Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil.
739 (1956) should, instead, have filed an information immediately
CASE DIGEST
Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a
preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua,
alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion
of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the
PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the case to
Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is
prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the
complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the
records was “premature” because Judge Samulde
failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the
accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal
Salvani stating that although he found that a probable
cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should
be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA.
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal
had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the
performance of the act to be required of the judge and
that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it.
Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a
WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating
judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his
finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima
facie evidence that the accused commited the crime
charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR
OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is
conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the
accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should
issue, the investigating judge must have examined in
writing and under oath the complainant and his
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he
must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and
there must be a need to place the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the
determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the
accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is
left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal
so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused.
20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76649-51, August 19, 1988
DECISION
(3rd Division)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches
and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film
piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain
videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in
the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual
Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications
for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The lower court issued the
desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the
petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized
the items described in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift
the search warrants and release the seized properties,
which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower
court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the judge properly lift the search warrants
he issued earlier?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and
AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of
the CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search
warrants he issued earlier.

The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned
search warrants in the absence of probable cause that
the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents
who acted as witnesses during the application for
search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the
subject matter of their testimony, which was the
alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the
private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who
was also a witness during the a
pplication stated that he had personal
knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the
private respondents were pirated tapes taken from
master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower
court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony
of petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence
because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes
were not shown to the court during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of
search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument
to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes
at the time of application may not be necessary as
these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable cause
exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is
not meritorious. The court cannot presume that
duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the
similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance
of a search warrant.
Quintero v NBI; G.R. No. L-35149; 23 Jun 1988; 162
SCRA 467
Claudine | 26 September 2017 | Comments (0)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a delegate of the First District of Leyte to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He delivered a
privileged speech at the plenary session and disclosed
that certain persons are bribing some delegates. He
eventually released from his hospital bed a sworn
statement the names of the persons who gave him the
money, implicating the First Lady among others. On the
basis of a search warrant, agents of the respondent
National Bureau of Investigation raided petitioner’s
house and a criminal complaint for direct bribery was
filed against him.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid.
RULING:
NO. The interrogations conducted by the respondent
judge upon the applicant NBI agent showed that the
latter knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to
show that petitioner had committed any offense. The
statement of Congressman Mate, which was the sole
basis for the issuance of the search warrant, was
replete with conclusions and inferences drawn from
what he allegedly witnessed when he visited petitioner
in the hospital. It lacked the directness and
definiteness which would have been present, had the
same statement dealt with facts which Congressman
Mate actually witnessed.
Search warrant issued is declared NULL and VOID.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989
THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK
FORCE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE
TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and
KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents.
K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and
prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the
country (per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to
hold as null and void two Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20,
1988, 2 reversing its Decision, dated October 24,
1986. 3 The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16,
1985, of the Regional Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order,
dated August 21, 1985. The Resolution, dated
September 24, 1987 disposed of, and granted, the
private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.'s
motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986
Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn,
denied the petitioner's own motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are not in controversy. We quote:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor
Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force hereinafter referred to as PADS
Task Force for purposes of convenience,
issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157,
158, 159, 160 and 161 against the
petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co.,
Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc.,
Philippine Veterans Corporation,
Philippine Veterans Development
Corporation, Philippine Construction
Development Corporation, Philippine
Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-
trade Development (Alvin Aquino),
Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and
Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants
was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau
of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS
Task Force. Attached to the said application is the
affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and
investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M.
Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported
deposition to support the application for the issuance
of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The
application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and
deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12,
1985. 5
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the
petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a
petition to enjoin the implementation of the search
warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial
court issued a temporary restraining order [effective
"for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the
case for hearing on March 18, 1985.
In disposing of the petition, the said court found the
material issues to be:
1) Competency of this Court to act on
petition filed by the petitioners;
2) Validity of the search warrants issued
by respondent State Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the petition has
become moot and academic because all
the search warrants sought to be
quashed had already been implemented
and executed. 8
On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its
challenged Orders, and held:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the Court hereby declares
Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, and 161 to be null and void.
Accordingly, the respondents are hereby
ordered to return and surrender
immediately all the personal properties
and documents seized by them from the
petitioners by virtue of the
aforementioned search warrants.
SO ORDERED. 9
On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied
reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to
contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower
court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court
held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-
judicial body with express powers
enumerated under PD 1936 to
prosecute foreign exchange violations
defined and punished under P.D. No.
1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-
judicial powers, ranks with the Regional
Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at
bar had no jurisdiction to declare the
search warrants in question null and
void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the
Assistant Solicitor General the decision
of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force is appealable to the Office of
the President.10
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co.,
Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily
of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force is "such other responsible officer'
countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants of search and seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on
Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its
Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently,
its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that
in so issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the
respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse
of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction," 11 specifically:
a) In deviating from the settled policy
and rulings of the Supreme Court that
no Regional Trial Courts may
countermand or restrain the
enforcement of lawful writs or decrees
issued by a quasi-judicial body of equal
and coordinate rank, like the PADS Task
Force;
b) For resorting to judicial legislation to
arrive at its erroneous basis for
reconsidering its previous Decision
dated October 24, 1986 (see Annex "I")
and thus promulgated the questioned
Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"),
which violated the constitutional
doctrine on separation of powers;
c) In not resolving directly the other
important issues raised by the petitioner
in its Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622-SP
despite the fact that petitioner has
demonstrated sufficiently and
convincingly that respondent RTC, in
issuing the questioned Orders in Special
Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C"
and 'D"), committed grave abuse of
discretion and/or acted in excess of
jurisdiction:
1. In ruling that (a) the description of
the things to be seized as stated in the
contested search warrant were too
general which allegedly render the
search warrants null and void; (b) the
applications for the contested search
warrants actually charged two offenses
in contravention of the 2nd paragraph,
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court; and (c) this case has not become
moot and academic, even if the
contested search warrants had already
been fully implemented with positive
results; and
2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task
Force has not been granted under PD
1936 'judicial or quasi-judicial
jurisdiction. 12
We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential
questions that confront us are- (i) is the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and
one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional
Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's
jurisdiction; and (ii) may the said presidential body be
said to be "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the
1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.**
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the
petitioner states that it is endowed with "express
powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute
foreign exchange violations as defined and punished
under PD No. 1883." 13 "By the very nature of its
express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is
contended, "which are decidedly quasi-judicial or
discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary
investigation on the charges of foreign exchange
violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest,
hold departure orders, among others, and depending
upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or
to file the corresponding information in court of
Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August
26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or
the power of adjudication ." 14
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now
assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of
quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not diminish the
regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The
right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one
unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the judiciary.
In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the
theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other
coordinate branches of the government, but solely on
the theory that they are required to declare the law in
every case which come before them." 16
This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error,
since what the petitioner puts to question is the
Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over
the private respondent's petition below and its
subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and seizure,
for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity
(allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the Regional
Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction.
An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of
judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic
privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is
whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior
courts, that may undertake such a review.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the
Court of Appeals exercises:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Court and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. 18
xxx xxx xxx
Under the present Constitution, with respect to its
provisions on Constitutional Commissions, it is
provided, in part that:
... Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. 19
On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. 20
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise:
... The Supreme Court may designate
certain branches of the Regional Trial
Court to handle exclusively criminal
cases, juvenile and domestic relations
cases, agrarian case, urban land reform
cases which do not fall under the
jurisdiction of quasi- judicial bodies and
agencies and/or such other special cases
as the Supreme Court may determine in
the interest of a speedy and efficient
administration of justice. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22
... The appeals to the Intermediate
Appellate Court [now, Court of Appeals]
from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue
to be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the
same is not inconsistent with the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. 23
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are
as follows:
SECTION 1. Appeals from specified
agencies.— Any provision of existing law
or Rule of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a
final ruling, award, order, decision, or
judgment of the Court of Agrarian
Relations; the Secretary of Labor under
Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred and two, also known as the
"Minimum Wage Law"; the Department
of Labor under Section 23 of Republic
Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-
five, also known as the "Industrial Peace
Act"; the Land Registration Commission;
the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Social Security
Commission; the Civil Aeronautics
Board; the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Inventions Board, may
appeal therefrom to the Court of
Appeals, within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed
questions of fact and law, or questions
of law, or all three kinds of questions.
From final judgments or decisions of the
Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party
may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. 24
Because of subsequent amendments, including the
abolition of various special courts, 25 jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently,
determined by the corresponding amendatory
statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards
of the National Labor Relations Commission are final
and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this
Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way
of appeal." 26
Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of
the Commission of Land Registration, en consults, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals. 27
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate
Court, 28 and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.29
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court
of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with
the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not
the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the
first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose
decisions may not be challenged before the regular
courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of
Appeals and this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule making." 30 The
most common types of such bodies have been listed as
follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in
situations wherein the government is
offering some gratuity, grant, or special
privilege, like the defunct Philippine
Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for
Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine
Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is
seeking to carry on certain government
functions, like the Bureau of
Immigration, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry
and Board of Commissioners, the Civil
Service Commission, the Central Bank of
the Philippines.
 (3) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is
performing some business service for
the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the
Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority,
Philippine National Railways, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is
seeking to regulate business affected
with public interest, like the Fiber
Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
Office, Office of the Insurance
Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is
seeking under the police power to
regulate private business and
