Statutes

Notebook: Statutory Construction

Created: 8/16/2019 6:56 AM Updated: 8/16/2019 4:41 PM
Author: pam.miraflr@gmail.com
URL: https://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/araneta-v-dinglasan-digest.html?fbclid=IwAR2x0SqDYMGLsdh-FmvMg8oQ3fviPUeF3Ff9PJsewod5jykv…

DEFINITION

Laws - (general) rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by the legal authorities
          - include RA, PD, EO, Presidential issuances, Jurisprudence, ordinances passed by the local sanggunians
Statues - (general) are acts of legislature commanding or prohibiting something (Philippine Commission, Philippine Legislature, Batasang
Pambansa, Congress)    
              - Presidential Decrees of Marco
Presidential issuances- issued by the President in exercise of his ordinance power
                                    - Executive order - acts of the President that involves the executive decisions
                                    - Administrative Order- affect the administrative body such as government officials, this is in accordance with his power
as the administrative head
                                    - Proclamation - public announcement
                                    - Memorandum Order- orders that concern a particular office or officer about their administrative duties

Constitution - declares the fundamental principles and general framework of the law and the government

Ordinance - act passed by a municipality in accordance with its law-making authority

PARTS OF A STATUTE

1. Title - heading in the preliminary part

                    - what makes the act individually known

                    - single subject rule (Section 26 (1), Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution)

Lidasan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

Facts:

1.   Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the
constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA
4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change
in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2.  Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3.  Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until
"clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1.   The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact
that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of
local application, originated.

2.  The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3.  The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not
be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4.  The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the impression that only the province
of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5.   Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill.

Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject
one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant
to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a
natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the
250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its
title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of
the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as
ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist
that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does
not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and
study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the
Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the
House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were
aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

2. Preamble - states the reason of the act

3. Enacting Clause - part of the statute that declares its enactment

                                       - starts with, "Be enacted"

4. Body - main part which indicates the specific procedures, substantive provisions and even excemptions
5. Repealing Clause - declares the previous statutes which have been revised for the new law
6. Saving Clause - restrictions in a repealing act
7. Separability Clause - in an event that that one or more provisions are unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall be still in force
8. Effectivity Clause - effective date

Public Statutes  Private Statutes

affect the public at large applies only to a specific person or subject

General - applies to the whole

state regardless of gender,
economic status, etc.
Special - only applies to
particular individuals of
communities
Local - operates only in a
specific location

CLASSIFICATION

According to Duration

Permanent Temporary

operates in a limited time only, or whose

Operates in an unlimited time except
life ceases upon the happening of the
when repealed
event

Laws with sunset clause (a slause in a statue that states the validity of the statute) - are temporary
GR - permanent
Araneta v. Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044
August 26, 1949

Facts:
1.      The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671
declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.  

2.              EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for
violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3.       EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the
required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4.       EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for
other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He
applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5.    Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections  in 1949. was questioned by
Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or
otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671  ceased to have any force and effect

YES. 

1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the
regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is
the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it.
2.  Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating
exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for
having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based
on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the
Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

Facts:
1.   Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum
of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces
and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.

2.     Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet
the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."

3.    House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1.   EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving
acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to
such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to
withdraw the same from the President.

2.     CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only
for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of
the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be
repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

3.      If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special
appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671
expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders
make new appropriations.

4.      The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a
limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years
since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers
under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.

            5.   The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the
President for a limited period "in times of war or                         other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment
of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it                      alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom
and unselfish patriotism                  of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.

          According to Time of Applicability

Prospective Retroactive

Looking forward Looking backward

Laws that are created before  Laws that are passed after the 
committing the offense; anticipates the offense was committed; one that affects 
regulation of a future conduct acts that already operated
           According to Operation

Declaratory Curative

Intended to clarify and answer doubts on a

To cure defects in the prior law
particular law

          According to Compliance Requirement

Mandatory Directory

Non-compliance doesn't necessarily 

If non compliance, renders the proceedings
render to proceedings or penalties

All affected subjects have no choice Statutes that are created for convenience 
 but to obey only, not for strict observance

Use of "shall, should, must, etc." Use of permissive words such as "may"
Supporting article:  http://ijlljs.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/article-on-mandatory-and-directory-provisions.pdf

