1

G.R. No. 141624 August 17, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HERNANDO B. DELIZO, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50995 granting the petition for certiorari of respondent Dr. Hernando B. Delizo and
nullifying the December 18, 1998 and February 1, 1999 Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa.

The Antecedents

Arsenio T. Ng filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondent with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, docketed as Inv. Slip No. 97-10288. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, First Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. signed an
Information dated October 10, 1997, charging the respondent with estafa. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of October, 1996, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
President and Chairman of Mediserv, Inc., by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent
representation, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
succeeded in inducing herein complainant, Arsenio T. Ng to give the amount of P12 Million, to
the accused on his pretext that said amount will be converted by him into shares of stock
(120,000 shares of stocks) and in order to complement such false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
he (respondent) even showed a Board Resolution defining his authority to contract loan from
the complainant and the conversion of such loan into shares of stock, which, on the strength
by said manifestations and representations, the complainant gave said amount and duly
received by the accused, he knowing fully well that the same were false and fraudulent and
were only made to entice complainant into believing that he, indeed, is empowered and in a
position to issue the equivalent number of shares of stocks (120,000) in order to obtain, as in
fact, he (accused) obtained the total amount of P12 Million from the complainant and the
accused, once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to release the
120,000 shares of stocks into complainant’s name, despite demands made on him and, with
intent to defraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert said amount, to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of Arsenio T. Ng, in the aforementioned amount of P12 Million.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Before the Information was filed, the Ambulatory Health Care Institute, Inc. (AHCII), also
known as Clinica Manila (CM), and the Health Check, Inc. (HCI) filed a Complaint on October
22, 1997 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the respondent and a
certain "John Doe" for injunction and damages. The case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-
97-5794. The petitioners therein alleged, inter alia, that a special meeting of the stockholders
of CM was held on October 9, 1997 after due notice to the respondent two weeks before the
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said date. During the said meeting, the stockholders elected a new board of directors, replacing
the respondent as CM president. Thereafter, at 3:00 p.m. of October 13, 1997, the respondent
and an unidentified companion arrived at the CM office at SM Megamall, announced that he
was still the president, and rallied the officers and employees against the new board of
directors. Despite the security guards’ request for him to leave the premises, the respondent
refused to do so. He, thereafter, wrote the China Banking Corporation, the depository bank of
CM, requesting it not to honor any change in the authorized signatories for CM, and appended
thereto a falsified General Information Sheet (GIS) to show that he was still a member of the
board of directors and president of CM. It was prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment
be rendered:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission to adjudge that respondent

be ordered:

1. Not to do any act or deed that will disturb or interfere with the operations and business of
the petitioners, and not to cause any alarm, scandal, disturbance, intrigue, disloyalty, disorder,
or defiance on the part of any (sic) employees, officers, contractors, workers of CLINICA
MANILA and HEALTH CHECK, INC.;

2. Not to do any act that will interfere with or disturb the management and operation of the
funds, bank accounts, receivables, and all other property transactions of the petitioners, and
to stop representing themselves as having any kind of power and authority over any asset of
the two companies and their management;

3. Not to do any act or deed, directly or indirectly, that will dishonor the name and reputation
of the petitioners;

4. To pay actual damages of P1,000,000; moral damages of P2,000,000; and exemplary

damages of P500,000; and to pay the costs of suit.4

On October 23, 1997, AHCII, Mediserv, Inc. (MI) and the respondent, filed a Complaint with
the SEC against Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya, Bartolome C.
Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina. The complainants alleged, inter alia, that they
had been stockholders of AHCII since August 1995, and represented a majority of the
outstanding capital stock, owning 52.37% and 6.08%, respectively, as shown by the GIS dated
October 15, 1997 filed with the SEC; the respondent was the incumbent chairman of the board
of directors and president of AHCII; and there was no quorum during the stockholders’ meeting
of October 9, 1997; as such, the said meeting where a new set of board of directors and officers
were, elected was in violation of the by-laws of the complainant AHCII and, consequently,
illegal. The complainants prayed that the following reliefs be granted after due proceedings:

a) Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued as permanent;

b) Adjudging the Special Stockholders’ Meeting purportedly held on October 9, 1997 as null
and void ab initio;

c) Adjudging any action, proceeding, resolution, and/or election made in the alleged
stockholders’ meeting purportedly held on October 9, 1997 as null and void ab initio;

d) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya,

Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina, jointly and severally, liable to pay
to complainant Delizo moral damages of not less than P1,000,000.00;
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e) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya,

Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina, jointly and severally, liable to pay
to the complainants, as follows:

i. Exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00;

ii. Actual damages not less than P250,000.00;

iii. Attorney’s fee of P200,000.00;

iv. Costs of litigation.

Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.5

The case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97-5796.

