Hocheng Philippines Corporations vs.

Farrales
G.R No. 211497 March 18, 2015

Facts:
Farrales was first employed by HPC on May 12, 1998 as Production Operator, followed
by promotions as (1) Leadman in 2004, (2) Acting Assistant Unit Chief in 2007, and (3)
Assistant Unit Chief of Production in 2008, a supervisory position with a monthly salary
of P17, 600.
On December 2, 2009, a report reached HPC management that a motorcycle helmet of
an employee, Reymar Solas (Reymar), was stolen at the parking lot within its premises
on November 27, 2009.
On December 3, 2009, Security Officer Francisco Paragas III confirmed a video sequence
recorded on closed-circuit television (CCTV) around 3:00 p.m. on November 27, 2009
showing Farrales taking the missing helmet from a parked motorcycle.
Later that day, HPC sent Farrales a notice to explain his involvement in the alleged theft.
The investigation was supported by the employees’ union, ULO-Hocheng.
Farrales’ explanation, as summarized by the CA:

On November 27, 2009, [Farrales] borrowed a helmet from his co-worker Eric Libutan
(“Eric”) since they reside in the same barangay. They agreed that Eric could get it at the
house of [Farrales] or the latter could return it the next time that they will see each other.
Eric told him that his motorcycle was black in color. As there were many motorcycles with
helmets, he asked another employee, Andy Lopega (“Andy”) who was in the parking area
where he could find Eric’s helmet. Andy handed over to him the supposed helmet which
he believed to be owned by Eric, then he went home.

On November 28, 2009, at around 6 o’clock in the morning, he saw Eric at their barangay
and told him to get the helmet. But Eric was in a rush to go to work, he did not bother to
get it.

In the morning of December 3, 2009, upon seeing Eric in the workplace, [Farrales] asked
him why he did not get the helmet from his house. Eric told him that, “Hindi po sa akin
yung nakuha nyong helmet.” [Farrales] was shocked and he immediately phoned the
HPC’s guard to report the situation that he mistook the helmet which he thought belonged
to Eric. After several employees were asked as to the ownership of the helmet, he finally
found the owner thereof, which is Jun Reyes’s (“Jun”) nephew, Reymar, who was with
him on November 27, 2009. [Farrales] promptly apologized to Jun and undertook to return
the helmet the following day and explained that it was an honest mistake. These all
happened in the morning of December 3, 2009; [Farrales] did not know yet that HPC will
send a letter demanding him to explain.10
A hearing was held on December 10, 2009 at 1:00 p.m. Present were Farrales, Eric
Libutan (Eric), Andy Lopega (Andy), Jun Reyes, Antonio Alinda, a witness, and Rolando
Garciso, representing ULO-Hocheng. From Andy it was learned that at the time of the
alleged incident, he was already seated on his motorcycle and about to leave the
company compound when Farrales approached and asked him to hand to him a yellow
helmet hanging from a motorcycle parked next to him. When Andy hesitated, Farrales
explained that he owned it, and so Andy complied. But Eric had specifically told Farrales
that his helmet was colored red and black and his motorcycle was a black Honda XRM-
125 with plate number 8746-DI, parked near the perimeter fence away from the walkway
to the pedestrian gate. The CCTV showed Farrales instructing Andy to fetch a yellow
helmet from a blue Rossi 110 motorcycle with plate number 3653-DN parked in the middle
of the parking lot, opposite the location given by Eric. Farrales in his defense claimed he
could no longer remember the details of what transpired that time, nor could he explain
why he missed Eric’s specific directions
On February 15, 2010, the HPC issued a Notice of Termination 12 to Farrales dismissing
him for violation of Article 69, Class A, Item No. 29 of the HPC Code of Discipline, which
provides that “stealing from the company, its employees and officials, or from its
contractors, visitors or clients,” is akin to serious misconduct and fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative, which are just causes for termination of employment under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.

On March 25, 2010, Farrales filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
appraisal and mid-year bonuses, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. He
also prayed for reinstatement, or in lieu thereof, separation pay with full backwages, plus
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. During the mandatory conference,
HPC paid Farrales P10,914.51, representing his 13th month pay for the period of January
to February 2010 and vacation leave/sick leave conversion. Farrales agreed to waive his
claim for incentive bonus.13

Issue:
Whether or not Farrales has been illegally dismissed.

Ruling:
Yes. To validly dismiss an employee, the law requires the employer to prove the existence
of any of the valid or authorized causes,24which, as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor
Code, are: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or the latter’s representative in connection with his work; (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person
of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. 25 As a supervisorial
employee, Farrales is admittedly subject to stricter rules of trust and confidence, and thus
pursuant to its management prerogative HPC enjoys a wider latitude of discretion to
assess his continuing trustworthiness, than if he were an ordinary rank-and-file
employee.26 HPC therefore insists that only substantial proof of Farrales’ guilt for theft is
needed to establish the just causes to dismiss him, as the NLRC lengthily asserted in its
decision.

Article 4 of the Labor Code mandates that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions thereof shall be resolved in favor of labor. Consistent with
the State’s avowed policy to afford protection to labor, as Article 3 of the Labor Code and
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution have enunciated, particularly in relation to
the worker’s security of tenure, the Court held that “[t]o be lawful, the cause for termination
must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of
livelihood. This is merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean
over backwards in favor of the working class, and mandate that every doubt must be
resolved in their favor.”27 Moreover, the penalty imposed on the erring employee ought to
be proportionate to the offense, taking into account its nature and surrounding
circumstances.

As aptly pointed out by the LA, while HPC has the onus probandi that the taking of
Reymar’s helmet by Farrales was with intent to gain, it failed to discharge this burden, as
shown by the following circumstances: Farrales sought and obtained the permission of
Eric, his co-employee as well as barangay co-resident, to borrow his helmet; at the
parking lot, Farrales asked another employee, Andy, to fetch a yellow helmet from one of
the parked motorcycles, mistakenly thinking it belonged to Eric (whom he knew owned
two helmets); the following day, November 28, Farrales asked Eric why he had not
dropped by his house to get his helmet, and Eric replied that Farrales got the wrong
helmet because he still had his other helmet with him; Farrales immediately sought the
help of the company guards to locate the owner of the yellow helmet, who turned out to
be Reymar; Farrales apologized to Reymar for his mistake, and his apology was promptly
accepted.30 All these circumstances belie HPC’s claim that Farrales took Reymar’s
helmet with intent to gain, the LA said.

But the Court agrees with the CA that Farrales committed no serious or willful misconduct
or disobedience to warrant his dismissal. It is not disputed that Farrales lost no time in
returning the helmet to Reymar the moment he was apprised of his mistake by Eric, which
proves, according to the CA, that he was not possessed of a depravity of conduct as
would justify HPC’s claimed loss of trust in him. Farrales immediately admitted his error
to the company guard and sought help to find the owner of the yellow helmet, and this,
the appellate court said, only shows that Farrales did indeed mistakenly think that the
helmet he took belonged to Eric.
Leus vs. St Scholastica’s College Westgrove
G.R. No. 187226 January 28, 2015

Facts:
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001,
SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and
Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock.
When SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao),
SSCW’s Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In
response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her
employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage. 5
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why
she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting
pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school.6
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She
averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of
wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further,
the petitioner requested a copy of SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better
respond to the charge against her.
On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of
a “Support Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS cites “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a ground for dismissal in
addition to the just causes for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of
the Labor Code.8

Issue:
Whether or not Cheryll’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to terminate
her employment?
Ruling:
No. The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se,
is “disgraceful and immoral considering that she is employed in a Catholic education
institution. However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the
aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s
pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner’s
conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that
premarital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed
considered disgraceful or immoral.
The determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step
process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct;
and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of
conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not
absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral.
There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.
That the distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality is important
because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. 41 The
Court further explained that: The morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not religious.
Thus, the proscription against “disgraceful or immoral conduct” under Section 94(e) of the
1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and
secular morality.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock,
gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful
or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of
the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer.
Security of tenure is a right which may not be denied on mere speculation of any unclear
and nebulous basis
The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be
exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.
In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in
lieu of reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best interest
of the parties
Rivera vs. Genesis Transport Service, Inc.
G.R. No. 215568 August 3, 2015

