outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a
G.R. No. 108538. January 22, 1996.*
LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA,
respondents.
Actions; Summons; Jurisdiction; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; A resident
defendant in an action in personam who cannot be personally served with summons may be
summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by
publication as provided in §§17 and 18 of the same Rule.—In an action in personam,
personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served,
substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is
temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by
leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action
in personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by
means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in
§§ 17 and 18 of the same Rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res.—On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi
in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a
nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served exterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, §17.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; What gives the court jurisdiction in an
action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, and the service of
summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction
but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process.—In such cases, what
gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over
the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the
property litigated or attached. Service of summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for
the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair
play or due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him
and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take
steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
Same; Same; Same; Partition; An action for partition and accounting under Rule 69 is
in the nature of an action quasi in rem.—Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar,
private respondent’s action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting
the defendant’s interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him.
Same; Same; Same; Service of summons upon a nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.—As
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service
of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail
to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.
Same; Same; Same; The three modes of service of summons upon a nonresident must
be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides.—Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the
question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be
justified under the third mode, namely, “in any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient.”
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides.
Same; Same; Same; The period to file an Answer in an action against a resident
defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant
who is not found in the Philippines.—It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in
an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed
against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the
period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty
(60) days from notice.
Same; Same; Same; Agency; Attorneys; The authority given by a wife to her husband
to negotiate cannot be construed as also including an authority to represent her in any
litigation.—In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint
her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent’s attorney that
“all communications” intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her
lawyer at the latter’s address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her
can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of
this case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations
between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the
property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of
correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority given to
petitioner’s husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including an
authority to represent her in any litigation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alfredo D. Valmonte and Cirilo E. Doronilla for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for private respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. The question is whether in an action
for partition filed against her and her husband, who is also her attorney, summons intended
for her may be served on her husband, who has a law office in the Philippines. The Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, said no and refused to declare Lourdes A. Valmonte in
default, but the Court of Appeals said yes. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife. They are
both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo
D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the
Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington
and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini Ermita, Manila.
On March 9, 1992, private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of
rentals against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. The subject of the action is a three-door
apartment located in Paco, Manila.
In her Complaint, private respondent alleged:
The plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway
Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses, of legal
age and at present residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive, South Seattle, Washington,
U.S.A., but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at
Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant
Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmonte's spouse holds office
and where he can be found.
Apparently, the foregoing averments were made on the basis of a letter previously sent by
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte to private respondent's counsel in which, in regard to the
partition of the property in question, she referred private respondent's counsel to her
husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. The
letter reads:
July 4, 1991
Dear Atty. Balgos:
This is in response to your letter, dated 20 June 1991, which I received on 3 July 1991. Please address all communications
to my lawyer, Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte, whose address, telephone and fax numbers appear below.
c/o Prime Marine
Gedisco Center, Unit 304
1564 A. Mabini, Ermita
Metro Manila
Telephone: 521-1736
Fax: 521-2095
Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who at the time,
was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar
as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte,
on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly
the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent
moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special
appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion.
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private respondent's motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied on September 23, 1992. Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and
declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A copy of the appellate court's decision was
received by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte on January 15, 1993 at his Manila office and on
January 21, 1993 in Seattle, Washington. Hence, this petition.
The issue at bar is whether in light of the facts set forth above, petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was validly served with summons. In holding that she had been, the Court of
Appeals stated:1
[I]n her above-quoted reply, Mrs. Valmonte clearly and unequivocally directed the
aforementioned counsel of Dimalanta to address all communications (evidently referring to
her controversy with her sister Mrs. Dimalanta over the Paco property, now the subject of
the instant case) to her lawyer who happens also to be her husband. Such directive was
made without any qualification just as was her choice/designation of her husband Atty.
Valmonte as her lawyer likewise made without any qualification or reservation. Any
disclaimer therefore on the part of Atty. Valmonte as to his being his wife's attorney (at
least with regard to the dispute vis-a-vis (sic) the Paco property) would appear to be feeble
or trifling, if not incredible.
This view is bolstered by Atty. Valmonte's subsequent alleged special appearance made on
behalf of his wife. Whereas Mrs. Valmonte had manifestly authorized her husband to serve
as her lawyer relative to her dispute with her sister over the Paco property and to receive all
communications regarding the same and subsequently to appear on her behalf by way of a
so-called special appearance, she would nonetheless now insist that the same husband
would nonetheless had absolutely no authority to receive summons on her behalf. In effect,
she is asserting that representation by her lawyer (who is also her husband) as far as the
Paco property controversy is concerned, should only be made by him when such
representation would be favorable to her but not otherwise. It would obviously be
inequitable for this Court to allow private respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte to hold that her
husband has the authority to represent her when an advantage is to be obtained by her and
to deny such authority when it would turn out to be her disadvantage. If this be allowed,
Our Rules of Court, instead of being an instrument to promote justice would be made use of
to thwart or frustrate the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Turning to another point, it would not do for Us to overlook the fact that the
disputed summons was served not upon just an ordinary lawyer of private
respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte, but upon her lawyer husband. But that is not
all, the same lawyer/husband happens to be also her co-defendant in the instant
case which involves real property which, according to her lawyer/husband/co-
defendant, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the defendants (the spouses
 Valmonte). It is highly inconceivable and certainly it would be contrary to human
nature for the lawyer/husband/co-defendant to keep to himself the fact that they
(the spouses Valmonte) had been sued with regard to a property which, he claims
to be conjugal. Parenthetically, there is nothing in the records of the case before
Us regarding any manifestation by private respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte about
her lack of knowledge about the case instituted against her and her
lawyer/husband/co-defendant by her sister Rosita. . . .
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus is given due course. This Court hereby Resolves to nullify the
orders of the court a quo dated July 3, 1992 and September 23, 1992 and further
declares private respondent Lourdes Arreola Valmonte as having been properly
served with summons.
Petitioners assail the aforequoted decision, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in
refusing to apply the provisions of Rule 14, §17 of the Revised Rules of Court and applying
instead Rule 14, §8 when the fact is that petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident
defendant; and (2) because even if Rule 14, §8 is the applicable provision, there was no valid
substituted service as there was no strict compliance with the requirement by leaving a copy
of the summons and complaint with petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte. Private respondent,
upon the other hand, asserts that petitioners are invoking a technicality and that strict
adherence to the rules would only result in a useless ceremony.
We hold that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed
against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent,
whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is because the rules on
service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the
other of these actions.
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he
cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-82 is essential
for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.3 If defendant cannot be served with
summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident,
service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. 4 Otherwise stated, a
resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with
summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with
Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§ 17 and 18 of the same Rule. 5
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines,
otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is
essential to make a binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the
country, summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, §17, which
provides:
§17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the
relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by
personal service as under section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case
a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer..
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it
has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the
Philippines or the property litigated or attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with
jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that he
will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property
in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he
is so minded.6
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's action, which is for
partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an
action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a specific
property and not to render a judgment against him. As explained in the leading case
of Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca :7
[An action quasi in rem is] an action which while not strictly speaking an action in
rem partakes of that nature and is substantially such. . . . The action quasi in rem differs
from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the
sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment
entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be
effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent
by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner
which the court may deem sufficient.
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was
not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her
attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, "in
any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the of filing an independent action Gemperle filed a counterclaim in the action brought by Mr.
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the Schenker against him, there would have been no doubt that the trial court could have
defendant resides.8 Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Schenker through his agent and attorney-in-fact, Mrs.
Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Schenker.
Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, §17 and
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the
as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private res- pondent's attorney that "all
service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for
communications" intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her
her failure to file an answer.
lawyer at the latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her
can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior this case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations
leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, §17. As provided in §19, such leave must between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the
be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of
his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application. correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority given to
petitioner's husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including an
authority to represent her in any litigation.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the
rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner Lourdes A.
file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an Valmonte in this case.
action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the
former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the orders dated July 3, 1992
least sixty (60) days from notice.
and September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48 are
REINSTATED.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of due process. That
is why in one case,9although the Court considered publication in the Philippines of the
SO ORDERED.
summons (against the contention that it should be made in the foreign state where
defendant was residing) sufficient, nonetheless the service was considered insufficient
because no copy of the summons was sent to the last known correct address in the
Philippines..

Private respondent cites the ruling in De Leon v. Hontanosas, 67 SCRA 458,462-463 (1975),
in which it was held that service of summons upon the defendant's husband was binding on
her. But the ruling in that case is justified because summons were served upon defendant's
husband in their conjugal home in Cebu City and the wife was only temporarily absent,
having gone to Dumaguete City for a vacation. The action was for collection of a sum of
money. In accordance with Rule 14, §8, substituted service could be made on any person of
sufficient discretion in the dwelling place of the defendant, and certainly defendant's
husband, who was there, was competent to receive the summons on her behalf. In any
event, it appears that defendant in that case submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by
instructing her husband to move for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued in that
case.

On the other hand, in the case of Gemperle v. Schenker, 10 it was held that service on the
wife of a nonresident defendant was found sufficient because the defendant had appointed
his wife as his attorney-in-fact. It was held that although defendant Paul Schenker was a
Swiss citizen and resident of Switzerland, service of summons upon his wife Helen Schenker
who was in the Philippines was sufficient because she was her husband's representative and
attorney-in-fact in a civil case, which he had earlier filed against William Gemperle. In fact
Gemperle's action was for damages arising from allegedly derogatory statements contained
in the complaint filed in the first case. As this Court said, "[i]n other words, Mrs. Schenker
had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also,
empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at
bar, which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf" 11 Indeed, if instead

G.R. No. 131724. February 28, 2000.*
MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JACKSON
TAN, respondent.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; Parties; Service of summons upon a
defendant corporation must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what
he should do with any legal papers received by him.—–Summons is the means by which the
defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby, the
court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is a
corporation, Rule 14, §13 requires that service of summons be made upon the corporation’s
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of the
rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know
what he should do with any legal papers received by him.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Doctrine of Substantial Compliance;
Requisites.—–In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the
requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must
be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the
copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign
a receipt or the sheriffs return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the
corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually served. The third
requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on
service of summons is attained.
Same; Same; Same; It is not allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by
the corporation through the person on whom the summons was served—for there to be
substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
served must be shown.—In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites
were fulfilled. With respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioner’s filing of a
motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and
the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually
turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases
applying the substantial compliance rule, there was direct evidence, such as the admission
of the corporation’s officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer
actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons was
served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance, actual
receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a
corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint against it
through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of
summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is
serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is
in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff’s return, there is nothing to
show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Receipt by a defendant corporation of the summons and complaint
cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.—Respondent casts
doubt on petitioner’s claim that it came to know about the summons and the complaint
against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of its mortgage. There is
nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner was in default in the payment of its loan. It
had received demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had reason to believe that a
foreclosure suit would be filed against it. The appellate court was, therefore, in error in
giving weight to respondent’s claims. Receipt by petitioner of the summons and complaint
cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Voluntary appearance is a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but the assertion of
affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.—–
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled this question. The
rule prior to La Navalwas that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for
dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This rule no longer holds true. Noting that the
doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La
Naval: Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall be
deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be
construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule that, in a motion to dismiss, the allegation
of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer
“for such other reliefs as” may be deemed “appropriate and proper” amounted to voluntary
appearance must be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 78 [1994]) that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
intentional.—–We turn to the effect of petitioner’s prayer for “other reliefs” in its Motion to
Dismiss. In De Midgely v. Fernandos, it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the allegation
of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a
prayer “for such other reliefs as” may be deemed “appropriate and proper” amounted to
voluntary appearance. This, however, must be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval
that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional. It would be absurd to
hold that petitioner unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the only relief that it
can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint against it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
A.S. Dy & Associates for petitioner.
Fernan, Mercado, Cordero, De la Torre & Bael for private respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
In December 1994, Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation, petitioner herein,
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 1 over its real property covered by TCT No. 24069
in favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of
petitioner's indebtedness to respondent in the amount of P2 million, without monthly
interest, but which, at maturity date on June 10, 1995, was payable in the amount of P4
million.1âwphi1.nêt
On November 9, 1995, respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of
mortgage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City. On November 21, 1995,
summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain
Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, dated November 23, 1995, as "a
Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest
ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to receive processes of the
Court."2
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, §13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that
service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is not one of
the authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that, in fact, he was not even
its employee.3
Petitioner also sought the dismissal of the complaint against it on the ground that it had
satisfied its obligation to respondent when the latter opted to be paid in shares of stock
under the following stipulation in the mortgage contract:
That in the remote possibility of failure on the part of the mortgagor to pay the
mortgage obligation and interest in cash, the MORTGAGEE at his option may
demand that payment be made in the form of shares of stock of Millenium
Industrial Commercial Corporation totaling at least 4,000,000 shares. 4
Petitioner further prayed for "other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
On December 15, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Its order
stated:
This refers to the Motion to Dismiss, dated December 4, 1995, by defendant
anchored on the following grounds:
1. That the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
corporation because summons was served upon a person who is not known to or an
employee of the defendant corporation.
2. That the obligation sought to be collected was already paid and extinguished.
By interposing the second ground, the defendant has availed of an affirmative
defense on the basis of which the Court has to hear and receive evidence. For the
Court to validly decide the said plea of the defendant it necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, defendant is considered to have
then abandoned its first ground and is deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself
to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is a legal truism that voluntary appearance
cures the defect of the summons, if any. The defendant's filing of the motion to
dismiss by pleading therein the second ground amount to voluntary appearance
and it indeed cured the defeat.
Wherefore, Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. 6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the trial court in its
order, dated January 16, 1996, for failure of petitioner to raise any new ground. Petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders of
the trial court.
On September 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 7 The appellate court
ruled that although petitioner denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it,
its actual receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a motion to dismiss,
hence, the purpose for issuing summons had been substantially achieved. Moreover, it was
held, by including the affirmative defense that it had already paid its obligation and praying
for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court.8
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON A MERE DRAFTSMAN
WHO IS NOT ONE OF THOSE UPON WHOM SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN
CASE OF A DEFENDANT CORPORATION AS MENTIONED IN THE RULES IS
VALID.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE
RELIEF IN A MOTION TO DISMISS ABANDONS AND WAIVES THE GROUND
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT
THEREIN ALSO PLEADED UNDER PREVAILING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A LEGAL GROUND TO GRANT
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BELOW.
First. Petitioner objects to the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in the
service of summons for two reasons: (1) the enumeration of persons on whom service of
summons on a corporation may be effected in Rule 14, §13, is exclusive and mandatory; and
(2) even assuming that substantial compliance is allowed, its alleged actual receipt of the
summons is based on an unfounded speculation because there is nothing in the records to
show that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the
corporation.9 Petitioner contends that it was able to file a motion to dismiss only because of
its timely discovery of the foreclosure suit against it when it checked the records of the case
in the trial court.
The contention is meritorious.
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an
action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.10 If the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, §13 requires that service of summons
be made upon the corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors.11 The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so
integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize
his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by him. 12
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, §13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general
rule.13 However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons
other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 we ruled that although the service of summons was made
on a person not enumerated in Rule 14, §13, if it appears that the summons and complaint be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative
were in fact received by the corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense. 20
purpose has been attained.
Third. Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioner's prayer for "other reliefs" in its Motion to
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court enumerated the requisites for the Dismiss. In De Midgely v.Fernandos,21 it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the including a prayer "for such other reliefs as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper"
summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or amounted to voluntary appearance. This, however, must be deemed superseded by the
the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation ruling in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional. It
through the person on whom the summons was actually served.16 The third requisite is the would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to
most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on the service of the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the
summons is attained. only relief that it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint
against it.1âwphi1.nêt
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With
respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint
the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. against petitioner is DISMISSED.
There is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the
summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the
SO ORDERED.
substantial compliance rule,17 there was direct evidence, such as the admission of the
corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person upon
whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual
receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons was served.
We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of
summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a corporation
only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint against it through
some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of summons
becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is serious
doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an
employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that
Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.

Respondent casts doubt on petitioner's claim that it came to know about the summons and
the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of its
mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner was in default in the
payment of its loan. It had received demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had reason to
believe that a foreclosure suit would be filed against it. The appellate court was, therefore,
in error in giving weight to respondent's claims. Receipt by petitioner of the summons and
complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.

Second. We now turn to the issue of jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals held that by raising the affirmative defense of payment and by praying for
other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner in effect waived its objection to the trial
court's jurisdiction over it. We think this is error.

Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals18 settled this question. The
rule prior to La Navalwas that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for
dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.19 This rule no longer holds true. Noting that the
doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La
Naval:

Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall

G.R. No. 136426. August 6, 1999.*
E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati City and IMPERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; The designation of persons or
officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is
now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.–The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for
a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states “general manager–
instead of only “manager–; “corporate secretary– instead of “secretary–; and “treasurer–
instead of “cashier.– The phrase “agent, or any of its directors– is conspicuously deleted in
the new rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined; The
liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal
requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic
corporation.–It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor
Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, the Court held: “A strict compliance with the mode of
service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon
whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is
insufficient. x x x. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know
what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, ‘to bring home to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action.’ x x x. The liberal construction rule cannot be
invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in
which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. x x x.– (italics supplied).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of summons upon persons other than those
mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper.–Service of summons
upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held
as improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm’s branch
office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firm’s
principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Dizon, it was held that the
service of summons on the general manager of the insurance firm’s Cebu branch was
improper; default order could have been obviated had the summons been served at the
firm’s principal office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the service of summons upon the branch
manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general
manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper; Trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.–Accordingly, we rule that the service of
summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro,
instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper.
Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.–Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court
over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the
same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which
necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been abandoned in the
case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,which became the basis of the
adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now provides that “the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance.– The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to
enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to
dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney,
precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no
means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service
of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be
null and void.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Capuyan, Quimpo & Salazar for petitioner.
Ermitano, Sangco, Manzano & Associates for private respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set
aside the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November 20, 1998 of the public respondent
Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 and
praying that the public respondent court be ordered to desist from further proceeding with
Civil Case No. 98-824.
Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office
address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive,
Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner
and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the
former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro
belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing
units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom,
the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.
On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract
and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than
a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. 1
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch
Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City2 but the Sheriff's Return of Service3stated that the summons was duly served
"upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr.
WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth,
Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the
summons.1âwphi1.nêt
On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss4 alleging
that on May 6, 1998, "summons intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell
Sabulbero, an employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. Defendant
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served
upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those
persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom
service of summons may be made.
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default5 alleging that defendant has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly on
May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriffs Return.
On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss6 alleging
that the records show that defendant, through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell
Sabulbero actually received the summons and the complaint on May 8, 1998 as evidenced by
the signature appearing on the copy of the summons and not on May 5, 1998 as stated in the
Sheriffs Return nor on May 6, 1998 as stated in the motion to dismiss; that defendant has
transferred its office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its new office address at
Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the purpose of the rule is to bring home
to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an Order7 denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss
as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was given ten (10)
days within which to file a responsive pleading. The trial court stated that since the
summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its
branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on
service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
On August 19, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration8 alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on
the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that
the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to
"general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and
director.
On August 27, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration9 alleging that defendant's branch manager "did bring home" to the
defendant-corporation the notice of the filing of the action and by virtue of which a motion to
dismiss was filed; and that it was one (1) month after receipt of the summons and the
complaint that defendant chose to file a motion to dismiss.
On September 4, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Reply 10 contending that
the changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics.
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order dated November 20,
1998.11
Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motions to dismiss and
for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served. Petitioner
invokes Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases Kanlaon Construction
Enterprises Co., Inc. vs.NLRC12 wherein it was held that service upon a construction project
manager is valid and in Gesulgon vs. NLRC13which held that a corporation is bound by the
service of summons upon its assistant manager.
The only issue for resolution is whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure was already in force.14
Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under
the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
or in-house counsel. (emphasis supplied).
This provision revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided
that:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. (emphasis supplied).
Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is
"restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio
unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear
and concise language.
We agree with petitioner.
Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager 15; a
corporation's assistant manager16; ordinary clerk of a corporation17; private secretary of
corporate executives18; retained counsel19; officials who had charge or control of the
operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager 20; or the corporation's
Chief Finance and Administrative Officer21. In these cases, these persons were considered as
"agent" within the contemplation of the old rule.22 Notably, under the new Rules, service of
summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.
The cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point.
In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons
on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the party himself; if
the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent,
summons shall be served on such person. In said case, summons was served on one Engr.
Estacio who managed and supervised the construction project in Iligan City (although the
principal address of the corporation is in Quezon City) and supervised the work of the
employees. It was held that as manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to
realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the
president or other responsible officer of petitioner such that summons for petitioner was
validly served on him as agent and authorized representative of petitioner. Also in the
Gesulgon case cited by private respondent, the summons was received by the clerk in the
office of the Assistant Manager (at principal office address) and under Section 13 of Rule 14
(old rule), summons may be made upon the clerk who is regarded as agent within the
contemplation of the rule.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only
"manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier."
The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court
Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:23
. . . the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to "be made on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors." The aforesaid terms were
obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the
word "agent" of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who
precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very appearance for
that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of the need for this
revised section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case
necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who
is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner.
(emphasis supplied).
Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision
Committee, stated that "(T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to one
named in (the) statute . . . .24
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales
Corporation vs. Mangosing,25 the Court held:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a
corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise the service is insufficient. . . .
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper
notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served
on him. In other words, "to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action." . . . .
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal
requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. . . . .
(emphasis supplied).
Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old
rule) has been held as improper.26 Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager
of a firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at
the firm's principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Inc. Co., Inc. vs. Dizon,27 it was
held that the service of summons on the general manager of the insurance firm's Cebu
branch was improper; default order could have been obviated had the summons been served
at the firm's principal office.
And in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et
al.28 the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, "strictest"
compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (on Priorities in
modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow
circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the
administration of justice.
Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at
its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal
office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer
jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant's voluntary appearance
in the action is equivalent to service of summons.29Before, the rule was that a party may
challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance
through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or
invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
court.30 This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,31 which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in
the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now
provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."
The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement
of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not
belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the
trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and
void.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the public
respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 98-824, and all its orders and issuances in connection therewith are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144662. October 13, 2003.*
SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Summons; Jurisdiction; Question of whether the substantial
compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, rule 14 of the 1997 Rule of Civil
Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case.—The
question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies
squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and
with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with
private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with
its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was
served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that
there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa.
The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in
Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made
through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed
with petitioner’s assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited
and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by
Villarosa, which is the later case.—Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling
in Millenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case.
We must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force
and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by
petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed
overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
Same; Same; Same; The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process.—At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party
to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of due process. We will deprive private respondent of its right to present its
defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on service
of summons.
PETITION for review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gramata & Sarte Law Firm for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision,1 dated May 12, 2000, of the Court of Appeals
and its resolution2 dated August 25, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54649 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. The decision set aside the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case No. 98-1567 and directed said court to conduct further
proceedings on the complaint for rescission of lease contract.
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land located along
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. On March 30, 1993, petitioners and private
respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation (hereafter Columbus) entered into a
lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth ten million
pesos (₱10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the lease. Because private respondent
failed to comply with this stipulation, the petitioners on November 13, 1998, filed a
complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1567. Summons was
served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy
of the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return described
Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners
filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion was granted and
petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted
for decision.
On April 22, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against defendant declaring the contract of lease rescinded, terminated and cancelled,
and ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱10 Million which is the value of the building which
defendant failed to construct on the leased properties, as and by way [of] actual
damages;
2. To pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱63,862.57 beginning November 1998 until defendant
and the sub-lessee vacate the leased property by way of reasonable compensation for the
use of the properties;
3. and all other persons and entities claiming rights under it, to surrender possession to
plaintiffs and to vacate the leased premises;
4. to pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱300,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
5. to pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;
6. to pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱100,000.00; and
7. to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, private respondent filed a
motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by petitioners. The trial court ordered the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the
trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default, thus:
It appearing that the decision rendered by this Court on April 27, 1999 became final and
executory on May 12, 1999, defendant’s Motion to Lift Order of Default is hereby DENIED.
Concomitant thereto, plaintiffs’ Motion for Execution is hereby GRANTED.
The Order of this Court on May 21, 1999 allowing the parties to file their respective
memoranda within ten (10) days from May 21, 1999 is hereby revoked and set aside, since
the incidents can be resolved based on the records.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution issue to enforce and implement the final and
executory decision rendered by this Court on April 27, 1999.
SO ORDERED.5
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted,
private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It suffered
the same fate as the motion for reconsideration for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was
directed to proceed with the enforcement of the decision.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision in Civil Case No. 98-1567 and all the
proceedings therein, including the order of default and writ of execution, are SET ASIDE.
The court a quo is ORDERED to require petitioner to file its answer and thereafter to
conduct further appropriate proceedings with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it denied private respondent’s
motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that private respondent was
not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer.
Section 11, 7 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service of summons
upon domestic private juridical entity shall be made through its president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Since service
upon private respondent was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in
private respondent’s office, as evidenced by the latter’s employment record, such service
cannot be considered valid. Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the order
of default, judgment by default and its execution, were also invalid because the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Besides, judgments by default are not
favored, especially so when there is a prima facie showing that the defaulting party has a
meritorious defense, which in this case was grounded on the contract of lease sued upon,
said the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review
averring that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I. … HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON PRIVATE
RESPONDENT COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION
II. … NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS CONFORMABLY WITH
THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE.
III. … HOLDING THAT WITH THE ADOPTION OF SECTION 11, RULE 14 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE NO LONGER APPLIES.
IV. … NOT HOLDING THAT JURISDICTION WAS ACQUIRED OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENT
COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION AND THAT ITS MOTION TO LIFT ORDER OF
DEFAULT LACKS MERIT.8
The issues in this case may be succinctly stated as follows:
a. Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction, and
b. Whether private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was in order.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a
private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the
substantial compliance rule. Petitioners cite Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation
v. Tan,9 and maintain that this Court, by referring to E.B Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v.
Judge Benito,10effectively ruled that said provision is the statement of the general rule on
service of summons upon corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception.
Petitioners claim that this Court, in an array of cases, upheld the substantial compliance
rule when it allowed the validity of the service of summons on the corporation’s employee
other than those mentioned in the Rule where said summons and complaint were in fact
seasonably received by the corporation from said employee. Petitioners insist that
technicality must not defeat speedy justice.
Petitioners stress that even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in
private respondent’s corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14
because the summons actually reached private respondent. This can be gleaned from
private respondent’s motion to lift order of default where private respondent did not
question the validity of the service of summons but explained in paragraph three thereof
that its failure to answer the complaint was due to its impression that the case would not be
pursued by petitioners because the corporation already made payments to them.11
From said averment, according to petitioners, private respondent in effect admitted that it
received the summons. Notwithstanding this, private respondent did not file its answer to
the complaint, said the petitioners. This is tantamount to negligence which the court cannot
tolerate, petitioners conclude. There being valid service of summons, the Regional Trial
Court acquired jurisdiction over private respondent, according to petitioners.
Petitioners further contend that the Court of Appeals’ reliance on E.B Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito,12in denying their motion for reconsideration was misplaced,
because the factual milieu in said case was different from that in the instant case. In
Villarosa, according to them, there was no showing of actual receipt by the defendant
corporation of the summons while in this case, private respondent actually received the
summons.
Private respondent counters that nowhere in the Millenium case did this Court expressly
state or remotely imply that we have not abandoned the doctrine of substantial compliance.
Private respondent claims that petitioners misquoted the portion of the Millenium decision
where this Court cited the Villarosa case, to make it appear that the Villarosa ruling, which
provides an interpretation of Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, states
the general rule on the service of summons upon corporations where the substantial
compliance rule is the exception. Private respondent avers that what this Court discussed in
the Millenium case was the rule on service of summons under the old Rules of Court prior to
the promulgation and effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Millenium case
held that as a general rule, service upon one who is not enumerated in Section 13,13 Rule 14
of the then Rules of Court is invalid, according to private respondent. An exception is when
the summons is actually received by the corporation, which means that there was
substantial compliance with the rule. Private respondent stresses that since the exception
referred to the old rule, it cannot be made to apply to the new rule, which clearly specifies
and limits the persons authorized to receive the summons in behalf of the
corporation.1a\^/phi1.net
Neither can petitioners rely on Millenium to justify their theory, adds private respondent,
because at the time the complaint in this case was filed with the trial court, the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure were already in effect. The case law applicable in the instant case,
contends private respondent, is Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper
interpretation of the new rule on the service of summons upon domestic corporation, thus:
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only
"manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier."
The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. 14
According to private respondent, service through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of
private respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is invalid.
We find private respondent’s submission on this issue meritorious.
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies
squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and
with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with
private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with
its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was
served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that
there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa.
The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in
Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case.1awphi1.nét We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as
service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules
of Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely,
private respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully
agreed with petitioner’s assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted,
limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule
on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their position for
said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millenium was
decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case
which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases15 cited by petitioners where we upheld the
doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the
later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard
and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative
or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process.16 We will deprive private respondent of its right to present its defense in this
multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
On the second issue, petitioners claim that private respondent’s motion to lift order of
default was not in order for it was filed late, contrary to the provision in sub-paragraph (b),
Section 3,17 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires filing of the motion
after notice but before judgment. Also, the motion was (a) not under oath; (b) did not show
the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect that caused private respondents’ failure to
answer; and (c) did not show private respondent’s meritorious defense.
Private respondent, in turn, argues that since service upon it was invalid, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over it. Hence, all the subsequent proceedings in the trial court are
null and void, including the order of default. This renders the second issue now moot and
academic.
We find merit in private respondent’s submissions. Since we have ruled that service of
summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it
necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire
jurisdiction over private respondent.18 Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings held
before it, including the order of default, are null and void.19 As private respondent points
out, the second issue has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The questioned decision, as well as the
resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54649 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003.*
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON
and ROMEO BOYON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Generally, trial courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons.—In general, trial
courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may
be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service; Personal service of summons is
preferred to substituted service; Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process
server resort to the latter; Circumstances which must be indicated in the proof of summons;
Failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.—As can be gleaned from the
above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only
if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover,
the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons
within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state
that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing
in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the
proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully
with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A general statement that such efforts were made will
not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.—The
Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by
either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents
without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge
thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the
efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will
not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extraterritorial Service; Extraterritorial service of
summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in
rem.—It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication
applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.The first is an action against the
thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named
as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to
the obligation or loan burdening it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for specific performance is an action in
personam.—In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not
assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an
action for specific performance is an action in personam.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lucia V. Oliveros for petitioners.
Arnold H. Labay for respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal
service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by publication is applicable in
actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is
for specific performance.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
60888. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision is worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of what prescinds, the assailed resolution and orders issued by
the public respondent are perforce ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. This pronouncement is
nonetheless rendered without prejudice to the refiling of the same case by the private
respondents with the court a quo."3
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"On July 2, 1998, [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific
performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the
transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was
lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa which is presided by herein public
respondent Judge N.C. Perello. On July 21, 1998, respondent judge, through the acting
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued summons to the
[respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the
process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
[respondents] failed. On December 9, 1998, [petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-
parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On December 28, 1998,
public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect
Summons by Publication. On July 30, 1999, the respondent judge, sans a written motion,
issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their respective
answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit
their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately, on December 7, 1999, respondent judge issued the
assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
‘x x x Therefore, Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to execute the necessary
document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with
the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title ‘to the parcel of land subject of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their names. Thereafter the
Register of Deeds of Makati City or Muntinlupa City may cancel Transfer of Certificate of
Title No. 149635 of the Defendants and issue another to Plaintiff under the deed of sale,
clean and free of any reported encumbrance.
‘Defendants are also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in the amount of ₱20,000 and
attorney’s fees of ₱20,000 including costs of this suit.’
xxxxxxxxx
"On January 5, 2000, [respondent] Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States
of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued
by the respondent court. On January 18, 2000, [respondents] filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a
quo. On March 17, 2000, the public respondent issued an Order denying the said motion on
the basis of the defaulted [respondents’] supposed loss of standing in court. On March 29,
2000, the [respondents] once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a
motion for reconsideration. On June 22, 2000, however, an Order was issued by the public
respondent denying the said motion. The [petitioners] moved for the execution of the
controverted judgment which the respondent judge ultimately granted."4
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court
(RTC).
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and
Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to
comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify
in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the
impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the
subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit
for specific performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution
and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents.
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the assailed
Resolution dated December 7, 1999 was already final and executory
"B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the Petition for
Certiorari of private respondents despite the pendency of an appeal earlier filed
"C. The Honorable Court erred in not holding that the Petition for Certiorari was
time barred
"D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proceedings in the
lower court are null and void due to invalid and defective service of summons and
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents." 6
In sum, the main issue revolves around the validity of the service of summons on
respondents.1ªvvphi1.nét
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Service of Summons
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on respondents
was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the trial court was
denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem,
because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. They further argue
that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the
trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by publication, which they
effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null
and void because of the invalid and defective service of summons. According to them, the
Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state that he had
exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. He allegedly tried to serve it
personally on them on July 22, 1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang. He,
however, resorted to substituted service on that same day, supposedly because he could not
find respondents in the above address. They further allege that the person to whom he gave
the summons was not even a resident of that address.
Respondents contend that when summons is served by substituted service, the return must
show that it was impossible to serve the summons personally, and that efforts had been
exerted toward that end. They add that noncompliance with the rule on substituted service
renders invalid all proceedings relative thereto.
As to the summons by publication subsequently effected by petitioners, respondents argue
that the case filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance and,
therefore, an action in personam. As such, the summons by publication was insufficient to
enable the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by publication was
permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective and invalid because of the
failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an Affidavit attesting that the
latter deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and of the order of publication, paid
the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail to the former’s last known
address.1awphi1.nét
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will
the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service,
following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
The necessity of stating in the process server’s Return or Proof of Service the material facts
Court, which read:
and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service was explained by this Court
in Hamilton v. Levy,11 from which we quote:
"Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
"x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
sign for it, by tendering it to him.
stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in
lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
"Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here,
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective."12
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof."
Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed in Madrigal v.
to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server Court of Appeals13 as follows:
resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted
"In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of
availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office
exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to
or regular place of business, of the defendant.7 It is likewise required that the pertinent facts
the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise,
proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The
the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons,
failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.8
person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to
do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds."14
Defective Personal Service of Summons
Summons by Publication Improper
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to
substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies
respondents. A review of the records9 reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No.
only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself
32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons
instead of against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant,
personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were
and the purpose is to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the
ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon
obligation or loan burdening it.15
was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find
respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server
obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
Summons is reproduced as follows: performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of
land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any
interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for
"That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo
specific performance is an action in personam.16
Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that
defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo
Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly
of the Revised Rules of Court."10 acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the
proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.17
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step
taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge
thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006.*
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdictions; Summons; Substituted Service; While substituted service of
summons is permitted, since it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual
method of service, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules.—Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either
upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When
the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no
valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is null and void.” In an action strictly in personam, personal service
on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons
to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the
summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While
substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in
derogation of the usual method of service.” Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply
with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed,
“compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the
issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The party relying on substituted
service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service; “Reasonable time” is defined as so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what
the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any, to the other party; One month from the issuance of summons can be
considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant.—The party
relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the
plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable time” to serve the summons to the defendant in
person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time” is defined as “so much
time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to
do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for
the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Under the Rules, the service of
summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the
sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons,
then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if
the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a
personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff,
“reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a
complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time” means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s
Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of
Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days
of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered
“reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sheriffs; Sheriffs are enjoined to try their best efforts to
accomplish personal service on defendant, and since the defendant is expected to try to avoid
and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on the defendant; “Several attempts” means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates.—Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties
on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and
speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined
to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand,
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff
must be resourceful, perse-vering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one
month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
“Several attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates.
In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service—the efforts made to
find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in
the Return.—The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the
Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate
the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified
in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9,
1989 requires that “impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,” which should be made
in the proof of service.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A person of suitable age and discretion
is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have
enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons; “Discretion” is defined as
the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed; The person upon whom
substituted service is made must have the “relation of confidence” to the defendant, ensuring
that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.—If the
substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a
person of “suitable age and discretion then residing therein.” A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
“Discre-tion” is defined as “the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed”.
Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand
English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the “relation of confidence” to the
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the
summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling
or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; If the substituted service will be done at de-fendant’s office
or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the
place.—If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of
business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the
person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or
business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these
details must be contained in the Return.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may
be assailed by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and
circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in
the Return or Certificate of Service.—A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return
readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on
petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those
efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become
impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of “on many occasions
several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally,” “at reasonable hours
during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her
place and/or residence or premises.” Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates
from the ruling—in Domagas v. Jensen, and other related cases—that the pertinent facts
and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated
in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what
hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of
summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative
that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described
with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through direct means.—Apart
from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary
efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states
that respondents were “informed, and so [they] allege” about the address and whereabouts
of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort
in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. More so, in the case in
hand, when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful or has not been clearly
ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued
persistently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In view of the numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special
civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and
wasteful legal expenses, the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of
failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice—the facts and circumstances
should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at
personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the
Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken; To allow sheriffs to describe the facts
and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise
duties relating to substituted service—for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal
carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.—In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA
243 (2000), it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriff’s Return, which states that
“despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on several
occasions the same proved futile,” conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service.
However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have
spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and
ap-peals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the
Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant
and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and
circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of
attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate
defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be
included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were
made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove
impossibility of prompt personal service. Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and
circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties
relating to substituted service—for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness
or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth millions
may be lost by a defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only
fair that the Sheriff’s Return should clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
hopelessness of personal service.
Jurisdictions; Summons; Substituted Service; There are two requirements under the
Rules regarding leaving summons with a “person of suitable age and discretion” residing in
defendant’s house or residence, namely, (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion, and, (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant; To protect a
defendant’s right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the
substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.—Granting
that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a “person of
suitable age and discretion” residing in defen-dant’s house or residence. Thus, there are two
(2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sher-iff’s general
assertion that de la Cruz is the “resident caretaker” of petitioner as pointed out by a certain
Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is
doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit
considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a male
caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s allegation that Macky de la Cruz is
not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information
in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for
the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary “relation of
confidence” with petitioner. To protect petitioner’s right to due process by being accorded
proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to
clearly comply with the rules. It has been stated and restated that substituted service of
summons must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the
circumstances authorized by the rules.
Same; Same; Same; Sheriffs; For the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty by a sheriff, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were
exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed; The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable where it is
patent that the sheriff’s return is defective.—The court a quo heavily relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It reasons out that “[t]he
certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein,
and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear
and convincing.” The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However,
for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or
attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These
facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the
substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the
dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption
cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply
with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service. In the case
of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305 (1987), it was held that “x x x the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sher-iff’s return is defective (emphasis
supplied).” While the Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort
or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at
bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required
by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return
did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is
void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that the indicated address is defendant’s
actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void substituted service valid
and effective.—On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes,
Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the substituted service
is void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes
Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void
substituted service valid and effective.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
R.C. Domingo, Jr. and Ruben C. Fruto for private respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a valid
service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily
submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of
the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect one’s
right to due process.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 presents the core issue whether there
was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction. Petitioner Manotoc claims the court a quo should have annulled the
proceedings in the trial court for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service
of summons.
The Facts
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the
Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda ‘Imee’ R. Marcos-Manotoc 2 for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s
judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United
States of America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos,
Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision,
tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the
then Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons 3 on July 6, 1993 addressed
to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de
la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. 4 When petitioner
failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Order 5 dated October 13,
1993.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided
in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was
neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules
on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore;
and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who
testified that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. He also
identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens
Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the Certification was issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone.
Petitioner also presented her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card 7 issued by
the Immigration Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore. She claimed that the
person referred to in plaintiff’s Exhibits "A" to "EEEE" as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even be her, but the
mother of Tommy Manotoc, and granting that she was the one referred to in said exhibits, only 27 out of
109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc. Hence, the infrequent number of times she allegedly entered
Alexandra Homes did not at all establish plaintiff’s position that she was a resident of said place.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs’ estate, presented Robert Swift, lead counsel for
plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who testified that he participated
in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that
petitioner’s residence was at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. 8 In addition, the entries 9 in the
logbook of Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the name of petitioner
Manotoc and the Sheriff’s Return, 10 were adduced in evidence.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its findings
that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court
relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service was made in the regular performance of
official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary. 11
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotoc’s plea for reconsideration for lack of merit. 12
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 13 before the Court of Appeals (CA) on
January 20, 1995, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the annulment of the October 11, 1994 and
December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge Aurelio C. Trampe.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 17, 1997, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, 14 dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition. The court a quo adopted the findings of the trial court that
petitioner’s residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue,
Pasig, Metro Manila, which was also the residence of her husband, as shown by the
testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the Returns of the registered mails sent to petitioner. It
ruled that the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and the Certification dated September
17, 1993 issued by Renato A. De Leon, Assistant Property Administrator of Alexandra
Homes, were hearsay, and that said Certification did not refer to July 1993—the month
when the substituted service was effected.
In the same Decision, the CA also rejected petitioner’s Philippine passport as proof of her
residency in Singapore as it merely showed the dates of her departure from and arrival in
the Philippines without presenting the boilerplate’s last two (2) inside pages where
petitioner’s residence was indicated. The CA considered the withholding of those pages as
suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the
old Revised Rules of Court.
On April 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15 which was denied by the
CA in its Resolution 16dated October 8, 1997.
Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for review on certiorari.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the Court’s consideration:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE
DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND B) IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE PETITIONER THROUGH A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 8, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON AN ALLEGED CARETAKER OF
PETITIONER’S RESIDENCE IN COMPLETE DEFIANCE OF THE RULING IN CASTILLO VS. CFI OF
BULACAN, BR. IV, G.R. NO. L-55869, FEBRUARY 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 632 WHICH DEFINES THE
PROPRIETY OF SUCH SERVICE UPON MERE OVERSEERS OF PREMISES WHERE A PARTY
SUPPOSEDLY RESIDES.
III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE RESIDENCE OF THE HUSBAND IS ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF HIS WIFE CONTRARY
TO THE RULING IN THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. DE COSTER, G.R. NO. 23181,
MARCH 16, 1925, 47 PHIL. 594.
IV. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE ON EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS UNDER SECTIONS 17 AND
18, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. 17
The assigned errors bring to the fore the crux of the disagreement—the validity of the
substituted service of summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit
to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of
the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void." 18 In
an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of
service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant,
for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then
substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted,
"it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service." 19 Hence,
it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction." 20
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case provides:
SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted
service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides
that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined
as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 23 Under
the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of
court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter
submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may
then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. 24 What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate
impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than
seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To
the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk
of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office
of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one
month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to
personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must
personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to be contained in the Return.
avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny,
and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably Let us examine the full text of the Sheriff’s Return, which reads:
on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted. THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons with
complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the
defendant IMELDA ‘IMEE’ MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or
(2) Specific Details in the Return
Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of
the day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in
accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said summons with complaint and
surrounding the attempted personal service. 25 The efforts made to find the defendant and
annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto,
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date Receptionist and Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the with the said defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts he refused to sign (emphases supplied).
done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to
justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted Service
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable Court of origin, duly
prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy
served for its record and information.
requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure. 26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires
that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993. 29
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
service.
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material
data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the
generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left
summons x x x personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the
with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." 27 A person of suitable
reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises."
age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates from the ruling—in Domagas v.
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
Jensen 30 and other related cases 31—that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice
efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. It cannot
and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
presupposed". 28 Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent
deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the
facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more
person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of
the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically only states that respondents were "informed, and so [they] allege" about the address and
described in the Return of Summons. whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct
means. 32 More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service
to have been pursued persistently.
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then
it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 33 it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriff’s
the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of
Return, which states that "despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the
defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
defendant on several occasions the same proved futile," conforms to the requirements of
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
valid substituted service. However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special
civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and
wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will
not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail
on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts,
inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons
for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken.
That such efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted
in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would
encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service—for it
would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly,
considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of
an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriff’s Return should
clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a "person of
suitable age and discretion" residing in defendant’s house or residence. Thus, there are two
(2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff’s general
assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain
Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is
doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit
considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a male
caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s allegation that Macky de la Cruz is
not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information
in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for
the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary "relation of
confidence" with petitioner. To protect petitioner’s right to due process by being accorded
proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to
clearly comply with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized by
the rules. 34
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict compliance with statute or
rule on substituted service, thus:
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or constructive service must be
strictly pursued. 35There must be strict compliance with the requirements of statutes
authorizing substituted or constructive service. 36
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain situations
authorized in the place of personal service when the latter is inconvenient or impossible, a
strict and literal compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to
support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive service. 37 Jurisdiction is
not to be assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the suit is
within the power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of the
statute have been complied with, and such compliance must appear on the record. 38 The
fact that the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not render the
service effectual if in fact the process was not served in accordance with the requirements of
the statute.39
Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was
strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings
held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty. It reasons out that "[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie
evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said
certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing." 40
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the
presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were
exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be
specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted
service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or
residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be
availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with the
stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 41 it was held that "x x x the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case
where it is patent that the sheriff’s return is defective (emphasis supplied)." While the
Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to
personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely
described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the
ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did not
mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void.
On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at
No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the substituted service is void has
rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104
is her actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void substituted service
valid and effective.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168723. July 9, 2008.*
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (TROPIFRESH DIVISION), petitioner, vs. HON. REINATO G.
QUILALA in his capacity as pairing judge of Branch 150, RTC-Makati City, and ALL
SEASON FARM, CORP., respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on
a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.—Well-settled is the rule that service
of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be
made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
or in-house counsel.
Same; Same; Same; A defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to
service of summons.—Under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by this
Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Platon, Martinez, Flores, San Pedro & Leaño for petitioner.
King, Capuchino, Tan and Associates for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated May 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87723 and its Resolution2 dated June 28, 2005, denying the motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the Order3 dated February 6, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, in Civil Case No. 03-093 and its
Order4 dated September 16, 2004 denying the motion for partial reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows.
In a complaint filed with the RTC of Makati City, presided over by Pairing Judge Reinato
Quilala, private respondent All Season Farm Corporation ("All Season") sought the recovery
of a sum of money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc.
(Tropifresh Division) ("Dole") and several of its officers. According to Dole, an alias
summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant
employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole.
On May 20, 2003, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a)
the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of summons; (b)
the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (c) All Season was not the real party in
interest; and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged
acts performed in their official capacities as corporate officers of Dole. 5 In its Order dated
February 6, 2004, the RTC denied said motion. Dole moved for partial reconsideration
raising the same issues but its motion was denied.
Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that the
alias summons was not properly served. The appellate court, however, ruled otherwise. It
reasoned that Dole’s president had known of the service of the alias summons although he
did not personally receive and sign it. It also held that in today’s corporate setup, documents
addressed to corporate officers are received in their behalf by their staff. 6 Dole sought
reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition where petitioner raises the lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT ALLOWED SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON A PRIVATE CORPORATION WHEN
IT HELD THAT DOLE WAS VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS IN SPITE OF THE
FACT THAT SUMMONS WAS NOT SERVED ON ITS PRESIDENT, MANAGING
PARTNER, GENERAL MANAGER, CORPORATE SECRETARY, TREASURER OR IN-
HOUSE COUNSEL THEREBY IGNORING THE RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON
PRIVATE DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS.7
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether there was a valid service of summons on
petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the corporate
defendant below, now the petitioner herein.
Petitioner contends that for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over a domestic
corporation, summons must be served only on the corporate officers enumerated in Section
11,8 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner maintains that the alias
summons was not validly served on it since the alias summons was served on Marifa Dela
Cruz, an employee of Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate and
distinct from petitioner. It further avers that even if she were an employee of the petitioner,
she is not one of the officers enumerated under Section 11, Rule 14. Thus, the RTC, without
proper service of summons, lacks jurisdiction over petitioner as defendant below.
Private respondent All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias summons through its
president on April 23, 2003. According to private respondent, there was full compliance with
Section 11, Rule 14, when Marifa Dela Cruz received the summons upon instruction of
petitioner’s president as indicated in the Officer’s Return.9 More so, petitioner had admitted
that it received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time 10 filed
on May 5, 2003.
Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted,
limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius.11 Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant, received
the alias summons.12Contrary to private respondent’s claim that it was received upon
instruction of the president of the corporation as indicated in the Officer’s Return, such fact
does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons which Marifa Dela Cruz signed.
There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the
president. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not
employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section
11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.

