Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
- versus -
CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,
WILLIAM NAVARRO, ISAGANI VELASCO, JR.,
NAVARRO, BELEN DOLLETON, NACHURA,
FLORENTINO ARCIAGA, PERALTA, and
BARTOLOME PATUGA, MENDOZA, JJ.
DIONISIO IGNACIO,
BERNARDINO ARGANA, AND
ERLINDA ARGANA-DELA Promulgated:
CRUZ, and AYALA LAND, INC.,
Respondents. May 5, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated December 13, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255, Las Piñas City in Civil Case No. 93-
3094, entitled “William Navarro, Isagani Navarro, Iluminada Legaspi, Belen
Dolleton, Florentino Arciaga, Bartolome Patuga, Dionisio Ignacio, Bernardino
Argana, and Erlinda Argana-Dela Cruz [plaintiffs] v. Ayala Land, Inc. (formerly
Las Piñas Ventures, Inc.), [defendant], and Estrellita Londonio, Emerita Feolino,
Porfirio Daen, and Timoteo Arciaga [intervenors],” stating that petitioner Atty.
Hicoblino M. Catly will be entitled only to the reduced amount of P1,000,000.00
as additional attorney’s fees, not the entire amount of P20,000,000.00 as prayed
for, and its Order[2] dated March 1, 2005 denying reconsideration of the said
decision.
Thereafter, since the subject properties were located in Las Piñas, the case
was re-raffled to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 255, then presided by Judge
Florentino M. Alumbres.
In its Order[10] dated January 3, 1995, the trial court granted the motion of
respondents to prosecute the case as pauper litigants and exempted them from
paying the legal fees.
In an Order[11] dated May 3, 1995, the trial court denied respondent ALI’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.[12]
In its Order[13] dated July 31, 1995, the trial court denied the motion of
respondents to declare respondent ALI in default for lack of merit.
In its Order[20] dated March 4, 1996, the trial court denied respondent ALI’s
motions for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial on April 30, 1996 at 8:30 in
the morning with a warning that should respondent ALI file a fourth motion to
dismiss, respondents would be allowed to present their evidence ex-parte, and
respondent ALI’s counsel would be cited for contempt of court for delaying the
proceedings of the case.
Perceiving bias on the part of the trial judge, respondent ALI filed a Motion
to Inhibit[21] on March 25, 1996. The trial court, in its Order[22] dated May 27,
1996, also denied respondent ALI’s Motion to Inhibit then Presiding Judge
Florentino M. Alumbres from hearing the case as the grounds alleged therein did
not fall under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and the filing of the
same was solely for the purpose of delay.
On June 17, 1996, respondent ALI filed a Petition for Certiorari[23]with the
Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the trial court’s Order dated January 3, 1995
(allowing respondents to litigate as paupers) and Order dated March 4, 1996
(denying respondent ALI’s motions). In its Decision dated September 27, 1996,
the CA dismissed respondent ALI’s petition and, later, denied the reconsideration
thereof.
Respondent ALI then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, in G.R. No.
127079, with this Court, alleging that the CA erred in holding that respondents are
pauper-litigants and in sustaining the trial court’s Order denying its motion for
inhibition and, later, a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated November
9, 2000 seeking to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the case insofar as
the complaint-in-intervention of Porfirio A. Daen is concerned.
On May 13, 1997, pending the resolution of respondent ALI’s petitions, both
parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),[24] where herein 8
respondents and 66 other therein plaintiffs (heirs of Lorenzo dela Cruz, Florentino
Navarro, Jose Dolleton, Patricio dela Cruz, Ignacio Arciaga, Dionisio Dolleton,
Leon Argana, Esteban Patuga, respectively), assisted by petitioner, waive,
renounce and cede in favor of respondent ALI, represented by its Senior Vice-
President and General Counsel Mercedita S. Nolledo and Assistant Vice-President
Ricardo N. Jacinto, and assisted by its counsel, any and all rights of exclusive
ownership over the subject properties. The said MOA provides that:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
— and —
a) Waive, renounce and cede, in favor of ALI, any and all rights to
exclusive ownership or co-ownership, past, present or future, xxx
xxxx
2.1 First Tranche. The first tranche payment shall be in the amount of
Ninety-Nine Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Six Hundred Thirty
Pesos and Forty-Six Centavos (P99,995,630.46), Philippine Currency, which sum
shall be, as it is hereby, paid directly to the Heirs immediately upon execution of
this Agreement; and the receipt of which amount said Heirs hereby so
acknowledge to their full satisfaction, thereby rendering immediately operative
the releases and waivers in parcel hereof. Upon the collective request of the said
Heirs, the said payment is hereby broken down as follows.
xxxx
xxxx
2.3 The Heirs also unqualifiedly declare that their agreement with each
other as to the sharing of the proceeds of the settlement is exclusively between
and among themselves, and any dispute or controversy concerning the same does
not affect this Agreement or their Joint Motion for Judgment Based on
Compromise to be signed and filed in court by the parties hereto. Release of the
balance referred to in par. 2.2 hereto by ALI to the Heirs shall completely and
absolutely discharge all of ALI’s obligations under the said Joint Motion for
Judgment Based on Compromise to the Heirs.