Facts:
Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. (Genesis) beginning
June 2002 as a bus conductor, assigned to the Cubao-Baler, Aurora route. As part of the
requisites for his employment, he was required to post a cash bond of P6,000.00.
Respondent Riza A. Moises is Genesis' President and General Manager.[7]

In his Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Rivera acknowledged that he was
dismissed by Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus
ticket receipts. He alleged that on June 10, 2010, he received a Memorandum [8] giving
him twenty-four (24) hours to explain why he should not be sanctioned for reporting and
remitting the amount of P198.00 instead of the admittedly correct amount of P394.00
worth of bus ticket receipts. He responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was
unable to correct "because the bus encountered mechanical problems."[9]

The discrepancy between the reported and remitted amount as against the correct
amount was detailed in the "Irregularity Report" prepared by Genesis' Inspector, Arnel
Villaseran (Villaseran).[10]

According to Villaseran, on May 25, 2010, he conducted a "man to man" inspection on

the tickets held by the passengers on board Bus No. 8286 who had transferred from Bus
No. 1820 in San Fernando, Pampanga. (Bus No. 1820 broke down.) In the course of his
inspection, he noticed that Ticket No. 723374 VA had a written corrected amount of
P394.00. However, the amount marked by perforations made on the ticket, which was the
amount originally indicated by the bus conductor, was only P198.00. Upon inquiring with
the passenger holding the ticket, Villaseran found out that the passenger paid P500.00 to
Rivera, who gave her change in the amount of P106.00. [11]

Subsequently, Villaseran conducted verification works with the Ticket Section of Genesis'
Cubao Main Office. Per his inquiries, the duplicate ticket surrendered by Rivera to
Genesis indicated only the unconnected amount of P198.00. It was also found that Rivera
remitted only P198.00.[12]

On July 20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice[13] informing him that a
hearing of his case was set on July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services
were terminated through a written notice dated July 30, 2010.[14] Contending that this
termination was arbitrary and not based on just causes for terminating employment, he
filed the Complaint[15] for illegal dismissal, which is subject of this Petition.[16]
For their defense, Genesis and Riza A. Moises claimed that Rivera's misdeclaration of
the amount in the bus ticket receipts and failure to remit the correct amount clearly
violated Genesis' policies and amounted to serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach
of trust; thereby justifying his dismissal

Issue:
Whether or not Rivera’s employment was terminated for just cause.

Ruling:
No. Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when
attended by such gravity as would leave the employer no other viable recourse but to cut
off an employee's livelihood.

For serious misconduct to justify dismissal, the following requisites must be present: (a) it
must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

In Philippine Plaza Holdings v. Episcope,[31] we discussed the requisites for valid

dismissal on account of willful breach of trust:

Among the just causes for termination is the employer's loss of trust and confidence in its
employee. Article 296 (c) (formerly Article 282 [c]) of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate the services of an employee for fraud or willful breach of the trust
reposed in him. But in order for the said cause to be properly invoked, certain
requirements must be complied with[,] namely[:]

(1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence and

(2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.[32]

Relating to the first requisite, Philippine Plaza Holdings clarified that two (2) classes of
employees are considered to hold positions of trust:

It is noteworthy to mention that there are two classes of positions of trust: on the one
hand, there are managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management
of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff; on the other hand, there
are fiduciary rank-and-file employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or
those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts
of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with
the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as
occupying positions of trust and confidence.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
The position an employee holds is not the sole criterion. More important than this
formalistic requirement is that loss of trust and confidence must be justified. As with
misconduct as basis for terminating employment, breach of trust demands that a degree
of severity attend the employee's breach of trust

The social justice suppositions underlying labor laws require that the statutory grounds
justifying termination of employment should not be read to justify the view that bus
conductors should, in all cases, be free from any kind of error. Not every improper act
should be taken to justify the termination of employment.

Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by petitioner can
hardly be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has
acted in a manner that runs afoul of his employer's trust. More so, petitioner cannot be
taken to have engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his
employer. Terminating his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust.
Balais, Jr. vs. Se’lon by Aimee

G.R. No. 196557 June 15, 2016

Facts:

Salais narrated that he was Salon de Orient's senior hairstylist and make-up artist from
October 16, 2004 until November 26, 2007 when respondent Amelita
Revilla (Revilla) took over the business. Revilla, however, retained his services as senior
hairstylist and make-up artist. Under the new management, Salon De Orient became
Se'lon by Aimee and respondent Alma Belarmino (Belarmino) was appointed as its salon
manager, who was in-charge of paying the employees' wages, dismissing erring
employees, and exercising control over them. Balais, on the other hand, being the senior
hairstylist and make-up artist, allegedly had the discretion to choose from among the
junior hairstylist who should assist him in servicing his clients, as customarily observed
in beauty salons. He worked during the 10am-7pm shift or 1am-8pm shift, six (6) days
a week with Sunday as his regular rest day for a monthly salary of Php 18,500.00 paid
every two (2) weeks. In June 2008, his salary was reduced to Php 15,000.00. Balais
claimed that his working relationship with respondents had been harmonious until the
evening of July 1, 2008 when Belarmino dismissed him without due process, in the
following manner:

Belarmino angrily shouted: "You get out of this Company! I do not need you here at
Se'Lon by Aimee!"

Balais Jr., calmly replied: "lbigay mo ang 13th month ko and sweldo ko, at separation
pay. "

Belarmino angrily replied: "Maghabla ka! kahit saan na korte at haharapin kita. "

Balais Jr. responded: "Maski ang Jollibee nagbibigay nang 13th month pay, sweldo and
separation pay pag may tinatanggal na empleyado! "

Belarmino retorted: "Eh di doon ka magtrabaho sa Jollibee kasi doon nagbibigay sila nang
13th month pay, sweldo at separation pay pag may tinatanggal na empleyado. "

Balais felt humiliated as he was berated in front of his co-workers. The next day, he did
not report for work anymore and instead filed the complaint before the NLRC.

Respondents alleged that it was known to all their employees that one of the salon's
policies was for junior stylists to take turns in assisting any of the senior stylists for
purposes of equalizing commissions. Balais failed to comply with this policy as the latter
allegedly gave preference to only two (2) junior stylists, disregarding the other two (2)
junior stylists. When Belarmino asked Balais for explanation, the latter allegedly snapped
and retorted that he would do whatever he wanted. Belarmino reminded him of the
salon's policy and his duty to comply with it but petitioner allegedly insisted he would do
as he pleased and if they can no longer take it, they would have to dismiss him

After the incident, Balais sued them and never reported back to work.
Respondents insisted that Balais was not terminated from employment but he instead
abandoned his work. Respondents explained that even assuming that he was indeed
dismissed, there was a valid ground therefor as his acts amounted to serious misconduct
against a superior and willful disobedience to reasonable policy related to his work.

Labor Arbiter
• Respondents liable for illegal dismissal
•Balais' was dismissed without cause and notice for merelydefending his decision to
avail of the services of someselected junior stylist of his choice
NLRC
•Affirmed in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter
• Petitioner – illegally dismissed
• Se'lon by Aimee failed to prove that the act of petitioneramounted to gross
insubordination
• Respondents failed to produce a copy of the supposedsalon policy on the rule of
rotation of junior stylists, thus, theveracity of the allegation of insubordination against
Balaisfailed to convince
Court of Appeals
 Reversed and set aside the NLRC Decisionand rendered a Decision sustaining
petitioner's dismissal asvalid and required respondents to pay Balais his accrued 13th
month pay and unpaid salaries.

Issue:
Whether or not Balais Jr., has been validly dismissed.

Ruling:
No. The principle echoed and re-echoed in our jurisprudence is that the onus of proving
that the employee was dismissed for a just cause rests on the employer, and the latter's
failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. 9

To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur:

(a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts.14 Mere absence is not sufficient.
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal.

Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of
an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites:

(1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness
being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude;" and

(2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engage d to discharge.

