Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACTS:
- Verzo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney’s fees before the LA against
Enchanted Kingdom.
POSITION OF VERZO:
- Verzo claimed that it was only after he was formally hired by Enchanted that he was informed of
his probationary status. And even after despite being placed on a probationary status, he was not
advised as to the standards required for his regularization.
- Verzo believed that he performed his job well
o he always punctual and regular in his attendance
o he was also respectful of his superiors
o he maintained a good working relationship with his subordinates
- For Verzo, the controversy began on January 5, 2010, when Schoefield approached and told him
that Enchanted had decided not to continue with his employment.
o While Velesrubio confirmed the news relayed by Schoefield, herefused to provide any
explanation therefor. Instead, Velesrubio advised him to resign so that he could be
provided with a certificate of employment that he could use in the future.
- Verzo asked Velesrubio several times to explain why he could not be considered for regularization,
but to no avail
- Verzo then approached Federico Juliano (Juliano), EnchantedÊs Executive Vice President for
operations
o Juliano did not give any explanation why Enchanted would not consider him for
regularization and only advised him to just resign
- It was only after Verzo submitted a letter to Velesrubio that the latter called for a meeting on that
same day. Instead of discussing the reason why he could not be regularized, however, Velesrubio,
together with Schoefield and Montemayor, proceeded to accuse him of imagined transgressions.
- he was not given the chance to explain his side either
- Verzo went to the office of Maduli to receive his performance appraisal. He was again advised to
just resign in exchange for a certificate of employment.
- Verzo then asked for time to answer the allegations in writing
o Before he was able to submit his written reply to the allegations hurled against him, Verzo
received a letter informing him that he was being terminated for his failure to qualify for
regularization.
RULING OF THE LA
ISSUE: DID THE DISMISSAL OF VERZO VIOLATE HIS SECURITY OF TENURE AS A PROBATIONARY
EMPLOYESS?
RULING: NO.
- A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated
to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment.
o It affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of a
probationer.
o While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer, to
ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, at the
same time, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the
reasonable standards for permanent employment.
- A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure.
o Aside from just or authorized causes of termination, under Article 281 of the Labor Code,
the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer
at the time of the engagement.
o In summary, a probationary employee may be terminated for any of the following:
(a) a just cause
(b) an authorized cause
(c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards prescribed by the employer
o General Rule: Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
provides that if the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the
reasonable standards on which his regularization would be based at the time of the
engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee
In Abbott Laboratories v. Alcaraz
The employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements:
o first, the employer must communicate the regularization
standards to the probationary employee; and
o Second, the employer must make such communication at the
time of the probationary employee’s engagement.
An exception to the foregoing rule is when the job is self-descriptive.
In Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr
o It has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary
employee of the standards of regularization should not be used
to exculpate an employee who acted in a manner contrary to
basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which there
was no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met.
an employee’s failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which
had been clearly made known to him would constitute a justifiable basis
for a probationary employees non-regularization.
APPLICATION:
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Enchanted should have complied with the 2 notice rule?
RULING: YES.
o Whether or not Verzo was afforded the opportunity to explain his side is of no
consequence.
Under Section 2 Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code:
Paragraph D:
o If the termination is brought about by the completion of a
contract or phase thereof, or by failure of an employee to meet
the standards of the employer in the case of probationary
employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served
the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date
of termination.
In Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. v. Magtibay, Jr
Unlike under the first ground for the valid termination of probationary
employment which is for cause, the second ground does not require
notice and hearing. Due process of law for this second ground consists of
making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his
probationary period known to him at the time of his probationary
employment. It is in apprising him of the standards against which his
performance shall be continuously assessed where due process
regarding the second ground lies, and not in notice and hearing as in the
case of the first ground
Considering that Verzo failed to meet the reasonable standards set out by it,
Enchanted cannot be compelled to regularize Verzo. Enchanted, being engaged
in the business of providing entertainment and amusement with mechanical rides
and facilities, is not duty-bound to retain an employee who is clearly unfit.
MANILA PAVILION HOTEL vs. HENRY DELADA
FACTS:
- Delada was the Union President of the Manila Pavilion Supervisors Association at MPH
o He was originally assigned as Head Waiter of Rotisserie, a fine dining restaurant
o Pursuant to a supervisory personnel reorganization program, MPH reassigned him as
Head Waiter of Seasons Coffee Shop
o declined the inter-outlet transfer and instead asked for a grievance meeting pursuant to
their CBA
o He also requested his retention as Head Waiter of Rotisserie while the grievance
procedure was ongoing.
o MPH replied and told respondent to report to his new assignment for the time being,
without prejudice to the resolution of the grievance involving the transfer.
o He adamantly refused to assume his new post at the Seasons Coffee Shop and instead
continued to report to Rotisserie.
o MPH sent him several memoranda on various dates, requiring him to explain in writing
why he should not be penalized for the following offenses:
serious misconduct
willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer
gross insubordination
gross and habitual neglect of duties
willful breach of trust
o Despite the notices from MPH, Delada persistently rebuffed orders for him to report to
his new assignment.
Deladas Contention:
since the grievance machinery under their CBA had already been
initiated, his transfer must be held in abeyance.
o Thus, on 9 May 2007, MPH initiated administrative proceedings against him. He attended
the hearings together with union representatives.
the parties failed to reach a settlement during the grievance meeting
Delada then elevated his grievance to the Peers Resources Development Director.
Still, no settlement between the parties was reached.
Delada then appealed the matter to the Grievance Committee level. The
committee recommended that he proceed to the next level of the grievance
procedure, as it was unable to reach a decision on the matter
o Delada lodged a Complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. On 25
May 2007, the parties agreed to submit for voluntary arbitration.
o While respondents Complaint concerning the validity of his transfer was pending
MPH continued with the disciplinary action against him for his refusal to report
to his new post at Seasons Coffee Shop.
Citing security and safety reasons, petitioner also placed respondent on
a 30-day preventive suspension.
o On 8 June 2007, MPH issued a Decision, which found him guilty of insubordination based
on his repeated and willful disobedience of the transfer order.
The Decision imposed on Delada the penalty of 90-day suspension.
He opposed the Decision, arguing that MPH had lost its authority to
proceed with the disciplinary action against him, since the matter had
already been included in the voluntary arbitration.
o On 14 December 2007, the PVA issued a Decision and ruled that the transfer of Delada
was a valid exercise of management prerogative
the transfer order was done in the interest of the efficient and economic
operations of MPH, and that there was no malice, bad faith, or improper motive
attendant upon the transfer of Delada
They found that the mere fact that he was the Union President did not put color
or ill motive and purpose
the PVA found that the real reason why he refused to obey the transfer order was
that he asked for additional monetary benefits as a condition for his transfer
the panel ruled that his transfer from Rotisserie to Seasons Coffee Shop did not
prejudice or inconvenience him
Neither did it result in diminution of salaries or demotion in rank.
The PVA thus pronounced that Delada had no valid and justifiable reason to
refuse or even to delay compliance with the managements directive
o The PVA also ruled that there was no legal and factual basis to support petitioners
imposition of preventive suspension on Delada
MPH went beyond the 30-day period of preventive suspension prescribed by the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code when petitioner proceeded to impose a
separate penalty of 90-day suspension on him.
MPH lost its authority to continue with the administrative proceedings for
insubordination and willful disobedience of the transfer order and to impose the
penalty of 90-day suspension on respondent.
According to the panel, it acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the issue
when the parties submitted the aforementioned issues before it.
Thus, MPH effectively relinquished its power to impose disciplinary
action on Delada.
o The CA affirmed the Decision of the PVA and denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Consequently, MPH filed the instant Petition.
ISSUE: Whether MPH retained the authority to continue with the administrative case against Delada
for insubordination and willful disobedience of the transfer order despite the joint submission to the
PVA?
RULING: NO.
- In the case of Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator Magsalin, and Ludo & Luym
Corporation v. Saornido
o the SC held that the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to
interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority
subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
o It was also ruled that that voluntary arbitrators are generally expected to decide only
those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement; that, nevertheless,
they can assume that they have the necessary power to make a final settlement on the
related issues, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes.
o However, the doctrine in the following cases is inapplicable in the case at bar. In those
cases, the voluntary arbitrators did in fact assume jurisdiction over the related issues and
made rulings on the matter.
- In the Present case, PVA did not make a ruling on the specific issue of insubordination and willful
disobedience of the transfer order.
o The PVA merely said that its disagreement with the 90-day penalty of suspension
stemmed from the fact that the penalty went beyond the 30-day limit for preventive
suspension
o it must be pointed out that the basis of the 30-day preventive suspension imposed on
Delada was different from that of the 90-day penalty of suspension
The 30-day preventive suspension was imposed by MPH on the assertion that
Delada might sabotage hotel operations if preventive suspension would not be
imposed on him.
the penalty of 90-day suspension was imposed on respondent as a form of
disciplinary action
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure resorted to by the employer
pending investigation of an alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by an
employee.
penalty of suspension refers to the disciplinary action imposed on the employee
after an official investigation or administrative hearing is conducted
- MPH did not lose its authority to discipline respondent for his continued refusal to report to his
new assignment.
o The court cited Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals.
In this case The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience
of a lawful order of an employer. Employees may object to, negotiate and seek
redress against employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal.
However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. For
Galanidas continued refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that
the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282(a) of
the Labor Code. Galanida is thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation
pay.
o Pursuant to Allied Banking, unless the order of MPH is rendered invalid, there is a
presumption of the validity of that order. Since the PVA eventually ruled that the transfer
order was a valid exercise of management prerogative, we hereby reverse the Decision
and the Resolution of the CA affirming the Decision of the PVA in this respect. MPH had
the authority to continue with the administrative proceedings for insubordination and
willful disobedience against Delada and to impose on him the penalty of suspension. As a
consequence, petitioner is not liable to pay back wages and other benefits for the period
corresponding to the penalty of 90-day suspension.
FACTS:
- Distribution and Control (DC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling and
distributing electrical products and equipment with Vincent M. Tiamsic as its president.
- Jeffery Santos on the other hand, was employed as petitioners’ company driver.
o He filed against DC a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal and payment of
separation pay.
o Contention:
o he received a notice informing him that he was being placed under preventive suspension
for a period of thirty (30) days because he was one of the employees suspected of having
participated in the unlawful taking of circuit breakers and electrical products
o a criminal complaint was filed against him and several other persons
o He immediately inquired from the Human Resources of DC as to the reason for his
suspension but his request fell into deaf ears
o after the lapse of his 30-day suspension he was no longer allowed to return to work
without any justification for such disallowance
- Contention of DC:
o Santos as their company driver whose job included the delivery of items purchased by
customers, receipt documentation and recording of previously purchased products and
return them to their warehouse
o However, DC through its hired auditors, conducted a physical stock inventory of all
materials stored in the company’s warehouse it was found out that a number of electrical
materials and products were missing
o Only Santos and the company warehouseman were the only persons who had complete
access to the company warehouse
o considering the size and weight of the missing items, they can only be carried by no less
than two (2) persons
o DC demanded an explanation from Santos and the warehouseman, but they failed to
make an account as to how these products had gone missing from the warehouse and
office building; as such, petitioners filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and,
thereafter, they suspended herein respondent; and after the lapse of his suspension,
respondent no longer returned to work.
RULING OF THE CA
Ruling: No.