individuals, like the Securities &
Exchange Commission, Board of Food
Inspectors, the Board of Review for
Moving Pictures, and the Professional
Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual
controversies because of some strong
social policy involved, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission,
the Court of Agrarian Relations, the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor,
the Social Security Commission, Bureau
of Labor Standards, Women and Minors
Bureau. 31
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies
to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and
unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the
proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality
and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential
Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was
not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is,
to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As
the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of
"dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of
foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing
more. We quote:
SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force.-The
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force, hereinafter referred to as Task
Force, shall have the following powers
and authority:
a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to
investigate and prosecute all dollar
salting activities, including the
overvaluation of imports and the
undervaluation of exports;
b) To administer oaths, summon persons
or issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses
or the production of such books, papers,
contracts, records, statements of
accounts, agreements, and other as may
be necessary in the conduct of
investigation;
c) To appoint or designate experts,
consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals,
investigators and hearing officers to
assist the Task Force in the discharge of
its duties and responsibilities; gather
data, information or documents;
conduct hearings, receive evidence,
both oral and documentary, in all cases
involving violation of foreign exchange
laws or regulations; and submit reports
containing findings and
recommendations for consideration of
appropriate authorities;
d) To punish direct and indirect
contempts with the appropriate
penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court; and to adopt such
measures and take such actions as may
be necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
f. After due investigation but prior to the
filing of the appropriate criminal charges
 with the fiscal's office or the courts as
the case may be, to impose a fine
and/or administrative sanctions as the
circumstances warrant, upon any person
found committing or to have committed
acts constituting blackmarketing or
salting abroad of foreign exchange,
provided said person voluntarily admits
the facts and circumstances constituting
the offense and presents proof that the
foreign exchange retained abroad has
already been brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal
action may be instituted against said
person before any other judicial
regulatory or administrative body for
violation of Presidential Decree No.
1883.
The amount of the fine shall be
determined by the Chairman of the
Presidential Anti- Dollar Salting Task
Force and paid in Pesos taking into
consideration the amount of foreign
exchange retained abroad, the exchange
rate differentials, uncollected taxes and
duties thereon, undeclared profits,
interest rates and such other relevant
factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force
which shall retain Twenty percent (20 %)
thereof. The informer, if any, shall be
entitled to Twenty percent (20 %) of the
fine. Should there be no informer, the
Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty
percent (40 %) of the fine and the
balance shall accrue to the general
funds of the National government. The
amount of the fine to be retained by the
Task Force shall form part of its
Confidential Fund and be utilized for the
operations of the Task Force . 33
The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions
(except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue
search warrants) that will reveal a legislative
intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial
responsibilities relative to offenses punished by
Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we
said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable
cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the
proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry
preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend
action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a
fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation
to determine whether or not prima facie evidence
exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet,
while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.
It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good
Government either, the executive body appointed to
investigate and prosecute cases involving "ill-gotten
wealth". It had been vested with enormous powers,
like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze
orders, and similar processes, but that did not, on
account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as
defined by recognized authorities. It cannot pronounce
judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction
to do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not,
hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-
equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court.
There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would
demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent
Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption
of jurisdiction by the court a quo.
It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential
Task Force has been empowered to issue warrants of
arrest, search, and seizure, makes it, ergo, a "semi-
court". Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the
private respondent, whether or not it can under the
1973 Charter, issue such kinds of processes.
It must be observed that under the present
Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are
exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent, the case has
become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the
question has been specifically put to the Court, we find
it unavoidable to resolve it as the final arbiter of legal
controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973
Constitution during whose regime the case was
commenced.
Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and
until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its
provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and
search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by
fiat of legislation have been at best controversial.
In Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 36 a 1975 decision, this Court
ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search
warrants, but held in the same vein that, by virtue of
the responsible officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of
Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a
search warrant or warrant of arrest.37 Authorities,
however, have continued to express reservations
whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given such a
power. 38
Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of
Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in which we categorically
averred: Until now only the judge can issue the warrant
of arrest." 40 "No law or presidential decree has been
enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in
a particular responsible officer ." 41
Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the
same question persisted following this Courts
subsequent rulings upholding the President's alleged
emergency arrest powers .42 [Mr. Justice Hugo
Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not a species of
"arrest" in its technical sense, and that the (deposed)
Chief Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his
capacity as a "responsible officer" under the 1973
Charter, but rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces in times of emergency, or in order to
carry out the deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In
the distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts
that can be done without need of judicial intervention
because they are not, precisely, judicial but Presidential
actions.]
In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the
mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by the
Local Government Code, 45 but had ceased to be one
with the approval of the 1987 Constitution according
judges sole authority to issue arrest and search
warrants. But in the same breath, we did not rule the
grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the
provisions of the former Constitution. We were agreed,
though, that the "responsible officer" referred to by
the fundamental law should be one capable of
approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." 46
In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the
respondent Court relied on American jurisprudence,
notably, Katz v. United States, 47 Johnson v. United
States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which
the American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors
(like the petitioner) cannot be given such powers
because of their incapacity for a "detached
scrutiny" 50 of the cases before them. We affirm the
Appellate Court.
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be
said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine
the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest
or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally
interested in the success of his case. Although his office
"is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused," 51 he
stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his
accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge
and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That
makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential
Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2002, unconstitutional.
It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution
spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to
issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by
legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the
license to give that authority to whomsoever it
pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes
the qualification that the officer himself must be
"responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any
similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in
discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as
used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and
competence but more significantly, neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality
presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no
manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
According to the Court of Appeals, the implied
exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution
was founded on the requirements of due process,
notably, the assurance to the respondent of an
unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to
the arrest of his person or seizure of his property. We
add that the exclusion is also demanded by the
principle of separation of powers on which our
republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise
essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is
chaired by the Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and
Industry), since under the Constitution, the President
has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they
cannot be made to issue judicial processes without
unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the courts.
At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all
questions on the matter, although the Court hopes that
this disposition has clarified a controversy that had
generated often bitter debates and bickerings.
The Court joins the Government in its campaign against
the scourge of "dollar- salting", a pernicious practice
that has substantially drained the nation's coffers and
has seriously threatened its economy. We recognize
the menace it has posed (and continues to pose) unto
the very stability of the country, the urgency for tough
measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and
foremost, the need for cooperation from the citizenry
in an all-out campaign. But while we support the
State's efforts, we do so not at the expense of
fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional
safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable acts of
Government. If in the event that as a result of this
ruling, we prove to be an "obstacle" to the vital
endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing of
valuable foreign exchange, we do not relish it and
certainly, do not mean it. The Constitution simply does
not leave us much choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Cruz, Feliciano and Cortes, JJ. concur in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
Maximo Soliven vs Ramon Makasiar
167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by
the President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,
together with others, was charged with libel by the
then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president
would sue then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely
she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president
may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for
herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked
by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President
of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like
Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is
the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed
and imposed by any other person.
Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 84873, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 11, 2011
(Constitutional Law – Search Warrant, Probable
Cause)
Facts: Based on the application and joint deposition, a
search warrant was issued against Siao and the same
complaint was filed against petitioner for violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the
application for the search warrant and the joint
 deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the
requirements prescribed by the Constitution on the
ground that probable cause was not personally
determined.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the said
warrant is valid.
Held: No, Probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under
oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce before the issuance of a search warrant.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84873. November 16, 1990.]
ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of
KENER TRADING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court
of Negros Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO,
in his capacity as City Fiscal of Bacolod City and THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC
COMPANY, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.
Ledesma, Guinez, Causing, Espino & Serfino Law
Office for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH
WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINITION AND
REQUISITES THEREOF. — The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed
under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines. Under this provision,
the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search
has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos,
Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133
SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable
cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must
examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104
SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31,
1987, 152 SCRA 647). These requirements are provided
under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY
THE EXAMINING JUDGE, MUST BE SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — It has
been ruled that the existence of probable cause
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza,
G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion
or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree,
be substantiated or supported by the record. In this
case, We find that the requirement mandated by the
law and the rules that the judge must personally
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuing the
warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The
applicant himself was not asked any searching question
by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only
part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to
subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The
application contained pre-typed questions, none of
which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of
a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are
in the possession and control of the person against
whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In
the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25,
1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona,
G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where
the applicant himself was not subjected to an
interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit)
and only because the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, importance or more essential to his peace and
not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed happiness than the right of personal security, and that
probable cause is to be established. The examining involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent the power to search and seize is necessary to the
and justification of the application."cralaw virtua1aw public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
library enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
BE DESCRIBED WITH PARTICULARITY. — Another basic principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a
infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
The law requires that the articles sought to be seized requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
must be described with particularity. The items listed in provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the
other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
so general that the searching team can practically take regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises an officer undertakes to justify it."
searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner’s
petition before respondent Court of Appeals and which
has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the
business of buying and selling scrap metals, second DECISION
hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the
application do not fall under the list of personal
property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule
MEDIALDEA, J.:
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because
neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged
that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject
of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside
other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or
the decision (pp. 38-42, Rollo) of respondent Court of
intended to be used as a means of committing an
Appeals which affirmed the orders dated August 24,
offense.
1987 (p. 43, Record) and October 14, 1987, (pp. 53-54,
Record) of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
4. ID.; ID.; ID.;SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES,
Occidental in Criminal Case No. 5657.
CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID WARRANT. — No
matter how incriminating the articles taken from the
On February 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas,
petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an
Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Constabulary-
invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona,
Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City,
G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388: ". . .
filed an application for a search warrant,
that nothing can justify the issuance of the search
alleging:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It
might be well to point out what has been said in Asian
"x x x.
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: ‘It has been said