However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant’s voluntary appearance in the
action is equivalent to service of summons.13 As held previously by this Court, the filing of
motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 14

Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It
was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of
summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging
the receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive
pleading.15 Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and
also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for
additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It
is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. 16 The RTC therefore
properly took cognizance of the case against Dole Philippines, Inc., and we agree that the
trial and the appellate courts committed no error of law when Dole’s contentions were
overruled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 20, 2005
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87723 and its Resolution dated June 28, 2005
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170943. September 23, 2008.*
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner, vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
respondent.
Actions; Summons; Service of Summons by Publication; Where the defendant could
not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, he
may properly be served with summons by publication.—Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of
the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts
are unknown.—In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such
times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied) Since petitioner could not be personally
served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought
and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
Same; Same; Same; The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old
rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this
has been changed—it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem.—Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in
personam and claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem.
Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule
because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of
this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only. This has
been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies “[i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” Thus, it now applies to any action,
whether in personam, in remor quasi in rem.
Same; Same; Same; The service of summons by publication is complemented by service
of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address; While the trial court
ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the
complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.—Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is
complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known
address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit “showing the deposit of a
copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to
the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.” The rules, however, do not
require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While
the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to
make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to
service by publication.
Same; Default; In case a defendant is declared in default, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the
court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence.—If the defendant fails to file
his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to
the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in
its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not
take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
Same; Same; An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming
party.—As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to
permitting respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an order of
default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of default can be made only
upon motion of the claiming party. Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed,
no default order should have been issued.274
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; If a party declared in default is entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to
such notice; Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common
sense, reason and practicality.—To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in
default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been
declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the
defending party is not known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can
be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.
Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense,
reason and practicality.
Same; Same; Equity; Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement—it may
be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.—Petitioner’s plea for
equity must fail in the face of the clear and express language of the rules of procedure and of the
September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is available only in the
absence of law, not as its replacement. Equity may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure,
never in contravention thereof.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the September 22, 2005 decision2 and December 29, 2005
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a
sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the
amount of P698,502.10 representing petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan4 advanced to
him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last
known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the
trial court allowed service of summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the
affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate 5 and an affidavit of service of
respondent’s employee6 to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail
to petitioner’s last known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved
that the case be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the
motion in an order dated September 11, 2003. ProprietyOf

Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Service By Publication
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Answer." He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. – In any
the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever
the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was
his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
respondent’s evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court
may order. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on
service by publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to
already deemed in default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.
locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of
summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner
In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for was properly served with summons by publication.
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the
affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and
also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was
claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is
actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to admit
wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it
petitioner’s answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. 10Because of this silence,
the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.11
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the
trial court in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any
were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now
summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, particularly the
applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.12
September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.

Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, 13 Rule 14
During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its
of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
decision in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest
and costs of suit.7
… an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the
post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision 8 sustaining
address.
the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court and dismissing the
petition. It denied reconsideration.9 Thus, this petition.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or
principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely, lack
published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service
of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the trial court
of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address. This complementary
to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the September 11, 2003
service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order
order and preference for technicality rather than justice and equity. In particular, he claims
for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered
that the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
mail to his last known address."
applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money.
He also contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been
prepared by the clerk of court, not respondent’s messenger. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed
by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders
and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on
The petition lacks merit.
the party who resorts to service by publication.

Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary
appearance in the action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer."14 This was equivalent to service of
summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
EntitlementTo
Notice Of Proceedings
The trial court allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte on account of petitioner’s
failure to file his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the
part of the trial court as well as the said court’s failure to furnish him with copies of orders
and processes issued in the course of the proceedings.
The effects of a defendant’s failure to file an answer within the time allowed therefor are
governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires
the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court.
SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. – A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (emphasis supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion
of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court
shall proceed to render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may
warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The
defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his answer on
time. That was in fact why he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Attached Answer." But respondent moved only for the ex parte presentation of
evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the
trial court stated:
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of evidence ex-parte
precisely ordered that "despite and notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no
answer has been filed with the Court within the required period and/or
forthcoming.["] Effectively[,] that was a finding that the defendant [that is, herein
petitioner] was in default for failure to file an answer or any responsive pleading
within the period fixed in the publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be found
and for which reason, service of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical
to notify the defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the reality
that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts
unknown – thus the publication of the summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect
that the defendant will not receive any notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it
was] impractical to send any notice or order to him. Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear
out that a copy of the order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant at
his last known address but it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting
respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an order of default. But the
trial court could not validly do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of
the claiming party.15 Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default
order should have been issued.
To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been declared in
default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the
defending party is not known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no
way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does
not require that the impossible be done.16 Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility.17 Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are
in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he could not reasonably
demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of
the September 11, 2003 order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known
address but it was unclaimed.
CorrectnessOf
Non-Admission Of Answer
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, he would not have
moved for the admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer
was belatedly filed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.
Petitioner’s plea for equity must fail in the face of the clear and express language of the
rules of procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the
answer. Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement. 19 Equity may
be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 213525. January 27, 2015.*
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP
LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Registered Mail; Proof of Service; Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service
shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both
of which must be appended to the paper being served.—The petitioner obviously ignores that
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the
affidavit and the registry receipt, viz.: Section 13. Proof of Service.—x x x. If service is made
by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued
by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy
of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the
service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person
effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper
being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service
if either or both are not submitted.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is
similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA).—As to the
nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such
appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given
due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an
error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or
final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition
for certiorariunder Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised
except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The reglementary periods under Rule
42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the
petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the
denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within
30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less
than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.—Grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Eduardo Seguera Fortaleza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.
Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the Reconsideration 1 of the
resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtdue to its non-
compliance with the provisions of Rule 64, particularly for:(a) the late filing of the petition;
(b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.3
Antecedents
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a
memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified
barangaysecretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating ₱4,393,593.60for the
premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher
to COA Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal
basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but
its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.5 On November
15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, 6 holding that under Section 447
and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are
expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangayworkers;
and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, 7 and filed its
motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. 8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the
denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.10
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for
certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August
19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service
and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents.
Issues
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for
certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals;11 and that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of
service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having
overlooked the submission of a verified declaration; and prays that the declaration attached
to the motion for reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with
the Efficient Use of Paper Rule12 by previously submitting a compact disc (CD) containing
the petition for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it
showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed
decision.
Ruling
We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.
I final order.17 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition
Petitioner did not comply with the rule on proof of service
The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari
complied with the requirement on proof of service.
The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry
receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by
the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by
registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the
mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served.
A compliance withthe rule is mandatory, such that
there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.13
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one
Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by
registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524
attached tothe appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The petition only
bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the
registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended
the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially
comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August
19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of service. 15
II
Fresh Period Ruleunder Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to
a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with
the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the
receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial. 16
The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final
order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such
appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given
due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an
error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or
for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. 18 Questions of fact cannot be
raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.20
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days
after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section
3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration
to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it
had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13,
2014, which was 25 days too late.
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated filing of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period ruleshould apply was fatal to the
recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly
assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be
relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.24 Absent this reason for
liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
III
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit
The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.
The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of
discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the
COA took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more thana year in resolving
the motion for reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution;
(3) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two
sentences; (4) the matter involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution, COA
Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear that they knew the
Local Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino Pimentel who offered an
opinion on the matter.25
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to
be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 26
harsh and disrespectful language that accused the Court and its Members of ignorance and
recklessness in the performance of their function of adjudication.
We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the Court
and its Members. We consider the accusatory language particularly offensive because it was
unfounded and undeserved. As this resolution earlier clarifies, the petition for certiorari did
not contain a proper affidavit of service.We do not need to rehash the clarification. Had the
petitioner and its counsel been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and more
contrite, they would have desisted from their harshness and disrespect towards the Court
and its Members. Although we are not beyond error, we assure the petitioner and its
counsel that our resolutions and determinations are arrived at or reached with much care
and caution, aware that the lives, properties and rights of the litigants are always at stake.
If there be errors, they would be unintended, and would be the result of human oversight.
But in this instance the Court and its Members committed no error. The petition bore only
cut reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere "perfunctory
scrutiny" would not pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules of Court.

A close look indicates that the petition for certioraridid not sufficiently disclose how the
COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did
not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the
COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the
mere terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in
demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he
had been the main proponent of the Local Government Codein the Legislature, expressed an
opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was
the latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their
being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose.
Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully explain
in writing why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh
and disrespectful language towards the Court and its Members; and, in his case, Atty.
Fortaleza should further show cause why he should" not be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit;
ORDERS the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect
contempt of court; and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same
period why he should not be disbarred.

It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the
SO ORDERED.
further reason of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement
Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.

IV

Petitioner and its counsel exhibited harshness and disrespect towards the Court and its
Members

The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner’s non-compliance
with the requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even "a perfunctory scrutiny" of
the petition for certiorari and its annexes could have easily shown that it had attached an
affidavit of service to the petition. It goes on to make the following statements, viz:

25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its
annexes up to its last page, thus, the erroneous finding that there was non-submission of
the proof of service; 26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of
this Honorable Court who took the observation from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be
the obtaining fact, when in truth and in fact, it is not;27

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill
consequences of their own shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to
readily lay blame on others like the Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed
 G.R. No. 206653. February 25, 2015.*
YUK LING ONG, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN T. CO, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two (2) grounds for annulment of
judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.—Annulment of judgment is a
recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no
available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and
Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, that is,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not
because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long
lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being
bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.
Same; Same; Same; Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the
judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.—Lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the
jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a
matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other processes on the
petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court.—In the present case,
petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because there was an
invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either
upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. If the
defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or
substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ephraim B. Cortez for petitioner.
Mark John F. Dumbrique for respondent.
MENDOZA, J.,
In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be
given an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the very moment that summons is
served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance in ensuring that the
defendant personally grasp the weight of responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only
in exceptional circumstances that constructive notification, or substituted service of
summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of the rigorous requirements for substituted
service of summons, then the Court has no other option but to strike down a void judgment,
regardless of the consequences. This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the June 27, 2012 Decision1 and the March 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA)in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271, which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment.
The Facts
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent
Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-
Malate Church.3
Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID)directing her to appear before the said agency because
her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly,
her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following
documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-01-
0177; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306;
(3) Decision,4 dated December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 260 (RTC), Parañaque City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as void ab initio; and (4) their marriage contract5 with the subject decision
annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent had been
declared void ab initio. The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent
filed a petition for declaration of nullity6 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the
RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177. Respondent stated that petitioner’s
address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. There was no showing of its status, whether
pending, withdrawn or terminated. On July 19, 2002, respondent filed another petition for
declaration of Nullity7 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-0306. Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa
Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued
summons.8 In his Server’s Return,9 process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August
1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were
received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision10 in Civil Case No. 02-0306 finding
respondent’s marriage with petitioner as void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on
petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her responsive pleading within the
reglementary period. The public prosecutor also stated that there were no indicative facts to
manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC concluded that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment11 under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court before the CA on November 24, 2008, claiming that she was never notified of
the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision, dated December 11, 2002, in
Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because, as
seen in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her
from participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in Civil
Case No. 02-0306 because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient
explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to
substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a
security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 27, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for annulment
of judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that there was no sufficient proof to establish that
respondent employed fraud to insure petitioner’s non-participation in the trial of Civil Case
No. CV-01-0177.
Relying on Robinson v. Miralles,13 the CA further ruled that the substituted service of
summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was valid. It found that there was a customary practice
in petitioner’s townhouse that the security guard would first entertain any visitors and
receive any communication in behalf of the homeowners. With this set-up, it was obviously
impossible for the process server to personally serve the summons upon petitioner. It also
declared that the process server’s return carries with it the presumption of regularity in the
discharge of a public officer’s duties and functions.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution,14 dated March 26, 2013.
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview of Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.15
Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons.1âwphi1 The
process server’s return only contained a general statement that substituted service was
resorted to "after several futile attempts to serve the same personally,"16 without stating the
dates and reasons of the failed attempts. Petitioner also reiterates her argument that
extrinsic fraud was employed.
In his Comment,17 filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the server’s return
satisfactorily stated the reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on August
1, 2002; and it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was
sent to the same address which she declared in this present petition.
Petitioner filed her Reply18 on October 8, 2014 reiterating her previous arguments.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 19 Annulment of judgment is an
equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a
judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from
the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.20
Petitioner raises two grounds to support her claim for annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic
fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud,
however, is too unsubstantial to warrant consideration. The discussion shall then focus on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law
because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature
of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons
or other processes on the petitioner.21
In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person
because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the
defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary
appearance in court.22 If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can
be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and
7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which state:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for
it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within
a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc)23 thoroughly discussed the rigorous
requirements of a substituted service of summons, to wit: xxx
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
xxx
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in
failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service,
the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house
of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified
in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
xxx
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant
is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements of the Court in Manotoc have been applied to several succeeding cases.
In Pascual v. Pascual,24 the return of summons did not show or indicate the actual exertion
or positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to
the defendant. Similarly, in Spouses Afdal v. Carlos,25 the process server’s indorsements
therein failed to state that the personal service on the defendants was rendered impossible
and that efforts were made to find them personally. In both those cases, the Court ruled
that the meticulous requirements for substituted service of summons were not met.
There are cases, however, in which Manotoc was applied, but, nevertheless, it was ruled
that there was no lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In Sagana v.
Francisco,26 the diligent efforts exerted by the sheriff to locate the respondent were
determined, not only based on the sheriff's return, but also on the process server's notation
and case records. In the case of Wong v. Factor-Koyama,27 on the other hand, even if the
sheriff performed an invalid substituted service of summons, jurisdiction over the person of
defendant was obtained because the latter had actively participated in trial, amounting to a
voluntary appearance under Section 20 of Rule 14.28
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-030629 was issued on July 29, 2002.
In his server’s return,30the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of
summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons. The server’s return
stated the following:
SERVER’S RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with copy of petition,
were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden
Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security
Officer thereat.
Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons, Duly Served, this 2nd day of
August, 2002.
RODOLFO P. TORRES, JR.
Process Server
(Emphasis supplied)
The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process
server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general
statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the
personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were
made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if
there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These
important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the
return to justify substituted service.
The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on
behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa
of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the
competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Also, aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records
which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent
did not even claim that petitioner made any voluntary appearance and actively participated
in Civil Case No. 02-0306.
The case of Robinson v. Miralles, cited by the CA, is not applicable. In that case, the return
described in thorough detail how the security guard refused the sheriff’s entry despite
several attempts. The defendant in the said case specifically instructed the guard to prevent
anybody to proceed to her residence. In the present case, the attempts made by the process
server were stated in a broad and ambiguous statement.
The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty could be applied in the case at bench. This p resumption of regularity, however,
was never intended to be applied even in cases where there are no showing of substantial
compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not
apply where it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective. 31 As earlier
explained, the server's return did not comply with the stringent requirements of substituted
service of summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined
to uphold the CA's denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons.
Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void.
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "[t]he numerous
claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great
number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts,
resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses."32
Although the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was promulgated as early as December 11,
2002, the Court must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The
favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory
because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute.
Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone.
Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for
declaration of nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March 26,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260,
Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 183370. August 17, 2015.* Same; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; To overcome the presumption of
regularity of official functions in favor of such sheriff’s return, the evidence against it must be
clear and convincing.—It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process server
NATION PETROLEUM GAS, INCORPORATED, NENA ANG, MARIO ANG, ALISON A.
is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out therein. This is fortified by the presumption of
SY, GUILLERMO G. SY, NELSON ANG, LUISA ANG, RENATO C. ANG, PAULINE T.
the regularity of performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption of regularity of
ANG, RICKY C. ANG,1 and MELINDA ANG, petitioners, vs. RIZAL COMMERCIAL
official functions in favor of such sheriff’s return, the evidence against it must be clear and
BANKING CORPORATION, substituted by PHILIPPINE ASSET GROWTH ONE, INC.,
convincing. Sans the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands
respondent.
deserving of faith and credit.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Words and Phrases; Summons is a writ by
Same; Civil Procedure; Summons; Service of Summons; Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of
which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. Its purpose is two
the Rules cannot be construed to apply simultaneously and do not provide for alternative
(2)-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant
modes of service of summons which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience
that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the
to the parties for, under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the
claim against him.—Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
defendants is generally preferred over substituted service.—Sections 6 and 7 of
brought against him or her. Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the Rulescannot be construed to apply simultaneously and do not provide for alternative
the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he
modes of service of summons which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of
may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. “[C]ompliance with the
convenience to the parties for, under our procedural rules, service of summons in the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a
after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with. The failure
person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him
to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the requirements of substituted service
and the theory on which such claim is premised.”
renders the service of summons ineffective.

Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; When the defendant is a domestic

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service of Summons; To avail themselves of
corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the persons
substituted service of summons, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The enumeration of persons to whom
actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable
summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on statutory
efforts.—To avail themselves of substituted service of summons, courts must rely on a
construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.—Service of summons on domestic
detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be
corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of
served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The Court requires that the Sheriff’s Return
the Rules, which states: SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.—When
clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service. The
the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. When the
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in
defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be made
the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The enumeration of
Under exceptional terms, the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons
persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the
may be proved by evidence aliunde. Substituted service will still be considered as regular if
rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Substantial compliance
other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented. BPI v. Spouses Evangelista,
cannot be invoked. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers specifically
393 SCRA 187 (2002), teaches Us that a defect in the service of summons, which is apparent
mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said corporation. Basic
on the face of the return, does not necessarily constitute conclusive proof that the actual
is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer
service has in fact been improperly made. In the interest of speedy justice, the trial court
jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be
has to immediately ascertain whether the patent defect is real and, if so, to fully determine
one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to
whether prior attempts at personal service have in fact been done and resort to the
render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
substituted service was justified. Should the returns not show compliance with the Ruleson
action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated
substituted service, actual and correct service may still be proven by evidence extraneous to
with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on
it. If substituted service is indeed improper, the trial court must issue new summons and
him.
serve it in accordance with the Rules.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21 (2006),
(CA) that there was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation
stresses that for substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several
through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.—We agree with
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period which
the CA that there was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation
eventually resulted in failure in order to prove impossibility of prompt service.—In the
through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.
instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted
service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual
petitioners. The “reasonable time” within which to personally serve the summons — 7 days
for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff as stated in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 499
SCRA 21 (2006) — has not yet elapsed at the time the substituted service was opted to.
Remarkably, based on the Sheriff’s Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal
service of summons upon the corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy
of their personal and real properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period which eventually
resulted in failure in order to prove impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate, “several
attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. Further,
except for the Quezon Province, there is, in fact, no considerable distance between the
residences of the individual petitioners since the cities of Makati and Quezon are part of the
National Capital Region; hence, accessible either by private or public modes of
transportation. Assuming that there is, the distance would not have been insurmountable
had respondent took its time and not unnecessarily rushed to accomplish personal service in
just a single day.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Voluntary Appearance; Despite improper service of
summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance.—Despite improper service of
summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The second sentence of
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules that “[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance” clearly refers to affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.—In the present case, the individual petitioners
prayed, among others, for the following: (1) discharge of the writ of attachment on their
properties; (2) denial of the motion to declare them in default; (3) admission of the
Comment/Opposition (to the motion to declare them in default) filed on December 19, 2006;
and (4) denial of respondent’s motion to strike off from the records (their opposition to the
motion to declare them in default). By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the
individual petitioners are deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said
court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. Therefore, the CA cannot be considered to have erred in affirming the
trial court’s denial of the Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper
service of summons.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gatchalian, Castro & Mawis for petitioners.
Villaraza, Cruz, Marcelo & Angangco for RCBC.
Divina Law for Phil. Asset Growth One, Inc.
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2007 Decision[2] and June
17, 2008 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787, which affirmed
the March 29, 2007 Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City, in
Civil Case No. 06-882, denying petitioners' Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for
alleged improper service of summons.
On October 16, 2006, respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed against
petitioner corporation and its directors/officers a Complaint[5] for civil damages arising from
estafa in relation to violations of the Trust Receipts Law. On October 26, 2006, after an ex
parte hearing was conducted, respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was
granted and the corresponding writ was issued.[6] Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served
upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent's
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment. The Sheriffs Report dated
November 13, 2006 narrated:
The undersigned sheriff respectfully submits the following report to wit:
On 26 October 2006, [a] copy of Writ of Attachment dated 26 October 2006, issued by the
Court in the above-entitled case was received by the undersigned for service and
implementation.
On even date, the undersigned served the Summons, copy of [the] Complaint, application for
attachment, the plaintiffs affidavit and bond, and the Order and Writ of Attachment, on the
defendants Nation Petroleum Gas et al, at BPI Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon.
Said summons and all pertinent papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda
Ang, were received by Claudia Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her
signature at the original copy of Summons and Writ. I also served copies to other defendants
at their given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.
On the same day, at the instance of the plaintiff's counsel and representative, the
undersigned levied the real properties of the defendants at the Register of Deeds of Lucena
City, Makati City, Pasig City, Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Manila. I also levied
a property (plant equipment) in NPGI plant in Sariaya, Quezon. Copies of the notices of levy
on attachment are hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, the original copies of the Summonses, Order, Writ of Attachment and all
pertinent papers are hereby returned to the Court of origin for record and information.[7]
Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss [8] on
November 15, 2006. They asserted that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
corporation since the summons was improperly served upon Claudia Abante (Abante), who
is a mere liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. Likewise, the individual petitioners argued that the sheriff
and/or process server did not personally approach them at their respective address as stated
in the Complaint. Neither did he resort to substituted service of summons, and that, even if
he did, there was no strict compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules. The Court's
pronouncements in Spouses Mason v. Court of Appeals,[9] E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
v. Judge Benito,[10] Laus v. Court of Appeals,[11] and Samartino v. Raon[12] were invoked in
praying for the dismissal of the complaint and the discharge of the writ of attachment.
Respondent countered in its Opposition with Motion to Declare Defendants in
Default[13] that there was valid service of summons upon petitioners. With respect to the
corporation, Abante received the summons upon the express authority and instruction of the
corporate secretary, petitioner Melinda Ang (Ang). As regards the individual petitioners, the
Sheriffs Report reflects that they were served "at their given addresses, but they refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof." Respondent stressed that said Report is prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein and that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official functions. In any case, it averred that, according to Oaminal v.
Castillo,[14] petitioners already voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction when they
prayed for the discharge of the writ of attachment, which is an affirmative relief apart from
the dismissal of the case.
A Reply with Comment/Opposition (to the motion to declare defendants in default)[15] was
then filed by petitioners. In support of their contention that the court lacks jurisdiction over
their persons, they submitted their Joint Affidavit[16] and the Affidavit[17] of Abante,
claiming, among others, that they neither personally met the sheriff and/or the process
server nor were handed a copy of the court documents; that Ang did not give Abante
telephone instructions to receive the same; and that Abante did not receive any instruction
from Ang. Petitioners further held that Oaminal finds no application in the instant case
since they only filed one motion and that the additional relief prayed for, which is the
discharge of the writ, is complementary to and a necessary consequence of a finding that the
court has no jurisdiction over their persons. Instead, Our ruling in Avon Insurance PLC v.
Court of Appeals[18] was relied upon.
In its Rejoinder with Motion to Strike,[19] respondent stood firm in defending the court's
jurisdiction. The denials of Ang and Abante were viewed as self-serving and could not
prevail over the presumption of regularity which the sheriff enjoys as an officer of the court.
Even assuming that the Sheriffs Return does not state in detail the fact that the summons
was served upon the individual petitioners through substituted service, respondent asserted
that this does not conclusively prove that such service is invalid because it may still be
shown through extraneous evidence similar to the case of BPI v. Spouses Evangelista.[20]
On March 29, 2007, the RTC denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and respondent's motion
to declare them in default. In upholding the jurisdiction of the court over the persons of
petitioners and requiring them to file an Answer, the Order ratiocinated:
The very essence of service of summons is for the defendants to be aware of an existing suit
against them and for them to file an answer or responsive pleading thereto. When corporate
and individual defendants were served with summons through the [liaison] officer who
received the same for and in their behalf as per instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, and
when defendants filed a responsive pleading in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, the essence
of service of summons was met and defendants are deemed to have ultimately received the
summons despite their protestations. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the
regularity of the Sheriffs service of summons as in fact its regularity is presumed. It bears
stressing that defendants did not per se deny having received summonses. Perforce, they are
challenging the manner of service of the same. Having ultimately received the summonses
upon them and considering the rules on service of the same was substantially complied
with, the Court finds no reason to deny the instant Motion to Dismiss.[21]
Petitioners elevated the jurisdictional issue to the CA via petition for certiorari and
prohibition.[22] As afore-stated, the appellate court later dismissed the petition and denied
the motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition raising the following issues for
resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON
ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BY RESORTING TO SUBSTITUTED
SERVICE OF SUMMONS DESPITE ABSENCE OF EARNEST EFFORTS ON THE PART
OF THE SERVING OFFICER TO SERVE SUMMONS PERSONALLY.[23]
We deny.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or
her.[24] Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to
notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. [25] "[C]ompliance with the rules regarding
the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can
be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the
theory on which such claim is premised."[26]
Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is
governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons
may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.[27] The
enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and
exclusive following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio
alterius.[28] Substantial compliance cannot be invoked.[29]Service of summons upon persons
other than those officers specifically mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and
not binding to said corporation.[30]
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer
jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be
one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to
render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated
with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on
him.[31]
As correctly argued by petitioners, Sps. Mason already resolved that substantial compliance
on service of summons upon a domestic corporation is no longer an excuse. Thus:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies
squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and
with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parailaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with
private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with
its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was
served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that
there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa.
The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in
Villarosa's favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made
through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial court's basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed
with petitioner's assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited
and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millennium to support their position for
said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millennium was
decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case
which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the
doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the
later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard
and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative
or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process. x x x[32]
The foregoing notwithstanding, We agree with the CA that there was a valid and effective
service of summons upon petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the
agent of the corporate secretary. It ruled:
Petitioner corporation asserts that based on the said rule [Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules],
the service of summons made by the sheriff upon its liaison officer, Claudia Abante, was
defective for the reason that a liaison officer is not one of the corporate officers enumerated
therein upon whom service of summons is authorized to be made. It contends that there
having been no valid service, the trial court consequently did not acquire jurisdiction to hear
the complaint a quo.
The contention deserves full credence only if it is to be assumed that Claudia Abante
received the summons in her official capacity as petitioner corporation's liaison officer.
However, this is not true in the instant case, since according to the sheriff, Abante
proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying documents only after receiving
instructions to do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner
corporation's corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the
summons, did so in representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers
competent under the Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical
person. Thus, while it may be true that there was no direct, physical handing of the
summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with having constructively received
the same, which in Our view, amounts to a valid service of summons.
Having herself instructed Abante to receive the summons, Ang, and for that matter,
petitioner corporation, is thus now precluded from impugning the jurisdiction of the trial
court on the ground of invalid service of summons. In point in this regard is the principle of
estoppel which, under our remedial laws, is an effective bar against any claim of lack of
jurisdiction. Under said doctrine, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
Thus, despite the assertions of Ang and Abante that, as between them, no such instruction
had been relayed and received, the sheriffs statement belying the allegations should be
accorded weight.
The sheriffs report is further bolstered by the presumption of regularity in the performance
of public duty as the same is provided for in Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. The
presumption applies so long as it is shown that the officer, in performing his duties, is not
inspired by any improper motive, a fact that is true with the sheriff in the case at bar. And,
if the presumption may be made to apply to public officers in general, with more reason
should its benefit be accorded to the sheriff, who is an officer of the court.
True, the presumption is disputable, but to overcome the same, more concrete evidence than
the affidavit of Abante is required. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, in line with
the ruling of the Supreme Court in R. Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and
Talsan Enterprises, Inc. vs. Baliwag, Abante's affidavit is self-serving in nature, and being
so, is not sufficient to overturn the said presumption.
On this aspect, petitioners score the respondent, asserting that the two above-cited cases
are not applicable to the case at hand inasmuch as these were decided before the advent of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, adding likewise that the cited cases and the
instant case differ in their respective factual milieus. We are not persuaded. Under either
the former or the present rules, it is clear that Abante's denial that she received instructions
from Ang is evidence that would pale in comparison to the declaration of an officer of the
court indisputably performing his duty objectively and free from any malicious and ill
motives.[33]
Petitioner corporation cannot conveniently rely on the sworn statements of the individual
petitioners and Abante. Upon examination, Ang's denial of having spoken with any process
server to give instruction to serve the summons and other pertinent papers to Abante [34]is
not incompatible with the Sheriffs Report stating that "[s]aid summons and all pertinent
papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were received by Claudia
Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her signature at the original copy of
Summons and Writ." While it may be true that Ang had not talked to the sheriff or process
server, it still does not rule out the possibility that she in fact spoke to Abante and
instructed the latter to receive the documents in her behalf. As to the Affidavit of Abante,
her disavowal of having spoken to Ang or receiving telephone instructions from her is truly
self-serving. Evidence as simple as a telephone billing statement or an affidavit of a
disinterested third person, among others, could have been presented to refute the sheriffs
claim, but there was none. Likewise, no substantial proofs were credibly shown to support
Abante's allegation that the sheriff insisted on having the court processes received and that
she was "intimidated by the presence of a court personnel who was quite earnest in
accomplishing his task."[35]
It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of
the facts as set out therein. This is fortified by the presumption of the regularity of
performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption of regularity of official functions
in favor of such sheriffs return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Sans
the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith
and credit.[36]
The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect to the service of summons
upon the individual petitioners.
Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for substituted service of
summons:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.\
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules cannot be construed to apply simultaneously and do not
provide for alternative modes of service of summons which can either be resorted to on the
mere basis of convenience to the parties for, under our procedural rules, service of summons
in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. [37] Resort to
the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in
person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied
with.[38] The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.[39]
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals[40] painstakingly elucidated the requirements of the Rules as
follows:
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted
service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that
the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined
as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." Under the
Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or
the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the
return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for
an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for
the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt
service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable
time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch
clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the
sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk
uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from
the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal
service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish
personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to
avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny,
and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to
be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferrably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and
time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts
done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to
justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service
prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy
requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that
"impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left
with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age
and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice
and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus,
to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons
and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the
summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling
or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then
it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom
the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must
be contained in the Return.[41]
In resorting to the substituted service, the sheriff in this case pithily declared in his Report
that he "also served copies to other defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof." Obviously, the Sheriffs Report dated November 13, 2006 does
not particularize why substituted service was resorted to and the precise manner by which
the summons was served upon the individual petitioners. The disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed will not apply where it is patent from the
sheriffs or server's return that it is defective.[42]
To avail themselves of substituted service of summons, courts must rely on a detailed
enumeration of the sheriffs actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served
despite diligent and reasonable efforts.[43] The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return
clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal
service.[44] The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service
should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service
failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot
be upheld.[45]
Under exceptional terms, the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons
may be proved by evidence aliunde.[46]Substituted service will still be considered as regular
if other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented. [47] BPI v. Spouses
Evangelista[48] teaches Us that a defect in the service of summons, which is apparent on the
face of the return, does not necessarily constitute conclusive proof that the actual service
has in fact been improperly made. In the interest of speedy justice, the trial court has to
immediately ascertain whether the patent defect is real and, if so, to fully determine
whether prior attempts at personal service have in fact been done and resort to the
substituted service was justified. Should the returns not show compliance with the Rules on
substituted service, actual and correct service may still be proven by evidence extraneous to
it. If substituted service is indeed improper, the trial court must issue new summons and
serve it in accordance with the Rules.
In the present case, while no actual hearing was conducted to verify the validity of the
grounds for substituted service of summons, the parties exchanged pleadings in support of
their respective positions. To justify, respondent contends:
34. In the instant case, representatives of the undersigned counsel and plaintiff RCBC
personally observed the service of summons on the defendants. Based on their account, the
following facts and circumstances transpired:
a. On [October 26, 2006], the Sheriff served summons on defendant NPGI at the G/F BPI
Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon, the reported office address of defendant NPGI
in the latter's General Information Sheet submitted with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
a. 1. In the said address, the Sheriff met a person who introduced herself as Ms. Claudia
Abante, the Liaison [Officer] of defendant NPGI.
a.2. Upon inquiry, the Sheriff was informed that defendants NPGI Officers were all not
around to receive the summons for defendant NPGI considering that, according to Ms.
Abante, the defendant NPGI Directors do not hold office at said address.
a.3. However, Ms. Abante volunteered to call defendant Melinda Ang on the phone to inform
her that summons was beings served upon defendant NPGI.
a.4. Subsequently, Ms. Abante informed the Sheriff that defendant Melinda Ang authorized
her to receive the summons for defendant NPGI.
a.5. Considering that she claimed to be authorized by defendant Melinda Ang, who is the
Corporate Secretary of defendant NPGI, to receive the summons on behalf of defendant
NPGI, the Sheriff entrusted the same to her, as well as the Complaintand the Writ of
Attachment, among others, and Ms. Abante voluntarily signed the receiving copy thereof.
a.6 the Sheriff did not intimidate Ms. Abante into receiving the summons. In fact, she
volunteered to receive the same.
b. Copies of the Complaint, summons and Writ of Attachment, among others, were likewise
served to defendant NPGI at its office located at 39th Floor, Yuchengco Tower, RCBC Plaza,
6819 Ayala Avenue, corner Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, Metro Manila ('RCBC
Plaza Office').
b.1. The personnel from said office also stated that all the defendant NPGI Directors were
not around and were probably at home. As such, a copy of the Complaint, summons
and Writ of Attachment, among others, were left with said office.
c. Thereafter, summons on the individual defendants were served at the following
addresses:
c. 1. Renato Ang, Nena Ang, Melinda Ang, Pauline Ang - 1348 Palm Avenue, Dasmarinas
Village, Makati City;
c.2. Guillermo Sy and Alison Sy - 1320 Glorioso Streets, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City;
c.3. Nelson Ang, Luisa Ang - 19 Swallow Drive, Greenmeadows, Quezon City;
c.4. Mario Ang - Diamond Furniture, Cabunyag Street, Candelaria, Quezon; and to evade service of summons, and the considerable distances between all their residences
(i.e., Makati City, Pasig City, City of Manila and Quezon Province), would clearly be
c.5. Ricky Ang - Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon. unreasonable.[49]

d. Upon service of the summons upon them, it became apparent that the individual According to respondent's version, copies of the complaint, summons and writ of
defendants were evading service of summons considering that the sheriff was being given a attachment, among others, were served to petitioner corporation at its offices in Candelaria,
run-around. Quezon and RCBC Plaza. In the Quezon office, the sheriff was informed that the individual
petitioners were all not around to receive the summons for the corporation considering that
they do not hold office at said address. Likewise, a staff from the RCBC Plaza office stated
d.1. In their respective residences, their house helpers stated that the individual defendants
that all them were not around and were probably at home. Thereafter, summons was served
were not at home but in the RCBC Plaza Office.
on the individual petitioners at their respective addresses in Makati City, Quezon City, and
Candelaria, Quezon. Their house helpers told that they were not at home but were in the
d.2. However, considering that the Sheriff had already been to the RCBC Plaza Office and
RCBC Plaza office. Considering that the sheriff already went there and its personnel said
the personnel at said office previously stated that all the defendants were not at said office,
that they were not at said office, it became apparent on the sheriff that the individual
it became apparent that all the defendants were trying to evade service of summons.
petitioners were trying to evade service of summons. Thus, given this predicament, it was
futile for him to go back to the RCBC Plaza office.
d.3. Given the obvious attempt of defendants to evade service of summons, it was futile for
the Sheriff to go back to the RCBC Plaza Office.
It is argued that the summons was properly served to the individual petitioners through
substituted service because there were justifiable causes existing which prevented personal
d.4. Hence, summons were served to the individual defendants through substituted service service within a reasonable period of time. Respondent asserts that requiring the sheriff to
by entrusting the same to their house helpers residing at the respective addresses, all of return several times at the residences of the ten (10) individual petitioners despite their
whom are of suitable age and discretion. intention to evade service of summons and the considerable distances of their residences
would clearly be unreasonable.
xxxx
Respondent's explanations do not suffice.
36. Indeed, in the instant case, contrary to the allegations contained in the Motion to
Dismiss, the summons were properly served to the individual defendants through In the instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to
substituted service considering that there were justifiable causes existing which prevented substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the
personal service upon all the individual defendants within a reasonable time. individual petitioners. The "reasonable time" within which to personally serve the summons
- 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff as stated in Manotoc - has not yet
elapsed at the time the substituted service was opted to. Remarkably, based on the Sheriffs
36.1. It should be noted that aside from defendant NPGI, there are ten (10) other Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal service of summons upon the
individual defendants in the instant case who are residing in addresses which are far corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy of their personal and real
apart (i.e., Makati City, Pasig City, City of Manila and Quezon Province). properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of
summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve
36.2. Summons were attempted to be served to all defendant NPGI Directors, Luisa Ang, the summons within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in order to
Guillermo Sy and Pauline Ang on the following addresses: prove impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate, "several attempts" means at least three
(3) tries, preferrably on at least two different dates.

1. Renato Ang, Nena Ang, Melinda Ang, Pauline Ang - 1348 Palm Avenue, Further, except for the Quezon Province, there is, in fact, no considerable distance between
Dasmarinas Village, Makati City; the residences of the individual petitioners since the cities of Makati and Quezon are part of
the National Capital Region; hence, accessible either by private or public modes of
2. Guillermo Sy and Alison Sy - 1320 Glorioso Streets, Dasmarinas Village, Makati transportation. Assuming that there is, the distance would not have been insurmountable
City; had respondent took its time and not unnecessarily rushed to accomplish personal service in
just a single day.
3. Nelson Ang, Luisa Ang - 19 Swallow Drive, Greenmeadows, Quezon City;
Finally, respondent alleges that the summons was served to the individual petitioners
4. Mario Ang - Diamond Furniture, Cabunyag Street, Candelaria, Quezon; and through substituted service by entrusting the same to their house helpers, all of whom are
of suitable age and discretion. It did not, however, elaborate that these persons know how to
5. Ricky Ang - Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon. read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the individual petitioners at the earliest
36.3. To require the sheriff to return several times at the residences of the ten (10) possible time for them to take appropriate action. There is no way for Us to conclusively
defendants as suggested by the defendants, despite the apparent intention of the defendants ascertain that the sheriff ensured, among others, that the persons found in the alleged
dwelling or residence comprehend the significance of the receipt of the summons and the
duty to immediately deliver it to the individual petitioners or at least notify them of said
receipt of summons.

The foregoing considered, it can be deduced that since there were no actual efforts exerted
and no positive steps undertaken to earnestly locate the individual petitioners, there is no
basis to convincingly say that they evaded the personal service of summons and merely gave
the sheriff a run-around, thus, justifying substituted service upon them.

Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary
appearance. The second sentence of Section 20, [50] Rule 14 of the Rules that "[t]he inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance" clearly refers to affirmative
defenses, not affirmative reliefs.[51]

In the present case, the individual petitioners prayed, among others, for the following: (1)
discharge of the writ of attachment on their properties; (2) denial of the motion to declare
them in default; (3) admission of the Comment/Opposition (to the motion to declare them in
default) filed on December 19, 2006; and (4) denial of respondent's motion to strike off from
the records (their opposition to the motion to declare them in default). By seeking
affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual petitioners are deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[52] Therefore, the CA cannot
be considered to have erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the Special Appearance
with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The December 12, 2007
Decision and June 17, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787,
which sustained the March 29, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 06-882, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 181517. July 6, 2015.*
GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO SAYSON, JR., petitioners, vs. NISSIN-
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Service of Summons; Jurisdiction; It is a well-
established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity
must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.—It is a well-established rule that the rules on
service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must be strictly complied with.
Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the
summons was received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on service of summons upon
a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC,
summons may be served only through its officers.
Same; Same; Same; Under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the
corporation is no longer authorized. The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead
of “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of merely “secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of
“cashier.”—In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project
manager, a corporation’s assistant manager, ordinary clerk of a corporation, private
secretary of corporate executives, retained counsel, and officials who had control over the
operations of the corporation like the assistant general manager or the corporation’s Chief
Finance and Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said persons as “agent”
within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons
upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The rule now likewise states
“general manager” instead of “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of merely “secretary”;
and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive
only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in
statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all others,
or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons
expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Same; Same; Same; The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process.—At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party
to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of due process. Corporations would be easily deprived of their right to present
their defense in a multimillion peso suit, if the Court would disregard the mandate of the
Rules on the service of summons.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Almoro Law Office for petitioners.
Bolos & Reyes-Beltran Law Offices for respondent.
PERALTA,** J.:
For resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which petitioners
Green Star Express, Inc. and Fruto Sayson, Jr. brought before the Court, assailing the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 17, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated
January 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86824. The CA nullified the Resolution dated May 5,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Civil Case No.
SPL-0969, and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The following are the antecedents of the case:
On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC)
owned figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.' s (Green
Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver,
petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent NissinUniversal Robina
Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68. NURC
denied any liability therefore and argued that the criminal case shall determine the
ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without
prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence.
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of
San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the
summons. On February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of
jurisdiction due to improper service.
On May 5, 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled
that there was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by
NURC. The dispositive portion of said Resolution thus reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby
DENIED.3
Since its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, NURC elevated the case to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari. On September 17, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC ruling, hence:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions,
dated May 5, 2004 and dated July 26, 2004, of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31, in Civil Case No. SPL-0969, are hereby NULLIFIED and a new one
rendered granting Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, dated February 3, 2004. Private
Respondents' Amended Complaint for Damages filed against Petitioner Nissin-Universal
Robina Corporation is accordingly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, Green Star and Sayson moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition.
The lone issue is whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the
trial court with jurisdiction.
The petition is benefit of merit. Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not vadily acquire jurisdiction over
NURC,14 although the corporation may have actually received the summons.15 To rule
otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in
It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private
the administration of justice.16
juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.5
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard
and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative
NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was
or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio.1âwphi1 It argues that under Section 11, Rule
due process. Corporations would be easily deprived of their right to present their defense in
14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on service of summons upon a
a multi-million peso suit, if the Court would disregard the mandate of the Rules on the
juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC,
service of summons.17
summons may be served only through its officers.6 Thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 17,
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
2007 and Resolution dated January 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86824 are hereby
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
AFFIRMED.
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.7
SO ORDERED.
This provision replaced the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
read:

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If the defendant is a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered,
service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors.8

In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project manager, a
corporation’s assistant manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary of
corporate executives, retained counsel, and officials who had control over the operations of
the corporation like the assistant general manager or the corporation’s Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said persons as "agent" within the
contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an
agent of the corporation is no longer authorized,9 The rule now likewise states "general
manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and
"treasure" instead of "cashier."10 It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to
the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory
construction that the express mention of one person excludes all others, or expression
unions est exclusion alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the person expressly
listed in the rules.11 If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.12

Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received the summons on January 22,
2004. Green star claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo. The
general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriff’s
Return.13 The Return did not even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the
summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers
that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the
same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However, Green
Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC’s motion to
dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to
support such allegation, the same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when
the case was already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of
summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under
 G.R. No. 206147. January 13, 2016.*
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Service of Summons; Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the
service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.—Jurisdiction over the person, or
jurisdiction in personam — the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to
subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action — is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the
plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to
the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of
the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action. Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the
service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons
authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.
Same; Same; Same; While proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court
jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or
defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendant’s subsequent voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an
answer.—While proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over
the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the
service of summons may be cured by the defendant’s subsequent voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this
case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus,
jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance.
Same; Same; Judgments; Parties; The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by
a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms
to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.—Although a partnership is based
on delectus personae or mutual agency, whereby any partner can generally represent the
partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit against the partnership is
necessarily a suit impleading each and every partner. It must be remembered that a
partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate personality from the
persons composing it. In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a
judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-
interest after the commencement of the action in court. A decision rendered on a complaint
in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for
no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which
he is not a party. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner
must first be impleaded before he could be prejudiced by the judgment against the
partnership.—In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner must first be
impleaded before he could be prejudiced by the judgment against the partnership. As will be
discussed later, a partner may raise several defenses during the trial to avoid or mitigate
his obligation to the partnership liability. Necessarily, before he could present evidence
during the trial, he must first be impleaded and informed of the case against him. It would
be the height of injustice to rob an innocent partner of his hard-earned personal belongings
without giving him an opportunity to be heard. Without any showing that Guy himself acted
maliciously on behalf of the company, causing damage or injury to the complainant, then he
and his personal properties cannot be made directly and solely accountable for the liability
of QSC, the judgment debtor, because he was not a party to the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Resort to the properties of a partner may be made only after
efforts in exhausting partnership assets have failed or that such partnership assets are
insufficient to cover the entire obligation.—The partners’ obligation with respect to the
partnership liabilities is subsidiary in nature. It provides that the partners shall only be
liable with their property after all the partnership assets have been exhausted. To say that
one’s liability is subsidiary means that it merely becomes secondary and only arises if the
one primarily liable fails to sufficiently satisfy the obligation. Resort to the properties of a
partner may be made only after efforts in exhausting partnership assets have failed or that
such partnership assets are insufficient to cover the entire obligation. The subsidiary nature
of the partners’ liability with the partnership is one of the valid defenses against a
premature execution of judgment directed to a partner.
Civil Law; Obligations; Joint Obligations; Partnerships; Article 1816 provides that the
partners’ obligation to third persons with respect to the partnership liability is pro rata or
joint.—Article 1816 provides that the partners’ obligation to third persons with respect to
the partnership liability is pro rata or joint. Liability is joint when a debtor is liable only for
the payment of only a proportionate part of the debt. In contrast, a solidary liability makes
a debtor liable for the payment of the entire debt. In the same vein, Article 1207 does not
presume solidary liability unless: 1) the obligation expressly so states; or 2) the law or
nature requires solidarity. With regard to partnerships, ordinarily, the liability of the
partners is not solidary. The joint liability of the partners is a defense that can be raised by
a partner impleaded in a complaint against the partnership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Andres, Padernal & Paras Law Offices for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Michael C. Guy (Guy), assailing the June 25, 2012 Decision1 and the
March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94816, which
affirmed the June 28, 20093 and February 19, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan (RTC), in Civil Case No. 3108, a case for
damages. The assailed RTC orders denied Guy's Motion to Lift Attachment Upon
Personalty5 on the ground that he was not a judgment debtor.
The Facts
It appears from the records that on March 3, 1997, Atty. Glenn Gacott (Gacott) from
Palawan purchased two (2) brand new transreceivers from Quantech Systems
Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey
Medestomas (Medestomas), amounting to a total of P18,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to
major defects, Gacott personally returned the transreceivers to QSC and requested that
they be replaced. Medestomas received the returned transreceivers and promised to send
him the replacement units within two (2) weeks from May 10, 1997.
Time passed and Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed
him that there were no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price.
Despite several demands, both oral and written, Gacott was never given a replacement or a
refund. The demands caused Gacott to incur expenses in the total amount of P40,936.44.
Thus, Gacott filed a complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and
Medestomas, afterwhich they filed their Answer, verified by Medestomas himself and a
certain Elton Ong (Ong). QSC and Medestomas did not present any evidence during the
trial.6
In a Decision,7 dated March 16, 2007, the RTC found that the two (2) transreceivers were
defective and that QSC and Medestomas failed to replace the same or return Gacott's
money. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the following:
1. Purchase price plus 6% per annum from March 3, 1997 up to and until fully paid ------------
2. Actual Damages -----------------------------------
3. Moral Damages -----------------------------------
4. Corrective Damages -------------------------------
5. Attorney’s Fees ------------------------------------
6. Costs.
SO ORDERED.
The decision became final as QSC and Medestomas did not interpose an appeal. Gacott then
secured a Writ of Execution,8 dated September 26, 2007.
During the execution stage, Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but was in fact
a general partnership registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In
the articles of partnership,9 Guy was appointed as General Manager of QSC.
To execute the judgment, Branch Sheriff Ronnie L. Felizarte (Sheriff Felizarte) went to the
main office of the Department of Transportation and Communications, Land Transportation
Office (DOTC-LTO), Quezon City, and verified whether Medestomas, QSC and Guy had
personal properties registered therein.10 Upon learning that Guy had vehicles registered in
his name, Gacott instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor
vehicles of Guy based on the certification issued by the DOTC-LTO.11
On March 3, 2009, Sheriff Felizarte attached Guy’s vehicle by virtue of the Notice of
Attachment/Levy upon Personalty12 served upon the record custodian of the DOTC-LTO of
Mandaluyong City. A similar notice was served to Guy through his housemaid at his
residence.
Thereafter, Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon Personalty, arguing that he was
not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached. 13 Gacott filed an
opposition to the motion.
The RTC Order
On June 28, 2009, the RTC issued an order denying Guy’s motion. It explained that
considering QSC was not a corporation, but a registered partnership, Guy should be treated
as a general partner pursuant to Section 21 of the Corporation Code, and he may be held
jointly and severally liable with QSC and Medestomas. The trial court wrote:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so
shall be liable as general partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising
as a result thereof x x x. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership x x x, loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is
liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. All partners
are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under
Article 1822 and 1823.14
Accordingly, it disposed:
P 18,000.00
40,000.00
WHEREFORE, with the ample discussion of the matter, this Court finds and so holds that
the75,000.00
property of movant Michael Guy may be validly attached in satisfaction of the liabilities
adjudged by this Court against Quantech Co., the latter being an ostensible Corporation and
100,000.00
the movant being considered by this Court as a general partner therein in accordance with
60,000.00
the order of this court impressed in its decision to this case imposing joint and several
liability to the defendants. The Motion to Lift Attachment Upon Personalty submitted by
the movant is therefore DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
Not satisfied, Guy moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion. He argued that he
was neither impleaded as a defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; that under Article 1824 of the Civil Code,
the partners were only solidarily liable for the partnership liability under exceptional
circumstances; and that in order for a partner to be liable for the debts of the partnership, it
must be shown that all partnership assets had first been exhausted.16
On February 19, 2010, the RTC issued an order17denying his motion.
The denial prompted Guy to seek relief before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On June 25, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision dismissing Guy’s appeal for the
same reasons given by the trial court. In addition thereto, the appellate court stated:
We hold that Michael Guy, being listed as a general partner of QSC during that time,
cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the court summons. The verified Answer filed by
one of the partners, Elton Ong, binds him as a partner because the Rules of Court does not
require that summons be served on all the partners. It is sufficient that service be made on
the "president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-
house counsel." To Our mind, it is immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served on
the theory that it was a corporation. What is important is that the summons was served on
QSC’s authorized officer xxx.18
The CA stressed that Guy, being a partner in QSC, was bound by the summons served upon
QSC based on Article 1821 of the Civil Code. The CA further opined that the law did not
require a partner to be actually involved in a suit in order for him to be made liable. He
remained “solidarily liable whether he participated or not, whether he ratified it or not, or
whether he had knowledge of the act or omission.”19
Aggrieved, Guy filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed
resolution, dated March 5, 2013.
Hence, the present petition raising the following
ISSUE
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER GUY IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE BREACH OF THE
CONTRACT OF SALE WITH RESPONDENT GACOTT.20
Guy argues that he is not solidarily liable with the partnership because the solidary liability
of the partners under Articles 1822, 1823 and 1824 of the Civil Code only applies when it
stemmed from the act of a partner. In this case, the alleged lapses were not attributable to
any of the partners. Guy further invokes Article 1816 of the Civil Code which states that the
liability of the partners to the partnership is merely joint and subsidiary in nature.
In his Comment,21 Gacott countered, among others, that because Guy was a general and
managing partner of QSC, he could not feign ignorance of the transactions undertaken by
QSC. Gacott insisted that notice to one partner must be considered as notice to the whole
partnership, which included the pendency of the civil suit against it.
In his Reply,22 Guy contended that jurisdiction over the person of the partnership was not
acquired because the summons was never served upon it or through any of its authorized
office. He also reiterated that a partner’s liability was joint and subsidiary, and not solidary.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The service of summons was flawed; voluntary appearance cured the defect
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam – the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other
rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions,
civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.23Jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As the
initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by
the proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action. 24
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive
enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. 25
The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to have been served with the
summons through any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely:
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house
counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in
Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons.26 The CA was obviously mistaken when it opined that it was immaterial whether
the summons to QSC was served on the theory that it was a corporation. 27
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction
over the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the
service of summons may be cured by the defendant’s subsequent voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this
case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus,
jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance.
A partner must be separately and distinctly impleaded before he can be bound by a judgment
The next question posed is whether the trial court’s jurisdiction over QSC extended to the
person of Guy insofar as holding him solidarily liable with the partnership. After a thorough
study of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court answers in the negative.
Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency, whereby any
partner can generally represent the partnership in its business affairs, it is non
sequitur that a suit against the partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and every
partner. It must be remembered that a partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct
and separate personality from the persons composing it.28
In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a judgment of a court is
conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the
commencement of the action in court.29 A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action
or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall
be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a
party.30The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee
of due process of law.31
In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,32 the Court declared that a person not impleaded and given the
opportunity to take part in the proceedings was not bound by the decision declaring as null
and void the title from which his title to the property had been derived. The effect of a
judgment could not be extended to non-parties by simply issuing an alias writ of execution
against them, for no man should be prejudiced by any proceeding to which he was a
stranger.
In Aguila v. Court of Appeals,33 the complainant had a cause of action against the
partnership. Nevertheless, it was the partners themselves that were impleaded in the
complaint. The Court dismissed the complaint and held that it was the partnership, not its
partners, officers or agents, which should be impleaded for a cause of action against the
partnership itself. The Court added that the partners could not be held liable for the
obligations of the partnership unless it was shown that the legal fiction of a different
juridical personality was being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes.34
Here, Guy was never made a party to the case. He did not have any participation in the
entire proceeding until his vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became QSC’s “co-
defendant debtor” during the judgment execution stage. It is a basic principle of law that
money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to
the judgment debtor.35 Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only
to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty
of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as
the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.36
In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner must first be impleaded before he
could be prejudiced by the judgment against the partnership. As will be discussed later, a
partner may raise several defenses during the trial to avoid or mitigate his obligation to the
partnership liability. Necessarily, before he could present evidence during the trial, he must
first be impleaded and informed of the case against him. It would be the height of injustice
to rob an innocent partner of his hard-earned personal belongings without giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Without any showing that Guy himself acted maliciously on behalf
of the company, causing damage or injury to the complainant, then he and his personal
properties cannot be made directly and solely accountable for the liability of QSC, the
judgment debtor, because he was not a party to the case.
Further, Article 1821 of the Civil Code does not state that there is no need to implead
a partner in order to be bound by the partnership liability. It provides that:
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the
knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or
then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could and
should have communicated it to the acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge
of the partnership, except in the case of fraud on the partnership, committed by or with
the consent of that partner.
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]
A careful reading of the provision shows that notice to any partner, under certain
circumstances, operates as notice to or knowledge to the partnership only. Evidently, it does
not provide for the reverse situation, or that notice to the partnership is notice to the
partners. Unless there is an unequivocal law which states that a partner is automatically
charged in a complaint against the partnership, the constitutional right to due process takes
precedence and a partner must first be impleaded before he can be considered as a judgment
debtor. To rule otherwise would be a dangerous precedent, harping in favor of the
deprivation of property without ample notice and hearing, which the Court certainly cannot
countenance.
Partners’ liability is subsidiary and generally joint; immediate levy upon the property of a
partner cannot be made
Granting that Guy was properly impleaded in the complaint, the execution of judgment
would be improper. Article 1816 of the Civil Code governs the liability of the partners to
third persons, which states that:
Article 1816. All partners, including industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata with all their
property and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted, for the contracts
which may be entered into in the name and for the account of the partnership, under its
signature and by a person authorized to act for the partnership. However, any partner may
enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.
[Emphasis Supplied]
This provision clearly states that, first, the partners’ obligation with respect to the
partnership liabilities is subsidiary in nature. It provides that the partners shall only be
liable with their property after all the partnership assets have been exhausted. To say that
one’s liability is subsidiary means that it merely becomes secondary and only arises if the
one primarily liable fails to sufficiently satisfy the obligation. Resort to the properties of a
partner may be made only after efforts in exhausting partnership assets have failed or that
such partnership assets are insufficient to cover the entire obligation. The subsidiary nature
of the partners’ liability with the partnership is one of the valid defenses against a
premature execution of judgment directed to a partner.
In this case, had he been properly impleaded, Guy’s liability would only arise after the
properties of QSC would have been exhausted. The records, however, miserably failed to
show that the partnership’s properties were exhausted. The report37 of the sheriff showed
that the latter went to the main office of the DOTC-LTO in Quezon City and verified
whether Medestomas, QSC and Guy had personal properties registered therein. Gacott then
instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor vehicles of
Guy.38 The sheriff then served the Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Personalty to the record
custodian of the DOTC-LTO of Mandaluyong City. A similar notice was served to Guy
through his housemaid at his residence.
Clearly, no genuine efforts were made to locate the properties of QSC that could have been
attached to satisfy the judgment − contrary to the clear mandate of Article 1816. Being
subsidiarily liable, Guy could only be held personally liable if properly impleaded and after
all partnership assets had been exhausted.
Second, Article 1816 provides that the partners’ obligation to third persons with respect to
the partnership liability is pro rata or joint.1âwphi1 Liability is joint when a debtor is liable
only for the payment of only a proportionate part of the debt. In contrast, a solidary liability
makes a debtor liable for the payment of the entire debt. In the same vein, Article 1207 does
not presume solidary liability unless: 1) the obligation expressly so states; or 2) the law
or nature requires solidarity. With regard to partnerships, ordinarily, the liability of the
partners is not solidary.39 The joint liability of the partners is a defense that can be raised
by a partner impleaded in a complaint against the partnership.
In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the partners’ liability be solidary in
nature. Articles 1822, 1823 and 1824 of the Civil Code provide for these exceptional
conditions, to wit:
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary
course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or
injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is
incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or
omitting to act.
Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
all their property and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted for the contracts
which may be entered into in the name and for the account of the partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision and the March 5,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94816 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Puerto Princesa City, is ORDERED TO RELEASE Michael C. Guy's Suzuki Grand Vitara
subject of the Notice of Levy/ Attachment upon Personalty.
SO ORDERED.

(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives
money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and

(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property
of a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any
partner while it is in the custody of the partnership.

Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything
chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.

[Emphases Supplied]

In essence, these provisions articulate that it is the act of a partner which caused loss or
injury to a third person that makes all other partners solidarily liable with the partnership
because of the words "any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary
course of the business," "one partner acting within the scope of his apparent
authority" and "misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the
partnership." The obligation is solidary because the law protects the third person, who in
good faith relied upon the authority of a partner, whether such authority is real or
apparent.40

In the case at bench, it was not shown that Guy or the other partners did a wrongful act or
misapplied the money or property he or the partnership received from Gacott. A third
person who transacted with said partnership can hold the partners solidarily liable for the
whole obligation if the case of the third person falls under Articles 1822 or
1823.41 Gacott’s claim stemmed from the alleged defective transreceivers he bought from
QSC, through the latter's employee, Medestomas. It was for a breach of warranty in a
contractual obligation entered into in the name and for the account of QSC, not due to the
acts of any of the partners. For said reason, it is the general rule under Article 1816 that
governs the joint liability of such breach, and not the exceptions under Articles 1822 to
1824. Thus, it was improper to hold Guy solidarily liable for the obligation of the
partnership.