          According to Whether or Not Rights are Given

Substantive  Non-Substantive (Remedial)

States the rights and obligations of life,  Declares how the proceedings should be
liberty, and property which if violated can  handled in accordance with the substantive
be subject to consequences statutes
Supporting Article:  https://philippinebar.wordpress.com/tag/remedial-law/

          According to Form

Affirmative Negative

Directs the doing of an act, or states what

Prohibits the things being done, 
 should be done in contrast to 
declares things that should not be done
the negative statutes

          According to Whether or Not There is a Penal Provision

Penal Non-Penal

Imposes punishments for its violation Doesn't invoke penalties

Defines the offenses and omissions which

 are against the state and invokes 
punishment when violated

HOW A BILL BECOMES A LAW

A statue starts with a BILL.

Bill- draft of a proposed law through all the various stages in the houses
Act - if a bills becomes enacted on and passed by the legislature

The following are the steps in order for a bill to become a law:

1. The bill should undergo 3 reading before it can be qualified to become a law. 

            a. First Reading - reading of the number and title of the bill
                                        - a certain committee will then be assigned for the bill. This committee can call for public meetings in order to
consolidate amendments. After the centralization of the amendments, the bill is now ready for the second reading.

            b. Second Reading- the bill is now posted at the Calendar of bills
            c. Third Reading- The legislative authorities are now ready to cast their votes for the bill

Similarly, the other House will undergo the same process, and the conference committee will deliberate the amendments and the decisions
of both Houses.
Lastly, the President will review the bill for approval or rejection. He can practice his power to veto the bill

Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Section 25.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.

4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations
bill is passed by the Congress.

Section 26. (Procedure on how a bill is passed)

1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Section 27. (Veto powers)

1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in
its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names
of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.

Every bill shall only have one subject as expressed in the title

To prevent hodgepdge legislation

To prevent fraud or unexpected suprises
To fairly apprise the people

    

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

The final copy of a bill or joint resolution that has passed both houses of a legislature and is ready for signature. In legislativepractice, a bill that has been duly in
of State.

Under the enrolled bill rule, once an election for the adoption of a statute is held, the procedural method by which themeasure was placed on the ballot cannot 

CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.

Facts: The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued  on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. 

        Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board
of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring             that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.
Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum         of P6,345.72 paid as margin
fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the
Bank refused to                 pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for
petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in             accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2069. 

Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. 
Held: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
 

Ratio: It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. 

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive
— on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to
the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections
to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
“What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third reading without amendments.
But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the
amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The
printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The
bill became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to

Held: The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments, which requires the judicial
department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment, required, it is said,
by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the
entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become a law.

EFFECTIVITY

1. Publication Requirement

Tañada v. Tuvera (resolution of the M.R.), L-63915 December 29, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners invoke due process in its petition to the Court for requiring the publication of a number of presidential issuance (i.e. PD’s, LOI’s,
General Orders, Proclamations, EO’s, Letters of Implementation and Administrative Orders) in the Official Gazette.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette for its effectivity

RULINGS:
The presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette to complete its effectivity. Article 2 of the New Civil Code
invokes publication as an indispensable requirement for laws to become effective. The clause in such provision stating that “unless it is
otherwise provided” pertains to the effective date but subject to the requirement of a complete publication.
The Court ordered that unless these presidential issuance were published in the Official Gazette, these shall have no binding force and effect.

Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Vega, GR No. 105364, June 28, 2001 (deviation from Tañada v. Tuvera)

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official
Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon
reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and
reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10,
1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law
became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have
general application thus it took effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld
that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

2. Prospective 

            Exceptions:
            a. Law provides for retroactive application
           b. Penal provision favorable to the accused
 
PEOPLE vs. MORILLA
G.R. No. 189883
February 5, 2014

FACTS:

During a checkpoint, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were caught illegally transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride by means
of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance.
During the trial, Mayor Mitra argued that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and explained that he only accommodated
the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. Likewise, Morilla insisted that he thought what he was transporting
were wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not
bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not intent or knowledge is material in determining the culpability of an accused in drug cases (NO)
2) Whether or not the finding of conspiracy is correct (YES)

HELD:

1) NO, intent or knowledge is not material in determining the culpability of an accused in drug cases.

