G.R. No.

L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, Petitioner,
APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Esca�o," to
which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
vs. THE HON. COURT OF advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954.

CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from
a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and
moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity
of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00
a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due
course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris
Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order
pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum
of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs
against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable,
under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950,
Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and
petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life
insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her
and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article
43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation
to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the
enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an
adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is
necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been
published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to
reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by
reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article
refers must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to
celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this
Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of
promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code
Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from
the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage.
But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in
the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but
also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some
questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed
are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of
promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage
engagement to be broken.
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil
Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.

1

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future
spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the
parent or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and
twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years.
Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry
cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen
years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the
aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or
guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may
institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material
and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents,
of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall
be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is
rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the
engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the
other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor
are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which
we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the
American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 - pp. 1342 - 1344
Maryland 1945 - pp. 1759 - 1762
Nevada 1943 - p. 75
Maine 1941 - pp. 140 - 141
New Hampshire 1941 - p. 223
California 1939 - p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 - p. 326
Indiana 1936 - p. 1009
Michigan 1935 - p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more
progression trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry
suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so
many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them,
may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol.
IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In
the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction
actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by
the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction
power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his
sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all,
we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly
the paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of
Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such
in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not
exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is
morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant - who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be - when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy."
2
 The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1)
a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500,
representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation
damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 - consisting
of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the
parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child
- and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount
of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as
a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid
cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love
affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself,
declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing
that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status,
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision
dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the
issues involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and
sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita
was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent
of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with
her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman
named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and
the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who
regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where
Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each
other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but
also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about
their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and
since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further
seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant
who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their
residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita
disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up
her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a
note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on
a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and
we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact
that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe
thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
3
and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established
that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused
great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents,
brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for
the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith
tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof
on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It
is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other,
not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment
and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so
with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant
who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to
win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he
who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each
other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from
going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby
sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00
as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch
38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for
a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed
with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for
the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty
lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community;
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August
1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August
1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of
Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages
in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 16503.
4
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of
the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his
Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless
and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to
wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of
Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic)
high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to
marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that
was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill
his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner
and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity
and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of
the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by
the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days
after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she
accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E"
(and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with
plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs
parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he
was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their
daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with
plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave
her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and
night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise
5
to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went
home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to
the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and
a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding.
8 just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended
that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and
legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10
affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial
court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It
is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that
plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic)
loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We
cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga,
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them?
And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff
was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of
this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she
declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant
after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he
also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman,
compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff,
a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who
has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public
policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows
6
a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial
court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover,
his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that
he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to
marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances
of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments
in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the
issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to
the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and
having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result
of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function
of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this
rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above
quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code
the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the
report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We
quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states.
. . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
7
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such
a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which
it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by
the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together
with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice
or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of
moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
8
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry
where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry,
and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was
criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it
be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because
here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for
the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when
the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient
to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would
deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced
woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting
injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the
criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal
case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties
are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the
doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot
recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that
if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their
relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
9
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. dignity.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant
even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive
the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to SO ORDERED.
be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by
a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of vs.
the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations. Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions. BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore,
in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded
that she is merely in delicto.
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed
by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration
and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of
the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where
his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only
create a scandal.

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared: Paquing

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA
less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and PAPA LOVE .
the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
PAKING
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it
not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the

10
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April
29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00
as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00
as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to
strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility
of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had
expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to
appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of
July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956.
This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid
petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955
in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside
the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no
answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating
facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's
affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has
a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry
the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-
3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29,
1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside
was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this
Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the
Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did
not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing
in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-
14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts
that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.
Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30,
1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out
that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the
provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1).
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-
to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion
were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days
before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ...
" He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
11
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged
against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition
precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under
the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a
"wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however,
is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower

court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

12
[G.R. No. 101749. July 10, 1992.]
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First
Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, Respondents.
Conrado G. Bunag for Petitioner.
Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo Law Office for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE AS A RULE CONCLUSIVE UPON THIS COURT. — The issue raised
primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once
again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential
mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive
upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to
clearly settled exceptions in case law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT’S FUNCTION IS LIMITED TO REVIEWING
ERRORS. — Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its
findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is
not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are
totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as
to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court
is not expected required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any
feature falling within any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may
warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; GENERALLY
NOT ACTIONABLE; EXCEPTION. — It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere
to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a
breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff
has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; RATIONALE. — However, the award of
moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy
for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically provide for in the statutes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARDED WHERE PETITIONER FORCIBLY ABDUCTED
RESPONDENT AND HAD CARNAL KNOWLEDGE WITH HER. — Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts or petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her
will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability,
only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-
one days, irremissibly constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs.
These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably
warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21, in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXTINCTION OF PENAL
ACTION DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY;
EXCEPTION. — Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto
only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at
the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently,
the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal
of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The reason most often given for this
holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now,
that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum
of evidence in criminal civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must
prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain
his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Thus, in Rillon, Et. Al. v. Rillon, we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
13
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted
to final judgment.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled
"Zenaida B. Cirilo v. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed
in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and,
implicitly, respondent court’s resolution of September 3, 1992 2 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this
case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and
the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we
approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced
hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered
indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, Defendant-Appellant
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-
appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or
until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, Defendant-Appellant Bunag,
Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973,
after leaving plaintiff-appellant, Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit
withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
"Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion,
abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted
the evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
`Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and
had finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears
that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while she
was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de
Dios Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in
a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were
sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and
Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to
take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at San Juan
de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n.,
pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).’
`Plaintiff rode in the case and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag,
Jr. seated himself by her right side. The car traveled north on its way to the
Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned
abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and
instead threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and
would bump the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened and silenced,
the car traveled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a
motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and
amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint
strength of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being a
woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where
the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could
not fight back and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie
down and embraced her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty,
after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his companion
to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him,
thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she
felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her vagina was penetrated
by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n., pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
`After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow
her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only
let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that
she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took
a taxi together after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to
the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.’s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o’clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26,
Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o’clock that same evening, defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following
day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications for marriage
license (Exhibits `A’ and `C’) and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr.
returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from
September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.chanrobles law library
`On September 29, 1973 complaint Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3,
1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against her by defendant-appellants (t.s.n., p.
35, Nov. 5, 1974).
14
`The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio
Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive
home at 9:00 o’clock in the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff
asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that
plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976).
However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told him that
Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas,
Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera’s
house, so that her sister requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did,
and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he
met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, `Pare, the children are here
already. Let us settle the matter and have them married.’
`He conferred with plaintiff who told that as she had already lost her honor, she
would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would
be married.’
"Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8,
1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter’s father to their
relationship.
"Defendants-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-
appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was
known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made
good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr.,
met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital’s
canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to
Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-
appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried
to get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel,
where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence
certificate number. Three hours later, the couple checked out of the hotel and
proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they
stayed until September 19, 1973. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter
disagreements with plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his
life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
"During this period, Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the
house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda,
member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
Bunag, Jr.’s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973
and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to
know about his son’s whereabouts when he was told of the couple’s elopement
late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He
likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and
agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by
herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag,
Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding,
inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent,
the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private
respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s
fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved
from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court’s decision
disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other
hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several
errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which were summarized by
respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that
defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant
damages for the breach of defendants-appellants’ promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr.
is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed
to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner’s defense,
resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation
of judgments; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and
jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a
simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive
damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed
to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had
agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but
one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the
agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the
witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and
evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual
15
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner
would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court,
and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are,
therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and
jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a
rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact
being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function
to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court.
Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid
of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not
expected required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature
falling within any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant
a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing
considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of
respondent court in favor of private Respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since the action involves a breach of promise to
marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is
not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under
Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts or petitioner in
forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her
against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal
liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitutes acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary
damages, pursuant to Article 21, in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219,
and Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by
the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with
rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal’s Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the
same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with
rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage.
There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case
might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect
the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the
offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved
are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized,
with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal civil
proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence
which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of
evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, Et. Al. v. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not
now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor
of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed
judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
16
SO ORDERED.

