THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 150762 January 20, 2006

COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision2 and the 7 November
2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the 30 September 1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista
("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal
Case No. 94-135055.

The Charge

The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in two
Informations,5 as follows:

Criminal Case No. 94-135055

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of HOMICIDE,

committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been
charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-
129891 and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by
then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 94-135056

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been
charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim. Case No. 93-
129892 and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt acts, to wit: by then
and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and stabbing him with a bladed weapon,
hitting him on the left arm, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his
own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is
only slight and not fatal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.

The Version of the Prosecution

On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong ("Quejong") and
their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were
drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong
decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie and Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz
and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.

Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyet’s house, Alberto Almojuela also known as
Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking liquor in
front of Almojuela’s house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela and
his companions blocked their path.

Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz
with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on
both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were
going home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil
ka na, tumigil ka na."

Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to
get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on
the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him
already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up
Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to ask for help.
While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion already
wounded!"

When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and
Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. They
next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However, there was nobody in the
precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD General Headquarters to report the
incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the UST Hospital.
Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. The
medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.
About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the WPD Homicide Division, his
station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad
and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They learned that
Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz
and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and frustrated homicide and
prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.

Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one SPO4
Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.

Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the post-
mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained two stab
wounds and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the heart and left
lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also
reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body, the wrist and on
the lower extremities.

The Version of the Defense

Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuela’s wife informed him that the group of Paz was challenging
Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to Almojuela’s house.
Almojuela’s house was about twenty meters away from Abarquez’s house. When he arrived at
Almojuela’s house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by Quejong. Paz was
holding Almojuela’s waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near Almojuela’s head
holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted at the group to stop.
The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group did
not heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered
away.

Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking marijuana.
Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his way home, Abarquez met
the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego") advised him to
report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the
incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had been stabbed. When
Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their barangay chairman. He
informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon the request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez
then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.

Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there was
marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to look for the source of the smoke and
saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move away as
there were children inside the house. He was on his way back to the house when Quejong tried to
strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez shouting, "Tumigil na
kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.

Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in front of his house when he
heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking
Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere. Abarquez was
forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved in the commotion ran away.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a
co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted as a
principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and
restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to pursue his
criminal act without resistance.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused, Coverdale Abarquez,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only as accomplice and hereby sentences
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional to ten (10)
years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

Abarquez appealed the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.

In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. The Court
of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The Court of
Appeals held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela in fatally
stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquez’s allegation that he was merely at the
crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.

In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied Abarquez’s motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt;

2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Abarquez alleges that the prosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a
misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion
based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the credibility of the
witnesses against him.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the
testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance
and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case. 16 This case is an exception to the
rule.

Concurrence in Criminal Design

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." 17

Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of
design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.18 Mere commission of
an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough. 19 Thus:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist
without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required
in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation.20

Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene
cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. 21

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony
of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from
helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:

q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations between Bitoy and Ricardo
Quejong?

a. They grappled with each other, sir.

q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do, if any?

a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.

q. And how this Dale hold you?

a. He held my two shoulders, sir.

PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:

I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused holding both shoulders,
your Honor.

q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what happened next, if any?

a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two

who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)

q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the course of grappling, if any?

You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what happened in the course of
grappling? (sic)

a. They fell to the ground, sir.

q. After that what happened next, if any?

a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold of Dale and I approach the
two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to pull him, sir. (sic)

q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)

a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.

q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or Ricardo? (sic)

a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches including the handle).

q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were trying to free yourself from
the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan kayo", in what way or manner did Dale Abarquez reprimanded
you? (sic)

a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22

xxx xxx xxx

q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?

a. Yes, sir.

q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong, is it not? 23

a. They were just arguing, sir.

[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the accused [C]overdale
Abarquez?

a. Yes, sir.

q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?

a. Yes, sir on my side.

q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from further quarrelling you, is it not?

a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.

q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by Abarquez?

ATTY. GASCON:

Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness while the witness act as
the accused demonstrating holding both hands of interpreter preventing the witness and saying Joey
tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na.

COURT:

q. How many times?

a. Twice, Your Honor.

ATTY. GASCON:

The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you were trying to attack Bitoy,
is it not?

a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)

q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey tumigal ka na, Joey
tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?

a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.

COURT:

Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when the accused tried to hold
you and prevent you?

a. Yes, sir.

q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying you but to stop you from
helping the victim?

a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey
tumigil ka na, is it not?

a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. 24

Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design. "Tumigil"
literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from
helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not
have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already
grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez’s action as an attempt to prevent him
from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of
Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or
reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from
helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight.
Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.