3. Upon execution hereof, the Heirs and all persons claiming rights under
them shall immediately vacate the area comprising the Property, or any portion
thereof which they may still be occupying, if any. The failure of the Heirs and all
persons claiming rights under them to vacate the Property or any portion thereof
which they may still be occupying shall entitle ALI to secure a writ of execution
to eject them from any portion of the Properties.
4. The Heirs have entered into this Agreement in their respective personal
capacities and as successors-in-interest of their Predecessors. They hereby jointly
and severally warrant that they collectively constitute the totality of all the heirs
of the Predecessors and that no one has been left out or otherwise excluded. Any
breach of this warranty shall be deemed a substantial breach of this Agreement
and each breach hereof shall be deemed a breach by all the Heirs.
5. The Heirs expressly warrant that they own and possess all of the rights
and interests claimed by the Predecessors to the Properties, and that there are no
other claimants to the said rights and interests.
6. The Heirs warrant that they have not sold, leased, mortgaged or in any
way encumbered in favor of any third party or person whatsoever, nor have they
otherwise diminished their rights to the Properties by any act or omission
[including but not limited to the non-payment of realty taxes].
10. With the exception of the consideration described in par. 2 hereof, the
Heirs acknowledge that no representation, undertaking, promises or commitment
of present or future fact, opinion or event has been made by ALI to induce this
Agreement. The Heirs acknowledge that they have entered into this Agreement
relying solely on their own independent inquiry into all relevant facts and
circumstances and with knowledge, or with full opportunity to obtain such
knowledge, of all the facts relating to the allegations upon which their claims are
based.
12. The Heirs hereby likewise quitclaim and waive, in favor of ALI’s
predecessors, any and all causes of action which they may have against such
predecessors.
13. All parties hereto acknowledge that each of them has read and
understood this Memorandum of Agreement or that the same has been read and
explained to each of them in a language that they understand by her/its respective
counsel.
14. The Heirs hereby agree to execute such documents as may be required
to carry out the purpose of this Memorandum of Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereby set their hands this 13th day
of May, 1997 at Makati City, Philippines.[25]
On the same day, May 13, 1997, therein plaintiffs (including herein
respondents), as successors-in-interest, and respondent ALI executed the Joint
Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise expressing their desire toward an
amicable settlement. Thus,
2. Plaintiffs and all persons claiming rights under them shall immediately
vacate the area comprising the Property, or any portion thereof which they may
still be occupying. The failure of plaintiffs and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the Property or any portion thereof which they may still be
occupying shall entitle ALI to secure a writ of execution to eject them from any
portion of the Properties.
3. Plaintiffs and their co-heirs have entered into this Agreement in their
respective personal capacities and as successors-in-interest of their
Predecessors. They hereby jointly and severally warrant that they collectively
constitute the totality of all the heirs of the Predecessor and that no one has been
left out or otherwise excluded. Any breach of this warranty shall be deemed a
substantial breach of this Agreement, and each breach hereof shall be deemed a
breach by all the Heirs.
4. Plaintiffs expressly warrant that they own and possess all of the rights
and interests claimed by the Predecessors to the Properties, and that there are no
other claimants to the said rights and interests.
10. On the other hand, ALI has entered into this Agreement relying solely
upon plaintiffs’ representations in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 hereof and their waivers,
obligations and undertakings in pars. 1 and 2 hereof. Accordingly, in the event of
the falsity of these representations and/or breach of these waivers, obligations and
undertakings, and in addition to its rights under paragraphs 8 and 9 hereof which
shall, in any case, remain effective, ALI shall have the right to rescind this
Compromise Agreement, without, however, waiving the releases made by the
plaintiffs in its favor under par. 1 hereof.
11. Plaintiffs hereby likewise quitclaim and waive, in favor of ALI and
ALI’s predecessors, any and all causes of action which they may have against
such predecessors.
12. All parties hereto acknowledge that each of them has read and
understood this Agreement or that the same has been read and explained to each
of them in a language that they understand by his/her/its respective counsel.
Other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for.
On May 14, 1997, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion[27] with the
trial court alleging that he was not consulted when therein heirs signed the MOA;
that his Contract for Legal and Other Valuable Services[28] dated September 3,
1993, wherein respondents engaged his services as counsel, be noted on record;
that should there be an amicable settlement of the case, his attorney’s fees should
be awarded in full as stipulated in the contract to fully compensate his efforts in
representing herein respondents and therein heirs; and that the trial court issued an
order confirming his right to collect his attorney’s fees to the exclusion of the other
agents and financiers. Petitioner also appended therein a copy of the Authority to
Collect Attorney’s Fee[s] as Stipulated in the Contract for Legal Services and
Other Valuable Considerations[29] which stated that should there be an amicable
settlement of the case by way of respondent ALI paying respondents any amount
which may be agreed upon by the parties, the respondents authorize petitioner to
directly collect from respondent ALI his 25% attorney’s fees and that they
authorize respondent ALI to deduct the 25% attorney’s fees from the total amount
due them and to pay and deliver the same to petitioner, his heirs or assigns.
