EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 1

PP v. JALOSJOS
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: WON accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of

Representatives

Ruling:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 2

COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ

Facts:
RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections” was passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised against Section 2
which states that “No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in
the same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994
barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.

Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent
officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory
relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled out that
there consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.

Issue: WON the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

Ruling:
The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides: “Nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is however considering
equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. The law can treat
barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself
provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term
and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the
Constitution provides for a 3-year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the
length of term and the application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize
substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.