17
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of
about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because of
a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under
an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman
under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign
object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death
shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set
for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following
witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl.
Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong
Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10)
Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento,
(14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee
Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal
Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber,
(23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the
testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita
Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused
Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo
City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of street children.
Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez,
alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot
went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the
bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young
boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out and
placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like
that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands
and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which turned out
later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside the vagina of Rosario
Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers
against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a
tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on
bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and
also guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated
each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection.
When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her
clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself
between the two (2) children and accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his
attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of
Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After
what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy
and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an
"American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left
them in the hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario
told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But they could
not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither
did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw
Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her
body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the
evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in
her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not
yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned
and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to
Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see
Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who resided
at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage
scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at
Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people
because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling.
Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to
18
the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He
went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal
circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw,
Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while
Rosario was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied
that he did not know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the
hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos,
who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who supplied the
personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the
testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense
witness, for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara
claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot
for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of
his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used
to visit a girl by the name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother.
His brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law
and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even
stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So
the Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had
regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house, he must have already did come to
know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court
he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can
safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior
especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found
out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital,
nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from
the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to
religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and
Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario
Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out
that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short interview with
Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her
residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the
medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It
was Fe Israel who was able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from
Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the
age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program assisted
only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel
movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which
came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the
abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by
the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object
lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and
foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended
to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign
object by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said
object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues.
Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The
patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on
May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted
allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not
obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified
that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life.
Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the
anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at
about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch
incision on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested
with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus
in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia,
poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been
caused through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the
intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon
by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the
vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues,
pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping
and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was
shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation
successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz
stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left.
The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced
her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which
was indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest,
secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral
vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent
small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the
foreign object, and it was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed
the same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards
she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object
until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar
Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace
Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her
granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor.
Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for
Rosario.
19
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence
at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person
who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she
was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with
his messenger came to her house and told her that the accused was willing to
settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did
not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay damages
anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a
lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled
once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer bear the situation, sent
her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her
that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the
records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an
assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter
arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the
bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's
grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left
only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the understanding that there
was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was
asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the document
prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it
subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance
of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of
Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of
the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was
directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department
to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the
suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be
an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation
headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the
local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at
Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of
them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an
American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina.
After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found
out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986
with an American, who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken
inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was
brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description
supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof
were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S.
Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite
drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the
result was negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the
appearance of the suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of
a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila,
and thinking that the so-called American may be European or Australian national,
the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and
P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile,
proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter
checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they
went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting,
but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while
they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male
caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the
two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr.
Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so the
two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation.
They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said
foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel.
Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard while the one
previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that
maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and
after several minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his
thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested
Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It could be
mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were accompanied by two (2)
policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and
was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they
first went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his
shoulder bag which contained his personal belongings, and from there they
brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters,
they were allowed a permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his
small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the
form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's
name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of
Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went to their
hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after
he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at
the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at
the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was
assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla
because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita
Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left
them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts was
unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was
already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only
20
learned about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper,
long after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime
of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was described as an American while
Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken
identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the commission of the offense,
already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973
as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized
on December 25, 1974 and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by
Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal
Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year
1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or
entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot
be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a
thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of Rosario
Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of
the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the
prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3
of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to
a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees to the private
prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly
committed by the court:
I within the rule which permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND
THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN
NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of
conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records
in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience
that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña,
161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide
of a young girl who died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to
be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—
whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time
the alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in
determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman
under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason
or unconscious state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually
abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the
absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the
victim's grandmother and father who testified that she was born on December
22, 1975. These oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130,
Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the
act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable
fact in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree
declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's
birth date because her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita
(Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to attend the funeral because
the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born
on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that
Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45,
Jan. 27, 1988).
21
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical
record and the death certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she
was admitted at the Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was
supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical
record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario
Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old.
The trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie
Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was born on
September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since
he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in
1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father
supported by other independent evidence such as the clinical record, death
certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the
baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any probative or
evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand
the application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the
1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable
to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the
declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or
ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor
do the declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age
were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to
testify as they both did testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial
which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other witnesses who
testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies
of Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal
knowledge of what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family
history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant
to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the
Court accepted the testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old
and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because the child
was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay,
but came from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and
unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no
reasonable assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632
[1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or
funeral was never established, which indicates that the day was rather
insignificant to be remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely
reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had direct knowledge
of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1)
year old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor
was there any basis shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The
clinical records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given
when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her only
about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial
court was merely based on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record
of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was
less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to
establish the exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing
a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial
court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations
made by interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years
old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief. (See
Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower
court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a
22
Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He
brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin
term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book,
there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25,
1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita
Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor
with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held
that:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements
on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and
marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967).
Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this
Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the
person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may
be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp.
84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as
entries made in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is
an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are
one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a
book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil.
105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that
Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in
evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that
he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one presented
in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date
different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal
certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore
highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975.
She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be
proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in
1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year old
when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was
born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly
not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's
testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old
when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more
reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that
she was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years
old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The
burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12
years old at the time of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The
prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the
time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual
elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that
she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the
appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid
P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid
P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances
coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the
impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of
her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at
such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force
or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was
committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a
consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the
appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside
Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence.
Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are
not enough to justify conviction.
23

Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in
Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from
Rosario as the same object which the appellant was holding at that time of the
alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987,
he answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang
napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at
napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na
kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag
niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng
Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang
dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating
pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil
natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang
larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na
nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa
kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na
katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya
lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit
"A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the
appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that the
object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in
color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p.
92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as
to the veracity of the statements made especially when he answered on
additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-
2" was the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one
shown to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie
Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did not actually
see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning
that the foreigner inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted
such statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such
statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility
on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13
years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into
the vagina of a young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie,
however, there must be more evidence to show that the statement, given after
a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event was so
startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside
Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario
to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in
her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even
categorically admitted to you that she was already able to remove the object
allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by
Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and when she
told you that she was already able to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already
removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she
again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for
me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words against me
as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both
children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6,
1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we can just imagine the
distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure
the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged
incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
24
but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog,
144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro
Solis, a witness for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of
Medicine and a graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of
Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology
University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and
also a graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the
Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became
Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI
up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP,
FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH
Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical
Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13
conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine"
and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background,
his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of
his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-
2" which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated.
Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the
probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a
human being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object,
the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The
tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions that
maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to
cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to
the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest
symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but
may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the
fact that this foreign body as shown to me is already not complete, this shows
exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is mechanism to
cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within
and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are,
manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause
current flow. All of these substances are irritants including areas of the container
and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues,
thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those
inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection in a way that the whole
generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process causing her the
systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms.
. . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any
reaction such as an infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of
this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed,
in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this
irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time,
there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the
insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body
in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator
was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on
May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before this was
extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any adverse infection
could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN.,
Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this
lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the
patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you
mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time
frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina
25
canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case
is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where
an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him
cannot be based on probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities
which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body
lodged inside the body. An examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per
certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard
Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached
certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator
depicted in the catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical
characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on
the open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows
the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert
and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in
much earlier. Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina
which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with
a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body
is more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of
the case. We see no reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience
should not be controlling and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined
Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of
Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N.
p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on
that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings,
if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room.
The patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel
chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to
the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was fairly
nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time
and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended
abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum
tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your
findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein
I placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and
was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum examination
wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw
purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign
body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to
try to remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so
also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both
in the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you
able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
26
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her
vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG
NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted
and placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from
the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened
next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that
date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after
that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition
at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal
conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since
Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital,
she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at
that time because there were several instances testified to by different witnesses
that she was still able to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo
Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group
she visits indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours
on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to
talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the
comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social
worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva
Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the
month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario
Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated
there, she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for
about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital
actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but
writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p.
12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could
still answer questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach
pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to halt the
aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood
poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity
caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of
the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and
into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in
the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis
supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the
defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant
faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines"
arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases
loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize
27
the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of
the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of
witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there
is no direct and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the
vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death seven (7) months
after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support
a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had
upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (People v.
Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420,
433 [1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant for the
crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and
how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children
encounter as they sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence
and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its
most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies
that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts
of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of
galvanizing the nation to care for its street children. It would have meant a lot
to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought
to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the
formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot
convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of
the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for
the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-
abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral
certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been
satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt
about her being less than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If
the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the
date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not
satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of
reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence
shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the
vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the
vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it.
Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was able to
remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second
encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was
even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also
contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign
object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only
after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set
in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in December
of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that
the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the
Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived
in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never
returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could
have happened only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable
for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months with the
kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital
confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang
naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities
after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she
was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and
Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she could
have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior
28
where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October,
1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the
alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish
appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral certainty. (See People v.
Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant
could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may
have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty
person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should
not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused
should be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals
or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The
evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest
suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan,
142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615
[1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that
reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt.
It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the court,
keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable
hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the
proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is
more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact
to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine
Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being
morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an
acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the
children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel.
Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to
look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but
in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the
appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited them
to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him
and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the
appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young
children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987
edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive
desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various
ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex
organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual between
a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this
is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and
violative of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]).
Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed
acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people. The state has expressly committed itself to
defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant
should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from
civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III,
Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC,
supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that
the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system.
29
It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt
of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility
is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities
are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from
a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance
of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform
under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for disillusionment on the part of the
innumerable persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's
house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate
profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered
mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death
as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant
for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that
he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence
and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which
saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated,
there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside
Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. True,
we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not
require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation
committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus,
considering the circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs
of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately
protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps,
their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The
provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for
the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty
among the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles,
media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this
serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the
Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise
the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts
soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us
to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street
children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about
it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The
appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with
prejudice to re-entry into the country.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ, concur.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public
order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not
overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines,

30
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
(Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated
26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals
dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under
the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat
(respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October
1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted
by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs.
Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of
the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked
if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then
went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the
latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture
taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at
the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as
Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby
Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado,
bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely
ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while
he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal,
he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr.
Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral
and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but
not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated
that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18
One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr.
Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended
invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60)
of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes
was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at
the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the
party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to
inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied
that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged
in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she
inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her
that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to
tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however,
lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes
did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes
conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the
same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the
party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted
Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were
no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was already
helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a
corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo
ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na
lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then
turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but
to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court,
also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes
to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the
basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the
elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the
penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed
and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the
place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was
a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She
was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes
to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed
the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr.
Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave
for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
31
the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants
Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta
Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his
attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim
must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found
more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him
to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should
not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other
guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which
appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter
as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from
the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals
or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot
with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to
morals or good customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching
several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to
ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and
both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by
appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have
told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the
celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be
the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered
such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection
of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code,
every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if
said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to
some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud
(Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees
in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the
argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in
the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the
Court of Appeals seriously erred in –
I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING
THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA
"COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
FILART’S INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY
BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF
HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S
BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated
in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed
in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49
which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
32
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50
As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to
the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited
by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed,
the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general
rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and
discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for
damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish
his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both
courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought
Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s
findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-
only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a
person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not just
disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he
was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of
his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party
intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-
hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless
affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss.
To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly
reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to
invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon
whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered
him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do
that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on
cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms.
Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were
at the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would
shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel
business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in
observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the
request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction
to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired
between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police
to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr.
Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only
that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19
33
and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be
held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.1awphi1.nét
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or
21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that
Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know
each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes
had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct
except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very
strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her
associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness
of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we
cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act
of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon
mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any
ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion
who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty
only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad
faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim
and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for
the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s
lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a
democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the
legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety
(Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public
good and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should
be imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with
the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not
disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of
long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the
Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a
showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the
KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian
organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal,
Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On
the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and
economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached
by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which
Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
34
SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