AMENDATORY AGREEMENT
WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families are among the signatories to the 13
May 1997 Memorandum of Agreement (the “MOA”) with ALI;
WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families and the Brokers are collectively
entitled to the sum of Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) under the Second
Tranche payment of the MOA;
WHEREAS, under the terms of the MOA, ALI was authorized by the
Heads of the Families and their co-heirs to pay for their account Atty. Catly an
aggregate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under the First and
Second Tranche payments of the MOA;
WHEREAS, Atty. Catly has claimed from the Heirs (as this term is
defined in the MOA), an additional Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for
his attorney’s fees, which claim is pending resolution before Branch 255 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas (the “Las Piñas Court”) in Civil Case No. 93-
3094 entitled “William Navarro, et al. v. Ayala Land, Inc.” (“Civil Case No. 93-
3094”);
The recomputed and adjusted amounts set forth under the second column
above shall be in lieu of the amounts provided for under Par. 2.1 of the MOA.
2. The Heads of the Families, the Brokers and Atty. Catly agree to abide
by the final decision or resolution of the Las Piñas Court in Civil Case No. 93-
3094 on the total amount of attorney’s fees that should be paid to Atty.
Catly. They agree to implement the said decision or resolution, once it attains
finality, immediately and without any delay.
4. Atty. Catly accepts the amount set forth in the MOA and such other
amount, if any, as the Las Piñas Court may declare, as the final settlement of his
claim for attorney’s fees and waives all other claims which he may have in
connection with Civil Case No. 93-3094. In acknowledgment thereof, he shall
affix his own signature on the MOA.
By: Sgd.
MERCEDITA S. NOLLEDO
And
Sgd.
RICARDO JACINTO
Assisted by:
However, in an Order[30] dated June 10, 1997, the trial court held in
abeyance its resolution on the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise,
pending the action of this Court on respondent ALI’s petition.
In its Order[31] dated June 23, 1997, the trial court directed the parties to
formally submit a copy of their amendatory agreement. In compliance therewith,
the respondents submitted an unnotarized but signed copy of the subject document,
while respondent ALI later submitted the notarized Amendatory Agreement
dated May 27, 1997.
On July 22, 1997, the trial court (per Judge Florentino M. Alumbres)
rendered a Separate Judgment in favor of the petitioner as follows:
SEPARATE JUDGMENT
During the hearing of the said motion on June 10, 1997, the parties
discussed an AMENDADORY AGREEMENT which relates to attorney’s fees of
Atty. Catly which they alluded to as forming part of their compromise agreement,
but the said amendatory agreement has not yet been submitted to the
Court. On June 23, 1997, an order was issued directing the parties to submit the
same for approval by the Court.
Thus, on June 27, 1997, in compliance with the said order, the plaintiffs
submitted their copy which is not notarized, while the defendant submitted its,
duly notarized, on July 4, 1997.
WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families are among the signatories to the 13
May 1997 Memorandum of Agreement (the “MOA”) with ALI;
WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families and the Brokers are collectively
entitled to the sum of Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) under the Second
Tranche payment of the MOA;
WHEREAS, under the terms of the MOA, ALI was authorized by the
Heads of the Families and their co-heirs to pay for their account Atty. Catly an
aggregate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under the First and
Second Tranche payments of the MOA;
WHEREAS, Atty. Catly has claimed from the Heirs (as this term is
defined in the MOA), an additional Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for
his attorney’s fees, which claim is pending resolution before Branch 255 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas (the “Las Piñas Court”) in Civil Case No. 93-
3094 entitled “William Navarro, et al. v. Ayala Land, Inc.” (“Civil Case No. 93-
3094”);
The recomputed and adjusted amounts set forth under the second column
above shall be in lieu of the amounts provided for under Par. 2.1 of the MOA.
2. The Heads of the Families, the Brokers and Atty. Catly agree to abide
by the final decision or resolution of the Las Piñas Court in Civil Case No. 93-
3094 on the total amount of attorney’s fees that should be paid to Atty.
Catly. They agree to implement the said decision or resolution, once it attains
finality, immediately and without any delay.
4. Atty. Catly accepts the amount set forth in the MOA and such other
amount, if any, as the Las Piñas Court may declare, as the final settlement of his
claim for attorney’s fees and waives all other claims which he may have in
connection with Civil Case No. 93-3094. In acknowledgment thereof, he shall
affix his own signature on the MOA.
Finding the terms and conditions set forth under the Amendatory
Agreement to be freely agreed upon, and the same not being contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy, the same are hereby approved.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On July 28, 1997, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Writ for
Execution of Judgment[33] with the trial court to enforce his claim for attorney’s
fees pursuant to the Separate Judgment dated July 22, 1997 on the premise that
said judgment is immediately executory. This prompted the respondents to file, in
G.R. No. 127079, an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order[34] with this Court seeking to enjoin the trial court from
enforcing the said Separate Judgment, particularly with regard to
the P30,000,000.00 award of attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioner. Respondent
ALI also opposed the petitioner’s ex-partemotion.
In its Order dated August 25, 1997, the trial court held in abeyance the
resolution on petitioner's motion for execution of the trial court’s Separate
Judgment dated July 22, 1997 until the respondents’ application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order shall have been resolved by this Court.
In a Decision dated May 7, 2004, this Court (Third Division), in G.R. No.
