G.R. No.

203298, January 17, 2018

INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. AND EDMER Y. LIM, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, STATIONERY EXPRESSIONS SHOP, INC. AND JOSEPHINE LIM BON HUAN, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 17 May 2012 Decision1 and the
6 September 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116221, which nullified the 15
September 2010 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig City (RTC), in Civil Case No.
71732.

THE FACTS

On 22 July 2008, petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink), represented by its president, petitioner
Edmer Y. Lim (Lim), filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondents
Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, and Joseph Lim Bon Huan (Bon Huan).4 Interlink sought from Expressions
the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals and damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease
contract.

In the Sheriff's Return,5 dated 26 September 2008, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel (Sheriff Muriel) of the RTC's
Branch 167 certified that on 24 September 2008, he served the summons issued in the subject case,
together with the copy of the complaint, on the respondents at the office of the defendant company's
president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel stated that Liwanan undertook to
forward the said documents to her superior.

On 5 January 2009, Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their failure to file
their answer.6

On 6 January 2009, respondents entered a special appearance through Atty. Generosa Jacinto (Atty.
Jacinto) alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over them. They further prayed that Interlink's motion for declaration of default be denied.7

Thus, in its Order,8 dated 2 March 2009, the RTC denied Interlink's motion to declare defendants in default.
The trial court agreed that the summons was not served in accordance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court rendering such service defective. Thus, it ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the
respondents.

In the Sheriff's Return,9 dated 15 May 2009, Sheriff Muriel certified that on 11 May 2009, he served the
summons on Expressions at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a certain Amee
Ochotorina (Ochotorina), a person of suitable age and discretion, who introduced herself as one of the
secretaries of Bon Huan. Sheriff Muriel added that Ochotorina assured him that the summons would be
brought to the attention of Bon Huan. He added that he had insisted that the summons be received
personally by Bon Huan, but Ochotorina refused and told him that Bon Huan was then attending to some
business matters.

On 25 June 2009, Interlink filed another motion to declare defendants in default.10 To this motion,
respondent again entered a special appearance through Atty. Jacinto on 10 July 2009. The respondents
alleged that the second service of the summons was still defective because Ochotorina did not work for nor
was connected with the office of the president of Expressions, and that she was neither its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, nor its in-house counsel.11

In the Order,12 dated 10 February 2010, the RTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default and
allowed Interlink to present evidence ex parte. The trial court was convinced that there was sufficient
compliance with the rules on service of summons to a juridical entity considering that the summons was
received by the assistant/secretary of the president. The trial court further stated that corporate officers are
usually busy and as such, summons to corporations are usually received only by assistants or secretaries of
corporate officers.

On 5 March 2010, the respondents, on special appearance through Atty. Jacinto, filed an omnibus motion
wherein they prayed that the 10 February 2010 order be recalled. The respondents insisted that the second
service of summons did not vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over their persons.13

In its Order,14 dated 9 August 2010, the RTC denied the respondents' omnibus motion. Thereafter, Interlink
proceeded with its ex parte presentation of evidence.

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that Interlink was able to prove its claims
against Expressions and Bon Huan. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
latter to pay the former jointly and severally the following:

a. The sum of PhP600,000.00 for the unpaid use of the 1,000 square meters which defendant
has unlawfully occupied for (4) months at the rate of PhP150.00 per square meter with the
interest of 12% per annum from the time of filing of the complaint until full payment;

b. The sum of PhP242,676.00 for the use of the leased premises from June to July 2008 with
12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until full payment;

c. The sum of PhP300,000.00 as actual damages;

d. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.15

Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.16

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated 17 May 2012, the CA annulled the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that
the second service of summons was still defective, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents, thus rendering the RTC decision void. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated 09 August 2010 and
10 February 2010 and the Decision dated 15 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167 of
Pasig City in Civil Case No. 71732 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent court is instructed to issue alias Summonses on the defendants therein and to direct the Branch
Sheriff to serve the same in a valid and effective manner in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court.

SO ORDERED.17

Interlink moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated 6 September
2012.

Hence, this petition.

THE ISSUE
WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS.

OUR RULING

The appeal has no merit.

No valid service of summons

It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons
or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the absence of service or when
the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and void.18

In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons.19

Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses
to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.20 If the defendant is a domestic private juridical entity,
service may be made on its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
or in-house counsel.21 It has been held that this enumeration is exclusive.22 Service on a domestic private
juridical entity must, therefore, be made only on the person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.23 If the service of summons is made upon persons other than those officers enumerated in
Section 11, the same is invalid.24

There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to its managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is further undisputed that
the questioned second service of summons was made upon Ochotorina, who was merely one of the
secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The
service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial court
jurisdiction over Expressions.

Even assuming arguendo that the second service of summons may be treated as a substituted service upon
Bon Huan as the president of Expressions, the same did not have the effect of giving the trial court
jurisdiction over the respondents.

It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with a competent person in charge.25 Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service, and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not
have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons.26

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that before a sheriff may resort to substituted service, he
must first establish the impossibility of prompt personal service. To establish such impossibility, there must
be at least three (3) attempts, preferably on at least two different dates, to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period of one (1) month or eventually result in failure. The sheriff must further cite why
such efforts are unsuccessful.

In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was not shown. The 15 May 2009 sheriffs return
reveals that Sheriff Muriel attempted to serve the second summons personally only once on 11 May 2009.
Clearly, the efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to establish that it was impossible to
personally serve the summons promptly. Further, Sheriff Muriel failed to cite reasons why personal service
proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina told him that Bon Huan was then attending to business
matters, and that he was assured that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and
reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. They are
enjoined to make their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant.28 Sheriff Muriel clearly
failed to met this requirement.

No voluntary submission to the

jurisdiction of the trial court

It must be recalled that the respondents filed an omnibus motion to recall the trial court's order granting
Interlink's motion for declaration of default and for allowance of ex parte presentation of evidence.

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court.29 Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is
considered voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.30 This, however, is tempered by the concept
of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others,
the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.31

As summarized by the Court in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy32 a special
appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance. Such special appearance,
however, requires that the defendant must explicitly and unequivocably pose objections to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person; otherwise, such failure would constitute voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted
to the court for resolution.

At first glance, the respondents may be seen to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Indeed, said omnibus motion, which is essentially a motion to lift order of default, prayed for an affirmative
relief which would not be possible if the movant does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court.

Nevertheless, a reading of the said omnibus motion reveals that the respondents expressly stated that the
said omnibus motion was filed on special appearance. Further, the respondents explicitly objected, in an
equivocal manner, to the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of invalid service of summons. Measured
against the requirements enunciated in Philippine Commercial International Bank, the Court is convinced
that the respondents never recognized and did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the RTC. A party who
makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid
service of summons is not deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.33

From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the respondents either by
valid service of summons or by their voluntary appearance. Necessarily, the proceedings before the RTC in
Civil Case No. 71732 are void with respect to the respondents. Thus, the CA did not err when it nullified the
9 August 2010 and 10 February 2010 Orders, and the 15 September 2010 Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The 17 May 2012 Decision and the 6
September 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116221 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183795 November 12, 2014

PRUDENTIAL BANK (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) as the duly appointed
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JULIANA DIEZ VDA. DE GABRIEL,Petitioner,
vs.
AMADOR A. MAGDAMIT, JR., on his behalf and as substituted heir (son) of AMADOR
MAGDAMIT, SR., and AMELIA F. MAGDAMIT, as substituted heir (Widow) of AMADOR
MAGDAMIT, SR., Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 3 September 2007 and 18 July 2008,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 93368, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),3 dated 18 January 2006, in Civil Case No. 05-112499, which reversed the ruling of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) on the ground that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents due to invalid service of summons.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

This is a case of unlawful detainer filed by petitioner Prudential Bank, now Bank of the Philippine
Islands (petitioner), in its capacity as administrator of the Estate of Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel
(Estate). It is based on the ground of respondents’ failure to pay rentals and refusal to vacate the
subject property, which is allegedly part of the Estate located at 1164 Interior, Julio Nakpil St., Paco,
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118317 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In the Original Complaint4 filed before the MeTC, Branch 15 of Manila, petitioner impleaded Amador
A. Magdamit, Jr. (Magdamit, Jr.), as respondent.