35
[G.R. NO. 147614 : January 29, 2004]
H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, v. MARINA PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, JESUS K. TYPOCO SR. and TAN YU, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
There is unjust enrichment when a building contractor is denied payment for
increased labor cost validly incurred and additional work validly rendered with
the owners express or implied agreement.
The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court, filed under Rule 45, seeks the reversal
of the Decision2 dated March 29, 2001, issued by the Court of Appeals3 in CA-
GR CV No. 60975. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
, and a new one entered DISMISSING the [petitioners] Complaint, and partially
granting the [respondent-corporations] Counterclaim, in that the [petitioner] is
directed to pay unto the [respondent-corporation] the sum of P4,604,579.00 in
actual damages plus P3,549,416.00 as and for liquidated damages.4
The Facts
The facts of the case, summarized by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
[Respondent] MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION (MPC for brevity) is engaged
in the business of real estate development.On May 10, 1988, MPC entered into
a contract5 with [Petitioner] H.[L.] CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. (HLC) to
construct Phase III of a condominium complex called MARINA BAYHOMES
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, consisting of townhouses and villas, totaling 31
housing units, for a total consideration of P38,580,609.00, within a period of 365
days from receipt of Notice to Proceed.The original completion date of the project
was May 16, 1989, but it was extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period
until November 30, 1989.6 ςrνll
The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco, president of MPC, and Honorio L.
Carlos, president of HLC.
On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of money against not
only MPC but also against the latters alleged president, [Respondent] Jesus K.
Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and [Respondent] Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of
various sums with an aggregate amount of P14 million pesos, broken down as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
a) P7,065,885.03 for costs of labor escalation, change orders and material price
escalation;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
b) P2,000,000.00 as additional compensatory damages, exclusive of the cost of
suit.
c) P3,147,992.00 representing retention money allegedly withheld by MPC on
HLCs Progress Billings as of January 1990, and
d) P2,000,000.00 representing the value of construction materials allegedly
withheld/detained by MPC.
Traversing the allegations of the complaint, [respondents] filed separate
answers, whereby the two individual [respondents] alleged that they are not
parties to the Construction Contract and Amendatory Contract and are therefore
not liable to HLC. [Respondent] MPC on the other hand alleged that the
[petitioner] has no cause of action against it and that it (HLC) is not entitled to
its various claims. MPC interposed a counterclaim in the aggregate sum of
P68,296,227.14 for actual and compensatory damages, liquidated damages,
unliquidated advances, and attorneys fees.7 ςrνll
On May 15, 1997, the trial court8 ruled as follows:9 ςrνll
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby rendered for
[Petitioner] H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. and as against [Respondents]
MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, TAN YU, and JESUS K. TYPOCO, SR., who
are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the [petitioner], as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1.the amount of P7,065,885.03, representing unpaid labor escalation costs,
change orders and material price escalations, plus 12% interest per annum from
date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.the amount of P3,147,992.39 representing the 10% retention money withheld
by the [respondents] [from] [petitioners] progress billing as of January 1990,
plus 12% interest per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, until fully
paid;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3.the amount of P2,000,000.00 representing the value of construction materials
and the like detained by the [respondents], plus 12% legal interest from the
date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4.the sum equivalent to 15% of the principal sum as and by way of attorneys
fees; and to
36
5.[p]ay the costs of this suit.
The counterclaim for liquidated damages, are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence. Liquidated damages can only be awarded under paragraph 2 of the
amended construction contract that extended the completion period and mainly
on the finding of the 85% substantial completion of the project, and that the
delay and stoppage of the project was caused by [respondents] default in
payment of [the] progress billings that would have allowed [petitioner] to have
the capability to continue and complete the project.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA held that respondents were not liable for escalations in the
cost of labor and construction materials, because of the following reasons: (1)
the contract between the parties was for a lump sum consideration, which did
not allow for cost escalation; and (2) petitioner failed to show any basis for the
award sought.
Respondents were also absolved from paying for change orders and extra work,
inasmuch as there was no supplemental agreement covering them as required
in the main Construction Contract. Although Progress Billing No. 24 apparently
indicates that extra work was rendered by petitioner, this claim is not supported
by sufficient evidence.
The CA further failed to find any basis for the release of the 10 percent retention
fee. The Construction Contract had provided that such release would be made
only under certain conditions, none of which was complied with, as petitioner
failed to complete the work required. Furthermore, MPC was not held liable for
detained or withheld construction materials, since petitioner had eventually
withdrawn them.
Nothing in the records indicated any personal liability on the part of Typoco and
Tan. Moreover, they had nothing to assume, as MPC was not held liable to
petitioner.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that petitioner was liable for actual and liquidated
damages. The latter had abandoned the project prior to its completion; hence,
MPC contracted out the work to another entity and incurred actual damages in
excess of the remaining balance of the contract price. In addition, the
Construction Contract had stipulated payment of liquidated damages in an
amount equivalent to 1/1000 of the contract price for each calendar day of delay.
Hence, this Petition.10
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
a.Whether or not the respondents are liable to pay the petitioner its claim for
price escalation of construction materials and labor cost escalation.
b.Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for cost of change
orders and extra works.
c.Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for the ten percent
retention money.
d.Whether or not the respondents are liable to pay the petitioner attorneys fees.
e.Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for the cost of
illegally detained materials.
f.Whether or not the respondents Jesus Typoco Sr., and Tan Yu are jointly and
solidarily liable to the petitioner for the latters claims.
g.Whether or not the petitioner is liable to the respondents for actual and
liquidated damages.11 ςrνll
In simpler terms, the issues to be resolved are as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to (a) a price escalation for labor and material
cost, (b) the cost of change orders and extra work, (c) the release of the 10
percent retention money, (d) the cost of illegally detained materials, and (e)
attorneys fees
(2) Whether Typoco and Tan are solidarily liable with MPC
(3) Whether petitioner is liable for actual and liquidated damages
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Liability for Additional Costs
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to price escalation for both labor and
materials, because MPC was delayed in paying for its obligations. The former
admits that it is normally not entitled to any price increase for labor and
materials, because a contractor is expected to build into its price a contingency
factor to protect it from cost increases that may occur during the contract
period.12 It justifies its claim, however, on the ground that a contractor cannot
be expected to anticipate price increases beyond the original contract period.
37
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that it was delayed in finishing the project;
hence, it is not entitled to any price increase.
It must be pointed out that the reason for the CAs denial of petitioners claim was
that the contract between the parties was for a lump sum consideration, and
petitioner was guilty of delay in completing the project.
Labor and Material
Cost Escalation
We agree with petitioner that it is entitled to price escalation, but only for the
labor component of Progress Billing No. 24. The Construction Contract contains
the following provision on the considerations therefor:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
6.1For and in consideration of the true and faithful performance of the work by
the CONTRACTOR, the OWNER shall pay the Lump Sum Contract Price of PESOS:
THIRTY EIGHT MILLION FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINE
(P38,580,609.00) broken down as shown in the Bid Form. No cost escalation
shall be allowed except on the labor component of the work x x x.13 ςrνll
Since the Contract allows escalation only of the labor component, the implication
is that material cost escalations are barred. There appears to be no provision,
either in the original or in the amended contract, that would justify billing of
increased cost of materials. Furthermore, no evidence -- like official economic
data showing an increase in the price index of construction materials -- was even
adduced by petitioner to prove that there had indeed been increases in material
costs.14 ςrνll
Petitioner attempts to pass off these cost escalations as a form of damages
suffered by it as a natural consequence of the delay in the payment of billings
and claims for additional work. It argues that the baseless and malicious refusal
to pay for those claims renders respondents liable for damages under Article
2201 of the Civil Code.
We disagree. Without tackling the issue of delay, we find that the contentious
Progress Billing No. 24 contains no claim for material cost escalation.The other
unsettled bills claimed by petitioner are those for change orders or extra work,
which have not been shown to be related to the increase in cost of materials.
Dealt with in separate contracts between the parties were such claims, the costs
of which were to be determined and agreed upon only when required by MPC.
Materials used for those additional jobs were to be purchased only when the
work was contracted, not prior thereto. As admitted by petitioner, expenses for
change orders/additional work were not included in the agreed contract price15
and, hence, were not subject to increases.
MPC admits that the labor cost escalation clause was adopted by the parties to
safeguard the contractor against losses in the event that, during the execution
of the Contract, the government would order a minimum wage adjustment,
which would then inflate the labor cost.16 Respondents deny liability for this
added expense because, according to the Contract, the allowance for labor cost
escalation is available only within the duration of the original construction period.
We clarify. The claimed cost of labor escalation pertains to the period September
1 to December 15, 1989, in the amount of P170,722.10; and December 16 to
January 27, 1990, P45,983.91. During those periods, petitioner had not yet
incurred any delay in the project, originally stipulated to be finished by May 16,
1989. But by mutual agreement, the period was extended up to October 31,
1989, with a grace period until November 30, 1989.
Furthermore, a legislated wage increase became effective after the expiration of
the original period.17 Respondents are, therefore, liable for this increase in labor
cost, because they allowed petitioner to continue working on the project until
April 20, 1990 (even beyond November 30, 1989).
MPC argues that to allow the claim for labor cost escalation would be to reward
petitioner for incurring delay, thereby breaching a contractual obligation.
This contention is untenable. Before the expiration of the extended period,
petitioner was not yet in delay. It was granted by MPC an extension to complete
the project until November 30, 1989. Moreover, despite the expiration of the
extended period, MPC allowed it to continue working on the project until the
former took over and awarded that project to another contractor. Hence, labor
costs were actually incurred by petitioner until April 20, 1990. It was thus entitled
to reimbursement for labor cost escalation until that date. MPC cannot now be
allowed to question the true valuation of the additional labor because, instead of
submitting to an independent evaluator, it violated the Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) issued by the trial court and hired another contractor to finish the
project.
Noteworthy is the fact that MPC paid for the labor cost escalation during the
period August 1-15, 1989,18 which was past the expiration of the original
period.Apparently, it thereafter stopped paying for labor cost escalation in
response to the suit filed against it by petitioner.
The CA denied the labor cost escalation claim because, despite having billed MPC
therefor, petitioner accepted payments that did not include such claim. The
appellate court construed the acceptance by petitioner as a waiver of the latters
right to be reimbursed for the increased labor cost.
We believe that this position is untenable. The CA mistook Exhibits C-7-B19 and
D-120 as bills coming from petitioner, when in truth they were Accomplishment
Evaluation Sheets issued by MPC. The notation labor escalation not included in
the said Exhibits was an admission on the part of MPC that it had not paid such
38
amount, upon the advice of Atty. Jose C. Laureta, its resident counsel. According
to him, petitioner should be faulted for having incurred labor cost increases after
the expiration of the original period (after May 16, 1989). Not having waived
such increases, it should thus bear them.21 ςrνll
To allow MPC to acquire the partially accomplished project without paying for
labor cost escalation validly incurred would constitute unjust enrichment at the
expense of petitioner.22 There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil
Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another.23 Since petitioner had rendered
services that were accepted by MPC, then the former should be compensated for
them. Labor cost escalation, in this case, has already been earned by petitioner.
Change Orders and Extra Work
Petitioner claims entitlement to compensation for change orders and extra work
that were covered by construction memoranda. MPC counters, however, that the
former never presented any cost estimate for additional work.The estimate
would have formed the basis for a consensual agreement and a computation of
actual accomplishment, for which MPC could have been unilaterally billed. Worse,
the extra work was allegedly assessed by its engineer to be worth only P705.41.
We side with petitioner. The General Conditions to the Construction Contract
provides:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
13.CLAIMS FOR EXTRA AND FORCE ACCOUNT WORK:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
If the Contractor claims that any construction by drawings or otherwise involve
extra cost under this Contract, he shall give the Owner and/or the Architect,
written notice thereof within a reasonable time after receipt of such instructions,
and in any event before proceeding to execute the work, except in emergency
endangering life or property. No such claim shall be valid unless so made.
Extra work for which no price is provided in the proposal shall be covered by a
supplementary agreement to be signed by both parties before such work is
commenced.24 ςrνll
The CA is correct in holding that there is no supplemental agreement covering
the claimed extra work and change orders. Exhibits C-1, C-2, C-2-A, C-3 and C-
4 show billings for extra work sent by petitioner to MPC. But the former did not
submit in evidence the alleged construction memoranda covering them.Neither
were they mentioned in the letter25 of Roilo Golez dated November 24, 1989.
Progress Billing No. 24, which pertained to the project as covered by the
Construction Contract, did not mention any claim for extra work or change
orders. These additional jobs were covered by separate bills other than the
twenty-four Progress Billings sent by petitioner.
MPC, however, never denied having ordered additional work. In Item No. 12 of
its Amended Answer,26 it averred that petitioners claim for change orders and
extra work were premature. Limneo P. Miranda, respondents work engineer,
manifested that additional work was indeed done, but that claims therefor were
not settled for the following reasons: (1) reconciliation between the parties was
never completed due to the absence of petitioners representative in scheduled
meetings; (2) difference in opinion on the proper valuation of the additional
work, as MPC wanted to use the net quantity method, while petitioner preferred
the gross method; and (3) some claims were rejected by MPC, because they had
not been properly approved in accordance with the Contract.27 ςrνll
Evidence on record further reveals that MPC approved some change order jobs
despite the absence of any supplementary agreement. In its Over-all Summary
of Reconciled Quantities as of September 6, 1989 (Annex C), 28 it valued
petitioners valid claim therefor at P79,340.52. After noting that the claim had
extremely been bloated, Atty. Laureta, in-house counsel for respondent
corporation, affirmed as valid the amount stated in the summary.29 ςrνll
Petitioner may have failed to show the construction memoranda covering its
claim, but it inarguably performed extra work that was accepted by MPC. Hence,
we will consider Annex C as the proper valuation thereof.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the
reasonable value of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written
contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment.30 Quantum meruit means that in
an action for work and labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the
plaintiff reasonably deserves.31 To deny payment for a building almost
completed and already occupied would be to permit unjust enrichment at the
expense of the contractor.32 ςrνll
The CA held that since Billing No. 24 did not include any claim for additional
work, such work had presumably been previously paid for. This reasoning is not
correct. It is beyond dispute that the change orders and extra work were billed
separately from the usual progress billings petitioner sent to MPC.
Retention Money
The CA denied the claim for the 10 percent retention money, because petitioner
had failed to comply with the conditions under paragraph 6.3 of the Construction
Contract. On the other hand, the latter avers that these conditions were deemed
fulfilled under Article 1186 of the Civil Code because, when its contract was
terminated, MPC prevented the fulfillment of those conditions. It would allegedly
be unfair and unreasonable for petitioner to guarantee a project finished by
another contractor.
We disagree with petitioner. In the construction industry, the 10 percent
retention money is a portion of the contract price automatically deducted from
39
the contractors billings, as security for the execution of corrective work -- if any
-- becomes necessary. This amount is to be released one year after the
completion of the project, minus the cost of corrective work.33 The conditions
for its release are stated in the Construction Contract as follows:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
6.3In all cases, however, payment of the progress billings shall be subject to
deduction of twenty percent (20%) recoupment of the downpayment, ten
percent (10%) retention and expanded withholding tax on CONTRACTORS
income. Upon issuance of the Certificate of Completion of the work by the
OWNER and upon submission of Guaranty Bond, Ninety Percent (90%) of the
retained amount shall be released to the CONTRACTOR and the balance thereof
shall be released by the OWNER within thirty (30) days after the expiration of
the guaranty period which is 365 days after issuance of the certificate of
completion.34 ςrνll
None of the foregoing conditions were satisfied; hence, the CA was correct in
forfeiting the retention fee. The completion of the work was stipulated in the
Contract to be within 365 days from the issuance of a Notice to Proceed or until
May 16, 1989. Then the period was extended up to November 30, 1989.
Petitioner worked on the project till April 20, 1990. It was given by MPC ample
time and two extensions to complete the project. The simple truth is that in
failing to finish the project, the former failed to fulfill a prerequisite for the release
of the retention money.
Detained Materials
Petitioner claims cost reimbursement of illegally detained materials, as it was
allowed to withdraw them from the site only after two years from the unilateral
termination of the Contract. By 1992, only 30 percent of the materials detained
were salvageable, while the rest had depreciated.
This contention has no merit. According to the CAs ruling, the only proof that
MPC detained materials belonging to petitioner was the denial of the request,
contained in the latters February 1990 letter,35 for the release of used form
lumber. Aside from that letter, however, no other attempt was shown to have
been made by petitioner to obtain its request. It should have tried again to do
so before claiming that respondents unreasonably prevented it from removing
its construction materials from the premises. As to the other materials, there
was absolutely no attempt to remove them from the construction site. Hence,
we cannot say that these were ever withheld from petitioner.
Detention is not proved by Atty. Lauretas letter36 dated July 4, 1992, allowing
petitioner to remove its materials from the site. The letter was merely a directive
for it to clear out its belongings therefrom, in view of the hiring of a second
contractor to finish the project.
Moreover, in a specifically designated yard inside the construction site, petitioner
maintained a warehouse that was guarded by its own security complement and
completely inaccessible to MPC personnel.37 It therefore had control over those
materials and should have made provisions to keep them safe from the elements
and from pilferage.
Attorneys Fees
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, because (1) respondents act or omission has compelled it to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect its interest; and (2)
respondents acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy its plainly
valid, just and demandable claim.
The grant of some of the claims of petitioner does not change the fact that it did
not finish the project. Attorneys fees are not granted every time a party prevails
in a suit, because no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.38
Petitioner is not, after all, blameless in the present controversy. Just because
MPC withheld some payments from petitioner does not mean that the former
was in gross or evident bad faith. MPC had claims that it wanted to offset with
those of the latter.
Second Issue:
Typoco and Tans Liabilities
Petitioner claims that Respondents Jesus Typoco and Tan Yu are solidarily liable
with MPC.
We concur with the CA that these two respondents are not liable. Section 31 of
the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) provides:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or trustees who
willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith x x x shall be liable
jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders and other persons.
The personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only when (a) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b) they are guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of
interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other
persons.39 ςrνll
The records are bereft of any evidence that Typoco acted in bad faith with gross
or inexcusable negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his authority as
company president. The unilateral termination of the Contract during the
40
existence of the TRO was indeed contemptible --
merely been cited for contempt of court at the
injunction would have then stopped work by the
there is no showing that the unilateral termination
void.
for which MPC should have
most -- and a preliminary
second contractor. Besides,
of the Contract was null and
obligation.42 Petitioner was already paid by MPC in the amount of P31,435,187
out of the total contract price of P38,580,609; thus, only P7,145,422 remained
outstanding. In order to finish the project, the latter had to contract the services
of a second construction firm for P11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered actual
damages in the amount of P4,604,579 for the completion of the project.