In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained:

To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the
criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and
directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal
design.

xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principal’s) criminal design did not
automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in
the principal’s criminal intent.

Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that
Abarquez’s son Bardie, who was one of Paz’s companions, was the one trying to pacify Almojuela.
The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez was holding
Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela. 26

The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not
extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show
concurrence in Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left
his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejong’s injury and
he expected Paz to look after his own companion.

When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus:

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both
constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact
establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense of
the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the prosecution must
prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient. 27

We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there
is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses.28 Hence:

xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof
to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. 29

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7
November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the 30
September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos.
94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Chairman

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 32-48.

3
Rollo, p. 31.

4
Penned by Judge Urbano C. Victorio, Sr., CA Rollo, pp. 9-21.
5
Filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Sed A. Cabangon.

6
CA Rollo, p. 7.

7
Ibid., p. 8.

8
Referred to as Jose Buenhijo Paz in the trial court’s Decision.

9
Referred to as Dr. Antonio Reposo in the TSN.

10
Also referred to as Winfreed Evangelista.
11
Supra note 4.

12
CA Rollo, pp. 20-21.

13
Supra note 2.

14
Supra note 3.

15
Rollo, p. 13.

16
People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57 (1997).

17
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code defines "principals."

18
People v. Cachola, G.R. Nos. 148712-15, 21 January 2004, 420 SCRA 520.

19
People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 132895, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 136.

20
Ibid., citing People v. Cual, 384 Phil 361 (2000).

21
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312.

22
TSN, 31 August 1995, pp. 9-12.

23
It was actually Bardie or Bardy Abarquez who was pacifying Bitoy Almojuela.

24
TSN, 12 December 1995, pp. 7-9, 11.

25
429 Phil. 701 (2002).

26
CA Rollo, p. 11.

27
People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 132895, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 136.

28
People v. Natividad, G.R. No. 151072, 23 September 2003, 411 SCRA 587.

29
Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 160328, 4 February 2005, 450 SCRA 495.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27,1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being
no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07
which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit. Further, the accused
is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to
the amount embezzled.

SO ORDERED.

As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the
petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received
collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government
accounts.

On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22,
1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The
Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08. 1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but
he was able to pay only P10,159,50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated October 12,
1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of
temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from the
service.2

On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to
the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said amount
was filed against him with the respondent court on October 11, 1983.

The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3

He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons.

His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the unliquidated
withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and
encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of absence. He avers he was later made to post
the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had
no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said amount.

The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding vouchers dated are
described as follows:

1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of
P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December 22,1980.

2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount
of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. NS958525 dated December 23,1980.

3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of
P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Cheek No. 956639J dated December 22,1980.

4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount
of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29,1980.

Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts
thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid
vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits ). 4

He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged but was in fact
the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to the sick wife in the
hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came
back from the hospital.5

Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner
was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had
already been encashed on December 23 1980, the encashment was not immediately recorded in the
petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage."
It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted with it, the
petitioner had no explanation to offer.6

Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cash
book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980, he
discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00 appeared to have been already encashed, the
encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he required the
petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was already
part of the latter's accountability.7

After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q.
Alconcel, made the following findings:

The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the amount of
P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the said
amount.

As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim that
same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:

First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the same
purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial
officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the period, January to
December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December 23, 1980, and in fact,
another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day. The two (2)
other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were issued and encashed on December 22 and
29, 1980, respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was only entered in accused's
Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and encashment, all
the other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above,
was issued and encashed on the same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his
Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging the
embezzlement of its money equivalent.

Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks Nos. 956639 and 958525, could
not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary
differentials of government officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since
these have been issued and encashed on the same day.

Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he duly
liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:

Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?

A I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the vouchers
paid by me or disbursed by me.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated?

 A Yes, Your honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you give these documents?

A give them to the cashier only, no other person.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO

Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these
payrolls to the cashier?

A On December 29, sir.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q Duly accomplished?

A Duly accomplished, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?

A At the office, Your Honor.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:

Q At what time?

A In the afternoon, sir.

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?

A He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was supposedly
having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp.
1618)

The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.

 And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on December 22,
23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave
Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the month of
December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the
same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to
October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the
day when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the other check which was
issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.

The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to
disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal.
On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point unmistakably to the
petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:

Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the
following factors:

First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not make
any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually received.

Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any
certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.

Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he did
not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.

The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a
1âwphi1

preliminary requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt
of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is the presence of
the following requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.