Finally, Section 21 of the Corporation Code,42 as invoked by the RTC, cannot be applied to
sustain Guy's liability. The said provision states that a general partner shall be liable for all
debts, liabilities and damages incurred by an ostensible corporation. It must be read,
however, in conjunction with Article 1816 of the Civil Code, which governs the liabilities of
partners against third persons. Accordingly, whether QSC was an alleged ostensible
corporation or a duly registered partnership, the liability of Guy, if any, would remain to be
joint and subsidiary because, as previously stated, all partners shall be liable pro rata with
 G.R. No. 201378. October 18, 2017.*
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, vs. TIARA COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Motion for
Extension of Time; Under the Rules, the period to file a petition for review on certiorari is
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the judgment, resolution, or final order appealed from.
Nevertheless, on motion of the party filed before the reglementary period, the Supreme Court
(SC) may grant extension for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.—Section 2 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court governing the procedure for filing an appeal through a petition for review
on certiorari expressly allows the filing of a motion for extension of time. Under the Rules,
the period to file a petition for review on certiorari is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
judgment, resolution, or final order appealed from. Nevertheless, on motion of the party
filed before the reglementary period, this Court may grant extension for a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days. In a Resolution dated July 16, 2012, we granted Florida’s motion
for extension of time. We thus find GV Florida’s petition to be timely filed.
Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; Interlocutory Orders; In remedial law, an order
denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory order; When an order is merely
interlocutory — one which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but is not the final decision of the whole controversy —
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an appeal cannot be had. In this instance, a party’s
recourse is to file an answer, with the option to include grounds stated in the motion to
dismiss, and proceed to trial. In the event that an adverse judgment is rendered, the party
can file an appeal and raise the interlocutory order as an error.—In remedial law, an order
denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory order. This classification is vital
because the kind of court order determines the particular remedy that a losing party may
pursue. In the case of a final order — one that finally disposes of a case — the proper
remedy is an appeal. On the other hand, when an order is merely interlocutory — one which
refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some
point or matter but is not the final decision of the whole controversy — Section 1 of Rule 41
provides that an appeal cannot be had. In this instance, a party’s recourse is to file an
answer, with the option to include grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and proceed to
trial. In the event that an adverse judgment is rendered, the party can file an appeal and
raise the interlocutory order as an error. This general rule is subject to a narrow exception.
A party may question an interlocutory order without awaiting judgment after trial if its
issuance is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, the party can file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; “Appeal” and “Certiorari,” Distinguished.—A special civil action
for certiorari is an original civil action and not an appeal. An appeal aims to correct errors in
judgment and rectify errors in the appreciation of facts and law which a lower court may
have committed in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari,
on the other hand, is used to correct errors in jurisdiction. We have defined an error in
jurisdiction as “one where the officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion is not mere abuse of
discretion but must be grave “as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.”—Grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in
remedial law. It is not mere abuse of discretion but must be grave “as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.” In more
concrete terms, not every error committed by a tribunal amounts to grave abuse of
discretion. A misappreciation of the facts or a misapplication of the law does not, by itself,
warrant the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. There must be a clear abuse of the
authority vested in a tribunal. This abuse must be so serious and so grave that it warrants
the interference of the court to nullify or modify the challenged action and to undo the
damage done.
Same; Civil Procedure; Summons; Service of Summons; Alias Summons; In cases of
improper service of summons, courts should not automatically dismiss the complaint by
reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to
issue alias summons and ensure that it is properly served.—We agree that there was
improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply jurisprudence and rule that in
cases of improper service of summons, courts should not automatically dismiss the
complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to
issue alias summons and ensure that it is properly served. Service of summons is the main
mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil
case. Through it, the defendant is informed of the action against him or her and he or she is
able to adequately prepare his or her course of action. Rules governing the proper service of
summons are not mere matters of procedure. They go into a defendant’s right to due
process. Thus, strict compliance with the rules on service of summons is mandatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a
corporation, the current rule has provided for a list of specific persons to whom service of
summons must be made.—Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure
for the issuance of summons to a domestic private juridical entity. It states: Sec. 11. Service
upon domestic private juridical entity.—When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service
may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed
the old rules pertaining to the service of summons on corporations. While the former rule
allowed service on an agent of a corporation, the current rule has provided for a list of
specific persons to whom service of summons must be made.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of summons is not the only mode through which a
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; When a party appears before the
court without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding
lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.—Service of summons, however, is
not the only mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. Voluntary
appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court’s lack of
jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the court
without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack
of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons. When a defendant, however, appears
before the court for the specific purpose of questioning the court’s jurisdiction over him or
her, this is a special appearance and does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so long as
a defendant raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other
grounds of objection. In such case, there is no voluntary appearance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Improper service of summons and lack of voluntary
appearance do not automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint.—Still, improper
service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not automatically warrant the
dismissal of the complaint. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 125
SCRA 522 (1983), we held: A case should not be dismissed simply because an original
summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a
defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly
summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summonscan be
actually served on said defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alias Summons; When there is improper service of
summons and the defendant makes a special appearance to question this, the proper and
speedy remedy is for the court to issue alias summons.—When there is improper service of
summons and the defendant makes a special appearance to question this, the proper and
speedy remedy is for the court to issue alias summons. In the present case, the summons
was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While she is not one of the officers
enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and
submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pretrial brief without any reservation as to the
court’s jurisdiction over it. At no point in its pretrial brief did TCC raise the issue of the
RTC’s jurisdiction over it. In fact, it even asked the RTC that it be allowed to reserve the
presentation of additional evidence through documents and witnesses. While it is true that
TCC initially filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, we rule that TCC waived any objection raised
therein as to the jurisdiction of the court when it subsequently filed its pretrial brief without
any reservation and even prayed to be allowed to present additional evidence. This, to this
Court’s mind, is an unequivocal submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC to conduct the
trial.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Prescription; Prescription is a ground for the
dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the merits; When the issue of prescription
requires the determination of evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright
dismissal without hearing.—Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint
without going to trial on the merits. Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is raised in a
motion to dismiss which is filed before the answer. It may also be raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer. At the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defense may be conducted as if a motion to dismiss was filed. Nevertheless, this
is only a general rule. When the issue of prescription requires the determination of
evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal without hearing.
Same; Evidence; Admissibility of Evidence; Under the Rules of Court, a party
presenting a document as evidence must first establish its due execution and authenticity as
a preliminary requirement for its admissibility.—TCC alleges that GV Florida’s third-party
complaint (which it argues is essentially an action for implied warranty) has already
prescribed. The Civil Code states that this claim must be made within six months from the
time of the delivery of the thing sold. Without preempting the RTC’s findings on the validity
of the argument that this is a warranty claim, a finding that the action has prescribed
requires the ascertainment of the delivery date of the tires in question. This, in turn,
requires the presentation of the delivery receipts as well as their identification and
authentication. Under the Rules of Court, a party presenting a document as evidence must
first establish its due execution and authenticity as a preliminary requirement for its
admissibility.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alagar, Silverio Law Offices for petitioner.
Destura & Associates Law Offices for respondent.
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner G.V. Florida Transport Inc. (GV Florida) to challenge the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110760 dated October 13, 2011 (Decision)2 and its
Resolution dated March 26, 2012 (Resolution)3 which denied GV Florida's subsequent
motion for reconsideration. The CA granted respondent Tiara Commercial Corporation's
(TCC) petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It found
that Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to grant TCC's motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party
complaint in an action for damages pending before the RTC.
The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages 4 against GV Florida
and its bus driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action arose out of a
vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan, Cordon,
Isabela on May I, 2007. In its complaint, VLI claimed that Vizquera's negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise due diligence in
supervising its employee.5
In its Answer,6 GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus had factory and
mechanical defects which caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate cause
of the vehicle collision.7
On April 8, 2008, GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint8 against TCC. According to
GV Florida, on March 23, 2007, it purchased from TCC fifty (50) brand new Michelin tires,
four (4) of which were installed into the bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that
though Vizquera exerted all efforts humanly possible to avoid the accident, the bus
nevertheless swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus. GV Florida
maintains that the '"proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was brought
about by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party plaintiff GV
Florida absolutely and totally had no control over."9
The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC. In the return of summons, it appears that
the sheriff served the summons to a certain Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who represented
herself as an accounting manager authorized by TCC to receive summons on its behalf. 10
TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time to
File Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss.11 Therein, it stated that the summons
was received by Gino-gino, its financial supervisor. The RTC granted TCC's prayer for
extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss.
TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss12 GV Florida's third-party complaint. First, it
argued that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of summons.
Under Section 11 of Rule 14, there is an exclusive list of the persons upon whom service of
summons on domestic juridical entities may be made. As the summons in this case was not
served on any of the persons listed in Section 11 of Rule 14, there was no proper service of
summons on TCC that would vest the RTC with jurisdiction over it. Second, TCC stated
that the purported cause of action in the third-party complaint is a claim for an implied
warranty which has already prescribed, having been made beyond the six-month period
allowed in the Civil Code. Third, the third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action
against TCC. TCC harped on the fact that GV Florida did not mention in the third-party
complaint that the tires that blew out were purchased from it. Moreover, a tire blow-out
does not relieve a common carrier of its liability. Fourth, TCC argues that there is a
condition precedent which the law requires before a claim for implied warranty may be
made. The party claiming must submit a warranty claim and demand. GV Florida failed to
do so in this case. Fifth, GV Florida has the burden of first establishing that the cause of the
accident was not its own negligence before it can be allowed to file a third-party complaint
against TCC. Sixth, venue was improperly laid since TCC's principal place of business is in
Makati. And finally, TCC states that the third-party complaint should be dismissed due to
GV Florida's failure to implead Michelin as an indispensable party.13
The RTC denied TCC's motion to dismiss in an Order14
dated March 2, 2009. It also denied
TCC's subsequent motion for reconsideration in an Order15 dated July 16, 2009.
On October 5, 2009, TCC filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the RTC's denial of its motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, TCC filed its Answer Ad Cautelam 16 which repeated its arguments
pertaining to jurisdiction, the prescription of the implied warranty claim, the impropriety of
the third-party complaint and the venue of the action, and the failure to implead Michelin.
Upon order of the RTC, the case was set for pre-trial17 and the parties submitted their
respective pretrial briefs. Notably, TCC filed its pre-trial brief without any reservations as
to the issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, not only did it fail to include in its identification of
issues the question of the RTC's jurisdiction, TCC even reserved the option to present
additional evidence.18
On October 13, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting TCC's petition and reversing
the Orders of the RTC. Emphasizing that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court is exclusive, the CA found that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over TCC
because of the improper service of summons upon a person not named in the
enumeration.19 It then proceeded to rule that GV Florida's third-party complaint against
TCC is a claim for implied warranty which, under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, must be
filed within six months from delivery. While the CA noted that the delivery receipt for the
tires is not in the records of the case, it may be assumed that the tires were delivered a few
days after the purchase date of March 23, 2007. Since GV Florida only filed the third-party
complaint on April 8, 2008, the action has prescribed.20
GV Florida thus filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the CA's Decision.
GV Florida argues that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over TCC. While it agrees that the
enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is exclusive, GV Florida argues
that service of summons is not the only means through which a court acquires jurisdiction
over a party. Under Section 20 of Rule 14, voluntary appearance of a defendant is
equivalent to service of summons, which then gives a court jurisdiction over such defendant.
In this case, GV Florida claims that TCC voluntarily appeared and submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed motions and pleadings seeking affirmative relief from
said court. It adds that Section 11 of Rule 14 is only a general rule which allows for
substantial compliance when there is clear proof that the domestic juridical entity in fact
received the summons. Moreover, GV Florida argues that improper service of summons is
not a ground for dismissal of the third-party complaint since the RTC has the authority to
issue alias summons.21
GV Florida also challenges the CA's ruling that its third-party complaint against TCC
should be dismissed on the ground of prescription. It claims that prescription cannot be the
basis of a dismissal when the issue involves evidentiary matters that can only be threshed
out during trial. In this case, GV Florida asserts that the issue of whether its action has
prescribed requires a determination of when the Michelin tires were delivered. Thus, there
is a need to examine the delivery receipts which, as GV Florida highlights, are not in the
records of the CA as stated in the Decision itself. 22
In its Comment, TCC raises the procedural defense that GV Florida's petition was filed out
of time. It insists that GV Florida's motion for extension of time to file its petition is no
longer allowed by virtue of AM No. 7-7-12-SC which prohibits the filing of motions for
extension of time in petitions filed under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.23 Further, TCC repeats its position that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it
due to improper service of summons. It also disputes GV Florida's argument that it
voluntarily appeared. TCC insists that it initially filed a Special Entry of Appearance to
apprise the RTC that "[TCC] is represented without necessarily waiving any right/s of the
latter."24 TCC adds that in its motion to dismiss and Answer Ad Cautelam, it consistently
raised the question of the propriety of the service of summons and the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over it.25
Moreover, TCC insists that GV Florida's implied warranty claim has prescribed and that
the latter has, in any case, failed to comply with a condition precedent-the filing of a
warranty claim or demand. TCC also insists that GV Florida has never complained about
the other Michelin tires it purchased. This, in TCC's view, belies GV Florida's claim that the
tires are defective.26
TCC also contends that GV Florida's filing of the third-party complaint is improper. It
explains that the test for ascertaining whether a third-party complaint may be filed is
whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff
may have against the original plaintiff in the original case. However, GV Florida's defense
against VLI, which is lack of negligence, is personal to GV Florida and cannot be raised by
TCC for its own benefit. TCC also asserts that in any case, the venue of the third-party
complaint is improperly laid since TCC's principal place of business is in Makati.27
Finally, TCC claims that the third-party complaint should be dismissed for failure to
implead an indispensable party-Michelin, the manufacturer of the tires which GV Florida
claims are defective.28
We GRANT the petition.
I
We emphasize that GV Florida's appeal came from an original special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 filed before the CA. In cases such as this, the
question of law presented before us is whether the CA was correct in its ruling that the
lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29
In particular, the main issue we must resolve is whether the CA correctly found that the
RTC's Order dismissing GV Florida's third-party complaint is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion which, in turn, merits its reversal and the reinstitution of the third-party
complaint.
A
However, we shall first resolve the procedural issue raised by TCC pertaining to the
timeliness of this petition.
Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governing the procedure for filing an appeal
through a petition for review on certiorari expressly allows the filing of a motion for
extension of time. Under the Rules, the period to file a petition for review on certiorari is
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the judgment, resolution, or final order appealed from.
Nevertheless, on motion of the party filed before the reglementary period, this Court may
grant extension for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. In a Resolution 30 dated July 16,
2012, we granted Florida's motion for extension of time. We thus find GV Florida's petition
to be timely filed.
B action--done capriciously, whimsically and without regard to existing rules and attendant
The central issue in this case arose from the RTC's Order dated March 2, 2009 denying
TCC's motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint. In remedial law, an order
denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory order.31 This classification is
vital because the kind of court order determines the particular remedy that a losing party
may pursue. In the case of a final order-one that finally disposes of a case-the proper remedy
is an appeal. On the other hand, when an order is merely interlocutory-one which refers to
something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or
matter but is not the final decision of the whole controversy, 32 -Section 1 of Rule 41 provides
that an appeal cannot be had. In this instance, a party's recourse is to file an answer, with
the option to include grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and proceed to trial. In the
event that an adverse judgment is rendered, the party can file an appeal and raise the
interlocutory order as an error.33
This general rule is subject to a narrow exception. A party may question an interlocutory
order without awaiting judgment after trial if its issuance is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.34 In this case, the party can file a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
A special civil action for certiorari is an original civil action and not an appeal. An appeal
aims to correct errors in judgment and rectify errors in the appreciation of facts and law
which a lower court may have committed in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.35 A
special civil action for certiorari, on the other hand, is used to correct errors
in jurisdiction. We have defined an error in jurisdiction as "one where the officer or tribunal
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction."36
This distinction finds concrete significance when a party pleads before a higher court
seeking the correction of a particular order. When a party seeks an appeal of a final order,
his or her petition must identify the errors in the lower court's findings of fact and law.
Meanwhile, when a party files a special civil action for certiorari, he or she must allege the
acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in remedial law. It is not mere abuse of
discretion but must be grave "as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law."37 In more concrete terms, not every error committed
by a tribunal amounts to grave abuse of discretion. A misappreciation of the facts or a
misapplication of the law does not, by itself, warrant the filing of a special civil action
for certiorari. There must be a clear abuse of the authority vested in a tribunal. This abuse
must be so serious and so grave that it warrants the interference of the court to nullify or
modify the challenged action and to undo the damage done.38
In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,39 we found grave abuse of discretion when a trial court judge
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent the implementation of a writ of execution
for an indefinite period. There, we declared that .the blatant violation of the Rules of Court
is clearly grave abuse of discretion.40 In Belongilot v. Cua,41 we also ruled that the
Ombudsman's dismissal of a complaint for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 was
attended with grave abuse of discretion because it used irrelevant considerations and
refused to properly examine pertinent facts in arriving at its decision on the issue of
probable cause.42 We held that "an examination of the records reveal a collective pattern of
facts."43
There are instances when litigants file a petition seeking the reversal of an interlocutory
order yet their pleadings fail to allege any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
tribunal. Instead, these petitions merely identify errors of fact and law and seek their
reversal. In such a case, the higher court must dismiss the petition because it fails to allege
the core requirement of a Rule 65 petition-the allegation of the presence of grave abuse of
discretion. Without this requirement, litigants can easily circumvent the rule that an
interlocutory order cannot be appealed. They will simply file a pleading denominated as a
special civil action for certiorari, but which instead raises errors in judgment and is, in
truth, an appeal. An appeal and a special civil action for certiorari are, however, not
interchangeable remedies.44
In the present case, TCC's petition for certiorari did not identify the RTC's specific acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Rather, it imputed errors in the RTC's proper
interpretation of the law. Further, the CA's Decision makes no finding of any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC. The penultimate paragraph of the Decision, which
summarizes the basis for its ruling, states:
In fine, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of [TCC] since the service of
summons to its Account Manager is not binding on the corporation. Furthermore, the action
brought by [GV Florida] against [TCC] is already barred by prescription having filed beyond
the six-month prescriptive period. Having settled the pivotal issues in this case, We find
that it is no longer necessary to address other arguments raised by the petitioner since
those questions, if considered, would not alter the outcome of this case. 45
The CA, in choosing to reverse the RTC in a special civil action for certiorari, based its
decision on its disagreement with the RTC as to the correct application of the law. This is
not an error in jurisdiction but merely an error in judgment. Instead of granting the petition
and reversing the RTC, what the CA should have done was to dismiss the petition
for certiorari for failing to allege grave abuse of discretion. We further note that the RTC
Order challenged before the CA through the petition for certiorari is an interlocutory order.
As there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion, TCC's recourse is to proceed to trial
and raise this error in its appeal in the event of an adverse judgment.
II
Nevertheless, we have examined the errors raised by GV Florida in the appeal filed before
us and hold that the CA erred in its conclusions of law as well.
We agree that there was improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply
jurisprudence and rule that in cases of improper service of summons, courts should not
automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The remedy is to issue alias summons and ensure that it is properly served.46
Service of summons is the main mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in a civil case. Through it, the defendant is informed of the action
against him or her and he or she is able to adequately prepare his or her course of action.
Rules governing the proper service of summons are not mere matters of procedure. They go
into a defendant's right to due process.47 Thus, strict compliance with the rules on service of
summons is mandatory.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of
summons to a domestic private juridical entity. It states:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the old rules pertaining to the
service of summons on corporations. While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a
corporation, the current rule has provided for a list of specific persons to whom service of
summons must be made.
In Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, 48 we
explained that the purpose of this rule is "to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do
with the legal papers served on him."49 This rule requires strict compliance; the old doctrine
that substantial compliance is sufficient no longer applies.50 In E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd. v. Benito,51we ruled that the liberal construction of the rules cannot be invoked as a
substitute for the plain requirements stated in Section 11 of Rule 14.52 In Mason v. Court of
Appeals,53 we definitively ruled that Villarosa settled the question of the application of the
rule on substantial compliance. It does not apply in the case of Section 11 of Rule 14. We
said:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies
squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at l 02 Juan Luna St., Davao City
and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement
with private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply
with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was
served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that
there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa.
The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in
Villarosa's favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made
through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which revised [ ] Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial court's basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed
with petitioner's assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited
and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.54 (Italics in the original.)
Service of summons, however, is not the only mode through which a court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of
jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court.55 When a party appears before the court
without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack
of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.56 When a defendant, however, appears
before the court for the specific purpose of questioning the court's jurisdiction over him or
her, this is a special appearance and does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.57Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so long as
a defendant raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other
grounds of objection. In such case, there is no voluntary appearance.
Still, improper service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not automatically
warrant the dismissal of the complaint.1âwphi1 In Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,58 we held:
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served.
It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears
before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed
against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said
defendant.59 (Italics in the original)
We repeated this doctrine in later cases such as Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v.
Ting Guan Trading Corporation,60 Spouses Anuncacion v. Bocanegra,61 and Teh v. Court of
Appeals.62
In Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Breva,63 we even said that
there is no grave abuse of discretion when a trial court refuses to dismiss a complaint solely
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because of improper
service of summons.64
Thus, when there is improper service of summons and the defendant makes a special
appearance to question this, the proper and speedy remedy is for the court to
issue alias summons.
In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC.
While she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC
has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pre-trial
brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it. At no point in its pre-trial
brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it. In fact, it even asked the RTC
that it be allowed to reserve the presentation of additional evidence through documents and
witnesses. While it is true that TCC initially filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, we rule that
TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the court when it
subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even prayed to be allowed
to present additional evidence. This, to this Court's mind, is an unequivocal submission to
the jurisdiction of the RTC to conduct the trial.
Moreover, we apply the doctrine in Lingner & Fisher GMBI-J and hold that the mere fact of
improper service of summons does not lead to the outright dismissal of the third-party
complaint. While the RTC should issue an aliassummons to remedy the error, its refusal to
dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over TCC
due to improper service of summons) does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
III
We also disagree with the CA that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be dismissed
on the ground of prescription.
Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the merits.
Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is raised in a motion to dismiss which is filed before
the answer. It may also be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. At the discretion
of the court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense may be conducted as if a
motion to dismiss was filed.65 Nevertheless, this is only a general rule. When the issue of
prescription requires the detcn11ination of evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an
outright dismissal without hearing.
In Sanchez v. Sanchez (Sanchez),66we held that the trial court erred when it dismissed an
action on the ground of prescription on the basis of the pleadings filed and without requiring
any trial. The issue of prescription in Sanchezrequired the prior determination of whether
the sale subject of the case was valid, void or voidable. This is a matter that requires the
presentation of evidence since the fact of prescription is not apparent in the pleadings. We
said:
The Court has consistently held that the affirmative defense of prescription does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the
issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the
merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss x x x.67(Citations omitted.)
Here, TCC alleges that GY Florida's third-party complaint (which it argues is essentially an
action for implied warranty) has already prescribed. The Civil Code states that this claim
must be made within six months from the time of the delivery of the thing sold. Without
preempting the RTC's findings on the validity of the argument that this is a warranty claim,
a finding that the action has prescribed requires the ascertainment of the delivery date of
the tires in question. This, in turn, requires the presentation of the delivery receipts as well
as their identification and authentication. Under the Rules of Court, a party presenting a
document as evidence must first establish its due execution and authenticity as a
preliminary requirement for its admissibility.68
We find that the reckoning date from which the prescriptive period may be ascertained is
not apparent from the pleadings themselves. We agree with GY Florida's observation that
the CA itself admitted in its Decision that the delivery receipts do not appear in the records.
A finding of fact as to the date of delivery can only be made after hearing and reception of
evidence. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
We further note that the CA based its finding on the delivery date on mere presumptions.
The assailed Decision states that since Florida purchased the Michelin tires on March 23,
2007, it may be presumed that the delivery was made in the ensuing days. Since the third-
party complaint was filed only on April 8, 2008, or more than one year from the date of
purchase, it concluded that the claim on the implied warranty has prescribed.69 Findings of
fact, however, cannot be based on mere assumptions. The Rules of Court provide the process
through which factual findings are arrived at. This procedure must be followed as it is the
means chosen by law to ascertain judicial truth. Relying on probabilities, when the rules
provide for a specific procedure to ascertain facts, cannot be countenanced.
Since we cannot proceed to rule beyond the question of whether the CA correctly ruled that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, this being the only question of law presented
before us in this petition for review on certiorari, we shall withhold ruling on the other
issues raised by TCC in its Comment which have not been discussed by the CA in
its Decision. In any case, we find that the other matters raised by TCC in its Comment are
questions that should first be threshed out before the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 13, 2011 and its Resolution dated March 26, 2012 are REVERSED. The Order dated
March 2, 2009 of Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 158836. September 30, 2015.*
SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and FIRST
ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 158967. September 30, 2015.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ANTIPOLO CITY,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FIRST ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 160726. September 30, 2015.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Antipolo City, petitioner, vs. FIRST
ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 160778. September 30, 2015.*
SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondent.
Statutes; Express Repeal of Statutes; The express repeal of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1818 clearly indicates Congress’ intent to replace PD No. 1818 with Republic Act (RA)
No. 8975.—This court has held that implied repeals are not favored, and “the failure to add
a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law[.]”
The express repeal of Presidential Decree No. 1818 clearly indicates Congress’ intent to
replace Presidential Decree No. 1818 with Republic Act No. 8975. Republic Act No. 8975
was approved on November 7, 2000 and was published in the Malaya and the Manila
Bulletin on November 11, 2000. It was also published in the Official Gazette on May 7,
2001. When this case was filed, Republic Act No. 8975 was already effective.
Same; Infrastructure Projects; In the recent decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in
Dynamic Builders v. Hon. Presbitero, Jr., 755 SCRA 90 (2015), it clarified that Republic Act
(RA) No. 8975 is applicable to national government infrastructure projects. It also discussed
the remedies available to aggrieved parties in cases involving local government infrastructure
projects.—Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 provides: SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions.—No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government,
or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting
under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: (a)
Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of
any national government project; (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof[.] (Emphasis supplied) In the recent decision
of this court in Dynamic Builders v. Hon. Presbitero, Jr., 755 SCRA 90 (2015), we clarified
that Republic Act No. 8975 is applicable to national government infrastructure projects. It
also discussed the remedies available to aggrieved parties in cases involving local
government infrastructure projects as follows: Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction
splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a
temporary restraining order from this court. Also, this law covers only national government
infrastructure projects. This case involves a local government infrastructure project. For
local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue provisional
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are
compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse;
(3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable
urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public interest[s] at
stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far outweigh (a)
the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public
benefits that will result from the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity
of temporary restraining orders issued by trial courts should be strictly followed. No
preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is
clear and convincing.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; The general rule is that “no man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by
a judgment rendered by the court.”—Due process requires that a party be given the chance
to be heard. The general rule is that “no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the
court.” Corollarily, an ancillary writ of remedy cannot affect nonparties to a case.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Voluntary Appearance; While Rule 14, Section 20 of the
Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the
same rule also provides that “[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.”—Petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation additionally argues that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction because respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
voluntarily appeared in court to argue why it should not be cited in contempt. While Rule
14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to
service of summons, the same rule also provides that “[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance
because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.—The
appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security
Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense
of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security
Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals; and SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Abaño, Pampilo, Paras, Pineda & Agustin Law Office and Saavedra, Tabaquero,
Villareal & Maniquis for Sunrise Garden Corp.
Atienza, Madrid, Buenaventura & Rodriguez for First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.
LEONEN, J.:
A person who is not a party in the main action cannot be the subject of the ancillary writ of That I am the owner in fee simple of several parcels of land situated at Cupang, Antipolo,
preliminary injunction. These consolidated petitions arose out of a pending case between Rizal with a consolidated area of 116 Hectares, more or less;cralawlawlibrary
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. was not a party to that case. . . . .

