CRIMINAL LAW 1

Digested Cases –Group 2

1. Roxie Elaine R. Galarpe

2. Gandalf L. Gonzales
3. Jemar E. Salac
4. Babie Jean D. Mahinay
5. Hercil B. Corpuz
6. Aboimel A. Udjaji
7. Ronnie Larasan
8. Montaser T. Ever
9. Earl Antonille H. Fernandez
10. Harold Ordeniza
11. Jeascel Feb S. Agad
12. Emmanuel A. Gallo
13. Boen Yator
14. Ana Georgina
15. Angelina Nipales
16. Archie Dandy Bernal

G.R. No. 161803, February 04, 2008

DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOSE CHING AAND/OR LIBERTY FOREST INC. AND
CRESILITO M LIMBAGA, Respondents

Facts:

A Nissan van owned by Dy Trading Inc. was traveling along the National Highway in barangay
Sumilihon, Butuan City on July 4, 1995. A Paula Bus heading to Surigao City was cruising the opposite way
towards the Nissan Van.

In between the lane of the two vehicles, a prime mover with a trailer, owned by Liberty Forest Inc.
and driven by Cresilito M. Limbaga. The prime mover was parked asked after suffering a tire blowout the
previous night. In the absence of a triangular reflectorized plate, the driver put banana leaves on the prime
mover’s rear as a form of early warning device.

To avoid the parked prime mover, Paula Bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the Nissan van;
while the van swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus then hit the front of the stationary prime mover.
The Paula Bus hit the rear of the prime mover.

Issue:

Whether or not the Liberty Forest Inc., and Cresilito M. Limbaga held liable to the damage on the
Nissan van:

a) Whether or not the prime mover driver, Cresilito M. Limbaga, negligent in parking the vehicle;
 b) Whether or not negligence and carelessness was the approximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van

Ruling

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, their
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault as negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict.

a) Yes. Cresilito M. Limabaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national road; he failed
to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorist.

Negligence is defined failure to observe the protection of the interest of another person that degree
of case, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.

It is common sense that the skewed parking posed a serious risk to oncoming motorist, in addition,
doing so made it occupy a substantial portion of the national road on lane of the passenger bus’s
lane.

b) Yes. Negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the van.

Proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting
other event in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor.

As discussed, skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorist.
Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking triggered the series of events
that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the van. The collision of
the two vehicles would not have occurred had the prime mover not have been parked askew.

The court decision:

Reinstate in full the RTC decision:

a) Liberty Forect Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga pay jointly and solidarily, plaintiff Dy Teban Trading
Inc. the amounts Php 279, 832.00 as actual and compensatory damage, Php 30, 000.00
attorney’s fee, Php 5, 000.00 expenses for litigation;

b) That all the money claims of plaintiff Rogelio C. Ortiz are dismissed;

c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or the case against him dismissed;

d) That the counterclaim of all the defendants is dismissed; and

e) That defendants Liberty Forest Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga to pay, jointly and solidarily, the
cost.

GR No. 103119, 1992-10-21, October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, Petitioner vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
Facts:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house... and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan.
He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed
with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house.
At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location... of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out; however, that Palangpangan
was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible
crime.
Issues:
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
Ruling:
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability and
now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means
which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to... punish such criminal tendencies.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation
is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does
not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
made them punishable.
WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime.
Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by
the law, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002

JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

Petitioner: JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA

Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:

In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of
the Ombudsman.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution 1 finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President
and the other respondents therein. The petition which was filed in before the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), alleged the following:

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
a.k.a.’ASIONG SALONGA’ and a.k.a.’JOSE VELARDE’, TOGETHER WITH Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada,
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the
crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. 7659,
committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, AccusedJoseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself, AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR a series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00) MORE
OR LESS FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING. IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR In connivance with co-accused
CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, In consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy and
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR
LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF
THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION,
SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00). . . .

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME ‘JOSE VELARDE’ AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

On 30 April 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" before the Sandiganbayan, praying that
he (1) be dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable cause; and (2) be discharged
from custody immediately since he was being charged only with illegal gambling under first specification
of the accusatory Information or, in the alternative, be allowed to post bail.

ISSUES:

Republic Act No. 7080, also known as the Anti-Plunder Law, has heretofore been declared constitutional
by this Court in its decision, dated 19 November 2001, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) 3
What should only then remain for resolution raised in the petition are —

1. Whether or not Jinggoy Estrada can be prosecuted for Plunder even if he has been charged only on
one count with what could constitute acts of plunder under paragraph (a) of the Amended Information;
and

2. Assuming ex argumenti that petitioner can be prosecuted for plunder, whether or not his stated
participation in the information disentitles him to bail.

HELD:

Unfortunately, the Amended Information which, according to the majority, charges petitioner with plunder
under paragraph (a), utterly failed to comply with the above Rule.

1. In fine, petitioner should not have been charged with the serious crime of plunder in the Amended
Information considering that his participation is limited only to paragraph (a) thereof alleging a single
crime of bribery. Indeed, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have sustained the validity of the
Amended Information as against petitioner. Certainly, this is grave abuse of discretion on its part.

2. Corollarily, The allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the offense charged, and thus
the same cannot validly support a judgment of conviction against petitioner for the crime of plunder. He
must be dropped from the Amended Information and proceeded against under a new one charging the
proper offense.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, SANDIGANBAYAN GRANT the petition. Petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada is ordered
excluded from the Amended Information for plunder.

G.R. NO. 175457: July 6, 2011

G.R. NO. 175482
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
VS. ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

Atty. David B. Loste, President of Integrated Bar of the Philippines Eastern Samar Chapter requested to
the Ombudsman a review of the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Andalim who is accused of
murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A.
Ambil Jr. Atty. Loste then sent a request to dismiss their case, however petitioners Ambil, Jr. and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were still charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together
with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint and the amendment of
the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the
allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the
imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According
to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail
where Mayor Adalim was held. Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and
rested its case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial but the same was denied.
Sandiganbayan founds petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in
moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in
the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees
do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be
released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are liable for violation of R.A. No 3019.

HELD: Yes.

Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the provincial
jail. Adalim was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to
move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim through
the justification of his lawyers that the mayor’s life will be in danger inside the provincial jail. As the
Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalim
safety.
Thus Ambil is found guilty in violation of the Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by giving Adalim unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in discharge of his official administrative function through evident bad
faith.