"That he was informed and verily believes that
KENNETH SIAO who may be found at KENER TRADING
located at Rizal Street corner Lacson Street, Bacolod
City has/have in her/his/their possession and control
the following property/ies, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower
parts and line accessories.
which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises
above mentioned.
"The undersigned has verified the report and found it
to be the fact and has therefore reasons to believe that
a SEARCH WARRANT should be issued to enable the
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession
and bring the following described property/ies, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive
assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower
parts and line accessories.
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays this Honorable
Court to issue a SEARCH WARRANT commanding any
peace officer to search the premises/house described
in this application and to seize and bring to this
Honorable Court the person/property/ies above-
mentioned to be dealt with as the law may direct.
Bacolod City, Philippines
Feb. 4, 1987 —.
SGD. FELIPE L. ROJAS, JR.
ILT, PC
OIC, PFOCIS, Bacolod City"
(p. 18, Records)
The application was subscribed before Judge
Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bacolod City and supported by the joint
deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an
employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation)
and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City,
quoted as follows:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after
having been duly sworn to, testify as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. QUESTION: What are your names and other
personal circumstances?
"ANSWER: IGNACIO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an
employee of NAPOCOR and presently residing at
Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City and AIA EDUARDO
ABAJA, CIS, regular member of the CO/INP CIS
Command, Bacolod City.
"2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of
KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal Street, near cor. Lacson
St., Bacolod City?
"ANSWER: Yes, Sir.
"3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that
said KENNETH SIAO who may be found in the said
premises/house has/have in his/her/their possession
and control the following property, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower
parts and line accessories?
"ANSWER: Yes, sir.
"4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described
property/ies is/are being kept in said premises/house?
"ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were
able to purchase some of these items.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands
and affixed our signature this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at
Bacolod City, Philippines.
"SGD. IGNACIO L. REYES SGD. EDUARDO J. ABAJA
Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of
Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City, Philippines.
SGD. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES
Judge
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
BACOLOD CITY"
(p. 19, Record)
On the basis of the foregoing application and joint
deposition, Judge Magallanes issued Search Warrant
No. 181, commanding the search of the property
described in the warrant.
Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in
Bacolod City conducted a search of the premises
described in the search warrant and seized the
following articles, to wit: 1) 272 kilos of galvanized
bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet
angular bar. The receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril,
PC Sergeant and marked "from Kenneth Siao" (p. 21,
Record).
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D.
1612) was filed against Kenneth Siao with the office of
the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation.
Thereafter, Siao filed a counter-affidavit alleging that
he had previously relinquished all his rights and
ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner
Erle Pendon. In a resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated
May 18, 1987, the office of the City Fiscal
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation
against petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24,
Record) for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed
against petitioner and docketed as Criminal Case No.
5657 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental.
The case was raffled to Branch 47 of the same court
presided over by respondent Judge Enrique T. Jocson.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987,
an application for the return of the articles seized by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record)
on the ground that the said search warrant was illegally
issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition to the
application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application was
subsequently amended to an application for quashal of
the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized by virtue thereof (pp. 33-38,
Records).
On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued
an order impliedly denying the application for the
quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the
issue of the validity of the issuance thereof. The order
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Counsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in
open court that at least one of the seized items bears
the identifying mark of the complainant National
Power Corporation, and there being no statement that
the seized items were acquired in usual course of
business for value, this court is constrained to have the
case tried without resolving whether or not the
questioned search warrant was issued validly." (p. 43,
Records)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
but it was denied on October 14, 1987 (p. 11, Rollo).
On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order,
assailing the legality of search warrant No. 181 and
praying for the permanent prohibition against the use
in evidence of the articles and properties seized and
the return thereof to petitioner. On April 4, 1988,
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
The appellate court found the existence of a probable
cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The
respondent court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the validity of the issuance of the
Search Warrant No. 181 and to sustain further the
ruling of the respondent trial court in denying the
petition for the return of the articles and personal
properties seized thereunder.
"WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with
costs against petitioner. The previous order to maintain
the status quo is hereby withdrawn and set aside.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 41, Rollo)
The motion for reconsideration of the above decision
filed by petitioner on May 2, 1988 was denied in a
resolution (p. 49, Rollo) dated July 21, 1988.
The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 181. It is the
contention of petitioner that the application for the
search warrant and the joint deposition of the
witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements
prescribed by the Constitution and the rules.
The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt.
Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaja and Reyes failed
to comply with the requisites of searching questions
and answers. The joint deposition of the witnesses
showed that the questions therein were pretyped,
mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were
merely filled-in. No examination of the applicant and of
the joint deponents was personally conducted by Judge
Magallanes as required by law and the rules.
Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the
application of Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya
and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had
personal knowledge that any specific offense was
committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to
be seized were stolen or that being so, they were
brought to Kenneth Siao.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for
the sake of polemics, that the articles belong to the
latter, his Constitutional right prevails over that of
NAPOCOR.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge alter examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search
warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R.
No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine
the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examination must
be under oath; and (3) the examination must be
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions
and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica
v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA
647). These requirements are provided under Section
4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states: "Sec. 4. Examination of complainant;
record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted."cralaw virtua1aw library
It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza,
G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion
or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree,
be substantiated or supported by the record.
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by
the law and the rules that the judge must personally
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuing the
warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The
applicant himself was not asked any searching question
by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only
part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to
subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The
application contained pre-typed questions, none of
which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of
a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are
in the possession and control of the person against
whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In
the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25,
1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona,
G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where
the applicant himself was not subjected to an
interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit)
and only because the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to," We held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.’
"x x x
"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if
the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry
on the intent and justification of the application."
(Emphasis supplied; p. 695)
Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2)
witnesses presented by the applicant can hardly satisfy
the same requirement. The public respondent
prosecutor admitted in his memorandum that the
questions propounded were pre-
typed.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged
was violation of the anti-fencing law which punishes
the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell,
or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should have
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612).
The four (4) questions propounded could hardly
support a finding of probable cause. The first question
was on the personal circumstances of the deponents.
The second and third were leading questions
answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was on
how the deponents knew about their answers in the
second and third questions. The judge could have
exploited this last question to convince himself of the
existence of a probable cause but he did not. There
was also no statement in the joint deposition that the
articles sought to be seized were derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that
applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft
was committed and the articles sought to be seized
were the proceeds thereof. It was not even shown
what connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading
or with the premises sought to be searched. By and
large, neither the application nor the joint deposition
provided facts or circumstance which could lead a
prudent man to believe that an offense had been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense, if any, are in the possession of the
person named in the application.
". . . [T]he searching questions propounded to the
applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses
must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of
the Judge just as long as the answers establish a
reasonable ground to believe the commission of a
specific offense and that the applicant is one
authorized by law, and said answers particularly
describe with certainty the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. The examination or
investigation which must be under oath may not be in
public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the examination
or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is
thorough and elicit the required information. To
repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.
(Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA
388) (Emphasis supplied)
And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23,
1988, 162 SCRA 467, 483:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Nolasco v. Paño No. 69803, October 8,
1985, 139 SCRA 163), the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant’s witness
are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in
an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its
generality. The law requires that the articles sought to
be seized must be described with particularity. The
items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR
Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly,
aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and
line accessories" are so general that the searching
team can practically take half of the business of Kener
Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as
alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent Court
of Appeals and which has not been denied by
respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and
selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and
accessories and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the
application do not fall under the list of personal
property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because
neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged
that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject
of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and
other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or
intended to be used as a means of committing an
offense.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had
doubts about the existence of probable cause in the
issuance of the search warrant. In denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion
to quash and application for articles seized by virtue of
search warrant No. 181, he
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The seeming lack of probable cause during the
application for search warrant in the lower court is
cured by the admission for the accused of counsel that
at least one of the items seized bore the identifying
mark of complainant National Power Corporation and
the failure to aver in the quashal motion and in the
open hearing that the seized items themselves were
acquired in the usual course of business for value in
good faith. However, this order is without prejudice to
the right of the accused to pursue against the
administrative liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes
Magallanes." (p. 54, Rollo)
In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the
articles seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181 was
taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the
receipt in behalf of Kener Trading, which possession is
punishable under Section 5, P.D. 1612, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of
any goods, article, item, object or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing."cralaw virtua1aw
library
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from
the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an
invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona,
G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA
388:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It
might be well to point out what has been said in Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few
are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal
security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny
of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of
government."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must
strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution.
No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid
of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt
issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-
chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21,
Record). There is no showing that the possession
thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof
to petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the
articles seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is
enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is
hereby rendered: 1) declaring Search Warrant No. 181
issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and
VOID; 2) ordering the return of the items seized by
virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner; and 3)
permanently enjoining respondents from using in
evidence the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant
No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE
CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO,
JR., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a
Provincial Election Supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial
Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional
Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation
and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-
complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of
Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of
the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and
without obtaining prior permission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law.
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty.
Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of
Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case; (2) to prepare and file the
necessary information in court; (3) to handle the
prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima
facie case and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution
or dismissal as the case may be. The directive to
conduct the preliminary investigation was pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 1752 dated January 14, 1986.
The resolution, in turn, is based on the constitutional
mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly and honest elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C
of the 1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election
Code which implements the constitutional provision.
The Resolution provides, among others:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, Regional Election Directors and
Provincial Election Supervisors are
hereby authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations of election
offenses committed in their respective
jurisdictions, file the corresponding
complaints and/or informations in court
whenever warranted, and to prosecute
the same pursuant to Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code. (Rollo, p. 15)
After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint,
Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on
September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial
court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par.
(h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.
In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent
court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused
OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election
Supervisor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before
the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside
its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty.
Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due
course to the information filed in this case if the same
has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after
which the prosecution of the case shall be under the
supervision and control of the latter." (at p. 23, Rollo,
emphasis supplied)
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court
gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15) days from receipt to file
another information charging the same offense with
the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal.
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in
an order dated December 8, 1988, the trial court
quashed the information. A motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent trial court justifies its stand on the
ground that the COMELEC through its Provincial
Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction to determine the
existence of probable cause in an election offense
which it seeks to prosecute in court because:
While under Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code approved on
December 3, 1985 duly authorized legal
officers of the Commission on Elections
have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election
offenses and to prosecute the same, it is
doubtful whether said authority under
the auspices of the 1973 Constitution,
still subsists under the 1987 Constitution
which has deleted in its Section 2,
Article III, the phrase "and such other
responsible officer as may be authorized
by law" in the equivalent section and
article of the 1973 Constitution. (Rollo,
p. 24)
The petition is impressed with merit.
We emphasize important features of the constitutional
mandate that " ... no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge ... " (Article III,
Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function
of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes
this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor
does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make
the determination of probable cause. The Judge does
not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to
him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to
make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in
the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper-whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is the function of the
Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v.
Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]):
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance) no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. That authority, at one
time reposed in them under Sections 13,
14 and 16 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of
Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil.
443, cited in Moran, Comments on the
Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was
removed from them by the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, effective on
January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on
November 11, 1984) which deleted all
provisions granting that power to said
Judges. We had occasion to point this
out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain
other basic propositions, namely: (1)
that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is "not a judicial function ...
(but) part of the prosecution's job, a
function of the executive," (2) that
wherever "there are enough fiscals or
prosecutors to conduct preliminary
investigations, courts are counseled to
leave this job which is essentially
executive to them," and the fact "that a
certain power is granted does not
necessarily mean that it should be
indiscriminately exercised."
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared
effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988
Amendments were published in the
issue of Bulletin Today of October 29,
1988) did not restore that authority to
Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said
amendments did not in fact deal at all
with the officers or courts having
authority to conduct preliminary
investigations.
This is not to say, however, that
somewhere along the line RTC Judges
also lost the power to make
a preliminary examination for the
purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest (or
search warrant). Such a power —
indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a
power — has been and remains vested
in every judge by the provision in the Bill
of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the
present (1987) Constitutions securing
the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thereby placing it
 beyond the competence of mere Court
rule or statute to revoke. The distinction
must, therefore, be made clear while an
RTC Judge may no longer conduct
preliminary investigations to ascertain
whether there is sufficient ground for
the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, he retains the authority,
when such a pleading is filed with his
court, to determine whether there is
probable cause justifying the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. It might be added
that this distinction accords, rather than
conflicts, with the rationale of
Salta because both law and rule, in
restricting to judges the authority to
order arrest, recognize that function to
be judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be
distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
judge. It is in this context that we address the issue
raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to
the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC
regarding election offenses.
Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections
shall exercise the following powers and
functions
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on
its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of
votes, investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of
violation of election laws, including acts
or omission constituting election frauds,
offenses, and practices. (Emphasis
supplied)
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC
not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of
violation of election laws. This means that the
COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for
the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable
cause and for filing an information in court. This power
is exclusive with COMELEC.
The grant to the COMELEC of the power,
among others, to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the
concomittant authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is not
without compelling reason. The evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing
this power to the COMELEC is to insure
the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result
in the frustration of the true will of the
people and make a mere idle ceremony
of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate
and prosecute offenses committed by
public officials in relation to their office
would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the
constitutional provisions relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived
neither explicit nor implicit grant to it
and its prosecuting arm, the
Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election
offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office as
contradistinguished from the clear and
categorical bestowal of said authority
and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and
the courts of first instance under
 Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of
the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Election Code of
1978 reveals the clear intention to place
in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election
offenses committed by any person,
whether private individual or public
officer or employee, and in the latter
instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his
official duties or not. In other words, it is
the nature of the offense and not the
personality of the offender that matters.
As long as the offense is an election
offense jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC, in view
of its all-embracing power over the
conduct of elections. (Corpus v.
Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987])
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in
the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or
Prosecutor files an information charging an election
offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is
because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He
does not do so under the sole authority of his office.
(People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November
6, 1989).i•t•c-aüsl In the instant case, there is no
averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is
bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of
COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the
COMELEC's preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the
1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President
issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the
ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:
Prosecution. The Commission shall,
through its duly authorized legal
officers, have exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable as provided
for in the preceding section, and to
prosecute the same: Provided, That in
the event that the Commission fails to
act on any complaint within two (2)
months from filing, the complainant
may file the complaint with the Office of
the Fiscal or with the Department of
Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of
the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by
the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that
section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in.
This is so, because, when the application for a warrant
of arrest is made and the information is filed with the
court, the judge will then determine whether or not a
probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparant that the
respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional
provision when it quashed the information filed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor. As indicated above what
the respondent trial court should have done was to
enforce its September 30, 1988 order, to wit:
Pursuant to Circular No. 12 of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court dated June
30, 1987 and considering that after a
personal examination of the evidence
submitted by the investigating Provincial
Election Supervisor III Negros Oriental
(Designated Legal Officer), there is
reasonable ground for this Court to rely
on the certification of said Provincial
Election Supervisor III in the information
that a probable cause exists, let a
warrant issue for the arrest of the
accused filing the bail at FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
recommended by the Provincial Election
Supervisor III.
The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is
not only superfluous but unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
questioned Orders dated October 3, 1988, November
22, 1988 and December 8, 1988 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The respondent trial court's Order dated
September 30, 1988 is REINSTATED. The respondent
court is ordered to proceed hearing the case with
deliberate speed until its termination.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado JJ., concur.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas
corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches
made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests
relied on the “confidential information” that the
authorities received. Except for one case where inciting
to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with
subversion for being a member of the New People’s
Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the
subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime – together
with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an
information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the
arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an
in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by
none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be
exercised by the offender as soon as possible.
Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived
and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of
irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial
free from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information”
was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests
made were bereft of probable cause and that the
petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in
any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their
fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against
the state. People vs. Marti -- Marti and his wife went to
the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages
simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his
friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to
examine and inspect the packages. However, before
the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the
owner's husband inspected the package and found
marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A
case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right
against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable
search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise
of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an
act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of
Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution
aderanga v Drilon (1991)
1. On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple
murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit,
Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter
Doe and Richard
Doe, for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag,
his wife Melchora
Bucag, and theirson Renato Bucag II. Venue was,
however, transferred to
Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter 87-2-
244.
2. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as
charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion,
however, escaped from
detention and has not been apprehended since
then. In an amended
information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo Roxas,
alias "Ely Roxas,"
"Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-
accused. Roxas
retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.
3. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed an Omnibus
Motion to dismiss, to
Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the
Arraignment on 14 October
1988. The trial court denied the omnibus motion but
directed the City
Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation
in order to grant the accused all the
opportunity to adduce whatever
evidence he has in support of his defense."
4. In the course of the preliminary investigation,
through a signed affidavit,
Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the
commission of the crime
charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
inhibited himself
from further conducting the preliminary investigation
against Paderanga at
the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution
dated 7 July 1989.
5. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice,
dated 24July 1989,
said city prosecutor requested the Department of
Justice to designate a state
prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation
against Paderanga. In a
resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State
Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with
the conduct of the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga, directed
the amendment of the
previously amended information to include and
implead Paderanga as one
of the accused therein. Paderanga moved for
reconsideration, contending
that the preliminary investigation was not yet
completed when said
resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived
of his right to present
a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional
evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime
charged.
6. The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in his
order dated 29
January 1990. From the aforesaid resolution and order,
Paderanga filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, he
submitted a Supplemental Petition with subpoena of April 25 - BUT THESE CONTENTIONS ARE
Memorandum, and then a WITHOUT MERIT