In the meantime, Mediserv, Inc., represented by its president, the respondent, and its
treasurer, Marissa D. Delizo, filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila, Branch 29, against the
China Banking Corporation, the Landheights (Iloilo) Development Corporation, Notary Public
Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr. and the Registrar of Deeds for the City of Manila. An amended complaint
was later filed, where it was alleged, inter alia, that MI received a loan from the bank in the
amount of P9,820,000, later increased to P11,200,000. To secure the payment of the said loan,
MI executed a real estate mortgage and amendment to real estate mortgage over its property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205824 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
MI also executed a promissory note on October 5, 2000 in favor of the bank in the amount of
P11,200,000. The bank, thereafter, foreclosed the mortgage and sold the property at public
auction in favor of the bank for P15,649,023.29, through defendant Notary Public Romeo A.
Ignacio, Jr. It was prayed that, after due proceedings, it be granted the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:

1. Immediately upon filing of this Complaint, this Honorable Court issues a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, or at least a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining and restraining defendant
Register of Deeds from effecting/allowing the registration or annotation of the purported
auction sale of plaintiff’s property covered by TCT No. 205824 of the Register of Deeds for the
City of Manila in favor of defendant Landheights, or any transaction, dealing or incident arising
from the purported auction sale allegedly conducted by defendant Ignacio until further orders
from this Honorable Court.

2. After hearing, to render Judgment, as follows:

a. Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued as permanent;

b. Declaring the alleged public auction sale conducted by defendant Ignacio over the subject
plaintiff’s property, as null and void;

c. Ordering and commanding Defendant China Bank to comply and to reduce into writing and/or
to document its agreement with plaintiff to consolidate the first P5 million loan of plaintiff with
it with the plaintiff’s second loan of P1,800,000.00;
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d. Adjudging defendants China Banking Corporation, Landheights (Iloilo) Development

Corporation and Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr., jointly and severally, liable to pay to plaintiff the
following:

1. Attorney’s Fees in the amount of P200,000.00; and

2. Costs of suit.

Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.6

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-86152.

On December 3, 1997, the Information for estafa against the respondent was filed with the
RTC of Mandaluyong City and raffled to Branch 214. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 167-MD. The private prosecutor filed an ex parte motion for preliminary attachment, which
was opposed by the respondent. On December 18, 1998, the trial court issued an Order7
directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P8,000,000. The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order with a prayer for the suspension of
the proceedings on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question on December 23, 1998.

As early as January 13, 1998, the trial court in Branch 213 issued an Order denying the motion
to suspend proceedings on the ground that the private complainant, Arsenio T. Ng, was not a
stockholder of MI; hence, the pendency of the two (2) SEC cases was not a ground for the
suspension of the case. On February 1, 1999, the trial court issued the assailed Order denying
the motion for reconsideration.

On February 19, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50995, for the nullification of the Orders of the trial court,
contending as follows:

6.A.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT GROSSLY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE APPLICANT
AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS DIRECTED.

6.B.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIMINAL CASE
IS ALREADY COVERED BY CASES BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA; HENCE, THERE IS NO CIVIL ASPECT ATTACHED
AND/OR DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL CASE.

6.C.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT ON A P12 MILLION CLAIM PER THE INFORMATION WITH ONLY P8 MILLION
BOND; HENCE, GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT, IMPROPER AND UNREASONABLE.

6.D.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN MERELY RELYING ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE EX
PARTE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT WHICH ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT/S AS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES.
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6.E.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL CASE IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS IN THE SEC CASES
AND THE RTC CASE WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.

6.F.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR BEFORE THE SAID MOTION CAN BE HEARD; HENCE, A CLEAR AND PALPABLE
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.

6.G.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN EXCESS
AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT DISQUALIFYING THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE IS
PRESENTLY LITIGATED AND/OR THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE ACTIONS BEFORE THE SEC AND
THE RTC.8

On January 18, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition and nullifying the
assailed Orders of the trial court, as well as the writ of preliminary attachment it issued. The
fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The assailed Orders of December 18, 1998 and
February 1, 1999, as well as the writ of attachment are hereby set aside. The respondent Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, is hereby directed to suspend
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 167-MD considering the existence of a prejudicial question in
SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-5794 and 10-97-5796 and Civil Case No. 97-86152.

SO ORDERED.9

The Present Petition

The People of the Philippines, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review on certiorari with
this Court, on the following grounds:

Public interest requires that all criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for
the protection of society (Gorospe vs. Pana Florida, 101 SCRA 445). Thus, the suspension of
criminal proceedings must be avoided unless the basis and grounds thereof are clear and
unmistakable.

The finding of the trial court that the criminal case, the civil case filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Manila and the cases filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are based on the same transaction is grounded entirely on speculation. The complaints filed
with the RTC and SEC cases do not support such finding.

Moreover, in ruling that a prejudicial question exists, the court based its finding solely on its
conclusion that the criminal, civil and SEC cases arose out of the same transaction. This is
contrary to Sec. 5, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Supreme Court that for
a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused (Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125).10
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The petitioner, thus, raises the following issues for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND SEC CASES ARE BASED ON THE SAME
TRANSACTION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES FILED WITH THE SEC AND THE CIVIL CASE FILED WITH THE
RTC RAISE PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE THE SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL ACTION FOR ESTAFA.

Central to the issues in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,11
which read:

Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. – The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.12

The petitioner asserts that the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa are
entirely different from and unrelated to the issues in the SEC cases and in Civil Case No. 97-
86152 pending before the RTC of Manila. It asserts that, contrary to the rulings of the appellate
court, the said cases are based on facts and transactions different from those in the criminal
case. According to the petitioner, the resolution of the issues in the SEC and the civil cases are
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case; hence, the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case was barren of factual and legal bases.

On the other hand, the CA held that the P12,000,000 subject of the transaction in the criminal
case was the same amount involved in the SEC cases and the civil case. The CA then concluded
that the issues raised or involved in such cases were determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the respondent in the criminal case, warranting the suspension of the latter case.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

In case the civil action is instituted ahead of the criminal action, under Section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits upon the commencement of the criminal action. Such criminal action
has precedence over the civil action to enforce the civil liability of the accused arising from the
delict. An exception is where the prejudicial question exists, under Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
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If the issues raised in a civil action are so similar or intimately related to those in the criminal
case such that the resolution of the said issues in the civil case are determinative of the juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the proceedings in the
latter case shall be suspended and the civil action shall proceed until judgment on its merits.13
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime because if
both actions arose from the same fact or transaction, the civil case does not constitute a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal action.14 Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal actions can, according to the law and rules, proceed
independently of each other.15 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.16

In this case, the transaction subject of the criminal case for estafa against the respondent is
the receipt of the amount of P12,000,000 from the private complainant, Ng, which was intended
for the purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of MI. According to the Information in Criminal
Case No. 167-MD, the respondent used the money for his personal benefit instead of purchasing
the said shares in behalf of Ng. The event or occurrence subject of SEC Case No. 97-5794 filed
by the AHCII and the HCI against the respondent was the latter’s refusal to vacate the office
of the president, and his insistence on performing and exercising the duties and powers of the
said office, as well as the chairmanship of the board of directors of the said corporation despite
his alleged ouster from the said positions. The plaintiff corporations sought a writ of injunction
and relief for damages against the respondent. Neither Ng nor the MI were parties in the said
case. On the other hand, SEC Case No. 97-5796 was filed by the respondent and several others,
for and in representation of the AHCII and the MI, as the plaintiffs, to nullify the October 9,
1997 stockholders’ meeting and the election of the board of directors and officers held thereon,
anchored on their claim that they owned majority of the outstanding capital of the AHCII, and
that the said meeting and election subsequently held were null and void. As in SEC Case No.
97-5794, Ng’s projected investment of P12,000,000 in the MI which, as alleged in the
Information, the respondent had misused for his personal benefit, was not the subject of SEC
Case No. 97-5796. There is even no showing in the SEC cases that Ng claimed to be a
stockholder of the MI on account of the respondent’s receipt of the P12,000,000 for the
intended purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks therein.

These issues are not, in any way, determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case for estafa. Whether the said meeting and elections will be declared null and
void by the SEC will not result in the conviction or acquittal of the respondent for estafa, for
swindling Ng of P12,000,000. Furthermore, the SEC cases involve intra-corporate disputes
between the respondent, on the one hand, and Ng and the other stockholders of the AHCII, on
the other, for the control of the said corporation’s management. It must be stressed that the
petitions before the SEC are bare of allegations relating to the alleged P12,000,000 received
by the respondent from Ng, and intended for the latter’s purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks
in the MI.

In his petition with the CA, the respondent alleged that in the SEC cases, the MI insisted that
the P12,000,000 received by him was a mere loan; that he would not be liable of estafa if he
could prove the same.17 According to the respondent, Ng alleged in the said SEC cases that
he and the members of his group became the major and controlling stockholders in AHCII
because of the infusion of P12,000,000 by Ng. On the other hand, the respondent averred in
his comment on the instant petition that the P12,000,000 he received from Ng referred to
AHCII shares of stocks owned by MI.18 A cursory reading of the Information will show that the
P12,000,000 was intended for the purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of the MI, and not of
the AHCII. Even the CA in its decision declared that the P12,000,000 was intended for Ng’s
purchase of shares of stocks in the MI:
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As regard the motion to suspend the proceedings in [the] questioned criminal case in view of
the presence of a prejudicial question in the SEC cases, petitioner insists in that the "nature of
the subject transaction involving the alleged P12 million of Mr. Cusencio (sic) T. Ng which is
the subject of the case at bar, is, likewise, the subject of the consolidated SEC cases." A perusal
of the complaints (p. 79, Rollo) filed with the SEC (SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-5794 and 10-97-
5796) and the Regional Trial Court of Manila shows that there really exists a prejudicial
question. It appears, as claimed by private respondent, that the amount of P12 million subject
of the instant Criminal Case for Estafa was given to petitioner to be diverted into shares of
stocks from Mediserv, Inc., while the petitioner averred that the amount was given as a loan.
Thus, it is clear that the nature of the transaction involving the P12 million of private respondent
in the criminal case is the same as the cases before the SEC and the Civil Case Q-97-88152
(sic) in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.19

Moreover, the respondent failed to submit to the CA the answer and other pleadings filed by
Ng as well as the pleadings of the stockholders of the AHCII in the SEC cases, containing
allegations that they became the majority and controlling stockholders of the AHCII because of
the infusion of P12,000,000. Such pleadings would have bolstered the respondent’s stance in
this case, and debilitated that of the petitioner herein.

We agree with the petitioner’s contention that the issue of whether or not the P12,000,000 was
merely a loan by Ng in favor of the MI is a matter of defense by the respondent in the criminal
case.

The transaction subject of the civil case is the loan procured by the MI in the amount of
P9,820,000, later increased to P11,200,000, from the China Banking Corporation, the payment
of which was secured by a real estate mortgage and amended real estate mortgage over its
property in Sampaloc, Manila. The MI sought to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said
mortgage and the sale of its property at public auction, on its allegation that it did not breach
its contract with the bank. The respondent’s agreement with Ng for the purchase of 120,000
shares of stocks in the MI, as well as the alleged misappropriation of the amount of P12,000,000
by the respondent, is not the subject matter of the civil case. Ng is not even a party thereto;
neither was he privy to the said transaction between the respondent and the MI, and the China
Banking Corporation involving the said loan.

In sum, the outcome of the civil case is not, in any way, determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the respondent in the criminal case. The CA thus erred in granting the petition of the
respondent and nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City dated
December 18, 1998 and February 1, 1999 are REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004

SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, petitioners,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56,
Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN
BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang,
for the nullification of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59157.

The Antecedents

On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term
loan of one million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by
Non-Negotiable Promissory Note No. 1906013 and was, likewise, secured by a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29607.4 As the
petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent
foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property
was sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was executed by Pasnonito D. Antiporda as Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the
respondent on January 14, 1998 and was registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City on January 27, 1998.

On December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption
period of the property would expire on January 27, 1999.5 Instead of redeeming the property,
the petitioners filed, on January 19, 1999, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale
against the respondent bank and the Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Mandaue City),
Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3454.6 Therein, the petitioners alleged that the
respondent bloated their obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73 by including excessive
past due interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fees and sheriff’s expense. They claimed that
such exorbitant charges were made to frustrate their chance to pay the loan, and to ensure
that the respondent bank would be the highest bidder during the auction sale. They also
asserted that the respondent failed to remit to the Sheriff the purchase price of the property
and was, likewise, guilty of fraud, collusion, breach of trust or misconduct in the conduct of the
auction sale of their property. Besides praying for injunctive relief, the petitioners prayed for
the following alternative reliefs:

3. After trial on the merits, and after determination of plaintiffs’ true obligation with defendant
bank, to declare the foreclosure on the subject property as null and void, and to allow the
plaintiffs to pay the same; as alternative prayer, to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the subject
real property based on the amount determined and established as true and exact obligation of
plaintiffs to defendant bank.7
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After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the
Register of Deeds in its name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of
Possession before the RTC of Mandaue City (Branch 56), docketed as LRC Case No. 3.8

The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court,9
opposed the petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-
3454 constituted a prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings
before the court. The petitioners averred that the filing of their complaint within the period to
redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to an offer to redeem the same, and had the
effect of preserving such right. They also asserted that the respondent acted in bad faith in
procuring the title over the property despite the pendency of their complaint in Civil Case No.
MAN-3454.

On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, rendered a decision in LRC Case No.
3 granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
respondent.10

Citing the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,11 and Gawaran v. Court of Appeals,12 the RTC
ruled that since the petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the
foreclosure, the respondent was entitled to a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of
the readjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate.13
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the court issued an order
denying the motion, stating that it was merely its ministerial function to issue a writ of
possession.14

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 59157 for the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision and the May 19, 2000 Order
of the RTC. Thepetitioners alleged that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent bank for
a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 instead of suspending the proceedings therein based on
the ruling of this Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court.15

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Finding that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the
writ of possession, the CA rendered a decision on March 2, 2001, dismissing the petition.16
Citing the rulings of this Court in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals17 and Navarra v. Court of
Appeals,18 the CA explained that the pendency of a separate proceeding questioning the
validity of the mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof cannot bar the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser at public auction. The appellate court ruled that
after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee, the issuance of a writ of
possession becomes a ministerial act of the trial court. Furthermore, the right of the respondent
bank to possess the property was based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the
properties in the foreclosure sale. The CA explained that the ruling in the Belisario case was
inapplicable because it involved a complaint to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed
property within the period of redemption, whereas, the complaint filed by the petitioners in
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the annulment of the mortgage or extrajudicial sale which
was not equivalent to an offer to redeem the property.19

The Present Petition

 11

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the decision, having been denied by the
appellate court, the petitioners filed this instant petition, assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT OF

REDEMPTION OVER THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY AS HAVING EXPIRED ON JANUARY 26,
1999, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR PENDING COMPLAINT TO ANNUL THE FORECLOSURE FILED
BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD, ON THE GROUND OF
FRAUD, AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THEIR SPECIFIC PRAYER THEREOF FOR
DETERMINATION OF THEIR TRUE OBLIGATION WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND TO ALLOW
THEM TO PAY THE SAME AND/OR TO REDEEM THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY.20

2. PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE OF THEIR PROPERTY

WITH A PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION TO STOP THE
ISSUANCE OF A DEFINITE DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE OF THEIR PROPERTY
IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHILE GIVING PREFERENCE AND ACTING WITH
DISPATCH ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION
ON THE SAME PROPERTY, BY GRANTING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION THEREON THEREBY
RENDERING MOOT AND ACADEMIC PETITIONERS’ PRAYERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR
ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE.21

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DECISION OF THIS

HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF BELISARIO VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, G.R. NO. L-73503, WHEREBY "THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO ENFORCE
REPURCHASE WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION IS EQUIVALENT TO AN OFFER TO
REDEEM AND HAS THE EFFECT OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION" INAPPLICABLE
TO THE CASE OF PETITIONERS.22

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE
ISSUE OR ISSUES JOINED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT BEFORE RESPONDENT JUDGE
DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4353 (sic) IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO THE ISSUE
RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION IN LRC CASE NO. 3.23

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING FAILED TO CONSIDER THE VALID
CAUSES OF ACTION OF PETITIONERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. MAN-4354 (sic).24

The threshold issues are as follows: (a) whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition
of the respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3; and, (b)
whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent in LRC Case No. 3 and in issuing the
writ of possession in its favor.

The issues being interrelated, the Court shall resolve the same simultaneously.

The petitioners contend that their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 and the respondent’s
petition for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 were raffled to Branch 56 of the RTC.
Although their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the nullification of the extrajudicial
sale at public auction on the ground of fraud, they also prayed, as an alternative remedy, that
they be allowed to redeem the property based on the amount to be determined by the court
after trial. Hence, they assert, the filing of their complaint before the expiry of the redemption
period to enforce their right of redemption was equivalent to a formal offer to redeem the
 12

property and had the effect of preserving their right of redemption. They argue that the RTC
should have suspended the proceedings in LRC Case No. 3 pending the final resolution of Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 so as not to render moot and academic the latter case, conformably with
the ruling of the Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court,25 after all, the two
cases were pending before the same court. The petitioners, thus, aver that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the
petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3. They, likewise, aver
that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial court and declared,
thus:

Further, as to the applicability of the case of Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R.
No. L-73503, Aug. 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 101, 108), suffice it to say, that the cause of action
therein was to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed property within the period of
redemption, which the Supreme Court held that it has the effect of preserving the right of
redemption. Whereas, Civil Case No. MAN-3454 filed by the petitioners is for the annulment of
mortgage or extrajudicial sale, which is not in effect an offer to redeem. Verily, the pendency
of said civil case does not preserve the right of redemption of the petitioners after the period
of redemption.26

The Court’s Ruling

The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.27

In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a
civil action and the respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-
A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and,
therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions.28 A similar
issue was raised in Manalo vs. Court of Appeals,29 where we held that:

At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be
considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the
respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled
to have the property repurchased or resold to a mortgagor’s successor-in-interest (petitioner);
while that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory period for
redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed separately
and take their own direction independent of each other.30

The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of
their property at public auction for P2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC
Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank was entitled to the possession of the property
after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was issued .
 13

Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said case, no prejudicial
question was involved. We merely held therein that the filing of an action to enforce redemption
within the period of redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court
allow the redemption, the redemptioner should then pay the amount already determined. In
fine, the filing of an action by the redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not suspend
the running of the statutory period to redeem the property, nor bar the purchaser at public
auction from procuring a writ of possession after the statutory period of redemption had lapsed,
without prejudice to the final outcome of such complaint to enforce the right of redemption.31

The remedy of the petitioners from the assailed decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 3 was to
appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals.32 However, instead of appealing by writ of
error, the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari. Certiorari is not proper where the
aggrieved party has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Moreover, the error of the
trial court in granting the respondent bank a writ of possession, if at all, was an error of
judgment correctible only by an ordinary appeal.

It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.33 The
trial court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory
period for redemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cannot be
validly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely complied with its
ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession.34

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 is AFFIRMED.

Cost against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 14

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-

MILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and
GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and
ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES CATALAN, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and
damages.

The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:

On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military
service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was
unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which
incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries,
withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech."1

On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.2

On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of Donation,"3 wherein
Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real
property described, viz:

A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by
heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan;
and on the West by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square
meters, more or less.

The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 180804 to
Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property
remained in Feliciano’s name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.5

On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No. 45636
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December
22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance7 of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court
appointed People’s Bank and Trust Company as Feliciano’s guardian.8 People’s Bank and Trust
Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI).
 15

On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property,
registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.9

On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus
Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on
February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents.11

On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property
registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida
Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956)
of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.12

On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,13 as well as damages against the herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano
had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not
of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the
Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia
and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the
property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that
its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought
remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.

On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute
his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.