In 1998, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City passed City Ordinance No. 08- That I have applied for the development of the aforestated consolidated lots into a memorial
981 entitled "An Ordinance Creating a Technical Committee to Conduct a Feasibility Study, park known as "SUNRISE GARDEN["];cralawlawlibrary
Preliminary and Parcellary Survey for the Proposed Construction of a City Road Connecting
Four (4) Barangays in Antipolo City (Barangay Cupang, Mayamot, Mabugan and Munting That setting aside of and/or providing a 6 hectares City Park is among the conditions set
Dilao) Starting From the Boundary of Cupang and Rancho Estate Subdivision in Marikina forth by the Antipolo, [sic] City council in the approval of the said project;cralawlawlibrary
City Traversing Marcos Highway and Sumulong Highway Up to Barangay Munting Dilao,
Antipolo City Exiting or Egressing to Imelda Avenue, Cainta, Rizal and Appropriating the . . . .
Amount of Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos Therefore."2
That I am willing to undertake and finance development of the City Park and City Road
In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of connecting Marcos Highway to Marikina - San Mateo - Antipolo National Highway which
Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos cost shall be applied to our [t]axes and other fees payable to the City
Highway.3 The request was approved through the enactment of Resolusyon Big. 027-99.4 Government;cralawlawlibrary

The Technical Committee created by City Ordinance No. 08-98 posted notices to property
owners that would be affected by the construction of the city road. 5 The notices
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
NOTICE TO THE PUBLIC
That I am willing to sign and execute all legal instrument necessary to transfer ownership
of the same to the City government[.]13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden Corporation. 14

Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor15 began to position its construction

equipment.16 However, armed guards,17 allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.,
PURSUANT TO CITY ORDINANCE NO. 08-98 DATED: NOVEMBER 11, 1998 AND
prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move the
BARANGAY RESOLUTION NO. 027-99 OF CUPANG BARANGAY COUNCIL, DATED
construction equipment.18
SEPTEMBER 10, 1999, CITY ROAD (PHASE I), THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS HEREBY
NOTIFIED THAT THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF ANTIPOLO IS GOING TO
On January 24, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint19 for damages with
CONSTRUCT THE 20.00 METERS WIDE CITY ROAD, LINKING MARCOS HIGHWAY
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock
TO ANTIPOLO-SAN MATEO NATIONAL ROAD (C-6), ALL PROPERTY OWNERS
Aggregates, Inc.20
AFFECTED ARE ENJOINED TO SEE THE PLANNING OFFICER OF ANTIPOLO CITY
FOR DETAILS OF THE PROGRAM.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. filed its Answer to the Complaint.21

In 2002, Engr. Eligio Cruz, Project Coordinator, submitted a report7 to the City Mayor,8 a The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on February 15, 2002, "directing
portion of which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Hardrock to cease and desist from preventing/blocking the contractor in moving its
equipments to the site of the proposed city road."22
3. Pilot Road had been determined and property owners had been appraised [sic] like M[r].
Armando Carpio who owns majority of the affected lots[,] Mr. Alonzo Espanola of Hard Undaunted by the temporary restraining order, Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. continued to
Rock, Heavens Gate, Josefma Santos through Mr. Manuel Santos, Jr., Heirs of Crispulo block the movement of the construction equipment. 23
Zapanta through Vice Mayor Lorenzo Zapanta, Gaudencio Caluma, RCR Realty, Maxima
Matias, Heirs of Gabriel Martinez through Sec. Martinez an[d] several actual occupants in On March 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
the course traversed by the Pilot Road[.]9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary subject to the posting of a bond by Sunrise Garden Corporation.24 On March 22, 2002, the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued.25cralawred

Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was located in
Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden Corporation planned to develop into a memorial
park.10
Sunrise Garden Corporation, through Cesar T. Guy, Chair of the Board of Directors,
executed an Undertaking11 where Sunrise Garden Corporation would construct the city road
at its own expense, subject to reimbursement through tax credits.12 A portion of the
Undertaking states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the
proposed city road.26
Sunrise Garden Corporation, thus, filed a Motion and Manifestation on May 16,
2002,27 praying for the amendment of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction "to include any and
all persons or group of persons from interfering, preventing or obstructing all of petitioner's
contractors, equipment personnel and representatives in proceeding with the construction of
the city road as authorized by Ordinance No. 08-98 of Antipolo City."28
The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and Manifestation and issued "Section 5. Preliminary Injunction not granted without notice; exception - no preliminary
an Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction29 on May 22, injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to
2002,30 stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary be enjoined xxx."46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge of this Court, that, until further It was further alleged in the Opposition that Sunrise Garden Corporation was intruding
orders, you, the said defendant and all your attorneys, representatives, agents and any into First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s titled properties. 47
other persons assisting you including any and all persons or groups of persons from
interfering, preventing or obstructing all of plaintiff's contractors, equipment personnel and On November 15, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed an Ex-parte Motion to require K-9
representatives in proceeding with the construction of a new access road as authorized by Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. to comply with the May
the Antipolo City Government and Barangay Cupang, leading to its memorial project site. 22, 2002 Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.48
As necessary, the services of Deputy Sheriff Rolando P. Palmares can be sought to enforce
this Writ. The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and issued an Order dated
November 22, 2002 requiring K-9 Security Agency to comply with the Amended Writ of
Antipolo City, this 22nd day of May 2002.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Preliminary Injunction.49

Despite the issuance of the Order to comply, security guards dressed in civilian clothes still
In compliance with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the informal settlers
allegedly prevented the workers from proceeding to the construction site on November 28,
allowed the construction equipment passage to the city road project. The construction of the
2002.50
city road then continued.32
Engr. Eligio Cruz, the Project Coordinator, spoke to the guards of K-9 Security Agency on
Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real
the site and showed them a copy of the Order issued by the trial court. 51 A copy of the Order
Estate Development, Inc.,33 blocked Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor's employees
shown to the guards was allegedly already served by Sheriff Roland Palmares and received
and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. 34
by K-9 Security Agency's Bagong Nayon Office and First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc.52 However, the guards replied that they were under Forefront Security Agency, not K-9
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., through its representative Mr. Boy Pineda,
Security Agency.53 The guards informed Engr. Eligio Cruz that First Alliance Real Estate
requested to have a dialogue with Sunrise Garden Corporation.35 It was agreed that the
Development, Inc. ordered them not to allow the city road construction. 54
meeting would be between the representatives of First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc. and Sunrise Garden Corporation.36 A meeting was scheduled on October 8, 2002 to be
On November 29, 2002, Engr. Eligio Cruz wrote a letter-report55 to Hon. Mauricio M.
held at the Office of the City Planning.37 On the day of the meeting, First Alliance Real
Rivera, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, 56 as
Estate Development, Inc.'s representative, however, did not arrive. 38
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A verification with the Business Permit, License and Franchising Office of the City
Mayor39 revealed that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. had no business record, Relative to the Order dated November 22, 2002, I wish to inform this Honorable Court that
and K-9 Security Agency had no permit to post guards. 40 on November 28, 2002 at about 1:30 P.M. several K-9 Security Guards dressed in civilian
clothes armed with shotguns, scattered and deployed in ambush position on the mountain
A Motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt was filed on October 11, 200241 by Sunrise slope of the property of Armando Carpio, blocked the buldozer [sic] clearing the City Road
Garden Corporation.42 which had barely began [sic].

On November 11, 2002, K-9 Security Agency, joined by First Alliance Real Estate The undersigned explained to the four guards who approached the contents of the Order
Development, Inc. and represented by the same counsel, 43 opposed the Motion to cite them and showed to the team leader (who refused to give his name) the copy served by Sheriff
in contempt, raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, since they were Roland Palmares and received by their Bagong Nayon Office as well as their principal First
not bound by the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 44 The Opposition45 stated Alliance Realty Corp.
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the aforestated team leader answered back that they are now under FOREFRONT
SECURITY AGENCY and have nothing to do with K-9 SECURITY subject of the order.
1.3 The purpose of the Writ of Injunction is to preserve the relation between the parties
Further the same guards are under the control of Officer-in-Charge ROLAND TOMINES,
during the pendency of the suit. This cannot be applied to K-9 and the Security Guards who
and have instructions from their principal FIRST ALLIANCE REALTY not to allow the
are not parties in the case. Neither did they claim authority from the defendant, for which
construction of the City Road.
reason this Honorable Court did not acquire jurisdiction over them and could not validly
enforce the Amended Writ of Injunction against them . . . .
IN VIEW of the foregoing incident, which constitute [sic] a clear defiance of the order, I am
constrained to report the matters to this Honorable Court for
. . . .
disposition.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1.5 Moreover, insofar as the K-9 and the Security Guards are concerned, the amended Writ
of Injunction is void, for lack of notice to them, in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 58, Rules of On November 29, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Motion to cite Forefront
Civil Procedure quoted in part as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in contempt. 58 Sunrise
Garden Corporation alleged that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was notified
and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.59 Sunrise Garden Corporation also
alleged that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. adopted K-9 Security Agency's
Opposition.60
On December 4, 2002, K-9 Security Agency filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
November 22, 2002 Order.61 Allegedly attached to the Motion were photocopies of TCT Nos.
342073-76 and 337784 to show that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was the
registered owner of the parcel of land where the pieces of construction equipment were
being placed.62
Apparently, to resolve the issue of ownership raised by First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc., the trial court ordered on December 9, 2002 the City Planning and
Development Office to conduct a table survey of the affected properties. 63 The
Order64 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When this case was called for hearing today, counsel for First Alliance Realty Corporation
submitted the xerox copies of titles of the Property which according to him are inside the
area being built as city road. Plaintiff's counsel also argued that the tiles [sic] of First
Alliance are outside the area where the road will traverse....
Now, each of the parties are authorized to send a representative for the purpose of table
survey and whatever the result of the table survey, City Planning and Development Office
shall submit a report before this Court within five (5) days from the termination of table
survey. The table survey would contain the signatures of each representative, the
representative of the [sic] Sunrise and the representative of First
Alliance.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On December 27, 2002, P/Supt. Jose Fenix Dayao of Antipolo City dispatched SPO4 Conrado
Abren Soza and other police officers to inspect the construction site. 66 Upon arrival, the
police officers were fired at by the security guards of Forefront Security Agency. 67
On January 15, 2003, the City Planning and Development Office, through Edgardo T. Cruz,
reported68 to the court that it could not accomplish the table survey, as required by the trial
court in its Order dated December 9, 2002, because the Register of Deeds could not provide
copies of First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s transfer certificates of
title.69 Attached to the City Planning and Development Office's report was a letter 70 from
the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, stating that a certain Arty. Benjamin A. Flestado
had filed a similar request in 2001, which request was forwarded to the Land Registration
Authority.71 Allegedly, the existing request for verification shows that First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. could not acquire a favorable report from the Land Registration
Authority proving ownership over the property.72
On January 29, 2003, the trial court issued an Order stating that since First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. could not prove ownership over the properties, then First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. or any of its hired security agencies must comply with the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.73 Portions of the January 29, 2003
Order74 read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Considering the fact that the First Alliance Realty Corporation could not prove that the
titles of their land will be traversed or affected in the road construction being made by
Sunrise Garden Corporation[,] it is incumbent [upon] the former to produce the certified
copies of the Certificate of Titles of the First Alliance Realty Corporation to this Court so
that the same will be sent to the CPDC of Antipolo City for the compliance of the Court
order to make a table survey. As it is now, the First Alliance Realty Corporation is bound to
comply with the amended injunction order of this Court dated November 22, 2002 wherein
it is ordered that IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge of this Court, that,
until further orders, you, the said defendant and all your attorneys, representatives, agents
and any other persons assisting you including any and all persons or groups of persons from
interfering, preventing or obstructing all plaintiff's contractors, equipment personnel and
representatives in proceeding with the construction of a new access road as authorized by
the Antipolo City Government and Barangay Cupang, leading to its memorial project site. . .
.
WHEREFORE, the First Alliance Realty Corporation or any of its Security Agencies acting
as guard assigned in the Land must comply with the amended writ of preliminary
injunction, as above mentioned.75ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration76reiterating their arguments that since the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over them, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction could not be enforced against
them.77 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.78
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals.79 This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75758.80
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued ex-parte a temporary
restraining order valid for 60 days.81
In the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals required the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on the Petition for Certiorari .82 The Office of the Solicitor General then entered its
appearance and filed its Comment.83
The Court of Appeals held two hearings with regard to the prayer for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.84 During the hearing on April 24, 2003, Justice Sabio requested
counsels85 of the parties to maintain the status quo even after the lapse of the effectivity of
the temporary restraining order, as follows:86
J. SABIO:
If we can have a word of honor among gentlemen that until the case would be decided there
should be no, [sic] if we maintain the status quo. A gentleman's agreement. With the
assurance that the court will resolve the incident at the earliest possible time.87
On June 20, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 88 The
Resolution89stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It will be recalled that in the hearing of the prayer for injunctive relief sought in this case
last April 24, 2003, there was a gentleman's agreement among counsels of parties that
status quo be maintained until such time that the main case will be resolved by this Court.
Petitioner, however, through a motion informed this Court that private respondents are
threatening to bulldoze the property subject matter of this litigation. Petitioner further
stated that such act of private respondent will render judgment hereon moot and academic.
Under such circumstances, we are left with no choice but to issue the injunctive relief
sought, considering further that the issuance thereof is warranted. petitioner with contempt of court for not following an unlawful order.

WHEREFORE, let a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued conditioned upon petitioner's
posting of a cash or surety bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for the damages
which may be sustained by private respondent by reason of this injunction or if the court
should finally decide that the applicant is not entitled thereto. After which, the Division
Clerk of Court is directed to issue the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents,
its agents or representatives from implementing public respondent's amended writ of
injunction dated May 22, 2002, January 29, 2003 and February 24, 2003 Orders. 90(Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sunrise Garden Corporation and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, separately filed Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. Sunrise Garden Corporation's
Petition91 was docketed as G.R. No. 158836, and the Republic of the Philippines'
Petition92 was docketed as G.R. No. 158967.
Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1st sentence provides, thus: "No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined" (underscoring
for emphasis). In the case at bench, petitioner was not only not impleaded as party to the
case, but that it was never given prior notice regarding the writ of injunction.
Public respondents' assertion that notice was already made to Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. is
specious. There is no showing at all as to the relationship between Hardrock Aggregates,
Inc. and petitioner. Since there is nothing to prove and establish that Hardrock, Inc. and
petitioner are one and the same, then they should be treated as separate and distinct
personalities.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition having merit, in fact and in law
is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the assailed ordered [sic] are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
and without jurisdiction. No costs.

Sunrise Garden Corporation offered93 to post a bond as provided under Rule 58, Section SO ORDERED.100 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
694 of the Rules of Court and prayed that this court issue a temporary restraining order to
prevent the Court of Appeals from implementing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 95
Republic of the Philippines then questioned the Court of Appeals' Decision and filed a
Petition for Review101 on Certiorari before this court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
Republic of the Philippines subsequently filed a Supplemental Petition96 for Certiorari on
160726.102 Sunrise Garden Corporation also filed a separate Petition for Review
August 21, 2003 informing this court that the Court of Appeals allegedly issued a second
on Certiorari 103 before this court, docketed as G.R. No. 160778.104
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 13, 2003, which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. then filed its Comment 105 on the Petition
for Certiorari filed by Sunrise Garden and a Consolidated Comment,106 addressing the
WHEREAS, in the Resolution promulgated August 13, 2003, the Division Clerk of Court is issues raised in the Office of the Solicitor General's Petition for Certiorari and Supplemental
directed to issue the Writ of Preliminary Injunction pursuant to the June 20, 2003 Petition for Certiorari .
Resolution of this Court.
In a Resolution107 dated January 28, 2004, this court consolidated G.R. Nos. 158836, 158967,
160726, and 160778.
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 73, YOUR AGENTS, EMPLOYEES, REPRESENTATIVES
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed an Omnibus Motion,108 praying that its
OR SUCH OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS ACTING IN YOUR BEHALF ARE ENJOINED
Consolidated Comment in G.R. No. 158967 "be adopted as its Comment [for] G.R. No.
FROM IMPLEMENTING THE AMENDED WRIT OF INJUNCTION DATED MAY 22,
160726."109 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. subsequently filed a
2002, JANUARY 29, 2003 AND FEBRUARY 24, 2003 ORDERS.
Manifestation,110 praying that the Comment it filed in G.R. Nos. 158967 and 158836 be
adopted as its Comment in G.R. No. 160778.111
GIVEN BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Mme.
Justice BENNIE ADEFUN-DE LA CRUZ [sic], Chairman, Mr. Justice JOSE L. SABIO, JR.
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines argue that the Court of
and Mr. Justice HAKIM S. ABDULWAHID, Members, this 13th day of August 2003, Manila,
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the Petition outright due to
Philippines.97ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
insufficiency of form and substance.112 Sunrise Garden Corporation argues that First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. failed to prove its ownership over the properties in
Republic of the Philippines prayed that the second Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated dispute.113 Thus, it did not establish any right that would entitle it to the reliefs prayed
August 13, 2003 be dissolved.98 for.114 Also, no evidence was presented before the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
would prove First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s claim that its property would be
While the Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition were pending before this court, the Court affected by the city road project.115
of Appeals, on November 5, 2003, granted First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s
Petition for Certiorari and annulled the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by Sunrise Garden Corporation points out that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
the trial court,99 reasoning as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary still failed to attach a certified true copy of its alleged titles to the properties affected by the
city road project.116Sunrise Garden Corporation also manifests that the alleged properties of
Indeed, public respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion and without First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. will not be affected by the city road project
jurisdiction when it sought the enforcement of its amended writ of preliminary injunction based on an alleged study conducted by the Antipolo City Planning and Development
against petitioner, who was never a party to the pending case. Worse, it threatened Office.117
Further, Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines argue that the Court
of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
because the Writ violated Presidential Decree No. 1818. 118
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or
controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural
resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation
of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines119 posit that the term
"infrastructure project" includes the construction of roads.120 Also, the construction of the
city road is a capital investment on the part of government because payment to Sunrise
Garden Corporation shall be through tax credits.121
Republic of the Philippines adds that Presidential Decree No. 1818 is applicable because it
does not distinguish between local government projects and national government
projects.122 Further, the city road project is intended to benefit not only the residents of
several barangay that it will traverse, but also the students of the barangay school. 123 Once
the city road project is completed, the travel time of the students will be lessened from two
hours to just 30 minutes.124
Sunrise Garden Corporation admits that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not issued
against First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.125 Nevertheless, the nullification of the
trial court's Orders effectively hampered the city road project. 126 The argument of First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. that "its property is being taken without just
compensation"127 proves that the injury to First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. is
quantifiable.
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines argue that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction did not state the law and facts on which it was based. 128 The Court
of Appeals did not state what clear legal right was being protected. 129 It merely stated that
"private respondents are threatening to bulldoze the property subject matter of [the]
litigation."130
As to the alleged "gentlemen's agreement" stated in the Order of the Court of Appeals,
Sunrise Garden Corporation points out that as per the transcript of stenographic notes, the
"gentlemen's agreement" was merely a suggestion of the court, but the parties themselves
never came to an agreement.131
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines argue that First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. was not denied due process when the trial court issued the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction because it was afforded several opportunities to be
heard.132
Republic of the Philippines acknowledges that the complaint for damages filed by Sunrise
Garden Corporation was only against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. because it was the entity
that initially blocked the movement of the construction equipment of Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor. However, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was given
several opportunities to air its side. The first opportunity was the meeting scheduled on
October 8, 2002 between First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., and Sunrise Garden
Corporation. However, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. did not appear despite
being the requesting party.133
Further, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was duly notified when it allegedly
received a copy of Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion to cite for contempt and filed an
Opposition to the Motion.134Sunrise Garden Corporation points out that First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. appeared in court to argue why it should not be cited in
contempt.135
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was given another chance to be heard when it
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 6, 2003 before the trial court. 136 Thus, First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. cannot claim that it was denied due process. 137
In any case, Republic of the Philippines argues that the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction does not require a trial-type hearing under Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.138
Sunrise Garden Corporation argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction and enforce it against First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.139 Assuming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the person
of First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., this was cured when the latter voluntarily
appeared in court.140 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. even filed pleadings such
as an Opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration.141 Other than filing pleadings, First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argued that its properties will be affected by the city
road project.142 This issue was then submitted for resolution before the trial court. 143
Sunrise Garden Corporation further argues that First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc. had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, which was to present its title to the
property.144
On the other hand, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. counters that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as it was not impleaded as a party-litigant
in the Complaint for damages filed by Sunrise Garden Corporation against Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc.145 Sunrise Garden Corporation does not deny that First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. was not included in the Complaint.146
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not involved in the Complaint for damages
before the trial court.147 Nonetheless, Sunrise Garden Corporation sought to enforce the
Amended Writ of Injunction against it even though the Amended Writ was addressed to
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.148 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. alleges that it has
no business relations with Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.149 Thus, the Amended Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is not binding on First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., and
it cannot be held in contempt.150
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argues that the Amended Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated May 22, 2002 was void as to First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
since it was never notified of the hearing.151 Further, to implement the Amended Writ
against First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was equivalent to deprivation of
property without due process.152 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., or its
properties, was not involved in Civil Case No. 02-6396 and yet Sunrise Garden insists on
including First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s properties in the city road
project.153
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argues that the Amended Writ of Preliminary
Injunction will allow Sunrise Garden Corporation to take possession and control of First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s property without due process of law. 154 First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. cites Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. v. Hon. Quintillan, etc.,
et al.155 where this court held that "[injunctions are not available to take property out of the
possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title was not
clearly, been [sic] established."156
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. also questions the standing of Republic of the
Philippines and the City Government of Antipolo because they were not impleaded as
parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 75758 and Civil Case No. 02-6396.167 Since they were not parties
during the proceedings in the lower courts, they were not affected by the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.168

First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. claims that the construction of the city road Also, the Petitions filed by Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
has the effect of appropriating and taking First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s General and before this court do not indicate the authority of the City Government of
private property for public use.157First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. questions the Antipolo to "represent the Republic"169 and sign the certification of non-forum shopping.170
lack of authority of Sunrise Garden Corporation to take the property considering that the
Office of the Solicitor General admitted before the Court of Appeals that there was no With regard to Republic of the Philippines' claim that a second Writ of Preliminary
expropriation ordinance, as follows:158 Injunction was issued by the Court of Appeals on August 13, 2003, First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. explains that this alleged second Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was actually the Writ issued by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated June 20,
J. Sabio:
2003.171 It is not a second Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
xxx could you show this Court an Ordinance authorizing the expropriation of that property?
xxx
On the arguments raised by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., Republic of the
Philippines counters that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. cannot claim denial
Sol. Saludares:
of due process due to the lack of expropriation proceeding. 172
There is no expropriation Ordinance.
Republic of the Philippines argues that expropriation and eminent domain are different,
J. Sabio:
citing Section 19173 of Republic Act No. 7160.174 Republic of the Philippines explained that if
How can you enter a property without any authority, [sic] it [sic] is basic that you can enter
compensation for the property is accepted, then there is no need for an expropriation
the property only upon a Court Order.
proceeding.175 In addition, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. is not an affected
landowner.176
xxx
As to the allegation that there was no public bidding, Republic of the Philippines discussed
Sol. Saludares:
that the City Government of Antipolo had no funds for the road project, thus, it could not
We have here a copy of the Ordinance, your honor.
bid out the project.177However, due to the urgent need for the construction of the city road,
the local government had to negotiate with a party "who [could] advance its realty
J. Sabio:
taxes."178 Sunrise Garden Corporation offered to do so, and the local government found the
What does it say?
offer favorable.179
Sol. Saludares:
The resolution of this case involves the following issues:
An Ordinance creating a technical committee to conduct x x x.
First, whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued a
J. Sabio:
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, contrary to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
That is not expropriation. I have read that. That is not expropriation. 159 (Emphasis supplied,
1818;cralawlawlibrary
citations omitted)
Second, whether respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was denied due
Further, the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by the Court of process when the trial court issued its January 29, 2003 Order requiring respondent First
Appeals is not violative of Presidential Decree No. 1818.160 First Alliance Real Estate Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary
Development, Inc. argues that the cases relied upon by Sunrise Garden Corporation and Injunction.
Republic of the Philippines, Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos161 and Republic v. Silerio,162 are not
applicable because in these cases, biddings were conducted.163 No bidding was conducted for Finally, whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real
the city road project as shown by Sunrise Garden Corporation's admission that it had an Estate Development, Inc.
agreement with the City Government of Antipolo.164 "There was no bidding conducted and
the agreement between the Petitioner [Sunrise Garden Corporation] and the City
I
Government of Antipolo City relative to [the] construction of the access road and payment
by way of tax credit can still be questioned, for being illegal." 165

First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. also alleges that Sunrise Garden Corporation At the outset, G.R. Nos. 158836 and 158967 were rendered moot and academic when the
disregarded the Court of Appeals' advice or their "gentlemen's agreement" to maintain the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SPNo. 75758 on November 5, 2003.
status quo when Sunrise Garden Corporation sought an Order from the trial court to
enforce the Amended Writ of Injunction.166 A case that is moot and academic has been defined as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. Also,
value.180 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary this law covers only national government infrastructure projects. This case involves a local
government infrastructure project.
In Philippine Savings Bank (PSBANK) v. Senate Impeachment Court,181 this court
For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue provisional
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are
compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse;
It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable
academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of. The judgment urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public interests] at
will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far outweigh (a)
things, it cannot be enforced.182 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public
benefits that will result from the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity
While the Petitions for Certiorari are moot and academic, we clarify that Presidential of temporary restraining orders issued by trial courts should be strictly followed. No
Decree No. 1818, cited by the parties, has been repealed by Republic Act No. 8975. 183 The preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is
repealing clause of this law provides for an express repeal, clear and convincing.188 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the notice to the public states that "the City Government of Antipolo is going to
SEC. 9. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 construct the 20.00 meters wide city road[.]"189 Also, the funds for the project would come
and Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City. There is nothing on record to show that
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended the city road project is a national government project. Hence, the prohibition on the
accordingly.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against national government projects does not
apply.

This court has held that implied repeals are not favored, and "the failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law[.]" 184 The II
express repeal of Presidential Decree No. 1818 clearly indicates Congress' intent to replace
Presidential Decree No. 1818 with Republic Act No. 8975.
Due process requires that a party be given the chance to be heard. The general rule is that
Republic Act No. 8975 was approved on November 7, 2000 and was published in the Malaya "no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a
and the Manila Bulletin on November 11, 2000. It was also published in the Official Gazette case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court."190 Corollarily, an ancillary writ of
on May 7, 2001.185When this case was filed, Republic Act No. 8975 was already effective. remedy cannot affect non-parties to a case.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Fernandez v. Court of Appeals191 involved an Administrative Complaint against three Court
of Appeals Justices.192 One of the acts complained of was the issuance of a Writ of
SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Preliminary Injunction, enjoining the implementation of an Order of the trial court.193 This
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. — No court, except the Supreme court dismissed the Complaint on the ground that an Administrative Complaint is not a
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary substitute for a lost appeal.194 This court also held that in any case, complainants did not
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any have the personality to question the Writ of Preliminary Injunction since they were not the
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government's direction, to aggrieved parties.195 Complainants had the option to intervene in the Petitions filed but did
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: not do so.196 This court discussed that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of
any national government project;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under
Section 2 hereof[.] (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the recent decision of this court in Dynamic Builders v. Hon. Presbitero, Jr.,186 we
clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 is applicable to national government infrastructure
projects.187 It also discussed the remedies available to aggrieved parties in cases involving
local government infrastructure projects as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be
bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.197 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,198 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued
against Juanito Infante, Domingo Infante, Lito Mangalidan, Jaime Aquino, John Doe, Peter
Doe, and Richard Doe.199 A certain Antonio Santos, who claimed ownership over the parcel
of land, filed a Petition for Certioraribefore the Court of Appeals, arguing that to enforce the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against him would be grave abuse of discretion since the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. 200 Mabayo Farms countered that
Antonio Santos was covered by the Writ because it was issued against three Does, and these
Does include Antonio Santos.201 Also, since Santos received a copy of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, he cannot claim lack of due process, and it was his duty to intervene in the
case.202 The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari and enjoined the trial court
from enforcing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Santos.203 This court
affirmed204 the Decision of the Court of Appeals and held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive
remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect
or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, a
person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot
be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the
defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger.205 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Regarding Mabayo Farms' argument that Santos should have intervened, this court
discussed that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, private respondent had no duty to intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No.
6695. Intervention in an action is neither compulsory nor mandatory but only optional and
permissive. Second, to warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: (a) the movant has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor
be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles a
person to intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment. Civil Case No. 6695 was an action for permanent injunction and
damages. As a stranger to the case, private respondent had neither legal interest in a
permanent injunction nor an interest on the damages to be imposed, if any, in Civil Case
No. 6695. To allow him to intervene would have unnecessarily complicated and prolonged
the case.206 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It may be argued that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. should have
intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, respondent First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc.'s interests, or its properties, were not part of the issues raised in
petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation's Complaint. That Complaint was against Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc. and not respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or its
properties.
III
We rule that the Court of Appeals did not err when it annulled and set aside the trial court's
Orders dated January 29, 2003, and February 24, 2002.
The Court of Appeals discussed that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Indeed public respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction
when it sought the enforcement of its amended writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioner, who was never a party to the pending case. Worse, it threatened petitioner with
contempt of court for not following an unlawful order.
Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1st sentence provides, thus: "No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. . ." In the case
at bench, petitioner was not only not impleaded as party to the case, but that it was never
given prior notice regarding the writ of injunction.
Public respondents' [referring to the Republic] assertion that notice was already made to
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. is specious. There is no showing at all as to the relationship
between Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. and petitioner. Since there is nothing to prove and
establish that Hardrock, Inc. and petitioners are one and the same, then they should be
treated as separate and distinct personalities.207ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argues that CA-G.R. SP No. 75758
is related to Civil Case No. 02-6396 where it was not included as a party
litigant.208 Respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. reiterates that it is not
liable for contempt because the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over it and, hence, it
is not bound by the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 209
Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires that the party to be enjoined must be
notified and heard. The rule provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RULE 58
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.—No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to
be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard
on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue
ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within
the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the
same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly
issue the corresponding order. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Sunrise Garden Corporation did not
refute that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was never a party to
the case. During the hearings before the Court of Appeals, counsel for petitioner Sunrise
Garden Corporation placed much emphasis on its argument that respondent First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. did not prove ownership over the property but did not refute
the primary issue of lack of jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. This is an admission that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
J. SABIO:
It is fundamental that an order of a court cannot be enforced against a person who is not a party to a case.
ATTY. GALIT [counsel for petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation]:
As I said, Your Honor, that is on my supposition. Earlier, Your Honor, both my good Companeros here have intelligently and clearly ventilated,
open the eyes of the Honorable Court that this particular person is claiming, Your Honor, a right which is not existing. A right which is not
existing, Your Honor. Why take refuge from an allegation that according to him this is not the proper forum. This is now the proper forum for the
petitioner to prove his right because he is being challenged.
J. SABIO:
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
He does not have to prove anything. He has the title in his possession. especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
ATTY. GALIT:
Mere title, Your Honor, without any specification to be attested by a competent person such as the expert witness, a geodetic engineer, a licensed submitted to the court for resolution.215 (Citations omitted)
geodetic engineer. . .
J. SABIO:
That is not the issue in this case. As we said if you try to question the validity of the title of the petitioner[,] do it in a proper forum. This is not the
proper forum. The issue here is not that. The issue is whether a writ of injunction can be enforced against a person who is not a party to the case. The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9
That is the pure and simple issue in this petition. Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the
ATTY. GALIT:
We have made clear, Your Honor, as to the procedural aspect of the case and as to the substantive aspect of the case. As to the substantive aspect of purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that
the case the petitioner, despite several challenges against them they failed and they continued to fail to present any iota of evidence that would
prove clear and unmistakable right to warrant the. . .
the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by
J. SABIO: K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their
That is not the issue where he has to defend his title. Because his title is not the one, the subject matter of the case in the court below.
ATTY. GALIT: pleadings.216
Your Honor, guided by the Supreme Court decision, a mere photocopy, a mere xerox copy of any public document, alleged public documents cannot
be said to be a basis of any right. This is a mere xerox copy to be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
J. SABIO: Petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation posits that a third-party claim would have been the
Then you challenge it in a proper forum[,] not this forum. That is not the issue here. That is beyond us to decide. The issue is whether he [sic]
injunction issued by the lower court should be enforced [against] petitioner who is not a party to the case.
proper remedy for respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., and not a
.... petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.217 Petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation
ATTY. GALIT:
To be clear, Your Honor, and with all due respect to this Honorable Court. We take a parallel stand and we absolutely submit to the pronouncement cited Ciudad Real & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals 218 where this court
of this Honorable Court that a party who is not a party litigant in the case below will never be affected by any issuance of an injunction. That is allegedly ruled that it is grave abuse of discretion to allow a "petitioner who is not a party
precisely correct and we do not dispute that, your Honor.
.... litigant in the proceedings below [to file a petition] for certiorari ."219
ATTY. SAAVEDRA [co-counsel for petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation]:
As a matter of fact insofar as we are concerned, Your Honor, whether the lower court has jurisdiction over their person because they were not
impleaded is immaterial. Because they are in the nature or category of strangers who refused to obey the writ of injunction which was addressed to Counsel for respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. countered
the squatters. Since they have no right to be protected, they have not shown that they own any portion of the land to be traversed what right do
they have to be protected for. that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
J. SABIO:
Again let us not go back to that issue so that we will not be misled, we do not becloud the real issue. The issue here is basic and fundamental.
Whether petitioner [w]ho has not been a party to the case because he has not been impleaded can be cited for contempt for refusal to obey or comply
with the amended writ of preliminary injunction? That is all.210
With respect to the comment of counsel for the respondent, Your Honor, [sic] We [sic] have
personality to challenge that because the writ of injunction, the order citing us for contempt
are [sic] addressed to us, Your Honor. And we have the personality to ask for the nullity of
Petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation additionally argues that the trial court acquired that order, Your Honor.220ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
jurisdiction because respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. voluntarily
appeared in court to argue why it should not be cited in contempt. 211
The case cited by petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation is not applicable. In Ciudad Real,
While Rule 14, Section 20212 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is the trial court denied the Motion to intervene filed by Magdiwang Realty
equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a Corporation.221 Magdiwang Realty Corporation did not question the trial court's Order, and
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the it became final and executory.222 When the case was brought before the Court of Appeals,
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."213 the court recognized Magdiwang Realty Corporation's standing. 223This court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al.,214 this court
discussed that voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the Despite the finality of the order denying Magdiwang's intervention way back in 1989, the
jurisdiction of a court. respondent court in its Decision of August 20, 1992 recognized the standing of Magdiwang
to assail in the appellate court the Compromise Agreement. Again, this ruling constitutes
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the grave abuse of discretion for Magdiwang was not a party in interest in Civil Case No. Q-
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in 35393.224ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had Considering that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it sought to enforce the
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent First Alliance Real Estate
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for Development, Inc., the Court of Appeals did not err in granting the Petition
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, for Certiorari filed by respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 158836 and 158967
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. are DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 160726 and 160778 are DENIED, and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 75758 is AFFIRMED.
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance; SO ORDERED.
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
 G.R. No. 209518. June 19, 2017.* The Facts

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, petitioner, vs. ANA KARI CARMENCITA On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad (Nustad), as represented by
NUSTAD, as represented by ATTY. MARGUERITE THERESE L. LUCILA, respondent. Atty. Marguerite Therese Lucila (Atty. Lucila), filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55, Lucena City (RTC) and prayed that Ma. Hazdina A. Tujan-Militante
(Tujan-'Militante) be orqered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; A trial court acquires jurisdiction over
owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certifi.cate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-
the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it is equally significant that
387158 and T-387159, which 'were all issued in Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-
even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person
Militante has been withholding the said titles.
of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.—A trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it is equally
significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction In its Order dated July 26, 2011, the RTC set the petition for a hearing4
over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 20. Voluntary Appearance.—The defendant’s
Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion
Proceedings5 dated September 2, 2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she argued
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
that the Order appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with certainty
that she is in possession of the subject titles.
Same; Same; Same; A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
The Ruling of the RTC
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.—By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial
court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative In an Order dated November 23, 2011, the RTC6 denied TujanMilitante' s Motion and ruled
relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or that it has jurisdiction over the case. Further the RTC stated.that it has not yet decided on
question that same jurisdiction. In this case, while Tujan-Militante’s motion to dismiss the merits of the case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender TCT Nos. T-435798, T-
challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons, 436799, T- 387.158 and T-387159 because it merely set the petition for a hearing.
the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative relief is
tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration7 and alleged that the Power of Attorney
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been executed by Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-Militante
made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a Norwegian, who is not allowed to own
[court]’s jurisdiction. lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case, petitioner prayed that the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority be impleaded. Moreover,
Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notarized document has in its favor the Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be In an Order8 dated February 27, 2012, the court a quo denied Tujan- Militante's Motion for
upheld.—We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that Reconsideration.
[Nustad] certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an oath
that she is authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition before the court a quo on her
behalf. A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to Aggrieved, Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld. The Ruling of the CA

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
In a Decision9 dated February 27, 2013, the CA recognized the jurisdictional defect
Militante and Associates for petitioner.
Caguioa & Gatmaytan for respondent.
over the person of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-
Militante's filing of her Motion

TIJAM, J.:
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution10 dated October 2, 2013.
Petitioner Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante seeks to set aside and reverse the: (1) Decision'
dated February 27, 2013, which dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65;
and (2) Resolution2 dated October 2, 2013, which denied petitioner's Motion for Hence, this appeal.
Reconsideration of the Court of Ap'peals3 (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons.
However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may
still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears
before it. 11 Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. 12
In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the
court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the ·subsequent filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary
appearance and submission to · the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is
inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for
such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s
jurisdiction. 13
As to the claim of Tujan-Militante that the requirements laid down in Sec. 24, Rule 13214 of
the Rules of Court apply with respect to the power of attorney notarized abroad, he cited the
ruling in Lopez v. Court of Appeals. 15 In said case, this Court held that the power of
attorney must comply with the requirements set forth under Sec. 25 (now Sec. 24), Rule 132
of the Rules of Court in order to be considered as valid.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that:
Section 24. Proof of official record.- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, andauthenticated by the seal
of his office. (emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of Rule 132 states that:
Section 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official· acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (emphasis supplied)
In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro 16 , this Court clarified that the ruling in
the Lopez case is inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence which were then effective we.re
the old Rules, prior to their amendment in 1989. When the Rules of Evidence were amended
in 1989, the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry therein " was substituted by
the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section . 19
,;17 , as found in the present Rules. Also, Section 25 of the former Rules became Section 24 of
the present Rules.
On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign
service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit:
written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The Court
agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial documents as one of the
public documents contemplated by ·the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified
only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.18(emphasis supplied)
As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign
service refers only to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a. foreign
country, as found in Section 19(a), Rule 132, such enumeration does not include documents
acknowledged before a notary public abroad.
With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important
is that [Nustad] certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an
oath that she is authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition before the court a quo on
her behalf. 19
A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the
same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the document should be upheld.20
Lastly, Tujan-Militante's contention that the TCTs under the name of N ustad are invalid
because of her citizenship constitutes a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly ruled
that the issue as to whether an alien is or is not qualified to acquire the lands covered by the
subject titles can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. 21
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the. Decision dated February
27, 2013 and Resolution dated October 2, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
124811 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.