In adjudging that the dismissal was grounded on a just and valid cause, the totality of
infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall
be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee.

Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is
about to be terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must
give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

The employer is mandated to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices:

(a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the
employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires;

(b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee, the employer must
notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason therefor.

Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an illegally dismissed employee is entitled
to reinstatement as a matter of right." Aside from the instances provided under Articles
28317 and 28418of the Labor Code, separation pay is, however, granted when
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employer
and the employee.

Employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their
actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement
but if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the
time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
Brown Madonna press, Inc. vs. Casas

G.R. No. 200898 June 15, 2015

Facts:

This case sprung from respondent Rosario M. Casas's (Casas) parting of ways with BMPI
as its Vice President for Finance and Administration on January 5, 2007. Casas claims she
was forced to leave her work, while the BMPI management asserts that she requested a
graceful exit from the company to avoid an administrative investigation. The facts leading
to this dispute are outlined below.

On May 1, 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk at Fortune General Insurance,
a member of the ALC Group of Companies. She eventually rose from the ranks; on
December 1, 2003, she was transferred to BMPI, another ALC member company, as its
Vice President for Finance and Administration.[2]

On January 5, 2007, Casas met with Cabangon, BMPI's company president, and Victoria
Nava (Nava), the Vice President for the Central Human Resource Department of the ALC
Group of Companies. During the meeting, Casas was allegedly told not to report to work
anymore starting January 8, 2007, upon the instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALC's
Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the reason for her abrupt dismissal was not
disclosed to her, but she was promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and
left.[3]

BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who requested a graceful exit from
the company during the January 5, 2007 meeting. The meeting was supposedly held to
confront Casas about certain complaints against her, and about the growing rift between
her and another company officer. BMPI asserts that Casas opted to leave the company
to avoid an administrative investigation against her and to give her the chance to
jumpstart her career outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon to
grant her some form of financial assistance as they were friends.[4]

Casas no longer reported for work on January 8, 2007, and BMPI, for its part, started the
processing of her clearance.[5] On May 17, 2007, Casas sent Cabangon-Chua a letter
asking for the reconsideration of his decision to terminate her employment. Cabangon-
Chua did not act on this letter.[6]

On July 20, 2007, Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for payment of
separation pay, backwages, retirement benefits and attorney's fees before the Regional
Arbitration Branch. The complaint was docketed as NLRC LAC 05-001892-08.

Labor Arbiter dismissed Casas’ complaint for lack of merit, and ordered BMPI to reinstate
her to her previous position without payment of backwages.

The NLRC found that Casas’ dismissal had been sufficiently established by evidence on
record.

The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling, and held that it did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in finding that Casas had been illegally dismissed.
Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it found no grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC’s ruling that Casas had been illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

The CA did not err in finding that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in its decision.

The present petition involves mixed questions of fact and law, with the core issue being
one of fact. This issue - from which the other issues arise - relates to the nature of Casas'
termination of employment relationship with BMPI. Did she voluntarily resign from, or
abandon her work at, BMPI, or was she summarily dismissed by Cabangon?

This question of fact is an issue that we cannot resolved in a Rule 45 petition, except in
the course of determining whether the CA correctly ruled in determining that the NLRC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion. In other words, the question we ask in resolving
the present case is not whether Casas abandoned her work or was illegally dismissed;
instead, we ask whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC's decision finding that Casas was dismissed from work.

We support the CA in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's factual

conclusion that Casas had been dismissed from work.

In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee's
dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first prove,
by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from employment.

Jurisprudence has established that employers interposing their employee's resignation

as a defense from illegal dismissal cases have the burden of proving that the employee
indeed voluntarily resigned.

Termination without a just or authorized cause renders the dismissal invalid, and entitles
the employee to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.

A mere accusation of wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an

employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be backed by substantial
evidence at the time the employee is dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is being
questioned before the courts.

Although statutory in nature, the procedural and substantive due process requirements in
illegal dismissal cases stem from the protection that the Constitution provides labor - the
Constitution has tasked the State to promote the workers' security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage.