People Vs. Santiago of criminal procedure.

As stated in the section 7 of the

Jones Law the territorial legislatures have the power to
FACTS:
define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the
Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7 Philippine legislature. Thus, the delegation to our
year old boy Porfiro Parondo by striking him with an government needs no demo, the crimes committed within
automobile that he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted our territory even before sec 2 of general orders no.58 was
for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was amended, were prosecuted and punish. jurisdiction .Act no.
sentenced to suffer 1 year and 1 day prision correcional, 2886 (feb 24 1920) criminal complainant was filed may 10
Santiago does not agree with the courts sentence, 1920. The silence of congress regarding those laws amendatory
questioning the constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending of the said general orders must be considered as an act of
order no. 58 stating that all prosecutions for public the approval.
offenses shall be in the name of the U.S, thus the court a
quo lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and
over the subject matter of the complaint. Act no. 2886
ammending order no. 58 stating that all prosecutions for
public offenses shall be in the name of the Philippine islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure in criminal matters is
incorporated in the constitution of the state?
HELD
:NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the
constitution of the states, but it is left in the hand of the
legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public
statutory law. It is limited to criminal procedure and its
intention is to give to its provision the effect of law
in criminal matters. In pursuance of the constitution of the
US each state has the authority, under its police power
rule to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules
US v Pablo legislative will and such repeals were never expressly
said, it is still in force and properly applicable.
Facts:
1. Andres Pablo, a policeman, committed perjury
when he swore in legal form before the justice Pablo is sentenced to 2 yrs. 4 mos. 1 day
of the court that he had not seen two jueteng imprisonment, 1,000 pesetas, and the cost of both
gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, when he and instances.
his partner raided a jueteng game.
2. In a testimony from both Ganzon and Dato,
Pablo saw Malicsi and Rodrigo in the den and
later accepted P15 in exchange for falsifying
his testimony to their aid.
Issue:
WON Pablo’s act of perjury or false testimony go
unpunished
Held:
In lack of penal sanction for perjury or false testimony
under act. No. 1697, repealing article 318 and 324
containing the term perjury, may Pablo’s act go
unpunished.
NO. The punishment for such acts were provided for
but not yet applied. Although Act No. 1697 was
enacted, it did not expressly repeal the punishment
terms of the said crime. As the act is contrary to
Pesigans vs Angeles effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2
of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
FACTS: Administrative Code.

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code)
dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe
carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of
Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the binding on the persons affected thereby.
provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and
constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were
negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the
carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police
Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial
veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on
Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of
carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO
626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of
Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and
damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who
heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan
City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its
publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the

Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is
a penal regulation published more than two months later in
the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
Tanada vs Tuvera It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he
Facts:
had no notice.
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature
of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, its contents. The Court declared that presidential
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of issuances of general application which have not been
implementations and administrative orders. published have no force and effect.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition
Issue:
WON publication in the Official Gazette is required before
any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable
Ruling:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not prevent the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignorance of the law excuses no one
US v Sweet
Facts:
Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the United States
military authorities in the Philippines. He assaulted a
prisoner of war for which he was charged with the
crime of physical injuries.
Issue: Whether or not the case can be prosecuted
under our civil courts.
Ruling Yes. The case against Sweet can be
prosecuted under our civil courts. The fact that the
acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as
an offense under the Spanish military legislation does
not render them any less an offense under the article
of the Penal Code punishable under civil courts.
Moreover, the military character sustained by the
person charged with the offense at the time of its
commission does not exempts him from the ordinary
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR.
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers
led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City
and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key
national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers
surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident,
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later,
Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate.
Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and
fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his
motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that
of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator
provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that
allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who
are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos
case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the
cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within
the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's
application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied.
The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported
from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention
of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to
bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like
Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The
Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.
Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to
allow him to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And
there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the
Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not
apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election
to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the
call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than
the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties
of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call
of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment
are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or
upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file
his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on
May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath
of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist
the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
US vs Ah Sing
FACTS:
- Ah Sing is a firemen at the steamship Shun Chang,
a foreign vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu
from Saigon.
He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them
on board and had them in his possession during the
trip.
- The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below
the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who
made a search upon anchoring on the Cebu port.
- impossible to conceive that the accused needed so
- Ah Sing confessed that it was his and that it was
bought in Saigon without stating his intention.
- CFI of Cebu: Ah Sing guilty in violation of the Opium
Law
ISSUE:
W/N the crime of illegal importation of opium into the
Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines
prohibited drug is found under this person's control
on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the
Philippine Islands.
- In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation
of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or
the defense proves otherwise.
- Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to
think that the accused was merely carrying opium
back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the
mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be
large an amount of opium for his personal use. No
better explanation being possible, the logical
deduction is that the defendant intended this opium
to be brought into the Philippine Islands
- To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it
be said that these statements do not relate to foreign
vessels in transit, a situation not present.

HELD:
Ah Sing having been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt

YES.
- As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold
that any person unlawfully imports or brings any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
Miquibas vs. Commanding General extended installations and temporary quarters are not
considered to have the same jurisdictional capacity as
NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court.
permanent bases and are governed by Article XIII
Habeas corpus.
paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in
the beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.
FACTS: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian
employee of the US army in the Philippines who had
2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed
been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila Area
forces
of things belonging to the US army in violation of the
94th article of War of the US. He was arrested and a
No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not
General Court-Martial was appointed. He was found
considered as a member of the US armed forces.
guilty. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign
Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a
nation has jurisdiction over all offenses committed
civilian employee is in the service of the US Army
within its territory but it may, by treaty or by
does not make him a member of the armed forces.
agreement, consent that the US shall exercise
jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within said
portions of territory.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the offense has been committed
within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over
the case.

No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was

committed is not within a US base for it is not names
in Annex A or B of Article XXVI of the Military Base
Agreement (MBA) and is merely part of the temporary
quarters located within presented limits of the city of
Manila. Moreover,
GUMABON VS. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF PRISONS ousted of jurisdiction and Habeas Corpus is the
37 SCRA 420 appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.

FACTS: What is required under the equal protection of law is the

1. Petitioners Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under
Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares similar circumstances would be accorded the same
were charged and convicted of the complex crime of treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liability
rebellion with murder. imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
2. They were imposed the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. allowed. For the principle that equal protection and security
3. At the time of the petition each suffered more than 13 shall be given to every person under circumstances, which
years of imprisonment. if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
4. Subsequently, the Court ruled in PEOPLE VS. terms of burdens or charges, those that fall within a class
HERNANDEZ (99 Phil 515) that the information against shall be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Article 143 of the RPC, there being no such complex
offense.
5. Petitioners thus invoke that the ruling in Hernandez be
applied to them.
6. Petitioners contend that he has served more than the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon
them and is thus entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal.

ISSUE:
Should the petition for Habeas Corpus be granted?

HELD:
Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
People of the Phil. Vs Pimentel
Facts:
In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged
with Subversion under R.A.1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law)
as amended before the RTC of Manila, and a warrant of
arrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but was not carried out
due to his disappearance. After seven years, on June 5,
1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on the basis of the
warrant of arrest in the subversion case, and was likewise
found to possess an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver
and six rounds of live ammunition. Because of this, Tujan
was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD No.
1866 before the RTC in Makati.
Contention of the People:
Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under
PD No.1866 on the ground that he has been previously in
jeopardy of being convicted for Subversion, based on
Sections 3(H) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Furthermore, Tujan contends that
common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition should be absorbed in subversion. The
present case is the twin prosecution of the earlier
subversion case, and therefore he is entitled to invoke the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
Contention of the State:
Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a
second time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned
in the subversion case, and (b) the previous offense
charged against him is for Subversion, punishable under
RA 1700, while the present case is for Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion,
punishable under PD 1866, a different law.
Issue/s to be Solved:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of
double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under
RA 1700.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under
RA1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion
under PD 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the subsequent
enactment of of RA 7636 on Sept. 22, 1992, totally
repealing RA 1700, as amended, has substantially
changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as
the said repealing law being favorable to the accused-
private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent,
should be given retroactive effect. With the enactment of
RA 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-
private respondent has no more legal basis, and should be
dismissed. It would be illogical for the trial courts to try and
sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense
that no longer exists. Subversion charge against Tujan
was dismissed, illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion against the same
accused is deemed amended. Accused was ordered to be
released immediately from detention, since he was already
detained for 7years, whereas the amended charge has a
penalty of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
Facts:
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an
administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof,
Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present
Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such
a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order
from a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners. The lower court ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding
it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of
the matter. Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the
lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded
and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to
act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself."
Hence, the Board appealed.
Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in
administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee
not to be a witness against himself.
Held:
Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the
license to practice medicine while administrative in
character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An
unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the
license of the respondent to practice medicine.
Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right
to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on
witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent
and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a
witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right
against self incrimination, along with the other rights granted
to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should
not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objective should not be accomplished according
to means and methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded to the human personality.