Respondent Tan is not an officer or a director of MPC. His participation is limited
to an alleged conversation between him and Engineer Mario Cornista, petitioners
project manager. Supposedly, the former verbally agreed therein to guarantee
the payment of the latters progress billings. We find no satisfactory evidence to
show respondents alleged solidary liability to petitioner.
Third Issue:
Liability for Actual and Liquidated Damages
Petitioner avers that it should be exonerated from the counterclaims for actual
and liquidated damages, because its failure to complete the project was due to
respondents acts.
Central to the resolution of this issue is the question of which party was in delay.
Aside from the contentious Progress Billing No. 24, there are no other unpaid
claims. The bills for extra work and change orders, aside from those for the
beams and columns, were premature and still subject to reconciliation and
adjustment. Hence, we cannot hold MPC liable for them.
In comparison, petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations. It could not
totally pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor, because the latter
was allowed to terminate the services of the contractor.
10.1The OWNER shall have the right to terminate this Contract in the event that
the CONTRACTOR incurs a fifteen percent (15%) or greater slippage in the
prosecution of the overall work evaluated against the Project schedule as
indicated by the critical path of the approved PERT/CPM network for the Project
or as amended by Art. II herein.
Either party shall have the right to terminate this Contract for reason of violation
or non-compliance by the other party of the terms and conditions herein agreed
upon.40 ςrνll
Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as provided in the Contract,43 the
pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
4.1Time is an essential feature of this Contract and in the event that the
CONTRACTOR fails to complete the contracted work within the stipulated time
inclusive of any granted extension of time, the CONTRACTOR shall pay the
OWNER, as liquidated damages, the amount of one over one thousand (1/1000)
of the value of the contract price for each and every calendar day of delay
(Sundays and Holidays included), not to exceed 15% of [the] Contract amount,
in the completion of the work as specified in Article II above. It is understood
that the liquidated damages herein provided are fixed, agreed upon and not by
way of penalty, and as such, the OWNER shall not be further required to prove
that he has incurred actual damages to be entitled thereto.In the case of such
delays, the OWNER is hereby authorized to deduct the amount of liquidated
damages from any money due or which may become due the CONTRACTOR in
this or any other contract or to collect such amount from the CONTRACTORs
performance bond whichever is convenient and expeditious to the OWNER.
Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid in case of a
breach.44 As worded, the amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered
by the owner due to delays in the completion of the project. Under Philippine
laws, these damages take the nature of penalties.45 A penal clause is an
accessory undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach. It is
attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance.
Thus, as held by the CA, petitioner is bound to pay liquidated damages for 92
days, or from the expiration of the grace period in the Amended Contract until
February 1, 1990, when it effectively abandoned the project.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partly GRANTED andthe assailed Decision
MODIFIED. Petitioner is AWARDED labor cost escalation in the sum of
P1,196,202 and cost of extra work in the sum of P79,340.52. In all other
respects, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

As of November 30, 1989, petitioner accomplished only approximately 80 SO ORDERED.

percent of the project. In other words, it was already in delay at the time. In
addition, Engineer Miranda testified that it would lose money even if it finished
the project;41 thus, respondents already suspected that it had no intention of
finishing the project at all.

Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the obligor is liable for
damages that are the natural and probable consequences of its breach of

41
G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its Resolution2 denying the
petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of
Appeals set aside the Decision3 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent against the
petitioner for sum of money and damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an
integrated system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As
part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the
National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the
UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came
forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including
the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to
BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982,
Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for
Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory
furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for
the account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB
to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested
Padolina to forward the contract of the project to FEMF for its approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the
purchase order and downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the
project, thus:
1.
Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or ₱1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building
Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or ₱286,687.504
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible
before the issuance of the purchase orders and the downpayment for the goods,
and would be transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the
President of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture,
per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for
copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract5 for the project, and that
such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down payment could
be remitted to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward
any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture
to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF
Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for
the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official
Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial
payment of ₱800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No.
256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and
delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños
and FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial
support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of buildings,
installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to exceed
₱29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the following:
ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting
philantrophic and scientific projects through financial support to such projects
that will contribute to the country’s economic development, shall grant such
financial support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX
as may be necessary for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratories,
setting up of offices and physical plants and facilities and other capital
42
investment of the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its component Research
Institutes not to exceed ₱29 Million. For this purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH COMPLEX;
and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE
MILLION PESOS (₱29,000,000.00) for the construction of the buildings of the
National Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the
installation of their laboratories and their physical plants and other facilities to
enable them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of
Trustees of the FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH
COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional grants and donations for specific
research and development projects which may be mutually agreed upon and,
from time to time, additional grants and donations of such amounts as may be
necessary to provide the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research
Institutes with operational flexibility especially with regard to incentives to staff
purchase of equipment/facilities, travel abroad, recruitment of local and
expatriate staff and such other activities and inputs which are difficult to obtain
under usual government rules and regulations.6
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982.7
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation
of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero
failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero
of the need to submit the contract so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its
evaluation and approval.8 Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB
submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the project as of February
28, 1983, and requested payment thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had
completed 78% of the project, amounting to ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost
of ₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent (40%) of the total
cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the
progress billing from PHILAB.10 On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made another
partial payment of ₱836,119.52 representing the already delivered laboratory
and office furniture after the requisite inspection and verification thereof by
representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The payment was made
in the form of a check, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF
through Padolina.11
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount
of ₱702,939.40 for the final payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives
from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the
accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. BIOTECH forwarded the
invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its payment.12 Lirio, in turn, forwarded
the invoice to Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985. However,
the FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for payment through
a letter on May 9, 1985.13 BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985,
requesting the payment of PHILAB’s bill.14 It sent another letter to Gapud, on
November 22, 1985, again appealing for the payment of PHILAB’s bill.15 In a
Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of
₱702,939.40 plus interest thereon of ₱224,940.61.16 There was, however, no
response from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH,
appealing for the payment of its bill even on installment basis.17
President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its
much-needed assistance for the payment of the balance already due plus interest
of ₱295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory furniture.18
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to
secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF.19 The letter was referred
to then Budget Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP
President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On September 30, 1986, Raul P. de
Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños, wrote then Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga,
submitting PHILAB’s claim to be officially entered as "accounts payable" as soon
as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.20
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant
contract and the MOA for its perusal.21
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract
executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated October 20, 1987,
Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any
contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to
BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE &
40/100 (₱702,939.40) plus an additional amount (as shall be determined during
the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction
the value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (₱11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%)
percent interest on the total amount from August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.22
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
43

