CHAPTER VI: THE NON ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGEON CLAUSE
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to
property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2)
tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay”
with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote
on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of
the Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of
the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to
freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-
based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to
property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for
the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes
judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes
upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion
to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question,
it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence
of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost
deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this
right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in
this case, organ of government before a court may come into
the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already
an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat
of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their
pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power
to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of
these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the
tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence
the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal
opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are
covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received
as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,”
“fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption
of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule
will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is
readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private
property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon
by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of
the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of
a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account
not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but
to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may
take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
IMBONG VS. OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of
the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law
be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of
the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
 The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application
or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In the
scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and
the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them.” To him,
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary
in that balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears
emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the
view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not
only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle
the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional
law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly
are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit
with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral wellbeing of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination
is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is
well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough
as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed
of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control
the population growth.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him,
“fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum
is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This
theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any
legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning
of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation
has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to
health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions
are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That
is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –… in
case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the support
of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church … are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should
be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does
have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH
Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The Court is of
the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an
act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If
he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief
and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-
coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they
fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7
and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck
down for being violative of the freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected. The punishment of
a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive
health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which
the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over
the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged
by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall
adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidate
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate
is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion
and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers
also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service
they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion,
force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made
a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does
not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent
with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should
be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA
does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is
the only government entity empowered to render such services
and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that
are associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health
products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to
ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From
the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time,
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains
to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of
skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582April 8,
2010
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006
as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again
filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it
was dismissed on moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the
COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that “the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nation’s. Until the time
comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot
ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have slipped into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a
party-list organization under RA 7941.
HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside
the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC
to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system
on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general
application relating to elections be applied to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003.
FACTS:
Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, admittedly while still
married to another, cohabited to Luciano Quilapio, Jr. since
1980, who was himself married to another. Escritor and
Quilapio had a nineteen-year old son. Alejandro Estrada, the
private complainant herein, was not personally related to
Escritor nor did he personally know her. However, he wanted
the Court to declare the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio as
immoral in consonance with the pertinent provision of the
Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that
under the rules of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of
whom she is a member, the act of signing a Declaration
Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which
would otherwise be classified as adulterous and bigamous.
Escritor and Quilapio's declarations are recorded in the Watch
Tower Central office. They were executed in the usual and
approved form prescribed by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society which was lifted from the article, "Maintaining Marriage
in Honor Before God and Men," in the March 15, 1977 issue of
the Watch Tower magazine, entitled The Watchtower. Escritor
alleged that in compliance with the foregoing rules, she and her
partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness in 1991,
and by virtue of such act, they are for all purposes, regarded as
husband and wife by the religious denomination of which they
are devout adherents. Although in 1998 Escritor was widowed,
thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her
mate is still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
remain valid. Once all legal impediments for both are lifted, the
couple can already register their marriage with the civil
authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases. The
elders in the congregations can then solemnize their marriage
as authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore, insofar as
the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about
the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should
carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on
illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.
HELD:
While Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio conforms to the
religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the cohabitation
violates Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot
interfere with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
in the same way that the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot interfere
with the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise
of religion protects practices based on religious grounds
provided such practices do not violate existing laws enacted in
the reasonable exercise of the State's police power. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, one of the grounds for
disciplinary action is "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service." The penalty for a first offense is suspension of six
months and one day to one year. A second offense is
punishable with dismissal from the service. Escritor, however,
deserves the same compassionate treatment accorded to a
similarly situated court employee in De Dios v. Alejo if Escritor
should end her unlawful relationship with Quilapio. In De Dios,
the Court, in deciding not to dismiss an employee because he
finally terminated his cohabitation with another woman Given
the circumstances, it would deem unduly harsh to penalize
Escritor for cohabiting for the last 23 years with a man she
believes is her husband and she knows is the father of her son.
No third party has claimed or suffered injury because of their
cohabitation. On the contrary, suspending or even dismissing
her for her continued cohabitation would only work hardship
on her family. Accordingly, respondent Soledad S. Escritor is
suspended for six months and one day without pay for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. However, the
suspension shall be lifted immediately upon Escritor's
manifestation to this Court that she has ceased cohabiting with
Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent Escritor is
warned that her continued cohabitation with Quilapio, during
or after her suspension and while Quilapio's marriage with his
legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty of dismissal from
the service.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Laurel, J.:
FACTS:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies
of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member
of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President.
In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director
of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States
the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were
actually issued and sold though the greater part remained
unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the
petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23,
Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the
issuance and selling of the commemorative postage stamps. It
was provided therein that, ‘No public money or property shall
ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces
or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.’