The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. Morilla
and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used
under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was
driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

2) YES, the finding of conspiracy is correct.

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.
Morilla’s argument that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a
syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous
drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police
officers that he was with the mayor.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017

TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds

PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and
special message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
Baguio City Branch.

On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan was conducted. It was found out that the deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt by
LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The
auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount of P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty. Petitioner
appealed to CA which affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the
finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became
final and executory.

On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.
Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the execution of the judgment of conviction.

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of
Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
          The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime of malversation of public funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2)
that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public funds
or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds to personal uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso,
went to the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the money went failed
to overcome the presumption of law.

For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation,
all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her
possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it
was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation.

SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an
amendatory law favorable to the accused.
          The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction already cripples the Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was
already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order
However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the
Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said
court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered
it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstancewarranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged
herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner
herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing
being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of
recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court
deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should
be imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day, to six (6) years.
The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more
lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of
which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

            c. Rules of Procedure

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v. SEC. ANGELO REYES, (G)
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

FACTS:
* June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
* May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's underwater composition.
* January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it
adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's
application for an ECC.
* March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon
Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in
the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
* Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly
seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
* Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

HELD:
* No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to
promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources
to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
* Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
* Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this
point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that
the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
* Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be
allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

2. Exception to the exception

            a.  rule of procedure intended to apply prospectively

Facts:

the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male person... bandied as members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there
is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its... application are attendant.
It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for... its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied... retroactively.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of
March 29, 1999.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were...
served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit... retroactively to
the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce,
and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the State
had consistently relied on the prescriptive... periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it
would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule.[
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question... since
'[t]he State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became
politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.'[29] According to the respondent, penal laws,... either procedural or substantive, may be
retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and
lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State... to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the
right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-
bar under the new rule.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or
regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished.
further
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in
criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule,... its
purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the
effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular

Issues:
whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapse... whether there is any... justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period

Ruling:
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against
the State.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999
when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the...
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
two years to do so.
If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to
revive these criminal cases.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an
"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Principles:
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new rule
or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or prospective effect:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c)
the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."

        b. Rules that are substantive in order

CASE: In Re Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan, A.C. 9676, April 2, 2018

Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court a copy of its September 26, 2012 Decision[1] in Case No. OMB-M-A-10-023-A
(Andrea M. Camilo v. Raul C. Brion, Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (SG-10), Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, Mati, Davao Oriental). In
the said Decision, the Office of the Ombudsman noted, viz.:On a final note, this Office finds it unsettling that the Deed of Partition submitted
before the DAR was notarized by Atty. Robellito B. Diuyan on 23 July 2003, when one of the signatories therein, Alejandro F. Camilo, had
earlier died on 23 August 2001. On this matter, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Supreme Court of the Philippines for its information
and appropriate action.In a Resolution[2] dated July 24, 2013, this Court treated the September 26, 2012 Decision in OMB-M-A-10-023-A and
the Deed of Partition as an administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan and required the latter to file a comment
thereon.[3]In a letter[4] dated October 30, 2013, and by way of comment, respondent admitted notarizing the Deed of Partition in his capacity
as District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in Mati City and all of Davao Oriental. He claimed that:[The] signature as Notary
Public in that [July 23, 2003] Deed of Partition subject matter of the complaint was indeed mine. I was still connected with the Public
Attorney's Office as District Public Attorney at that time. I retired on April 20, 2008. My function [included] the execution and/or notarization
of a document x x x.
In a Report and Recommendation[11] dated September 24, 2014, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found respondent guilty of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. While it found no deceit or malice on the part of the respondent, and even considered the fact
that respondent was a former public official with no previous record of misconduct, as well as the fact that the affiants in the subject Deed of
Partition were farmers who did not have any IDs and only had Community Tax Certificates (CTCs) to present and prove their identities, the IBP-
CBD nonetheless found him grossly negligent in the performance of his functions.

Issues:
Whether respondent should he held administratively liable for notarizing a Deed of Partition on the basis of the affiants' CTCs.

Ruling:
However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation his duties as Notary-Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does
not provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench... respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he
notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003.
Principles:
It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public interest and
dictated by public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document into a public one; and as a public document, it enjoys
full credit on its face.