3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR.
WILLIAM PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff to supply and install several
laboratory furnitures and equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein
defendant located at its campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of
PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT
& 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory
furnitures and equipment at defendant’s BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid
three (3) times on installment basis:
a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;
c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (₱702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant
arrogantly and maliciously made plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the
balance aforestated, that was why plaintiff’s President and General Manager
himself, HECTOR C. NAVASERO, personally went to and from UP Los Baños to
talk with defendant’s responsible officers in the hope of expecting payment,
when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay whatsoever right
from the start on a misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of plaintiff’s demand
letters since year 1983 up to the present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, and H hereof;
6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil and unnecessary
misrepresentations that it was going to pay its obligation and asking plaintiff so
many red tapes and requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took
plaintiff almost eight (8) years to finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant
had no intention to pay, defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that
other government institutions may be warned that they must not unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of the people they serve.23
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action
against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture
in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the
PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied
obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint without prejudice to PHILAB’s recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice
to plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid
balance of ₱792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.24
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial
court erred in finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and
equipment was between PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay
the respondent the balance of the purchase price.25
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was
never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be
bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto.
The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for the
laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: "No
one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision,
UP, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON
CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE
MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.26
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the
subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as this mode of appeal is generally restricted to questions of law.27 However,
this rule is not absolute. The Court may review the factual findings of the CA
should they be contrary to those of the trial court.28 Correspondingly, this Court
may review findings of facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts.29
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the
evidentiary effect and substance of the corresponding letters and
44
communications which support the statements of the witnesses showing
affirmatively that an implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the
FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it and
the respondent as it could not have entered into any agreement without the
requisite public bidding and a formal written contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not
applying the law on contracts between the respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise,
attests that it was never privy to the MOA entered into between the petitioner
and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF donated was a sum of
money equivalent to ₱29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment supplied
by it to the petitioner. The respondent submits that the petitioner, being the
recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of
the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one for sum of money
predicated on the alleged promise of the petitioner to pay for the purchase price
of the furniture, which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to do. However,
the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged itself to pay for
the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled to
its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the
petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts
take effect only between the parties and their assigns.30 A contract cannot be
binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even
if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.31 Likewise
admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed
by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and
delivery of office and laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to
specifically declare that the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract
of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in accord that the FEMF
had remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks drawn and issued
by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount of
₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project of ₱2,934,068.90 and that the
respondent received the said checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF.
There is also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a single centavo for
the said furniture delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been using
ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact
contract of sale was entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract
implied in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual
intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed,
but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence
and terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit words
between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used,
or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the
transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances must warrant
inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay.32 An implied-
in-fact contract requires the parties’ intent to enter into a contract; it is a true
contract.33 The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would
view it, to determine the existence or not of an implied-in-fact contract.34 The
totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine their
intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds
is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.35
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for
the fabrication and supply of the laboratory furniture until the go-signal was
given to it to fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that
the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina asked the respondent to
prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the
execution of the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the
respondent failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that the petitioner was
merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor
was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the inception,
the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for
which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the
FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was
the Marcos Foundation who would be paying for this particular transaction for
the completion of this particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were
occasions during our inspection in Los Baños, at the installation site, there were
occasions, two or three occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the
President, I think, or manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really
between the foundation and him to which includes (sic) the construction
company constructing the building. He is fully aware that it is the foundation who
(sic) engaged them and issued the payments.36
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and
sought its assistance for the collection of the amount due from the FEMF:
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance
still due us on the laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
45
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as
possible to keep up our operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for
the payment of the amount due, in which the respondent admitted it tried to
collect from her predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were
supplied by our company to the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of the Philippines, Los Baños, Laguna, in
1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-
NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90), the previous
administration had so far paid us the sum of ₱2,236,119.52 thus leaving a
balance of PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24%
per annum and 30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your
predecessor, the latest of which was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to
DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our
claim has remained unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto
attached for easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that
payment of this obligation will soon be made as this is one project the Republic
of the Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.38
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of
accounts for the payments of the laboratory furniture it delivered to the
petitioner which the petitioner, through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its
payment. However, the FEMF failed to pay the last statement of account of the
respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only when the
respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from the government and/or the
PCGG did it file the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the
payment of its last delivery of laboratory furniture.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the
respondent based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense
of another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully.39
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must
unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value
to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would
be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.40 Unjust enrichment is a term used
to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or
benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself
a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.42
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface
supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be
present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime or quasi-delict.43
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only
when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-
delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law,
that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not
lie.44
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do
not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an
action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its
claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA
with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
46
SO ORDERED.

47
G.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011
ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008 Decision2
and the 4 August 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals’ Decision, are as follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores
(petitioner) amounting to ₱400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3%
compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To
secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed)
covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo,
Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note5 and the
Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for
Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents. The case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 (RTC, Branch 33) and
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner
was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33
found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of
Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed was executed on 31 October
1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only
dated 4 November 1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from
recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action against her.
However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the personal
action which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant
resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004,
the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42) of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
where they admitted the loan but stated that it only amounted to ₱340,000.
Respondents further alleged that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it
was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. Respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-
shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005,
respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and
lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the motion to
dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims
or demands which, although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute
separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former
action. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8
February 2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents’ motion. The RTC,
Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did
not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan petitioner extended to
Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the Court
of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and
8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a motion to dismiss
is interlocutory and not appealable, the rule admits of exceptions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42 acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondents’ motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available
ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of Appeals ruled that on a
48
nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of
action against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the
suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal
action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but
not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action
against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could not split the single
cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection
case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover
the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground
of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a
mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has the
option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or
instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.11 An election of
the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of
suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending
on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself.13 If the
mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for
the collection of the debt, and vice versa.14 The Court explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real
action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the
two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an
election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the
debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property
itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the
mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the
right to sue for deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause
of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or
the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On
the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action
against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to
justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity
(Osorio v. San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the
vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose
his mortgage, he will, in effect, be authorized plural redress for a single breach
of contract at so much costs to the court and with so much vexation and
oppressiveness to the debtor.16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into
consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled
that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was executed without Enrico’s consent. The RTC, Branch 33
stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who has the
burden of proving his cause of action. On the other hand, said circumstances
tend to support the claim of defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not
consent to the mortgage of their conjugal property and that the loan application
was her personal decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by defendant
Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of her husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the ₱400,000 loan
plus interest which he extended to defendant Edna Lindo. He can institute a
personal action against the defendant for the amount due which should be filed
in the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides at the election of the plaintiff in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no
jurisdiction to try such personal action.17
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan. She
claimed, however, that her husband did not give his consent and that he was
not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the RTC, Branch 33 held that petitioner
49
could still recover the amount due from Edna through a personal action over
which it had no jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 of San
Pedro Laguna (RTC, Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the Real Estate
Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without the consent of her husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal
property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by
her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent
the authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real
estate mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the
subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made
to retroact to October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously made by
petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not
valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null
and void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with
the stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost
is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying
or settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity,
the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the
debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real
estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or consent of petitioner’s
spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan
however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Edna’s liability is not affected by the illegality
of the real estate mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property,
is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community
property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other
spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be
void. However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were
executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4
November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse
that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the
RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory without
asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a
separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled
jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of
the loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute
against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and
not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the
mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that
respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the
principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code
which provides:
50
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."23 The principle
of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited
without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the
expense of another.241avvphi1

The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one
from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or
consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna
admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid
without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of
Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second,
when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93.
Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative
remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because
the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal
action that petitioner might have against Edna.

Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust

enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on
multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that
Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to ₱340,000.
Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous
decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed.
Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC,
Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her indebtedness.

WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No.
04-110858.

SO ORDERED.

51
G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000
RODRIGO CONCEPCION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.
NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent
spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for moral
damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorneys
fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner claims absence of factual and legal basis
for the award of damages.
The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and
Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in
an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion,
who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located.
Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying government
agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures
on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by
contributing capital on condition that after her capital investment was returned
to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the
deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment
and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He
shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing
Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng
asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni
Bing."1cräläwvirtualibräry
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some
relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship.
However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged
affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two
(2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the
imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from
a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone
reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should something happen to
his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and
shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence
Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital
anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined
as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and
customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors
fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even
expressed her desire to leave her husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced to
write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil
suit against him for damages.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly
of being Florence's lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to protect the
name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he sought an
appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate his feelings
about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint
venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only casually asked the latter
about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion
raises the following issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the award of
damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there is
basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but which were
overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate court.
Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of
Appeals was without legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to
him by respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 262 and 22193 of the Civil
Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation.
Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of anothers residence or meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another. Petitioner also
insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly
overlooked, misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if
considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility of the witnesses
for private respondents and the manner by which the testimonial evidence was
analyzed and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court
for not taking into account the fact that the trial judge who penned the decision
was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of
respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus,
his decision rendered was flawed.
The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts.4 The reason behind this is that the Supreme Court
respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.5 Thus it accords the highest respect, even finality, to
52
the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented before it.
The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of
the trial court; however, its factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by
the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.6 In this
respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative,
conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the
findings culled by the trial court of origin.7 This rule of course cannot be
unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was not
the one who heard the case, because not having heard the testimonies himself,
the judge would not be in a better position than the appellate courts to make
such determination.8cräläwvirtualibräry
However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the
evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on the
record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is
so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies
not having heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find any misapprehension
of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of
performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes
were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt
as to the factual findings of the court a quo? We find none. A painstaking review
of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed
from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no
consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for
damages has been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a reversal.
Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or lives
the service, the case cannot be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted.
That would be absurb; inconceivable.
According to petitioner, private respondents evidence is inconsistent as to time,
place and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. We find this to
be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the
afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the
presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being
repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this
finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in the complaint as to the
time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an allegation in a
pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by evidence.
If evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence controls, not
the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it may dent the
credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case.
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as
witnesses the persons they named as eyewitnesses to the incident and that they
presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible witness
during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruels testimony is not
credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all, petitioner
capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates Villaruels residence and
that of private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the formers
number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses, No.
51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes, Villaruel could not
have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears
however from Villaruels testimony that at the time of the incident complained of,
he was staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent to that of the
Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated.
What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were
neighbors on 14 July 1985.
There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial
evidence of private respondents but these are not of such significance as to alter
the finding of facts of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee
truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.9
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
testimonies.10cräläwvirtualibräry
All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of
damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioners
posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of
neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need
further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an
invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind
Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of
every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of
the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the
statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short,
if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective.11 Thus,
under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind.
It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of
those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The
violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely
examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages
53
therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane,
insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.12 Under Art. 2217 of the If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually
Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, happen, then there would have been no cause or motive at all for them to consult
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response
social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary from petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they decided
computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the validity of their claim. On the
defendants wrongful act or omission. other hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at great length why
Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental why the Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped our
proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language. attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner sent his
Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he made an lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to
appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would
he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was
with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the not for her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not
name of his late brother (Florences husband).13 How he could be convinced by a party to the court case.
some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would protect his nephews
and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true, he did not say. Petitioner WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the
admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and
relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the denial Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary
of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.
latter's humiliation.
SO ORDERED.
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never
knew respondent, had never seen him before, and was unaware of his business
partnership with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness stand
however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture for in that
alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what were the
collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that
the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by combining the first
syllables of the name Florence and Allem, the name of Nestors wife. He said that
he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence which
Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to
speak to his relatives who were the source of his information. Nestor went with
him and those they were able to talk to denied the rumor.

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth
about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made
by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the latters
privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and
children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married man - of having an
adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private respondent
much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his
neighborhood without feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension
and distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a few days
after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology
and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.

54
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society
is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as
the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St.
Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing
into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only
in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher
at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors
at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed
only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students,
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles
of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s
Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-
in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC
found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner
proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and
uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures
in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe
(Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed
that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap
(Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from
joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia
M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu
City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed
that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that
precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia,
joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No.
CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the
photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation
ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of
55
the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the
following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends
Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have
known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew
or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded
upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted
by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection
with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing
constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a
writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at
the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right
to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order
dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order,
herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the
writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition,
viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners
are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of
habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy
as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas
data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered
the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant
to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas
datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the
controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security
of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
56
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect
a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s
right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in
fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue
on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of
the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction
among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the
gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control
of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of
its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted
solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations
to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy
to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational
privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly
then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it
not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section
1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys
the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of
public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
57
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not
be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour.
To "engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily
mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the
reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose
business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the
effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is
easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core
of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right
to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right
to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks
and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said
flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have at
least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators
regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no
longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical
protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the
same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H
v. W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take
into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or
else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that
the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with
wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as
the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not
necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those
that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At
the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social media
platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are
under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a
user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––
access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of
the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking
sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected
with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another
user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their
accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of
the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users
are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among
others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook
friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
58
accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In
H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states
in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information,
these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the
user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks
of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to
interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting,
fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct.
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools
that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those
to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a
protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is
first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest
the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures
to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world,
of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or
deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38
Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if,
for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that
only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public
by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep
said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to
other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In
other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the
images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary
in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when
the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts,
downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this
was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly,
were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only
limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according
to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent.
Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos
which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do
not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed
me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed
me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in
[F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted
on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the
various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when
these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
59
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one
key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them.
Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-
serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account
that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the
photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to
the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the
digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the
zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its
users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others
who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis
or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy
to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who
is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not
with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are
not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set
at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public,
depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the
post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s
proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or
privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting
into the "democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to
task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the
actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum
submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52
These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy
rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
60
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely
to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other
than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of
privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest
and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53
This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers
ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a
cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her
own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors,
fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the
part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion
that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people
skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may
be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations
have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber
citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the
children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58
Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about
being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations.
In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’
rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever
they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be
cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up.
Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind
of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of
their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege
to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of
their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep
track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy
rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of
the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP.
Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
61
G.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioner’s – (1) motion to
quash the information; and (2) motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002
Order denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its August 5,
2003 Order2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair
competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the
Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the
dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson,
the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said informations
read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI
Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinson’s Galleria,
EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such
as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are
closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar
products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause
confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage
and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the
following internationally: "CATERPILLAR", "CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN",
"CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR &
DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved
in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same
branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding
probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated
August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and
other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and
motion for reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He
contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4 of
imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per
R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioner’s twin
motions.6 A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5,
2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are – (1) Which court has jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the
respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on
the ground of – (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency
of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable
cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the
criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false
designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment
from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. – Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions
imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five
(5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is
found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155
[Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal
and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought
before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
–
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. – All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and
166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction
under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
62
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No.
166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin
and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) –
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. – All actions under this Chapter
[V – Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation], hereof shall be
brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly
repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads –
SEC. 239. Repeals. – 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith,
more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as
amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential
Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby
repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its
entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the phrases "parts of Acts" and
"inconsistent herewith;" and it would have simply stated "Republic Act No. 165,
as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of
the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential
Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed." It would have removed all
doubts that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The
use of the phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith" only means that
the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of
harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.6 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is
consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293
intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section
163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction
conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted
by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws8 conferring
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial
Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from
P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving
violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued
A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial
Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further
issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual
Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner finds no
application in the present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27
of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A. No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical
ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for violation of intellectual property
rights is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in Mirpuri on
the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to the
enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be
construed as a jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual
property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was
a prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March
26, 2003 order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment
and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown
reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition
and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence
of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.11 Under Rule 111,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair
competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.12 Pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as
admitted13 by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal
cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides –
63
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases – shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)

xxxxxxxxx WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either SO ORDERED.
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to
a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused
his discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes
submitted before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice.14 Moreover, the Order dated August 9,
2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus
failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of
his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c),
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but
familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegations.

In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not
established that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his
failure to attach documents relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of
the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with

requirements. — The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses
of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters
involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for
the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service
thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated
as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto.

xxxxxxxxx

64
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 122150 - March 17, 2003
GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
VALENTINO U. CARANTES, Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari,
raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT
CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME
ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO
THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES
OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A
SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY
AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
(Branch 6), a complaint for damages2 for the injuries and expenses he sustained
after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him on the night of December
9, 1985.3 In answer thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case arising
from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,4 had already been
provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March
23, 1987, due to petitioners lack of interest;5 and that the dismissal was with
respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.6
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18,
1991, ruling that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal
case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino
Cerantes to pay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for
hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual
Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary
Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,9
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners
complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any
reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly
instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried
with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the
dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. 10
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave11 should be
observed, i.e., a civil action for damages may be filed and proceed independently
of the criminal action even without reservation to file the same has been
made;12 and that the requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.13
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the
prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
...
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex
delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict)
are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved
or previously instituted.
65
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right to bring
an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by
Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should be dismissed;16 and that the reservation
requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only
regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure.17
In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven
by Herminio Andaya that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned
by respondent Alfredo Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for the
suspension of the civil case for damages filed against him in view of the pendency
of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal
case, did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action against the
petitioner or his driver. The criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of
the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal, the Court identified the issues
as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damages despite the
absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought
with it the dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation
requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making power of
the Court.18
The Court expounded:
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation
is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":
. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to
prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court;
in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties-litigants.20
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately
institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to
do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior
reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049,
whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted
therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

. . . 1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute

separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de
deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. In other words the right
of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal
action.

...

Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a

separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair,
diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the
general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature.
For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a
separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action
must be reserved before it may be brought separately.19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988
amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these

independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous
determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

66