The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he
has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to
account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive
protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere
emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the
petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an
warrant presumptuousness.

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is
evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution
and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he
malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached.
His conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 41.

2
As ordered by the Minister of Finance in Administrative Case No. 0001424.

3
Except as to the total shortage, which was reduced to P50,310.00.

4
Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5.

5
Rollo, pp. 47-48; 52-54; 99-103.

6
lbid., pp. 48-49.

7
Id., pp. 49-50; 106-107.

8
Article 217, Revised Penal Code.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110353 May 21, 1998

TOMAS H. COSEP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer
of Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality decided to construct an artesian
well for one of its localities. Hence, it secured the services of private complainant Angelino E.
Alegre to undertake the said project, under a "pakyaw" arrangement for the contract price of
P5,000.00 payable after completion of the project. Petitioner, being the Planning Officer of the
Municipality, monitored the progress of the construction.

After the project was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal
Treasurer. However, only P4,500.00 was given to the private complainant, the balance being
allegedly withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his expenses in processing the papers
in the Municipal Treasurer's Office.

Aggrieved, private complainant filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan, First Division,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 17503 against petitioner for violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. The information reads:

That on or about August of 1987, or immediately prior and subsequent thereto,

in Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused, a public officer, being the Municipal planning and
Development Officer of the said municipality, with the duty to administer and
award government projects and to prepare the necessary documents required
for money claims against the municipality of OLUTANGA, Zamboanga del Sur,
did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive five hundred
pesos (500.00) from a certain Angelino Alegre as a consideration for awarding
the construction of the artesian well, Solar, Olutanga and for facilitation the
necessary documents for the money claims of the latter from the Municipality
of Olutanga for constructing the above mentioned Artesian Well.
 Contrary to law.

On April 10, 1992, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

In an effort to escape liability, petitioner advances the theory that private complainant was
never a contractor, but was merely a laborer entitled to a daily rate of P20.00. Moreover, the
amount of P4,500.00 he gave to the private complainant represents the total salary of the
other thirteen (13) workers who constructed the artesian well. Hence, he could not have
withheld the said P500.00 since there was none in the first place. To bolster his contention,
petitioner presented as evidence the Time Book and Payroll Sheet,1 and a Memorandum
dated May 10, 1987, issued by the Mayor of Olutanga indicating that private complainant was
hired as the head laborer during the construction of the artesian well. 2

Apparently, not impressed with petitioner's defense, the Sandiganbayan, in a decision dated
April 15, 19933filed against him, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Tomas Cosep y Hibayan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime defined in Section 3, paragraph (b),
Republic Act 3019, as amended, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imposes upon him the penalties of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years and twenty (20) days, as
maximum, and of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court
orders him to pay Angelino E. Alegre, the private complainant, P500.00
representing the amount which the accused demanded and received from him.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending that: (a) he was not accorded an impartial
trial by the Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to
justify his conviction.

Regarding the first assignment of error, petitioner bewails the fact that during his testimony
the Justices of the Sandiganbayan actively participated in the proceeding by propounding no
less than sixty-eight questions4 which, in his opinion, were indications of partiality or
prejudgment of guilt. Specifically, he cites the questions on pages 34 to 42 of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes 5 as indications of the Justices' hostility against him.

We do not agree.

Admittedly, petitioner, like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an
"impartial and neutral judge" as an indispensable imperative of due process. 6 Judges must
not only be impartial, but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that the decision will be just. 7 However, this is not to say that judges must remain
passive or silent during the proceedings. Since they are in a better position to observe the
demeanor of the witness as he testifies on the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to
ask questions to elicit
facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points8 and
to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. 9 Also, the judge, being the arbiter,
may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
waste of time. 10
With the above doctrines serving as guidelines, we have scrutinized carefully the questions
propounded by the Justices, and none was indicative of their partiality for the prosecution in
proving its case against the petitioner. More precisely, on pages 34 to 35 of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes, the gist of the questions were on the monitoring procedure being
undertaken by the petitioner in supervising the project. While on pages 36 to 39, the
questions dealt with the identities and qualifications of the workers who participated in the
construction of the project. Those on pages 41 to 42, referred to queries which sought to
clarify the facts and circumstances of another case filed against the petitioner by a certain
Mr. Macapala. All told, these questions cannot be said to have crossed the limits of propriety.
In propounding these questions, the Justices merely attempted to ferret the the truth as to
the facts to which the witness was testifying.

In any case, if petitioner were under the impression that the Justices were unduly interfering
in his testimony, he was free to manifest his objection. 11 However, the records show that he
answered the questions freely and without any objection from his counsel on the alleged
active participation of the Justices when he gave his testimony.

