TIME, INC. vs. REYES et al.

39 SCRA 303 (1971)

FACTS

Time, Inc. is an American corporation with principal offices at Rocketfeller Center, New York
City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a weekly news magazine. In its issue of 18 August 1967, an
essay entitled "Corruption in Asia", in part, reads, as follows:

The problem of Manila's mayor, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, is a case

in point. When it was discovered last year that the mayor's coffers
contained far more pesos than seemed reasonable in the light of his
income, an investigation was launched. Witnesses who had helped him out
under curious circumstance were asked to explain in court. One
government official admitted lending Villegas P30,000 pesos ($7,700)
without interest because he was the mayor's compadre. An assistant
declared he had given Villegas loans without collateral because he
regarded the boss as my own son. A wealthy Manila businessman testified
that he had lent Villegas' wife 15,000 pesos because the mayor was like a
brother to me. With that, Villegas denounced the investigation as an
invasion of his family's privacy. The case was dismissed on a technicality,
and Villegas is still mayor.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul certain
orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal entitled "Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce
Enrile vs. Time, Inc., and Time-Life International, Publisher of 'Time' Magazine (Asia Edition)", and to
prohibit the said court from further proceeding with the said civil case.

Since Villegas and Enrile could not file a criminal action for libel against Time, it being a
corporation, they instead filed a suit for damages, the cause of action being a violation of the obligation
under quasi-delict/tort1 against Time before the CFI of Rizal. Time, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss based
on lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.

Applying the provision of the Rules of Court on Resolution of Motion, after hearing, the court may
dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading. The court shall not
defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every
case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.

Accordingly, precisely the very reason for this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction filed by Petioner Time, Inc. before the Supreme Court is the deferment of the
resolution of its Motion to Dismiss by the CFI Manila, it finding that the grounds relied upon in the motion
to dismiss (i.e. lack of jurisdiction and improper venue) DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE
INDUBITABLE.

1
Elements, generally: (1) There is an act or omission; (2) through fault or negligence; (3) that caused damage to
another; (4) there being no pre-existing relationship between the tortfeasor and the injured party.
ISSUES

1. Was the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction premature, the
resolution of Time’s motion to dismiss having only been deferred and not having been definitely
ruled upon by the CFI of Manila?
2. Is the CFI of Rizal correct in deferring the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss?

HELD

1. No. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the CFI of Rizal's lack of jurisdiction to entertain
the action; and the rulings of the Supreme Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or
both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.

2. No. The action of the CFI of Rizal in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for improper venue, is in excess of
jurisdiction and correctable by writ of prohibition or certiorari even before trial on the merits
is had.

Although this case involved a foreign element, the Supreme Court resolved it as a procedural issue
rather than as a conflict of law case. Consulting the Revised Penal Code will reveal that Republic Act No.
4363 amended Article 360 on June 19, 1965 specifically providing that where one of the offended parties
is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of libel, the action
shall be filed in the CFI of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published x x x.

Thus, it was a mistake for Villegas and Enrile to believe that the protection against “out-of-town
suits” of R.A. 4363 does not apply in favor of nonresident corporations like Time and that consequently
they could file the action for damages against it outside of Manila, as in before the CFI of Rizal. At that
time, Villegas was the incumbent Mayor of Manila (hence the Constitutional Law Case, Velasco v.
Villegas), and the immortal Enrile was then the Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently the Acting
Commissioner of Customs.

The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by an

out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent upon convenience
or inconvenience to a party; and moreover, venue was fixed under Republic Act No. 4363, pursuant to the
basic policy of the law, that is, to protect the interest of the public service when the offended party is a
public officer, by minimizing as much as possible any interference with the discharge of his duties.

Some Notes from Coquia and Pangalangan:

What judgment would the court have reached had it gone beyond the jurisdictional question and
decided the case from a conflict tort perspective? Under the traditional rule of lex loci delicti comissi, the
tortious conduct took place in a foreign country hence, Philippine law is not the governing law. However,
following the most significant relations approach, the Supreme Court could have adjudged Philippine law
as controlling because of the significant links between the forum and the parties.