Supplemental Memorandum with Additional a. He already filed his counter-affidavit pursuant to

Exculpatory/Exonerating the subpoena issued to

Evidence Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of him where he controverted the charge against him and
Roxas dated 20 June dismissed it saying it

1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit was malicious design of his political opponents. He also
of 30 March 1990 failed to to show

wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the subpoena issued involved a separate complaint
the Department of charging an offense

Justice, through Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, different from that charged in the complaint attached
issued Resolution in the 1st subpoena

648 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion b. The credibility of witness and their testimonies are
for reconsideration matters of defense best

having been likewise denied, Paderanga then addressed trial court for evaluation
filed the petition for
c. Right to ask clarifactory question is not absolute.
mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme Court Fiscal has discretion if he

ISSUE: What is the quantum of evidence will propound these questions to the parties or
needed for probable in preliminary witnesses concerned.

investigation? (I think #2 under “held” is the one d. Proper forum before which absence of preliminary
relevant in this case) investigation should be

HELD: ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court..

Absence of a
1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of full
preliminary investigation because preliminary investigation does not go to the
jurisdiction of the court but
when the resolution was issued there were still
incidents pending such as the validity merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could
even be waived. Indeed,
of testimonies and affidavits of Roxas, Hanpol as bases
for preliminary investigation, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be
inquired into by the trial
the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed, the
clarifactory question that were court

supposed to be propounded by petitioner’s counsel to 2. Petitioner also alleged that there is no prima facie
Roxas and Hanapol. He also evidence, or probable cause, or

claims he was deprived of the opportunity to file sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and
his counter-affidavit to the prolonged public trial, on the
basis of the following grounds: probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof, and it does not
a. the questioned resolution of respondent
Gingoyon is full of factual place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.

misrepresentations or misapprehensions  The quantum of evidence now required in

preliminary investigation is

such evidence sufficient to “engender a well founded

b. respondent’s reliance on the decision of the
belief” as to the
Regional Trial Court against
fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s
Felipe Galarion suffers from constitutional and
probable guilt
procedural infirmities
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion
considering that petitioner was not a party thereto,
for the full and
much less was he given
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
any opportunity to comment on or rebut the
presentation of
prosecution evidence;
such evidence only as may engender a well grounded
c. reliance on Rogelio Hanopol’s testimony is likewise
belief that an
“contemptible,” it
offense has been committed and that the accused is
being merely hearsay in addition to the fact that
probably guilty
petitioner was never given
thereof.
the opportunity to cross-examine Hanopol at the time
he testified in court;  We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings
in the case at bar that
d. the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30, 1989, which is
the only evidence there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s
involvement in the
against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his
affidavit of retraction commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence
dated June 20, 1990.
presented and the facts obtaining therein.
 Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial,
and it is often the only GR: The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the
means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal
crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is
that an injunction will not
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution

determining whether a crime has been committed and XPN: Citing the case of Brocka et al vs Enrile
whether there is
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional respondent shall only have the right to submit
rights of the accused; a counter-affidavit, to

b. When necessary for the orderly administration examine all other evidence submitted by the
of justice or to avoid complainant and, where the

oppression or multiplicity of actions; fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions

to the parties or
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub
judice; their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority; right to examine or cross-examine.

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,  Thus, even if petitioner was not given the
ordinance or regulation; opportunity to cross-examine

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented
to testify during the
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas,
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
he cannot assert any
prosecution;
legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and
investigation precisely
motivated by the lust for
because such right was never available to him.
vengeance; and
 The admissibility or inadmissibility of said
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
testimonies should be ventilated
accused and a motion
before the trial court during the trial proper and not in
to quash on that ground has been denied.
the preliminary
- In this case, the circumstances of the case do not fall
investigation
in any of the exceptions.