While we do not see any merit in petitioner's first assigned error, we, however, agree with him
that his guilt was not adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

It is well settled that whether the accused is guilty or not of the offense charged is a question
which involves a determination of facts as presented by the prosecution and the defense. The
duty to ascertain which is more credible is lodged with the trial court which had the
opportunity to observe the witness directly and to test his credibility by his demeanor on the
stand. Thus, the Sandiganbayan's factual findings are generally accorded respect, even
finality, unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or premised on the
absence of evidence on the record. 12 A re-examination of the entire proceedings of the
instant case compels us to take exception to the aforementioned general rule.

It must be borne in mind that criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the
Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough review by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 13

Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the
absence of his defense 14 for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's
case and not on the weakness of the defense.

Going over the records and the TSN of the private complainant, we entertain serious
misgivings about his testimony, especially after he had erred as regards important facts and
information, not to mention the questionable lapses of memory. Indeed, for evidence to be
believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. 15

It is worthy to note that private complainant narrated that he was the one who paid the
workers their wages during the construction of the well. 16 However, it baffles us that in
paying these workers, he never bothered to have them sign any payroll or voucher
receipt, 17 a practice which is routine for those engaged in hiring workers for construction
projects. At the very least, the payroll or voucher receipts are necessary, not only for
accounting purposes, but for protection against spurious or unsubstantiated claims that may
arise. Simply put, private complainant's behavior was in total disregard of logic and usual
management practice expected from a prudent businessman.

What is incredible is the failure of private complainant to remember even a single name of his
workers. 18Since six of the thirteen (13) laborers bore his own surname Alegre, it strains
credulity that he could not remember any of them. Obviously, private complainant's claim
that he is a contractor is a falsehood.

If he were indeed one, he should have presented documentary evidence to support his claim.
In fact, the record is bereft of any project study, purchase order, delivery receipt, proofs of
procurement of materials and other evidence which would sustain the finding that he was
indeed a contractor engaged in his normal work. His testimony alone in this regard is grossly
inadequate, thus rendering the prosecution's cause inherently weak.

Likewise, in the Time and Book Payroll Sheet 19 issued by the Municipality, a document duly
signed by the private complainant stated that he was the head laborer during the
construction. In the early case of U.S. v. Carrington,20 we have asserted the public document
character of the municipal payroll; as such, it is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.21 The same can only be rebutted by other competent evidence 22and cannot be
overcome by the testimony of a single witness. 23 As earlier stated, private complainant never
even offered any evidence to contravene the presumption that the recitals in the municipal
payroll giving his status as a head laborer were true. Besides, the Time and Payroll Sheet,
having been signed by the Municipal Treasurer, it is clothed with the presumption of
regularity, particularly since it was not objected to by the private complainant.

Aside from the foregoing considerations, private complainant signed the payroll sheet
indicating his status as a head laborer. Therefore, this representation is conclusive upon him
and he cannot deny or disprove the same without violating the principle of estoppel.

All these considerations taken together, it is clear that the prosecution failed to establish
private complainant's assertion that he is a contractor. Hence, we agree with the defense that
private complainant, as laborer, together with thirteen (13) other workers was entitled only to
a total of P4,475.00 and not P5,000.00 representing their salaries. This being the case, the
P4,500.00 that he received from petitioner was even in excess of the amount which he and the
other workers, was originally entitled to. Consequently, to affirm petitioner's conviction
would result in a serious injustice. It is axiomatic that in every criminal prosecution, if the
state fails to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, it fails utterly. 24 Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with
moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence of the
accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. 25

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as
it convicted and sentenced petitioner Tomas Cosep of violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019
is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner Cosep is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Kapunan, J., concur.

Purisima, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit "4," Folder of Exhibit.

2 Exhibit "2," Folder of Exhibit.

3 Rollo, pp. 19-38, penned by Justice Jose S. Balajadia, with Justices Francis
Garchitorena and Narciso T. Atienza, concurring.

4 TSN, November 25, 1992, pp. 34-42.

5 Rollo, p. 4.

6 Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

7 Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986).

8 People v. Opinada, 142 SCRA 259 (1986).

9 Eggert v. Moster Safe Co., 730 P2d 895.

10 Domanico v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 218 (1983).

11 People v. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996).

12 Pareño v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242 (1996).

13 Fileteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996).

14 People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 (1995).

15 People v. Magpantay, G.R. No. 113250-52, January 14, 1998.

16 T.S.N., November 24, 1992, pp. 20-21.

17 Ibid., pp. 22-23.

18 Ibid.

19 Exhibit "A," Folder of Exhibit.

20 5 Phil. 725 (1901).

