against Wilfredo Cawaling without cost.

Four (4) years later, an Information charging Cawaling with murder was refiled.

On December 15, 1999, following the submission of the case for decision, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 82, Odiongan, Romblon, rendered judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, WILFREDO CAWALING is hereby found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the offense of homicide and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor medium as maximum
there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, or, from 4 years and 2 months to 8
years and 1 day with all its accessory penalties.

The accused shall be entitled to the benefits of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code on preventive
imprisonment.

Accused, in case of appeal of the Decision, may apply for bail pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Consistent with paragraph 2,6 Section 13 of Rule 124, the CA certified the case and elevated the
records to us for review.

Cawaling, in his Appellant’s Brief, posits the following assignment of errors:

1. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it convicted the herein accused-appellant
of Murder without sufficient and credible evidence.

2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it disregarded the findings of the trial court
on the aspect of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and their testimonies,
despite well-established jurisprudence on the matter.7

As the assigned errors are intertwined, we shall discuss and resolve both simultaneously.

Cawaling maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof in
criminal cases because the eyewitness testimony of Rommel Brigido, as corroborated by Gloria
Capispisan, is not credible. He asserts that the RTC’s findings on the credibility of the witnesses
should not have been disregarded by the CA. Specifically, Cawaling points out that, as held by
the RTC, the testimony of Palti Umambong, the self-confessed killer of the victim, was more
worthy of credence. As such, Cawaling prays that the decision of the CA be reversed and set
aside, and a new one issued, acquitting and exonerating him of the crime charged.

Conversely, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the RTC overlooked facts and
circumstances when it found Cawaling liable merely as an accomplice to the crime of homicide.
The OSG avers that the delay in the execution of Rommel Brigido’s affidavit and the failure of the
witnesses to identify the gun used by Cawaling do not diminish their credibility. In all, the OSG
insists that the CA’s reversal of the RTC decision was warranted.

Consequently, we juxtapose the conflicting findings of the two lower courts.

The RTC’s findings zero in on Rommel Brigido’s belated execution of an affidavit which, for the
lower court, completely diminished his credibility, to wit:

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

On the third issue, the Court painstakingly perused the record of the case with objectivity and an
open mind, probing and analyzing the pros and cons so as to arrive at a definitive conclusion
thus eliminating the possibility of error and misjudgment.

In the testimony of Rommel in 1995 during the hearing of the petition for bail, the following
incidents came into light.

Rommel asseverated that he was the companion of Wilfredo and Palti when they came from the
town of San Jose, Romblon.

When Leodegario got near the bench where Wilfredo was seated, the latter "pointed his gun
towards Leodegario and two shots rang out" and that there was a handkerchief covering the gun
(t.s.n., p. 4, 9/28).
When he saw Wilfredo pointing his gun towards Leodegario, he also "saw Palti holding a gun
pointing downward."

By a simple process of mathematical computation Rommel who initially testified in 1995 at age
29 was only 20 or 21 at the time of the incident in 1987. For one to remember the minutest
details of events that happened eight years ago, merits the Court’s attention why it is so.

When the witness testified that the gun which Wilfredo was holding was covered with a
handkerchief, it is crystal clear that he did not see the gun itself but probably the likeness of a
gun, or, after the death of Leodegario his mind had been conditioned to conclude that what was
covered by the handkerchief was a gun.

By testifying that he saw "Palti holding a gun" at the time that Wilfredo was pointing his gun
towards Leodegario, a disquieting poser comes up: Why was Palti holding a gun? Did he fire his
gun? Or did he not?

Although Rommel said Palti did not fire his gun, it cannot be the gospel truth. It does not mean
that Palti did not fire his gun, those critical moments of April 19, 1987.

Remember that Rommel categorically stated that he was ten (10) meters distant from Wilfredo
when the incident happened. Six o’clock in the afternoon, the beginning of nighttime and the end
of daytime, is "nag-aagaw ang liwanag at dilim." And with the distance mentioned by Rommel it
is hard to say with definiteness as to whose gun the shot came from, unless there is only one
person in the vicinity. It could be from the gun of Palti who was visibly seen by Gloria and
Rommel as holding a gun and not Wilfredo because his hand allegedly with a gun was covered
by a handkerchief thus impairing their vision of the firearm.

The squeezing of a trigger requires only a fraction of a second, without unnecessary movement
of body. For one to say he saw someone pulling the trigger of a gun at a distance of ten (10)
meters and at a semi-darkness of the day is stretching the mind too far. One may hear the report
of a gun but not the pulling of the trigger at the distance aforestated.

A presumption thus arises that a person allegedly holding a gun covered by a handkerchief, if
said person is the only one in the premises, the report of a gun could be attributed to him.

But what if there were two persons? As in this case?

As to the credibility of Rommel, it may be stated that when the case originally filed against
Wilfredo and Palti on June 24, 1987 and docketed as OD-275, Rommel was not listed as a
witness for the prosecution. It was only in 1995 when the case was revived that he gave his
testimony for the prosecution. So, it took him eight (8) years after 1987 to air his side of the
incident. Like in the case filed in 1987 Rommel was also not listed in the information filed in 1995
as a witness for the prosecution. This creates a [sic] serious doubts in the mind of the Court.

A surprise witness.

The explanation for the delay was because the case was dismissed. Yes, the explanation seems
plausible but one cannot disregard the fact that Rommel never did execute an affidavit or sworn
statement inculpating Wilfredo as the assailant of Leodegario from 1987 to the early part of 1995.

He only surfaced in 1995.

Whatever is in the mind of Rommel, is beyond this Court’s comprehension, although such state
of mind and the forces at work can be reasonably inferred from the acts and submission of the
witness.

What, therefore, prompted Rommel to come out of his self-imposed silence for eight years and
[give] his testimony in this case?

First of all, as the record would show Rommel was more or less, an "alalay" or friend of Wilfredo.
For short, they are in good terms with one another. In 1987 and prior to that.
This harmonious relationship may have ended when Rommel was not taken in as a candidate for
vice mayor by Wilfredo when the latter ran for mayor.

As things go by, Rommel instead ran for vice mayor as an independent, but lost. With this, it
means a break-up in their personal relationship.

Politics had taken a toll.

Finally, Rommel emerged as a winner in the last political exercise where he was elected to the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose, under another political patronage.

The testimony of Rommel, therefore, remains suspect considering that he testified that (a)
Wilfredo is a dangerous man and had killed his uncle Rexinel Brigido, (b) he saw a gun in the
hand of Wilfredo "but covered by handkerchief, (c) he saw Palti at that critical moment holding a
gun, (d) the long delay in giving his testimony, and (e) the supervening events after 1987.

These circumstances have created doubts in the mind of the Court.

xxxx

The undisputed assertion of Gloria and Rommel that Palti was holding a gun pointed downward
(Rommel) and that she saw before the shooting Palti holding a gun (Gloria) are proof enough
that Palti was holding a gun before, during and after the killing of Leodegario. Coupled by the
admission in open Court by Palti that it was him who shot the victim, these pieces of evidence
bear the earmarks of truth, no evidence to the contrary having been proved and established by
the prosecution.

Why was Palti holding a gun at the crucial minutes of the incident? Did he or did not fire his gun?

What had motivated Palti to shoot Leodegario as alleged by him? What possible reason would it
be?

Remember that he was not paid his winning bet of ₱100.00 by Leodegario despite his repeated
demands. The words "manloloko" (Palti) and "makulit ka" (Leodegario) are expletives bordering
on violence.

What did the prosecution witnesses say about Palti? As pointed out by this court Palti’s
participation was downgraded to the point that Palti was merely "holding a gun." The heat was on
Wilfredo not Palti. It is understandable because it would be an exercise in futility to pin down Palti
in the killing because he cannot anymore be proceeded against in view of the double jeopardy
rule.

These circumstances amply suffice [to support] the Court’s findings that Palti committed the
offense.

xxxx

Be that as it may, circumstances are aplenty – by Palti’s admission and the testimony of Rommel
and Gloria that he (Palti) was holding a gun – that if put on the dock Palti would have been found
culpable for homicide and not murder. The lesser offense of homicide because the prosecution
failed to establish and prove that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation existed in
the commission of the offense. Three requisites must be duly proved before evident
premeditation may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, namely: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
to his determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

The killing of Leodegario was at the spur of the moment. An unpremeditated killing.

xxxx
The question to be asked: Could an accomplice be convicted even if the principal has not been
tried and convicted? The answer is yes. If principal is at large, still an accomplice can be
convicted so long as the crime is fully established and the requisites for conviction as an
accomplice are present.

Again, reliance on the autopsy report of Dr. Edmundo Reloj (Exh. "A") is necessary if only to
determine the number of bullet wounds the victim sustained. The doctor mentioned of two (2)
wounds, entrance and exit. In other words, only one bullet entered the body of the victim,
resulting however to two (2) wounds, the entrance and the exit. Therefore, there as only one
assailant, contrary to the allegation in the information that the victim suffered "serious and mortal
gunshot wounds in different part[s] of his body" and the testimony of Rommel and Gloria that
"two shots rang out."

xxxx

Wilfredo, on the other hand, cannot be faulted for the killing of Leodegario, but is found, on the
basis of the evidence, as an accomplice in that Wilfredo according to Rommel was "going around
pointing his gun to different directions," and Gloria testifying that "Wilfredo ran after her
companions, firing a gun."

The case of People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 where the accused prevented others in helping
the victim by scaring them away is deemed an accomplice only.

In case of doubt the Court must lean to the milder form of penalty, that of an accomplice. (People
v. Manlangit, 73 SCRA 49).8

Cawaling took exception to the portion of the RTC decision that convicted him as accomplice to
homicide, and appealed to the CA. But as previously mentioned, the CA reversed the RTC
decision, convicted Cawaling of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The CA found
that:

Scrutinizing the evidence on record, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has successfully
overthrown the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

Primarily, the appellant questions the credibility of Gloria Capispisan and prosecution rebuttal
witness Rommel Brigido who were present at the time of the commission of the offense. We find
no reason, however, why they would lie to implicate the accused. We find their testimonies
straightforward, unhesitating and sincere. Between the self-serving testimonies of the accused
and the positive identification of the assailant made by prosecution witnesses, the latter deserves
greater credence.

As correctly pointed out by the appellee, herein appellant was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the one who shot the victim, as follows:

Testimony of Rommel Brigido

Q: When Leodegario Capispisan came near Wilfredo Cawaling, who was seated on the
bench by the road, what happen? (sic)

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario Capispisan
saying: "Who is brave", and two shots rung out.

Q: You have demonstrated that the gun came from the lap of Wilfredo Cawaling, what if
any covers that gun?

A: There was a handkerchief covering that gun.

Q: How far was Leodegario Capispisan when Wilfredo Cawaling stood up and fired
against Leodegario Capispisan?

A: Witness pointing at the door with a distance of six (6) meters.

 Q: What happen (sic) to Leodegario Capispisan when two shots rung out?

A: He fall (sic) down.

Q: Under this set up, was there an opportunity for Leodegario Capispisan to be avoiding
(sic) the hit?

A: No, sir, because he has no chance to avoid that incident, he raised his two hands,
(witness demonstrating by raising his right and left hands) and moreover the other side of
the road is a cliff.

xxxx

Q: What did the accused Cawaling do, the first time that you saw Capispisan
approaching on April 19, 1987?

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun and two shots rung out.

xxxx

Testimony of Gloria Capispisan

Q: Mrs. Capispisan, do you know the accused, Wilfredo Cawaling in this case?

A: Yes, sir, I know.

Q: Since when have you known him?

A: I know him since I was a child, since childhood because he was engage (sic) in buying
fish.

Q: Where were you residing at the time when you knew Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: Sta. Fe, Romblon.

Q: And where was he buying fish during your younger days?

A: He is buying fish from the fishermen at Cabalian, Sta. Fe, Romblon.

Q: Now, since you have known Wilfredo Cawaling for long, please look around and point
to him if he is in the courtroom this morning?

A: I can see him (witness pointing to somebody in the courtroom who when asked his
name, replied that he is Wilfredo Cawaling).

Q: Do you know Leodegario Capispisan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How are you related to the late Leodegario Capispisan?

A: Leodegario Capispisan is my father-in-law.

Q: And where is Leodegario Capispisan now?

A: He is already dead, he was shot by Wilfredo Cawaling.

Q: On April 19, 1987, about six o’clock in the evening, where were you?

A: We were near Porferio Vina.

Q: Where did you come from?

A: We came from the caucus of Romy Roldan.

xxxx

Q: According to you, you attended a caucus in the house of Romy Roldan, who were
your companions in going home from there?

A: My companions were: Themosticles Sulat, Jojo Sulat, Noe Antonio, Leon Barrientos,
Roberto Capispisan, Leodegario Capispisan and two other tagalogs and myself.

xxxx

Q: Now, who was ahead while you were on your way home?

A: We were ahead.

Q: When you reached near the place of Porferio Vina, do you know where was Wilfredo
Cawaling?

A: I saw him sir.

Q: Where was he?

A: He is sitting in the bench near the street.

Q: Why were you passing the street?

A: That is the only road that we will be passing to Busay.

Q: You claimed that you saw Wilfredo Cawaling seated on a bench, how was he seated,
will you demonstrate that to this Honorable Court?

A: (Witness demonstrating by putting her two hands over her lap with her hand covered
by her handkerchief and the right hand over the handkerchief).

Q: About how far were you from Wilfredo Cawaling when you noticed his sitting in a
manner you have portrayed?

A: About ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Now, when you were near the place already where he was sitting, what happened?

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and he pointed his gun and saying who is brave,
by dropping the handkerchief.

Q: Now, when Wilfredo Cawaling pointed his gun, to whom was it pointed?

A: To Leodegario Capispisan, sir.

Q: When Wilfredo said who is brave, what did he do with his gun which he was pointing
to Leodegario Capispisan?

A: It was pointed to Leodegario Capispisan and simultaneously I heard two shots.

Q: Did he fell (sic) down with his back or his stomach?

A: He fell down on his back with blood oozing from his breast.

xxxx
 Q: What did Wilfredo Cawaling do after firing his gun and after Leodegario Capispisan
fell?

A: He pointed his gun towards me.

Q: What else?

A: After telling him that I did not know this man, referring to my father-in-law, he ran after
my companions firing his gun.9

From the foregoing contradictory findings, it is obvious that the resolution of this case hinges on
which version of the case is more worthy of credence. In other words, we must rule on whether
the prosecution’s belatedly proffered eyewitness testimony of Rommel Brigido trumps the
similarly belated testimony of Palti Umambong who now claims authorship of the crime.

It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the trial judge, who has the
direct opportunity and unique advantage to observe at close range their conduct and deportment
on the witness stand.10 The general rule is that findings of fact of the trial court, its assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court utmost respect, if not
conclusive effect, and can only be set aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked, ignored,
misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would
alter the outcome of the case.11

This principle notwithstanding, we hold that the appellate court did not err in reversing the trial
court and convicting Cawaling of murder, as we fully agree with the argument of the OSG that –

In this case, the judge who rendered the appealed decision, Judge Francisco F. Fanlo Jr., is not
the same judge who heard the prosecution witnesses, namely, Rommel Brigido, who testified on
August 23, 1995 and Gloria Capispisan, who testified on August 24, and 25, 1995. When these
two witnesses testified in 1995 the presiding Judge was Judge Cesar Maravilla. It was only on
January 12, 1998 or three years later when Judge Fanlo, Jr. took over the case and heard these
witnesses for additional cross-examination. The additional cross-examination centered on the
affidavits executed by these witnesses after the incident and not on the incident itself. The rule
on the weight to be given to the findings of the trial court does not unqualifiedly apply, when the
judge who rendered the decision did not hear the principal evidence of the prosecution. For in
such, case, his evaluation of the evidence is based on the transcript of stenographic notes, which
also forms the basis for the Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s decision and render its
own decision.12

Moreover, Rommel Brigido’s belated execution of an affidavit does not detract from or diminish
the weight of his direct and positive testimony that Cawaling shot Leodegario, viz:

Q: Do you know Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Since when have you known him?