3. As to petitioner’s contention that he was not granted Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
the opportunity of cross-
Manila
examination:
EN BANC
 It is a fundamental principle that the accused
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
in a preliminary

investigation has no right to cross-examine the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
witnesses which the
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
complainant may present.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
 Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
provides that the
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos,
Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace
Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced
by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case
was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San
Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not receive any payment
for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule
as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when
an attorney had been appointed to the position of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in
private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney
Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On
December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining
the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused
presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting
as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking
Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls
under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion
by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further
stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in
private law practice. This Order was appealed to the
CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20,
1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief.
There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the
right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her
interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides
that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend
of the offended party. It does not appear that
he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no
control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of
San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as
private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the
other hand, as already pointed out, the
offended party in this criminal case had a right
to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that
Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as
private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant
proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being
without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned
trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we
consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32
of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing
as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation
of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the
decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R.
NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie
cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the
court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations
to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to
compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscal’s certification in the
informations of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue
warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for
the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the
fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for
the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such
certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere
ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under
Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s certification and require
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable
cause.
Petition dismissed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-36906-07 July 27, 1987
ISAAC O. TOLENTINO, ESTEBAN MENDOZA, LADISLAO
ACERON, EUFRONIO ERNI, MARCIAL DIMAPILIS,
AGAPITO MENDOZA, CORNELIO MARAAN, JOSE
FERMA, EFREN MENDIOLA, ALFREDO NER, REGINO
PANGHULAN, RAFAEL BAYOT, AURELIO M. PARRA, and
SIMPILIO V. CASTILLO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th
Judicial District, TEODORO B. SANTOS, in his capacity
as Asst. City Fiscal of Pasay City and Trial Fiscal of the
Circuit Criminal Court and CRISANTO R. MOJICA and
ESPIRIDION MANALASTAS, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court dismisses the petition and upholds the
validity of the preliminary examination and
investigation conducted by respondent Judge in
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-43, Tagaytay City, of the now
defunct Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial
District as well as in Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-306,
T.C., on the controlling authority of Collector of
customs V. Villaluz and five other cases jointly decided
therewith, 71 SCRA 356,1 which held that judges of the
special circuit criminal courts2 are vested with the same
authority as judges of the regular courts of first
instance to conduct preliminary investigation of
offenses falling within their jurisdiction.
The first two petitioners were the Mayor and Vice-
Mayor, respectively, while the third up to the eleventh
petitioners were Councilors of Tagaytay City, during the
period involved. Bayot was the former treasurer of the
city while Parra and and Castillo were the Acting City
Auditor and incumbent Officer in-Charge, respectively,
of the City Treasurer's Office.
Respondent Teodoro B. Santos was the Assistant City
Fiscal of Pasay City and the trial fiscal assigned in
respondent Judge's sala. Respondent's Crisanto Mojica
and Esperidion Manalastas were the City Fiscal and
Asst. City Fiscal, respectively, of Tagaytay City.
The undisputed antecedent facts are as follows:
On or about January 25, 1973, private respondent
Fiscal Mojica filed a complaint against petitioners
Bayot, Parra and Castillo before the Circuit Criminal
Court at Pasig, Rizal, presided by respondent Judge, for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
their alleged refusal to pay his salary as City Fiscal of
Tagaytay City since June, 1969. The sworn complaint
docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-28-Tagaytay City, read as
follows:
That since June, 1969 and continuously up to
the present, notwithstanding repeated
demands and despite the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, concurred in by the Auditor
General, both known to said respondents, that
the salary of the City Fiscal may be paid out of
the appropriation for City Attorney, the said
respondents, conspiring together, with evident
bad faith or gross negligence in the
performance of their official duties, caused
undue injury to herein complainant by refusing
to pay his salary as City Fiscal of Tagaytay City at
the rate of P4,200.00 per annum.
Contrary to law.
After conducting a preliminary examination and
investigation of the complaint, respondent Judge on
January 29, 1973, issued in open court a resolution: (a)
ruling that under existing law, the City Fiscal was
entitled to receive the salaries from the City under
Section 3 of the Decentralization Act; (b) holding that
there exists a prima facie case against petitioners
Bayot, Parra and Castillo; (c) ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them; (d) directing the
respondent Fiscal to file the necessary information
within 48 hours; and (e) ordering respondent Fiscal to
"conduct the preliminary examination and
investigation in this case to determine the criminal
hability of all the members of said City Council and
thereafter to file the corresponding information in the
court of competent jurisdiction, if the evidence so
warrants.
Pursuant to the Order of respondent Judge,
respondent Fiscal Santos filed the information against
Bayot, Parra and Castillo for violations of Section 3 (e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
information, dated February 16, 1933, was docketed as
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1306-T.C.
On February 26, 1973 respondent Fiscal Santos
summoned all the members of the City Council for
preliminary investigation after which respondent
Esperidion Manalastas filed another complaint, dated
March 30, 1973, against the three officials charged in
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1306-T.C. This time, the
complaint also included then incumbent City Mayor,
Atty. Isaac C. Tolentino and City Councilors Alfredo Ner
and Efren Mendiola. The complaint, docketed as CCC-
VII-43, reads as follows:
That since October 11, 1971 and continuously
up to the present, notwithstanding repeated
demands and despite the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, concurred in by the Auditor
General, both known to said respondents, that
the salary of the Asst. City Fiscal may be paid
out of the appropriation for City Attorney, the
said respondents, conspiring together, with
evident bad faith or gross negligence in the
performance of their official duties, caused
undue injury to herein complainant by refusing
to pay his salary as Asst. City Fiscal of Tagaytay
City at the rate of P3,000.00 per annum.
Contrary to law.
Respondent Judge set the case for preliminary
investigation for April 5, 1973 and April 12, 1973. On
April 5, 1973, an "Urgent Motion to Quash/Dismiss"
the information was filed but respondent Judge denied
the same in his resolution of May 15, 1973.
On May 23, 1973, simultaneous Urgent Motions for
Reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Quash
the information were filed in Case No. CCC-VII-43 and
in Case No. CCC-VII-1306-T.C. which were likewise
simultaneously denied by respondent Judge in two
resolutions, both dated May 26, 1973.
Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge or any of his representatives from
continuing with the investigation and trial of Criminal
Case No. CCC-VII-1306 and of Criminal Case No. CCC-
VII-43 and to declare null and void all proceedings
taken and orders issued by respondent Judge in
connection therewith.
Petitioners assail respondent Judge's giving due course
to the two complaints and proceeding with the
preliminary investigation thereof as in violation of law
and the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process which allegedly constitute a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners
contend that Criminal Circuit Courts did not have the
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and
citing Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 5179 allege that said
special courts were created with limited jurisdiction,
concurrent with regular courts of first instance, to try
and decide only certain specific criminal cases.
As already indicated, petitioners' contention has been
rejected in the controlling cases of Collector
of Customs v. Villaluz, et al., supra. The Court's ruling
therein is fully applicable here, as follows:
What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is
the scope of the cases that may be tried by
Circuit Criminal Courts.
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited
jurisdiction, only because they cannot try and
decide all criminal cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as
courts of general jurisdiction. They can only
take cognizance of cases expressly specified in
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 126. Nevertheless,
they have the same powers and functions as
those conferred upon regular Courts of First
Instance necessary to effectively exercise such
special and limited jurisdiction. This is plain and
evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic
law, Republic Act No. 5179:
Section 3. The provisions of all laws and the
Rules of Court relative to the judges of the
Courts of First Instance and the trial, and
disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein
shall be applicable to the Circuit Judge and the
cases cognizable by them insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. ... Unless inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, the Circuit Criminal
Courts shall have the same powers as those
conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of
 Court upon regular Courts of First Instance,
insofar as may be necessary to carry their
jurisdiction into effect. 3
If the main purposes then in creating Circuit
Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of
the regular Courts of First Instance and to
accelerate the disposition of the cases therein
as well as stem the tide of criminality, it is only
logical that such authority vested in the judges
of the Courts of First Instance is likewise
conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. Otherwise,
the Courts of First Instance would still be
carrying the burden of conducting preliminary
investigations in those cases where Circuit
Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and
consequently delaying the trial and disposition
of criminal cases pending before such Courts of
First Instance.1avvphi1
That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No.
5179 clearly intended, by Sections 2 and 6
thereof, to clothe the Circuit Criminal Court
with all the powers vested in regular Courts of
First Instance including the authority to conduct
preliminary examinations and investigations, is
confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6452, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 44, Section
39 of which confers on Circuit Criminal Courts.
Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts concurrent original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
thereunder and expressly directs that the
"preliminary investigation of cases filed under
this Act shall be terminated within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of their filing". 4
In ruling that the power of preliminary examination
and investigation exercised by judges of Courts of First
Instance is also possessed by judges of the now
defunct Circuit Criminal Courts, the Court in the cited
cases admonished Circuit Criminal Courts judges to
refrain from encumbering themselves with the
additional burden of conducting preliminary
investigations of criminal complaints. The reminder
therein that the main task of trial judges is to
concentrate on hearing and deciding cases filed in their
courts and not to conduct preliminary investigations of
criminal complaints which are best left to the municipal
judge or provincial or city fiscal is equally applicable to
judges of the regular courts such as the Regional Trial
Courts, and is herein reiterated:
But while We sustain the power of the Circuit
Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary
examination (p. 36), pursuant to Our
constitutional power of administrative
supervision over all courts (See. 6, Art. X, 1973
Constitution) as a matter of policy, We enjoin
the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal
Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and
deciding criminal cases filed before their courts
(see Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29,
March 31, 1973). The primary purpose of the
creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in
addition to the existing Courts of First Instance,
as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load
of the Courts of First Instance as well as to
expedite the disposition of criminal cases
involving serious offenses specified in Section 1
of Republic Act 5179, as amended. Circuit
Criminal Judges therefore, should not
encumber themselves with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal
complaints, which they should refer to the
municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who
in turn can utilize the assistance of the state
prosecutor to conduct such preliminary
examination and investigation. 5
Another contention of petitioners is improper venue.
They alleged that "the Criminal Circuit Court has no
power, authority and jurisdiction to try and decide,
much less conduct the questioned preliminary
investigations of cases over crimes which allegedly
were committed in the Province of Cavite, because of
improper venue. The rule, it is true, is that "the Circuit
Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within
their respective districts." This rule, however, is subject
to the condition that "cases shall be heard within the
province where the crime subject of the offense was
committed" (Section 4, RA 5179) However, the law also
directs that "when the interest of justice so demands
with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may
be heard in a neighboring province within the district,"
which conditions do not exist in the instant petition
such as to justify the hearing in Pasig of an offense
committed in the Province of Cavite."
Petitioners cited correctly the provisions of Section 4 of
Republic Act 5179 but their contention of improper
venue must be rejected. The Court in its Resolution of
May 16, 1972 approving respondent Judge's petition
for authority to hear certain cases in Pasig, Rizal, had
granted respondent Judge a general authorization to
hear and decide all succeeding cases that may be filed
with his court from the province of Cavite and its three
cities, at Pasig, Rizal. The resolution is reproduced as
follows:
M-19-22 (In re: Petition for authority to hear
cases in Pasig, Rizal, Onofre A. Villaluz, Judge of
the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Seventh
Judicial District, petitioner).-Considering: (a) the
comment of Hilarion Maglabe, accused in
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1-974, Tagaytay City,
stating that he has no objection to the petition
of Judge Onofre A. Villaluz; (b) the
manifestation and comment of the Provincial
Fiscal of Cavite, interposing no objection to the
instant petition of said judge; and (c) the
supplementary manifestation and comment of
said Provincial Fiscal that in his eagerness to
comply with this Court's resolution of March
20, 1972, he failed to notice that Criminal Case
No. CCC-VII-939, Cavite, was filed directly with
the Circuit Criminal Court. The Court Resolved
to AUTHORIZE Judge Onofre A. Villaluz to
conduct the arraignment and trial of criminal
cases Nos. CCC-VII-939-Cavite & CCC-VII-940-
Cavite, entitled People v. Eliseo Calderon y de la
Cruz, CCC-VII-964-Cavite, entitled People v.
Nestor Bencito, et al., Hon. Maglabe, et al., and
all succeeding cases that may be filed with his
Court from the province Of Cavite and its three
cities, at Pasig, Rizal. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' argument that the two complaints cannot
be the subject of a judicial inquiry is without basis. It is
alleged that to compel petitioners to pay the salaries of
respondent fiscals is in effect an encroachment by the
courts into the council's power to legislate for it is
necessary that the council should pass a resolution to
appropriate the amount sufficient to cover the salaries
claimed by respondent fiscals.
It is clear from the records that the payment of the
salaries of respondent fiscals had been authorized by
the Auditor General pursuant to an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice. Moreover, as gleaned from the
resolution dated January 29, 1973, respondent Judge
found that the payment of salaries of respondent
fiscals find justification under Section 3 of the
Decentralization Act in relation to Section 25 of the
said act. Thus, respondent Judge in the exercise of his
discretion, after considering the evidence presented at
the preliminary investigation and concluding that the
petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to pay
respondent fiscals' salaries properly ordered the filing
of the informations.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the
restraining order issued is lifted and set aside. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44910 November 29, 1976
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF SERAFIN G. CRUZ. SERAFIN G.
CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. ROMEO GATAN of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August
30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along Kennon Road,
Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, under the command of
respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial
interrogation, where he is presently detained.
On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf wherein it
was claimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held
incommunicado; that he is restrained of his liberty
without due process of law and is in the custody of the
respondent not by virtue of a judgment or court order;
that he is not a member of any subversive organization
covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and falls within the
class of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has not been suspended. 1
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable
to the Court on Friday, November 12, 1976 at 3:00 p.m.
and required the respondent to make a return of the
writ not later than Wednesday, November 10, 1976. 2
Admitting that the petitioner has been arrested and
detained, the respondent justifies such arrest and
detention as having been legally ordered by the
President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
powers under martial law claiming that Serafin G. Cruz
was arrested by virtue of Arrest, Search, and Seizure
Order No. 4122, dated August 28, 1976, issued by the
Secretary of National Defense, for violation of Art. 147
of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations), Serafin
G. Cruz being the "Over-all Commander and Contractor
General of the Bataan Defenders Command," an
unregistered veterans outfit, at the time of his arrest. It
is further claimed that his continued detention is the
free will and volition of the petitioner who expressed
fears that he might be harmed or injured by some
members of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if he
were free from custody while the mastermind and legal
counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio Baylon
Buenafe, has not yet been arrested. 3
On November 17, 1976, counsel, who filed the petition
in behalf of Serafin G. Cruz, filed a comment on the
return saying, among others, that after November 12,
1976, he talked with Serafin G. Cruz and the latter
avowed his preference to stay within the confines of
Camp Olivas, notwithstanding the subsequent arrest of
the said Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, thus rendering
the issues raised in the petition unnecessary and/or
irrelevant. 4 Then, at the hearing of the case, Serafin G.
Cruz manifested to the Court that he prefers to stay
under protective custody. Under the circumstances,
there is no other recourse but to dismiss the case.
But, be that as it may, under General Order No. 2-A, as
amended, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972,
ordered the Secretary of National Defense "to arrest or
cause the arrest and take into custody and to hold
them until otherwise ordered released by me or by my
duly designated representative: 1. Such persons as may
have committed crimes and offenses in furtherance or
on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion as defined in
Articles 134 to 138 of the Revised Penal Code, and
other crimes against public order as defined in Articles
146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, and 156 of the
same Code; ...
The petitioner in the instant case was arrested and
detained by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure
Order issued by the Secretary of National Defense for
violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code
pursuant to the aforequoted General Order No. 2-A, as
amended; hence, his arrest and continued detention is
legal. The declaration of martial law and the
consequent suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably
believed or charged to be engaged in the disorder or in
fomenting it having been settled in the case of Aquino,
Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile etc., et al., 5 any inquiry by this Court
into the continued detention of the petitioner would
be purposeless.
WHEREFORE, the instant case should be, as it is hereby,
DISMISSED. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando (Chairman), J., concurs in the result.
239 Phil. 468
CRUZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the petitioners challenge the
admission by the respondent judge of evidence seized
by virtue of an allegedly invalid search warrant and of
an extrajudicial confession taken from them without
according them the right to assistance of counsel.
[1]
They seek to restrain further proceedings in the
criminal case against them for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act (which we have suspended)[2] and
ask that they be acquitted with the setting aside of the
questioned orders.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, suggests that
the petition should be dismissed as it is not alleged
therein that the respondent judge has committed grave
abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction. He adds that if any reversible error has
been committed, it may be corrected not in this
petition but in an ordinary appeal, which may not even
be necessary if the petitioners are exonerated.[3]
The petitioners, in their Reply, do not meet these
arguments head-on, thus impliedly admitting the
formal defect in their petition, but submit that
technicalities should yield to substantial questions in
the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary or
protracted litigation. Their contention is that since
there are important constitutional issues involved,
these questions should be decided in this petition
instead of having them debated and resolved first in
the lower court in accordance with the usual
procedure, to the prejudice of the speedy disposition
of their case.[4]
We are not usually persuaded by this kind of argument,
since procedural rules are intended precisely to insure
an orderly administration of justice. Rights are best
established in accordance with the procedure laid
down by the adjective law, which is as binding on the
parties as the substantive law since they are supposed
to complement each other. The Solicitor General is
obviously correct in faulting the petition and in
contending that, besides being defective, it is not the
proper remedy at this time. There is no disputing this
stand.
Worthy of note in this connection is the separate
opinion of the present Chief Justice in Joseph v. Villaluz,
[5]
where he declared that:
"... the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not
overrule in a special civil action the trial court's
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for
failure or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence
since it cannot review in such special civil action the
prosecution's evidence and decide here and now in
advance that it has or has not established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners-
accused. The orderly procedure prescribed by the
Rules of Court is for the accused to present their
evidence after which the trial court will on the basis of
the evidence presented before it by both the
prosecution and the defense render its judgment of
conviction or acquittal. If the verdict be one of
acquittal, the case ends there. If it be a verdict of
conviction, then appeal is the proper remedy - and
such appeal in order to have a review of the trial
court's findings of fact lies within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals."
We reiterate the rule here.
Even so, the Court has decided, without detracting
from the validity of the above-cited observations, to
deviate from the established procedure on this matter
and to categorically resolve the issues presented in the
case before us. The challenged orders are, indeed,
interlocutory. Nevertheless, a restatement of the
principles governing such issues will, it is expected,
simplify the proceedings in the court below and speed
up the disposition of the criminal case against the
petitioners.
The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by
the respondent judge is unconstitutional because it
does not indicate the specific offense they are
supposed to have committed. There is, therefore,
according to them, no valid finding of probable cause
as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in
conformity with the Bill of Rights. In support of this
argument, they cite Stonehill v. Diokno,[6]where Chief
Justice Concepcion struck down the search warrants
issued therein for being based on the general
allegation that the petitioners had committed
violations of "Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code."
He declared:
"In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect
to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal law."
We have examined the search warrant issued in the
instant case and find it does not come under the
strictures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited,
there was a bare reference to the laws in general,
without any specification of the particular sections
thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of
the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such
codifications. There is no similar ambiguity in the
instant case.
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant
states that it is in connection with "Violation of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Acts of
1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that
"there is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes
alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No. 628 Comia St.,
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their
possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated
above."[7] Although the specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no
question at all of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of
the description to be made of the "place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The petitioners also fault the admission of the
extrajudicial confessions which they had given without
the assistance or advice of counsel and cite Section 20
of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution providing
that "any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
In the separate sworn statements taken from Adolfo
Olaes and Linda Cruz on September 24, 1982,[8] it
appears that both petitioners were, before being
examined, specifically informed of their right to the
assistance of counsel, which would be provided them
by the investigating office at their request. Asked if
they understood, they said "Opo" and affixed their
signatures opposite their answer. This was followed by
a statement entitled "Pagpapatunay" or Verification in
which they said inter alia that they did not need the
assistance of counsel ("Hindi ko na kailangan ang
tulong ng isang manananggol.") which they also
signed. It was only after these preliminary precautions
had been taken that the interrogation began and was
recorded in the sworn statement later introduced
against them at their trial.
There is no claim that any force, violence, intimidation
or threat or any means vitiating the free will was
employed against them. Their only objection to the
extrajudicial confessions is that they were obtained
without the assistance of counsel. They do not aver in
their petition that they were not apprised of their right
to counsel or that they were denied the assistance of
counsel when they asked for it, or, indeed, that they
had asked for it.
Even so, their investigation did not conform to the
requirements laid down in People v. Galit,[9] where we
declared:
"At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it bein the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone
on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
These requirements were made even stricter under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
providing as follows:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel."
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him."
Applying the above rules, we reach the conclusion that
the extrajudicial confessions should be declared
inadmissible as evidence against the herein petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. The
extrajudicial confessions are excluded but the articles
seized under the challenged search warrant may be
admitted in evidence. Our temporary restraining order
of May 25, 1987, is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60504 May 14, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS MELITON C. GERONIMO, petitioner
vs.
LT. FIDEL V. RAMOS IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE
CONSTABULARY AND THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-60591 May 14, 1985
MELITON C. GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN PENDRE, AND THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 60732-39 May 14, 1985
MELITON C. GERONIMO AND 75 OTHER PERSONS
NAMED AS ACCUSED IN THE VARIOUS COMPLAINTS
ATTACHED TO THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO E. JAVIER, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE OF
BARAS, RIZAL and TERESA, RIZAL, SIMPLICIO C.
PAGTALONAN ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
RIZAL, FORTUNATO U. MALABANAN, INP Station
COMMANDER of BARAS, RIZAL and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:
These interrelated petitions arose from the controversy
over the mayoralty elections in 1980, wherein the
petitioner who was elected to the post of mayor of
Baras, Rizal was subsequently disqualified as a
candidate for mayor by this Court's affirmance of the
Commission on Elections' decision on the ground that
he was a political turncoat.
The controversy stemmed from the following
uncontroverted facts:
On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre
filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C.
Geronimo from running as a candidate for the
mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political
turncoatism.
After hearing the petition, the COMELEC on January 19.
1980 issued Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Meliton
C Geronimo. On January 22, 1980, Geronimo filed a
motion to reconsider the said resolution, and on
January 28, 1980 or two days before the elections, he
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to restrain
the COMELEC from implementing its resolution. Or. the
same day, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order against the COMELEC.
In the elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo
obtained a margin of 325 votes when he garnered
2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera's
2,370 votes. On March 11, 1980, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the proclamation
made earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the winning
candidate for mayor but the proclamation was
declared temporary subject to the decision of this
Court on the petition for certiorari filed by Geronimo.
On September 26, 1981, this Court rendered a decision
in G.R. No. 52413, entitled "Meliton C. Geronimo v.
Commission on Elections and Julian C. Pendre",
dismissing the petition for certiorari and ordering the
lifting of the restraining order of January 28, 1980. We
ruled that Geronimo was disqualified to run as a
candidate for mayor for being a political turncoat. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied with finality on January 19, 1982.
On February 15, 1982, the COMELEC issued the
questioned resolution No. 82-428 which set aside the
temporary proclamation of Geronimo "it appearing
that the disqualification of said respondent Geronimo
had been finally decided by the Supreme Court ..." and
which further provided for the following:
1. To declare the certificate of candidacy of Meliton C.
Geronimo for the position of Mayor in the January 30,
1980 elections null and void from the beginning;
2. To declare all votes cast for Meliton C. Geronimo for
Mayor in the January 30, 1980 elections as "STRAY"
votes;
3. To proclaim Bayani A. Ferrera, who garnered 2,370
votes, as the duly elected Mayor of Baras, Rizal in the
January 30, 1980 elections:
4. To direct Meliton C. Geronimo to turn over to Bayani
A. Ferrera the position and office of Municipal Mayor
of Baras, Rizal.
On February 15, 1982, Geronimo filed a motion to
defer action which was denied by the COMELEC in
Resolution No. 82429.
On February 17, 1982, Geronimo filed a motion for
reconsideration followed on March 18, 1982 by an
urgent motion to set aside COMELEC Resolution Nos.
82-428 and 82- 429 with motion to enjoin Bayani
Ferrera from exercising the functions of the mayor of
Baras, Rizal. On March 22, 1982, the COMELEC denied
Geronimo's motion for reconsideration.
On May 3, 1982, the petitioner together with some of
his political followers of more than fifty persons
entered en masse the Municipal Hall of Baras,
occupied its premises and continued to do so until May
13, 1982, causing a paralyzation of official business in
the municipality. During this period, Ferrera held office
in his own house. Parenthetically, Geronimo did not
enter the office of the mayor but stayed in another
room in the municipal building.
On May 4, 1982, Pendre filed with the COMELEC a
motion to cite and declare Geronimo in contempt. On
May 10, Geronimo amended his urgent motion of
March 18, 1982 and further moved to have the oath of
office of Bayani A. Ferrera declared premature,
ineffective, and void.
On May 12, 1982, the COMELEC after hearing, issued
Resolution No. 82-605, finding Geronimo guilty of
contempt and sentencing him to suffer an
imprisonment of five (5) months and to pay a fine of
P1,000.00. In said resolution, the COMELEC simply
"noted" Geronimo's urgent motion because of its
previous denial of his motion for reconsideration. The
amended urgent motion was likewise "noted", since it
was declared a mere repetition of what was already
decided by the COMELEC.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of May 14,
1982, Geronimo and his followers, mostly women were
forcibly taken out of the municipal hall of Baras, Rizal
by the military with tile use of teargas grenades. Gun
shots were also fired by the Philippine Constabulary.
Some of Geronimo's followers retaliated with empty
bottles when they heard the breaking of the glass
windows of the room where Geronimo was staying.
The petitioner was seized, handcuffed, and brought to
the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa, Rizal.
Sometime between the months of April and May, 1982,
a series of criminal charges were filed against
Geronimo and his followers namely: Usurpation of
Authority [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)];
Violation of Usurpation of Authority of Official (sic)
[Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Tumultous Affray
[Art. 153, RPC]: Sedition (Art. 139, RPC); Illegal
Possession of Firearms; Disobedience to a Person in
Authority or the Agent of such Person (Art. 151, RPC)
and Alarm and Scandal (Art. 155, RPC).
On May 19, 1982, Geronimo filed a petition for habeas
corpus alleging that there is no legal basis for his arrest
and detention since the COMELEC's resolution no. 82-
605 holding him in contempt was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 60504.
On May 27, 1982, this Court issued a resolution
ordering the release of Geronimo on his own
recognizance, pending the determination by this Court
of the petition's merits.
On May 31, 1982, Geronimo filed another petition
docketed as G.R. No. 60591, seeking to annul and set
aside COMELEC's resolution no. 82-605 declaring
petitioner in contempt of the COMELEC and which also
dismissed petitioner's motion to set aside COMELEC
resolution nos. 82-428 and 82-429.
The third petition was filed by Geronimo and seventy-
five (75) others on June 16, 1982, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 60732-39, seeking the dismissal of the criminal
complaints earlier filed against them in the months of
March, April and May, 1982.
In the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, Geronimo maintains that there is no legal basis
for his detention. He contends that the resolution of
the COMELEC ordering his detention was issued with
grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction.
Geronimo anchors his charge that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion on three grounds:
(1) that the questioned resolution was not properly
promulgated; (2) that Ferrera did not acquire the
plurality of votes for the mayorship of Baras; and (3)
that Julian Pendre who filed the motion for contempt
had no personality to institute the same because he
did not file his candidacy for the position of mayor, of
Baras, Rizal.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which governs
contempt proceedings only requires—(a) that a charge
be made in writing and (b) that an opportunity be
given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel
for certain acts enumerated in said rule, after which a
person may be punished for contempt. As we held
in Aguador v. Enerio (37 SCRA 164), "... there is no
particular form prescribed by the Rules of Court in
which a contempt charge shall be framed or described.
There is also no requirement in the Rules of Court that
a copy of the contempt charge shall be served on the
respondent named therein when it is filed in court. All
that Section 3, Rule 71 (formerly Rule 64) requires on
this matter is that a charge in writing be filed. The
respondent in a contempt proceeding is, of course,
entitled to know the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, but this requirement is
properly satisfied when the court, after the respondent
appears before it, reads to the respondent the
complaint or furnishes him a copy thereof." Likewise,
during the promulgation of the decision, the accused-
respondent need not be present. It is enough that he is
notified of the same either personally or by registered
mail. Since the petitioner was duly notified of the
charges against him and was given an opportunity to
be heard, after which he was informed and shown a
copy of the COMELEC resolution finding him guilty of
contempt, there was sufficient compliance with the
due process requirement in the contempt proceeding
against him.
The fact that Ferrera did not acquire the plurality of
votes for the mayorship of Baras and the fact that
Julian Pendre did not file his candidacy for the said
position are both immaterial to the charge of
contempt. What is important is whether or not the
petitioner committed contumacious acts in utter
disregard of the COMELEC resolution which was issued
pursuant to the decision of this Court.
The record shows that after hearing the petition filed
by Juan C. Pendre, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8305 disqualifying Meliton C. Geronimo for political
turncoatism. The decision was based on Section 10,
Article XII-C of the Constitution prior to its amendment
in 1981 and on Presidential Decree No. 1661 and Batas
Pambansa No. 52. As earlier stated, this decision of
COMELEC was affirmed by this Court. Two motions for
reconsideration were denied with finality and a third
motion for reconsideration was no longer considered
for deliberation but was merely noted. The regrettable
defiance by the petitioner of a COMELEC decision
affirmed by this Court and declared final is sufficient
basis for the exercise of the contempt power.
Nonetheless, we take certain factual considerations
into account. The petitioner was acting under strong
political pressures from his followers. His defiance of
the COMELEC may have been based on an erroneous
interpretation of the turncoatism provisions of the
Constitution and statute as shown by our decision in
G.R. No. 52413 dismissing Mr. Geronimo's petition.
However, the emotional impulses which prodded him
to act as he did must be understood in the light of his
successful campaign for the mayorship and the
happenstance that "turncoatism" was and remains a
highly controversial and perplexing concept. As a
matter of fact, the Constitution and the statute have
been amended to allow political "turncoats" to run for
member of the Batasang Pambansa in the last
elections.
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent COMELEC when it held the petitioner guilty
of contempt. However, we find the penalty of five (5)
months imprisonment to be harsh. Time and again, this
Court has held that the power to punish for contempt
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the
retaliatory Idea of punishment. (See Repeque v.
Aquilizan, 130 SCRA 258; Lipata v. Tutaan, 124 SCRA
880, citing Gamboa v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270; and People
v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265; Yangson v. Salandanan, 68
SCRA 43, Balasabas v. Aquilizan, 106 SCRA 502; and
Sulit v. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 211-212).
We rule, therefore, that the thirteen (13) days during
which the petitioner was confined in the National
Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal more than suffice for
the purpose of serving his sentence for contempt.
The second petition filed by Mr. Geronimo docketed as
G.R. No. 60591, seeks to annul the same COMELEC