21 Sec. 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

22 People v. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 (1988); People v. Liones, 117 SCRA 382
(1982).
23 Francisco, Evidence, Third Edition, 1996, p. 517.

24 People v. Tiwalen, 213 SCRA 701 (1992).

25 People v. Yabut, 210 SCRA 394 (1992).

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, 1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:

That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE
THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to
Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of
rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee
bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with
the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2

The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:

(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱8,496.55.4

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.5

The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in
1989, spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop
business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743,
post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; 8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and
during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of
₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED
ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he
filed a criminal complaint against them.12

While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit
or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to
guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof.14

On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias
Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal
cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to
imprisonment and fine, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and
a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;

2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and
a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,

3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and a
fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;

4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses
incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of
₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

With Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. 16 On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with
her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17

On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the
provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless
the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not
prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not
exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part
in every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that
in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated November 16, 1999.22

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF
THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER
THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.

2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA

BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE WHICH STATES:

Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN

AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE
SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P.
BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23

Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the
three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope
of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as
penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court
of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes
the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a
sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with
regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of
statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis derogant
generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated
altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the
article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the
latter should specifically provide the contrary.

The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under
the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article
2228 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive
effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 1729 of
the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the crime
of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs.
Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments
used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC.
Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which,
by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case
of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application
of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.33

All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.

Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. 35

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant
Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check
subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did
not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct
inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that
may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However,
this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive

evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation
in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.39

As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40

To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is
a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established
as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and
kept within the penal fold.

Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction
must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court ruled thus
in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco,
merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to
us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for
the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.

Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in
order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines
the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the
accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of
proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence
falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted. 1a\^/phi1.net

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the
petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (now retired) and concurred in by Justices
Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and Eloy R. Bello (now retired).

2
Original Records, pp. 1-2.

3
Id., p. 3.

4
Id., p. 5.

5
Id., pp. 29-31.

6
Also known as Ronie.

7
TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 4-7.

8
Id., pp. 16-21.

9
TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 2-3.

10
TSN of January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 1-2.

TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 19; TSN of December 4, 1991,
11

Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 1 and 3; TSN of January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo
Oculam, p. 1; Original Records, p. 128.

TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 2 and 4; TSN of January 28,
12

1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 2; Original Records, p. 125.

TSN of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, pp. 7-8, 11-12 and 15; TSN of
13

December 20, 1993, Testimony of Adronico Ladonga, p. 18.

 TSN of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, p. 10; TSN of December 20,
14

1993, Testimony of Adronico Ladonga, pp. 24-26.

15
Original Records, p. 124.

16
Id., p. 126.

17
Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo, p. 28.

18
Rollo, p. 133.

19
No. 18260, January 27, 1923, 44 Phil. 437.

20
No. 5952, October 24, 1911, 20 Phil. 379.

21
No. 9268, November 4, 1914, 28 Phil. 305.

22
Rollo, p. 39.

23
Rollo, pp. 69-70.

Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000,
24

342 SCRA 449, 483.

25
Note No. 19, supra.

26
Note No. 20, supra.

27
Note No. 21, supra.

28
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

29
ART. 17. Principals. – The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished.

ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. – Every
30

penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the
 offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.

31
G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004.

ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
32

mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary

personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall
remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is
satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of
the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction
or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or
less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no

subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal

institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time
established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as
those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of
his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances
should improve.

People vs. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People vs.
33

Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 448, 469; People vs.
Quinicio, G.R. No. 142430, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.

People vs. Pickrell, G.R. No. 120409, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 19, 33; People vs.
34

Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454, 473; People vs. Pagalasan, G.R.
Nos. 131926 & 138991, June 18, 2003, 404 SCRA 275, 291.

People vs. Caballero, G.R. Nos. 149028-30, April 2, 2003, 400 SCRA 424, 437; People vs.
35

Ponce, G.R. No. 126254, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 352, 359-360.

36
TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 20.

People vs. Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608, September 24, 2002, SCRA 540, 553; People vs.
37

Melencion, G.R. No. 121902, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 113, 123.

People vs. Leaño, G.R. No. 138886, October 9, 2001, 366 SCRA 774; People vs. Compo,
38

G.R. No. 112990, May 28, 2001, 358 SCRA 266, 272.

39
People vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 151072, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 587, 595.
40
People vs. Mandao, G.R. No. 135048, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 292.

41
Id., pp. 304-305.