On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants
was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the
time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared,
the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of
due execution of the donation in question must be upheld.14 It rendered judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint;

2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in question
which is now declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);

3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorney’s fees of ₱10,000.00, and to pay the
Costs.(sic)

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of
Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.16 The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and held, viz:

In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-
appellants failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the
precise moment when the property in dispute was donated.
 16

Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation
coupled with compliance with certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter
vivos of real property under Article 749, which provides:

xxx

Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of
her ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by
law of the concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).

The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees’ Folder of
Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia
Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident
much less apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the
RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of
Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document,
the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document
with respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein,
jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor
the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.17

Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO.
66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT "THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT
COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS)
FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN
AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED";

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT "S") AND
THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY
REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO.
66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND
DELIA BASA; AND-

4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.18

Petitioners aver that the presumption of Feliciano’s competence to donate property to Mercedes
had been rebutted because they presented more than the requisite preponderance of evidence.
First, they presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued
 17

on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs.
Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these
two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental
condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until
his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Feliciano’s marriage to Corazon Cerezo
on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he made the
questioned donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his
successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these
donations were approved and confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.19 In addition,
petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes
Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly borne
out by the fact that the document was registered only on February 20, 1992, more that 10
years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew
that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be innocent
purchasers of the property in question.20 Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred
by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they had filed their
case on April 1, 1997, even before the four year period after Feliciano’s death on August 14,
1997 had begun.21

The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it.22 Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with
an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous.23 The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent,
like any contract, renders the donation voidable.24

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given.25 However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon
the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.26

A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado
of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia
by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the
allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.

A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable
of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public
when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and
"catatonia" with certain paranoid states and called the condition "dementia praecox." Eugene
Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelin’s conception in the early 1900s to include cases
with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition "schizophrenia." According to medical
references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with
symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses.1avvphi1 The condition
improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers
 18

may appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission may appear strange because
they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and
are prone to have "ideas of reference." The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors
are directed against the sufferers.27 It has been proven that the administration of the correct
medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer
to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent
thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse.28 Schizophrenia can result in a dementing
illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimer’s disease. However, the illness will wax and wane
over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.29

From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does
not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the
existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus,
the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.30 Sufficient proof of his
infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.31

It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he
donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered
into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his
other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute
contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency
and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts
executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.32

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to
whomever she chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that
Mercedes’ sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little
bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material
is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its
execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.

Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time
on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal
had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it
remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.34

IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 19

G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-
appellee.

Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.

Vicente Foz for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment
of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the
complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the
litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.

By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon
thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity
of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they
and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs
of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897,
leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio
of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of
the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and
their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that,
about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the
land left by their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two
plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land,
according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in question
belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to
the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part
of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at
P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said
products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be
rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore
to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since
1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying
each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land,
the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May
25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the
due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for
the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen
cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto
 20

de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit,
an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his
(Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from
said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May
17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria
del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph
of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that
had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in
favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis
Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother
and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this
cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded
and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to
the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and,
besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the
trial be charged against them.

In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth,
and in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in
the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority
the four years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They
therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.

After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the
case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and
the proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted
to the clerk of this court.

As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May
17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted
to the decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were
then minors and therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the
instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly
a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the
deed and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because
of some defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263
and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.

The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of
Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25
ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death,
his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and
Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the
complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister
Luis and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno
Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and
Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited,
by operation of law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.
 21

The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-
fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the
complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this
claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such
as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.

It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother
conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a
portion of the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes
of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the
possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the
protocols or registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao
Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the
instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of
May 20, 1901, in his own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz,
Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion
of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.

However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower
Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the
same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the
land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now
forms a part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in
order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the
plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado,
together with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in
possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary
the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land,
effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission
and authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400
"as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the land described in said instrument and
situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with
21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro
Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of
Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu
stream.

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground
that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for
the further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud
in obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.

As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were
born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-
1891, were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the
book Exhibit A, which she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father
Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo
Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this
witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration
certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in
1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22
years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and
 22

sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of
age.

The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and
sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his
uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his
predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other
cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then
already 23 years of age; that she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother
and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado,
prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.

The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu
who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her
sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some
time, she did not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.

Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and
to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the
land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-
law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land
and of inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger
in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes.

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for
the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff
Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal
age; that said document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it
had been read to them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them
who did not understand Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was
18 years of age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then
a young maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all
this took place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time of his
testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the
latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death,
was under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products
yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed,
had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and
that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of
another portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left
by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu.
lawphi1.net

The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the
plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about
the year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of
his other relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property
belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.
 23

In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he
mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita
Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not
acquainted with its contents. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction
had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which
the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a
witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he
did not do so, for no instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. The
transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15
cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6
cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by
the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to
the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document
whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her
uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said document was
being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose names appear
therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well as
her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having
been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose
of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis
Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned
in the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the
brother and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y
Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had
made in behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband
Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of
Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor
Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with
him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive
and thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just
price of the property.

So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the
parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors'
mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of
the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made
with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate
sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors'
father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.

In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed
to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs'
widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to
her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts,
and the totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold
absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no
conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of
the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent
of the vendors who executed it.
 24

Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous
dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting
parties, and also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the
vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase
in the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold,
in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had
any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has
held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes
of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the
parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate
estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes
of seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes,
and, in consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is
likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of
seed.

The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its
ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale;
and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17,
1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao
Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property;
but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired
the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover
this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed
Exhibit 3.

Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the
nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of
the date of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are
the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)

The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife
Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of
about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed
by her on May 25,1894 — an instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise
recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were
destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu
he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the
truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father
in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale,
he himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his
testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits
that might be produced by said real property.

The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one
of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this
document is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed
by the plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be
 25

rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein
set forth.

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on
the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is,
they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence
appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for
no certified copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce
any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18
years of age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the
copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not
constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.

However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it
cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at
the time they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial
deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of
land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600
received by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel
of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they
will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by
them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th
Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from
the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property,
nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf

With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis
Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910,
causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial
instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it
to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken
out on February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23
years of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the
statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that,
on the date when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation
contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be
concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial
instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and
interests as a result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the
plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes
of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father
stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining
portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which
was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to
meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made
by their father himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of
 26

seed, which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must
have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution
of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves
the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that
of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs,
makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the
land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned,
and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value
of said land.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have
been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of
record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur.

But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the general statement,
in the prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by
an infant executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the
defense of infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's
representations as to his majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other party
had good reason to believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.

The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of Spain in the cases
cited in the prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in
like instances by many of the courts in the United States.

For the purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of authority, Spanish
and American, recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting
attention at this time; and in this connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United
States look with rather less favor than the supreme court of Spain upon the application of the
doctrine, doubtless because the cases wherein it may properly be applied, are much less likely
to occur in a jurisdiction where majority is reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein
majority is not ordinarily attained until the infant reaches the age of 25.

Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:

 27

If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five
years of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about
that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should
no (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he
assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the
deceivers.

In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find the following:

(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem,
tunc adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in
dolo, quo casu competit minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde ast ac si nullus
fuiset in dolo, et ideo datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de act. empt.
secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. adde Albericum tenentem,
quabndo per aspectum a liter constaret, in authent. sacramenta puberum, col. 3. C. si advers
vendit.

(2) Engoñosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. Et adverte nam per istam
legem Partitarum, que non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talem assertionem faciat, videtur
comprobari dictum Guillielm. de Cun. de quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in princ. D.
de jurejur. quod si pupillus proximus pubertari juret, cum contrahit, se esse puberem, et postea
etiam juret, quod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum dispositio authenticae
sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi Paul. de Cast. multum
commendans, dicens, se alibi non legisse; si tamen teneamus illam opinionem, quod etiam
pupillus doli capax obligatur ex juramento, non esset ita miranda dicat, decissio; vide per
Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in princ. Item lex ista Partitarum expresse sentit de adulto, non
de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal tiempo: Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto
11. dict. tit. C. si minor. se major. dixer. et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid autem dicemus in
dubio, cum non constat de dolo minoris? Azon. in summa illius tit. in fin. Cynus tamen, et alli,
tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de
probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum dicit, si lo faze engoñosamente: et ita tenent
Alberic. et Salicet. in dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate asserat se
mojorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc
non restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu scripturam probet se minorem; et si juravit
corporaliter, nullo modo restituitur, ut ibi; et per quae instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus
juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr. s. quis autem, col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit
scriptura, ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem aliquas notabiles quaestiones in ista materia, in col.
5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor ex tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non;
et tenet glossa finalis in 1. de aetate, D. de minor. in fin. gloss. vide ibi per Speculat. ubi etiam
de aliis in ista materia.

In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860, I find an excellent
illustration of the conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the
following resolution therein set forth.

Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be twenty-five years
of age and, due to the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are married, or have
administration of their property, or on account of other special circumstances affecting them,
the other parties to the contract believe them to be of legal age.

With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as set forth in 22 Cyc.
(p. 610), supported by numerous citations of authority.
 28

Estoppel to disaffirm — (I) In General. — The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general
rule applicable to infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have created
an estoppel against him to disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by
the acts or admissions of other persons.

(II) False representations as to age. — According to some authorities the fact that an infant
at the time of entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt
that he had attained the age of majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop the
infant from disaffirming the same or setting up the defense of infancy against the enforcement
of any rights thereunder; but there is also authority for the view that such false representations
will create an estoppel against the infant, and under the statutes of some states no contract
can be disaffirmed where, on account of the minor's representations as to his majority, the
other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting. Where the infant has
made no representations whatever as to his age, the mere fact that the person with whom he
dealt believed him to be of age, even though his belief was warranted by the infant's
appearance and the surrounding circumstances, and the infant knew of such belief, will not
render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.
 29

G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners
of murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.2

The petitioners contest the CA’s affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for
review on certiorari.

We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because
the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission of the
crime. We order his immediate release from prison because he already served his sentence, as
hereby modified. Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in
order to accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Antecedents

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the
petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following information,
to wit:

That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Bogña, Municipality of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and
without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault
and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994,4
the trial ensued.

The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major
Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona
(Herminia).

Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-
law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8
pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay;
that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the
sala of Desder’s house, she heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and then two
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successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona;
that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, that’s enough!; that while
aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking
sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously
adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that
she rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the
shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced
dead.5

Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994,6 based on
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla,
Sorsogon.

Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated
his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.7

Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent ₱30,000.00 for the funeral expenses
of Llona.8

Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were
Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and
Lagonsing.

The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his
family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,

Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the
house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the
petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of
Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated only because of their being employed by
their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.

As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court
hereby sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency,
in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the
cost.

Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he
being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered,
unless he is charged of other lawful cause or causes.

Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the
service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.9
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The Court referred the petitioners’ direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.10

On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado

and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) ₱30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.11

After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,12 the petitioners now appeal.

Issue

The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a
credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandilla’s testimony unreliable, namely:
(a) she had failed to identify them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually
witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the
assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c)
the autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary
to Mirandilla’s claim; (d) Mirandilla’s testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e)
Mirandilla’s account was inconsistent with that of Jesalva’s.

Ruling

The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on
Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect

The RTC and CA’s conclusions were based on Mirandilla’s positive identification of the petitioners
as the malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them made during her court
testimony on March 6, 1995,13 viz:

q Who were you saying ‘we sat together’?

a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.

q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala and the
house you wherein (sic)?

a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.

q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting arrangement of
yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.

a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of
me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona
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q How about Kdg. Jesalva?

a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in otherwords,
the door was at his back.

q Was the door open?

a Yes, sir.

q Was the door immediately found… Rather was this the main door of the house?

a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.

q And from the porch is the main stairs already?

a Yes, sir.

q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting the
persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you doing then?

a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.

q How about Kgd. Jesalva?

a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any incident
that happened?

a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were successive
shots.

q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who was
responsible for the shots?

a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.

q Who is this Salvador Atizado?

a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.

q Can you be able to identify him?

a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)

q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?

a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.

q Then after that what happened?

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a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible ‘stop that’s enough’, and I gave
assistance to Kgd. Llona.

q Then after that what happened?

a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the
gun.

q Then what did you do when you heard that?

a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at that time I
do not know his name.

q Then what did you see of him?

a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun.

q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun
was pointed at?

a It was pointed towards me.

q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?

a Yes, sir.

q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this man?

a Yes, sir.

q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?

a Yes, sir.

q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?

a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the person,
the person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)

q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver and he
was moving backward, did you see other persons as his companion, if any?

a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the
process of leaving the place.

q Who is the first name of this Atizado?

a Danilo Atizado

q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?

a Salvador Monreal was the one left.

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Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandilla’s positive
identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the
petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.

It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judge’s evaluation of
the credibility of a witness and of the witness’ testimony is accorded the highest respect
because the trial judge’s unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness
enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not.14 Such evaluation,
when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially
affect the disposition of the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners
have not called attention to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted
circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that Mirandilla’s positive declarations on
the identities of the assailants prevailed over the petitioners’ denials and alibi.16

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.17 Yet, the State did not have to prove the
petitioners’ previous agreement to commit the murder,18 because their conspiracy was
deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act.19 They
had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of
purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable
as co-principals.20 Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals
in murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment

or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
 35

its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might
make.21 For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders.22 Moreover, treachery must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.23

The CA held that Mirandilla’s testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that treachery
attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizado’s shooting the victim at the latter’s back
had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreal’s
conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed
with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreal’s handgun did not fire.24

We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly
assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an
altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim
provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be swift and
unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.25 Such
manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured their unhampered
execution of the crime.

II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2)
of the RPC.26 But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being
a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s
minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was
not presented at the trial.

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was
committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated
that he was 17 years of age.27 Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that
he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.28 Thirdly, Villafe’s affidavit
dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.29 Fourthly,
as RTC’s minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,30 Monreal was 22 years old when
he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,31 which meant that he was not over 18
years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a
teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.32

The foregoing showing of Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the
norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,33 viz:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption
of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is
proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the
child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence
of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
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Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate
court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where
the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall
be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of
age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of
the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty
of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum
period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his
proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.

Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18,
1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreal’s detention should be credited
in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,35 the revision
of the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.

In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic
Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and
services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-
integration, geared towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict
serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. – Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act
and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of
Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime stands,36
despite the reduction of Monreal’s penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order
to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted only ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱30,000.00 as actual damages, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts
for death indemnity and moral damages should each be raised to ₱75,000.00 to accord with
prevailing case law;37 and that exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 due to the attendance of
treachery should be further awarded,38 to accord with the pronouncement in People v.
Catubig,39 to wit:
 37

The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the
social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which,
is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by
an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance
is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of
an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.

The award of actual damages of ₱30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.

WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following modifications:

(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one
day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;

(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release
Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being
held for other lawful causes; and

(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona
₱75,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as actual damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of
Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days
from service.

SO ORDERED.