Resolution No. 82-605, subject matter of the first
petition for two reasons: (1) it declared petitioner
guilty of contempt; and (2) it dismissed petitioner's
urgent motion to set aside COMELEC Resolution Nos.
82-479 and 82-429 which, among others, proclaimed
Ferrera as the winning candidate and directed herein
petitioner to turn over to the former the position and
office of the Municipal Mayor of Baras, Rizal.
As we have already disposed of the issue of contempt
in the first petition, we shall deal only with the other
matter covered by the questioned resolution.
The petitioner maintains that the COMELEC exceeded
its power and jurisdiction when it proclaimed Bayani A.
Ferrera as mayor of Baras, Rizal, in spite of the fact that
he did not obtain the plurality of votes in the January
30, 1980 municipal elections.
We find this contention impressed with merit.
In the case of Yason v. Comelec (G.R. No. 52731,
January 31, 1985.), we ruled that:
In elections, the first consideration of
every democratic polity is to give effect
to the expressed will of the majority. It is
true that constitutional and statutory
provisions requiring compliance with
measures intended to enhance the
quality of our democratic institutions
must be obeyed. The restriction against
turncoatism is one such measure.
However, even as there should be
compliance with the provision on
turncoatism, an interpretation in
particular cases which respects the free
and untrammelled expression of the
voters' choice must bee followed in its
enforcement.
The importance of the people's choice must be the
paramount consideration in every election, for the
Constitution has vested in them the right to freely
select, by secret-ballot in clean elections, the men and
women who shall make laws for them or govern in
their name and behalf. The people have a natural and a
constitutional right to participate directly in the form of
government under which they live. Such a right is
among the most important and sacred of the freedoms
inherent in a democratic society and one which must
be most vigilantly guarded if a people desires to
maintain through self-government for themselves and
their posterity a genuinely functioning democracy in
which the individual may, in accordance with law, have
a voice in the form of his government and in the choice
of the people who will run that government for him.
(See also U.S. v. Iturrius, 37 Phil. 765). Thus, it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed
as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number
of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental Idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and
no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does
not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
This is particularly true where, as in this case, there is
only one other candidate who ran for the public office.
The votes for the deceased or non-qualified candidate
are still expressive of a public clamor that the majority
of the voters do not like the losing candidate to be
their representative or to hold the reins of government
for them.
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that
the candidate who lost in an election cannot be
proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate
who won is found ineligible for the office to which he
was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
Again, the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the
election is quite different from that
produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office. ... If it
be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner,
and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of
the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. ...
The result is a failure of elections for that particular
office. The winning candidate is not qualified and
cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected. A
permanent vacancy is thus created.
Section 48 of the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Big. 337, which provides:
SEC. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the
Office of the Governor, City or Municipal
Mayor.. — (l) In case a permanent
vacancy arises when a governor, city or
municipal mayor refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies or is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office, the
vice-governor, city or municipal vice-
mayor, as the case may be, shall assume
the office for the unexpired term of the
former.
xxx xxx xxx
merely reiterates the established and more democratic
rule to meet the situation present in this case.
It is, therefore, patent that the COMELEC committed a
grave error when it proclaimed the defeated candidate,
Bayani Ferrera, elected to the office of mayor. After the
ineligibility of Geronimo had been ascertained and
after his proclamation was set aside, the COMELEC
should have proclaimed the vice-mayor as entitled to
the office and not Ferrera who failed to obtain the
plurality of votes in the election.
Anent the third petition, G.R. Nos. 60732-39,
petitioners maintain that the criminal charges filed
against them are "excessive and harsh, obviously
vindictive, harassing, intimidating and prosecuting,
aimed primarily at discouraging and unnerving Meliton
C. Geronimo from asserting his right to the mayorship
of Baras to which the electorate of Baras, many of
whom are his co-accused in the many criminal suits
pending against them, has elected him.
It is an undisputed fact that all the criminal charges
were the result of the events that transpired before
and until the May 14,1982 incident, when Mr.
Geronimo was forcibly taken out of the municipal
building of Baras by the military. The charges were also
filed almost successively: one on March 20; one on
April 12; one on April 14; two on May 4, two on May
14, and one on May 19,— and with the same court and
presided over by the same judge. In one of the criminal
complaints wherein about 75 people were charged, the
warrants of arrest were issued on the same day that
the preliminary examination was conducted. Such a
hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of conducting
the preliminary examination to determine probable
cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest and
eventually for the filing of the necessary information
cannot be sanctioned by this Court. A judge must first
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. The
requirements are strict. (See Placer v. Villanueva, 126
SCRA 463). The examination must be legitimate and
not a feigned one intended to justify a course of action
already predetermined.
In the very recent case of Salonga v. Patio, et al, (G.R.
No. 59924, February 18, 1985) we had occasion to
underscore the importance and purpose of a
preliminary investigation and how it should be
conducted if it is to conform with the paramount
requirements of due process. In that case we ruled:
The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive
 prosecution, and to protect him from an
open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety
of a public trial, and also to protect the
state from useless and expensive trials.
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing
Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The
right to a preliminary investigation is a
statutory grant, and to withhold it would
be to transgress constitutional due
process. (See People v. Oandasan, 25
SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy
the due process clause it is not enough
that the preliminary investigation is
conducted in the sense of making sure
that a transgressor shag not escape with
impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only the purposes of the
State. More important, it is a part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair play
which are birthrights of all who live in
our country. It is, therefore, imperative
upon the fiscal or the judge as the case
may be, to relieve the accused from the
pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case
or that no probable cause exists to form
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused. Although there is no general
formula or fixed rule for the
determination of probable cause since
the same must be decided in the light of
the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not
disregard the facts before the judge nor
run counter to the clear dictates of
reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or
fiscal, therefore, should not go on with
the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up
during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold ...
Similar caution is warranted for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. In the case at bar and especially
considering the background circumstances which led to
the filing of charges, we find it highly improbable for
the judge to be able to determine the existence of
reasonable grounds to believe that the offenses have
been committed and that each and everyone of the
seventy-six (76) persons are probably guilty thereof in a
matter of a few hours and to proceed with the issuance
of the warrants of arrest also on the same day. It
should be remembered and the judge should have
taken into account that all the offenses which were
allegedly committed were only the product and result
of the outburst of the feelings and emotions of the
people of Baras due to the highly tense situation in the
municipality, which culminated with the May 14, 1982
incident. The judge, therefore, in conducting his
preliminary investigation should have ascertained with
double care if, indeed, there was ample evidence to
warrant the issuance of arrest warrants and eventually
the filing of criminal informations against such a big
number of persons, most of whom were impelled by
different motivations and whose respective
participations were of varying natures and degrees.
One of the crimes charged was sedition, a particularly
grave offense not to be lightly treated by any
prosecuting officer or judge. The possibility of
prolonged detention because of the charge should
have been considered.
In view of the above considerations and, as suggested
by the Solicitor-General in his manifestation made
during the hearing on these petitions, embodied in our
resolution dated May 29, 1984, the warrants of arrest
issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Teresa, Rizal are
recalled and the matter is referred to the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal who is directed to determine whether or
not the preliminary examinations should be continued
and, thereafter, to make a ruling on the results of any
examination.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 60504, the petition for habeas
corpus is hereby GRANTED. The penalty for contempt
of the Commission on Elections is declared fully
satisfied; the petitioner's bail on his own recognizance
is CANCELLED; and he is restored to his liberty.
In G.R. No. 60591, the petition is GRANTED in part. The
resolution of the Commission on Elections proclaiming
Bayani A. Ferrera duly elected mayor of Baras, Rizal is
SET ASIDE. A permanent vacancy having arisen in the
Office of Mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume the office
after taking his oath and qualifying.
In G.R. Nos. 60732-39, the petition is GRANTED in part.
The warrants of arrest issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Teresa, Rizal are RECALLED as null and void.
The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal is ORDERED to determine
whether or not the preliminary examinations should be
continued and, thereafter, to take the appropriate
action on the matter, according to the tenor of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., I reserve my vote.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs Jaime Salazar
186 SCRA 217 – Political Law – Separation of Powers –
SC Cannot Change Law
Statutory Construction – The Court Can Only Interpret
Laws
Criminal Law – Complex Crimes – Compound Crimes –
Rebellion Absorbs Common Crimes
Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure – Bail; When
available
Constitutional Law – Warrant of Arrest – Judge Should
Personally Determine Probable Cause
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was
issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from
the failed coup attempts against then president
Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to
the seriousness of the crime charged against him.
Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later
filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his
detention and alleging that the crime being charged
against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no
such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the
landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was
ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with
common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper
crime that should have been charged against him
is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it
only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes
(from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the
warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that
it was impossible for the judge to have been able to
examine the voluminous record of the case from the
prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional
provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of
arrest after personally determining the existence of
probable cause has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that
the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it
should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be
abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined
probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court
also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D.
942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine.
The said law provided that graver crimes may not be
complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon
Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power
granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution).
That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the
rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still
stands. The courts cannot change this because courts
can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the
rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to
strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is
correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with
murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed.
He can only be charged with rebellion – which is
bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge
Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue
the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him
despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite
a voluminous record from the preliminary investigation
it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within
which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to
assume that he had not, or could not have, so
complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed.