REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
QUEZON CITY
___________________ Division

RONNEL D. STA. ANA,

Complainant-Appellee,
NLRC LAC No._____________
- versus - NLRC NCR Case No. 04-05879-18
BRADY PHARMA and/or
PAM HIRANG
Respondents-Appellants.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

REPLY
(To Respondents-Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal)

COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE RONNEL D. STA. ANA

(“Complainant”), by counsel, and unto this Honorable Commission,
respectfully states:

I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1.1 On 22 October 2018, Complainant-Appellee (“Appellee” for

brevity) received through counsel a copy of Respondents-Appellants’
Memorandum of Appeal, dated the 12 October 2018.

1.2 In their Memorandum of Appeal, Respondents-Appellants

seek the reversal of the Decision rendered by the Honorable Labor
Arbiter “on the ground of prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion and
serious errors in her findings of facts.”

1.3 Under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Appellee may
file with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where
the appeal was filed his/her answer or reply to appellant's
memorandum of appeal, not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof.
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1.4 That the tenth day for herein Appellee to file his Reply to
Appellant’s Memorandum of Appeal falls on 01 November 2018.
Considering that 01 November 2018 and 02 November 2018 are
special non-working days, while 03 November 2018 and 04
November 2018 falls on the weekend, Appellee has until 05
November 2018 to file his reply to appellant's memorandum of
appeal. Thus, Appellee respectfully submits herewith this Reply to
Respondents-Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal within the
reglementary period.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2.1 Complainant-Appellee Ronnel D. Sta. Ana was hired by

the Company on July 19, 2016 as a Logistics Personnel under a
probationary term of employment for a period of six months. Having
met the qualifications and standards, Complainant was hired as a
regular employee.

2.2 The Complainant-Appellee diligently discharged his

duties and responsibilities as a regular Logistics Personnel whose job
generally involves traveling from one place to another to deliver
goods. The Company did not provide a means of transportation to
their Logistics Personnel. Thus, the Complainant-Appellee had to
hurdle constant commute in order to perform his work.

2.3 In the course of Complainant-Appellee’s employment, the

Company through its Human Resources Manager Ms. Francia
Hirang directed the Logistics Personnel employees to canvass for
motorcycles which they can use in their work. Initially, they were
given liberty to choose the make and model of the motorcycle. The
set-up is that the Company will purchase the motorcycle for the
employees and the latter will pay for the same by way of salary
deductions. However, later on the employees were no longer given
liberty to choose the make and model of the motorcycles and it was
the Company who eventually had the final say regarding the matter.

2.4 Sometime in September 2017, Complainant-Appellee

approached the HR Manager Francia Hirang to discuss the matter
relative to the purchase of motorcycle for work. He intimated to the
HR Manager that at that time, his wife was pregnant with twins and
inquired whether he can forego purchasing a motorcycle.
 3

Complainant-Appellee was worried that if he purchased the

motorcycle, he will not be able to provide well for his wife and
children considering that his salary will be subject to deductions.

2.5 Much to Complainant-Appellee’s surprise, the HR

Manager was not open to discuss the matter or to even come up with
some suggestions that could have helped Complainant-Appellee
with his dilemma. When he inquired with the HR Manager,
Complainant-Appellee was only given a choice to either resign or
find another work. Since he cannot afford to lose his job,
Complainant-Appellee chose to continue with his work in the
Company.

2.6 On 20 February 2018, Complainant-Appellee went to

work and was on his way for delivery when an emergency meeting
was called by HR Manager Hirang in the Company’s conference
room. The main agenda of the emergency meeting was to discuss the
matter about the purchase of motorcycles. The HR Manager was
pressuring the employees to come up with their decision regarding
the matter.

2.7 Complainant-Appellee tried to think of an alternative so

he can continue work without being compelled to purchase a
motorcycle. He asked the Head of Accounting if he can be transferred
to the Company’s warehouse department but he was informed that
only two vacancies were available and it was already filled-up.

2.8 Left with no other recourse, Complainant-Appellee once

again talked to HR Manager Hirang during the emergency meeting
to raise his predicament that he cannot purchase the motorcycle
especially since his wife had given birth to twins and they also
already had an elder child. In reply, the HR Manager said “Ronnel
mag-resign ka na, umalis ka na dito hindi na kita kailangan at hindi ka
kawalan sa kumpanya.”

2.9 Complainant-Appellee was trying to explain but the HR

Manager shouted at him “Ronnel, out!” and compelled him to leave
the meeting.

2.10 Later in the day, Complainant-Appellee reflected at the

current state of his family life and he knew that he cannot lose his job
which was his only source of income. He tried to reach out to HR
Manager Hirang via text message to implore her to allow him to
return to work. He explained that his family relied on him for
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necessities and sustenance, and that he badly needed work especially

since he had his wife and three children to feed.

2.11 The reply of the HR Manager was that she already

reported Complainant to the Company owner Mr. Bernard Go.
Further, she told Complainant “wag ka na pumasok.” Complainant-
Appellee asked to talk to the owner so he can persuade the latter to
allow him to return to work. His pleas fell on deaf ears.

2.12 The following day 21 February 2018, Complainant-

Appellee went to their office to report for work but he was denied
entry into the premises by Company’s security guards. He was
informed that he was banned from entering but he was not given any
reason why.

2.13 His sudden and unjust termination from work left

Complainant-Appellee’s family life in disarray to the point that his
wife became depressed. They also came close to separating because
of they had no idea how to pick up their lives and to provide for their
children.

2.14 After failure of Single Entry Approach (SEnA)

proceedings, the parties were directed to file their respective Position
Papers (on 23 August 2018) and Replies (on 12 September 2018).

2.15 The Honorable Labor Arbiter rendered her Decision

which reads,

“WHEREFORE, premises considered,

judgment is hereby rendered finding
complainant’s dismissal ILLEGAL.
Respondent Brady Pharma is held liable to
pay complainant backwages and separation
pay in the total amount of P135,276.14 as per
attached computation.”

2.16 On 22 October 2018, Complainant-Appellee received

Respondent-Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal. Thus, this Reply
to Respondent-Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal.
 5

III.

SUBMISSIONS

3.1 The Honorable Labor Arbiter correctly ruled that the Appellee
was illegally dismissed; as supported by law, settled jurisprudence
and evidence on record.

3.2 The Appellee is entitled to the award of his money claims

including payment of backwages, separation pay, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

IV.

DISCUSSIONS

A.
The Honorable Labor Arbiter correctly ruled that the Appellee was
illegally dismissed; as supported by law, settled jurisprudence and
evidence on record.

The Honorable Labor Arbiter’s

finding of illegal dismissal is
supported by factual and legal
bases and thus deserves high
respect and consideration.

4.1 The Honorable Labor Arbiter correctly ruled that Appellee

was illegally dismissed from employment as this finding is
supported by applicable laws and jurisprudence, as well as the
surrounding facts; contrary to the claim of Respondents-Appellants
that there was prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion and
serious errors in the findings of facts.

4.2 In this case, it is already established that there had been a

dismissal. The only issue is whether or not the dismissal of herein
Appellee was valid or illegal.

4.3 As correctly found by the Honorable Labor Arbiter, the

Appellee was illegally dismissed from employment considering that
there was no valid and voluntary resignation on the latter’s part. The
Decision of the Honorable Labor Arbiter states,
 6

“Well-settled rule that in termination cases,

burden of proof rests upon the employer to show
that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and
failure to do so would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal. In Mobile Protective &
Detective Agency v. Ompad, the Court ruled that
should the employer interpose the defense of
resignation, it is incumbent upon the
employer to prove that the employee
voluntarily resigned. On this point,
respondents failed to discharge the burden.”
(Emphasis supplied)

4.4 Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, resignation is

defined as "the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by
personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment.
It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act of abandonment. The intent to relinquish
must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of
the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether he in fact intended to
terminate his employment.1

4.5 In their Memorandum of Appeal, Respondents-Appellants

insist that Appellee verbally resigned and such verbal resignation
was valid and timely accepted by the company. Respondents-
Appellants rely heavily in the case of FCA Security and General
Services Inc. vs Academia Jr. II to support their position that there was
a valid verbal resignation.

4.6 In the said case, the validity of the resignation was sustained
because a) The testimonies of other employees corroborated the employee’s
verbal resignation, b) the employee started to process his clearances, and c)
the employee failed to present evidence to dispute the credibility of the
witnesses against him.

4.7 However, as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, in order to

determine whether an employee truly intended to resign, the totality
of circumstances must be taken into consideration. In Appellee’s
case, his subsequent act of pleading from the respondents that he be
allowed to return to work is a clear indication that he had no
intention to relinquish his work.

1 Zenaida D. Mendoza vs HMS Credit Corporation, et al, GR No. 187232, 17 April 2013.
 7

4.8 More importantly, the Labor Arbiter (citing Valdez vs NLRC

and Fungo vs Lourdes School of Mandaluyong) was also correct in
ruling that the filing of the complaint against Respondents-
Appellants belies the claim of voluntary resignation as “resignation is
inconsistent with the filing of said complaint.”

4.9 It is likewise worthy to cite pertinent portion of the Honorable

Labor Arbiter’s Decision which states,

“While complainant leave the respondents’ office on

February 20, 2018 during the meeting, however, the
same is not sufficient to assume his intention to quit
working or to relinquish his post. At most, it can be
assumed as his disagreement on the policy that the
company is planning to implement. The fact that
complainant vigorously pursued his complainant against
the respondents is a clear manifestation that he had no
intention of relinquishing his employment. The element
of voluntariness in complainant’s resignation is,
therefore, missing.

By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action

against respondents, complainant clearly manifested that
he has no intention of relinquishing his employment,
which act is wholly incompatible to respondents’
assertion that complainant voluntarly resigned.”2

4.10 It is therefore glaringly clear that there was no voluntary

resignation on Appellee’s part. That being the case, there is no other
logical conclusion aside from the fact that Appellee was illegally
terminated.

4.11 As a regular employee, substantive due process provides

that Complainant may only be removed for any just or authorized
cause for dismissal.

4.12 Time and again, Respondents-Appellants not only failed

to prove Appellee’s voluntary resignation, they also failed to
establish that Appellee was terminated based on any of the just or
authorized causes for dismissal provided for by law.

4.13 The following are the just causes for dismissal provided
under the Labor Code:

2 26 September 2018 Decision, pages 5 to 6

 8

“An employer may terminate an

employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by

the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of

his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the

trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the

employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.”3

Meanwhile, the following are authorized causes for

dismissal:

(a) Installation of labor-saving devices.

(b) Redundancy.

(c) Retrenchment to prevent losses.

(d) Closure or cessation of operation.

(e) Disease.4

4.14 Respondents-Appellants were never able to establish

that the Appellee’s dismissal was based on any of the foregoing
grounds and which would therefore amount to compliance with
substantive due process. Not only that, Respondents-Appellants
were also never able to establish compliance with procedural due
process.

3 Art. 282, Labor Code of the Philippines.

4 Articles 283-284, Labor Code of the Philippines.
 9

4.15 Generally, procedural due process requires that the

employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before
the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him.5

4.16 In this case, no notice was ever given to the Complainant

that would at least show even a little semblance of compliance with
procedural due process. It must be noted that despite Complainant’s
right to security of tenure and despite his repeated pleas, Appellee
was told by Ms. Francia Hirang not to report for work anymore.
Worse, he was banned from returning to the company’s premises,
contrary to the claims of Respondents that Complainant was never
prohibited from reporting back to work.

4.17 The Honorable Labor Arbiter was correct in not giving

credence to Respondents-Appellants’ futile and vain attempts to
circumvent the laws on security of tenure by conveniently claiming
that Appellee voluntarily resigned. In truth, Appellee was illegally
dismissed from his employment.

4.18 Respondents-Appellants submission that Appellee

resigned because of personal reasons, not because the company
exerted efforts to constructively dismiss him from employment
deserves scant consideration.

4.19 In paragraph 40 of Respondents-Appellants’

Memorandum of Appeal, it was stated,

“It is respectfully submitted that the Labor

Arbiter’s conclusion of constructive dismissal is
not supported by the facts and applicable
jurisprudence.”

4.20 A simple perusal of the Decision rendered by the labor

Arbiter would reveal that nowhere in the decision was there ever a
finding or conclusion of constructive dismissal, more so that it
served as the basis for the finding of illegal dismissal. The exhaustive
discussion on constructive dismissal provided by Respondents-
Appellants finds no application in this case. At most, it can only be
taken as a poor after-thought to try to come up with a justification or
argument to negate the finding of illegal dismissal.

5 Distribution & Control Products Inc vs Santos, GR No. 212616, 10 July 2017.
 10

4.21 Respondents-Appellants having failed to sufficiently

establish that there was voluntary resignation; the only conclusion is
that the Appellee was illegally dismissed considering further that
Respondents-Appellants miserably failed to prove compliance with
the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process
under the Labor Code.

4.22 With the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully

submitted that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Labor Arbiter in rendering the Decision now being assailed by
the Respondents-Appellants. On the contrary, the findings of the
Labor Arbiter as to the illegality of the dismissal of the Appellee
finds basis in law, settled jurisprudence and evidence on record

B.

Having established that Appellee was illegally dismissed, he is

therefore entitled to the award of his money claims including
payment of backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.

4.23 In their Memorandum of Appeal the Respondents-

Appellants insists on their misguided notion that there was a valid
resignation, and in view of said resignation, Appellee was separated
from the company. Therefore, there is no merit to Appellee’s claim
for backwages, reinstatement, separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

4.24 Contrary to Respondents-Appellants’ allegation,

Appellee is entitled to the award of his monetary claims. Well-
settled is the rule that in cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or authorized cause. An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

4.25 As previously discussed, the Company failed to prove

that the Complainant was dismissed for either a just or authorized
cause. Neither was the Complainant given the benefit of the twin
 11

requirements of notice and hearing. The circumstances would show

that the only cause for Appellee’s termination was his refusal to
agree to the scheme of the company for the employees to purchase a
motorcycle which would be paid under a salary deduction basis. As
the reason for Appellee’s dismissal is not among the just or
authorized causes for termination, and there being no compliance
with the twin-notice requirements of the law, there is doubt that
Appellee was unjustly dismissed from employment. Appellee is then
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages.

4.26 If in case reinstatement is no longer possible, the

Supreme Court has held that separation pay in addition to
backwages shall be paid. In the case of Aliling v.
Feliciano, citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde 6 it was held,

“Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is

entitled to two reliefs: backwages and
reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are
separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of
strained relations between the employee and
the employer, separation pay is granted. In
effect, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages.

The normal consequences of (respondents')

illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, and payment
of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of
actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is
no longer viable as an option, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service should be awarded as an
alternative. The payment of separation pay is
in addition to payment of backwages.”

4.27 Having sufficiently established that Appellee was

illegally dismissed, it is therefore apparent that he is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges

6 G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 209.
 12

and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other

benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.7 It is only when reinstatement is no longer feasible
that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed and still
subject also to payment of backwages.

4.28 As to moral and exemplary damages, these are usually

awarded to employees wherein the termination of an employee was
indisputably tainted with bad faith and fraud, constituting an act
oppressive to labor, and was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.8

4.29 Further, Article 2217 of the New Civil Code provides:

“Article 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act
for omission.”

4.30 In order that an award of moral damages may be

awarded to Complainant, there should be a finding that
Respondents-Appellants had acted in bad faith, and such bad faith
caused sleepless night, wounded feelings, severe and serious anxiety
or similar injury to the Complainant.

4.31 In this case, the acts of the Respondents-Appellants are

evidently tainted with bad faith constituting acts oppressive to labor.
Respondents-Appellants are trying to compel employees, including
Complainant, to agree to a scheme that involves salary deductions
despite having full knowledge of the personal circumstances and
dilemma of the Appellee. There was obvious bad faith on the part of
the Respondents-Appellants when it dismissed the Appellee for his
refusal to accept a scheme which he had every right to decline. The
acts of Respondents-Appellants are manifestly tainted with bad faith,
oppressive to labor and contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. Thus, the award of moral damages is justified.

7 Art. 279, Labor Code of the Philippines.

8Abbott Laboratories Philippines v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, 23 July 2013; Belaunzaran v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120038, 23 December 1996.
 13

4.32 As to exemplary damages, it is imposed by way of

example or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages are
imposed to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
curb socially deleterious actions. In order to recover exemplary
damages, one must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages.9

4.33 As discussed in length, the Complainant is entitled to the

award of moral damages. But more importantly, exemplary damages
must be awarded in order to deter others from committing the same
acts as the Respondents-Appellants. To reiterate, the acts of the
Respondents-Appellants showing intent to circumvent the law on
security of tenure (a right that is constitutionally protected) is a
socially deleterious action that must not be emulated. It would be at
the height of social injustice not to award exemplary damages
considering the gravity of the actions of the Company.

4.34 Lastly, as to the award of attorney’s fees, the case of

Moreno v. RTG Construction Inc. vs Facto10 is pertinent. In the said
case, the Supreme Court held,

“Settled is the rule that in actions for recovery of

wages, or where an employee was forced to litigate
and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and
interests, a monetary award by way of attorney's
fees is justifiable under Article 111 of the Labor
Code; Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its
Implementing Rules; and paragraph 7, Article
2208 of the Civil Code.” (Emphasis supplied)

4.35 Hence, both under the Labor Code and Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, it is sufficient that the employee was forced to litigate
thereby incurring expenses to protect his rights and interests in order
to entitle him to the award of attorney’s fees. Following this, the
Appellee’s entitlement to the award of attorney’s fees is
unquestionable.

4.36 Overall, to sanction the acts of the Respondents-

Appellants would lead to a blatant disregard of the Constitution and
the Labor laws. It must never be forgotten that the very Constitution
itself states,”The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It

9 Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118325, 29 January 1997.

10 GR No. 163872, Dec 21, 2009
 14

shall protect the rights of workers and promote their

welfare.11”Accordingly, since a finding of illegal dismissal is in order,
the award to the Complainant of moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees is not only proper but highly justified under
the premises.

V.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully

prayed unto the Honorable Commission that the instant appeal BE
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Other reliefs which are just and equitable are likewise prayed for.

05 November 2018
Marikina City for Quezon City

CHING & CHING LAW OFFICE

Counsel for the Complainant
No. 1 J. Chanyungco St.,
Brgy. Sta. Elena, Marikina City
Tel./Fax No. (02) 681-12-78

By:

EXPLANATION
(Re: Service by registered mail)

Undersigned counsel respectfully manifests that the

foregoing Reply to Respondents-Appellants’ Memorandum of
Appeal was filed with this Honorable Office and served upon the
other party by registered mail in lieu of personal service due to
distance, time constraint and lack of messengerial personnel.

The registry receipts evidencing the mailing of the foregoing

Reply to Respondents-Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal and
copies thereof to the aforementioned addressees are attached to the
Affidavit of Filing and Service annexed hereto.

11 Art.II, Sec.18 of the 1987 Constitution.

 15

Copy furnished:

ATTY. RAUL TITO MAXELMO A. ESTRELLA

GERODIAS SUCHIANCO ESTRELLA
Counsel for Respondents-Appellants
Suite 2404 Discovery Centre 25 ACB
Ave., Ortigas Centre, Pasig City 1605

BRADY PHARMA INC.

3F Bendel Center, 281 EDSA,
Brgy. Highway Hills,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.