127079, entitled “Ayala Land, Inc. v. William Navarro, Isagani Navarro,
Iluminada Legaspi, Belen Dolleton, Florentino Arciaga, Bartolome Patuga,
Dionisio Ignacio, Bernardino Argana, and Erlinda Argana,” dismissed the petition
of therein petitioner (herein respondent ALI) for being moot, and ordered the
remand of the records of the case to the trial court for the determination on the
propriety of the award of P30,000,000.00 attorney’s fees in favor of
petitioner. The pertinent portions of the Decision state:
We now go back to the issue raised in the instant petition, i.e., whether or
not the Court of Appeals erred (a) in allowing respondents to litigate as paupers;
and, (b) in sustaining the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for
inhibition.
Obviously, with the execution of the May 13, 1997 MOA or compromise
agreement and the May 27, 1997 amendatory agreement, the parties resolved to
settle their differences and put an end to the litigation.[41] It bears reiterating that
on July 22, 1997, the trial court rendered its Judgment approving this amendatory
agreement.
SO ORDERED.[45]
In a Decision dated December 1, 2004, the trial court (per Judge Raul
Bautista Villanueva) approved the parties’ Joint Motion for Judgment Based on
Compromise dated May 13, 1997, dismissed all the complaints-in-intervention by
therein intervenors, and directed respondents to pay respondent ALI the amount
ofP563,358.00 by way of attorney’s fees which shall be taken from the second
tranche payment and deducted from their pro-rata share. The salient portions of
the said Decision state:
2.1 First Tranche. The first tranche payment shall be in the amount of
Ninety-Nine Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Six Hundred Thirty
Pesos and Forty-Six Centavos (P99,995,630.46), Philippine Currency, which sum
shall be, as it is hereby, paid directly to the Heirs immediately upon execution of
this Agreement, and the receipt of which amount said Heirs hereby so
acknowledge to their full satisfaction, thereby rendering immediately operative
the releases and waivers in par. 1 hereof. Upon the collective request of the said
Heirs, the said payment is hereby broken down as follows:
Payee Amount
I. Others
1. Leopoldo P. Espiritu (financier) 11,000,000.00
2. Hicoblino Catly (attorney’s fees) 9,000,000.00
3. Emerita Feolina (agent) 1,500,000.00
4. Esperanza Espiritu (agent) 750,000.00
5. Leopoldo Espiritu (agent) 1,750,000.00
Payee Amount
A.
1. Dionisio Ignacio 2,000,000.00
2. William Navarro 2,000,000.00
3. Dionisio Arciaga 500,000.00
4. Iluminada Legaspi 1,700,000.00
5. Belen Dolleton 1,700,000.00
6. Isagani Navarro 4,900,000.00
7. Bernardino Argana 1,700,000.00
8. Bartolome Patuga 2,000,000.00
B.
1. Leopoldo Espiritu 1,500,000.00
2. Hicoblino Catly 1,000,000.00
3. Emerita Feolino 500,000.00
4. Esperanza Espiritu 250,000.00
5. Leopoldo Espiritu 250,000.00
2.3. the Heirs also unqualifiedly declare that their agreement with each
other as to the sharing of the proceeds of the settlement is exclusively between
and among themselves, and any dispute or controversy concerning the same does
not affect this Agreement or the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on
Compromise to be signed and filed in court by the parties hereto. Release of the
balance referred to in par. 2.2 hereof by ALI to the Heirs shall completely and
absolutely discharge all of ALI’s obligations under the said Joint Motion for
Judgment Based on Compromise to the Heirs.
xxx xxx xxx
For one, and with the Decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court
promulgated on 07 May 2004 in G.R. No. 127079 in the case entitled “Ayala
Land, Inc. v. William Navarro, et al.,” there is no longer any impediment to the
resolution of the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise dated 09 June
1997. It must be noted that the Court earlier suspended the approval of the said
joint motion in its Order dated 10 June 1997 “(a)s there is no written order yet
from the Supreme Court dismissing the appeal in connection with this case.” With
the above Decision of the Supreme Court, the subject Order of the Court is
deemed moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[46]
In a Decision dated December 13, 2004, the trial court (per Judge Raul
Bautista Villanueva), acting on petitioner's claim for additional P20,000,000.00
attorney’s fees in his Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Writ for Execution of Judgment
dated July 28, 1997 and Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated May 31, 2004,
ruled that petitioner can execute judgment on the additional attorney’s fees, but
only up to the amount of P1,000,000.00, not the entire P20,000,000.00. The trial
court explained the rationale as follows:
The Court, after taking into account the foregoing, finds that Atty. Catly is
entitled to additional attorney's fees. For one, the Court is convinced that
Atty. Catly has duly served the plaintiffs and protected their interests. The
numerous pleadings he filed before the Court, the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court shows that he pursued the claims of the plaintiffs before the venues where
these were being litigated or assailed. In fact, he was successful in having the
petitions of the defendant dismissed before the Court of Appeals and, eventually,
before the Supreme Court per the Decision promulgated on 07 May 2004.
xxxx
Of course, with the Amendatory Agreement, the payment due to the said
persons in the second tranche is subject to the “final decision or resolution of
the Las Piñas Court in Civil Case No. 93-3094 on the total amount of attorney's
fees that should be paid to Atty. Catly.” In such event, “(a)ny balance remaining
after the satisfaction of Atty. Catly's claim in accordance with the decision or
resolution of the Las Piñas Court shall be paid by ALI (the defendant Ayala Land)
to the Heads of the Families and the Brokers in proportion to the amounts
corresponding to them as set forth in paragraph 2.2 of the MOA xxx.
