Geluz v CA

Facts:
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband
of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Lazo’s cuase of action was the third and last
abortion of his wife to the said doctor.
The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and was aborted when the
husband was campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.
The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. The doctor
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus - NO

Held: No. Petition granted.

Ratio:
Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus
that is not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the present case, there
is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment
of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have
taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,

Facts:
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C.
Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he
likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to
the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the
subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract
was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or
before 1990 and not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.
Held:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the
well-entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving
the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be
open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from
the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not
reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a
married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the
bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.

Marable v Marable
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal
before Mayor Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 and their marriage was blessed
with 5 children.
Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. Petitioner
developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly
terminated it. But despite the end of the affair, their quarrels aggravated. Petitioner felt that he was unloved,
unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. Petitioner left the family
home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had
accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam
after dating several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds and filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.
Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at
an early age. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children.
This caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. He further alleged that he supported
himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. But despite his success at work, he
alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his
own family.
Petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering from “Antisocial Personality
Disorder,” characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner’s personality
disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences
have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
The RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner’s
psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC
decision. CA denied MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
NO! CA’s decision was upheld.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning
and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. The evaluation of Dr.
Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can
rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. It is indispensable that the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that
he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological
disorder rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Laurel v Abrogar
FACTS
PLDT sued Laurel, for violation of Art 308 RPC (theft), allegedly using international long distance calls
belonging to PLDT, without its knowledge and consent
Laurel filed motion to quash information, contending “international calls are not personal property” .LDT:
“calls & right to conduct business, both capabl of appropriation, thus personal property
ISSUE: WON the international calls as well as the business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
HELD:
Case remanded to trial court. Crime is properly designated as theft. Prosecution directed to amend
information, to clearly state the property subject of the theft are services & business of PLDT. Intl long
distance calls are not personal properties. PLDT: could not have acquired ownership over such calls, merely
encodes, enhances, decodes, and transmits said calls could not validly claim that such call were taken
without its consent. Use of the facilities w/o PLDT consent is the unlawful taking of the telephone services
and business. Only reqt for a personal property to be the object of theft under the RPC is that it be capable
of appropriation. The word “take” in the RPC maybe committed through the use of the offender’s own hands
as well as any mechanical device. Business of providing telecommunication or telephone services is likewise
personal property. Business is not enumerated as real property in Art 415. Thus it is personal property.