State Policies on Labor Relations

1. San Miguel Corp Employees Union vs. Bersamina

HELD: There is a labor dispute.

While it is SanMigÊs submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the
contractual workers of Lipercon and DÊRite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist „regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee‰ (Article 212 [1] Labor Code, supra) provided the
controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a „change‰ or „arrangement‰ thereof
(ibid). Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and
defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

We recognize the proprietary right of SanMig to exercise an inherent management prerogative and its best business judgment
to determine whether it should contract out the performance of some of its work to independent contractors. However, the
rights of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law equally call for recognition and protection. Those contending interests must be
placed in proper perspective and equilibrium.

2. Kiok Loy vs. NLRC

ISSUE:

Petitioner contends that the National Labor Relations CommissionÊs finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is
not supported by law

HELD:

Petition is without merit.

Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations 6 towards a collective agreement,6 is one of the democratic frameworks
under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound
and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal
obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
„to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to
wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or
question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.

While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate contract
negotiation.7 The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are
present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employeesÊ representative in accordance with
any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a
demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . . . . all of which preconditions are undisputedly present
in the instant case.

3. Scout Ramon v Albano Memorial College v Noriel

FACTS

The controversy began with the filing of a petition for certification election on September 22, 1977 by the Scout Ramon V.
Albano Memorial College Chapter of private respondent labor union. It alleged that the written consent of 67 employees out
of an alleged total working force of 200, more or less, had been secured. There was, on October 21, 1977, a motion to dismiss
the petition filed by the employer, the present petitioner. It was based on the lack of the 30% consent require-ment, as there
were 250 employees, the required thirty percent of the said work force being 75. With the figure of the actual number of
employees in the school establishment thus supplied, private respondent submitted on October 26, 1977 the additional
signatures of 22 employees in support of its plea for a certification election. There was an opposition on the part of the present
petitioner. It was filed on November 2, 1977. Then came, fifteen days later, an order from the Med-Arbiter assigned to the case
dismissing the petition for certification on the ground that the compliance with the 30% requirement must be shown as of the
time of its filing.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a Union.

HELD:

There is no merit to this petition. Sc ordered that a certification election be conducted.

Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election for the collective
bargaining process. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with
freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling.

Bureau of Labor Relations may order holding of certification election despite failure to meet 30% consent requirement. Order
for holding certification election valid even if 30% requirement was not met at the time of filing of petition provided the same
were thereafter met.

Right to self-organization

a. Bases of rights
1. Constitution Art.III Sec 8;

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

2. Art XIII, sec 3;

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential
use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share
in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and
growth.

3. Art IX(B) sec 2

Section 2.

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable,
and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.

No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.

The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

b. Extent of scope

1. Republic Savings Bank v CIR

FACTS

Respondents were employees of the Bank who were discharged after writing a letter-charge to the bank president, demanding
his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees.

At the instance of the respondents, prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR on September 15, 1958, alleging that the
Bank's conduct violated section 4 (a) (5) of the Industrial Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer „to
dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having given or
being about to give testimony under this Act.

The Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint contending that respondents were discharged not for union activities but
for having written and published a libelous letter against the bank president.

HELD:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in
the exercise of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,5 interference with
which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(l). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has
been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as
such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that col,
lective bargaining be contemplated.

Some other members of this Court believe, without necessarily expressing approval of the way the respondents expressed
their grievances, that what the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance committee.

To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited,13 as the right of an employer to discharge for tcause14
is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not ouch the normal exercise of the right of an employer to select his employees or
to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self-
organization.15 But the difficulty arises in determining whether in fact the discharges are made because of such a separable
cause or because of some other activities engaged in by employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.

2. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union

Issue: WON the exemption given to those belonging to particular religious sects not to join associations or unions defeats the
right to self-organization

HELD: No. the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.

What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the „right‰ to form or join associations. a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, Le., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join
or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and
even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at
any time.

3. Reyes v trajano

FACTS

The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of TriUnion
Industries Corporation. There were 2 competing unions. Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240
actually took part in the election, conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Among the 240
employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the lNK.

The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending
labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEUOLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice,1 for (c) a third
choice: "NO UNION."

The 141 INK members were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing
unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not
members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections."

The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the
election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the
employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest
the results of the election," because "they are not members of either contending unit,

The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees' petition. By Order dated December 21, 1987, he certified the
TUEUOLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. In that Order he decided the fact
that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render meaningless the rights of the non-members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to
exercise the rights to be represented by a labor organization as the bargaining agent,"

Petitioners argued that the MedArbiter had "practically disenfranchised petitioners who had an overwhelming majority,"

In that comment it insists that "if the workers who are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious belief
opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they themselves can not have a bargaining representative,
then the right to be represented by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit."

ISSUE:

WON members on INK can exercise their right to vote in a certification election when they are barred by their religion to join
associations.

HELD: yes, they have the right to vote.

INK employees have the right to participate in a certification election and vote for "No Union.

The right to self organization includes the right not to form or join a union. Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or
assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist
any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to
refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted
by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which
particular labor organization.

Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may
take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote
to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.

Failure to take part in previous elections no bar to right to participate in future elections

4. Kapatiran v Calleja

FACTS

From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and
Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation, with a 3-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was to
expire. TUPAS filed an amended notice of strike on September 28, 1987 as a means of pressuring the company to extend,
renew, or negotiate a new CBA with it.

On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, registered as a
labor union. Claiming that it has the majority of the daily wage rank and file employees numbering 191, they filed a petition
for a certification election at the Bureau of Labor Relations which was granted.

TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the members of the NEW ULO were mostly
members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to affiliate with any labor union. It also accused
the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS bargaining rights.

ISSUE: WON members of INK sect can form a union despite the prohibition of their sect for its members to join associations.

HELD: YES

The right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs,
does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the
recognition of the tenets of the sect x x x should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution
to workers, regardless of religious affiliation.

5. Pan-Am World Airways, Inc v Pan-Am Employees

FACTS

On August 25, 1965, respondent union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and on August 28, 1965, the same
respondent union declared and maintained a strike against the herein petitioner.1
Then, on September 17, 1965, the President of the Philippines certif ied the strike to the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations as being an industrial dispute affecting the national interest, the parties being called to a conference on September
20, 1965.2 Several conferences were held.

It was the position of the Union that its members would not resume the performance of their duties unless its officers were
likewise included in the return-to-work order.

Petitioner was of a different mind. It was agreeable to having the workers return to work but not the five officials of
respondent Union. It alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-strike clause of an existing collective bargaining
agreement the result being that the officials could, as the responsible parties, be liable for dismissal as they would not be only
lacking in „incentive and motivation for doing their work properly but would likewise have the opportunity to cause „grave
and irreparable injury to petitioner."

Management did offer, however, to deposit their salaries even if they would not be working, with the further promise that
they would not even be required to refund any amount should the right to remain in their positions be considered as legally
terminated by their calling the alleged illegal strike.

To be more specific, the apprehension entertained by petitioner was in the petition expressed by it thus: “The five officers of
the union consist of three (3) Passenger Traffic Representatives and a reservation clerk who in the course of their duties could
cause mix-ups in the reservation and accommodation of passengers which could result in very many suits for damages against
petitioner. The other union officer who is in the cargo department could underweigh or overweigh cargo to the great
detriment of the service or even of the safety of petitioner’s aircraft."

Nonetheless, on September 28, 1965, Judge Bugayong issued an order requiring petitioner to accept the five union officers
pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike

ISSUE: WON or not the dismissal of the union officers impairs the right to self-organization.

HELD:

The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right of self-organization. There is both a
constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their
employers. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to
speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.

If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedented demand, the laborers in this particular union would thus be confronted
with the sad spectacle of the leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible, possibly even constituting a menace to the
operations of the enterprise.

That is an indictment of the gravest character, devoid of any factual basis. What is worse, the result, even if not intended,
would be to call into question their undeniable right to choose their leaders, who must be treated as such with all the respect
to which they are legitimately entitled. The fact that they would be paid but not be allowed to work is, to repeat, to add to the
infamy that would thus attach, to them necessarily, but to respondent union equally.

c. Workers with right to self-organization

1. Cathay Pacific Steel v CA

FACTS

Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong as Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its Cainta Plant on 16
February 1990. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Personnel Superintendent.
Sometime in June 1996, the supervisory personnel of CAPASCO launched a move to organize a union among their ranks, later
known as private respondent CUSE.

Private respondent Tamondong actively involved himself in the formation of the union and was even elected as one of its
officers after its creation.

Consequently, petitioner CAPASCO sent a memo to private respondent Tamondong requiring him to explain and to
discontinue from his union activities, with a warning that a continuance thereof shall adversely affect his employment in the
company. Private respondent Tamondong ignored said warning.

In view of that, on 6 February 1997, petitioner CAPASCO through a memo terminated the employment of private respondent
Tamondong on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, citing his union activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty to
the company.

Private respondent Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving unfair labor practice by filing
a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC,

In contrast, petitioner CAPASCO contended that by virtue of private respondent TamondongÊs position as Personnel
Superintendent and the functions actually performed by him in the company, he was considered as a managerial employee,
thus, under the law he was prohibited from joining a union as well as from being elected as one of its officers.

Labor Arbiter favored Tamondong. NLRC modified the judgement and dismissed the case for illegal dismissal. CA reinstated
the decision of the labor arbiter. Hence, the case before SC.

ISSUE: WON Tamondong’s dismissal was illegal.

HELD: YES. Tamondong was illegally dismissed. He is only as supervisory personnel and not a managerial personnel
contrary to what the company claims.

The company claimed that Tamondong was performing functions of a managerial employee because he was the one laying
down major management policies on personnel relations such as: issuing memos on company rules and regulations, imposing
disciplinary sanctions such as warnings and suspensions, and executing the same with full power and discretion.

However, based on the findings of CA, Tamondong to observe fixed daily working hours from 8:00 am to 12:00 noon and
from 1:00pm to 5:00 pm. This imposition upon private respondent Tamondong, according to the Court of Appeals, is very
uncharacteristic of a managerial employee.

Tamondong may have been exercising certain important powers, such as control and supervision over erring rank-and-file
employees, however, x x x he does not possess the power to hire, transfer, terminate, or discipline erring employees of the
company. At the most, the record merely showed that [private respondent] Tamondong informed and warned rank-and-file
employees with respect to their violations of CAPASCOÊs rules and regulations

2. Fil Oil Refinery Corp v Filoil Supervisory and Confidential Employees Association

FACTS