However, the above notwithstanding, the Court holds that Atty. Catly is
not entitled to the full amount of P20,000,000.00 as awarded to him in the
Separate Judgment dated 22 July 1997. To begin with, the settlement of the
herein case resulting in the plaintiffs and the defendant Ayala Land executing
among others, the MOA wherein the total consideration for the same under the
first and second tranches of payment P119,995,630.46 was not due to his own
efforts. The records show that Atty. Catly had no active participation in the
negotiations involving the parties that resulted in their compromise agreement.
More importantly, and despite the legal work he has done, Atty. Catly has
not proven yet the case of the plaintiffs regarding their supposed claim over the
property subject hereof. While the plaintiffs have documents which they used as
basis in claiming ownership of the properties of the defendant, these have not
been formally presented in Court. Of course, this is no longer necessary since the
parties agreed to settle among themselves.
xxxx
Admittedly, the clients of Atty. Catly are the original plaintiffs herein,
namely, William Navarro, Dionisio Ignacio, Dionisio Arciaga, Iluminada
Legaspi, Belen Dolleton, Ignacio (or Isagani) Navarro, Bernardino Argana and
Bartolome Patuga. Surely, he does not represent the co-heirs of the plaintiffs who
were also included in the compromise agreement or MOA and who shared in the
above settlement price, as well as the brokers or financiers named therein. Thus,
he could not base his claim on the entire amount of about P119,995,630.46.
The fact that Compromise Agreement dated 02 April 2001 was executed
by Atty. Catly and the alleged attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs is of no
moment. For one, this does not include the other individuals who were named as
payees for the second tranche so their share amounting to about P2.5 million
cannot just be given to him. More importantly, the said agreement was never
approved by the Court. As such, it likewise became subject to the Decision
dated 07 May 2004 promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Added to this, Atty. Catly benefited immensely from the settlement of the
above case among the plaintiffs and the defendant Ayala Land. In fact, he
received more than what some of the plaintiffs have received. For him to get a
total sum of P30,000,000.00 would be downright unfair, especially since the
settlement price of P119,995,630.46 was not entirely allocated to his clients.
In the end, the Court sees no cogent reason to deprive the original
plaintiffs and those named as recipients of sums in the second tranche provided
for in the MOA dated 13 May 1997 of what are due them and which they are
deserving of.
SO ORDERED.[47]
On March 1, 2005, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the
respondents and denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The trial court
stated that:
As to his assertion that the Supreme Court wanted only the Court to
determine as to “whether there had been vices of consent, forgery or irregularity
in the preparation of the AMENDATORY AGREEMENT,” this is hardly
convincing. On the contrary, it is clear in the Decision of the Third Division of
the Supreme Court promulgated on 07 May 2004 in G.R. No. 127079 entitled
“Ayala Land, Inc. v. William Navarro, et al.” that the “issue of whether or not
Atty. Catly's attorney's fees is reasonable should be resolved by the trial
court.” In effect, the Separate Judgment dated 22 July 1997 will be implemented
only after the Court has determined the “propriety of Atty. Hicoblino's attorney's
fees of P30,000,000.00 being assailed by both parties before that court.” Having
done so in the questioned Order dated 13 December 2004, what remains to be
done now by the Court is to have the same executed.
On the award of attorney's fees in favor of the defendant per the Decision
of the Court dated 01 December 2004, the attempt of Atty. Catly to question the
same is misplaced. For one, this is not the subject of the Order dated 13
December 2004. More importantly, the original plaintiffs are not assailing the
same so much so that with respect thereto it is binding on them.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[48]
Meanwhile, in the Resolution of December 3, 2008, the Court resolved,
among others, to grant the motion to substitute Lourdes A. Catly, wife of Atty.
Catly, as party petitioner in the present case, in view of the death of Atty. Catly on
April 5, 2008, and to require the counsel for petitioner to comply anew with the
Resolution dated March 10, 2008 by submitting the new addresses of the
respondents, considering that according to the respondents’ former counsel, Atty.
Patrocinio S. Palanog, he is no longer the counsel of record of the respondents. In
view of petitioner’s manifestation, through counsel, that all efforts were exerted to
locate the addresses of the respondents but to no avail, the Court issued a
Resolution on June 8, 2009 dispensing with the filing by respondents of their
comment on the petition for review oncertiorari.
Petitioner anchors on the theory that the trial court, now presided by Judge
Raul Bautista Villanueva, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner alleges that the trial
court erred in reopening the judgment on compromise entered into by the parties,
which was previously approved by the trial court’s then Presiding Judge Florentino
M. Alumbres, and already partially executed in its Separate Judgment dated July
22, 1997. Petitioner argues that said judgment has attained final and executory
status as respondents did not appeal from the said judgment nor did they question
the Amendatory Agreement dated May 27, 1997. Thus, petitioner prays that
judgment be rendered by this Court setting aside the trial court’s Decision dated
December 13, 2004 which reduced the award of the additional attorney’s fees to
only P1,000,000.00, instead ofP20,000,000.00; directing respondent ALI to
immediately release the sum of P20,000,000.00 as additional attorney’s fees of
petitioner pursuant to the July 22, 1997 Separate Judgment; and enjoining the trial
court from implementing its Order dated March 1, 2005 which denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
Records show that on December 13, 2004, the trial court rendered a
Decision finding that petitioner can execute judgment on the additional attorney’s
fees but only up to the extent of P1,000,000.00, not the entire amount
of P20,000,000.00 as prayed for in his petition. Petitioner received a copy of the
assailed decision onDecember 22, 2004. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
on December 29, 2004, but the same was denied in the trial court’s Order
dated March 1, 2005. Petitioner received a copy of the challenged order on March
7, 2005. On March 17, 2005, instead of appealing the assailed decision and order
of the trial court to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal under Section 2(a)
of Rule 41 of the Rules, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari directly
with this Court, stating that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to an excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.
Even if the petition will be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
the same should be dismissed. In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday
HoldingsCorporation,[50] which has been often cited in subsequent cases,[51] the
Court declared that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorariwill not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites ofcertiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.
On the contrary, the direct recourse to this Court as an exception to the rule
on hierarchy of courts has been recognized because it was dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest
of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.[54] Considering the
merits of the present case, the Court sees the need to relax the iron clad policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts and, thus, takes cognizance
over the case. The trial court, in its Decisions dated December 1,
2004 and December 13, 2004 (per Presiding Judge Raul Bautista Villanueva),
erred in motu proprio modifying the Separate Judgment dated July 22, 1997 (per
Presiding Judge Florentino M. Alumbres) by reducing the entitlement of
petitioner’s additional attorney’s fees from P20,000,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.
Petitioner insists that when the amendatory agreement was executed among
petitioner, respondents, and respondent ALI and the same was submitted to the
trial court for approval, the primordial consideration of the parties was to honor the
25% contingent attorney’s fees agreement as provided in the retainer contract
between the petitioner and his clients (herein respondents).
This argument has factual and legal bases as the trial court’s dispositions, in
its December 1, 2004 and December 13, 2004 Decision, are erroneous.
Said case, G.R. No. 127079, pointed out that with the execution of the May
13, 1997 MOA or compromise agreement and the May 27, 1997 Amendatory
Agreement, the parties resolved to settle their differences and put an end to the
litigation, and the trial court (per Presiding Judge Florentino M. Alumbres) had
rendered the July 22, 1997 Separate Judgment approving the said Amendatory
Agreement. It also explained that with the Separate Judgment of the trial court
approving the parties’ Amendatory Agreement, therein respondent ALI’s petition
was denied for being moot and academic. The reason why the Court ordered the
remand of the case to the trial court was for the purpose of resolving with dispatch
the propriety of petitioner’s attorney’s fees of P30,000,000.00 which was being
assailed by the parties.
On December 1, 2004, instead of conducting a hearing to determine the
appropriate amount of attorney’s fees that petitioner should be entitled to, the trial
court (per Judge Raul Bautista Villanueva rendered a Decision stating that it
approved the parties’ Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise dated May
13, 1997, dismissed therein intervenors’ complaints-in-intervention, and directed
respondents to pay respondent ALI the amount of P563,358.00 by way of
attorney’s fees to be taken from the second tranche payment and deducted from
their pro-rata share. It provided that with the approval of the parties’ Joint Motion
for Judgment Based on Compromise dated May 13, 1997, there exists no hindrance
to the execution of the said compromise agreement. It stated that the said motion
reflected the true, valid, and lawful terms of settlement agreed upon by the parties
pursuant to the MOA and the amendatory agreement. Later, on December 13,
2004, the trial court (through Presiding Judge Raul Bautista Villanueva), acting on
petitioner's claim for additional P20,000,000.00 attorney’s fees in his Ex-
Parte Motion to Issue Writ for Execution of Judgment dated July 28, 1997 and Ex-
Parte Manifestation and Motion dated May 31, 2004, rendered a Decision stating
that petitioner can execute judgment only up to the amount of P1,000,000.00, not
the entire P20,000,000.00.
The said Decisions are erroneous. The trial court misrepresented certain
facts by making it appear that the approval of the parties’ Joint Motion for
Judgment Based on Compromise dated May 13, 1997 was a pending incident that
needs to be resolved so as to define the rights of the parties and, thus, proceeded to
include it in its Decision dated December 1, 2004. The ruling that it approved the
same was a surplusage and inaccurate. There was no need for the trial court to
include in its disposition that it approved the parties’ Joint Motion for Judgment
Based on Compromise precisely because the same has been earlier approved in the
Separate Judgment dated July 22, 1997.
It bears stressing that the Decision dated May 7, 2004 of the Court, in G.R.
No. 127079, expressly acknowledged the existence of the compromise agreement
among the parties, designated as MOA and, later, the amendatory agreement, and
also the validity of their Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise which it
gave judicial imprimatur. It mentioned that as to petitioner’s attorney’s fees
of P30,000,000.00, while it was the amount they agreed upon in their MOA and
amendatory agreement; however, they are now contesting its
reasonableness. Respondent ALI opposed petitioner’s motion to execute the
compromise judgment on the ground that his attorney’s fees was excessive and
unconscionable, while respondents filed with this Court a motion for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the trial court from granting petitioner’s
motion. We declared in said G.R. No. 127079 that the issue of whether or not
petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees is reasonable should be resolved by the trial
court. Consequently, We denied respondent ALI’s petition for being moot and
remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of resolving with dispatch the
propriety of petitioner’s attorney’s fees of P30,000,000.00 which was being
assailed by both parties.
Clearly, in G.R. No. 127079, the Court ordered the trial court to resolve the
issue of whether petitioner should be entitled to the entire amount
of P30,000,000.00 (the sum of P10,000,000.00 was already received by the
petitioner, plus the claim of the additional amount of P20,000,000.00). This
directive necessarily requires the duty of the trial court (through Judge Raul
Bautista Villanueva) to determine the appropriate amount of additional attorney’s
fees to be awarded to petitioner, whether it should be the entire amount
of P20,000,000.00 (as claimed by petitioner) or a reduced amount (as claimed by
respondent ALI). If to the mind of the trial court, despite the Separate Judgment
dated July 22, 1997 (per Judge Florentino M. Alumbres) directing respondent ALI
to release the amount of P20,000,000.00 as additional attorney’s fees of petitioner,
the said amount appears to be unreasonable, then it should have forthwith
conducted a hearing with dispatch to resolve the issue of the reasonable amount of
attorney’s fees on quantum meruit basis and, accordingly, modify the said Separate
Judgment dated July 22, 1997 to be incorporated in the Decision dated December
1, 2004. This is in consonance with the ruling in Roldan v. Court of
Appeals[56] which states:
As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter,
modify or change even an admittedly valid stipulation between the parties
regarding attorney's fees is conceded. The high standards of the legal profession
as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit
the lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his
oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his
profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice,
the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic
therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable
character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts (Panay Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos v. City of Manila, 45 SCRA 409
[1972]; Rolando v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 8 SCRA 826 [1963]). And this Court has consistently ruled that even
with the presence of an agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless
reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the contract when the amount thereof
appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987]; Mutual Paper Inc. v. Eastern Scott
Paper Co., 110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe v. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425
[1959]; Turner v. Casabar, 65 Phil. 490 [1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. v. Alejano,
53 Phil. 986 [1929]). For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included
in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to
attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or
unconscionable (Philippine Engineering Co. vs. Green, 48 Phil. 466). (Italics
supplied)
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for
determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a device
to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if there was a
formal written contract for attorney’s fees as long as the agreed fee was found by
the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the
services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as the
time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved; importance of the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing
other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case; customary
charges for similar services; amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and
professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered.[57] Indubitably entwined
with a lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fee is the power of the Court to
reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable in
relation to Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules. Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if
they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or unreasonableness.[58]
What petitioner sought in his earlier pleadings, i.e., Ex-Parte Motion to Issue
Writ for Execution of Judgment dated July 28, 1997 and Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion dated May 31, 2004, was the execution and implementation of the July
22, 1997 Separate Judgment (per Judge Florentino M. Alumbres) which declared
that in view of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties under the
Amendatory Agreement dated May 27, 1997, respondent ALI is directed to
immediately release the sum of P20,000,000.00 in favor of the petitioner as his
attorney’s fees.
The Court is surprised with the trial court’s Decision dated December 13,
2004 justifying the reduction of attorney’s fees by stating that to allow petitioner to
get the total sum of P30,000,000.00 would be downright unfair, especially since
the settlement price of P119,995,630.46 was not entirely allocated to his
clients. The trial court should have taken the principle of quantum meruit with
regard to engagement of petitioner as respondents’ counsel vis-à-vis the concept of
compromise agreement entered into by the parties. The amicable settlement
of P120,000,000.00 was paid not only to the 8 respondents, collectively referred to
in the amendatory agreement as “Heads of the Families” (who had signed a
contract engaging petitioner as their counsel), but also to 66 other individuals (who
had no written contract with petitioner, but was assisted by the petitioner in the
execution of the MOA and the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on
Compromise). The respondents, designated as “Heads of the Families,”
represented all the heirs in the case. There was no need for the trial court, in its
Decision dated December 1, 2004, to enumerate individually the heirs being
represented by herein respondents. Petitioner actively represented the 8
respondents in their pleadings and other proceedings with the trial court as
stipulated in their Contract for Legal and Other Valuable Services,[60] dated
September 3, 1993, which stated that the 8 respondents engaged petitioner to be
their counsel in connection with the 32 hectare land located at Barangay Pugad
Lawin, Las Piñas; that the said parcel of land, covered by TCT No. T-5332, was
occupied by Las Piñas Ventures, Inc.; that the 8 respondents agreed to institute
legal action for annulment of TCT No. T-5332 and recovery of possession with
damages against Las Piñas Ventures, Inc.; and that for and in consideration of the
legal services rendered by petitioner, the 8 respondents shall, in proportion to their
respective shares, contribute 25% of the total area recovered from Las Piñas
Ventures, Inc. or its equivalent in cash upon successful termination of court
litigation; and that all litigation expenses shall be on the account of the petitioner’s
law firm. Hence, what bothers this Court is the failure of the trial court to hear the
parties, so as to render judgment based on the outcome of the hearing and confirm
the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees in favor of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule
6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of
Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October
16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The
Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987
to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s
sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged
that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P.
Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for
himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept,
on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The
complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s
deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application
was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel
Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of
the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the
purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando
Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No.
119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by
the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he
engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer
for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge
filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council
when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now
pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent
events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and
the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the
DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its
decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over
the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now
final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by
the Supreme Court.
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the
respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this
allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for
the subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on
Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he
had an inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s
affidavit where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely
attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his
rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of
his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them
was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel
Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay,
Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the
farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the
withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel
Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the
subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications
of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective
supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office
ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision
of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by
law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the
practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of
law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in
the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications
of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the
Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a
breach of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official
and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official,
but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical
conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to
the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the
government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear
the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public;
their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public
offices to promote their private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be
affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is
not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that
private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office
to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the
same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending
application for visas before his office.18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence
showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case
before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that
the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before
the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application
in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application
was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting
claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it
was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its
decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership to the
Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not
brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient
basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard
that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR,
not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is
the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically
stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting
party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s
disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it
to be in the respondent’s favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter,
dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to
the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely
showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed
areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be
rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the
decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot
give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only
hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no
personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the
respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel
Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21,
2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to
her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was
used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo.
According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would
be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be
considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates
when the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2,
1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was
executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the
transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the
respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the
loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation
from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally
represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of
evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we
ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government
lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of
his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; andsecond, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers,
after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act
of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously
exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. 1avv phi 1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private
practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before
the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against
the respondent’s favor.
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in
an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The
matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered
by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the
decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the
subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President,
the Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in
G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no
obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the
complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be
rebutted in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02,
Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Footnotes
* On official leave, per Special Order No. 916 dated November 24, 2010.
1A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
2A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
4Excluding from the Operation of Proclamation No. 423 dated July 12, 1957, which
Established the Military Reservation known as Fort William Mckinley (now Fort Andres
Bonifacio), situated in the Municipalities of Pasig-Taguig and Parañaque, Province of Rizal,
and Pasay City (now of Metropolitan Manila), a certain portion of land embraced therein
known as Barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village situated in the
Municipality of Taguig, Metropolitan Manila, and Declaring the Same Open for Disposition
under the Provisions of Republic Act Nos. 274 and 730.
5Excluding from the Operation of Proclamation No. 423 dated July 12, 1957, which
Established the Military Reservation known as Fort William Mckinley (now Fort Andres
Bonifacio) situated in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Pateros and Parañaque, Province
of Rizal and Pasay City (now Metropolitan Manila), as amended by Proclamation No. 2476
dated January 7, 1986, certain portions of land embraced therein known as Barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and Signal Village situated in the
Municipality of Taguig, Metropolitan Manila and Declaring the Same Open for Disposition
under the Provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and Republic Act No. 730 in relation to the
Provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended; and Providing the Implementing Guidelines.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt
of the accused.
Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the
court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar
which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is
because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not
under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke
compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule
on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to
satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not
be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession
made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.
Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the
accused.
Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He
was not informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the
information against him was written in a language he could not understand and was not
explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted
by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid
custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC
annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the
lower for further proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to
the principle of right to a public trial.
Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and
there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.
ZULUETA V. CA
FACTS:Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, she entered the clinic of her
husband, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in the clinic and took documents consisting of letters
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. These documents were used as evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine filed by Cecilia.
Dr. Martin moved for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages at RTC of Manila. They rendered
judgment, in his favor and ordered Cecilia to a immediately return the documents and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. They
were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. They
appealed, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In appealing of the decision of CA, Cecilia’s ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., this Court ruled
that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court.
When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was
admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1
to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for
certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of
the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to
admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in
the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath, Such
verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner
became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in
her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his
use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and
papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by
this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was
dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became
effective again.
HELD:The SC ruled that the wife cannot use the said documents and letters as evidences because they were
obtained in violation of her husband’s constitutional right to privacy.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]
Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates
petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with
other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board
classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November
28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128
which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,
addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to
the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and
expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also
filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in
x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our
(Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the
bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor
of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a
form of religious exercise and expression.
Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may
disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict
such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the
task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from
leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni
Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is
best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and
present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not
the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact
cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended
cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification,
exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or
expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a
Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and
not left to administrative agencies.
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU [219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR 1993]
Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered
expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias
in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s
Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against
their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a
system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it
doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and
singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings
of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship.
Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.
2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation
to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health
and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school
is not justified.
The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and
worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right
does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students
expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it
doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s
request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion
of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free
education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due
to religious beliefs is unjustified.