NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1

REPUBLIC v VILLANUEVA
Summary: The INC bought land, and wanted it registered. The CFI and SC agreed that it could
not own land, as it is a private corporation

Doctrine: A corporation, a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of

public domain, in accordance with the constitutional prohibition in Sec 11 Art XIV of the 1973
Constitution that “no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of public
domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.”

Facts:
Two lots were acquired by the INC in Bulacan in exchange for another lot. The said lands
are in an area certified as alienable by the Bureau of Forestry. The INC, a corporation, thus filed
for an application for the registration of the two lots alleging that it and its predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years.

The Republic, through the director of lands opposed INC contending that it is disqualified
from holding or acquiring alienable lands of the public domain and that the land applied for is
public land and not susceptible to private corporations. CFI ordered the registration of the two
lots in the name of INC represented by their executive minister Erano G. Manalo. Hence this
appeal.

Issue: WON the INC is allowed to acquire or hold alienable lands of public domain

Ruling:
No. A corporation, a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of
public domain. These lots were not private lands. All lands that are not acquired from the
government belong to the public domain.
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MERALCO vs CASTRO-BARTOLOME

Facts:
MERALCOM purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on August 13, 1976 from
Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the corresponding appeal was
likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following arguments;
firstly, the land in question had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive
prescription as a result of open continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more
than thirty years by the original owner, Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing spouses,
whom Meralco acquired the disputed land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by Ramos
spouses and Peguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by
virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.

Issue:
1. Won Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold lands of public domain and
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
2. Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically guarantee its
rights to possession and title of the land.
3. WoN it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant would be extended to
a juridical person.

Ruling:
1. No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law to
hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private
corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands not
exceeding one thousand hectares.

2. No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who
occupied the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land for more than
thirty years, does not automatically amount to rights and possession. It would cease to be public
only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under the law.
This conclusion is anchored on the principle that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. The exception to the
rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest possess and occupied the same
since time immemorial. Such possessions justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest.
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3 . Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title before
juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until the
certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be
confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void. As between the State
and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The court also took notice that the
constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural
public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable
lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v IAC

Facst:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Nazario, acquired from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the
Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan.

Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute

ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of
the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

Issue:
1. WoN the land is already a private land - YES
2. WoN the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies- NO

Ruling:
IAC affirmed Acme . Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
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The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had
a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. The
only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,000 hectares

GODINEZ V. FONG PAK LUEN

Facts:

The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Godinez to
defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co-
defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-
defendant Navata. The latter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a
Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to
acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said parcel of
land as purported contract of sale executed by Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered
non-existent.

The defendant filed her answer that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of
limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Godinez on November 27, 1941,
conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said
defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract
must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of action
accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond
the 10-year period provided by law.

The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by plaintiffs but was denied.

Issue: WoN the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the Civil Code.

Ruling:
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No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits.
However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract
of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or
merely prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on
imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against
whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.

As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same
property to Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized
citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.

PHIL PORTS AUTHORITY vs MENDOZA

Facts:
The Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution No. 10 placing on only one organization
the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. To
implement its policy of integration, PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides that
it is necessary that two or more contractors presently operating within the same port premises
who desire to continue or renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one
organization.

Accordingly, the eleven port services contractors in the Cebu City Port formed the United
South Dockhandlers, Inc. (USDI). The latter corporation was recognized by PPA and granted a
special permit to handle exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the
City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a management contract. Private respondents Pernito,
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et al. instituted an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with preliminary preventive and
mandatory injunction and damages against PPA and USDI.

They assail the policy adopted by PPA to grant only one permit to only one group as
violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade.

Issue: WON PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and
void for being violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade.

Ruling:
No. Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that the state shall regulate or
prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in the
Constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. Regulate means
includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but regulate should not be construed as
synonymous with suppress or prohibit. "Competition can best regulate a free economy.

In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in the port of Cebu. The
operations there, particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect not only the City of Cebu, the
principal port in the South, but also the economy of the whole country as well. Any prolonged
disjunction of the services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and
international trade and commerce.

Operations in said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to
regulation and control for the public good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through
compulsory merger may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly
because the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in the
arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only USDI, actually USDI is
comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but
decided to merge and ultimately constituted themselves as USDI. But over and above the platter
of whether the monopoly has been created, the overriding and more significant consideration is
public interest. Accordingly, PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional
and legal provision on monopolies.

SECRETARY OF DENR vs YAP

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Facts:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of CA affirming that of the RTC in
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor
Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through OSG opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code.

Issue: WON unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

Ruling:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
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REP. OF THE PHIL. vs CA

Facts:
Court of First Instance of Cagayan issued Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Carag,
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing
an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued OCT
No. 11585 in the name of spouses Carag. OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the
encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were
issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of
Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A.