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation
of the principle of separation of church and state
HELD: NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general
welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who
guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act
No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue
postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume
that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and
selling the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of
a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken,
a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting
aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional
inhibition. The court resolved to deny the petition for a writ of
prohibition.
ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of
Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by
means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No.
6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during
the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor
as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused
to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext
that it was the property of the church because church funds
were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution,
filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required
bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed
an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to
the subject image contending that when they were adopted,
the barangay council was not duly constituted because the
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to
participate; and that they contravened the constitutional
provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of
religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or
church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for
purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with
barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela,
Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration"
every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente
Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds
for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and
cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money
for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The
construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion
or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One
of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when
the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or
illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of
the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his
image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution,
the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the
monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
GLESIA NI CRISTO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B.
GIRONELLA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ABRA,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It is easily understandable why Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr. on
behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo would take umbrage on the
portion of the opinion of respondent Judge Leopoldo B.
Gironella in the course of acquitting the defendants accused of
Triple Rape. Thus: "it will also be observed that Florencio Ola
was released on July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken by him
from July 28, 1979, to August 21 to denounce to the proper
authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife Merlinda
Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Her husband Florencio Ola and her in-laws were still in the
process of being convinced to become members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also
consulted her brothers of the Iglesia ni Cristo as it was thru
their assistance that made possible the institution of this
action. Her husband and in-laws are now members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing
of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to the
community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in
general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its
member of his/her problem." 1 There was absolutely no need
for the last sentence therein being included. Respondent judge
was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming a member of the bench. While the offending
portion of such opinion is not impressed with such gravity,
disciplinary action nonetheless is warranted.
As noted in the report of Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova,
adopting the memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator
Romeo D. Mendoza: "Respondent judge, in his comment dated
January 20, 1981, alleged that the charges made against him by
herein complainant are unfair and unfounded as the decision
rendered by him in Criminal Case No. 2003, acquitting the three
cranad(3) accused of Triple Rape, was prepared by him in the
honest conviction that the evidence adduced at the trial of said
case was not sufficiently clear to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent judge further
contended that the statements complained of are his honest
appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the statement of the complainant witness
cranad(Merlinda Ola), in addition to the fact that she had
always been accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers
of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of the sect." 2
There was a reply on the part of complainant, Teofilo Ramos,
Sr. who, according to the report, "claimed that the statement
made by the herein respondent judge that the complaining
witness had always been accompanied in court during the trial
by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of
said sect, was uncalled for and intended to further malign the
Iglesia ni Cristo, thereby seriously putting under doubt
respondent judge's competency and integrity as a magistrate of
the law. He also claimed that the inconsistencies in the
testimony of the rape victim in the said criminal case were
minor matters that did not disprove the commission of the
crime of rape by the members of the police authorities as well
as their identities. Complainant proferred as an excuse for said
inconsistencies the fact that the victim is a simple and
unlearned housewife and no malicious motive or evil intent had
been shown at the trial which had impelled said victim to point
an accusing finger against the three cranad(3) accused in the
subject criminal case." 3 In the state of the record, it was
submitted in such report that "on the basis of the pleadings and
other documents of record, respondent judge's liability or lack
of it can already be determined without need of further
investigation. Accordingly, the undersigned finds it unnecessary
to refer this case to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation. This Court, in the case of Sta. Maria. v. Ubay, held
that 'cumbersome, time-consuming procedure of investigation
need not be resorted to if the allegations in the complaint, the
comments thereon, and the documents presented provide
ample basis for a resolution of the complainant's charges.'" 4
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution.
The use of the word "gimmick" could offend the sensibilities of
the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state
that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly
complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or
device to persuade others to take a course of action, which
without it may not be acceptable. While it would be going too
far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could have
that effect. The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri,
comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused
of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts would
certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion 5 implies
respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is
privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a
derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the
attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds
support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is
safeguarded by the fundamental law. 6 No adverse implication
can arise from such an occurrence. It goes without saying that if
their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of
a trial judge to maintain the proper decorum.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the
right of a court to give expression to its views is equally
deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to
rationality if note be taken that not all members of the bench
are possessed of such an extensive vocabulary in the English
language that the misuse of a word is to be followed
automatically by reprisal of a severe character. While under the
circumstances, some members of the Court are of the opinion
that censure is warranted, it is the view of the majority that an
admonition would suffice.
WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby
admonished to be much more careful in the use of language
likely to offend an individual or religious sect.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957
Facts:
· American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency
established in Manila in November, 1898
· City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that
are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila
· American Bible Society has been distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine dialect
· City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society
that it was violating several Ordinances for operating without
the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the
corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the
period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
· To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society
paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees under protest
· American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000,
and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of
Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not
required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
· City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed,
reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in question
· Trial Court dismissed the complaint
· American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals
Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for
the distribution and sale of bibles
Ruling: NO
· Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in
question, person or entity engaged in any of the business,
trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a
Mayor’s permit and license from the City Treasurer. American
Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated
· However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that
all other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except
those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax
P5.00
· Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend
upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade
or occupation.
· 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and
fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of
books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on
dealers in general merchandise, including importers and
indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject
to the payment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in
general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers
and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers,
general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes:
namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential
commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license
shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of
different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not
be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if
he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by
ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such,
as may be provided by ordinance
· The only difference between the 2 provisions is the
limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail
dealer has to pay per annum
· As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, the power to impose
a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in
the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship
which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal
fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of
policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It
is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the
pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.
· Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax
the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can
close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse
· Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the
National Internal Revenue Code, Corporations or associations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . .
or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the
income of whatever kind and character from any of its
properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for
profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
· The price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American
Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said "merchandise" for profit
· Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing
so it would impair American Bible Society’s free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing
considerations, we hereby reverse the decision appealed from,
sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45
unduly collected from it
Fortunato Pamil vs Victorino Teleron
December 2, 2011
86 SCRA 413 – Political Law – Inviolability of the Separation of
Church and State
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for
mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as
mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo
warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of
Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the
1917 Revised Administrative Code:
…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
office ecclesiastic, soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge
Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is
repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows
ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the
1935 Constitution, “No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.” If the the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section
2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective
office. However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme
Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8)
which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to
be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be
granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set
aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty
position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can
one who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in
duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with
church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the
church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands
because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service
and persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial
or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public
elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of
1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall
ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file
their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no
longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The
Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories
formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code,
“ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the
municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices
under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they
being not included in the enumeration of person’s ineligible
under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons
possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly
disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public
office.”
Benjamin Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
December 5, 2011
59 SCRA 54 – Political Law – Primacy of the Constitution over
Contractual Rights
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has
been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since
1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being
enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on
the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain
employment in the said factory one must be a member of the
said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from
EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the
close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the
INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being
a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his
resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which
notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano
due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF
reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement
because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is
unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and
ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal
rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union
and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the
factory where he was employed, his employment could not be
validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority
therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not
to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes
both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of
contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right
to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the
primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.
Reli German vs Santiago Barangan
December 4, 2011
135 SCRA 514 – Political Law – Religious Freedom vs Clear and
Present Danger Doctrine
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP
Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But
they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering
the church because the same is within the vicinity of the
Malacañang. And considering that German’s group is
expressively known as the August Twenty-One Movement who
were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed
that they were not really there to worship but rather they are
there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to
worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom to
worship and locomotion.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or
restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion,
but only in the manner by which they had attempted to
translate the same into action. There has been a clear
manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al to
practice their religious belief but not in the manner that
German et al impressed. Such manner impresses “clear and
present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to
curtail it even at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to
worship.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure then from
what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if
on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most
fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among
human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his
Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful
claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in
times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace
and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of
mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is devoid of
meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of
worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and
peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -
even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference
to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying
phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must
be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of
such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both
petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present
danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons
within the premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as
the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to
insure against any public disturbance or violence.
GERONA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET
AL.
G.R. No. L-13954
August 12, 1959 MONTEMAYOR, J.
EN BANC
FACTS:
1. When RA 1265 (An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsary In
All Educational Institutions) took effect, the Sec. of Education
issued Dept. Order No. 8 prescribing the rules and regulations
for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony.
2. The said order mandates that a proper salute must be given,
or at least standing still with arms and hands straight at sides
along with the singing of the National Anthem and recital of the
pledge. However, petitioners’ children attending the Buenavista
Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to do so.
3. This was because, as members of Jehova’s Witnesses, they
believe that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to
that of laws enacted by the State. This is based on a verse
which states:
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou
shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them.”
They consider that the flag is an “image” within this command
and thus refuse to salute it. Because of this, they were expelled
from the school.
4. The counsel of petitioners wrote to the Sec. of Education that
the children be allowed to just remain silent and stand still with
their arms and hands straight at their sides. This was, however,
denied along with the children’s reinstatement.
5. An action was then filed before the CFI with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction but the complaint was dismissed.
Hence, the present petition with the SC issuing a temporary
writ subject to the result of the case.
ISSUE: Should the department order be upheld?
RULING: Yes. The CFI decision was affirmed and the writ of
preliminary injunction was dissolved.
1. First, there was no question with the act of saluting since the
department order allows that students can just stand still with
their arms and hands straight at their sides. The issue was
focused on the singing of the national anthem and the recital of
pledge.
2. The court eventually held that if the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and
with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. The reasons are:
a. the flag is not an image nor the flag ceremony a religious rite;
the flag is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty.
b. the wordings of the patriotic pledge or the national anthem
does not have anything that is religiously objectionable as they
speak only of love of country, patriotism, liberty and the glory
of suffering and dying for it.
c. the State was merely carrying out its constitutional duty to
supervise and regulate educational institutions and see to it
that all schools aim to develop civic conscience and teach the
duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution).
d. considering the separation of the State and Church, the flag
does not have any religious significance.
e. also, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not
a religious ceremony must rest with the court; it cannot be left
to a religious group or sector to its follower as there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meaning to be given as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.
f. as emphatically stated, if a man lived on an island, alone and
all by himself, he would normally have complete and absolute
rights as to the way he lives, his religion, including the manners
he practices his religious beliefs with no laws to obey, no rules
and regulations to follow; but since man is gregarious by nature
and instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive
and enjoy the benefits of society, he becomes a member of a
community or nation; thus, he has to give up rights for the
benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general welfare, just as
his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of
their rights in his favor.
g. also, exempting the children will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority; other pupils would naturally ask
for the same privilege because they might want to do
something else such as play or study; if this exemption is
extended, then the flag ceremony would soon be a thing of the
past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the
time will come when we would have citizens untaught and
uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and
love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism
— a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small
portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded
and was granted an exemption.
3. US jurisprudence made as basis:
a. Reynolds vs. US – the law prohibited polygamy which was
allowed for Mormons
“Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his
religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”
b. Hamilton vs. University of California – the university requires
military science and tactics training but the objectioners believe
that war and preparation for war is a violation of their religious
belief
– it was held untenable. The Court stated that California did not
call them. They sought education in the university and the due
process clause secured by law will be violated if they are to be
exempted from the training.
In this case, having elected not to comply with the regulations
about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public
schools.
c. Minersville School District vs. Gobitis – same facts with
present case; the US Supreme Court upheld the conduct of flag
ceremony but after 3 years, it was reversed in West Virginia
State Board of Education vs. Bernette. This was only because in
the latter case, the parents are to be prosecuted criminally if
their children are not in school. It turned out as a dilemma with
the authority against individual rights so the Court then
approved the exemption. However, it is not the ruling in the
present case.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in the latter case stating:
“The constitutional protection of religious freedom … gave
religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom
from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma…”
Ebralinag v Cebu G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
J. Grino-Aquino
Facts:
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their
classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and DECS
Department Order No. 8 which stipulated compulsory flag
ceremonies in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God"
They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the
State. They allege that the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against
official control.
Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education- In requiring school
pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious
belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing
a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, Any teacher or student
or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony
may be dismissed after due investigation. (This was due to
Gerona)
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints
about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools,
who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the
Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade
the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum.
In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked
to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect
promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on
their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of
allegiance to the flag.
However, things took a turn for the worst. In the Daan
Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog,
ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted
to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute
Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend
public schools."
43 students were subsequently expelled after refusing to sing.
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who
were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who
succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of
Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some
more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
The petitioning students filed on account of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents in violating their due
process and their right to education. They alleged for the nullity
of the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of petitioners from
their respective schools, prohibiting respondents from further
barring the petitioners from their classes, and compelling the
respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order
the re-admission of petitioners to their respective schools. They
also prayed for a TRO.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-
admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further
orders from this Court.
The OSG commented on the defense of the expulsion orders
and claimed that the flag salute was devoid of any religious
significance and the State had compelling interests to expel the
children.
Issue: Whether school children who are members or a religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from
school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of
their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to
the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare.
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in
the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external
acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. Ie. they stand quietly during
the ceremony.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the
exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and
present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and
duty) to prevent.
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's
Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem
and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population"
will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a
nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and
admiration for national heroes
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will
bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand
of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for dully constituted authorities.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even
to the country — assuming that such unity and loyalty can be
attained through coercion — is not a goal that is
constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses

from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive
free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to
make such education accessible to all

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the

Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however
"bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them
a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the
warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, while the
highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise
of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should
commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If
they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while
their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent.