Sierra vs. People g.r. no.
182941 july 3 2009 - 53 l and by means of the qualifying circumstance treache
People vs. Medina g.r. no. 113691 feb 6 1998 - 47
People vs. Tabag g.r. no. 116511 feb 12 1997 - 39
Ty vs. People g.r. no. 149275 sept. 27 2004 - 34
People vs. Genosa G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004 -
7
People vs. Artuz G.R. No. L-23386, May 26, 1976 - 4
People vs. Casas G.R. No. 212565 Feb. 25, 2015 - 1
G.R. No. 212565 February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN CASAS y VINTULAN, Accused-Appella
nt.
DEC IS ION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accu
sed-appellant Benjamin Casas y Vintulan (Casas) assai
ling the Decision2 dated November 20, 2013 of the C
ourt of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313
which affirmed the Decision3 dated November 4, 201
1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 1
60 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, fin
ding Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the cri
mes of Murder and Attempted Homicide under Article
s 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), resp
ectively.
The Facts
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the R
TC charging Casas of the Murder of Joel Tabile y Gu
lla4 (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz
y Ricardo6 (Eligio), the pertinent portions of which re
spectively read:
Crim. Case No. 136842
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in
the City of San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with another person, whose true identity an
d present whereabouts are unknown, with the use of a
bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill
and by means of the qualifying circumstance treachery
(sic), evident premeditation and abuse of superior str
ength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and fel
oniously attack, assault and stab one Joel Tabile y Gu
lla, thereby inflicting upon the latter several stab wou
nds on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Crim. Case No. 136843
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in
the City of San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with another person, whose true identity an
d present whereabouts are unknown, with intent to kil
1
ry, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strengt
h, which qualifies the crime to frustrated murder, with
the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, did, t
hen and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously att
ack, assault and stab one Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, there
by inflicting upon the latter several stab wounds on th
e different parts of his body, which ordinarily would
have caused his death, thus, performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of murder
as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not prod
uce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused, that is, due to the timely medical assistan
ce rendered unto said Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, which p
revented his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.8
During arraignment, Casas entered a plea of not guilty
. After which, joint trial on the merits ensued.9
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows:
On December 24, 2007, between 1 to 2 o’ clock in th
e afternoon, Casas, accompanied by a certain "Ron-Ro
n" (Ron-Ron), went to a certain taho factory located a
t 313 F. Roman Street, San Juan City, looking for a c
ertain Jesus. Failing to find the person he was looking
for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail
used for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an emplo
yee of the tahofactory, confronted Casas, saying to the
latter, "Benjie[(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang
mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang kalaban mo, dapat ha
napin mo na lang." Casas replied "Gusto mo ito? (ref
erring to his knife)." Eligio told Casas to get rid of th
e knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio and
Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee,
Casas took the knife from Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligi
o twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his
continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, f
or his part, tried to help Eligio with the use of a bam
boo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the
floor, and was prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbe
d him twice, the first blow entering his back and exiti
ng at the front of his torso, and the second blow hitti
ng the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to ov
ertake Eligio, and stabbed him again on the stomach.
Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a p
lastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing
the latter to drop the knife and cease the attack. PO1
Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he wa
s riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident wh
en he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who as
ked for assistance as the latter saw a bloodied male.
The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, w
ho turned out to be Casas, and asked him what happe
ned. The latter replied that he had just stabbed someo
ne. After confirming that there was indeed a stabbing
incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arreste
d Casas.10
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a de
murrer to Evidence11 on the basis of the alleged inco
nsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witne
sses, which the RTC denied in an Order12 dated Dec in that position Joel could not defend himself. Accor
ember 30, 2010.13 With the demurrer’s denial, the de dingly, it ruled that Casas employed treachery in killi
fense changed its theory as Casas admitted that he sta ng Joel, and thus should be convicted for Murder.20
bbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed self-defense t
As for Eligio, the RTC opined that though Casas’s int
o justify his actions.14 In particular, Casas claimed th
ent to kill the former was present (as shown by the w
at he was a former employee of the taho factory and
eapon he used, the number of wounds he inflicted, his
that on December 24, 2007, the date of the incident,
resolution to chase and harm Eligio after the latter fl
his former employer asked him to get the remainder o
ed, and the parts of Eligio’s body that Casas injured),
f his salary. While at the factory, Joel challenged him
the circumstances that would qualify the case to Murd
to a fight. Casas averred that he refused to accept Joe
er were not attendant; therefore, Casas should be conv
l’s challenge, but the latter took a knife and attacked
icted only of Homicide in such respect. The RTC also
him. During the alleged attack, Casas posited that he
ruled that the said crime was only in its attempted st
suffered minor injuries when he disarmed and stabbed
age given that the prosecution was not able to prove t
Joel. Eligio and one Rolando Jaronel witnessed the fi
hat he performed all the acts of execution which woul
ght, and when they saw that Casas stabbed Joel they
d consummate the Homicide,21 nor show the nature o
began to attack him also. In order to protect himself,
f Eligio’s wounds.22
Casas repeatedly stabbed Eligio. He maintained that h
e did not intend to kill Joel.15 Dissatisfied, Casas appealed23 to the CA.
The RTC Ruling The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated November 4, 2011, the RTC co In a Decision24 dated November 20, 2013, the CA af
nvicted Casas of the following: firmed the RTC’s conviction of Casas but modified th
e amounts awarded to ₱75,000.00 in civil indemnity,
(a) in Crim. Case No. 136842, Murder (of Joel), there
₱12,500.00 in actual damages, ₱37,200.00 in loss of e
by sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion p
arning capacity, ₱30,000.00 in moral damages, and ₱3
erpetua, with all the concomitant accessory penalties,
0,000.00 in exemplary damages for the Murder of Joe
and ordering him to pay the amounts of ₱50,000.00 i
l. As for the Attempted Homicide of Eligio, it awarde
n civil indemnity, ₱12,500.00 in actual damages, ₱37,
d ₱25,000.00 in temperate damages, and ₱10,000.00 i
200.00 in loss of earning capacity, ₱30,000.00 in mor
n moral damages, in order to conform with recent juri
al damages, ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages, and co
sprudence.
sts; and
Aggrieved, Casas filed the instant appeal.25
(b) in Crim. Case No. 136843,Attempted Homicide (o
f Eligio), thereby sentencing him to suffer an indeter The Issue Before the Court
minate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and six The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not
(6) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and Casas’s conviction for the crimes of Murder and Atte
ordering him to pay the amount of ₱14,000.00 as tem mpted Homicide should be upheld.
perate damages, and costs.17 The Court’s Ruling
It declared that the evidence on record did not suppor The appeal is partly meritorious.
t Casas’s theory of self-defense, observing that the vic
tims showed no unlawful aggression towards Casas. O The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liabi
n the other hand, the prosecution’s witnesses invariabl lity.
y testified that it was Casas who wielded a knife, bro
Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from
ught it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prost
the denial of his demurrer, banks on the justifying cir
rate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing, establishi
cumstance of self-defense in order to overturn his con
ng that Casas was the aggressor. Further, it was point
viction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homi
ed out that Casas suffered only nine (9) injuries, consi
cide. The statutory basis therefor is Article 11 (1) of t
sting of three (3) abrasions, one (1) contusion, and fiv
he RPC which reads:
e (5) incised wounds, which did not, collectively or in
dividually, threaten his life at any time.18 Conversely, Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.— The following do
Joel was killed because of the stab wounds that Casa not incur any criminal liability:
s inflicted, while Eligio was stabbed multiple times. A
s such, the second requirement under Article 11 (1) of 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights
the RPC, i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means , provided that the following circumstances concur:
employed to repel the unlawful aggression, was non-e First. Unlawful aggression;
xistent.19
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
Meanwhile, the RTC found that Casas stabbed Joel tw to prevent or repel it;
ice when the latter slipped, fell, and lay prostrate, and

2
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of th
e person defending himself.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is sati
sfied that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly
pronounced that the above-mentioned requirements we
re not present in this case. It is significant to point ou
t that upon invoking the justifying circumstance of sel
f-defense, Casas assumed the burden of proving the ju
stification of his act with clear and convincing eviden
ce. This is because his having admitted the killing req
uired him to rely on the strength of his own evidence,
not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, w
hich, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved i
n view of his admission.26
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggr
ession on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is a
condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there ca
n be no self-defense unless the victim committed unla
wful aggression against the person who resorted to sel
f-defense.27 As shown by the records, it was Casas w
ho was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who
wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on
Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he w
as fleeing.28 Being the party initiating the attack, and
overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot succ
essfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Ver
ily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there m
ust be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or im
minent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or inti
midating attitude,29 as against the one claiming self-d
efense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between E
ligio and Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggres
sion was employed by the former against the latter co
nsidering that Eligio had already yielded from the bra
wl and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It is well-settled th
at the moment the first aggressor runs away – if and
so such was the case with respect to Eligio – unlawfu
l aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases t
o exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the def
ender no longer has any right to kill or wound the for
mer aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defe
nse, is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun
by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was
still existing when the aggressor was injured by the a
ccused.30
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggressi
on was not proven, Casas’s claim of self-defense falte
rs and his criminal liability stands.
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees th
at Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder
with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No. 13684
2, i.e., the death of Joel, considering the prosecution’s
failure to prove the existence of treachery. The Court
3
expounds. The elements of Murder that the prosecuti
on must establish are: (a) that a person was killed; (b)
that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated
in Article 248 is treachery.1âwphi1 Under Article 14
of the RPC, "[t]here is treachery when the offender co
mmits any of the crimes against the person, employin
g means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its executio
n, without risk to himself arising from the defense wh
ich the offended party might make." In other words, t
o appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the
means of execution employed gives the victim no opp
ortunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the met
hods of execution were deliberately or consciously ad
opted;31 indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it mus
t be proven by clear and convincing evidence.32
In People v. Se,33 the Court explained that the essenc
e of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforese
en attack on the victim, without the slightest provocati
on on the latter’s part. The victim must not have kno
wn the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the
attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was
forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fl
eeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, the
n the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be a
ppreciated.34
In People v. Discalsota,35 the Court held that treacher
y cannot be appreciated in instances when the victim
had the opportunity to flee or defend himself.36
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued b
etween Eligio and Casas.37 Joel, seeing that Casas ha
d stabbed Eligio, wanted to help the latter by using a
bamboo pole but slipped and fell.38 As he was lying
prostrate on the floor, Casas delivered the blows that
ended Joel’s life. Under these circumstances, it is the
Court’s observation that Joel was fully aware of the d
anger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas w
as armed with a knife and had just used the same on
Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed hims
elf with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvi
ous that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Furt
her, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being
no showing that no appreciable interval of time had
elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to al
low for the assailant’s careful reflection, it does not e
qually appear that Casas deliberately adopted means i
n order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defe
nd himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just happened
to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor
when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently,
this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well
as Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life,
prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifyi
ng circumstance. Thus, insofar as the incidents in Cri
m. Case No. 136842 go, the Court downgrades the co
nviction to the crime of Homicide. In consequence, C
asas is instead meted with the penalty of imprisonmen
t with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and on
e (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
all the concomitant accessory penalties, for the Homic
ide of Joel.
The downgrading of Casas’s conviction in Crim. Case
No. 136842 results in the deletion of the award of ₱
30,000.00 in exemplary damages.39 Further, keeping
with recent jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to inc
rease the award of moral damages from ₱30,000.00 to
₱75,000.00,40 as well as delete the award of ₱12,50
0.00 in actual damages and, in lieu thereof, award te
mperate damages in the higher amount of ₱25,000.00.
41 The Court also perceives error in the award of ₱3
7,200.00 in loss of earning capacity since the establish
ed formula thereof was incorrectly applied.
The formula for the computation of loss of earning ca
pacity is as follows:42
Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Ann
ual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual i
ncome)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of
the deceased).
Thus, operating under the established facts as found b
y the RTC that Joel was 22 when he was killed by C
asas, and that he had monthly salary of 1,000.00 to 1,
500.00 as a utility man,43 the loss of earning capacity
is computed as such:
Net earning capacity = [2/3(80-22)] x [(1500 x 12) - (
(1,500 x 12) x 50%)]
= [2/3(58)] x [₱18,000.00 - ₱9,000.00]
= ₱348,000.00
Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is
increased from ₱37,200.00 to ₱348,000.00 as above-c
omputed. Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of ₱7
5,000.00 stands.44
In similar light, the Court modifies the award of mora
l damages in Crim. Case No. 136843from ₱10,000.00
to ₱20,000.00 to conform with recent jurisprudence.45
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per an
num shall be imposed on all damages awarded, in bot
h Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, from the date
of finality of judgment until fully paid.46
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fa
ct and conclusions of law in the Decision dated Nove
mber 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313 with MODIFICATION in th
at, in Crim. Case No. 136842, considering that the qu
alifying circumstance of treachery was not proven, acc
used-appellant Benjamin Casas y Vintulan is found G
UILTY beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of
4
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Cod
e and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of i
mprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6) y
ears and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, t
o seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maxi
mum, with all the concomitant accessory penalties.
Further, in order to conform with existing jurispruden
ce, the following monetary awards are MODIFIED: in
Crim. Case No. 136842, (a) the award of ₱12,500.00
in actual damages is deleted and, in lieu thereof, ₱25
,000.00 in temperate damages is awarded; (b) the awa
rd of loss of earning capacity is increased from ₱37,2
00.00 to ₱348,000.00; (c) the award of ₱30,000.00 in
moral damages is increased to ₱75,000.00; and (d) the
award of ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages is delete
d; and in Crim. Case No. 136843, the award of ₱10,0
00.00 in moral damages is increased to ₱20,000.00. In
addition, all awards for damages, in Crim. Case Nos.
136842 and 136843, shall bear legal interest at the ra
te of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of fi
nality of judgment until fully paid.
The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-23386. May 26, 1976.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appell
ee, vs. PAMFILO ARTUZ, defendant-appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jose A. Ambrosio and Patrio
C. Avendaño for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, First Assistant So
licitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Norbert
o P. Eduardo for appellee.
SYNOPSIS
While the accused was trying to pacify the fig
ht between deceased and a certain Panganiban, the de
ceased, with a weapon, rushed at the accused. They g
rappled for the weapon until the accused succeeded in
taking possession thereof. The accused brandished th
e weapon to warn the deceased, but, the latter continu
ed to rush at the accused. At this point, the accused h
it the deceased which resulted in the latter's death.
The lower court found the accused guilty of h
omicide with the attendant mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and incomplete self defense and
sentenced him to two years, four months and one day
of prision correcional as minimum, to six years and o
ne day of prision mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the Supreme Court finding that acc
used was entitled to the justifying circumstances of se
lf-defense, reversed the lower court's decision and acq
uitted the accused.
SYLLABUS
 1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUM
STANCES; SELF DEFENSE; ACCUSED ENTITLED
THERETO IN CASE AT BAR. — Where, as in the
case at bar, where the accused was attacked by the de
ceased with a weapon and thereafter the two grappled
for it with the accused succeeding in getting hold of t
he weapon who warned the deceased not to continue
with the assault, but, unheeding, the deceased continu
ed to rush at the accused, in view of which the accus
ed was forced to the hit the deceased which caused th
e latter's death, the accused is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of self defense and therefore should be
acquitted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID., TEST OF RATIONALITY.
— The test of rationality is not what a man should d
o under normal circumstances and with time for cool
reflection present. It is rather how an individual in su
ch dire situation, with the grim prospect of loss of lif
e, would react. The law wisely takes into consideratio
n the well-nigh irresistable force of the instinct of self
preservation. From the case of the United States vs.
Patala, 2 Phil 752, promulgated in 1901, to People vs.
, Boholst-Caballero, L-23249, November 25, 1974, the
Court has been steadfast and unwavering in its adher
ence to such a test of rationality. There is no justificat
ion for a departure from such a norm.
DECIS ION
FERNANDO, J p:
It is a sad fate that every once in a while a p
erson, peace-loving and law-abiding, contrary to his w
ishes but unable to control events or to anticipate wha
t pugnacious and bellicose trouble makers may have i
n mind, is compelled to resort to force in self defense
, in the course of which the aggressor may suffer phy
sical injuries or even death. So it did happen in this c
ase resulting in a prosecution for murder of the accus
ed Pamfilo Artuz, now appellant. The lower court, mi
ndful of the circumstances to be hereafter narrated, di
d find that there was indeed an unlawful aggression a
nd that there was no provocation on his part. In view
of its belief, however, that there was lack of reasonab
le necessity for the means employed, it held that there
was incomplete self-defense. Accordingly, appellant
was sentenced to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum. Nonetheless, f
ully cognizant as it was that the fatal incident could n
ot be ascribed to a criminal intent on the part of appe
llant, it did allow his provisional release on liberty wh
ile his appeal was being prosecuted. A vigorous case
for the reversal of the decision for acquittal was filed
by his counsel, Attorney Estanislao A. Fernandez, late
r appointed to this Court, but now retired. 1 The brief
for the People of the Philippines submitted by the th
en Solicitor General. Justice, Felix V. Makasiar, joine
d the plea for his acquittal. After a careful examinatio
n of the evidence of record, we are persuaded that sel
f defense had indeed been shown as there was more t
5
han reasonable necessity for the means employed. The
conviction is set aside, and the appellant is acquitted.
LLpr
The facts of record were presented and apprai
sed in the able brief for appellant in their most favora
ble light from his standpoint, as was to be expected.
The cause of objectivity and impartiality may be bette
r served by setting forth the facts according to the bri
ef of appellee, the People of the Philippines Thus: "Si
nce appellant raises only a legal issue, he is deemed t
o have accepted the finding of facts made by the trial
court. The facts of the case and the conclusions of the
Court therefrom are as follows: 'These facts are prov
en: Leoncio Panganiban was the object of an assault
perpetrated by Dominador Rallonza and companions;
Panganiban informed Artuz about the incident and the
latter immediately went down the house to report the
matter to the authorities. Panganiban and Rallonza m
et Pat. Amorosa and while the three were walking the
y met Rallonza's group. A fight again ensued between
Panganiban and Dominador Rallonza. Artuz separated
Rallonza from Panganiban after which Rallonza rushe
d at Artuz with a weapon in his hand. Rallonza and
Artuz grappled for the weapon until Artuz succeeded i
n grabbing it. After Artuz was in possession of the w
eapon . . . and when Rallonza continued to rush at hi
m, Artuz stabbed Rallonza first in the lower chest and
later twice at the back. Under the above facts, it can
not be said that there was reasonable means employed
by accused Artuz in repelling the aggression of Rallo
nza. After Artuz had taken possession of the weapon
and Rallonza had nothing more in his hand, the mena
ce or danger to the life of the accused ceased or was
greatly minimized . . . Although the claim of self-defe
nse is not established by clear and convincing evidenc
e, the facts show that accused is at least entitled to an
incomplete self-defense which minimizes to a certain
extent his criminal responsibility. The Court does not
give much weight and credit to the testimony of the p
rosecuting witnesses tending to show that the stabbing
of Rallonza was done with treachery. As found by th
e Court it was the deceased who commenced the unla
wful aggression first against Leoncio Panganiban and
then to the herein accused and that accused did not gi
ve any provocation for such aggression for undoubtedl
y it was Rallonza, who at that time was under the inf
luence of liquor, who gave the provocation for the inc
ident. These circumstances disprove the charge of mur
der; instead they show that Artuz fought back to defe
nd himself against Rallonza, but the means employed
by him were not reasonable and commensurate to the
danger in which he was placed at the time he became
master of the situation . . . " 2
There was a manifestation of fealty to the cre
ed that should animate the prosecuting arm of the gov
ernment when the then Solicitor-General Felix V. Ma
kasiar, now a member of this Court as previously not
ed, after appraising the above facts concluded that app
ellant had demonstrated that he was entitled to the jus
tifying circumstance of self-defense. His acquittal is th tacked the former. There was a struggle, with the acc
erefore in order. As set forth at the outset, this Court used having succeeded in getting the weapon away fr
is of the same mind. llcd om his assailant who, however, tried to recover the w
eapon. Thereupon, the accused retreated a little, freed
1. Appellee's brief analyzed both the contentio
his right hand from the grasp of his opponent, and inf
n of counsel for appellant and the reasoning followed
licted the wounds, from the effects of which the dece
by the lower court in rejecting the claim of self-defen
ased died four days later. This Court, speaking throug
se. Thus: "It is the contention of appellant's counsel t
h Justice Street, holding that the means employed was
hat after appellant had wrested the weapon (tres canto
reasonable, pointed out: "Under these circumstances i
s) from the deceased, the struggle had not ceased, for
t is but natural that the appellant should have used th
the danger to the appellant still existed because it was
e same weapon to defend himself, and more properly
not impossible that the deceased could recover the w
so because his antagonist was larger and stronger than
eapon and thereafter used it against appellant. It is arg
himself. In dealing with situations of this kind some
ued that even after the appellant had wrested the wea
allowance must be made for the excitement naturally i
pon from the deceased, the latter continued to advanc
ncident to the physical contest; and it cannot fairly be
e toward him despite the fact that he was swinging th
said that in using the bolo as he did, the appellant p
e weapon from left to right and warning the deceased
assed beyond what was reasonably necessary for his o
not to approach him. The deceased must have been u
wn defense. It might very well have happened that th
nreasonably emboldened by the alcohol he had taken t
e deceased would have recovered the bolo, and, enrag
hat, unheeding of the warnings given by the appellant,
ed as he then was, the most probable thing is that he
he rushed at the latter, in the course of which he wa
himself would have struck the appellant with the wea
s hit by the weapon the chest. In the continuing strug
pon, inflicting perhaps a fatal injury, or injuries, upon
gle, the deceased was also twice at the back. With su
him. In the light of these considerations, we are of th
ch as a background, the trial court concluded that, eve
e opinion that the appellant should be acquitted." 7 T
n assuming that the first wound on the chest was infli
he brief for the appellant relied on the first Philippine
cted in self-defense, the wounds subsequently inflicted
case in point, United States v. Patala, 8 decided in 19
at the back of the deceased was not reasonably dema
01, and thereafter United States v. Molina, 9 decided
nded by the circumstances 'since the menace or dange
in 1911. The opinions in both cases came from Justic
r to the life of the accused ceased or was greatly mini
e Mapa. In United States v. Patala, it was shown that
mized.'" 3 Appellee's brief then referred to what it ch
the accused, who was a member of the crew in an int
aracterized as revealing incidents: "1. That the decease
er-island vessel, was performing his task cleaning the
d and his gang mauled up Leoncio Panganiban for no
fish to be served the passengers when all of a sudden
reason at all than the apparent they get from such un
the cook, believing that some fish were missing, slapp
warranted assaults (p. 3, t.s.n., Dec. 12, 1962); 2. Tha
ed and kicked him. The accused ran away; he was pu
t the deceased and his gang were notorious for these
rsued and attacked with a knife. Then, as stated by Ju
sadistic activities in that vicinity (p. 2, t.s.n., Aug. 26,
stice Mapa, "taking advantage of some favorable chan
1963); 3. That the deceased and his gang defied poli
ce during the struggle, [he] succeeded in wresting the
ce authority, in the person of policeman Urbano Amor
knife from the deceased and inflicted upon him a wou
osa, who tried to stop them from assaulting Leoncio P
nd in the left side, from the result of which he died a
anganiban when they, instead, rushed at the latter evid
few hours later. " 10 It was then set forth: "The aggr
ently because they were irked when Leoncio Panganib
ession on the part of the deceased was in every respe
an pointed them to the policeman as his assailants (pp
ct unjustified, and the defendant had a perfect right to
. 6-7, t.s.n., Feb. 5, 1963; p. 21, t.s.n., Feb. 28. 1962);
repel the attack in the most adequate form within his
4. That in the ensuing free-for-all, the deceased first
power under the critical circumstances of a sudden a
wounded the appellant on the knee with the death we
ssault." 11 United States v. Molina, 12 the evidence d
apon and when the latter wrested possession thereof, t
isclosed that the accused went to the house of the dec
he deceased still pressed the attack until he was stabb
eased hoping to settle amicably a dispute that arose w
ed on the chest (p. 7, t.s.n., Feb. 5, 1963; p. 10, t.s.n.,
hen his son, who was living with the latter's daughter
Sept. 2, 1963); 5. That the struggle continued on wit
as his common-law wife, left her. His mission was un
hout let-up for about a minute longer when the deceas
successful, for upon reaching that place, the accused
ed still [persisting in his efforts to] recover the death
was insulted and then assaulted with a bolo. While he
weapon, was stabbed on the back and thereafter he fel
had no weapon with him, he fought with the aggress
l down to the ground (p. 16, t.s.n., Feb. 28, 1962) . .
or and was able to get hold of the bolo. With it, he i
. " 4 Its conclusion, with which we are in agreement,
nflicted the wound which proved fatal. In holding that
is that "appellant is entitled to the justifying circumsta
the means was reasonable and that the plea of self-d
nce of self-defense." 5
efense was entitled to acceptance, Justice Mapa emph
2. The brief for the appellee relied on People asized: "Considering the decidedly aggressive attitude
v. Pancho. 6 It was shown in that case that a controv of the deceased from the commencement this struggle
ersy having arisen between the accused and the decea until its termination, it can not be said that there was
sed who was at fault, the latter seized his bolo and at a cessation of the danger for the accused, even for a s
6
ingle instant. If, through the various incidents of the s
truggle, or any favorable accident whatever, the decea
sed had succeeded in recovering the bolo or in posses
sing himself of the hatchet, as he attempted to do to t
he last, the result of the combat would probably have
been very different; perhaps the accused, instead of be
ing the slayer, would himself have been killed. The a
ccused certainly was not duty-bound to expose himsel
f to such a contingency, and while the struggle contin
ued, and, consequently, the danger to his person or to
his life subsisted, he had a perfect and indisputable ri
ght to repel such danger by wounding his adversary, i
f necessary, as from the circumstances of the case it
was, and even to disable him completely so that he c
ould not continue the assault. In our opinion, the mea
ns employed by the accused were rationally necessary
to repel the assault, and as the latter was in all respec
ts unlawful and was not preceded by any provocation
of any kind on the part of the accused himself, we de
clare the said accused to be exempt from criminal lia
bility, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
4 of article 8 of the Penal Code." 13
3. It may not be amiss to point out that in ad
dition to Justice Mapa, the other two in the illustrious
group of Filipino jurists who were first appointed to
this Court, Chief Justice Arellano himself and Justice
Torres, viewed the matter similarly. In United States v
. Gesmundo, 14 a 1907 decision, the accused used a
pen-knife against the deceased, who held him by the
neck. As succinctly put by Chief Justice Arellano: "D
eath resulted from the wounds inflicted. The character
istic elements of self-defense are here well defined, an
d anyone acting under such circumstances is relieved
from criminal responsibility. " 15 United States v. Par
as, 16 promulgated that same year, the accused used a
revolver after having been assaulted and knocked do
wn by the deceased. With his nose bleeding and whil
e still being kicked by the aggressor, he fired several
shots at his assailant. Again, this Court held that was
a proper case of self-defense, the means employed bei
ng reasonable, the essential point being "that without
any known cause or reason, Florencio Paras, in the da
rkness of night, was assaulted in a brutal manner by J
ames Reed, who knocked him down, and the assaulte
d party in self-defense fired at his assailant several sh
ots with the revolver he carried in his hand." 17 It wa
s further stated by Justice Torres: "It is reasonable to
believe that the accused, when he defended himself b
y shooting his assailant, did not exceed his rights in h
is defense or employ unnecessary means to repel an a
ttack already commenced in a cruel and violent mann
er or to prevent its continuation, because from the sud
denness of the attack, the end thereof, without risk to
his person, could not be assured. It would not be prop
er or reasonable to claim that he should have fled or
selected a less deadly weapon, because in the emerge
ncy in which, without any reason whatever, he was pl
aced, and being attacked by a person larger and stron
ger than himself, there was nothing more natural than
7
to have made use of the weapon he held, in order to
defend himself; anyone, upon being assaulted in simil
ar manner, would have acted likewise. In the natural
order of things, following the instinct of self-preservat
ion, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense; a
n impossibility can be demanded of the injured person
when it can not be affirmed that he could have done
less than he did in defending himself by shooting at h
is assailant who had maltreated him and knocked dow
n." 18
4. It would thus appear that the lower court w
as unduly strict in its appreciation of the situation that
confronted appellant. It was not for him a matter that
he could, calmness, and sobriety, objectively weigh.
He was attacked by an assailant intent on mayhem an
d possibly worse. He had already been wounded; his l
ife was in danger. The aggressor in addition was furth
er emboldened by his gang, rowdy elements unmindfu
l of, if not taking pride in, the injury they could inflic
t on peaceful citizens. It was the assailant likewise wh
o had the weapon. Appellant had the good fortune of
being able to take it away from him. That ought to h
ave given pause to the former. It did not. The peril th
en to appellant's life, actual and imminent, continued.
He had in his hand the only means of self-defense. H
e did brandish it to warn the deceased. The response
was negative. What else was there left then for appell
ant except to act exactly as he did? It would be to dis
regard the counsel of realism and to rely on the conje
ctural if on the above facts he would be denied excul
pation. The test of rationality is not what a man shoul
d do under normal circumstances and with time for c
ool reflection present. It is rather how an individual in
such dire situation, with the grim prospect of the loss
of life, would react. The law wisely takes into consid
eration the well-nigh irresistible force of the instinct o
f self-preservation. This Court, from the previously cit
ed case of United States v. Patala 19 promulgated in
1901, to People v. Boholst-Caballero, 20 a 1974 decis
ion, has been steadfast and unwavering in its adherenc
e to such a test of rationality. 21 There is no justifica
tion for a departure from such a norm. The appellant
is entitled to acquittal. llcd
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court
of February 26, 1964 finding the, accused guilty of h
omicide with the attendant mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense is re
versed and the accused is acquitted. His bond for pro
visional liberty is ordered cancelled. With costs de ofi
cio.
||| (People v. Artuz, G.R. No. L-23386, [May 26, 197
6], 163 PHIL 112-121)
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARI
VIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECIS ION
PANGANIBAN, J p: y and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.0
0), Philippine currency as moral damages." 2
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant an
chors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory — th The Information 3charged appellant with parri
e "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly cide as follows:
constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, howe
"That on or about the 15th day of November
ver, she is not entitled to complete exoneration becaus
1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Pr
e there was no unlawful aggression — no immediate
ovince of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdictio
and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband
n of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
at the time she shot him.
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premedi
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no s tation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and felo
elf-defense, complete or incomplete. niously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GEN
OSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeate
deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herse
dly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumul
lf for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to
ative provocation that broke down her psychological r
wit:
esistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysi
s" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby ent 'Cadaveric spasm.
itling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident p
In addition, appellant should also be credited
ost-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets
with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upo
and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
n an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produc
ed passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she su 'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at t
ffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spo he occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration
use, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pre of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels
gnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her i on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the
n the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which ove dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracran
rcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her lif ial hemorrhage.
e and her unborn child's.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, p
Considering the presence of these two mitigati osterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
ng circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the be
nefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may no Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
w apply for and be released from custody on parole, which caused his death." 4
because she has already served the minimum period o
f her penalty while under detention during the penden With the assistance of her counsel, 5appellant
cy of this case. pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3
, 1997. 6In due course, she was tried for and convicte
The Case d of parricide.
For automatic review before this Court is the The Facts
September 25, 1998 Decision 1of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Version of the Prosecution
Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyo
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) su
nd reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion
mmarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this
of the Decision reads:
wise:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in ma
duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
rriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereaft
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
er, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house a
the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246
t Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Ale
of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA
x, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 199
No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic agg
5, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Ma
ravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumst
tiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte wher
ance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty o
e they lived with their two children, namely: John Ma
f DEATH.
rben and Earl Pierre.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Bas
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousan
obas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary.
d pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnit
They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
8
home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching
his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found
out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look fo
r him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went t
o a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening f
or the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not se
e appellant arrive but on his way home passing the si
de of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I
won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why
kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time
Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since t
hen, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited a
nd was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlin
da Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about
fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pi
g because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy che
ck-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her mo
torcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who un
fortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon,
Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc
when he saw appellant going out of their house with
her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking
the gate and taking her children to the waiting area w
here he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behi
nd the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and h
er children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not
want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Ste
ban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating fr
om his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steb
an went there to find out the cause of the stench but t
he house was locked from the inside. Since he did no
t have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the
gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able
to get inside through the kitchen door but only after
destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. A
lone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where
the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw t
he lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed c
overed with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with
injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban w
ent out of the house and sent word to the mother of
Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Ilumin
ada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead bo
dy as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day,
SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police statio
n at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul
smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together with SP
O1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, S
PO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside
the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben
lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There wa
s blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs o
n. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
9
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from
where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pip
e measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with
a diameter of one and half (1½) inches. It had an op
en end without a stop valve with a red stain at one e
nd. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver
of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside
at the back of the house before the postmortem exami
nation was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence o
f the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyt
e responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found
that Ben had been dead for two to three days and hi
s body was already decomposing. The postmortem ex
amination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted i
n the Information for parricide later filed against appe
llant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was
'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracrani
al hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occi
pital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified
that going home after work on November 15, 1995, s
he got worried that her husband who was not home y
et might have gone gambling since it was a payday.
With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look f
or Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte
but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk u
pon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went hom
e despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their h
ouse.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for f
ollowing him, even challenging her to a fight. She all
egedly ignored him and instead attended to their child
ren who were doing their homework. Apparently disa
ppointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light
and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the televisi
on antenna or wire to keep her from watching televisi
on. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack h
er so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her
hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of
the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point,
appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him
to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return ho
me, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant
outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her
by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be kille
d so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that s
he was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer
but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a thr
ee-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She howeve
r, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him
to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smas
hed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to
pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran i
nside the bedroom.
 "Appellant, however, insisted that she ended t
he life of her husband by shooting him. She supposed
ly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot
Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the b
edroom." 7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in th
is manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly m
arried on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, o
btaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business
Administration, and was working, at the time of her h
usband's death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in
Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John
Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other si
nce elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwan
g; they were classmates; and they were third degree c
ousins. Both sets of parents were against their relation
ship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other su
itors from courting her. Their closeness developed as
he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the
home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's brother, Al
ex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Mar
ivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon ther
eafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights
would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosec
ution that he could not remember when Ben and Mari
vic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarr
eled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, M
arivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in o
ne incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen
knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but af
ter a week, she returned apparently having asked for
Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 199
4, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushe
d to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's forehe
ad and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Mar
ivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again ask
ed for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-l
aw, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married
in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc
City.' She said as the marriage went along, Marivic b
ecame `already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Geno
sa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, ther
e were `three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was wh
en Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his
left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1
994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead, 'using
a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It
was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went
10
to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 wh
en the couple had already transferred to the house in
Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as
'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought B
en to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testif
ied that on November 15, 1995 'After we collected ou
r salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.'
They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which the
y went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer — allegedly only t
wo (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbe
que and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was n
ot there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after wh
ich he went across the road to wait 'for the runner an
d the usher of the masiao game because during that ti
me, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I w
as waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can pla
ce my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the ev
ening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarr
eling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who
is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' te
stimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overh
eard by him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate
to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I a
m innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he wa
s across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas
admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits
every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once to
ld Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by
Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Be
n would always take her back after she would leave h
im 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic h
ad hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben `even had a wound' on the ri
ght forehead. He had known the couple for only one (
1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of
marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitua
l drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap he
r, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and
sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and s
he would often run home to her parents, but Ben wou
ld follow her and seek her out, promising to change a
nd would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she
would be beaten, she would seek medical help from
Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These d
octors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by
Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat h
er or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at lea
st three times a week.
 "7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so
closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse an
d violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was
a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on Novem
ber 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben an
d Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through
the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with
each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He di
d not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify.
(Please note this was the same night as that testified
to by Arturo Busabos. 8)
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, a
nd the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he
heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of
November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window o
f his hut which is located beside the Genosa house an
d saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then Be
n Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck o
f the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while,
Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the r
oom of the children. After that, he went back to work
as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at
8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this w
as the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basob
as).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighb
or of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Le
yte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters fro
m theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to b
e living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the coup
le was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him tha
t Ben would pawn items and then would use the mon
ey to gamble. One time, he went to their house and t
hey were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be
pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that
while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he
became drunk, he would go to our house and he will
say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me
, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and look for a w
hore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben `would bo
x his wife and I would see bruises and one time she r
an to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to h
is right breast) as according to her a knife was stricke
n to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben
had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified
only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student,
who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the aftern
oon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her hous
e and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched i
n the market place, several taverns and some other pl
aces, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivi
c home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her h
usband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about
7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husban
d was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew
11
he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking and
I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house
and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please not
e that this is the same night as that testified to by Art
uro Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not th
e first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the hou
se as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband
would come home drunk. At one time when she did
sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening
when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very nois
y in the sala and I had heard something was broken li
ke a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and th
ey locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in, he got
a chair and a knife and `showed us the knife through
the window grill and he scared us.' She said that Mari
vic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-exam
ination, she said that when she left Marivic's house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that
he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isa
bel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and h
ad also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Cai
ng testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9,
1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries
inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported i
n his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. T
he prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Cain
g and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension hea
dache and hypertension of Marivic on twenty-three (2
3) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '
2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clini
c which reflected all the consultations made by Marivi
c and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reporte
d was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he
is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the inj
uries were directly related to the crime committed. He
said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to exam
ine the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether
she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in
the place where the Genosas resided, testified that abo
ut two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to h
is office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help
to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were ex
periencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return
in the morning, but he did not hear from her again an
d assumed 'that they might have settled with each oth
er or they might have forgiven with each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husban
d when she got home that night it was her husband w
ho began the provocation. Marivic said she was fright
ened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted
to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fa
ct, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medi
cal Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and h
ypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on D
ecember 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she
had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they woul
d reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben wa
s violent and abusive towards her that night was beca
use 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu . .
. Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she sh
ot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedro
om; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone pass
ing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; th
at she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 19
95; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented h
erself a room, and got herself a job as a field researc
her under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell
anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to
have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was ar
rested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic
said that she threw the gun away; that she did not kn
ow what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him
once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist wit
h the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whir
led' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towar
ds the drawer when he saw that she had packed his t
hings.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on N
ovember 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of
the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. Thi
s fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses
and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was
the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the t
ime of the incident, and among her responsibilities as
such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, suc
h as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of c
adavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She
merely took the medical board exams and passed in
1986. She was called by the police to go to the Geno
sa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some p
olice officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Geno
sa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone positi
on with his back to the door. He was wearing only a
brief.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that `there is only one injur
y and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of
the head' which she described as a `fracture'. And that
based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3
12
days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused h
is death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defen
se counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 19
96, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill,
with treachery and evidence premeditation, . . . wilfull
y, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound . . . her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon . . . which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997,
14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997
, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50)
days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. For
tunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic
guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parric
ide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circ
umstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty
of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable
Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24 Ja
nuary 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P
. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel,
attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2)
drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Mariv
ic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed
to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal
of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appear
ance of undersigned counsel. DSAEIT
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Mariv
ic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to th
e Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teres
ita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judic
ial Records Office, wherein she submitted her `Brief
without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honora
ble Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 Februa
ry 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court
on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an U
RGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honor
able Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and t
he re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psycholo
gists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind
at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allo
w a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the te
stimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was
a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified
forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that th
e description of the death wound (as culled from the
post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a g
unshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September
2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's U
RGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case
'to the trial court for the reception of expert psycholo
gical and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woma
n syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice,
and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the pr
oceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN
and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A.
Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunit
o L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, t
he Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interview
s were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that
the clinical interviews and psychological assessment w
ere done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clini
cal psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own p
rivate clinic and connected presently to the De La Sal
le University as a professor. Before this, she was the
Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumptio
n College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at t
he Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's Coll
ege; and was the counseling psychologist of the Natio
nal Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology fr
om the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts
in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo
, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president
of the Psychological Association of the Philippines a
nd is a member of the American Psychological Associ
ation. She is the secretary of the International Council
of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member
of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a membe
r of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is acti
vely involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, r
ecently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psych
ological profile of families involved in domestic viole
nce and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Com
mission doing research about Military Psychology. Sh
e has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psycholo
gy' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo)
. The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as
an expert on battered women as this is the first case
of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she
conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychologica
l profile of families involved in domestic violence, an
d nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a
period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are
13
lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts
, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric d
isorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to c
omprise of `a lot of incidents of psychological abuse,
verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse a
nd also sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, `the
battered woman usually has a very low opinion of her
self. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing chara
cteristics. . . . they usually think very lowly of themse
lves and so when the violence would happen, they us
ually think that they provoke it, that they were the on
e who precipitated the violence, they provoke their sp
ouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abus
ive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered .
. . comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken
homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like th
e battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion of hi
mself. But then emerges to have superiority complex
and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile,
very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a
very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times the
y are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and dr
ugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usual
ly comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pam
pers them and makes them feel entitled to do anythin
g. Also, they see often how their parents abused each
other so `there is a lot of modeling of aggression in t
he family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of re
asons why a battered woman does not leave her husb
and: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked t
he violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope he
r husband will change, the belief in her obligations to
keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react diffe
rently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock t
hemselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight
back triggering 'physical violence on both of them.' S
he said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses
also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic,
are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnor
mal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and
day out, is long lasting and `even would cause hospita
lization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the batter
y of psychological tests she administered, it was her o
pinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woma
n because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence wh
ich we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) o
f loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees her
self as damaged and as a broken person. And at the s
ame time she still has the imprint of all the abuses th
at she had experienced in the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself a
s a loving wife and did not even consider filing for n
ullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was
at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought o
f herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarill
o, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared
and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippi
ne Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Bo
ard of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psyc
hiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatr
y for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private
practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memori
al Medical Centre where he gained his training on ps
ychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to a
ctive duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, ass
igned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (
26) years. Prior to his retirement from government ser
vice, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He o
btained his medical degree from the University of San
to Tomas. He was also a member of the World Assoc
iation of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical
Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philipp
ine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of N
ervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy
from the Period 1954-1978' which was presented twi
ce in international congresses. He also authored 'The
Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2000', which was likewise published internationally a
nd locally. He had a medical textbook published on th
e use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the fir
st to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb gra
nt; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in
1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals
with the functional disorder of the mind and neurolog
y deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor
degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finis
h medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V.
Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encou
ntered a suit involving violent family relations, and te
stified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the
14
Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he ha
s seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those
days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconcil
iation. As a result of his experience with domestic vio
lence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita De
proza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty
(40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is
physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abus
e, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconsci
ous state such that the woman is sometimes confined.
The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depe
nds on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo sa
id that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one
episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the ps
ychological stamina and physiologic constitutional sta
mina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repet
itive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress dis
order and this . . . is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disord
er is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or neuro
logic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming bru
tality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anx
iety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it
were real, although she is not actually being beaten at
that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency
to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, a
nd she is irritable and restless. She tends to become h
ard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity a
nd her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family ba
ckground relates to an individual's illness, such as the
deprivation of the continuous care and love of the par
ents. As to the batterer, he normally `internalizes what
is around him within the environment.' And it becom
es his own personality. He is very competitive; he is
aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows hi
s strong facade 'but in it there are doubts in himself a
nd prone to act without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that `even though w
ithout the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one
who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of
the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cann
ot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in hi
s mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
 "Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post
traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, an
d `primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or
any weapon that is available in the immediate surroun
ding or in a hospital . . . because that abound in the
household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when
she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life an
d there is no other recourse left on her but to act deci
sively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Ge
nosa in his office in an interview he conducted for tw
o (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a h
elp in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psy
chiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecut
or, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her hu
sband Marivic's mental condition was that she was 're
-experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying
to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the
trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come
in flashes and probably at that point in time that thin
gs happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma f
lashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Mariv
ic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert an
ymore . . . she is mentally stress (sic) because of the
predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was pr
esented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a qu
o were elevated." 9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense un
tenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evi
dence that appellant had killed the deceased while he
was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciate
d the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, b
ecause Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when
he was killed — lying in bed asleep when Marivic s
mashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the
case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urge
nt Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) t
he exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination
of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appe
llant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to de
termine her state of mind at the time she had killed h
15
er spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' re
ports in the records of the case for purposes of the au
tomatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopenin
g of the case for the lower court to admit the experts'
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a R
esolution granting in part appellant's Motion, remandin
g the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "batte
red woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower c
ourt to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings
taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and add
itional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial jud
ge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clini
cal psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan 10 and Alfred
o Pajarillo, 11 supposedly experts on domestic violenc
e. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evi
dence, were then presented to and admitted by the lo
wer court before finally being submitted to this Court
to form part of the records of the case. 12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors
of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgati
ng an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on t
he evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as
a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally marr
ied and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the ca
use of death to be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring a
nd disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a g
ambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further grav
ely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battere
d husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiri
ng testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding
that Marivic's flight to Manila and her subsequent apo
logies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt
to save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding
that there was an aggravating circumstance of treacher
y.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to
re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in thi
s case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa
 of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death." 13
In the main, the following are the essential le
gal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense
and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery
attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellan
t are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolutio
n of the principal issues. As consistently held by this
Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a hig
h degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appe
al in the absence of any showing that the trial judge
gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunders
tood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that could affect the outcome of
the case. 14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find
no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or misap
preciation of material facts that would reverse or modi
fy the trial court's disposition of the case. In any even
t, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors
of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgate
d "an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on t
he evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that
in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution an
d the defense witnesses and — on the basis of those
and of the documentary evidence on record — made
his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3
-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-d
efense theory of the accused. While she, or even this
Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusion
s, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial
evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence pres
ented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to h
ave been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The I
nformation had been filed with the lower court on No
vember 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least
13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the tria
l judge about two months from the conclusion of trial
to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the tri
al and resolved the case with dispatch should not be t
aken against him, much less used to condemn him for
being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which
he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, w
e find his actions in substantial compliance with his c
onstitutional obligation. 15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fac
t that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally mar
16
ried, despite the non-presentation of their marriage co
ntract. In People v. Malabago, 16this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationsh
ip of the offender with the victim. In the case of parri
cide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship bet
ween the accused and the deceased is the marriage ce
rtificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, how
ever, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be co
nsidered by the trial court if such proof is not objecte
d to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses — namely, t
he mother and the brother of appellant's deceased spo
use — attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic. 17 The defense raised no objection to these t
estimonies. Moreover, during her direct-examination, a
ppellant herself made a judicial admission of her marr
iage to Ben. 18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial a
dmission is conclusive upon the party making it, exce
pt only when there is a showing that (1) the admissio
n was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no ad
mission was in fact made. 19Other than merely attack
ing the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the
defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the
deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specifi
c or direct cause of Ben's death — whether by a guns
hot or by beating with a pipe — has no legal consequ
ence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 20
00 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has ad
mitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of
hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting hi
m at the back of his head, the Court believes that exh
umation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determin
e which of said acts actually caused the victim's death
." Determining which of these admitted acts caused th
e death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of ap
pellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully ap
preciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, w
omanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us f
or automatic review, appellant had not raised the nove
l defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which s
uch evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of s
elf-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial
court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites
of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensi
bly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that
led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal ch
aracter, especially his past behavior, did not constitute
vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not
requiring testimony from appellant's children. As corre
ctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal ac
tions are prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to
determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary
 to present. 20 As the former further points out, neith
er the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appella
nt from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, sh
e cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring t
hem to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matte
r of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her s
ubsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia o
f her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unbo
rn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's ap
preciation of these circumstances has little bearing on
the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to a
void criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or def
ense of her unborn child. When the accused admits ki
lling the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove an
y claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convin
cing evidence. 21Well-settled is the rule that in crimin
al cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stran
ger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from th
e prosecution to the defense. 22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the n
ovel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While n
ew in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been r
ecognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-def
ense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. 23 By a
ppreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is affli
cted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "
understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind o
f a person who has been cyclically abused and control
led over a period of time." 24
A battered woman has been defined as a wom
an "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physic
al or psychological behavior by a man in order to coe
rce her to do something he wants her to do without c
oncern for her rights. Battered women include wives
or women in any form of intimate relationship with m
en. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cyc
le at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an a
busive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a sec
ond time, and she remains in the situation, she is defi
ned as a battered woman." 25
Battered women exhibit common personality tr
aits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about
the home, the family and the female sex role; emotion
al dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency t
o accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and f
alse hopes that the relationship will improve. 26
More graphically, the battered woman syndro
me is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violenc
e," 27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
17
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tr
anquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 28
During the tension-building phase, minor batte
ring occurs — it could be verbal or slight physical ab
use or another form of hostile behavior. The woman u
sually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of ki
nd, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of hi
s way. What actually happens is that she allows herse
lf to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively
minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of t
he violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, howe
ver, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory
" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he h
as the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woma
n in her effort to placate him are not usually successf
ul, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Eac
h partner senses the imminent loss of control and the
growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persi
stent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emoti
onally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavail
able, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive
and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the v
iolence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute
battering incident. 29
The acute battering incident is said to be char
acterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes,
death. The battered woman deems this incident as unp
redictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she
has no control; only the batterer may put an end to th
e violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the ti
me of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending
it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cann
ot reason with him, and that resistance would only ex
acerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment f
rom the attack and the terrible pain, although she may
later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent pas
sivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalize
d thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger ph
ysically, and she knows from her past painful experie
nce that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incid
ents are often very savage and out of control, such th
at innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get
hurt. 30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begin
s when the acute battering incident ends. During this t
ranquil period, the couple experience profound relief.
On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and
nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that
he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for i
t, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to
beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woma
n also tries to convince herself that the battery will ne
ver happen again; that her partner will change for the
better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I
the real person whom she loves. was convinced and after that I go t
o him and he said `sorry'.
A battered woman usually believes that she is
the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batter Q During those times that you were the recipient of s
er. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels respons uch cruelty and abusive behavior by
ible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the c your husband, were you able to see
hances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving profe a doctor?
ssional help, are very slim, especially if she remains
A Yes, sir.
with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does h
e seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Q Who are these doctors?
Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation th
at she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically. A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucer
o and Dra. Cerillo.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is we
ll-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this ph xxx xxx xxx
ase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally depen Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your
dent on each other — she for his nurturant behavior, injuries?
he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycl
e of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner A Yes, sir.
may believe that it is better to die than to be separate
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
d. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of
functioning without the other. 31 A Of course my husband.
History of Abuse in the Present Case Q You mean Ben Genosa?
To show the history of violence inflicted upon A Yes, sir.
appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. Sh
e herself described her heart-rending experience as fol xxx xxx xxx
lows: [Court]/to the witness
"ATTY. TABUCANON Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Gen ?
osa? A Everytime he got drunk.
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in th Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the i
e subsequent year he was cruel to m nfliction of injury inflicted on your
e and a behavior of habitual drinker. occurred, after your marriage, from t
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marri hat time on, how frequent was the o
age, your husband was abusive to yo ccurrence?
u and cruel. In what way was this a A Everytime he got drunk.
busive and cruelty manifested to you
? Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in
a months or in a week?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always sla
p me and sometimes he pinned me A Three times a week.
down on the bed and sometimes bea
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat yo
t me.
u?
Q How many times did this happen?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometim
A Several times already. es he will just quarrel me." 32

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father
and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you le
aving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart" 33on Mar
ivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Cai
ng bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic batter
y in this manner.
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incid
ents which are found in the chart of
your clinic?

Q What will happen when he follow you? A Yes, sir.

18
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor? Q What did she tell you?
A I did. A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know t
he cause of these injuries. And she t
Q Will you please read the physical findings together
old me that it was done to her by h
with the dates for the record.
er husband.
A 1. May 12, 1990 — physical findings are as follow
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
s: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and r
edness of eye. Attending physician: A Yes, sir.
Dr. Lucero;
xxx xxx xxx
2. March 10, 1992 — Contusion-Hematoma (L) lowe
ATTY. TABUCANON:
r arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attendin
g physician: Dr. Canora; Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical exa
mine the accused sometime in the m
3. March 26, 1993 — Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
onth of November, 1995 when this i
4. August 1, 1994 — Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2° to ncident happened?
trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
A As per record, yes.
5. April 17, 1995 — Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulde
Q What was the date?
r. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
A It was on November 6, 1995.
6. June 5, 1995 — Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multip
le contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Can Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
ora.
A Yes, sir.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents
wherein you were the attending phys Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Ho
ician, is that correct? norable Court, was the patient pregn
ant?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage
A Yes, sir. of pregnancy was she?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were A Eight (8) months pregnant.
the one who attended the patient. W
hat do you mean by abrasion furuncl Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of preg
e left axilla? nancy?

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in A Yes, sir.

contact with something rough subst Q What was your November 6, 19'95 examination, w
ance if force is applied. as it an examination about her pregn
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla? ancy or for some other findings?

A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasi A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache w
on. hich complicates her pregnancy.

Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to traum Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confine
a? d?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is A Yes, sir.

an inflammation of left breast. So, [ Q For how many days?
pain] meaning there is tenderness. W
hen your breast is traumatized, there A One day.
is tenderness pain.
Q Where?
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Gen
A Yes, sir. osa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on Novembe
19
 r 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pre
gnant. What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache s
econdary to hypertension and I think
I have a record here, also the same
period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
consultation for twenty-three (23) ti
mes.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consulta
tion, that the patient had hypertensio
n?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refra
ctory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was g
iven to her, because tension headach
e is more or less stress related and e
motional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when yo
u said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical exami
nation of the patient is the family hi
story in line of giving the root cause
of what is causing this disease. So,
from the moment you ask to the pati
ent all comes from the domestic pro
blem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressur
e, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can
cause increases in hypertension whic
h is unfortunately does not response
to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did
you take the blood pressure of the a
ccused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood press
ure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you
mean this is dangerous level of bloo
d pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
20
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a f
ormer neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testifi
ed that he had seen the couple quarreling several time
s; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to h
im with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflic
ted upon her by Ben. 35
Ecel Arano also testified 36that for a number
of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at th
e Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben wo
uld come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion
that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten
o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy
. . . and I heard something was broken like a vase."
Then Marivic came running into Ecel's room and lock
ed the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop
a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Mari
vic again asked her help — this time to find Ben —
but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa
home, where they found him already drunk. Again afr
aid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep
at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel h
esitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing,
she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the deat
h of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw o
r heard the couple quarreling. 37Marivic relates in det
ail the following backdrop of the fateful night when li
fe was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a
vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in
November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the
office working then after office hour
s, I boarded the service bus and wen
t to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwa
ng, I immediately asked my son, wh
ere was his father, then my second c
hild said, `he was not home yet'. I
was worried because that was payda
y, I was anticipating that he was ga
mbling. So while waiting for him, m
y eldest son arrived from school, I p
repared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel l
ooking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence sit
uated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your res
idence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence
?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom r
equested to sleep with me at that ti
me because I had fears that he was
again drunk and I was worried that
he would again beat me so I request
ed my cousin to sleep with me, but
she resisted because she had fears th
at the same thing will happen again
last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested t
o sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that eve
ning?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her fathe
r would not allow her because of Be
n.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you p
regnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at
that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your
husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his
usual behavior.
21
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual un
ruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and
yelling at you? What else did he do
if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dare
d me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at
you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following . . .
him, looking for him. I was just wor
ried he might be overly drunk and h
e would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did
he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignor
e him because I want to avoid troub
le for fear that he will beat me agai
n. Perhaps he was disappointed beca
use I just ignore him of his provocat
ion and he switch off the light and I
said to him, `why did you switch o
ff the light when the children were t
here.' At that time I was also attendi
ng to my children who were doing t
heir assignments. He was angry with
me for not answering his challenge,
so he went to the kitchen and [got]
a bolo and cut the antenna wire to s
top me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching
T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shout
ing because they were scared and he
was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1½ feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happe
ned as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you
?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he w
hirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell o
n the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know w
here he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular tim
e?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what
were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he
got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of
the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house,
he dragged you? How did he drag y
ou?
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get somethi
ng and then he kept on shouting at
me that `you might as well be killed
so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawe
r?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
22
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that dra
wer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was abo
ut to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have
the key then he pulled his wallet wh
ich contained a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that he was g
oing to kill me and I smashed his ar
m and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the dr
awer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pic
k-up the wallet and the blade, I sma
shed him then I ran to the other roo
m, and on that very moment everyth
ing on my mind was to pity on mys
elf, then the feeling I had on that ve
ry moment was the same when I wa
s admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I w
as about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your roo
m?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record
will you please describe this blade a
bout 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both ed
ges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimida
te me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called
by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it
in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She
had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totalin
g about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the for
mer briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a qu
o as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a b
attered wife? Could you in layman's
term describe to this Court what her
life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more
than ten years, that she was sufferin
g emotional anguish. There were a l
ot of instances of abuses, to emotion
al abuse, to verbal abuse and to phy
sical abuse. The husband had a very
meager income, she was the one wh
o was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involv
ed in a lot of vices, going out with
barkadas, drinking, even womanizing
being involved in cockfight and goi
ng home very angry and which will
trigger a lot of physical abuse. She a
lso had the experience a lot of taunti
ng from the husband for the reason t
hat the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying th
at the child she was carrying was no
t his own. So she was very angry, s
he was at the same time very depres
sed because she was also aware, alm
ost like living in purgatory or even
hell when it was happening day in a
nd day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public pro
secutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingl
y put forward, additional supporting evidence as show
n below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this c
ase in 1999, where you talked to her
about three hours, what was the mo
st relevant information did you gathe
r?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that
happened. The most important infor
mation were escalating abuses that s
he had experienced during her marit
al life.
23
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we pre
sume that you already knew of the f
acts of the case or at least you have
substantial knowledge of the facts of
the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not kn
ow whether I can consider them as s
ubstantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that o
n the side of her husband they were
fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the r
elatives of her husband that were fo
nd of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her h
usband who are also battering their
wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance
that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband followed her and
battered [her] several times in that r
oom?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she
was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no pro
blem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not c
omplete on saying this matter. I thin
k that is the first time that we have
this in the Philippines, what is your
opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and
in this kind happened, it was really
a self-defense. I also believe that the
re had been provocation and I also b
elieve that she became a disordered
person. She had to suffer anxiety rea
ction because of all the battering tha
t happened and so she became an ab
normal person who had lost she's no
t during the time and that is why it
happened because of all the physical
 battering, emotional battering, all th
e psychological abuses that she had
experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she e
xtremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes." 40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was
demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] obje
ctive personality test, what . . . [is t
his] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose o
f that test is to find out about the ly
ing prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling
me the truth, or is she someone who
can exaggerate or . . . [will] tell a l
ie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this obj
ective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Me
aning she is a person that I can trust
. That the data that I'm gathering fro
m her are the truth. 41
The other expert witness presented by the defe
nse, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report, 42which was based on his interview and exa
mination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that dur
ing the first three years of her marriage to Ben, every
thing looked good — the atmosphere was fine, norma
l and happy — until "Ben started to be attracted to ot
her girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] espec
ially cockfighting . . . At the same time Ben was ofte
n joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed th
e attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to
his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verb
al and emotional abuses but as time passed, he becam
e physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the vicious
ness of her husband was progressive every time he go
t drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticip
ate whenever she suspected that her husband went for
a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve
years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was
battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly b
y her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law,
but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of clos
e relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her fe
eling ashamed of what was happening to her. But inc
24
essant battering became more and more frequent and
more severe. . . .." 43
From the totality of evidence presented, there
is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence ex
perienced by the abused woman, her state of mind me
tamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we can
not rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reaso
nable person who is evaluating the events immediately
surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly
pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological
effect of battering on wives and common law partners
are both relevant and necessary. "How can the menta
l state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The
average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why sho
uld she continue to live with such a man? How could
she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiri
ng hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pa
ck her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why d
oes she not cut loose and make a new life for herself
? Such is the reaction of the average person confronte
d with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.'" 44
To understand the syndrome properly, howeve
r, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of a
n ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the m
ind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, s
evere beatings may not be consistent with — nay, co
mprehensible to — those who have not been through
a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to cla
rify and refute common myths and misconceptions ab
out battered women. 45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Wa
lker, as well as her research on domestic violence, ha
s had a significant impact in the United States and th
e United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution o
f cases, in which a battered woman is charged with th
e killing of her violent partner. The psychologist expl
ains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted u
pon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "abilit
y to act decisively in her own interests, making her fe
el trapped in the relationship with no means of escape
." 46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that
"the abuse often escalates at the point of separation a
nd battered women are in greater danger of dying the
n." 47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Da
yan said that "the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has . . . self-defeating and
self-sacrificing characteristics. . . . [W]hen the violen
ce would happen, they usually think that they provoke
[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the
violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be phy
sically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them."
48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of re
asons why a battered woman does not readily leave a
n abusive partner — poverty, self-blame and guilt aris
ing from the latter's belief that she provoked the viole
nce, that she has an obligation to keep the family inta
ct at all cost for the sake of their children, and that s
he is the only hope for her spouse to change. 49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr.
Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified i
n suits involving violent family relations, having evalu
ated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family
disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his exper
ience with domestic violence cases, he became a cons
ultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City.
As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse
on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss
of consciousness. 50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming bru
tality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress diso
rder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxciet
ism." 51After being repeatedly and severely abused, b
attered persons "may believe that they are essentially
helpless, lacking power to change their situation. . . .
[A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stim
ulating the development of coping responses to the tra
uma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster a
n active response to try to escape further trauma. Furt
hermore, . . . the victim ceases to believe that anythin
g she can do will have a predictable positive effect."
52
A study 53conducted by Martin Seligman, a p
sychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found t
hat "even if a person has control over a situation, but
believes that she does not, she will be more likely to
respond to that situation with coping responses rather
than trying to escape." He said that it was the cogniti
ve aspect — the individual's thoughts — that proved
all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as "lear
ned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation t
urn out to be less important than the individual's set o
f beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Batte
red women don't attempt to leave the battering situati
on, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safet
y; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does
will alter their terrible circumstances." 54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that
she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior
of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of
killing her, and that there is no escape. 55Battered wo
men feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and us
ually fail to leave the relationship. 56Unless a shelter
is available, she stays with her husband, not only bec
25
ause she typically lacks a means of self-support, but a
lso because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more. 57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured t
he records for specific evidence establishing that appel
lant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from
her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicte
d with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, f
ailed to find sufficient evidence that would support su
ch a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find a
mple evidence that would confirm the presence of the
essential characteristics of BWS. TcSICH
The defense fell short of proving all three pha
ses of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizin
g the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No do
ubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to
the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the t
ension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to e
xplain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of
this stage. However, that single incident does not prov
e the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she f
ailed to prove that in at least another battering episod
e in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usu
ally arise or build up prior to acute battering? How di
d Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor
abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent
the situation from developing into the next (more viol
ent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidenc
e in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simpl
y mentioned that she would usually run away to her
mother's or father's house; 58 that Ben would seek he
r out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change;
and that believing his words, she would return to their
common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violen
t incidents between her and her spouse? Did she belie
ve that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? An
d that she was the sole support of his emotional stabil
ity and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was s
he on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their
relationship? Did both of them regard death as prefera
ble to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appell
ant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that w
ould clearly and fully demonstrate the essential charac
teristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given
by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they
were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically
and scientifically, how the personality of the battered
woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of r
epeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testi
monies, which were culled from their numerous studie
s of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts
that appellant had related to them — if at all — base
d on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the e
lements of a modifying circumstance must be proven i
n order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack
supporting evidence that would establish all the essent
ials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested sp
ecifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in
a relationship does not in itself establish the legal rig
ht of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence
must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the
Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defens
e is the state of mind of the battered woman at the ti
me of the offense 60 — she must have actually feare
d imminent harm from her batterer and honestly belie
ved in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the r
ule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face
a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be a
voided must be imminent and actual, not merely imag
inary. 61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the f
ollowing requisites and effect of self-defense: 62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The foll
owing do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights, provided that the following circumstances co
ncur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of th
e person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential elem
ent of self-defense. 63It presupposes actual, sudden an
d unexpected attack — or an imminent danger thereof
— on the life or safety of a person. 64In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between th
e unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upo
n him. She had already been able to withdraw from h
is violent behavior and escape to their children's bedr
oom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence
of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was
26
no longer in a position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she
came out of their children's bedroom — and based o
n past violent incidents, there was a great probability
that he would still have pursued her and inflicted grav
er harm — then, the imminence of the real threat upo
n her life would not have ceased yet. Where the bruta
lized person is already suffering from BWS, further e
vidence of actual physical assault at the time of the ki
lling is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usu
ally have a predictable pattern. To require the battered
person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her t
o 'murder by installment.'" 65Still, impending danger (
based on the conduct of the victim in previous batteri
ng episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly for
ce must be shown. Threatening behavior or communic
ation can satisfy the required imminence of danger. 6
6Considering such circumstances and the existence of
BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if n
ot continuous, does not warrant self-defense. 67In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defen
se — complete or incomplete — on the part of the vi
ctim. 68Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not compl
etely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. Whi
le she did not raise any other modifying circumstance
s that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to e
valuate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that
mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrin
e that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly fo
r review on any issue, including that which has not b
een raised by the parties. 69
From several psychological tests she had admi
nistered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined a
s follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman S
yndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced
with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] p
rovocation which broke down her psychological resist
ance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she
developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending
danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly
experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a sta
te of psychological paralysis which can only be ended
by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra.
Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pai
n taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltre
atment" as well as the severity and the prolonged adm
inistration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disor
der. 71Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious
battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged admi
nistration of battering or the prolong
ed commission of the battering and t
he psychological and constitutional s
tamina of the victim and another one
is the public and social support ava
ilable to the victim. If nobody is int
erceding, the more she will go to th
at disorder . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the
qualifications in terms of severity of
the posttraumatic stress disorder, Dr.
Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig
[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disor
der is injury to the head, banging of
the head like that. It is usually the v
ery very severe stimulus that precipit
ate this post[t]raumatic stress disorde
r. Others are suffocating the victim l
ike holding a pillow on the face, str
angulating the individual, suffocating
the individual, and boxing the indiv
idual. In this situation therefore, the
victim is heightened to painful stimu
lus, like for example she is pregnant
, she is very susceptible because the
woman will not only protect herself,
she is also to protect the fetus. So th
e anxiety is heightened to the end [s
ic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Wi
tness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or d
elayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you
called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one
battering and the individual will man
ifest now a severe emotional instabil
ity, higher irritability remorse, restles
sness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be th
inking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repet
itious maltreatment, any prolonged, i
t is longer than six (6) months. The
[acute] is only the first day to six (6
27
) months. After this six (6) months
you become chronic. It is stated in t
he book specifically that after six (6)
months is chronic. The [a]typical o
ne is the repetitious battering but the
individual who is abnormal and the
n become normal. This is how you
get neurosis from neurotic personalit
y of these cases of post[t]raumatic st
ress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the tri
al judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered
woman syndrome . . . affects . . . h
is or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it . . . obfuscated her rationa
lity?
A Of course obfuscated." 73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of
the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in "cumu
lative provocation which broke down her psychologica
l resistance and natural self-control," "psychological p
aralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairme
nt of memory." acAESC
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, suc
h manifestations were analogous to an illness that dim
inished the exercise by appellant of her will power wi
thout, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her fr
eedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to par
agraphs 9 74 and 10 75 of Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her
favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant
the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced pas
sion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state o
f mind is present when a crime is committed as a res
ult of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by
prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimul
us so powerful as to overcome reason. 77To appreciat
e this circumstance, the following requisites should co
ncur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act
is not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the ac
cused might recover her normal equanimity. 78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben
Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his bei
ng killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill
her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet
in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalle
d that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The
attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.
79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which
was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unb
orn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation
overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to
retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental s
tate continued. According to her, she felt her blood pr
essure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity an
d of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In
a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer
where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon an
d used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to th
e conclusion that there was no considerable period of
time within which Marivic could have recovered her n
ormal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony
80that with "neurotic anxiety" — a psychological effe
ct on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma
" — the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it
were real, although she is not actually being beaten at
the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the wh
ole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she su
ffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Suc
h reliving which is beyond the control of a person un
der similar circumstances, must have been what Mariv
ic experienced during the brief time interval and preve
nted her from recovering her normal equanimity. Acc
ordingly, she should further be credited with the mitig
ating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumsta
nces — psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation — did not arise from the same set of fac
ts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose
from the cyclical nature and the severity of the batter
y inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That
is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulte
d in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous
to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will pow
er without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, r
esulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on
her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred w
hen she was eight months pregnant with their child w
as deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life,
but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perce
ption naturally produced passion and obfuscation on h
er part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of t
he crimes against persons by employing means, metho
ds or forms in the execution thereof without risk to o
neself arising from the defense that the offended party
might make. 81In order to qualify an act as treachero
28
us, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indu
bitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced fr
om mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no pl
ace in the appreciation of evidence. 82Because of the
gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be pro
ved as conclusively as the killing itself. 83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instan
t case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death up
on appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances
merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had
been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, ci
rcular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to
exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, h
owever, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably.
Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to
the events surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house,
he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get somethi
ng and then he kept on shouting at
me that 'you might as well be killed
so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawe
r?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that dra
wer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was abo
ut to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have
the key then he pulled his wallet wh
ich contained a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that he was g
oing to kill me and I smashed his ar
m and then the wallet and the blade
 fell. The one he used to open the dr
awer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pic
k-up the wallet and the blade, I sma
shed him then I ran to the other roo
m, and on that very moment everyth
ing on my mind was to pity on mys
elf, then the feeling I had on that ve
ry moment was the same when I wa
s admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I w
as about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record
will you please describe this blade a
bout 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both ed
ges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimida
te me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it cor
rect?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pic
k-up the pipe and I smashed him an
d I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thin
g like what happened before when I
was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic,
I was about to vomit. I know my bl
ood pressure was raised. I was fright
ened I was about to die because of
my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
29
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and
smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed at
the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happene
d?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've bee
n through with him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die
also because of my blood pressure a
nd the baby, so I got that gun and I
shot him. AEHCDa
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer." 84
The above testimony is insufficient to establis
h the presence of treachery. There is no showing of t
he victim's position relative to appellant's at the time
of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule
that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a q
uarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to ha
ve been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant. 85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have
been consciously and deliberately chosen for the spec
ific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without
risk from any defense that might be put up by the pa
rty attacked. 86There is no showing, though, that the
present appellant intentionally chose a specific means
of successfully attacking her husband without any risk
to herself from any retaliatory act that he might mak
e. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of usin
g the gun occurred to her only at about the same mo
ment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In
the absence of any convincing proof that she consciou
sly and deliberately employed the method by which s
he committed the crime in order to ensure its executio
n, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor. 87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 2
46 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no ag
gravating circumstance have been found to have atten
ded the commission of the offense, the penalty shall b
e lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 o
f paragraph 5 88 of the same Code. 89 The penalty o
f reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposabl
e, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to
be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one
degree, and no other modifying circumstances were sh
own to have attended the commission of the offense.
90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minim
um of the penalty shall be within the range of that w
hich is next lower in degree — prision mayor — and
the maximum shall be within the range of the mediu
m period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instan
t case, we deem it just and proper to impose the pena
lty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6)
years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to recl
usion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 m
onths and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant h
as already served the minimum period, she may now
apply for and be released from detention on parole. 9
1
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, th
e battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor sim
ple to analyze and recognize vis-a-vis the given set of
facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how
to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took
great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisi
ons are made — on the basis of existing law and juri
sprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a ju
st and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to t
ake a good look at studies conducted here and abroad
in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome
and the distinct personality of the chronically abused
person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And d
efinitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel,
Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently b
attered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make
or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Pe
nal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the po
ssibility of self-defense arising from the battered wom
an syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be p
roven to have characterized at least two battering epis
odes between the appellant and her intimate partner. S
econd, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the batte
red person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm
from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the ti
me of the killing, the batterer must have posed probab
le — not necessarily immediate and actual — grave h
arm to the accused, based on the history of violence p
erpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken alto
gether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites
of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the presen
t case, however, not all of these elements were duly e
stablished.
30
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant M
arivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. Ho
wever, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances a
nd no aggravating circumstance attending her commiss
ion of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6
) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion tempo
ral as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for
more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may i
mmediately RELEASE her from custody upon due det
ermination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is
being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de ofi
cio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., A
zcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur in the result.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Austria-Marti
nez, JJ ., join Mr. Justice Santiago in his dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide, our esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban found that there was no factual basis t
o conclude that Marivic was suffering from "Battered
Woman Syndrome" (BWS) at the time she took the li
fe of her husband. With due respect, I register my dis
sent.
The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndro
me" is recognized in foreign jurisprudence as a form
of self-defense. It operates upon the premise that a w
oman who has been cyclically abused and controlled
over a period of time develops a fearful state of mind
. Living in constant danger of harm or death, she kno
ws that future beatings are almost certain to occur an
d will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of t
he violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to w
hen a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it wi
ll seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle o
f violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she
would succumb to her helplessness and fail to percei
ve possible solutions to the problem other than to inju
re or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an exis
ting or impending lethal aggression and thus would ha
ve no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts
and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her s
ufferings. 1
As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the
"Battered Woman Syndrome" has three phases, to wi
t: (1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterin
gs in the form of verbal or slight physical abuse occu
rs. Here, the woman tries to pacify the batterer throug
h a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply st
aying out of his way; (2) the acute battering incident
phase which is characterized by brutality, destructiven
ess and sometimes, death. The battered woman usuall
y realizes that she cannot reason with him and that re
sistance would only exacerbate her condition; and (3)
the tranquil period, where the couple experience a co
mpound relief and the batterer may show a tender and
nurturing behavior towards his partner.
Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the d
efense was able to establish the occurrence on more t
han one occasion of the "tension-building phase" of th
e cycle. The various testimonies of appellant's witness
es clearly reveal that she knew exactly when she wou
ld once again be subjected to acute battery. Her cousi
n, Ecel Arano, testified that she often asked the latter
to sleep in her house as she was afraid every time her
husband came home drunk. Clearly, whenever appell
ant requested for Arano's company, she was experienc
ing a tension-building phase. The barangay captain, Pa
nfilo Tero, also testified that appellant sought his help
two months before she killed her husband, again dem
onstrating that she was in the tension-building phase a
nd was attempting to prevent another incident of acute
battery. Appellant presented evidence to prove that th
e tension-building phase would occur whenever her hu
sband would go out looking for other women, would l
ose at cockfights or would come home drunk. She oft
en tried to ignore her husband's attitude or, as testifie
d to by some witnesses for the prosecution, even shou
ted back, fought off or even injured her husband duri
ng the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the o
nset of acute battery. cAIDEa
Appellant was able to perfectly describe the te
nsion-building phase of the cycle immediately prior to
the death of her husband, i.e., when she knew or felt
that she was going to be killed by the deceased. She
could not possibly have testified with clarity as to pri
or tension-building phases in the cycle as she had nev
er tried to kill her husband before this time.
It was shown by the testimonies of appellant a
nd even witnesses for the prosecution that appellant w
ould seek shelter in her mother's or her father's house
after an acute battering incident, after which would be
gin the process of begging for forgiveness, promises o
f change in behavior and return to the conjugal home,
only for the same cycle to begin all over again.
To require appellant to prove the state of min
d of the deceased, as seems to be required in thepone
ncia, would mean that no person would ever be able t
o prove self-defense in a battered woman case. Appell
ant could not possibly prove whether the deceased felt
provoked into battering by any act or omission of ap
pellant. She cannot possibly prove that she felt herself
to be the sole support of the deceased's emotional sta
bility and well-being. Nevertheless, appellant felt trapp
31
ed and helpless in the relationship as, in the end, she
resorted to killing her husband as no one could or did
help her, whether out of fear or insensitivity, during
the violent marriage she endured.
The "acute battering incident stage" was well
demonstrated by the severe beatings suffered by Mari
vic in the hands of the deceased as well as the threats
to kill her using a bolo or a cutter. 2The physical ab
uses occurred at least 3 times a week in the 11 miser
able years of their marriage, 3six incidents of which
were documented by the 1990-1995 medical records o
f Marivic. They included, among others, hematoma, c
ontusion, and pain on the breasts; multiple contusions
and trauma on the different parts of her body even du
ring her pregnancy in 1995. 4The tranquil period unde
rwent by Marivic was shown by the repeated "kiss an
d make-up" episodes of their relationship. On more th
an 5 occasions, Marivic ran to her parents' house after
violent fights with the deceased only to forgive the l
atter every time he would fetch her and promise to ch
ange. 5
All these recurring phases of cycle of violence
, repentance and forgiveness developed a trauma in th
e mind of Marivic making her believe that a forthcom
ing attack from the deceased would cause her death.
This state of mind of Marivic was revealed in her test
imony given way back in 1998, before she was exami
ned by experts on BWS. Unaware of the significance
of her declarations, she candidly narrated how she felt
immediately before she killed the deceased, thus —
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawe
r?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the dra
wer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was abo
ut to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have
the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inc
hes long and I was aware that he w
as going to kill me and I smashed h
is arm and then the wallet and the b
lade fell. The one he used to open t
he drawer I saw, it was a pipe about
that long, and when he was about t
o pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the roo
 m, and on that very moment everyth
ing on my mind was pity on myself,
then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was a
dmitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was
about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx 6
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the room, I felt the same thing like
what happened before I was admitte
d in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about
to vomit. I know my blood pressure
has raised. I was frightened I was ab
out to die because of my blood pres
sure. STIcaE
xxx xxx xxx
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've bee
n through him, I took pity on myself
and I felt I was about to die also b
ecause of my blood pressure and the
baby, so I got the gun and shot hi
m. 7
It must be stressed that the defense of "Batter
ed Woman Syndrome" was not raised by Marivic bef
ore the lower court but only here on automatic review
. This makes the foregoing testimony more worthy of
great weight and credence considering that the same c
ould not have been cunningly given to suit or confor
m to the profile of a battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic
to fear death because of her medical history. Dr. Dino
Caing testified that he treated Marivic for hypertensio
n due to domestically related emotional stress on 23 s
eparate occasions. The latest one was on November 6,
1995 when she suffered from severe hypertension an
d had a blood pressure of 180/120 on the 8th month
of her pregnancy. 8
Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinic
al psychologist and an expert on BWS who examined
Marivic, assessed the effects of the repeated violence
on the latter as follows:
A What I remember . . . was it was more than ten ye
ars that she was suffering from emot
ional anguish. There were a lot of in
stance of abuses, . . . emotional abu
se . . . verbal abuse and . . . physica
l abuse. The husband had very meag
er income, she was the one who was
practically the bread earner of the f
amily. The husband was involved in
a lot of vices, going out with barkad
as, drinking, even womanizing, bein
g involved in cockfighting and in go
ing home very angry which . . . trig
gered a lot of physical abuse. She al
32
so had the experience of taunting fro
m the husband for the reason that th
e husband even accused her of infid
elity, the husband was saying that th
e child she was carrying was not his
own. So she was very angry, she w
as at the same time very depressed
because she . . . [felt] almost like li
ving in purgatory or even in hell wh
en it was happening day in and day
out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what was it that triggered . . . that tragedy in
your opinion?
A I think for several weeks, she was already having a
ll those tensions, all those anxieties,
they were not enough, that the husba
nd was even going to cockfighting .
. .
A She was angry with him, he was angry with her an
d I think he dragged her and even s
pun her around. She tried to fight hi
m so there was a lot of fight and w
hen she was able to escape, she wen
t to another room and she locked he
rself with the children. And when th
e husband was for a while very angr
y he calms down then and then (sic)
. But I remember before that the hus
band was looking for the gun and I
think he was not able to open the ca
binet because she had the key. So d
uring that time, I remember, that she
was very much afraid of him, so w
hen the husband calmed down and h
e was asleep, all she was concerned
was to end up her misery, to save h
er child which she was carrying and
to save her two children. I believe t
hat somehow she's not rational. 9
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. TRUYA
Q Mrs. Witness, being an expert witness, giving more
the facts and circumstances on this
case that the books you studied in th
e expertise in line and in the 77 hou
r contact with appellant Mrs. Genosa
, could you say that this is not ordin
ary self-defense but a survival on he
r part? TCacIA
A Yes, sir.
Q To what she did to her husband (sic)?
A Yes, sir this is not an ordinary self-defense, but thi
s [is] a need to survive, a need to s
 urvive with her two sons and [the] c
hild she's bringing.
Q Had she not able to kill her husband, would she sti
ll be in the very short moment with
the victim (sic)?
A If she did not do that she believes that she will be
the one who would be killed. 10
There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was
afflicted with the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and th
at it was an apprehension of death and the instinct to
defend her and her unborn child's life that drove her t
o kill her husband.
The ponente further refused to sustain the self
-defense proffered by Marivic because there was alleg
edly no aggression or danger posed on her life by the
victim at the time she attacked the latter. Again, I beg
to disagree.
Traditionally, in order that self-defense may b
e appreciated, the unlawful aggression or the attack m
ust be imminent and actually in existence. This interpr
etation must, however, be re-evaluated vis-a-vis the re
cognized inherent characteristic of the psyche of a per
son afflicted with the "Battered Woman Syndrome." A
s previously discussed, women afflicted by this syndro
me live in constant fear for their life and thus respon
d in self-defense. Once BWS and an impending dange
r based on the conduct of the deceased in previous ba
ttering episodes are established, actual occurrence of a
n assault is no longer a condition sine qua non before
self-defense may be upheld. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger. As stated in the ponencia, to require the batte
red person to await an obvious deadly attack before s
he can defend her life would amount to sentencing he
r to murder by installment. AHCETa
In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpet
rated by the deceased, which culminated in the physic
al assaults and an attempt to shoot Marivic when she
was 8 months pregnant, took the place of unlawful ag
gression, thus entitling her to a complete self-defense
even if there was no actual employment of violence b
y the deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic had
every reason to believe that the deceased would kill h
er that night not only because the latter was verbally t
hreatening to kill her while attempting to get a gun fr
om the drawer, but more importantly because the dece
ased wounded her on the wrist with a bolo, and becau
se of the deceased's previous conduct of threatening t
o cut her throat with a cutter which he kept in his wa
llet. Quoted hereunder are the relevant testimonies of
Marivic —
A When I arrived home, he was already in his usual
behavior.
xxx xxx xxx
33
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual un
ruly behavior.
xxx xxx xxx
A He was nagging . . . me at that time and I just ign
ore[d] him because I want to avoid t
rouble for fear that he will beat me
again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore[d] hi[s] provoc
ation and he switch off the light and
I said to him, "why did you switch
off the light when the children were
there." At that time I was also atten
ding to my children who were doing
their assignments. He was angry wi
th me for not answering his challeng
e, so he went to the kitchen and g[o
]t a bolo and cut the antenna wire to
stop me from watching television.
xxx xxx xxx
A He switch[ed] off the light and the children were s
houting because they were scared an
d he was already holding a bolo.
Q How do you describe this bolo?
A 1½ feet.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said the children were scared, what else happe
ned as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I ran to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you
?
A When I attempt[ed] to run he held my hands and h
e whirled me and I fell [on] the bed
side. 11
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
To the witness
xxx xxx xxx
Q The bolo that you said which Ben was holding at t
hat time, [was] it a bolo or a knife?
A Bolo.
Q Were you wounded or were there inflictions on yo
ur body when he was holding and tr
ying to frighten you [with] that bolo
?
A No, only here.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness pointed to her wrist).
COURT Q Where did he bring you?
To the witness A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get somethi
ng and then he kept shouting at me
Q You were demonstrating a motion, whirling, did yo
that "you might as well be killed so
ur husband really whirl you?
there will be nobody to nag me."
A Yes, your Honor.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawe
Q How did he whirl you? r?