CA dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the
Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.14

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available

Ruling:
CA erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition
because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner clearly alleged in the
complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the
ground of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the
disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not
alienable and disposable.
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PROV. OF NORTH COTABATO vs THE GOVERNMENT

Facts:
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and MILFwere scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP - MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MOA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This public document
would reach a consensus between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a
Bangsamoro homeland. However, the Executive Department did not sign the document.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and
pray for the Court to enjoin the Executive Department to enter into agreements similar to MOA
in the future.

Issue: WON the MO-AD is constitutional insofar as provisions on Articles XII of the
Constitution is concerned.
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Ruling:
The initiated MOA-AD between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is patently unconstitutional. The Executive
branch's commitment under the MOA-AD to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-
AD violates, among others, the following provisions in the Constitution:
(1) Section 2, Article XII on State ownership of all lands of the public domain and of all natural
resources in the Philippines. Under paragraph 3 on Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD,
ancestral domain, which consists of ancestral lands and the natural resources in such lands, does
not form part of the public domain. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to land they
or their ancestors continuously possessed since time immemorial, excluding the period that their
possession was disrupted by conquest, war, civil disturbance, force majeure, other forms of
usurpation or displacement by force, deceit or stealth, or as a consequence of government
project, or any voluntary dealings by the government and private parties. Under paragraph 1 on
Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro people are the Moros and all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Thus, the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro refers to the lands that all the peoples in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan possessed
before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521. In short, the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro
refers to the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. This negates the Regalian doctrine in the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions;
(2) Section 9, Article XII on the establishment of an independent economic and planning agency
headed by the President. This agency is the National Economic and Development Authority.
Under the MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) will have its own economic
planning agency.;
(3) Section 20, Article XII on the establishment of an independent monetary authority, now the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have its own financial and
banking authority.
In sum, if this Court did not stop the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD), this country would have been dismembered because the Executive branch
would have committed to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD
gives to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) the attributes of a state, with its own people,
territory, government, armed forces, foreign trade missions, and all other institutions of a state,
under the BJE's own basic law or constitution. Clearly, under the MOA-AD, the Executive
branch assumes the mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-
AD.

ALCANTARA vs DENR

Facts:
Petitioner under the Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA) No. 542 by the
DENR, was allowed to lease 923 hectares of public forest land at General Santos City. However,
such land is being claimed as the ancestral land of the Indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 11

people, who claim that they and their ancestors have been cultivating, possessing, and occupying
it since time immemorial.

According to them, Christian settlers started occupying the area only after WWII. Due to
this, there was a constant friction (violent at times) between them. The IPs eventually lost
physical control of much of the and Alcantara, a son of one of the settlers, claims that FLGLA
No. 542 has been subsisting since 1983. The respondents, as representatives of said tribes, filed
a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the
cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of land to the indigenous communities.

Respondent-intervenors, the Heirs of Datu Abdul Pendatun and the Heirs of Sabal Mula
Gawan, claim that among those who took the land by force was petitioner's predecessor,
Conrado Alcantara. They narrate that in 1962, some of their tribal leaders tried to retake the land
but failed because the well-armed settlers repelled them, which led to the killing of 2 of their
leaders.

Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint questioning the authority of the COSLAP and
alleged that it was the DENR secretary who should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose
of public lands. Also, the COSLAP should suspend the hearing of the case, because the DENR
was then hearing a similar controversy. He was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 for another 25
years, to expire on Dec 31, 2018, despite the pendedncy f the COSLAP case and the opposition
from private respondents.

RA 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rigths Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize
and promote all the rights of country's Indigenus Cultural Communities(ICCs)/IPs within the
framework of the Constitution.

Issue: WON the petitioner may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of
FLGLA No. 542 (Dec. 31, 2018) based on his alleged residual rights

Ruling:
No. The Court made the final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and it was
made in volation of prevailing laws and it was proper for it to be cancelled.

The CA also stated that based on the records, that subject land belongs to the Blaan ICC
since they have been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since
time immemorial, a fact which has not been disputed by the petitioner. It was also declared that
FLGLA No. 542 violated Sec 1 of PD 410 which states that "all unappropriated agricultural
lands forming the part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral land of the
ICCs/IPs occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to
be distributed exclusively among the members of ICC concerned.
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OROPORT CARGO HANDLING SERVICES INC vs PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL

AUTHORITY

Facts:
Oroport bid for the management and operation of MCT. As no bidder won in the two public
biddings, PIA took over MCT operations.

Oroport sued PIA and Phividec in the RTC for injunction and damages.It accused PIA of
illegally operating MCT without a license from PPA or a franchise from Congress. Also alleged
unfair competition since PIA handled cargoes of the general public. Invoked unlawful
deprivation of property as it stands to incur investment losses with PIA’s take over of MCT
operations.It prayed that PIA be stopped from handling cargoes not owned or consigned to its
industrial estate locators. During the hearings for its application for preliminary injunction, it
contended that since the core business of PIA and Phividec is the establishment and operation of
industrial estates, their authority to build and operate ports should be construed merely as a
complement of their primary function. Thus, the ports they built should accommodate only
cargoes owned or consigned to its industrial estate locators or else it can build ports and handle
cargoes anywhere, directly competing with PPA.

PIA and Phividec invoked RA 8975 which prohibits lower courts from issuing TRO and
Injunction on government infrastructure projects. They highlighted the fact that PIA’s operation
of MCT is endorsed by the government and by various groups. They added that preventing PIA
from operating MCT will aggravate the huge financial deficit of the national government and
contribute to the collapse of the economy.

RTC enjoined PIA and Phividec from handling cargoes not owned or consigned to its
industrial estate locators. PIA sought to reverse the order and dismiss the complaint which
Oroport opposed.Issued the two orders (1) denying the MR filed by defendants with urgent
motion for the dismissal of the complaint and (2) granting the injunctive relief prayed for by the
plaintiff.The RTC emphasized that before PIA could operate as a public utility, it should be
properly authorized by PPA since cargo-handling is a regulated activity. In imposing low tariff
rates and accepting third-party cargoes, PIA unlawfully deprived Oroport of its property.

PIA filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition invoking Section 3 of Rep.
Act No. 8975, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue writs of preliminary injunction
against operations of government infrastructure projects. Assuming it had, it issued the writ
without hearing and Oroport was not entitled thereto. It prayed ex parte for a TRO. Oroport
countered that Rep. Act No. 8975 exempts urgent constitutional issues from the prohibition to
issue injunctive relief.
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Issue: WON PIA can temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement with PPA
(Philippine Ports Authority) sans a franchise or a license? (Yes)

Ruling:
PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a franchise or license as it was necessary,
temporary and beneficial to the public. The decision to bid out cargo-handling services is within
the province and discretion of PPA which necessarily required prior study and evaluation. This
task is best left to the judgment of PPA and cannot be set aside absent grave abuse of discretion
on its part. As long as the standards are set in determining the contractor and such standards are
reasonable and related to the purpose for which they are used, courts should not inquire into the
wisdom of PPA’s choice.

Franchises from Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate
because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to
authorize the operation of certain public utilities. Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution does
not necessarily imply that only Congress can grant such authorization. The determination of
whether the winning bidder is qualified to undertake the contracted service should be left to the
sound judgment of PPA or PIA as these agencies are in the best position to evaluate the
feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with the
project’s development plans. Neither the Court nor Congress has the time and the technical
know-how to look into this matter.

Presidential Decree No. 538, gives PIA the legal authority to construct, operate and
maintain port facilities including stevedoring and port terminal services even without PPA’s
authority. The MOA granting PIA the exclusive control and supervision of all ports, wharves,
piers and services within the industrial area, recognizing its power to collect port fees, dues and
charges, makes PIA’s authority over MCT operations more secure.

After the two public biddings failed, PIA was left with no other option but to take over
MCT operations so that it could earn, pending the award to a qualified bidder, some amount to
pay the loan to JBIC and to avoid being declared in default. During the September 27, 2004
hearing before the CA-Mindanao, Atty. Raul Ragandang of PIA said that Phividec will not
permanently engage in cargo-handling considering that it has no capacity to operate MCT.
f. Oroport is estopped from questioning PIA’s authority because it participated in the two public
biddings. As a cargo-handling contractor, it is not a real party-in-interest in this case as only
PPA may protest PIA’s operation of MCT. Even assuming that Oroport is a real party-in-
interest, it is not entitled to an injunction as the alleged damage or threat of damage is
speculative and factually baseless.

Oroport has no right to manage MCT since it has no contractual relations with PIA,
Phividec orPPA. It has no statutory grant of authority. Clearly, it has no right in esse to be
protected by aninjunctive writ.

Business permits may be terminated by authorities any time based on policy guidelines
and statutes because what is given is not a property right but a mere privilege.The law
authorizing PPA to take over arrastre and stevedoring services in government-owned ports and
cancel permits issued to private operators is a valid exercise of police power; it does not violate
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 14

due process of law as the exercise of police power is paramount over the right against non-
impairment of contracts.

Moreover, a regulated monopoly is not proscribed in industries affected with public

interest such as in port rendition of arrastre/stevedoring services in Philippine ports. Oroport’s
allegation of unfair competition also fails because private monopolies are not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. Certain public utilities must be given franchises for public
interest and these franchises do not violate the law against monopolies. PIA’s policy decision to
handle the cargo operation itself enjoys presumption of regularity as it did not violate any
relevant law, rules, regulations, ordinance or issuances in so doing.