A: Since I was born because we were neighbor[s].

xxxx

Q: In the afternoon of April 19, 1987, did you see Wilfredo Cawaling?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where for the first time did you see him that afternoon of April 19, 1987?

A: In sitio Hinulugan, Brgy. Busay.

Q: Where did you come from that afternoon?

A: We came from the town.

Q: The town of what?

A: San Jose.

Q: Aside from Wilfredo Cawaling, do you have any companion in going to the town of
San Jose, Romblon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who were your companion (sic)?

A: Palti Umambong.

xxxx

Q: Now, on your way home, where did you go?

A: We passed by Porferia Vina coming from the town.

Q: What did you do in the place of Porferia Vina?

A: We were together in drinking two (2) balls of tuba.

xxxx

Q: Now, while drinking tube, what happen[ed]?

A: While our drinking is not yet finished, I saw Wilfredo Cawaling sitting along the other
side of the road.

xxxx

Q: How far was Wilfredo Cawaling sitting on the bench from the road where Leodegario
Capispisan and his group were passing?

A: It was near, because the bench was just along the side of the road.

Q: When Leodegario Capispisan came near Wilfredo Cawaling, who was [seated] on the
bench by the road, what happen[ed]?

A: Wilfredo Cawaling suddenly stood up and pointed his gun to Leodegario Capispisan
saying: "Who is brave," and two shots [rang] out.

xxxx

Q: How far was Leodegario Capispisan when Wilfredo Cawaling stood up and fired
against Leodegario Capispisan?

A: Witness pointing at the door, with a distance of six (6) meters.13

We have had occasion to hold that delay in making a criminal accusation will not
necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.14 In
this case, Rommel Brigido, on cross examination, explained, thus:

Q: Why did it take you so long to execute this affidavit where the incident took place way
back on April [19] 1987 and you only executed your affidavit in support of this information
on July 27, 1995?
 A: Because that case was dismissed and [Wilfredo] Cawaling was at large at that time
and I was asked to execute an affidavit.

xxxx

Q: Why did you say that [Cawaling] is a dangerous man?

A: He killed so many people and recently also shot my uncle, Rexinol Brigido.15

Gloria Capispisan likewise satisfactorily explained her failure to include the name of Rommel
Brigido in her earlier account of the killing in April 1987, as the latter was the companion of
Cawaling. Subsequent thereto, Gloria categorically testified that Rommel was at the side of
Cawaling during the incident.

The RTC erred in convicting Cawaling merely as an accomplice to homicide, and in giving full
faith and credence to Palti Umambong’s testimony that he was the one who shot the victim.

We have gone through the trial court’s lengthy disquisition and tried to find a rational explanation
why Palti, who previously pled not guilty to the crime, will now accept responsibility for the
murder of Leodegario. Obviously, it is because the case against him had already been
dismissed, and he can no longer be successfully prosecuted for the offense without breaching
the rule on double jeopardy. Thus, with Palti securely shielded from punishment by the principle
of double jeopardy, he was at liberty to own authorship of the crime. Accordingly, Palti’s
credibility as a witness directly debunking Rommel’s testimony is tainted by a serious cloud of
doubt.

Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, in his treatise on Evidence, writes: "the credibility of a witness
depends as much upon himself as upon his testimony, upon his interest as upon his mental
cultivation, his conduct before and at the trial, the consistency of his behavior from the time he
became aware of the fact to the time he relates it."16 Not surprisingly, Palti is now motivated to
confess to a crime for which he can no longer be held liable because of our rule on double
jeopardy.17

We note that it was only Palti who was arraigned and who pled not guilty to the initial Information
for murder. At that time, Cawaling was at large. After the case against Palti was dismissed, and
now no longer in peril of punishment, he acknowledges commission of the crime and
conveniently absolves Cawaling who had remained at large. We perceive a brazen conspiracy to
escape criminal liability for murder.

Justice Francisco, in the same book, states that when there is conflicting evidence, the court is
compelled to examine closely the motives of the witnesses for telling the truth or for falsely
testifying.18 As between Rommel and Palti, there is, in the former, an absence of proof, except for
the defense’s bare allegations of political motivations, of an improper motive that would have
impelled him to testify for the prosecution and accuse his former friend and companion,
Cawaling, of murder.19 As no improper motive can be imputed to Rommel, his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credence.

One other thing has sealed the conviction of Cawaling. We note that he jumped bail and fled. On
this score, jurisprudence has consistently held that flight of an accused is indicative of his guilt.20

As to the propriety of Cawaling’s conviction for murder, the CA correctly appreciated the
circumstance of treachery.21 We quote with favor the appellate court’s ruling thereon:

The Solicitor General submits that the commission of the crime in the present case was attended
by treachery as clearly established by Rommel Brigido and Gloria Capispisan, who testified that
they saw appellant stand up from where he was seated and without warning, pointed his gun at
Leodegario and instantaneously fired the same, thus killing Leodegario on the spot.

It is contended that "the attack being sudden and unexpected, Leodegario was not given any
chance to retaliate or defend himself from such attack."

We agree.
Treachery may be appreciated even if the attack was frontal but no less unexpected and sudden,
giving the victim no opportunity, to repel it or offer any defense of his person. Frontal attach can
be treachery when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed.22

We likewise agree with the OSG that the heirs of the victim must be awarded moral damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.23

Lastly, we dispose of a corollary incident – the Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property
bond and post cash bond in lieu thereof – filed by bondsperson Margarita Cruz. In this
connection, Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.— Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to execute the
judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight, the motion must be denied. The posted
property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond by
movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is
presented.

We are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a
relative, obtain provisional liberty. However, under Section 124 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman,
guarantees the appearance of the accused before any court as required under specified
conditions.

It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed temporary
liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee and evade punishment. As it stands now,
Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the property bond cannot be
released. 1avvphi1

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellant Wilfredo Cawaling is found GUILTY of Murder and ordered to pay,
₱50,000.00 as indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, to the heirs of the victim.
The Manifestation with Motion of Movant Cruz is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Asistio v. People, GR No. 200465, April 20, 2015

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).4 The accusatory portion of the Information filed against
her reads: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the
Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
and as such, have a complete control and exclusively manage the entire business of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such and the confidence reposed on her, personal
interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then
and there entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused
fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to
the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5 cralawlawlib rary

Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. By virtue of a
Memorandum of Agreement between the school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school
principal, directed petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead,
petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce financial
statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school bulletin board.

The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial reports of the
Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica Nealiga
(member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later executed
their respective affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on the documents obtained
from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements
prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its
members for three (3) years in the following amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y.
1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y. 2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the
Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so.
Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner.

After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by
way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime
charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held
criminally liable.

On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offense or
predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction
to hear and determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first level courts. c ralawre d

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no jurisdiction,
further discussions over the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the principle of primary
jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a falsified resolution to purposely empower them to
file the instant case become moot and academic.

IT IS SO ORDERED.6 cralawlawlib ra ry

On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's motion for a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal.7 The RTC held: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal sanctions/liability for violation of acts or
omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in law that an act or omission
is not a crime unless there is a law making it so and providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the
facts charged in the information do not charge an offense. And even assuming arguendo that they do
constitute an offense, the penalty therefor is that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A.
[6938] which is "imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of
not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court," which falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second level court.

Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution is the undisputed fact that
before this case was filed in Court, conciliation/mediation process for the amicable settlement of the
dispute was not availed of by the private complainants who are all members (directors) of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in accordance with the by-laws of the
Cooperative and the Cooperative Code itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of
Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute
involving the parties is certainly a dispute and issue between and among directors, officers or members
of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed by the
Guidelines.

Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of the President as outlined in
the Cooperative Code and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to by the complainants,
the rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and
determine the present case.8 cralawlaw lib rary

Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.

On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders dated
October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the RTC for further
proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision.9

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, raising the
following issues: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS AND
CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE TO THE
PENAL SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-6938 AND
ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER PENALTY OF 5
YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE
AND USED IT AS A GROUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE
DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938,
(COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION -
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING TO COURT.

3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE ON
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.

4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER PENALTY
HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.

5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND AMENDED COOPERATIVE CODE RA-
9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE OF EXPOSE (SIC)
FACTO LAW.]10 cralawlawlibra ry

The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out
as the proper remedy to assail the CA decision.

Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the assailed CA decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that the Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one
of the party respondents, and considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since the focal issue
raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938,
in relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by RA 7691. She adds that had she chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with
the same question of law.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.11 In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court had again stressed the
distinction between the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to wit: chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45,
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of
the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be
but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a
general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including
that to be taken under Rule 45. xxx.13 cralawlawlib ra ry

In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,14 the Court explained
that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have
distinct applications. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an
improper remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.

However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when the petition before it is
clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65.15 In accordance with the liberal spirit
which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as
having been filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered by petitioner for a more
liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the
petition at bench lacks substantive merit and raises only questions of law which should have been duly
made in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.16

On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's criminal case for violation of
Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the
CA ruling that it is the RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her
case.

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and
the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis
added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938
provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her
criminal case which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124: chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry

Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby
prohibited: cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain,
unambiguous, and categorical. She submits that statutory construction of such clear provisions,
especially if prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would subject her to higher penalty, should not
be allowed.

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner's case pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Section 47
(liability of directors, officers and committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and
Section 51 (illegal use of confidential information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than
ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a clerical error because the
"liability of directors, officers and committee members" is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA
6938, while Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and employees, to
wit:chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and
committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members
and other persons.

When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty,
any interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which has been reposed in
him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for damages and for double the
profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.

Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their
compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation except for reasonable per
diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by a majority
vote of the members with voting rights at a regular or special general assembly meeting specifically
called for the purpose: Provided further, that no additional compensation other than per diems shall be
paid during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any compelling reason to warrant a
departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her
criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical errors,
mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical
or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the
face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is to
prevent the nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court
to give a statute a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or
absurdity. It is its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary
rule under which it must be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature intended to make
a typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act, and not to carry out the
legislative scheme, but to destroy it.

xxxx

Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124, paragraph 4, as the trial court
did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. To
reiterate, [Sec] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee Members,"
provides for violations under which the said officers could be held liable for, and the corresponding
liability for damages and profits from the said violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for
penal sanction, an application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision evidently
refers to the penal sanction on erring directors, officers and committee members. It would make no
sense if we were to follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124,
paragraph 4 instead, just because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47, which upon
examination of the Code provides for the "Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees
of the cooperative.

We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3) should refer to "[Section] 46
(Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and
[Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential information)." Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46,
therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of
not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which
under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.18 cralawlawlib ra ry

It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in Section 124 (3) of RA 6938
on the liability of directors, officers and committee members, has been recognized and duly corrected
when the legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008." Pertinent portions of the corrected
provision read: c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and committee
members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty
of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee members shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members,
and other persons.

xxxx

ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby
prohibited:cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

xxxx

(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Article 45 on the Liability
of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a Director, and Article
49 on the Illegal Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's
discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the Cooperative filed a
criminal case against petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the
Cooperative Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or
mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner,
because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute and should have been
resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an intra-cooperative dispute.
Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the same cooperative. The
instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The
Board Resolution authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in
behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the
jurisdiction of the regular court.19 cralawlawl ibra ry

Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the
prosecution of the offense is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal
case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party, while the Cooperative
and its members are mere private complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil
aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is
not one arising between or among members of the same cooperative.

On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules in the negative.

In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one
of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case" and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.23 c ralawlawli bra ry

In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal
does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.24 As aptly noted by the CA: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case against her is an
acquittal. It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant
is acquitted because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt;
but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or
the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."25 cralawlawlibra ry

On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double jeopardy due to
its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the
CA in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not
attach, thus:chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It
must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer
to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.

The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused.

Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's
consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly
argued by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he
is deemed to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was
granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.26 cralawlawlib rary

The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution of her case before the
RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res
judicatabecause the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution27 dated August 13, 2012, granted her
demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in
Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.28 In support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the
private complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported
sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are the same, and that the case for violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private
documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.29 At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy which
embrace's a prohibition against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may
prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.32

In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double jeopardy are present in
view of the MeTC Resolution33 dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence
and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-
20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double jeopardy — a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first — is present. Such question of identity or lack of identity
of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved.34

Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the information for
Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private
document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to determine
whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under Section
5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for falsification of private
document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case
No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not
necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second offense.

The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged that petitioner, being
then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year
1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the
RPC. The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are:
(1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article
171;36(2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage.

The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being then such
officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to
it, in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with Coca-
Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales profits of such products should have
accrued to the Cooperative. The essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the
offender is a director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and lcnowingly
(a) votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with
their duty as such directors, officers or committee member.

Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification
of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as
alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to
necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to
attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. Not only are their
elements different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a
felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes
it a crime is the special, law enacting it.

Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.38
cralaw lawlib rary

Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct offenses as discussed
above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of
the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes
as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed
against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution
against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G. Principle of Adherence of Jurisdiction

People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267

H. Objections on Jurisdictional Grounds

Fukuzume v. People, supra
Atienza v. People, supra
People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29
Foz, Jr. v. People, 603 SCRA 124

I. Jurisdiction Conferred by Law

Bacalso vs. Ramolete, 21 SCRA 519
People vs. Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114
Heirs of Santiago Nisperos vs. Nisperos-Ducusin, 702 SCRA 721
Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA 650

J. Jurisdiction Vested in Courts not Judges

People vs. Fule, 105 Phil. 1171

K. Determination of Jurisdiction
Treas vs. People, supra
Buaya vs. Polo, 169 SCRA 471

L. When Jurisdiction Attaches

Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191

M. Withdrawal of Information
Palana vs. People, 534 SCRA 296

N. Affidavit of Desistance
People vs. Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, November 19, 1996

RULE 110: Prosecution of Offenses

SECTION 1:

Effects of Institution of the Criminal Action on the Prescriptive Period

Pertaining to Violations of Ordinances –
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Hon. Judge Nelson F. Lidua Sr.,
G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013
Zaldivia vs. Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992

Rules of Prescription for Violation of Special Law (BP 22)

People vs. Pangilinan (G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012)

Section 2:

Name of People of the Philippines

Francisco Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 177720, February 18, 2009

Section 3 and 4:

When Complaint or information is Sufficient

Enrile vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014
Rosaldes vs. People (G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014)
People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647
Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223,
November 28, 2007
People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004

Section 5:

Criminal Actions in General

Ampatuan, Jr. vs. Sec. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013
Hasegawa vs. Giron, G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013
Crespo vs. Mogul , G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Discretion of Public Prosecutor

Pinote v. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409
Bureau of Customs v. Whelan, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011
Flores v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 03, 2010

Criminal Prosection Cannot be Restained; Exceptions

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163,
June 25, 2014

Review by the Secretary of Justice

Department of Justice vs. Alaon, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014

When Private Offended Party May Bring Special Civil Acion of Certiorari in
Criminal Proceedings
Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, G.R. No. 126210, March 9, 2000

Prosecutors in Election Cases

Ejercito vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

Complainant in Private Crimes

Lee Pue Liong a.k.a. Paul Lee vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R. No. 181658,
August 7, 2013

Sufficiency of Complaint or Information

Enrile vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014
Designation; Acts or Omissions
Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015
Su Zhi Shan @ Alvin Ching So vs. People, G.R. No. 169933, March 9,
2007
People vs. Cagadas Jr., G.R. No. 88044, Jan 23, 1991
People vs. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
Matrido vs. People, G.R. No. 179061, Juy 13, 2009
Licyayo vs. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008
People vs. Padit, G.R. No. 202978, February 1 2016
People vs. Mejia, G.R .No. 185723, August 4, 2009