A Whirled around. aScITE A Yes, sir.

Q Just like spinning. Q What is there in the drawer?

xxx xxx xxx A I was aware that it was a gun.

Q Where did he whirl you, was it inside the bedroom xxx xxx xxx
or outside?
Q What happened when you were brought to the dra
A In our bedroom. wer?

Q Then after the whirling what happened?
A He kicked my ass and then I screamed. 12
xxx xxx xxx
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know w
here he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do . . .?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us. 13
xxx xxx xxx
A I was frightened that my husband would hurt me, s
o I packed all his things then on the
following day I will leave, I was af
raid and I want to make sure I woul
d deliver my baby safely. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and g
ot angry with me for packing his clo
thes, then he dragged me again outsi
de of the bedroom holding my neck.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house,
he dragged you? How did he drag .
. . you?
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was abo
ut to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have
the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inc
hes long and I was aware that he w
as going to kill me and I smashed h
is arm and then the wallet and the b
lade fell. The one he used to open t
he drawer I saw, it was a pipe about
that long, and when he was about t
o pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the roo
m, and on that very moment everyth
ing on my mind was pity on myself,
then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was a
dmitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was
about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record
will you please describe this blade a
bout 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both ed
ges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?

A And he dragged me towards the door backwards. A Yes sir, that was the object used when he intimidat
e me. 15
ATTY. TABUCANON
34
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. TABUCANON
Q In other words, there were two (2) incidents, the fir
st incident and then he left and then
two (2) hours after he came back?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the whirling happened in the first incident? Ec
DTIH
A Yes, sir.
Q And the dragging with arms flexed in her neck and
on that blade happened on the seco
nd incident (sic)?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
To the witness
Q Why, what is that blade about?
A A cutter about 3 inches long.
Q Who used that?
A Ben.
Q He used that on you?
A He scared me on that (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q But he did not hit you with that?
A Yes, because I managed to run every time he scare
d (sic). 16
There are many things which cannot be prove
d by direct evidence. One of this is state of mind. In
the case at bar, there is more than sufficient physical
evidence presented by the appellant from which her m
ental state can be inferred. The prosecution did not ob
ject to the presentation of these physical and testimoni
al pieces of evidence, namely, the medical records of
23 instances of domestic violence-related injuries and
the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the bar
angay captain. Indeed, no person would endure 23 rep
orted instances of beatings if she were planning to kil
l her spouse in the first place. The majority need not
worry that women around the country will mastermind
the killings of their husbands and then use this Decis
ion to bolster their attempts to employ the BWS defe
nse.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant
should be allowed the mitigating circumstance of pass
ion and obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a
finding that the acts of violence and battery committ
ed by the deceased were illegal and unlawful and wer
e committed immediately before appellant could recov
er her natural equanimity. But what is the natural equ
35
animity of a battered woman? Appellant was not a no
rmal married woman. She can never be in a state of n
atural equanimity as she was in a constant state of ale
rtness and hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute
battery. The esteemed ponente also correctly found th
at the appellant acted with diminished will-power. Ho
wever, he failed to go further. In the case of People v
. Javier, 17it was held:
Since accused-appellant has already admitted t
o the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the c
laimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case,
however, aside from the testimony of the accused tha
t his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to
loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented regard
ing his mental condition at the time of the killing. Thi
s Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of acc
used-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and conject
ures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown th
at accused-appellant was suffering an illness which di
minished his exercise of will-power at the time of the
killing. 18
In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and
did in fact present clear and convincing evidence that
she was a battered woman for 13–14 years and that s
he suffered from the "Battered Woman Syndrome". E
xpert testimony was presented and admitted to this eff
ect, such that the ponente ably discussed the causes a
nd effects of the syndrome. To ignore the testimony a
nd the evidence thus presented is to make impossible
the proof of mental state. Evidence as to the mental st
ate need not be also "beyond reasonable doubt."
Verily, the requirement of threatening behavior
al pattern of the batterer in previous violent episodes
was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This, jux
taposed to Marivic's affliction with BWS justified the
killing of the deceased. The danger posed or created i
n her mind by the latter's threats using bladed weapon
s, bred a state of fear, where under the circumstances,
the natural response of the battered woman would be
to defend herself even at the cost of taking the life o
f the batterer.
The ponencia's acknowledgment of "Battered
Woman Syndrome" as a valid form of self-defense, is
a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for
battered women who are trapped in a culture of silen
ce, shame, and fear. This would however be an empty
victory if we deliberately close our eyes to the antec
edents of this case. The facts are simple. Marivic was
suffering from the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and
was defending herself when she killed her husband. H
er acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in o
rder.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Ma
rivic Genosa.
||| (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, [January 15,
2004], 464 PHIL 680-761)
[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004.]
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHI
LIPPINES, respondent.
DECIS ION
TINGA, J p:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set asi
de the Decision 1of the Court of Appeals Eighth Divi
sion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 J
uly 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification th
e judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ma
nila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guil
ty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 2(B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncin
g Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7
) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty bef
ore the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docket
ed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-13046
5. The accusatory portion of the Information in Crimi
nal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City o
f Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and t
here willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or dra
w and issue to Manila Doctors' Hospital to apply on a
ccount or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No. M
etrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Mani
la Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she di
d not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draw
ee bank for payment of such check in full upon its pr
esentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was sub
sequently dishonored by the drawee bank for "Accoun
t Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishon
or, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Ho
spital the amount of the check or to make arrangemen
t for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice. TAIESD
Contrary to law. 3
The other Informations are similarly worded e
xcept for the number of the checks and dates of issue.
The data are hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Check No. Postdated sychological and
Case No.
93-130459 487710 30 March h1993
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993
93-130461 487709 01 March offered
93-130462 487707
30 December 1992
93-130463 487706 30 November 1
93-130464 487708 30 January 199
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty. 5
The evidence for the prosecution shows that T
y's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Mani
la Doctors' Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990
until 4 June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty sig
ned the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Paym
ent" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1
990. 6As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account 7
shows the total liability of the mother in the amount
of P657,182.40. Ty's sister, Judy Chua, was also confi
ned at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 19
92, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.
55. 8The total hospital bills of the two patients amoun
ted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a
promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the
obligation in installments. 9To assure payment of the
obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) chec
ks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all
deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishon
ored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the h
ospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Accou
nt Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant ho
spital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As
the demand letters were not heeded, complainant file
d the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant cas
e. 10
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued th
e checks because of "an uncontrollable fear of a great
er injury." She averred that she was forced to issue th
e checks to obtain release for her mother whom the h
ospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not
discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She allege
d that her mother was deprived of room facilities, suc
h as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television
set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting
off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother's
food and refusal to change the latter's gown and beds
heets. She also bewailed the hospital's suspending me
dical treatment of her mother. The "debasing treatmen
t," she pointed out, so affected her mother's mental, p
physical health that the latter contem
Amount
plated suicide if she would not be discharged from th
e hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to c
omply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was com
pelled to sign a promissory note, open an account wit
Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothe
P30,000.00
r's immediate discharge. 11
P30,000.00
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence
1993 by theP30,000.00
prosecution, the trial court found that T
y issued
the checks subject of the case in payment of
P30,000.00
the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theor
36
y of the defense. 12Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial Petitioner now comes to this Court basically a
court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven ( lleging the same issues raised before the Court of Ap
7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her t peals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the app
o a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision r ellate court based on the following grounds:
eads:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDE
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, NCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FO
for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of RCED TO OR COMPELLED IN T
a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their r HE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT
espective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven ( AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE S
7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, an UBJECT CHECKS.
d is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of impriso
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IM
nment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-
PULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLAB
two (42) months.
LE FEAR OF A GREATER INJUR
SO ORDERED. 13 Y OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GRE
ATER EVIL OR INJURY.
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of
the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiter C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHO
ated her defense that she issued the checks "under the W[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUA
or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury." She also NCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty ISDHcT
when evidence showed there was absence of valuable
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAY
consideration for the issuance of the checks and the p
EE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULL
ayee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in t
Y AWARE OF THE LACK OF FU
he account. She protested that the trial court should n
NDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
ot have applied the law mechanically, without due reg
ard to the principles of justice and equity. 14 E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS
WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRI
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appell
AL COURT[,] SHOULD NOT HAV
ate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
E APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW ME
modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment
CHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE R
and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thou
EGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
sand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amo
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
unt of the check, in each case." 15
In its Memorandum, 20the Office of the Solici
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals
tor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that
rejected Ty's defenses of involuntariness in the issuanc
a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not inte
e of the checks and the hospital's knowledge of her c
nded to be presented for payment, has the same effect
hecking account's lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22
as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit
makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check puni
of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payme
shable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibit
nt, the drawee bank will generally accept the same, re
um. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bounc
gardless of whether it was issued in payment of an ob
ing check and not the purpose for which it was issued
ligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What t
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
he law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check,
16
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced t and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act o
hat there was no valuable consideration for the issuan f issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. 21
ce of the checks as they were issued in payment of th
We find the petition to be without merit and a
e hospital bills of Ty's mother. 17
ccordingly sustain Ty's conviction.
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a pri
Well-settled is the rule that the factual finding
son term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca
s and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
v. Court of Appeals 18wherein this Court declared th
Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and
at in determining the penalty imposed for violation of
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain fa
Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming val
cts or circumstances which would substantially affect t
uable human material and preventing unnecessary depr
he disposition of the case. 22Jurisdiction of this Court
ivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, w
over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is lim
ith due regard to the protection of the social order. 19
ited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to
37
the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are concl
usive, and carry even more weight when said court af
firms the findings of the trial court, absent any showi
ng that the findings are totally devoid of support in th
e record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion. 23
In the instant case, the Court discerns no com
pelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived a
t by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appe
als.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7)
checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that
the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of a
n uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidan
ce of a greater evil or injury. She would also have th
e Court believe that there was no valuable considerati
on in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense's claim of un
controllable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a
greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve fa
ctual issues which are best determined by the trial co
urt. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had i
n fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendere
d judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash
of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial cou
rt and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issu
e factual questions already passed upon twice below, r
ather than questions of law appropriate for review und
er a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised — whether th
e defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant
her exemption from criminal liability — has to be res
olved in the negative. For this exempting circumstanc
e to be invoked successfully, the following requisites
must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (
2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fe
ar of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed. 24
It must appear that the threat that caused the
uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence t
hat the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. 25I
t should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable f
ear for one's life or limb. 26A mere threat of a future
injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fan
ciful, or remote. 27A person invoking uncontrollable f
ear must show therefore that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not o
nly without will but against his will as well. 28It mus
t be of such character as to leave no opportunity to th
e accused for escape. 29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harb
ored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that
she was compelled to issue the checks — a conditio
38
n the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged — for fear that her mothe
r's health might deteriorate further due to the inhuman
e treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might
commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. ESTaHC
To begin with, there was no showing that the
mother's illness was so life-threatening such that her c
ontinued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged u
nethical treatment would induce a well-grounded appr
ehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law's int
ent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal lia
bility much less petitioner's flimsy fear that her mothe
r might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she i
nvokes was not impending or insuperable as to depriv
e her of all volition and to make her a mere instrume
nt without will, moved exclusively by the hospital's th
reats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that
she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. S
he did not take advantage of the many opportunities a
vailable to her to avoid committing one. By her very
own words, she admitted that the collateral or security
the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mo
ther may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelr
y. 30And if indeed she was coerced to open an accou
nt with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge
that the issuance of checks without funds may result i
n a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her c
ounsel advised her not to open a current account nor i
ssue postdated checks "because the moment I will not
have funds it will be a big problem." 31Besides, apart
from petitioner's bare assertion, the record is bereft o
f any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim th
at she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with an
d give in to the hospital's demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statemen
t of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 1
1 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in t
his case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the prese
nce of three requisites to exempt the actor from liabili
ty under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be
avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be g
reater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be
no other practical and less harmful means of preventin
g it. 32
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoid
ed is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sough
t to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or
may happen in the future, this defense is not applicabl
e. 33Ty could have taken advantage of an available o
ption to avoid committing a crime. By her own admis
sion, she had the choice to give jewelry or other form
s of security instead of postdated checks to secure her
obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity
to be availing, the greater injury feared should not ha
ve been brought about by the negligence or impruden
ce, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. 34In thi
s case, the issuance of the bounced checks was broug
ht about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hosp
ital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty ha
s chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable
fear and the justifying circumstance of state of neces
sity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been
half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the iss
uance of the bounced checks was done without her fu
ll volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is qui
te clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance
of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of th
e bounced checks. DISTcH
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Dec
ision of the trial court in the Civil Case 35for damage
s filed by Ty's mother against the hospital is wholly i
rrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench.
While the findings therein may establish a claim for d
amages which, we may add, need only be supported b
y a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily
engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liabilit
y.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presume
d, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evid
ence to the contrary, that the same was issued for val
uable consideration. 36 Section 24 37 of the Negotiab
le Instruments Law creates a presumption that every p
arty to an instrument acquired the same for a consider
ation 38 or for value. 39 In alleging otherwise, Ty ha
s the onus to prove that the checks were issued witho
ut consideration. She must present convincing evidenc
e to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitione
r failed to discharge her burden of proof. "Valuable c
onsideration may in general terms, be said to consist
either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruin
g to the party who makes the contract, or some forbe
arance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act,
or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by t
he other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration
means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in fa
vor of the party who makes the contract, such as the
maker or indorser." 40
In this case, Ty's mother and sister availed of
the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the
care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation t
o pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with t
hem and by force of her signature on her mother's Co
ntract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for
39
payment, and on the promissory note she executed in
favor of the hospital.
Anent Ty's claim that the obligation to pay th
e hospital bills was not her personal obligation becaus
e she was not the patient, and therefore there was no
consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. V
ann, et al. 41tells us that "it is no defense to an actio
n on a promissory note for the maker to say that ther
e was no consideration which was beneficial to him p
ersonally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a be
nefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suf
fered by the promisee, at the instance of the promisso
r. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or p
rivilege or suffers some detriment and the release and
extinguishment of the original obligation of George V
ann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.
Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and
gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note exe
cuted by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient co
nsideration for the new notes."
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of
issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which i
t was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to i
ts issuance. 42B.P. 22 does not make any distinction
as to whether the checks within its contemplation are
issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guara
ntee the obligation. 43The thrust of the law is to proh
ibit the making of worthless checks and putting them
into circulation. 44As this Court held in Lim v. Peopl
e of the Philippines, 45"what is primordial is that suc
h issued checks were worthless and the fact of its wo
rthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of th
eir issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22."
ECHSDc
The law itself creates a prima facie presumpti
on of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2
of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficie
nt funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a c
heck payment of which is refused by the drawee bank
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such b
ank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of kn
owledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unles
s such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the a
mount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payme
nt in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check ha
s not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the
dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. 46If
not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. 47
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was a
ware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds
 with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessaril
y exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficien
cy or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee ba
nk is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element
of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of
the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, mal
ice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequentia
l. 48
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v
. Court of Appeals 49wherein this Court inquired into
the true nature of transaction between the drawer and
the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persua
de the Court that the circumstances surrounding her c
ase deserve special attention and do not warrant a stri
ct and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioner's reliance on the case is misplaced.
The material operative facts therein obtaining are diffe
rent from those established in the instant petition. In t
he 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cove
r a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the l
essor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It
was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able
to sell or lease the goods while privately financing th
ose in desperate need so they may be accommodated.
The maker of the check thus became an unwilling vic
tim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-p
urchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all fr
om the deposit, since the checks were used as collater
al for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt
of an actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to c
over the receipt of an actual "account or for value." S
ubstantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Co
urt of Appeals, has established that the checks were is
sued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty's mother.
CITcSH
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals i
n deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any pr
oof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor th
at she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-2
000, 50 adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of App
eals 51 and Lim v. People, 52 authorizes the non-imp
osition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 case
s subject to certain conditions. However, the Court res
olves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative
Circular 13-2001 53 which clarified Administrative 12
-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrativ
e Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonmen
t as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establis
hes a rule of preference in the application of the pena
l provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circu
40
mstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone sho
uld be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Ne
edless to say, the determination of whether circumstan
ces warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely
upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprison
ment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindranc
e.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrat
ive Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment a
s an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) t
he judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound dis
cretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circ
umstances of each case, determine whether the imposi
tion of a fine alone would best serve the interests of j
ustice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary
to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be
imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, ther
e is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revise
d Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
54
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIE
D and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty G
UILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AF
FIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C.
Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to doubl
e the amount of each dishonored check subject of the
seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in ca
se of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay privat
e complainant, Manila Doctors' Hospital, the amount o
f Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) re
presenting the total amount of the dishonored checks.
Costs against the petitioner. cCSTHA
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275, [September 27, 20
04], 482 PHIL 427-448)
[G.R. No. 116511. February 12, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v
s. COLOMA TABAG, SARENAS TABAG, MARCE
LINO TABAG, FERNANDO MAGLINTE, JR. ARTE
MIO AWOD, LAUREÑO AWOD, ROMEO AGUIPO
, LEOPOLDO LEONCIO and ERNESTO MAWANG,
accused. COLOMA TABAG * and SARENAS TAB
AG, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rolando C. Rama for accused-appellant Sarenas Tabag
.
SYLLABUS
 1. REMEDIAL LAW; WEIGHT AND SUFFI
CIENCY; ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ROLE AS MA
STERMIND OF THE MASSACRE OR THE PRINCI
PAL BY INDUCEMENT; ESTABLISHED WITH M
ORAL CERTAINTY BY WEIGHTY CIRCUMSTAN
TIAL EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — We have held
time and again that conspiracy need not be establishe
d by direct proof. It may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or i
nferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerte
d action, and community of intent. It must, however b
e shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
offense itself. Indeed, Sarenas was not at the scene o
f the massacre at the time it was committed. His alibi
was firmly established not only through his evidence
but also by the testimony of prosecution witness Pabl
o Oca. That fact, notwithstanding, we are convinced t
hat Sarenas was not just a co-conspirator; he was the
mastermind of the massacre or the principal by induce
ment. His role was established with moral certainty b
y weighty circumstantial evidence. Under Section 4, R
ule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than o
ne circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferenc
es are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a convicti
on beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially form
ulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstant
ial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to o
ne fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accu
sed, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty perso
n, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent wi
th each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the a
ccused is guilty, and at the same time, inconsistent wi
th any other hypothesis except that of guilty. In the in
stant case, the following circumstances were duly pro
ven: 1. Sarenas was the leader of the ICHDF team in
Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao. 2. Before the mass
acre in question, members of Sarenas' family were ma
ssacred by person whom he believed were members o
f the NPA. Sarenas suspected the Magdasals to be me
mbers of the NPA. 3. Prosecution witness Pablo Oca
and the other accused were members of Sarenas' team
; as such, they took orders from Sarenas. On his cross
-examination, Sarenas proudly admitted of his authorit
y to give orders. 4. At about 9:00 p.m. of 11 March
1984, Sarenas' team met at the ICHDF Detachment in
Barangay Buan where Sarenas gave a briefing to his
son Marcelino and brother Coloma. 5. After the briefi
ng, Sarenas instructed the team to form on patrol in
New Visayas and "some distance away." Marcelino an
d Coloma led the team. 6. The area of operation of S
arenas' team is comprised of the barangays of Buan,
New Visayas, and Sunlon, all of Asuncion, Davao. 7.
Somewhere along the way, instead of patrolling their
area of operation, Marcelino proceeded toward Sitio C
andiis, Barangay Cabidianan, Asuncion, Davao. 8. Pab
lo asked Marcelino where they were going, but the lat
41
ter kicked the former in his buttocks and told him jus
t to keep quiet and to follow. 9. Upon reaching Sitio
Candiis, the team proceeded to the house of the victi
ms. Marcelino Tabag ordered Pablo Oca to serve as "l
ook-out," while Marcelino, Coloma Tabag, Fernando
Maglinte, Laureño Awod, Artemio Awod, and Romeo
Aguipo fired their garands toward the victims' house.
Then Marcelino, Coloma, Laureño, and Artemio went
up the house and started stabbing Welbino's wife and
children. 10. After the massacre, the team returned to
its detachment in Barangay Buan. Upon arrival thereat
, Sarenas asked his son Marcelino whether it was fini
shed, and the latter answered in the affirmative. 11. A
fter Marcelino made the report to his father that "it [
was] finished," the members of the team were gathere
d. Sarenas forthwith warned them against squealing, o
therwise the squealer would be shot. From the foregoi
ng, it is clear that Sarenas had the motive to eliminate
Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and his family. The briefing
was on a matter which he could neither openly discus
s nor entrust to others who were not of his confidenc
e. He thus chose for the purpose no less than his son
Marcelino and brother Coloma. Then, as the subseque
nt developments showed, the briefing turned to none
other than an instruction to get rid of the Magdasal fa
mily or "to finish" them off. If it were otherwise, Mar
celino would not have led the team to a place outside
of its area of operation, or to sitio Candiis of Baranga
y Cabidianan, in another municipality, where the hous
e of the victims was located. Sarenas knew exactly w
here Marcelino should lead the team and what it was
expected to do. He even waited at the detachment in
Barangay Buan for the team's return, and upon its ret
urn he asked Marcelino whether "it's finished." When
Marcelino assured him that was, Sarenas warned the o
ther members of the team not to talk about or reveal t
he massacre, otherwise the squealer would be killed.
None did, not until nearly a year later. All told, the c
oncordant combination and cumulative effect of the fo
regoing circumstances more than satisfy the requireme
nts of Section 4. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUM
STANCES; FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR LAWF
UL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE; NOT AP
PLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In no way can Sa
renas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6,
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacr
e of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as
done in fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercis
e of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. Other than "suspici
on." there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr.,
his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members
of the NPA. And even if they were members of the
NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On th
at fateful night of 11 March 1984, they were peaceful
ly resting in their humble home expecting for the daw
n of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing
justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nightti
me, on the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but
a merciless vigilante-style execution.
3. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
NIGHTTIME AND BAND; ABSORBED IN TREAC
HERY. — The trial court likewise erred in appreciati
ng nighttime and band as generic aggravating circumst
ances. Under the facts of this case, nighttime or noctu
rnity was absorbed in treachery, since it was evidently
an integral part of the peculiar treacherous means an
d manner adopted to ensure the execution of the crim
es, or that it facilitated the treacherous character of th
e attack. Band or cuadrilla was likewise absorbed in t
reachery. LLphil
4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; V
OLUNTARY SURRENDER; APPLICABLE IN CAS
E AT BAR. — Aside from disregarding nighttime an
d band as aggravating circumstances, we also give acc
used Sarenas Tabag the benefit of the mitigating circu
mstance of voluntary surrender. For, as evidenced by
a certification issued by Judge Napy Agayan, Sarenas
Tabag voluntarily surrendered himself before the warr
ant or his arrest was served on him.
5. ID.; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMS
TANCES; TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLIN
GS IN CASE AT BAR. — As to the crime committe
d, we agree with the trial court that in killing Welbin
o Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn and their children
Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, the accused committed four
separate crimes of murder, which are charged in the
information. There was no challenge thereon on the gr
ound that the information charges more than one offe
nse. Accordingly, the accused could be properly convi
cted of four counts or murder. As to the circumstance
which qualified the killings to murders, we differ wit
h the view of the trial court. It should be treachery, n
ot evident premeditation, as ruled by the latter. The e
vidence for the prosecution failed to satisfy two of th
e three requisites of evident premeditation, viz., (a) th
e time when Sarenas determined to commit the crime,
(b) a sufficient lapse of time between such determina
tion and execution to allow him to reflect upon the co
nsequences of his act. On the other hand, treachery w
as established beyond cavil. Accused Marcelino Tabag
, Coloma Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Laureño Awod,
Artemio Awod and Romeo Aguipo suddenly fired thei
r high-powered firearms toward Welbino Magdasal, Sr
., and thereafter, they went upstairs and stabbed his w
ife Wendelyn and his children Welbino, Jr., and Melis
a. The victims, all unarmed, were caught by surprise
and were in no position to offer any defense. There c
an be no doubt in any one's mind that the accused em
ployed means, methods, or forms on the execution of
the killings which tended directly and specially to ens
ure their execution, without risk to themselves arising
from the defense which the offended party might mak
e.
6. ID.; CIVIL LIABILITIES; THE AWARD
OF P400,000.00 "AS MORAL DAMAGES" IS NOT
42
CORRECT; CASE AT BAR. — As to the civil liabili
ties the award of P400,000.00 "as moral damages" is
not correct. Current case law fixes the indemnity for
death at P50,000.00. Moral damages may also be reco
vered in criminal cases under Article 2219 of the Civi
l Code. Marciana Magdasal, mother of Welbino Magd
asal, Sr., left to the discretion of the trial court the qu
alification of her sufferings caused by the death of he
r son, daughter-in-law, and two grandchildren. Since
Marciana's husband did not testify as to his moral suf
fering, any award for moral damages must be in favor
of Marciana only, and an award of P10,000.00 in eac
h of the four counts of murder is adequate. Hence, th
e total indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of the vi
ctims shall be P200,000.00 and the aggregate moral d
amages to be awarded to Marciana Magdasal shall be
P40,000.00.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIG
HTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BE
PRESENT; ESCAPE OF THE ACCUSED AFTER A
RRAIGNMENT IS DEEMED A WAIVER THEREOF
; CASE AT BAR. — The trial court erred in not pro
ceeding with the case against Laureño Awod and Arte
mio Awod after their successful escape on 19 October
1989 while in preventive detention. They had already
been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last senten
ce of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Con
stitution, trial against them should continue and upon
its termination, judgment should be rendered against t
hem notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, b
oth accused have died and the fact of such death is s
ufficiently established. Conformably with our decision
in People vs. Salas, their escape should have been co
nsidered a waiver of their right to be present at their t
rial and the inability of the court to notify them of th
e subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continui
ng with their trial. They were to be deemed to have r
eceived notice. The same fact of their escape made th
eir failure to appear unjustified because they have, by
escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and prote
ction of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gim
enez vs. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just
like those of the others, should have been brought to i
ts ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had t
he duty to rule on the evidence presented by the pros
ecution against all the accused and to render its judg
ment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives
re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence on their own be
half and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
who testified against them. LexLib
DECIS ION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
At about 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984 in Siti
o Candiis, Barangay Cabidianan, New Corella, Davao,
the spouses Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and Wendelyn R
epalda Magdasal, together with their children Welbino
, Jr., and Melisa, were massacred in their home allege
dly by members of the Integrated Civilian Home Defe That on or about March 11, 1984, in the Mun
nse Force (ICHDF). icipality of New Corella, Province of Davao, Philippin
es, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
On 14 March 1984, Aniceto Magdasal and M
, the above-mentioned accused, all members of the IC
arciana Magdasal, parents of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., r
HDF, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
eported the incident to the Municipal Mayor of Asunc
with Coloma Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando Magl
ion, Davao, and to the police authorities of New Core
inte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Laureño Awod, Romeo Agui
lla. They executed a joint affidavit on that date "to re
po, Leopoldo Leoncio and Ernesto Mawang, who are
quest the authorities concerned to follow up said incid
all still at large, with treachery and evident premeditat
ent and to conduct proper investigation to the end in
ion and with intent to kill, armed with garand, armalit
view that justice will prevail." 1 Later, they, together
e and carbine, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
with one Lucrecio Dagohoy, executed sworn statement
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Welbino Ma
s before the police authorities of New Corella. 2 Yet,
gdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, J
the identities of the killers remained unknown.
r. and Melisa Magdasal, thereby inflicting upon them
The first light on the case was shed on 27 Fe injuries which caused their death and further causing
bruary 1985 when Sergio Doctolero, barangay captain actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs
of Buan, Asuncion, Davao, executed a sworn statemen of the victims.
t 3 declaring that a member of the ICHDF, Romeo G
The commission of the foregoing offense is at
uipo, had confessed to him that it was the team led b
tended by the aggravating circumstance of superior str
y Sarenas Tabag that massacred the Magdasals. The r
ength, nighttime and in band committed with the aid
eal break came three days before the first anniversary
of armed men.
of the massacre when Ernesto Mawang, a member of
that team, gave his sworn statement 4 naming those i Contrary to law.
nvolved in the massacre. Not long after, another mem
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
ber thereof, one Pablo Oca, likewise gave a sworn sta
6364 and raffled to Branch 2 of the said court.
tement 5 corroborating Mawang's statements.
Since the other accused had remained at large, the co
On 15 July 1985, an information for murder a
urt proceeded with the case against Sarenas Tabag o
gainst accused Coloma Tabag, Sarenas Tabag, Marceli
nly. At his arraignment on 11 December 1985, he e
no Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Ro
ntered a plea of not guilty. 13
meo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio, and Ernesto Mawang
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of N On 3 March 1987, the prosecution filed a mot
ew Corella, Davao. 6 Accompanying the information ion to dismiss the case as against Ernesto Mawang be
were the above mentioned joint affidavit, sworn state cause it found after a thorough re-assessment of the p
ments, and death certificates of the victims. The infor rosecution's evidence that he "does not only appear to
mation was docketed as Criminal Case No. 897. 7 be less guilty, but he appears not responsible in any
way in the commission of the crime charged. . . [He]
After examining, through searching questions,
has not participated in the killing of the victims, he h
witnesses Pablo Oca and Sergio Doctolero, Judge Nap
as not fired any shot nor has lunged any bolo to the
y Agayan issued a warrant for the arrest of the accuse
victims, and his presence in the crime scene was not
d. No bond was recommended for their temporary lib
voluntary on his part." 14 The court granted the motio
erty, since they were charged with a capital offense a
n and ordered the immediate release of Mawang from
nd the evidence of guilt was strong. 8
detention. 15 lexlib
On 21 August 1985, accused Sarenas Tabag s
In the meantime, accused Coloma Tabag, Arte
urrendered to Judge Agayan. 9 The others could not b
mio Awod, Laureño Awod, and Romeo Aguipo were
e arrested; hence, an alias warrant for their arrest was
arrested. 16 All of them entered a plea of not guilty a
issued. 10
t their arraignment. 17
Sarenas Tabag waived submission of his count
On 19 October 1989, accused Laureño Awod
er-affidavit and preliminary investigation. Finding prob
and Artemio Awod, together with three others, escape
able cause against him, the MTC ordered on 28 Augu
d from the Provincial Jail. Upon being informed of th
st 1985 the transmittal of the record of the case to the
is incident, 18 the trial court continued the proceeding
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and the commitment o
s as against Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag, and Rome
f Sarenas at the Provincial Jail. 11
o Aguipo only. 19
After appropriate proceedings, an information
The witnesses presented by the prosecution we
12 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
re Pablo Oca, Sergio Doctolero, Aniceto Magdasal, Pa
Tagum, Davao, charging the above named accused wit
blo Babagonyo (a member of the Philippine National
h the crime of multiple murder. The accusatory portio
Police [PNP]), Marciana Magdasal, and Enrique Berm
n thereof reads as follows:
ejo (Administrative Officer of the PNP of New Corell
43
a, Davao), with Doctolero recalled as rebuttal witness.
On its part, the defense presented Sarenas Tabag, Ro
meo Aguipo, Coloma Tabag, and Alfredo Galocino, w
ith Sarenas Tabag and one Ricardo Agrade called as s
ur-rebuttal witnesses.
On 7 January 1992, the trial court promulgate
d its decision, 20 dated 19 December 1991, the dispos
itive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Sarenas T
abag, Coloma Tabag and Romeo Aguipo or Guipo gui
lty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of four (4)
counts of Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, for the deaths of Wel
bino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Ma
gdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, each of them is sent
enced to suffer four (4) indivisible prison terms of RE
CLUSION PERPETUA, to suffer all the accessory pe
nalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
They are further condemned to jointly and sev
erally indemnify the heirs of their victims in the total
sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (P400,000.00
) PESOS as moral damages; SIX THOUSAND (P6,00
0.00) as attorney's fees to Marciana Magdasal, mother
of the late Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and FOUR THOU
SAND (P4,000.00) PESOS as actual and compensator
y damages. 21
The material operative facts established by the
evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Ap
pellee as follows:
On March 11, 1984, at around 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, Pablo Oca was in the CHDF detachment
in Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao. (p. 5, TSN, Sept
ember 10, 1986) Also present were Marcelino Tabag,
appellant Sarenas Tabag, appellant Coloma Tabag, Art
emio Awod, Laureño Awod, Ernesto Mawang, Romeo
Guipo and Fernando Maglinte, all members of the C
HDF. (p. 6, Ibid.) While there, appellant Sarenas talke
d to his son, Marcelino Tabag, and his brother, appell
ant Coloma Tabag (Ibid.) Thereafter, Sarenas told the
group to go on patrol. (pp. 7 and 14, Ibid.) Pablo ask
ed Marcelino where they were going but the latter kic
ked him in the buttocks, and told him to "just keep q
uiet and follow." (p. 15, Ibid.)
Marcelino led the group to Barangay Cadi-is,
Asuncion, ** Davao. (p. 7, Ibid.) The group reached
Cadi-is at 11:00 o'clock in the evening (p. 17, Ibid.).
Upon reaching the house of Welbino Magdasal, the gr
oup stood to observe for a while. (p. 12, TSN, Januar
y 18, 1988) Pablo Oca was posted as lookout five me
ters away from the house. (p. 17, Ibid. and p. 18, TS
N, September 10, 1986)
After some time, Fernando Maglinte went up t
he house and knocked at the door. (p. 17, Ibid.) The
door was opened and Welbino Magdasal went out of
the house. (p. 17, TSN, January 13, 1988) Marcelino
44
ordered his companions to open fire at Welbino. (p. 2
4, TSN, September 10, 1986) The children who were
inside the house started shouting. (p. 10, Ibid.) Three
men from Marcelino's group went up the house and st
abbed to death Welbino's wife, Wendelyn, and their t
wo children, Welbino, Jr., and Melisa. (Ibid.)
After the massacre, Marcelino's group went ba
ck to their detachment at Barangay Buan. (Ibid.) Upo
n arrival, appellant Sarenas asked Marcelino, "Is it fin
ished" to which the latter answered, "Yes, it is finishe
d." (p. 11, Ibid.) Sarenas inquired further, "Did you g
ather the CHDF?" (Ibid.) Sarenas warned each membe
r of Marcelino's group to keep quiet about the inciden
t and threatened to shoot whoever will squeal. (p. 11,
and 16, Ibid.)
As a result of the massacre, the entire family
of Welbino died. Welbino's mouth was shattered and
his intestines protruded out. (p. 9, TSN, April 12, 198
9) Wendelyn's left leg and left arm were twisted. (Ibi
d.) Welbino, Jr. sustained wounds on his face and sta
b wounds in his chest. (Ibid.) Melisa was likewise wo
unded and died in the hospital. (Ibid.) A total of thirt
y-two empty shells of M16 spent bullets were recover
ed from the scene of the massacre. (p. 4, TSN, Januar
y 5, 1990)
This summary is faithfully borne out by the transcript
s of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; he
nce, we adopt it as our own.
It was further established through the testimon
y of Pablo Oca that after talking to his son Marcelino
and brother Coloma, Sarenas called for the other me
mbers of the ICHDF and instructed them to go on pat
rol. While on the way to New Visayas, Marcelino sep
arated from the others. The latter, nevertheless, follow
ed him to Sitio Candiis and then to the house of the
victims. 22
Alibi and denial were the defenses interposed
by accused Sarenas Tabag, Coloma Tabag, and Rome
o Aguipo.
Sarenas Tabag was the head of the ICHDF tea
m in question. He was enlisted into it when he was t
he barangay captain of Buan, Asuncion, Davao. The t
eam was to serve only in the municipality of Asuncio
n; its specific "area of operation" were the barangays
of Buan, New Visayas, and Sunlon, all in Asuncion.
All the members of the team took orders from him. 2
3 On 11 March up to 12 March 1984, he was with C
pl. Gafod on a military operation of the 37th Infantry
Battalion in New Visayas and Sunlon, Asuncion, Dav
ao. Aside from Cpl. Gafod, he was with Laureño Aw
od, Artemio Awod, Marcelino Tabag, Ernesto Mawan
g, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Pepito Tabag, and Cortez T
abag. Sarenas asserted that he could not have conduct
ed a briefing, as some of his men, particularly Colom
a Tabag and Pablo Oca, were in Mawab. 24 Sarenas l
ikewise denied having asked Marcelino after the killin
g, "Human na?" and having threatened those who patr
olled on that fateful night that anybody who squeals
would be shot with a clip of bullets. Sarenas also testi
fied that Pablo Oca could not have been at the detach
ment on the night of 11 March 1984, as he was relie
ved of his post as a member of the ICHDF as early a
s 24 December 1983 for having discharged seven clip
s from his garand rifle while drunk. 25 This then pro
vided Oca's motive to testify against him (Sarenas). 2
6 Sarenas further declared that members of his family
were massacred by suspected members of the NPA. 2
7 n of 21 February 1996, we ordered the dismissal of th
Coloma Tabag declared that on 11 March 198
4, he was in Mawab, Davao del Norte, panning for g
old. He went there on 4 March 1984 with his two chi
ldren. Mawab is more than twenty kilometers away fr
om Barangay Buan, Asuncion, Davao del Norte. 28
Romeo Aguipo testified that at 10:00 p.m. of
11 March 1984, he was at the copra drier in Baranga
y Buan "watching the copra." He said he was there fr
om 9 March to 12 March 1984. The copra drier was
only two kilometers away from the ICHDF detachmen
t. 29
The trial court gave full faith to the version of
the prosecution and disregarded that of the defense.
As to the motive of accused Sarenas Tabag, the trial
court stated:
Fourth: Sarenas Tabag also declared that his f
amily, sometime before March 11, 1984, was massacr
ed and his suspects were the members of the New Pe
oples' Army.
The Magdasals, who first resided in Buan, As
uncion, transferred to Sunlon, Asuncion, which was in
fested with members of the New Peoples' Army, acco
rding to Sarenas Tabag.
Sunlon being infested with members of the Ne
w Peoples' Army, Welbino Magdasal, Sr. and/or his f
amily could easily be suspected or he and his family
must be members of the New Peoples' Army.
Since the family of Sarenas Tabag was a victi
m of a massacre by the New Peoples' Army, the killi
ng of Welbino Magdasal, Sr. and the members of his
family must be the retaliation of Sarenas Tabag perpet
rated through his men who were CHDF members. 30
In support of its conclusion that four counts o
f murder were committed, the trial court rationalized t
hat
the deaths of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendely
n Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magda
sal resulted not [from] a single act punishable as com
plex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Cod
e but [from] a series of acts . . . with the qualifying a
ggravating circumstances of either treachery, evident p
remeditation, or superior strength having been taken a
dvantage of. 31
45
It opted to consider evident premeditation to qualify t
he killing to "multiple murder" and considered treac
hery, nighttime, and band as generic aggravating cir
cumstances. 32
From the judgment of conviction, only accuse
d Sarenas Tabag and Coloma Tabag filed their notice
of appeal. 33
On 8 August 1995, after filing his Appellant's
Brief, 34 accused Coloma Tabag died at the Davao Pr
ison and Penal Farm. 35 Accordingly, in the resolutio
e case against him.
Only the appeal of accused Sarenas Tabag is l
eft for our determination.
In his Appellant's Brief, accused Sarenas Taba
g contends that the trial court erred in
1. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLA
NT SARENAS TABAG NOT BECAUSE OF THE W
EAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE
BUT BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE DE
FENSE'S EVIDENCE;
2. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLA
NT SARENAS TABAG AS CONSPIRATOR OR CO
NFEDERATE, THE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRAC
Y NOT HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;
3. NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLA
NT SARENAS TABAG ON THE GROUND THAT
HE IS EXEMPTED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
UNDER ARTICLE 11, (5) & (6), OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
The first assigned error is without basis. The t
rial court convicted him primarily on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. If at all the trial court c
onsidered the weakness of the evidence of the defense
, it was merely to show that the massive proof of guil
t was not shakened by the "brazen and unmitigated lie
s of the accused and their witnesses." 36
Regarding Tabag's second assigned error, we
have held time and again that conspiracy need not be
established by direct proof. It may be deduced from t
he mode and manner in which the offense was perpet
rated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themsel
ves when such acts point to a joint purpose and desig
n, concerted action, and community of intent. 37 It m
ust, however, be shown to exist as clearly and as con
vincingly as the offense itself. 38
Indeed, Sarenas was not at the scene of the m
assacre at the time it was committed. His alibi was fir
mly established not only through his evidence but also
by the testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Oca.
That fact, notwithstanding, we are convinced that Sare
nas was not just a co-conspirator; he was the masterm
ind of the massacre or the principal by inducement. H
is role was established with moral certainty by weight
y circumstantial evidence.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Co
urt, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the fa
cts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is su
ch as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doub
t. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of convi
ction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroke
n chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclu
sion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all ot
hers, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances prov
en must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the sa
me time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis excep
t that of guilty. 39
In the instant case, the following circumstance
s were duly proven:
1. Sarenas was the leader of the ICHDF team in Bara
ngay Buan, Asuncion, Davao.
2. Before the massacre in question, members of Saren
as' family were massacred by person
s whom he believed were members
of the NPA. Sarenas suspected the
Magdasals to be members of the NP
A. 40
3. Prosecution witness Pablo Oca and the other accuse
d were members of Sarenas' team; a
s such, they took orders from Sarena
s. On his cross-examination, Sarenas
proudly admitted of his authority to
give orders. 41
4. At about 9:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984, Sarenas' tea
m met at the ICHDF Detachment in
Barangay Buan where Sarenas gave
a briefing to his son Marcelino and
brother Coloma.
5. After the briefing, Sarenas instructed the team to g
o on patrol in New Visayas and "so
me distance away." Marcelino and C
oloma led the team.
6. The area of operation of Sarenas' team is comprise
d of the barangays of Buan, New Vi
sayas, and Sunlon, all of Asuncion,
Davao.
7. Somewhere along the way, instead of patrolling the
ir area of operation, Marcelino proce
eded toward Sitio Candiis, Barangay
Cabidianan, Asuncion, Davao.
8. Pablo asked Marcelino where they were going, but
the latter kicked the former on his b
46
uttocks and told him just to keep qu
iet and to follow.
9. Upon reaching Sitio Candiis, the team proceeded to
the house of the victims. Marcelino
Tabag ordered Pablo Oca to serve as
"look-out," while Marcelino, Colom
a Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Laureñ
o Awod, Artemio Awod, and Romeo
Aguipo fired their garands toward t
he victims' house. Then Marcelino,
Coloma, Laureño, and Artemio went
up the house and started stabbing W
elbino's wife and children. 42
10. After the massacre, the team returned to its detach
ment in Barangay Buan. Upon arriva
l thereat, Sarenas asked his son Mar
celino whether it was finished, and t
he latter answered in the affirmative.
43
11. After Marcelino made the report to his father that
"it [was] finished," the members of t
he team were gathered. Sarenas forth
with warned them against squealing,
otherwise the squealer would be shot
. 44
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sarenas ha
d the motive to eliminate Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and
his family. The briefing was on a matter which he co
uld neither openly discuss nor entrust to others who
were not of his confidence. He thus chose for the pur
pose no less than his son Marcelino and brother Colo
ma. Then, as the subsequent developments showed, th
e briefing turned to none other than an instruction to
get rid of the Magdasal family or "to finish" them off
. If it were otherwise, Marcelino would not have led t
he team to a place outside of its area of operation, or
to Sitio Candiis of Barangay Cabidianan, in another m
unicipality, where the house of the victims was locate
d. Sarenas knew exactly where Marcelino should lead
the team and what it was expected to do. He even wa
ited at the detachment in Barangay Buan for the team'
s return, and upon its return he asked Marcelino whet
her "it's finished." When Marcelino assured him that i
t was, Sarenas warned the other members of the team
not to talk about or reveal the massacre, otherwise the
squealer would be killed. None did, not until nearly
a year later.
All told, the concordant combination and cum
ulative effect 45 of the foregoing circumstances more
than satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 o
f the Rules of Court.
In his third assigned error, accused Sarenas Ta
bag invokes paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Re
vised Penal Code, which provide for justifying circum
stances. 46 He contends that being a member of the I
CHDF involved in the battle against insurgency, he w
as in the performance of an official duty or function
duly authorized by law 47 and that he is, therefore, e
xempt from criminal liability.
This assigned error is not predicated on a hyp
othesis that even granting arguendo that he was a co-
conspirator with the other accused in the massacre of
the Magdasals he would still be "exempt" from any cr
iminal liability because he was in the performance of
an official duty or function duly authorized by law. N
ot being so, he thus admits that he was a co-conspirat
or. The slip may be showing much, or that the consci
ence has unwittingly told the truth. Yet, we shall not
put Sarenas on a bind or be too harsh to him for the
imprecise formulation of this assigned error. cdrep
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges un
der paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Pen
al Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no
means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedi
ence to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no evidence t
hat Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and th
eir children were members of the NPA. And even if t
hey were members of the NPA, they were entitled to
due process of law. On that fateful night of 11 March
1984, they were peacefully resting in their humble h
ome expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day.
Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and un
provoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The
massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style e
xecution.
As to the crime committed, we agree with the
trial court that in killing Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his
wife Wendelyn, and their children Welbino, Jr., and
Melisa, the accused committed four separate crimes of
murder, which are charged in the information. There
was no challenge thereon on the ground that the infor
mation charges more than one offense. 48 Accordingl
y, the accused could be properly convicted of four co
unts of murder.
As to the circumstance which qualified the kil
lings to murders, we differ with the view of the trial
court. It should be treachery, 49 not evident premedita
tion, 50 as ruled by the latter. The evidence for the pr
osecution failed to satisfy two of the three requisites
of evident premeditation, viz., (a) the time when Sare
nas determined to commit the crime, (b) a sufficient l
apse of time between such determination and executio
n to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of hi
s act. 51 On the other hand, treachery was established
beyond cavil. Accused Marcelino Tabag, Coloma Tab
ag, Fernando Maglinte, Laureño Awod, Artemio Awo
d, and Romeo Aguipo suddenly fired their high-power
ed firearms toward Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and therea
fter, they went upstairs and stabbed his wife Wendely
n and his children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa. The victi
ms, all unarmed, were caught by surprise and were in
no position to offer any defense. There can be no dou
47
bt in any one's mind that the accused employed mean
s, methods, or forms in the execution of the killings
which tended directly and specially to ensure their exe
cution, without risk to themselves arising from the def
ense which the offended party might make. 52
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating n
ighttime and band as generic aggravating circumstance
s. Under the facts of this case, nighttime or nocturnity
was absorbed in treachery, since it was evidently an
integral part of the peculiar treacherous means and ma
nner adopted to ensure the execution of the crimes, or
that it facilitated the treacherous character of the atta
ck. 53 Band or cuadrilla was likewise absorbed in tre
achery. 54
Aside from disregarding nighttime and band a
s aggravating circumstances, we also give accused Sar
enas Tabag the benefit of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. For, as evidenced by a certific
ation issued by Judge Napy Agayan, Sarenas Tabag v
oluntarily surrendered himself before the warrant for h
is arrest was served on him.
The penalty for murder at the time the accuse
d committed the four separate crimes of murder was r
eclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Th
ere being one mitigating circumstance without any ag
gravating circumstance to offset it, and applying the I
ndeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable in
each case is prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as minimum,
to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as max
imum.
As to the civil liabilities, the award of P400,0
00.00 "as moral damages" is not correct. Current case
law fixes the indemnity for death at P50,000.00. Mora
l damages may also be recovered in criminal cases un
der Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Marciana Magdas
al, mother of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., left to the discre
tion of the trial court the quantification of her sufferin
gs caused by the death of her son, daughter-in-law, an
d two grandchildren. Since Marciana's husband did no
t testify as to his moral suffering, any award for mora
l damages must be in favor of Marciana only, and an
award of P10,000.00 in each of the four counts of mu
rder is adequate. Hence, the total indemnity to be awa
rded to the heirs of the victims shall be P200,000.00,
and the aggregate moral damages to be awarded to M
arciana Magdasal shall be P40,000.00.
Finally, the trial court also erred in not procee
ding with the case against Laureño Awod and Artemi
o Awod after their successful escape on 19 October 1
989 while in preventive detention. They had already b
een arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence
of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constit
ution, 55 trial against them should continue and upon
its termination, judgment should be rendered against t
hem notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, b
oth accused have died and the fact of such death is s
ufficiently established. Conformably with our decision
in People v. Salas, 56 their escape should have been
considered a waiver of their right to be present at thei
r trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of
the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from contin
uing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have
received notice. The same fact of their escape made t
heir failure to appear unjustified because they have, b
y escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and pr
otection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to G
imenez v. Nazareno, 57 the trial against the fugitives,
just like those of the others, should have been brought
to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court
had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its j
udgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugiti
ves' re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to
have waived their right to present evidence on their o
wn behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witn
esses who testified against them.
It is obvious that the trial court forgot our ruli
ngs in Salas and Nazareno. We thus take this opportu
nity to admonish trial judges to abandon any cavalier
stance against accused who escaped after arraignment,
thereby allowing the latter to make a mockery of our
laws and the judicial process. Judges must always kee
p in mind Salas and Nazareno and apply without hesit
ation the principles therein laid down, otherwise they
would court disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branc
h 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao, in
Criminal Case No. 6364 is AFFIRMED, with the mod
ification (1) sentencing accused-appellant SARENAS
TABAG in each of the four crimes to an indeterminat
e penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of re
clusion temporal, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) year
s, Four (4) months, and One (1) day of reclusion tem
poral, as maximum; and (2) deleting the award of P40
0,000.00 as moral damages and awarding, in lieu ther
eof, (a) P200,000.00 as indemnity for the deaths of W
elbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, W
elbino Magdasal, Jr., and Melisa Magdasal, payable to
the heirs of the victims; and (b) P40,000.00 as moral
damages, payable to Marciana Magdasal.
The Resolution of 21 February 1996 dismissin
g the case as against accused Coloma Tabag because
of his death is hereby reiterated.
The trial court is ordered to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 6364 as against acc
used Laureño Awod and Artemio Awod if they are sti
ll alive, in accordance with the principles laid down i
n People v. Salas and Gimenez v. Nazareno.
Costs against accused-appellant Sarenas Tabag.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Tabag, G.R. No. 116511, [February 12,
1997], 335 PHIL 579-601)
48
[G.R. No. 113691. February 6, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.
ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
De Jesus Paguio & Manimtim for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Alberto Medina was charged with the crime o
f murder for the death of Andres M. Dalisay. Medina
pleaded "not guilty'' to the charge. After trial in due c
ourse, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentencing him to suffer the pen
alty of reclusion perpetua.In this appeal, the appellant
puts in issue, (1) his insanity and (2) the presence and
the effect of the following circumstances: (a) treacher
y, (b) evident premeditation, and (c) voluntary surrend
er.
The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's ple
a for acquittal but accepted his claim of voluntary sur
render. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be
clearly proved, for there is presumption that acts pena
lized by law are voluntary. Hence, in the absence of
positive evidence that the accused had previously lost
his reason or was demented moments prior to or duri
ng the perpetration of the crime, the court will always
presume that he was in a normal state of mind. In th
is case, the testimony of the expert witness failed to e
stablish legal insanity on the part of the appellant. Th
e treacherous nature of the appellant's attack on the vi
ctim was clearly established by the testimony of a pro
secution eyewitness. However, evident premeditation
was not present in this case. The mitigating circumsta
nce of voluntary surrender should have been credited i
n favor of the appellant since the evidence herein suff
iciently established the elements thereof. Voluntary sur
render diminishes the appellant's penalty. Following A
rt. 64(2) of the Code, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender entitled the appellant to the impos
ition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Th
e appellant was imposed an indeterminate sentence of
ten years and one day of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, and seventeen years, four months and one
day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum. aS
cITE
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUM
STANCES; INSANITY; MUST BE CLEARLY PRO
VED. — The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the
Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, in th
e absence of proof to the contrary, every person is pr
esumed to be of sound mind. The defense of insanity
or imbecility must be clearly proved, for there is a pr
esumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary. H
ence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accu
sed had previously lost his reason or was demented m
oments prior to or during the perpetration of the crim
e, the courts will always presume that he was in a no
rmal state of mind. IDSaTE
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;CONSTRUED. — Care must be
taken to distinguish between lack of reason (insanity)
and failure to use reason or good judgment due to ex
treme anger (passion)."...[I]t is now well settled that
mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, w
hich results, not from any disease of mind, but from a
perverted condition of the moral system, where the p
erson is mentally sane, does not exempt one from res
ponsibility for crimes committed under its influence.''
Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted
as an exempting circumstance, Philippine case law sh
ows a common reliance on the test of cognition, whic
h requires a complete deprivation of intelligence — n
ot only of the will — in committing the criminal act.
It has been held that mere abnormality of the mental
faculties does not exclude criminal culpability.
3. ID.;AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Tr
eachery can be gleaned from the fact that appellant w
aited behind a chico tree and then, all of a sudden, ju
mped on the victim. Appellant's attack was not only s
udden and unexpected; it was also vicious and relentle
ss. After delivering the first stab, appellant chased his
victim and stabbed him seven more times. These seve
n additional stabs were inflicted when the victim was
helpless, as he fell down several times during the purs
uit. Counterattack and escape proved futile because of
the injuries that the victim sustained. The medico-lega
l officer reported that of the eight stab wounds on the
victim, six were fatal. Clearly, in killing his victim, a
ppellant employed means which ensured its execution
without risk to himself arising from any defense whic
h the victim might make. Treachery which qualified t
he killing as murder was properly appreciated by the t
rial court.
4. ID.;MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VO
LUNTARY SURRENDER; ELEMENTS; PRESENT I
N CASE AT BAR. — The mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should have been credited in fav
or of the appellant. The Solicitor General concurs and
notes that appellant, after having earlier given himself
up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight
on May 20, 1992, or about an hour after the stabbing
incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of
the Batangas City Police Station. Hence, the evidence
sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surr
ender, namely: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in aut
hority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) hi
s surrender was voluntary.
5. ID.; MURDER; PROPER PENALTY; CAS
E AT BAR. — Voluntary surrender diminishes appell
ant's penalty. Since the crime was committed prior to
the effectivity of Republic Act 7659, the imposable pe
nalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. The proscription of the death penalty
49
by the 1987 Constitution did not amend the imposabl
e penalty under said article. Thus, Art. 64, which pro
vides the rules for the application of penalties containi
ng three periods, governs the determination of the pro
per penalty in this particular case. Contrary to the con
tention of the Solicitor General, Art. 63 of the Revise
d Penal Code does not apply. Following Art. 64 (2) o
f the Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary s
urrender entitles appellant to the imposition of reclusi
on temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Ind
eterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended),
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate sent
ence of prision mayor in its maximum period, as mini
mum, and reclusion temporal in its maximum period,
as maximum. ETCcSa
DECIS ION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The law presumes that an offender possesses f
ull control of his mental faculties. Thus, the exemptin
g circumstance of insanity or imbecility under Art 12,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, must be established
by clear and competent evidence showing that the ac
cused completely lost his reason, or was demented im
mediately prior to or at the very moment the crime w
as committed.
The Case
This is the legal precept relied upon by this C
ourt in denying this appeal from the Decision 1 dated
November 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Ba
tangas City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case No. 5787 con
victing Alberto Medina y Catud of murder.
In an Information dated June 10, 1992, Secon
d Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benito E. Lat charge
d appellant with murder allegedly committed as follo
ws: 2
"That on or about the 20th day of May, 1992,
at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, in Barangay K
aingin, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Bata
ngas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this H
onorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
a balisong knife, with intent to kill, with treachery an
d evident premeditation and without any justifiable ca
use, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felon
iously attack, assault and stab with the said balisong k
nife one Andres M. Dalisay, suddenly and without wa
rning, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds o
n the different parts of his body, which directly cause
d his death.
Contrary to law."
On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel
Jose Contreras, pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 3
After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads
: 4
 "WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused,
ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD, guilty beyond reaso
nable doubt of the crime of murder as defined and pe
nalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal [Code] a
nd there being no mitigating circumstance to offset th
e qualifying circumstance of treachery and generic ag
gravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and h
ereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Andres
M. Dalisay the sum of P50,000.00. Costs against the
deceased."
Hence, this appeal. 5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as reco
unted by the solicitor general in the appellee's brief, is
as follows: 6
"At around 11 pm on May 20, 1991, a party
was held in the house of Sebastian and Delia Aguila i
n Barangay Caingin, Balite, Batangas, to celebrate the
awarding of a championship trophy to the basketball t
eam of Larry Andal. Among those present during the
celebration were Andres Dalisay, Edgardo Silang, Larr
y Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustian
o Aguila and appellant Alberto Medina (pp. 3-5, tsn,
September 9, 1992, testimony of Larry Andal).During
the celebration, appellant and Dalisay danced the 'cha-
cha' in the shade (sulambi) near the terrace of the hou
se of Delia and Sebastian Aguila. While the two were
dancing, the group watched and clapped their hands.
When the dance was finished, appellant left the house
of the Aguilas. After a while, Dalisay invited Andal t
o go home (pp. 8-11, tsn, September 11, 1992).The t
wo left the house of the Aguilas, with Dalisay walkin
g ahead of Andal. While they were walking, Andal sa
w appellant, who was waiting along the way, stab Dal
isay with a 'balisong' in the abdominal region. Dalisay
held the hand of appellant. While they were grapplin
g, Dalisay was able to extricate himself and started to
run away. Appellant chased him. When appellant cau
ght up with Dalisay, appellant stabbed Dalisay once
more at the back. Dalisay fell to the ground. He tried
to get up and run, but he again fell down. Appellant s
tabbed him [once more] on the chest. Then [a]ppellant
fled from the scene.
Andal, who was about one meter away, was s
o stunned and shocked by what he saw that he did no
t do anything to help Dalisay. Andal and his relatives
brought Dalisay to the Batangas Regional Hospital, bu
t Dalisay was pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 2-6, ts
n, Sept. 11, 1992).
At that time of the incident, prosecution witne
ss Edgardo Silang was urinating twenty paces away.
He heard Delia Aguila, the sister of appellant, shoutin
g, "Husay ka Alberto pihadong makukulong ka, sinaks
ak mo si Andres." When he turned to where the shout
50
came from, he saw Dalisay running towards him, pur
sued by appellant. He saw blood in front of the body
of Dalisay. He held the arm of Dalisay and tried to h
ug him but Dalisay fell to the ground. At that point,
he saw appellant flee (pp. 5-18, tsn, Sept. 9, 1992, tes
timony of Edgardo Silang).
Dr. Benjamin M. Aguado, the Municipal Healt
h Officer of San Pascual Rural Health Unit, conducte
d a post-mortem examination of the body of the dece
ased. He issued a Post-Mortem Examination Report (
Exhibit 'C') containing the following findings:
'1. Stab Wound between the 3rd & 4th intersp
ace at the lateral side of the body of the sternum mea
suring ½ inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in
depth.
2. Stab Wound at the left Hypochondriac regi
on measuring ½ inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] exp
osing the omentum.
3. Stab Wound thigh left just below the Ingui
nal Hernia measuring 1 inch in length 3 cm in wid[th
] x 4 cm in depth.
4. Stab Wound of the thigh left mid portion a
nterior surface measuring 1 inch in length x 3 cm in
wid[th] x 4 cm depth.
5. Stab Wound at the scapular region mid port
ion measuring ½ inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3
cm in depth.
6. Stab Wound at the back left between the 7t
h and 8th interspace measuring ½ inch in length x 2
cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
7. Stab Wound at lower portion of the scapula
r region left measuring ½ inch in length x 2 cm in wi
d[th] x 3 cm in depth.
8. Stab Wound at the back right at the level o
f the kidney measuring ½ inch in length x 2 cm in w
id[th] x 4 cm in depth.'
(Exhibit 'C')."
Version of the Defense
In his brief, appellant sets up insanity as his d
efense. His version of the facts is as follows: 7
"1. Accused-appellant Alberto Medina testified
that on the evening of May 20, 1992, he went to the
house of his sister, Delia Aguila, purposely to watch
t.v. (TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 5).Upon his arrival,
he saw the group of the deceased Andres Dalisay, Lar
ry Andal and Edgardo Silang who were then engaged
in a drinking spree at the balcony of the Aguila resid
ence (Ibid,p. 6).
2. Accused-appellant refused the group's invita
tion to join them in their drinking; however, he accept
ed their invitation to dance with Andres Dalisay (Ibid.
).In fact, accused-appellant danced with him for about
six (6) or seven (7) times (Ibid, p. 7).
3. As the dance and the party ended, the guest
s started to leave. Accused-appellant left his sister's h
ouse to head for his home at Barangay Balete, which
was more or less 200 meters away. Among the person
s left behind was Andres Dalisay.
4. While walking along the path, accused-appe
llant heard Andres Dalisay say, 'Bert, sandali lang',(TS
N, September 9, 1993, p. 10) prompting the former to
stop.
5. Thereupon, Andres Dalisay, who appeared t
o be drunk, approached accused-appellant and uttered:
'Bakit mo ako hiniya?' and hit him (accused-appellant)
on the chest (Ibid).Enraged, accused-appellant prepare
d to fight back when Andres Dalisay threatened to kil
l him (Ibid.,p. 11).At this point, accused-appellant furt
her testified, it looked as if Andres Dalisay was takin
g something out [of] his pocket.
6. Upon seeing this, accused-appellant beat hi
m to the draw, took out his 'balisong' and stabbed An
dres Dalisay, who then looked like a devil with 'horns
' (Ibid.,p. 11 and 19).It was only when Andres Dalisa
y uttered 'May tama ako' did accused-appellant stop ...
stabbing his victim (Ibid.,p. 16).
7. Upon realizing that he has stabbed a person
, accused-appellant surrendered himself and the weapo
n on the same evening to the authorities (TSN, Septe
mber 9, 1993, p. 20).
8. On several occasions before, specifically du
ring the latter part of 1981, accused-appellant had exh
ibited unusual behaviors. His sister Lorna Medina testi
fied that on June 22, 1982, she brought her brother to
the National Mental Hospital after the latter had sho
wn unusual conduct, such as looking blankly at a dist
ance, hitting his wife or banging her head on the wall
for no reason and having sleepless nights (TSN, Aug
ust 11, 1993, pp. 13-15).
9. From June to October of 1982, accused-app
ellant was confined at the National Mental Hospital M
s.Lourdes Palapal,the Records Officer of the National
Center for Mental Health (formerly, the National Men
tal Hospital) testified on the documents issued by thei
r office relative to the confinement of accused-appella
nt for 'schizophreniform disorder' during that period (
Exhibits 3 to 11).
10. After his release from the hospital, accuse
d-appellant lived with his mother and his two children
at Brgy. Balete, San Pascual, Batangas. His condition
did not seem to improve, though. Lorna Medina furt
her testified that in January of 1992, accused-appellant
again exhibited the same unusual behavior which she
had observed from him in 1982 (TSN, August 11, 19
93, p. 17).
51
11. This prompted Lorna to refer her brother's
case to Dr. Teresita Adigue, a psychologist-friend who
conducted a psychological examination on accused-ap
pellant (TSN, August 11, 1993, p. 17).
12. Dr. Teresita Adigue,a Doctor of Psycholog
y and a holder of a Master's Degree in Clinical and I
ndustrial Psychology and another Master's Degree in
Guidance and Counselling, and an accredited psycholo
gist of the Philippine National Police testified that on
January 20, 1992, she administered a psychological ev
aluation on accused-appellant (TSN, May 24, 1993, p.
5).
13. Dr. Adigue testified that based on the eval
uation of accused-appellant, the latter has been shown
to be suffering from depression and was exhibiting ho
micidal tendencies, and that he did not know the diffe
rence between right and wrong (TSN, May 24, 1993,
p. 10 and TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 16).On cross-exami
nation, the witness affirmed that a person suffering fr
om depression may be insane (TSN, July 20, 1993, p.
10).
14. Dr. Adigue stated that the psychological e
valuation made on accused-appellant was based on the
behavioral history of the latter furnished to her by L
orna Medina and Leticia Regalado, (TSN, July 20, 19
93, p. 11) a case study based on the family backgrou
nd of accused-appellant (Ibid.,p. 12),and on a series of
psychological tests ('draw a person' test, the 'card' tes
t wherein the emotions of the subject are represented
by the cards, and the thematic perception test) (TSN,
May 24, 1993, p. 7)."
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court rejected the appellant's defense
of insanity. It ruled that Dr. Adigue was not properly
qualified as an expert witness because: (1) she did not
have the appellant's complete behavioral history; (2)
she failed to demonstrate satisfactorily how she arrive
d at her conclusions; (3) her method of testing was in
complete and inconclusive; (4) her examination lasted
for only a few hours without any follow-up evaluation
; (5) the university from where she allegedly obtained
her doctoral degree is not known to specialize in psyc
hology or psychiatry; (6) she is not known as a psych
iatrist; and (7) she reported that 'the mental activity [o
f the accused was] functioning on the normal level' at
the time of the evaluation, that he comprehended instr
uctions fast, and that he was suffering only from mild
depression.
The testimony of appellant's sister that she ha
d observed unusual behavior on the part of appellant
did not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity, "bec
ause not every aberration of the mind or mental defici
ency constitute[s] insanity." That the accused was rele
ased from confinement at the National Center for Men
tal Health on October 4, 1982 and was not readmitted
for any mental disorder for about ten years militated
against his alleged lunacy. Additionally, the trial judge
observed that, during the hearings, appellant was atte
ntive, well-behaved and responsive to the questions pr
opounded to him in English even without translation.
On the other hand, appellant's mental agility
was shown when he admitted seeing the deceased tak
e something out of his pocket, for which reason he de
cided to beat him to the draw ("Inunahan ko na").Wit
h his balisong,he repeatedly stabbed the deceased. The
trial court appreciated treachery based on Andal's nar
ration of the stabbing incident.
Assignment of Errors
The defense assigns the following errors alleg
edly committed by the trial court in convicting appella
nt:
"A
The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting
accused-appellant or mitigating his criminal liability o
n the ground of insanity.
B e has some emotional disturbances."
Assuming, arguendo,that accused-appellant is c
riminally liable for the death of Andres Dalisay, the tr
ial court nevertheless erred in convicting him of the c
rime of murder by appreciating the aggravating circu
mstances of treachery and evident premeditation despit
e doubt tending to show the existence of such circum
stances.
C d report does not support the claim that appellant coul
Assuming, arguendo,that accused-appellant is c
riminally liable, the trial court likewise erred in not a
ppreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary s
urrender in his favor."
In short, appellant puts in issue (1) his insanit
y and (2) the presence and the effect of the following
circumstances: (a) treachery, (b) evident premeditation,
and (c) voluntary surrender. We shall deal with each
of these issues.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We reject ap
pellant's plea for acquittal but accept his claim of vol
untary surrender.
First Issue : Appellant's Insanity Not Proven
Appellant insists that the trial court gravely er
red in refusing to consider Dr. Adigue as an expert w
itness. He argues that Dr. Adigue, being an accredited
psychologist of the Philippine National Police since 1
979 and a holder of a doctorate in psychology from t
he University of Calcutta, India, and a master's degree
in clinical and industrial psychology, deserves creden
ce.
52
Appellant misses the point. More than her aca
demic qualifications as a psychologist, what really ma
tters is the failure of Dr. Adigue's testimony to establi
sh legal insanity on the part of the appellant. After ex
amining the appellant on January 20, 1992, or four m
onths prior to the incident, and after conducting the "
Draw-a-Person" Test, the Thematic Apperception Test
and the Hand Test, she reported the results of her exa
mination as follows:
"VII. TEST RESULTS/EVALUATIONS
Psychological test results revealed that subject'
s mental activity is functioning on the normal level at
the time of evaluation. He can comprehend instruction
s fast and [was] never hesitant to take the said exami
nations.
With regards to some dominant personality fac
tors, test results revealed also the fact that subject is s
uffering only from mild depression because of proble
ms he had encountered in life and in things around hi
m. He had also developed negative reactions and outl
ook in life, therefore the undersigned concluded that h
Verily, such results do not prove the alleged i
nsanity of the appellant. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revise
d Penal Code, requires a complete deprivation of ratio
nality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be
deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of
responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete a
bsence of the power to discern. 8 More relevantly, sai
d not distinguish right from wrong.
Thus, the trial court properly rejected appellan
t's defense of insanity. The presumption of law, per A
rt. 800 of the Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanit
y, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every
person is presumed to be of sound mind. 9
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be
clearly proved, 10 for there is a presumption that acts
penalized by law are voluntary. 11 Hence, in the abse
nce of positive evidence that the accused had previous
ly lost his reason or was demented moments prior to
or during the perpetration of the crime, the courts will
always presume that he was in a normal state of min
d. In Bascos,12 the accused was exempted from crimi
nal liability because he was a violent maniac as confir
med by the acting district health officer who examine
d him. In Bonoan,13 the Court reversed the convictio
n of the accused, holding that a person afflicted with
dementia praecox and manic depressive psychosis has
"no control whatever of his acts. ...There is in this dis
order a pathologic lessening [of] normal inhibitions an
d the case [in] which impulses may lead to actions im
pairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to m
otor impulses (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal M
edicine and Toxicology [2d ed.,1926],vol. I, p. 617)."
There, the accused was treated at the psychiatric depa
rtment of San Lazaro Hospital and was released long
before the commission of the crime, but the reports of
the alienists 14 who examined the accused after the
crime confirmed his mental disorders. The Court held
that the evidence that the accused appeared lucid whe
n he stabbed the victim did not necessarily prove his
sanity, because it was "clear from what Dr. Sydney S
mith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, Universi
ty of Edinburgh, said in his work on Forensic Medici
ne, (3d. ed. [London],p. 382),that in the type of deme
ntia praecox,'the crime is usually preceded by much c
omplaining and planning.In these people, homicidal att
acks are common, because of delusions that they are
being interfered with sexually or that their property is
being taken.' " 15
However, care must be taken to distinguish be
tween lack of reason (insanity) and failure to use reas
on or good judgment due to extreme anger (passion)."
...[I]t is now well settled that mere mental depravity,
or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from a
ny disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of
the moral system, where the person is mentally sane,
does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes co
mmitted under its influence." 16
Thus, before the defense of insanity may be a
ccepted as an exempting circumstance, Philippine case
law shows a common reliance on the test of cognitio
n, which requires a complete deprivation of intelligenc
e — not only of the will — in committing the crimin
al act. 17 In the cited case of Rafanan,the fact that ap
pellant threatened the victim with death in case she re
ported her ravishment indicated that he was aware of
the reprehensible moral depravity of that assault and t
hat he was not deprived of intelligence. In Dungo,that
the accused knew the nature of what he had done ne
gated his claim that he was insane when he fatally sta
bbed his victim. 18 In Aquino 19 ,appellant, who too
k 120 cc of cough syrup and consumed three sticks o
f marijuana before raping his victim and hitting her h
ead with a stone, had some form of mental illness wh
ich did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The pr
esence of his reasoning faculties, enabling him to exer
cise sound judgment and to satisfactorily articulate the
aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounted any intimati
on of insanity when he committed the felony. It has b
een held that mere abnormality of the mental faculties
does not exclude criminal culpability.
In the present case, Dr. Adigue's testimony di
d not establish complete deprivation of appellant's reas
on. Consequently, appellant cannot claim exemption fr
om criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revi
sed Penal Code.
Alternatively, appellant argues that his conditi
on should merit, at the very least, the appreciation of
a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 9 of the
Code. 20 In Formigones,the Court found the feeblemi
ndedness of the accused to be a mitigating circumstan
ce, noting that his faculties were not fully developed.
53
After stabbing his wife, the accused in said case took
her dead body up their house, put her on the floor an
d lay beside her for hours, showing remorse at having
killed her. The accused was "'suffering [from] some
physical defect which thus restrict[ed] his means of ac
tion, defense or communication with his fellow beings
,' or such illness 'as would diminish the exercise of hi
s will power.' " 21In Rafanan,schizophrenic reaction, a
lthough not exempting because it does not completely
deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts,
was considered a mitigating circumstance which dimin
ished the exercise of the offender's will power without
, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts. 22
In the instant case, however, the defense miser
ably failed to establish the deprivation of the appellant
's will when he stabbed his victim. Appellant testified
that he thought the victim was going to pull out a we
apon, thus he beat him to the draw and stabbed him
with his balisong.23This statement shows that he did
not suffer any deprivation of reason or discernment.
While the victim appeared to him as a "devil with hor
ns," such perceptual distortion occurred only after he
had dealt the fatal blows on the victim. The Court ca
nnot, therefore, appreciate this mitigating circumstance
in his favor.
Second Issue : Proof of Treachery
The treacherous nature of appellant's attack on
the victim was established by Andal who witnessed t
he incident. Testified the witness: 24
"FISCAL CARAAN:
Q What about you, where [were] you on that occasio
n?
A I was with Andres in going home sir.
Q Can you tell the court [if you were] walking togeth
er at that time?
A Yes sir.
Q Who was ahead?
A Andres was ahead of me, sir.
Q And you [were] following?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While walking together, can you tell the court what
actually happened?
A Alberto waited for us on the way that were going
pass, sir.
Q Why do you say that Alberto [was] waiting for you
an Andres during that time?
A Perhaps he has a bad intentioned, (sic) sir.
Q While walking on that path Andres was ahead of y
ou what did you see if you had see[
n] anything?
A Alberto stabbed Andres Dalisay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happen[ed] after Alberto had [stabbed] Andre
s Dalisay?
A They chased one another, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happen[ed] after that?
A When the first stubbed (sic) hit Dalisay, Dalisay tri
ed to hold the hand of Alberto and
when they were struggling Andres w
as able to push Alberto and they bot
h fell down and with Alberto on top
of Andres, Andres was able to push
Alberto and he was able to get up
and Andres ran away and Alberto ch
ased him sir.
FISCAL CARAAN:
Q Did Alberto [catch] up with Andres ...?
A Yes sir, Andres Dalisay toppled down and Alberto
stabbed him at the back, sir.
Q What happen[ed] next?
A After the stabbing of Andres at the back by Albert
o, Andres was able to get up and ra
n and while running he fell for the s
econd time and Alberto stabbed [him
] again on the chest, sir."
Treachery can be gleaned from the fact that a
ppellant waited behind a chico tree and then, all of a
sudden, jumped on the victim. Appellant's attack was
not only sudden and unexpected; it was also vicious a
nd relentless. After delivering the first stab, appellant
chased his victim and stabbed him seven more times.
These seven additional stabs were inflicted when the
victim was helpless, as he fell down several times dur
ing the pursuit. Counterattack and escape proved futile
because of the injuries that the victim sustained. The
medico-legal officer reported that of the eight stab wo
unds on the victim, six were fatal. 25 Clearly, in killi
ng his victim, appellant employed means which ensur
ed its execution without risk to himself arising from a
ny defense which the victim might make. 26 Treacher
y which qualified the killing as murder was properly
appreciated by the trial court.
Third Issue : Absence of Evident Premeditation
The Court concurs with appellant and the soli
citor general that the trial court erred in appreciating e
vident premeditation. The solicitor general explains th
at "only a few minutes had passed" from the time app
54
ellant left his sister's house to the time he stabbed his
victim. Thus, no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable
from the determination to commit the crime until its
execution to allow appellant to reflect upon the conse
quences of his act. 27 Under such circumstances, evid
ent premeditation cannot be appreciated.
Fourth Issue : Voluntary Surrender
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surre
nder should have been credited in favor of the appella
nt. 28The solicitor general concurs and notes that app
ellant, after having earlier given himself up to a certai
n Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1
992, or about an hour after the stabbing incident, to
Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batang
as City Police Station. 29Hence, the evidence sufficie
ntly established the elements of voluntary surrender, n
amely: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested;
(2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or
an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrend
er was voluntary. 30
The Proper Penalty
Voluntary surrender diminishes appellant's pen
alty. Since the crime was committed prior to the effec
tivity of Republic Act 7659, the imposable penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. The proscription of the death penalty by the
1987 Constitution did not amend the imposable penalt
y under said article. 31Thus, Art. 64, which provides
the rules for the application of penalties containing thr
ee periods, governs the determination of the proper pe
nalty in this particular case. 32Contrary to the content
ion of the solicitor general, Art. 63 of the Revised Pe
nal Code does not apply. 33
Following Art. 64 (2) of the Code, the mitigat
ing circumstance of voluntary surrender entitles appell
ant to the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maxi
mum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence La
w (Act No. 4103, as amended),appellant should be se
ntenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision mayor
in its maximum period, as minimum, and reclusion t
emporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFI
RMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is IMPOSE
D an indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day
of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, and sevente
en years, four months and one day of reclusion tempo
ral maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Medina y Catud, G.R. No. 113691, [Febr
uary 6, 1998], 349 PHIL 718-736)
SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 182941. July 3, 2009.]
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA,
petitioner , vs . PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J : p
Before us is the petition of Rob
ert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the
review on certiorari 1 of the Decision
2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Ap
peals 4 (CA)that affirmed with modifica
tion his conviction for the crime of qu
alified rape rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig Cit
y, in its decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old
AAA 5 was playing with her friend BB
B in the second floor of her family's h
ouse in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner a
rrived holding a knife and told AAA a
nd BBB that he wanted to play with t
hem. The petitioner then undressed B
BB and had sexual intercourse with he
r. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undr
essed her, and also had sexual interco
urse with her by inserting his male or
gan into hers. The petitioner warned
AAA not to tell anybody of what they
did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the
incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher)
and to Dolores Mangantula (the pare
nt of a classmate), who both accompa
nied AAA to the barangay office. AAA
was later subjected to physical exami
nation that revealed a laceration on h
er hymen consistent with her claim of
sexual abuse. On the basis of the co
mplaint and the physical findings, the
petitioner was charged with rape unde
r the following Information: ITaCEc
On or about August 5,
2000, in Pasig City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honora
ble Court, the accused, a min
HCaIDS
or, 15 years old, with lewd de
signs and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawf
ully and feloniously have sexu
al intercourse with his (accuse
d) sister, AAA, thirteen years o
f age, against the latter's will
and consent.
Contrary to law. 6
The petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge and raised the defense
s of denial and alibi. He claimed that
he was selling cigarettes at the time o
f the alleged rape. He also claimed th
55
at AAA only invented her story becaus The petitioner elevated this RTC
e she bore him a grudge for the beat decision to the CA by attacking AAA's
ings he gave her. The parties' mother credibility. He also invoked paragraph
(CCC) supported the petitioner's story; 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenil
she also stated that AAA was a troubl e Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) 9 t
emaker. Both CCC and son testified th o exempt him from criminal liability co
at the petitioner was fifteen (15) years nsidering that he was only 15 years ol
old when the alleged incident happen d at the time the crime was committe
ed. 7 d.

The defense also presented BBB The CA nevertheless affirmed th

who denied that the petitioner raped e petitioner's conviction with modificati
her; she confirmed the petitioner's clai on as to penalty as follows:
m that AAA bore her brother a grudg WHEREFORE, finding tha
e. t the trial court did not err in

On April 5, 2006, the RTC convi convicting Robert Sierra, the a

ssailed Decision is hereby AFFI
cted the petitioner of qualified rape as
RMED with MODIFICATION th
follows: DEcTIS

at Robert Sierra has to suffer

WHEREFORE, in view of
the penalty of imprisonment o
the foregoing, this Court finds
f RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAX
the accused ROBERT SIERRA y
IMUM. The award of damages
CANEDA GUILTY beyond reas
are likewise affirmed.
onable doubt of the crime of
SO ORDERED. 10
rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in
relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) In ruling that the petitioner was
and hereby sentences the said not exempt from criminal liability, the
juvenile in conflict with law t CA held: AaCcST

o suffer the penalty of impriso

As to the penalty, We a
nment of reclusion perpetua; a
gree with the Office of the So
nd to indemnify the victim the
licitor General that Robert is n
amount of P75,000 as civil in
ot exempt from liability. First, i
demnity, P50,000 as moral da
t was not clearly established a
mages, and P25,000 as exemp
nd proved by the defense tha
lary damages.
t Robert was 15 years old or
SO ORDERED. 8 below at the time of the com
56
mission of the crime. It was in shall place the ch
cumbent for the defense to pr ild in conflict with
esent Robert's birth certificate the law under s
if it was to invoke Section 64 uspended sentenc
of Republic Act No. 9344. Nei e, without need o
ther is the suspension of sent f application: Prov
ence available to Robert as th ided, however, Th
e Supreme Court, in one case, at suspension of
clarified that: sentence shall still
be applied even
We note that, in
if the juvenile is
the meantime, Rep. Act
already eighteen (
No. 9344 took effect on
18) years of age
May 20, 2006. Section
or more at the ti
38 of the law reads:
me of the prono
SEC. 38. A
uncement of his/
utomatic Suspensi
her guilt.
on of Sentence .
Upon susp
— Once the child
ension of sentenc
who is under ei
e and after consi
ghteen (18) years
dering the variou
of age at the tim
s circumstances o
e of the commiss
f the child, the c
ion of the offens
ourt shall impose
e is found guilty
the appropriate d
of the offense ch
isposition measur
arged, the court
es as provided in
shall determine a
the Supreme Co
nd ascertain any
urt on Juveniles i
civil liability which
n Conflict with th
may have result
e Law.
ed from the offe
nse committed. H The law merely a
owever, instead o mended Article 192 of P
f pronouncing the .D. No. 603, as amende
judgment of con d by A.M. No. 02-1-18-S
viction, the court C, in that the suspensio
57
 n of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile
even if he is already 18
years of age or more a
t the time of the prono
uncement of his/her gui
lt. The other disqualifica
tions in Article 192 of P.
D. No. 603, as amende
d, and Section 32 of A.
M. No. 02-1-18-SC have
not been deleted from
Section 38 of Republic
Act No. 9344. Evidently,
the intention of Congres
s was to maintain the o
ther disqualifications as
provided in Article 192
of P.D. No. 603, as ame
nded, and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. H
ence, juveniles who hav
e been convicted of a c
rime the imposable pen
alty for which is reclusio
n perpetua, life imprison
ment or reclusion perpe
tua to death or death,
are disqualified from ha
ving their sentences sus
pended. 11
The CA denied the petitioner's s
ubsequent motion for reconsideration;
hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
58
The petitioner no longer assails
the prosecution's evidence on his guilt
of the crime charged; what he now a
ssails is the failure of the CA to apply
paragraph 1, Section 6 12 of R.A. No.
9344 under the following issues:
(1 Whether or not the CA erre
d in not applying the p
rovisions of R.A. No. 93
44 on the petitioner's e
xemption from criminal
liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA err
ed in ruling that it was
incumbent for the defen
se to present the petitio
ner's birth certificate to
invoke Section 64 of R.
A. No. 9344when the b
urden of proving his ag
e lies with the prosecuti
on by express provision
s of R.A. No. 9344; and
SHIETa
(3) Whether or not the CA err
ed in applying the rulin
g in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton 13 thereby den
ying the petitioner the
benefit of exemption fro
m criminal liability unde
r R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case
is the determination of who bears the
burden of proof for purposes of deter
mining exemption from criminal liabilit
y based on the age of the petitioner
at the time the crime was committed.
The petitioner posits that the bu
rden of proof should be on the prose
cution as the party who stands to los
e the case if no evidence is presented
to show that the petitioner was not
a 15-year old minor entitled to the ex
empting benefit provided under Sectio
n 6 of R.A. No. 9344. 14 He additional
ly claims that Sections 3, 157, 16
8 17 of the law also provide a presum
ption of minority in favor of a child in
conflict with the law, so that any dou
bt regarding his age should be resolv
ed in his favor. IcaEDC
The petitioner further submits th
at the undisputed facts and evidence
on record — specifically: the allegation
of the Information, the testimonies of
the petitioner and CCC that the pros
ecution never objected to, and the fin
dings of the RTC — established that
he was not more than 15 years old at
the time of the commission of the cr
ime.
The People's Comment, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OS
G), counters that the burden belongs t
o the petitioner who should have pres
ented his birth certificate or other doc
umentary evidence proving that his ag
e was 15 years or below. The OSG als
o stressed that while petitioner is pres
umed to be a minor, he is disqualified
to have his sentence suspended follo
wing the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton. 18 EaHDcS
THE COURT'S RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the p
rosecution's evidence and the findings
of the lower courts on the petitioner's
and 6
guilt, since the petition opens the who
le case for review and the issues befo
re us are predicated on the petitioner'
s guilt of the crime charged. A deter
mination of guilt is likewise relevant u
nder the terms of R.A. No. 9344 since
its exempting effect is only on the cr
iminal, not on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, a
fter examination of the CA decision an
d the records of the case, to deviate f
rom the lower courts' findings of guilt.
The records show that the prosecutio
n established all the elements of the c
rime charged through the credible test
imony of AAA and the other corrobor
ating evidence; sexual intercourse did i
ndeed take place as the information c
harged. 19 As against AAA's testimony,
the petitioner could only raise the def
enses of denial and alibi — defenses t
hat, in a long line of cases, we have
59
held to be inherently weak unless sup
ported by clear and convincing eviden
ce; the petitioner failed to present this
required evidentiary support. 20 We h
ave held, too, that as negative defens
es, denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the credible and positive testimony of
the complainant. 21 We sustain the lo
wer courts on the issue of credibility,
as we see no compelling reason to d
oubt the validity of their conclusions i
n this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, ra
ises a new ground — i.e., exemption f
rom criminal liability under R.A. No. 9
344 — that implies an admission of g
uilt, this consideration in no way sway
ed the conclusion we made above, as
the defense is entitled to present all a
lternative defenses available to it, even
inconsistent ones. We note, too, that
the defense's claim of exemption from
liability was made for the first time i
n its appeal to the CA. While this ma
y initially imply an essential change of
theory that is usually disallowed on ap
peal for reasons of fairness, 22 no ess
ential change is really involved as the
claim for exemption from liability is no
t incompatible with the evidence subm
itted below and with the lower courts'
conclusion that the petitioner is guilty
of the crime charged. An exempting
60
circumstance, by its nature, admits tha
t criminal and civil liabilities exist, but
the accused is freed from criminal liab
ility; in other words, the accused com
mitted a crime, but he cannot be held
criminally liable therefor because of a
n exemption granted by law. In admitt
ing this type of defense on appeal, w
e are not unmindful, too, that the app
eal of a criminal case (even one made
under Rule 45) opens the whole case
for review, even on questions that th
e parties did not raise. 23 By mandate
of the Constitution, no less, we are bo
und to look into every circumstance a
nd resolve every doubt in favor of the
accused. 24 It is with these considerat
ions in mind and in obedience to the
direct and more specific commands of
R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of c
hildren in conflict with the law should
be handled that we rule in this Rule 4
5 petition. AIHTEa
We find a review of the facts of
the present case and of the applicabl
e law on exemption from liability com
pelling because of the patent errors th
e CA committed in these regards. Spe
cifically, the CA's findings of fact on t
he issues of age and minority, premis
ed on the supposed absence of evide
nce, are contradicted by the evidence
on record; it also manifestly overlooke
d certain relevant facts not disputed b
y the parties that, if properly consider
ed, would justify a different conclusion
. 25
In tackling the issues of age and
minority, we stress at the outset that
the ages of both the petitioner and th
e complaining victim are material and
are at issue. The age of the petitioner
is critical for purposes of his entitlem
ent to exemption from criminal liability
under R.A. No. 9344, while the age
of the latter is material in characterizin
g the crime committed and in conside
ring the resulting civil liability that R.A.
No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstanc
e
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into
law on April 28, 2006 and took effect
on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to pro
mote and protect the rights of a child
in conflict with the law or a child at
risk by providing a system that would
ensure that children are dealt with in
a manner appropriate to their well-bei
ng through a variety of disposition me
asures such as care, guidance and sup
ervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational t
raining programs and other alternative
s to institutional care. 26 More importa
ntly in the context of this case, this la
61
w modifies as well the minimum age l
imit of criminal irresponsibility for min
or offenders; it changed what paragra
phs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revis
ed Penal Code (RPC), as amended, pr
eviously provided — i.e., from "under
nine years of age" and "above nine y
ears of age and under fifteen" (who a
cted without discernment) — to "fiftee
n years old or under" and "above fifte
en but below 18" (who acted without
discernment) in determining exemption
from criminal liability. In providing ex
emption, the new law — as the old p
aragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the R
PC did — presumes that the minor of
fenders completely lack the intelligenc
e to distinguish right from wrong, so t
hat their acts are deemed involuntary
ones for which they cannot be held a
ccountable. 27 The current law also dr
ew its changes from the principle of r
estorative justice that it espouses; it c
onsiders the ages 9 to 15 years as for
mative years and gives minors of thes
e ages a chance to right their wrong
through diversion and intervention me
asures. 28 DHITcS
In the present case, the petition
er claims total exemption from crimina
l liability because he was not more th
an 15 years old at the time the rape t
ook place. The CA disbelieved this clai
m for the petitioner's failure to presen
t his birth certificate as required by Se
ction 64 of R.A. No. 9344. 29 The CA
also found him disqualified to avail of
a suspension of sentence because the
imposable penalty for the crime of ra
pe is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section
1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, r
efers to the duty of a party to presen
t evidence on the facts in issue in ord
er to establish his or her claim or def
ense. In a criminal case, the burden of
proof to establish the guilt of the ac
cused falls upon the prosecution whic
h has the duty to prove all the essent
ial ingredients of the crime. The prose
cution completes its case as soon as i
t has presented the evidence it believ
es is sufficient to prove the required e
lements. At this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the defense to dispr
ove what the prosecution has shown
by evidence, or to prove by evidence
the circumstances showing that the ac
cused did not commit the crime charg
ed or cannot otherwise be held liable
therefor. In the present case, the pros
ecution completed its evidence and ha
d done everything that the law requir
es it to do. The burden of evidence h
as now shifted to the defense which n
62
ow claims, by an affirmative defense, t
hat the accused, even if guilty, should
be exempt from criminal liability becau
se of his age when he committed the
crime. The defense, therefore, not the
prosecution, has the burden of showin
g by evidence that the petitioner was
15 years old or less when he committ
ed the rape charged. 30
This conclusion can also be reac
hed by considering that minority and
age are not elements of the crime of
rape; the prosecution therefore has no
duty to prove these circumstances. T
o impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and
age integral elements of the crime wh
en clearly they are not. 31 If the prose
cution has a burden related to age, th
is burden relates to proof of the age
of the victim as a circumstance that q
ualifies the crime of rape. 32 SHCaEA
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evi
dence
to Prove the Accused's Minority and A
ge
The CA seriously erred when it reje
cted testimonial evidence showing that th
e petitioner was only 15 years old at the
time he committed the crime. Section 7
of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how th
e age of a child in conflict with the law
may be determined:
 SEC. 7. Determination of tal records, or tra
Age. — . . . The age of a c vel papers. cCEAHT

hild may be determined from

(2) . . .
the child's birth certificate, bap
(3) When the above document
tismal certificate or any other
s cannot be obtained o
pertinent documents. In the a
r pending receipt of suc
bsence of these documents, a
h documents, the law e
ge may be based on informati
nforcement officer shall
on from the child himself/hers
exhaust other measures
elf, testimonies of other perso
to determine age by:
ns, the physical appearance of
the child and other relevant (a) Interviewing the chil
evidence. In case of doubt as d and obtaining i
to the age of the child, it shal nformation that i
l be resolved in his/her favor. ndicate age (e.g.,
[Emphasis supplied] date of birthday,
grade level in sch
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulat
ool);
ions Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provide
s the implementing details of this provisi (b) Interviewing persons
who may have kn
on by enumerating the measures that ma
owledge that indi
y be undertaken by a law enforcement o
cate[s] age of the
fficer to ascertain the child's age:
child (e.g., relativ
(1) Obtain documents that sho es, neighbors, tea
w proof of the child's a chers, classmates);
ge, such as
(c) Evaluating the physic
(a) Child's birth certificat al appearance ( e.
e; g., height, built)

(b) Child's baptismal cer of the child; and

tificate ;or (d) Obtaining other rele

(c) Any other pertinent vant evidence of

documents such age.

as but not limited xxx xxx xxx

to the child's sc
hool records, den

63
 Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while
a relatively new law (having been pass
ed only in 2006), does not depart fro
m the jurisprudence existing at that ti
me on the evidence that may be adm
itted as satisfactory proof of the accus
ed's minority and age. cDTCIA
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Berg
antino, 33 we accepted testimonial evid
ence to prove the minority and age o
f the accused in the absence of any d
ocument or other satisfactory evidence
showing the date of birth. This was f
ollowed by U.S. v. Roxas 34 where the
defendant's statement about his age w
as considered sufficient, even without
corroborative evidence, to establish th
at he was a minor of 16 years at the
time he committed the offense charge
d. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,
the Court appreciated the minority a
nd age of the accused on the basis o
f his claim that he was 17 years old a
t the time of the commission of the o
ffense in the absence of any contradic
tory evidence or objection on the part
of the prosecution. Then, in People v
. Villagracia, 36 we found the testimon
y of the accused that he was less tha
n 15 years old sufficient to establish hi
s minority. We reiterated these dicta i
n the cases of People v. Morial
David v. Court of Appeals , 38
ed that the allegations of minority and
age by the accused will be accepted
as facts upon the prosecution's failure
to disprove the claim by contrary evid
ence.
In these cases, we gave evidenti
ary weight to testimonial evidence on
the accused's minority and age upon t
he concurrence of the following condit
ions: (1) the absence of any other sati
sfactory evidence such as the birth cer
tificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date
of birth of the accused; (2) the presen
ce of testimony from accused and/or
a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the compl
ained incident without any objection o
n the part of the prosecution; and (3)
35 lack of any contrary evidence showing
that the accused's and/or his relatives'
testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present
in this case. First, the petitioner and C
CC both testified regarding his minorit
y and age when the rape was commit
ted. 39Second, the records before us s
how that these pieces of testimonial e
vidence were never objected to by th
e prosecution. And lastly, the prosecuti
on did not present any contrary evide
37 and nce to prove that the petitioner was a
and rul
64
bove 15 years old when the crime wa
s committed. ACaEcH
We also stress that the last para
graph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that any doubt on the age o
f the child must be resolved in his fav
or. 40 Hence, any doubt in this case r
egarding the petitioner's age at the ti
me he committed the rape should be
resolved in his favor. In other words, t
he testimony that the petitioner as 15
years old when the crime took place s
hould be read to mean that he was n
ot more than 15 years old as this is t
he more favorable reading that R.A. N
o. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.
A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, a
nd established jurisprudence in accord
with the latest statutory developments,
the CA therefore cannot but be in er
ror in not appreciating and giving evi
dentiary value to the petitioner's and
CCC's testimonies relating to the form
er's age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 93
44
That the petitioner committed th
e rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effe
ct and that he is no longer a minor (
he was already 20 years old when he
took the stand) will not bar him from
65
enjoying the benefit of total exemptio
n that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 gra
nts. 41 As we explained in discussing S
ections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344 42
in the recent case of Ortega v. Peopl
e: 43
Section 64 of the law categorical
ly provides that cases of children 15 y
ears old and below, at the time of th
e commission of the crime, shall imme
diately be dismissed and the child shal
l be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer
s (LSWDO). What is controlling, theref
ore, with respect to the exemption fro
m criminal liability of the CICL, is not
the CICL's age at the time of the pro
mulgation of judgment but the CICL's
age at the time of the commission of
the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A.
No. 9344, the age of criminal irrespon
sibility has been raised from 9 to 15 y
ears old. [Emphasis supplied] EaHDcS
The retroactive application of R.
A. No. 9344 is also justified under Arti
cle 22 of the RPC, as amended, which
provides that penal laws are to be gi
ven retroactive effect insofar as they f
avor the accused who is not found to
be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the
records of this case indicates that the
petitioner is a habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
 The last paragraph of Section 6 ines in appreciating the age of the co
of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the ac mplainant:
cused shall continue to be civilly liable In order to remove any
despite his exemption from criminal li confusion that may be engend
ability; hence, the petitioner is civilly li ered by the foregoing cases,
able to AAA despite his exemption fro we hereby set the following g

m criminal liability. The extent of his c uidelines in appreciating age,

ivil liability depends on the crime he either as an element of the cr

ime or as a qualifying circums
would have been liable for had he no
tance.
t been found to be exempt from crim
inal liability. 1. The best evidence to prove
the age of the offended
The RTC and CA found, based
party is an original or
on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RP
certified true copy of th
C, as amended, that the petitioner is
e certificate of live birth
guilty of qualified rape because of his of such party.
relationship with AAA within the secon
2. In the absence of a certific
d civil degree of consanguinity and th
ate of live birth, similar
e latter's minority. 44 Both courts acco
authentic documents su
rdingly imposed the civil liability corres ch as baptismal certifica
ponding to qualified rape. TSEAaD
te and school records w

The relationship between the pet hich show the date of

itioner and AAA, as siblings, does not birth of the victim woul
d suffice to prove age.
appear to be a disputed matter. Their
T

ADCSE

mother, CCC, declared in her testimon 3. If the certificate of live birth

y that AAA and the petitioner are her or authentic document
children. The prosecution and the defe is shown to have been
nse likewise stipulated in the proceedi lost or destroyed or oth

ngs below that the relationship exists. erwise unavailable, the t

We find, however, that AAA's minority, estimony, if clear and cr

though alleged in the Information, ha edible, of the victim's m

other or a member of t
d not been sufficiently proven. 45 Peo
he family either by affin
ple v. Pruna 46 laid down these guidel
ity or consanguinity wh
o is qualified to testify
66
 on matters respecting p
edigree such as the exa
ct age or date of birth
of the offended party p
ursuant to Section 40, R
ule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be suffici
ent under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is allege
d to be below 3
years of age and
what is sought to
be proved is tha
t she is less than
7 years old;
b. If the victim is allege
d to be below 7
years of age and
what is sought to
be proved is tha
t she is less than
12 years old;
c. If the victim is allege
d to be below 12
years of age an
d what is sought
to be proved is t
hat she is less th
an 18 years old. Sa
HIEA
4. In the absence of a certific
ate of live birth, authent
ic document, or the test
imony of the victim's m
other or relatives concer
67
ning the victim's age, th
e complainant's testimo
ny will suffice provided
that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that h
as the burden of provin
g the age of the offend
ed party. The failure of
the accused to object t
o the testimonial eviden
ce regarding age shall
not be taken against hi
m. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evi
dence proving the age of AAA. They
do not likewise show that the petition
er ever expressly and clearly admitted
AAA's age at the time of the rape. Pu
rsuant to Pruna, neither can his failure
to object to AAA's testimony be take
n against him.
Thus, the required concurrence
of circumstances that would upgrade t
he crime to qualified rape — i.e., relat
ionship within the third degree of con
sanguinity and minority of the victim
— does not exist. The crime for which
the petitioner should have been foun
d criminally liable should therefore onl
y be simple rape pursuant to par. 1,
Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified
rape. The civil liability that can be im
posed on the petitioner follows the ch
aracterization of the crime and the att
endant circumstances. HACaSc
Accordingly, we uphold the gran
t of moral damages of P50,000.00 but
increase the awarded exemplary dam
ages P30,000.00, both pursuant to pre
vailing jurisprudence. 47 Moral damage
s are automatically awarded to rape vi
ctims without the necessity of proof; t
he law assumes that the victim suffere
d moral injuries entitling her to this a
ward. 48 Article 2230 of the Civil Code
justifies the award of exemplary dam
ages because of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of relationsh
ip between AAA and petitioner and d
welling. 49 As discussed above, the rel
ationship (between the parties) is not
disputed. We appreciate dwelling as a
n aggravating circumstance based on
AAA's testimony that the rape was co
mmitted in their house. 50 While dwelli
ng as an aggravating circumstance wa
s not alleged in the Information, estab
lished jurisprudence holds that it may
nevertheless be appreciated as basis f
or the award of exemplary damages.
1 es for petitioner's continued detention,
We modify the awarded civil ind
emnity of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, th
e latter being the civil indemnity appr
opriate for simple rape 52 on the findi
ng that rape had been committed. 53
In light of the above discussion
and our conclusions, we see no need
to discuss the petition's third assignme
nt of error.
WHEREFORE, premises considere
d, the instant petition is GRANTED. Th
e Decision dated February 29, 2008 a
nd Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H
.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. CIAacS
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A.
No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H
for rape filed against petitioner Rober
t Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSE
D. Petitioner is REFERRED to the appr
opriate local social welfare and develo
pment officer who shall proceed in ac
cordance with the provisions of R.A. N
o. 9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay
the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil in
demnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damag
es.
5
Unless there are other valid caus
we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RE
LEASE under the above terms.
Let a copy of this Decision be f
urnished the Director of the Bureau of
68
 Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its
immediate implementation. The Directo
r of the Bureau of Corrections is direc
ted to report to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision the
action he has taken. HETDAC

Let a copy of this Decision be like

wise furnished the Juvenile Justice and W
elfare Council.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Sierra y Caneda v. People, G.R. No. 182941,

[July 3, 2009], 609 PHIL 446-471)

69