Instead of filing an Answer, Magdamit, Jr. filed a Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss. Among others, Magdamit, Jr. argued that (1) petitioner was not duly authorized through a
Board Resolution to institute the complaint, (2) he was not the occupant of the subject property but
instead, his parents, as grantees or awardees of Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel, and (3) the MeTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the summons was served at his former address at
1164 Interior Julio Nakpil St., Paco, Manila. On 30 April 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out
this pleading on the ground that it is prohibited. Petitioner then filed an Amended Complaint, this
time, impleading both Magdamit, Jr. and Amador Magdamit, Sr. (Magdamit, Sr.).

In an Order5 dated 26 June 2003, the MeTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Strike Out Magdamit, Jr.’s
Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss and ordered Magdamit,Jr. to file an Answer.
The Order reads:

After due consideration of the matter and arguments stated therein, the Court resolves to DENY the
defendant’s Motion to dismiss, it appearing that the summons issued in this case was served, albeit
substituted nevertheless valid. It is of no consequence that defendant is also presently residing in
Bacoor, Cavite. Suffice it to say that summons was served upon him (although substituted) on the
leased premises which plaintiff is justified in assuming that he is also residing there at. Moreover, it
appears that he knew the person on whom summons was served (together with a copy of the
complaint) as a certain Dara Cabug only that he claims that the latter is not of "suitable age and
discretion" to receive the summons. Simply put, the requirement of due process has been satisfied.
Be that as it may, it would not unduly prejudice the rights of the plaintiff if defendant is given
additional period of five (5) days from notice hereof within which to file his Answer.6

In response to the Amended Complaint, both Magdamit, Jr. and Magdamit, Sr. filed their Answers
separately. On 9 July 2003, Magdamit, Jr., filed his Answerwith Counterclaim7 (In a Special
Appearance Capacity). On the other hand, Magdamit, Sr. filed his Answer8 on 13 November 2003.
Magdamit, Sr. argued that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the
summons was not properly served as the summons was received by Madel Magalona, who is not
authorized to receive summons being a mere housemaid of Magdamit, Sr.’s daughter, Arleen Marie
Cabug. Also, Magdamit, Sr. argued that in the 1960s, the Spouses Francisco and Juliana Gabriel
assigned the subject property to him free of charge as a reward and in recompense for the long,
faithful, and devoted services he rendered to them. Since then, he had been continuously exercising
acts of ownership over the subject property, including payment of real estate taxes. Magdamit, Sr.
further argued that amendment of the Complaint in order to implead him is improper. According to
Magdamit, Sr., amendment cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a court that never
acquired it in the first place, and the ejectment case cannot be instituted against Magdamit, Jr.
because an action to recover possession cannot be maintained against one who is not in actual or
legal possession thereof.9

Pending litigation of the case, Magdamit, Jr., who was made an original defendant in the MeTC,
substituted his deceased father, Magdamit, Sr.

Ruling of the MeTC

After trial, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner. According to the MeTC, "[t]he fact that the person
who received the summons was a 13-year old girl does not make the service of summons invalid.
That she was of sufficient age and discretion is shown by the fact that she was intelligent enough to
immediately bring to the attention of defendant Atty. Amador Magdamit, Jr. the summons and copy
of the complaint she received."10 The MeTC went on further, stating that Magdamit Sr.’s claim of
ownership is beyond its jurisdiction because the onlyissue in an ejectment case is "possession de
facto". The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision dated 21 March 2005 reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Amador
Magdamit, Sr.:

1. ordering said defendant and all persons claiming right under him to vacate the subject
three (3) lots covered by TCT No. 118317 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, located at and
also known as 1164 Interior J. Nakpil St., Paco, Manila and to peacefully surrender
possession thereof to plaintiff;

2. ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱180,000.00 representing rentals or
reasonable compensation for the use of the property due from August 2003 up to February
2005 and ₱10,000.00 per month thereafter until defendants fully vacate the subject property;

3. ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

4. to pay the costs. The complaint is dismissed as against defendant Amador Magdamit, Jr.
and the latter’s counterclaim is likewise dismissed.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the RTC

On appeal, the RTC set aside the decision of the MeTC and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents.12 According to the RTC, amending the original
complaint to implead Magdamit, Sr. to cure a defect in the complaint and introduce a non-existing
cause of action, which petitioner did not possess at the outset, and to confer

jurisdiction upon the court that never acquired jurisdiction in the first place renders the complaint
dismissible. The RTC further stated that because the Return did not clearly indicate the impossibility
of service of summons within a reasonable time upon the respondents, the process server’s resort to
substituted service of summons was unjustified. The decision of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds merit on the appeal and consequently, the decision on appeal is
hereby set aside, and this case is accordingly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants.13

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
beforethe CA. The petitioner argued that the RTC erred in ruling thatthe MeTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents due to improper service of summons considering that
the respondents participated in the proceedings in the MeTC by filing a Notice of Appearance with
Motion to Dismiss, Answer with Counterclaim, entering into pre-trial, submitting position papers, and
presenting evidence, which militate against the alleged improper service of summons. On 3
September 2007, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

According to the CA, the Return, with only a general statement and without specifying the details of
the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, will notsuffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. The CA also rejected
petitioner’s contention that respondents’ voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court cured
any defect in the substituted service of summons when as early as during the infancy of the
proceedings in the MeTC, Magdamit, Jr. seasonably raised the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his
person by filing a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, which the respondents incessantly
reiterated in their pleadings even when the case was elevated to the RTC, then to the CA. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the CA reads:

Having found that the MeTC did notacquire jurisdiction over the persons (sic) of respondents, it
would be futile on Our part to still pass upon the other errors assigned by petitioner. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.14

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition, raising the following assignment of errors:

"I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Review of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated January 18,2006; and disposing of only
the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person of respondents for alleged improper service of
summons;

II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling on the material and substantial
issues in the case; and

III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila dismissing of the Complaint against Magdamit, Jr., based on the ground
that he was no longer residing at the subject property prior to, and at the time of the filing of
the ejectment complaint."15

The pivotal issue is whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Both respondents, Magdamit, Jr. and Magdamit, Sr. argued that the MeTC did not acquire
jurisdiction overtheir persons due to defective or improper service of summons. Magdamit,Sr. argued
that the MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over his person due to improper/defective service
of summons because it was served upon an incompetent person, the housemaid of his daughter.
Magdamit Sr. also argued that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over him because he was
impleaded asa respondent only after the inherently invalid original complaint was amended.
According to Magdamit, Sr., the original complaint was inherently invalid because it was instituted
against Magdamit, Jr., against whom an action to recover possession cannot be maintained,
because he is not in actual or legal possession thereof. Thus, the amendment of the inherently
invalid original complaint for the purpose of curing a defect to confer jurisdiction was invalid as the
MeTC never acquired jurisdiction in the first place.16Pertinent to the position of Magdamit, Sr. is the
Sheriff’s Return dated 24 October 2003 on the service of summons on Magdamit, Jr. which reads:

1. That, on October 22, 2003, he proceeded to the place of defendant Amador Magdamit, Sr.
at No. 1164 Int. Julio Nakpil St., Paco, Manila, for the purpose of serving the Summons
issued in the above-entitled case, but no service was effected because he was not around;

2. That, on October 23, 2003, undersigned repaired (sic) anew to the said place but for the
second time, he failed to reached (sic) said defendant. Thus, he elected (sic) substituted
service by serving the said summons together with the copy of the complaint and annexes
attached thereat (sic) to Ms. Madel Magalona, a person of sufficient age and living thereat
who however refused to acknowledge(d) receipt thereof;

3. That, undersigned explained to (this)Ms. Magalona the contents of the said process in a
language she fully understood and adviced (sic) her to gave (sic) the same to her employer
as soon as he arrives.17

On the other hand, Magdamit, Jr. argued that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person
because the summons was not served at his residence but at the house of Magdamit, Sr., and on a
person not authorized to receive summons. The Sheriff’s Return dated 25 March 2003 reads:

This is to certify, that on the 24th day of March, 2003, xxx served copy of the Summons together
with the copy of the Complaint and its attachment, upon defendant/s Amador A. Magdamit, Jr. at
1164 Int., J. Nakpil St., Paco, Manila, by tendering the copy to Dara Cabug (grand daughter), a
person of sufficient age, discretion and residing therein who however refused to acknowledged (sic)
receipt thereof.

That on several occasions despite deligent (sic) efforts exerted to serve the said processes
personally to defendant/s herein the same proved futile. Thus, substituted service was effected in
accordance with the provision of Sec. 8, Rule 14, Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, the original summons is now respectfully returned to the Honorable Court,
DULY SERVED.18

Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through
service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the
absence or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant isdefective, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and void.19

In actionsin personamsuch as ejectment, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal service of summons is preferred
over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of
summons.20 Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the
impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business of the defendant.21

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,22 we have succinctly discussed a valid resort to substituted service
of summons:

We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or
the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period.

However, when the court, clerk of court,or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the
summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses.
The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of
prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time"
means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to
require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s
Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to
be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding
month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with
regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation
of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on
defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on
the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts
by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return
of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989
requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personallyand the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a
person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion
is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have
enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" isdefined as "the
ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of
what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, suchperson
must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully
realize the need to deliver the summonsand complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time
for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive orat least be notified of the receipt of the
summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such
as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge tounderstand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.23(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

The service of summons on Magdamit, Sr. failed to comply with the rule laid down in Manotoc. The
resort to substituted service after just two (2) attempts to personally serve the summons on
Magdamit, Sr., is premature under our pronouncement that:

What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate
impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time"means no more than seven (7)
days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
"reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the
branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff
for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten
(10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be
considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.24
Then too, the proof of service failed to specify the details of the attendant circumstances. The Return
merely expressed a general statement that because the Sheriff failed to reachMagdamit, Sr., he
elected substituted service of summons. The Return failed to state the impossibility to serve
summons within a reasonable time. And the further defect in the service was that the summons was
served on a person not of sufficient discretion, an incompetent person, Madel Magalona, a
housemaid of Magdamit Sr.’s daughter, Arleen Marie Cabug.

Similar to the case of Magdamit, Sr., the service of summons on Magdamit, Jr. also failed to
complywith the rules laid down in Manotoc. The summons was served at 1163 Int., J. Nakpil St.,
Paco, Manila, Magdamit, Jr.’s former residence when at the time, Magdamit, Jr. was residing at
0369 Jupiter St., Progressive Village 20 and 21, Molino I, Bacoor, Cavite. In Keister v. Navarro,25 we
have defined "dwelling house" or "residence" to refer to a place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of
the country at the time to the time of service. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the Sheriff "to leave the
copy at defendant's former dwelling house, residence, or place ofabode, as the case may be, after
his removal therefrom".26

Worse, the Return did not make mention of any attempt to serve the summons at the actual
residence of Magdamit, Jr. The Return merely expressed a general statement that the sheriff
exerted efforts to serve the summons and that the same was futile, "[t]hat on several occasions
despite deligent (sic) efforts exerted to serve the said processes personally to defendant/s herein the
same proved futile," without any statement on the impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time. Further, the summons was served on a certain DaraCabug, a person not of
suitable age and discretion, who is unauthorized to receive the same.

Notably, the requirement additionally is that

Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and
complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible timefor the person to take appropriate action.
Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter
would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it tothe defendant or
at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons.27

The readily acceptable conclusion inthis case is that the process server at once resorted to
substituted service of summons without exerting enough effort to personally serve summons on
respondents. In Sps. Jose v. Sps. Boyon,28 we discussed the effect of failure to specify the details of
the effort exerted by the process serverto personally serve summons upon the defendants:

The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either
the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At
best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the
details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying withthe rules of
substituted service of summons.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the Returns contained mere general statements that efforts at personal service
were made. Not having specified the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted
to serve the summons,30 there was a failure to comply strictly with all the requirements of substituted
service, and as a result the service of summons is rendered ineffective.31

Filing an Answer does not amount to voluntary appearance

The petitioner asserted that assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective,
respondents’ filing of their respective Answers and participation in the proceedings in the MeTC,
such as attending the pre-trial and presenting evidence, amount to voluntary appearance which
vested the MeTC jurisdiction over their persons.

Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. Section 20, Rule14 of the
Rules of Court clearly states:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

However, such is not the case atbar. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents are not
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by virtue of filing an Answer or other
appropriate responsive pleadings and by participating in the case.

The mandate under the Rules on Summary Proceedings that govern ejectment cases, is expeditious
administration of justice such that the filing of an Answer is mandatory. To give effect to the
mandatory character and speedy disposition of cases, the defendant is required to file an answer
within ten (10) days from service of summons, otherwise, the court, motu proprio, or upon motion of
the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, limited
to the relief prayed for by the petitioner.32 Through this rule, the parties are precluded from resorting
to dilatory maneuvers.

Compliantly, respondents filed their respective Answers. In the MeTC, at first, Magdamit, Jr. filed a
Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, where he seasonably raised the issue of lack
of jurisdiction, which the MeTC later ordered to be stricken out. In lieu thereof, Magdamit, Jr. filed an
Answer with Counterclaim (In a Special Appearance Capacity). Again, Magdamit, Jr. reiterated the
lack of jurisdiction over his person and the subject matter. On the other hand, Magdamit, Sr. filed an
Answer with an allegation by special defense that the original complaint

should be dismissed outright because the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and the
subject matter. In sum, both respondents filed their Answers via special appearance.
1âw phi 1

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy,33 we held
that filing of an answer in a special appearance cannot be construed as voluntary appearance or
submission to the court’s jurisdiction:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power
of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary

appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendantmust be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
in instanceswhere a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution.34 (Emphasis supplied and underscoring supplied)

Parallel to our ruling in Philippine Commercial International Bank, the respondents’ act of filing their
respective Answers with express reservation should not be construed as a waiver of the lack of
jurisdiction of the MeTC over their person because of non-service/defective/improper service of
summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, sans voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction, filing an answer in compliance with the rules on summary procedure in lieu of
obtaining an adverse summary judgment does not amount to voluntary submission. As we already
held, a party who makes a special appearance in court, challenging the jurisdiction of said court, is
not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.35 It should not be construed as
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93368, which upheld the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court that the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 174798 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents due to invalid service of summons, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201821, September 19, 2018

PABLO B. MALABANAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The action for the reversion of land initiated by the State is not directed against the judgment of the Land
Registration Court but against the title. Hence, jurisdiction is vested in the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the land involved is located.

The Case

The registered owner appeals the decision promulgated on May 27, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the order issued on December 11, 1998 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
83, in Tanauan, Batangas dismissing the action for reversion of land and cancellation of title instituted by
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), docketed as
Civil Case No. C-192.2

Antecedents

The Republic commenced Civil Case No. C-192 against Angelo B. Malabanan, Pablo B. Malabanan (petitioner
herein), and Greenthumb Realty and Development Corporation (Greenthumb), the registered owners of
various parcels of land covered by certificates of title derived from Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
24268 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.

The Republic alleged that TCT No. T-24268 had emanated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-
17421 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas, which was purportedly issued pursuant to Decree No. 589383
in L.R.A. Record No. 50573; that upon verification, the Land Registration Authority could not find any copy
of the judgment rendered in LRC Record No. 50573; and that the tract of land covered by TCT No. T-24268,
being within the unclassified public forest, remained part of the public domain that pertained to the State
and could not be the subject of disposition or registration.3

In response, the petitioner moved to dismiss Civil Case No. C-192 by arguing that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action because it sought the annulment of the judgment and the decree issued in LRC
Record No. 50573 by the Court of First Instance the jurisdiction over which pertained to the Court of Appeals
(CA).4

The Republic opposed the motion to dismiss, insisting that its complaint did not ask the RTC to annul a
judgment because the judgment supposedly rendered in LRC Record No. 50573 did not exist to begin with.5

On December 11, 1998, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss,6 stating as follows:

The motion is meritorious.

A similar complaint for reversion to the public domain of the same parcel of land was filed with this Court on
July 14, 1997 by plaintiff against defendants-movants. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. T-784 was
dismissed on December 7, 1992 for lack of jurisdiction.

As pointed out by the movants, the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-17421 and all its
derivative titles would involve the nullification of the judgment of the Land Registration Court which decreed
the issuance of the title over the property. Therefore, the applicable provision of law is Section 9 (2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts.

Moreover, this Court is aware, and takes judicial notice, of the fact that the parcels of land, subject of
reversion had been the subject of several cases before this court concerning the ownership and possession
thereof by defendant-movants. These cases were even elevated to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court which, in effect upheld the ownership of properties by defendants Malabanans. Said decisions of this
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court should then be annulled.7

After the Republic filed its notice of appeal.8 The defendants (including the petitioner) moved that the RTC
deny due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that the mode of appeal adopted was improper
because the issue of jurisdiction, being a question of law, was directly cognizable by the Supreme Court on
appeal by petition for review on certiorari.9

On June 29, 1999, the RTC denied due course to the Republic's notice of appeal, and dismissed the appeal.10

The Republic assailed the order of June 29, 1999 in the CA by petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP No.
54721), alleging that the RTC thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction.

The CA promulgated its ruling of February 29, 2000 to the effect that the determination of whether or not an
appeal could be dismissed on the ground that the issue involved was a pure question of law was exclusively
lodged in the CA as the appellate court; and that the RTC should have given due course to the appeal, and
transmitted the original records to the CA.11

On May 27, 2011, the CA, resolving the appeal of the Republic on the merits, set aside the order issued by
the RTC on December 11, 1998,12 and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed December 11, 1998 Order of the RTC is SET
ASIDE and the case is consequently REMANDED to the RTC with the directive that all defendants-appellees
be required to file their respective responsive pleading, and to thereafter proceed with the trial on the merits
as well as the resolution of the case with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.13

The CA explained as follows:

The Republic insists that it "cannot be precluded from availing the remedy of an action for reversion in order
to revert lands of the public domain, such as the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 0-17421 which was
improperly titled in the name of private person to its patrimony." and over which the RTC exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction. It claims that the DENR found that the land covered by TCT No. 24268 is
within the unclassified public forest of Batangas per Land Classification CM No. 10, thereby making the
subject property not capable of private ownership nor of disposition, or registration.

We agree.

It is settled that jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter of the litigation is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complainant.

Here, the Republic alleges that upon an investigation by the DENR, the subject property was found to be
situated within the unclassified public forest of Batangas, thereby rendering it inalienable. More so that
the defendants-appellees' title over the property emanated from an original certificate of title, whose decree
of registration and upon which it was based, is not therefore null and void.

Under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public land Act, viz.:

"Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of the [Republic of the Philippines]."

Stated differently, where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is
found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an original action for
reversion, an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the government pursuant to
the Regalian Doctrine, and over which action, no doubt, the RTC exercise exclusive jurisdiction.

Besides, inasmuch as the allegations in the April 30, 1998 Motion to Dismiss raised matters which require
presentation of evidence and determination of facts, said allegations are consequently best resolved in a
trial on the merits, and not in a motion to dismiss. It thus behooved the RTC to assume jurisdiction over the
Republic's action for reversion, calibrate all the evidence that both parties will present in the trial, and
determine whether Republic's pieces of evidence indeed prove its contention that the subject property is
part of the public domain.14

On May 4, 2012, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.15

Hence, this appeal.

Issues
The petitioner insists that the CA erred: (1) in setting aside the order of the RTC for the dismissal of Civil
Case No. C-192; and (2) in directing the RTC to proceed with the trial on the merits as well as the resolution
of Civil Case No. C-192 with dispatch.

The petitioner argues that the action to annul OCT No. 0-17421 and its derivative certificates of title
necessarily related to the final judgment of the Land Registration Court; and that conformably with the
rulings in Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,16 Collado v. Court of Appeals,17 and Republic v.
Court of Appeals,18 the Republic should lodge its complaint for annulment of judgment in the CA pursuant to
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

The Republic counters that it is not seeking hereby the annulment of the judgment from which Decree No.
589383 was derived inasmuch as such judgment did not exist; and that the action for reversion and
cancellation of title was definitely within the jurisdiction of the RTC.19

Should Civil Case No. C-192 be considered an action to annul the judgment of the Land Registration Court?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

The basic rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in
the complaint,20 the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.21 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in the answer or motion
to dismiss;22 otherwise, jurisdiction becomes dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.23

The complaint in Civil Case No. C-192 alleged that: (a) TCT No. T-24268 had emanated from OCT No. 0-
17421 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas pursuant to Decree No. 589383, issued in L.R.C. Record No.
50573; (b) copy of the decision in L.R.C. Record No. 50573 could not be found in the files of the Land
Registration Authority; (c) the land described in TCT No. T-24268 was within the unclassified public forest of
Batangas; (d) TCT No. T-24268 was subdivided into four lots that were covered by TCT No. T-24386, TCT
No. T-24387, TCT No. T-24388 and TCT No. T-24389; (d) the land covered by TCT No. T-24386 was in turn
subdivided into 92 lots registered in the name of Greenthumb Realty and Development Corporation; (e) the
lands covered by TCT No. T-24387 and TCT No. T-24388 were now subdivided into nine lots each all in the
name of the Malabanans (including herein petitioner); and (f) TCT No. T-24389 remained in the name of the
Malabanans.

The complaint sought as reliefs the cancellation of OCT No. 0-17421, and the reversion to the Republic of
the tract of land therein covered on the grounds that there had been no decision of the Land Registration
Court authorizing its issuance, and that the land covered by TCT No. 24268 was within the unclassified
public forest of Batangas.

We find and declare that the complaint of the Republic was not seeking the annulment of the judgment
issued in L.R.C. Record No. 50573.

The factual setting in Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila24 is similar to that in Civil Case No.
C-192. Therein, the Republic filed a complaint for cancellation of titles and reversion of OCT No. 588
supposedly issued pursuant to Decree No. 57486 because OCT No. 588 did not cover the lots described in
Decree No. 57486. In resolving whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action for cancellation of
titles and reversion, the Court observed and held:

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to
be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is
filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer
to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.

In the present case, the material averments, as well as the character of the relief prayed for by petitioners
in the complaint before the R TC, show that their action is one for cancellation of titles and reversion, not for
annulment of judgment of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Lot Nos. 43 to 50, the parcels of land subject
matter of the action, were not the subject of the CFI's judgment in the relevant prior land registration case.
Hence, petitioners pray that the certificates of title of RCAM be cancelled which will not necessitate the
annulment of said judgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment of judgment finds no
application in the instant case.

The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment of
the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, like the present
case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein" and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion excess of jurisdiction can be attributed to the RTC in
denying RCAM's motion to dismiss.25

The rulings in Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,26 Collado v. Court of Appeals27 andRepublic v.
Court of Appeals28 the petitioner cited and relied upon have no relevance herein. Therein, the Republic had
instituted actions for the annulment of judgment, not actions for the cancellation and reversion of title, like
what happened herein. The Republic recognized therein that the land titles subject of each action had been
issued pursuant to final judgments rendered by the Land Registration Court, and that such judgments must
necessarily be first invalidated before the lands involved could revert to the public domain. In contrast, the
Republic alleges herein that no judgment had ever existed.

In a reversion suit, we should emphasize, the attack is directed not against the judgment ordering the
issuance of title, but against the title that is being sought to be cancelled either because the judgment was
not validly rendered, or the title issued did not faithfully reflect the land referred to in the judgment,29 or
because no judgment was rendered at all.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on May 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70770; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMMUNICATIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal relief is for
the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a
claim over a sum of money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. (First Sarmiento)
assailing the April 3, 2012 Decision2 and July 25, 2012 Order3 of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, Malolos
City, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 04-M-2012.

The facts as established by the parties are as follows:

On June 19, 2002,4 First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) a
P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a real estate mortgage5 over 1,076 parcels of land.6

On March 15, 2003,7 the loan agreement was amended8 with the increase of the loan amount to
P51,200,000.00. On September 15, 2003, the loan agreement was further amended9 when the loan amount
was increased to P100,000,000.00.
On January 2, 2006,10 PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.11 It
claimed in its Petition that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to
pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan. This prompted PBCOM to resort to extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, a recourse granted to it under the loan agreement.12

On December 27, 2011, First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
with the Regional Trial Court. However, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the absence of
the mortgaged properties' tax declarations, which would be used to assess the docket fees.13

On December 29, 2011, Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco (Judge Francisco), First Vice-Executive Judge
Ma. Theresa A. Mendoza Arcega, Second Vice-Executive Judge Ma. Belen R. Liban, and Third Vice-Executive
Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of City of Malolos, Bulacan, granted First Sarmiento's
Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary
Estimation, and ruled that First Sarmiento's action for annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of
pecuniary estimation.14

Also on December 29, 2011, the mortgaged properties were auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest
bidder.15

On January 2, 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its
amendments, with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.16 It
paid a filing fee of P5,545.00.17

First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint that it never received the loan proceeds of P100,000,000.00 from
PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. It prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ex-Officio Sheriff from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage or registering the certificate of sale in PBCOM's
favor with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.18

That same day, Judge Francisco issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order for 72 hours, enjoining the
registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.19

On January 4, 2012, the Regional Trial Court directed the parties to observe the status quo ante.20

On January 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos City, Bulacan issued a certificate of
sale to PBCOM.21

In its Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order),22 PBCOM asserted that the
Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for
annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair
market value of the mortgaged properties.23

PBCOM also pointed out that the Regional Trial Court's directive to maintain the status quo order beyond 72
hours constituted an indefinite extension of the temporary restraining order, a clear contravention of the
rules.24

On April 3, 2012, Branch 11, Regional Trial Court,25 Malolos City, Bulacan dismissed the Complaint for lack
of jurisdiction:

Following the High Court's ruling in the case of Home Guaranty Corporation v. R. II Builders, Inc. and
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 192549, March 9, 2011, cited by the bank in its Rejoinder, which
appears to be the latest jurisprudence on the matter to the effect that an action for annulment or rescission
of contract does not operate to efface the true objective and nature of the action which is to recover real
property, this Court hereby RESOLVES TO DISMISS the instant case for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff having
failed to pay the appropriate filing fees.

Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.26
On July 25, 2012, the Regional Trial Court27 denied First Sarmiento's motion for reconsideration.28

On August 17, 2012, First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to this Court with its Petition for Review29under
Rule 45. It insists that its Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.30 It points out that the Executive Judge and Vice-Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court
likewise acknowledged that its action was incapable of pecuniary estimation.31

Petitioner highlights that the Supreme Court En Banc in Lu v. Lu Ym held "that an action for declaration of
nullity of issuance of shares or an action questioning the legality of a conveyance is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation."32 Furthermore, petitioner maintains that the Supreme Court En Banc in Bunayog v.
Tunas also established that a complaint questioning the validity of a mortgage is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.33

It emphasizes that Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II Builders, which the Regional Trial Court relied on to
dismiss its complaint for lack of jurisdiction, was rendered by a division of the Supreme Court; hence, it
cannot modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court En Banc.34

On September 19, 2012,35 this Court directed respondent PBCOM to comment on the petition.

In its Comment,36 respondent contends that petitioner's action to annul the real estate mortgage and enjoin
the foreclosure proceedings did not hide the true objective of the action, which is to restore petitioner's
ownership of the foreclosed properties.37

Respondent maintains that this Court has already settled that "a complaint for cancellation of sale which
prayed for both permanent and preliminary injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the land in
litigation is a real action."38

It likewise stresses that since petitioner's primary objective in filing its Complaint was to prevent the
scheduled foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties and the conveyance of their ownership to
the highest bidder, the case was a real action.39

Finally, it denies that Home Guaranty Corporation modified and reversed Lu v. Lu Ym because the factual
and legal milieus of these two (2) cases were different.40

On November 26, 2012,41 this Court required petitioner to file a reply to the comment.

On February 1, 2013, petitioner filed its Reply42 where it denies that its Complaint was for the annulment of
the foreclosure sale, because when it filed its Complaint, the foreclosure sale had not yet happened.43

It proclaims that its Complaint sought the removal of the lien on the mortgaged properties and was not
intended to recover ownership or possession since it was still the registered owner with possession of the
mortgaged properties when it filed its Complaint.44

On February 27, 2013,45 this Court noted petitioner's reply and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.

On May 30, 2013, the parties filed their respective memoranda.46

In its Memorandum,47 petitioner continues to insist that it did not receive the loan proceeds from PBCOM
which is why it filed its Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage in response to the latter's Petition
for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.48

Petitioner reiterates that its Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage was an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation because it merely sought to remove the lien on its properties, not the recovery or
reconveyance of the mortgaged properties.49

It states that it never expressly or impliedly sought the conveyance of the mortgaged properties because it
was still the registered owner of the mortgaged properties when its Complaint was first presented for filing
with the Clerk of Court.50

On the other hand, respondent in its Memorandum51 restates its stand that petitioner's Complaint involved a
real action; hence, the estimated value of the mortgaged properties should have been alleged and used as
the basis for the computation of the docket fees.52

Respondent claims that the allegations in petitioner's Complaint reveal the latter's real intention to assert its
title and recover the real properties sold at the public auction.53

The only issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Regional Trial Court obtained jurisdiction over
First Sarmiento Corporation, Inc.'s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court allows for a direct recourse to this Court by appeal from a judgment, final
order, or resolution of the Regional Trial Court. Rule 45, Section 1 provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Rule 41, Section 2(c) likewise provides:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

....

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall
be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Thus, there is no question that a petitioner may file a verified petition for review directly with this Court if
only questions of law are at issue; however, if both questions of law and of facts are present, the correct
remedy is to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.54

Doña Adela Export International v. Trade and Investment Development Corp.55 differentiated between a
question of law and a question of fact as follows:
We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may
be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question
of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a
question of law.56 (Citation omitted)
In the case at bar, the underlying question for this Court's resolution pertains to jurisdiction, or to be more
precise, whether the Regional Trial Court attained jurisdiction over petitioner's Complaint with the amount of
docket fees paid.

Considering that the issue of jurisdiction is a pure question of law,57 petitioner did not err in filing its appeal
directly with this Court pursuant to law and prevailing jurisprudence.

II

Petitioner contends that its Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage has a subject incapable of
pecuniary estimation because it was not intended to recover ownership or possession of the mortgaged
properties sold to respondent during the auction sale.58 It insists that it had ownership and possession of the
mortgaged properties when it filed its Complaint; hence, it never expressly or impliedly sought recovery of
their ownership or possession.59

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case"60 brought before it for
resolution.

Courts exercise the powers conferred on them with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: "(a) the
cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the
remedy."61
Jurisdiction over the thing or the res is a court's authority over the object subject of litigation.62 The court
obtains jurisdiction or actual custody over the object through the seizure of the object under legal process or
the institution of legal proceedings which recognize the power and authority of the court.63

Jurisdiction over the parties is the court's power to render judgment that are binding on the parties. The
courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs when they file their initiatory pleading, while the defendants
come under the court's jurisdiction upon the valid service of summons or their voluntary appearance in
court.64

Jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case is the court's authority to hear and
determine cases within a general class where the proceedings in question belong. This power is conferred by
law and cannot be acquired through stipulation, agreement between the parties,65 or implied waiver due to
the silence of a party.66

Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, with Congress given the plenary power, for cases not
enumerated in Article VIII, Section 567 of the Constitution, to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.68

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, provided for the jurisdictional division between the first and second level courts by considering the
complexity of the cases and the experience needed of the judges assigned to hear the cases.

In criminal cases, first level courts are granted exclusive original jurisdiction to hear complaints on violations
of city or municipal ordinances69 and offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years.70 In contrast, second level courts, with more experienced judges sitting at the helm, are granted
exclusive original jurisdiction to preside over all other criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any other court, tribunal, or body.71

The same holds true for civil actions and probate proceedings, where first level courts have the power to
hear cases where the value of personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
P100,000.00 or P200,000.00 if in Metro Manila.72 First level courts also possess the authority to hear civil
actions involving title to, possession of, or any interest in real property where the value does not exceed
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the real property is situated in Metro Manila.73 Second level courts then assume
jurisdiction when the values involved exceed the threshold amounts reserved for first level courts74 or when
the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.75

First level courts were also conferred with the power to hear the relatively uncomplicated cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer,76 while second level courts are authorized to hear all actions in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction77 with claims above a certain threshold amount. Second level courts are likewise
authorized to hear all cases involving the contract of marriage and marital relations,78 in recognition of the
expertise and probity required in deciding issues which traverse the marital sphere.

Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides Regional Trial Courts with exclusive,
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation."

Lapitan v. Scandia79 instructed that to determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be established. This
finds support in this Court's repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by examining the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.80Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of
Cruz81 stated, thus:
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency,
over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations
therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is
entitled to any or all such reliefs.82
However, Lapitan stressed that where the money claim is only a consequence of the remedy sought, the
action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary estimation:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum
of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of
damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first
organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of
June 11, 1901).83 (Citation omitted)
Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla84 likewise stressed that if the primary cause of action is based on a claim of
ownership or a claim of legal right to control, possess, dispose, or enjoy such property, the action is a real
action involving title to real property.85

A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces this Court that petitioner never prayed for the
reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or
possession over them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it
entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00
loan agreement.86 This is evident in its Complaint, which read:
GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

7. Defendant PBCOM knows fully well that plaintiff did not receive from it the loan it (PBCOM) alleged to
have granted in its favor.

8. Despite this, defendant PBCOM has filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Bulacan, a petition for extra judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage, bent on foreclosing the real estate properties of plaintiff, photocopy of
the petition is hereto attached as Annex "F".

9. The auction sale of the properties is set on December 29, 2011.

10. Defendant PBCOM, well knowing the facts narrated above and willfully disregarding the property rights
of plaintiff, wrongfully filed an extra judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and pursuant to said
petition, the Ex-Officio Sheriff now does offer for sale, the real estate properties of the plaintiff as set forth
in its (PBCOM) said petition.

11. Unless defendants PBCOM and Ex-Officio Sheriff are restrained by this Honorable Court, they will infringe
the property rights of the plaintiff in the manner herein before related.87
Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation88 stated that an action for
cancellation of mortgage has a subject that is incapable of pecuniary estimation:
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the
real estate and chattel mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v. Tumas, this Court ruled that
where the issue involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. In
the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, this Court, citing Bumayog, held that an action questioning the
validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons
for this Court to revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence, petitioner's contention [cannot] be sustained. Since
respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the clerk of court, consequently, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN-4045.89
It is not disputed that even if the Complaint were filed a few days after the mortgaged properties were
foreclosed and sold at auction to respondent as the highest bidder, the certificate of sale was only issued to
respondent after the Complaint was filed.

Section 6 of Act No. 3135,90 as amended, provides that a property sold through an extrajudicial sale may be
redeemed "at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale":
Section 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred
to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any
person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property
is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale;
and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act.
Mahinay v. Dura Tire & Rubber Industries Inc.91 clarified that "[t]he date of the sale' referred to in Section 6
is the date the certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds. This is because the sale of
registered land does not 'take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land' until it is registered."92

The registration of the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff after an extrajudicial sale is a mandatory
requirement; thus, if the certificate of sale is not registered with the Registry of Deeds, the property sold at
auction is not conveyed to the new owner and the period of redemption does not begin to run.93

In the case at bar, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Malolos, Bulacan was restrained from registering the
certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan and the certificate of sale was only issued to
respondent after the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage was filed. Therefore, even if the
properties had already been foreclosed when the Complaint was filed, their ownership and possession
remained with petitioner since the certificate of sale was not registered with the Registry of Deeds. This
supports petitioner's claim that it never asked for the reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the
mortgaged properties when it filed its Complaint since it still enjoyed ownership and possession over them.

Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of court, upon the direction of the
Executive Judge, this Court is convinced that the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the
Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.

Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant case were a real action and the correct docket fees were
not paid by petitioner, the case should not have been dismissed; instead, the payment of additional docket
fees should have been made a lien on the judgment award. The records attest that in filing its complaint,
petitioner readily paid the docket fees assessed by the clerk of court; hence, there was no evidence of bad
faith or intention to defraud the government that would have rightfully merited the dismissal of the
Complaint.94

III

Although not raised in the Petition, this Court nonetheless deems it proper to pass upon the legality of the
Regional Trial Court January 4, 2012 Order, which directed the parties to observe the status quo
ante,95 effectively extending indefinitely its 72-hour ex-parte temporary restraining order issued on January
2, 2012.96

Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a temporary restraining order may be
issued:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty
(20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the
said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and
place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or
the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex-parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period,
the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining
order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have
authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be
effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order
issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.
It is clear that a temporary restraining order may be issued by a trial court in only two (2) instances: first,
when great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant even before the application for writ of
preliminary injunction can be heard; and second, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. The executive judge of a multi-sala court or the presiding judge
of a single-sala court may issue a 72-hour temporary restraining order.

In both instances, the temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte. However, in the first instance,
the temporary restraining order has an effectivity of only 20 days to be counted from service to the party
sought to be enjoined. Likewise, within those 20 days, the court shall order the enjoined party to show why
the injunction should not be granted and shall then determine whether or not the injunction should be
granted.

In the second instance, when there is extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, the court shall issue a temporary restraining order effective for only 72 hours upon
issuance. Within those 72 hours, the court shall conduct a summary hearing to determine if the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for writ of preliminary injunction can be heard.
However, in no case shall the extension exceed 20 days.

If the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the given periods, the temporary
restraining order is automatically vacated and the court has no authority to extend or renew it on the same
ground of its original issuance.

Despite the clear wording of the rules, the Regional Trial Court issued a status quo ante order dated January
4, 2012, indefinitely extending the temporary restraining order on the registration of the certificate of sale
with the Registry of Deeds.

Petitioner applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, yet the Regional Trial Court did not conduct any
hearing for that purpose and merely directed the parties to observe the status quo ante.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc v. Court of Appeals97 explained the difference between preliminary injunction
and a restraining order as follows:
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing a
particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status
quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case
can be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of
the application for preliminary injunction. Under the former A§5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A§5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a
limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application
for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If
no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the
temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued;
hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of
Court.98 (Citations omitted)
A temporary restraining order cannot be extended indefinitely to take the place of a writ of preliminary
injunction, since a temporary restraining order is intended only to have a limited lifespan and is deemed
automatically vacated upon the expiration of 72 hours or 20 days, as the case may be. As such, the
temporary restraining order has long expired and, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, there was
nothing to stop the sheriff from registering the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds.

This Court has repeatedly expounded on the nature of a temporary restraining order99 and a preliminary
injunction.100 Yet lower courts consistently interchange these ancillary remedies and disregard the sunset
clause101 inherent in a temporary restraining order by erroneously extending it indefinitely. Such ignorance
or defiance of basic remedial measures is a gross disservice to the public, who look towards the court for
legal guidance and legal remedy. More importantly, this cavalier attitude towards these injunctive reliefs
might even be construed as a deliberate effort to look the other way to favor a party, which will then sully
the image of the entire judiciary. Henceforth, this Court will demand stricter compliance with the rules from
the members of the bench as regards their issuances of these injunctive reliefs.

IV

Finally, there is a need to reassess the place of Home Guaranty v. R-II Builders102 in our jurisprudence.

In Home Guaranty, R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) filed a Complaint for the rescission of the Deed of
Assignment and Conveyance it entered into with Home Guaranty Corporation and National Housing
Authority. The Complaint was initially determined to have a subject that is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and the docket fees were assessed and paid accordingly.103

R-II Builders later filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, which deleted its
earlier prayer for the resolution of its Deed of Assignment and Conveyance, and prayed for the conveyance
of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint involved a real action and directed R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees.104

Instead of paying the additional docket fees, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint and instead filed a motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint, which revived the prayer in
its original Complaint to resolve the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance and deleted the causes of action
for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool in its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint.105 The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to admit the Second Amended Complaint,
ratiocinating that the docket fees to the original Complaint had been paid; that the Second Amended
Complaint was not intended to delay the proceedings; and that the Second Amended Complaint was
consistent with R-II Builders' previous pleadings.106

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and reiterated that the case involved a
subject that was incapable of pecuniary estimation.107 However, Home Guaranty reversed the Court of
Appeals Decision, ruling that the Complaint and the Amended and Supplemental Complaint both involved
prayers for the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the Asset Pool, causes of action which were
undoubtedly real actions. Thus, the correct docket fees had not yet been paid:108
Although an action for resolution and/or the nullification of a contract, like an action for specific
performance, fall squarely into the category of actions where the subject matter is considered incapable of
pecuniary estimation, we find that the causes of action for resolution and/or nullification of the [Deed of
Assignment and Conveyance] was erroneously isolated by the [Court of Appeals] from the other causes of
action alleged in R-II Builders' original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint which prayed
for the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the Asset Pool. In Gochan v. Gochan, this Court held
that an action for specific performance would still be considered a real action where it seeks the conveyance
or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance of real property.

....

Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its continuing stake is, in the
first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the
same properties sought in the original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both
presuppose a real action for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or
estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid. . . .109 (Citations omitted)
Home Guaranty stated that to determine whether an action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy prayed for must first be determined.110Nonetheless, in
citing Ruby Shelter Builders v. Formaran, Home Guaranty looked beyond R-II Builder's principal action for
annulment or rescission of contract to purportedly unmask its true objective and nature of its action, which
was to recover real property.111

In a dissenting opinion in the Home Guaranty112 June 22, 2011 Resolution that dismissed R-II Builders'
motion for reconsideration, Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. stressed that one must first look at the
principal action of the case to determine if it is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation:
Whether or not the case is a real action, and whether or not the proper docket fees were paid, one must
look to the main cause of action of the case. In all instances, in the original Complaint, the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint and the Amended Complaint, it was all for the resolution or rescission of the [Deed
of Assignment and Conveyance], with the prayer for the provisional remedy of injunction and the
appointment of a trustee and subsequently a receiver. In the Second Amended Complaint, the return of the
remaining assets of the asset pool, if any, to respondent R-II Builders would only be the result of the
resolution or rescission of the [Deed of Assignment and Conveyance].

Even if real property in the Asset Pool may change hands as a result of the case in the trial court, the fact
alone that real property is involved does not make that property the basis of computing the docket fees. De
Leon v. Court of Appeals has already settled the matter. That case, citing Bautista v, Lim, held that a case
for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, in the
Decision We rendered on July 25, 2005 in Serrano v. Delica, We ruled that the action for cancellation of
contracts of sale and the titles is a real action. Similarly, on February 10, 2009, We ruled in Ruby Shelter
Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Formaran III (Ruby Shelter) that an action for nullification
of a Memorandum of Agreement which required the lot owner to issue deeds of sale and cancellation of the.
Deeds of Sale is a real action.113 (Citations omitted)
Whatever confusion there might have been regarding the nature of actions for nullity of contracts or legality
of conveyances, which would also involve recovery of sum of money or real property, was directly addressed
by Lu v. Lu Ym.114Lu underscored that "where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation."115

This finds support in numerous decisions where this Court proclaimed that the test to determine whether an
action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is to ascertain the nature of the principal action or
relief sought. Thus, if the principal relief sought is the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the
action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of
money or real property and the money claim is only a consequence of the principal relief, then the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.116

Considering that the principal remedy sought by R-II Builders was the resolution of the Deed of Assignment
and Conveyance, the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and Home Guaranty erred in treating it
as a real action simply because the principal action was accompanied by a prayer for conveyance of real
property.

It is clear that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be dependent on the supposed ultimate motive or true
objective of the complaint because this will require the judge to speculate on the defenses of the plaintiff
beyond the material allegations contained in the complaint. Likewise, in attempting to pinpoint the true
objective of the complaint at the initial stages of trial, the judge might end up dictating the result outside of
the evidence still to be presented during the trial, opening up the judge to charges of partiality and even
impropriety. Furthermore, the judge is not aware of the evidence to be presented by either party when the
complaint is filed; thus, there is no reliable basis that can be used to infer the true objective of the
complaint. It is imperative then that the competing claims as basis of subject matter jurisdiction be textually
based, finding its basis in the body of the complaint and the relief sought without reference to extraneous
facts not alleged or evidence still to be presented.

Nonetheless, if subject matter jurisdiction is assailed during the course of the trial and evidence is presented
to prove the defense's allegation of lack of jurisdiction, this will lead to an anomaly where the defense's
evidence, instead of the complaint, will effectively determine the remedy and cause of action.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that its complaint prayed for the annulment of the real estate
mortgage it entered into with respondent and not for the recovery or reconveyance of the mortgaged
properties because it was still the registered owner when it filed its complaint. The evidence on record
supports petitioner's claim; hence, there was no reason for the dismissal of its Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.

Home Guaranty likewise erred in dismissing the action because of non-payment of the correct filing
fees. Fedman Development Corporation v. Agcaoili117 reiterated that where the assessed docket fees have
been paid and the assessment turns out to be insufficient, the court still acquires jurisdiction over the case,
subject to payment of the deficiency assessment.118 The only exception is when the deficiency in docket fees
is accompanied with bad faith and an intention to defraud the government.119 It is not disputed that R-II
Builders paid the assessed docket fees when it filed its Complaint, negating bad faith or intent on its part to
defraud the government.

In light of the foregoing, this Court reaffirms that the nature of an action is determined by the principal relief
sought in the complaint, irrespective of the other causes of actions that may also crop up as a consequence
of the principal relief prayed for. The contrary rule espoused in Home Guaranty is thereby set aside.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The assailed April 3, 2012 Decision and July 25,
2012 Order of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, City of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 04-M-2012
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The case is ordered REMANDED to Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, City of Malolos, Bulacan for continued
trial on First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc.'s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its
amendments.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of rights and
determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's name.

The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who bears it.
Rather, it is chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a product of the exercise
of autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.

In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these labels be
registered. Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects of one's identity that
pertain to one's name are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live Birth filed with the civil
registrar.

Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first, as an
exercise of one's autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. The other
is not an exercise to change the label that was given to a person; it is simply to correct the data as it was
recorded in the Civil Registry.

This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal3 from the Regional Trial Court
December 7, 2010 Order4 granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for Correction
of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.

Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always been female. Her parents, married
on May 23, 1981, have never changed their names. For her, in her petition before the Regional Trial Court,
her Certificate of Live Birth contained errors, which should be corrected. For her, she was not changing the
name that was given to her; she was merely correcting its entry.

To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan
City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 21555 for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of
her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 1086 of the Rules of Court.7

In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle name,
"Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her
Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.8

As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of
records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate.9
The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a hearing on
August 2, 2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela.10

The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on its
behalf.11 Trial then ensued.

During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's certification, and
transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who examined her also certified
that she was female.12 On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she never undertook any gender-
reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain
a passport.13

The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 2010 Order, granted the petition.14 It lent credence to the
documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous."15It
concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court,16 citing Republic v. Cagandahan.17 Thus:

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil Registrar General,
NSO through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the Birth Certificate of
the petitioner as well as in the National Statistics Office Authenticated copy particularly her first name
"MICHAEL" to "MICHELLE", gender from "MALE" to "FEMALE", middle name of petitioner to be entered as
"SORIANO", middle names of petitioner's parents to be properly supplied as "ANGANGAN" for the mother
and "BALINGAO" for the father, as well as date of marriage of petitioner's parents to be recorded as "MAY
23, 1981", after payment of legal fees if there be any.

SO ORDERED.18

The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court for Petitions for Change of Name.19 It argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did not state her
official name, "Michael Gallo."20 Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the
cause of the change of name.21

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor General's
appeal.22 It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were
clerical, harmless, and innocuous.23 It further clarified that Rule 108 is limited to the implementation of
Article 412 of the Civil Code24 and that the proceedings which stem from it can "either be summary, if the
correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it] affects . . . civil status, citizenship or nationality . . .
which are deemed substantial corrections."25

The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for changing the
given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register."26

Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name, to wit: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.27

The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter, classifies a
change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may be corrected without a
judicial order."28 It applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, her parents' middle names,
and the latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve substantial corrections.29
As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a summary
proceeding would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's more rigid and stringent
adversarial proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural requirements under Rule 108.30

However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it, Gallo wants to
change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals in finding for Gallo.31

Citing Republic v. Mercadera,32 petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule 108.33 Thus, the
correction must only be for a patently misspelled name.34 As "Michael" could not have been the result of
misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it contemplates a
substantial change.35

Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule.36 It also argues that the use
of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103.37

Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction38 as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first name, superseding
the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.39

To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic, 40 which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 . . . and 108 . . . of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied."41

Respondent Gallo, in her Comment,42 counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned corrections
are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.43 In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the applicable rule is Rule 108
and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly satisfied.44 Lastly, she
contends that petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court
and only raised these issues before this Court.45

Petitioner filed its Reply.46 The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their respective
Memoranda.47

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the change
sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;

Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and

Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

This Court finds for the respondent. Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil Registry.

In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction of error,
petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should only raise questions of
law.
Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not include
weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.

In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.48:

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It
is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the
lower courts.

Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question of fact:

Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the
issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether
the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same;
rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as
to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question
of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is
factual.49(Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining
whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking into the
party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.

On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is helpful in
identifying the nature of the determination sought.

Republic Act No. 1017250 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus:

Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or
the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.51

Likewise, Republic Act No. 904852 states:

Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner.53

By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and
evaluation of existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever
used.

This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of Appeals, that
this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this Court is bound by the
lower courts' findings.

II.A

In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of
Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all
other corrections sought.

Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons,"54 which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there.55

Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage,
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments of
natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of name.56

As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which amended
Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or corrections of name
were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.

Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name.57 On the
other hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the civil register
may be changed or corrected.58

Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial changes in
the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by law, or Rule 108
for corrections of clerical errors.

This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who may
be affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these proceedings bind the whole
world.59

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to
Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court
to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with
regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter
the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known."
When granted, a person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for
the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial
permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a
court decree.

The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the
court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the
decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to
indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."

Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. However, "there
could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the
surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but
because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests
for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request,
but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced . . . . mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant . . ."60 (Citations omitted)

Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must file a
petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing date
and directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation.61 After finding that there is proper
and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional Trial Court may grant the petition and order
its entry in the civil register.62

On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous mistakes
in his or her documents with the civil register.63 It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the
entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule64 and those affecting the civil status,
citizenship, and nationality of a person.65 The proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the
correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors.66

As explained in Republic v. Mercadera:67

Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even
substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the
parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is
merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court
may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings
depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a
party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature
of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted ...." "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but
only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution."68 (Emphasis in the original)

Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial
Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.69 After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a
copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.70

Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108, thus:

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412
and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In
order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change
and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of
name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors
in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the
authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be
corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under
Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."71 (Citations omitted)

However, Republic Act No. 904872 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing
clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the
jurisdiction of the civil register.73

In Silverio v. Republic:74

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .

....

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial. 75 (Citations omitted)

In Republic v. Cagandahan:76

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.77 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

In Republic v. Sali:78

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name
in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.79 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or
typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames.80

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.81

Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name through
administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and
later denied.

In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172.82

In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may now be
changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes may now be
administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in the
entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office of the
city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.83

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.— No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of
a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry,
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.84 (Emphasis supplied)

However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on August 15,
2012—more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13,
2010.85Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.

II.B

As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the nature of the
correction sought by Gallo.

Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent contends that
it is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical errors.

Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of
clerical errors.

A clerical or typographical error pertains to a

[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry
in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the , and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records[.] 86

However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical or
typographical.87

Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error in names
with the civil register.

In Republic v. Mercadera,88 Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from "Marilyn" to
"Merlyn."89 She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she prayed that the trial court
correct her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she grew up to."90 The Office of the
Solicitor General argued that this change was substantial which must comply with the procedure under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.91 However, this Court ruled that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition
merely sought to correct a misspelled given name:
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what
appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled.
The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that blemished
Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.

The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction
of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.92

Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless errors that
need not go through the proceedings under Rule 103:

Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize the same a
harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves the
substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, it was held that the change of petitioner's name from "Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary
proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the
correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as
given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General,
ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon' to
'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced
with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).93 (Citations omitted)

Likewise, in Republic v. Sali,94 Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of Live Birth,
alleging that her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of "Lorena," and her date of birth
as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that she had been using the name "Lorena" and
the birth date "April 24, 1968" ever since. She also averred that she had always been known as "Lorena" in
her community. She claimed that the petition was just to correct the error and not to evade any criminal or
civil liability, or to affect any succession of another person.95

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's claim,
alleging that the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the correction of a simple
clerical error. It averred that there must be a valid ground for the name change, and the applicant's names
and aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing. It also contended
that assuming Rule 108 was the proper remedy, Sali failed to exhaust her remedies when she did not file an
affidavit under Republic Act No. 9048.96

In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of name, but a
petition for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali had been using the name
"Lorena" since birth, and she merely sought to have her records conform to the name she had been using as
her true name. She had no intention of changing her name altogether. Thus, her prayer for the correction of
her misspelled name is not contemplated by Rule 103.97

In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change sought by
Gallo is substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly entirely different from
each other. It argues that "Michael" could not have been the result of a misspelling of "Michelle."98

On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with the
requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied.99

Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she
is commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the
petition to change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name.

Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.100
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her
given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of
these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in
"Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly,
considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo does not
seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as
"Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given
name.

However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.

As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010.101 The current law, Republic Act
No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012.102

The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. 103

To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of clerical or
typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in
case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or nickname.
Thus:

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.104

Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional Trial
Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the Regional Trial Court
take cognizance of her case. In Republic v. Sali,105

Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for correction of
entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were committed in the
recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's name are
confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. The
evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is
apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the
clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.

Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . .

....

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name
in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court . . .

....

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's
primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the
petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC
should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali’s first name.106
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as
Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May 23,
1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.

Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner.107

These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it involves any
change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.

Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding"108 fall within the coverage of clerical
mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the
name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be made.

Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before filing a
petition under Rule 108.

However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a
substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048.109

This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan:110

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.111 (Citation omitted)

It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to
biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical
error.112

However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a
substantive matter.

In Cagandahan,113 this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in his or her
Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule 108.114In that
case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error in recording but a petition for
a change of records because the sex change was initiated by the petitioner.115

IV

Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before proceeding to the
courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048.116

On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these doctrines because
it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these Issues before this
Court.117

This Court rules in favor of Gallo.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative
processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be
given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust
administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition
which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.118

However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's
jurisdiction.119 Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:120

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non compliance
with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to
dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take
cognizance of the case and try it. 121(Citation omitted)

Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has
jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper
jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.122

In Republic v. Lacap: 123

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that
is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.124 (Citation omitted)

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take
cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot
be waived.

However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to
raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune
time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.125

In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:126

True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law,
and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches
from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case
with its active participation ...

....

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction ...
In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated— obviously for
reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court ... And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, ... the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.127 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised only as an
afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from doing so.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a)where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warrantoproceedings . .
.128 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only raised in
this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is estopped from
invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle
Soriano Gallo be corrected as follows:

1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";

2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";
5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and
6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."

SO ORDERED.

MARILOU PUNONGBAYAN-VISITACION, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

CARMELITA P. PUNONGBAYAN, Respondents.
 DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 30 January 2009 Decision1 and 18
October 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77040 which affirmed the 12 May
2003 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Iligan City (RTC).

THE FACTS

Petitioner Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion (Visitacion) was the corporate secretary and assistant treasurer of
St. Peter's College of Iligan City. On 26 July 1999, acting on the advice of her counsel, she wrote a letter to
private respondent Carmelita P. Punongbayan (Punongbayan). The correspondence substantially read:

Upon advise of our legal counsel which I had been instructed to hereunder quote this should answer the
concerns you embodied in the July 19 memo to Security Bank as well as the July 23, memo to the office of
the treasurer to wit:

A. You had been preening (sic) as the school's validly appointed/designated president when
such is not the fact. The validity of the alleged March 10 meeting of the management is still
the subject of an on-going determination by the SEC and your misrepresentation as the
school's President has no basis in law and in fact.

B. Even as Officer-in-Charge, your actions on school matters need prior consultation and
ratification of the management committees. No such consultation/ratification was had on
these matters.

C. You KNOWINGLY COMMITTED ACTS OF FALSIFICATION when you misrepresented to the

bank that your signature is essentially required in disbursements above P5,000.00. Your
inordinate desire to poke into the school's finances could be the by-product of an erroneous
advice from some defrocked members of the committee. Otherwise, there would have been
need to calibrate amounts in the checks vis-a-vis the signatories thereto.4

Insulted, Punongbayan filed a Complaint for Libel against Visitacion. On 25 October 1999, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution approving the filing of a case for libel against Visitacion.5

The RTC Ruling

In its 12 May 2003 judgment, the RTC convicted Visitacion of libel. The trial court disregarded Visitacion's
defense of good faith finding that her act of writing the disputed letter was motivated by hostility or malice.
It opined that if it was true that Visitacion merely wanted to safeguard the corporation funds, her resort to
an uncivil and confrontational manner was unwarranted. The RTC highlighted that the letter belittled,
disparaged, and willfully hurt Punongbayan's sensibilities. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court perceives that the evidence on record is not only adequate to
prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, but overwhelming that she has committed the crime of
libel, hence judgment of conviction is hereby rendered, the terms of which provide:

a. Since there is no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance accused is condemned to suffer a

straight prison term of one (1) year; and

b. Considering that the malicious imputation of a crime referred to in the libelous letter had
caused private complainant to be subjected to public contempt and ridicule, and this had
caused the latter to underwent (sic) sleepless nights and moral sufferings, additionally, and
in accordance with Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, accused is adjudged to pay by
way of civil liability, moral damages to the tune of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), and
the costs of the suit.6
Aggrieved, Visitacion filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary injunction before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its 30 January 2009, the CA dismissed Visitacion's petition. The appellate court posited that the
promulgation of the judgment despite Visitacion's absence was proper. It explained that under Rule 120,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court, trial in absentia is permitted should the accused fail to appear during the
date of promulgation despite due notice. The CA noted that Visitacion was notified of the scheduled
promulgation through her previous counsel and was in fact able to file a motion to defer promulgation of
judgment. Further, the appellate court pointed out that the sheriff visited Visitacion at her house on several
occasions but she was conveniently not around during those times. Thus, it believed that her excuse for her
absence was specious.

In addition, the CA expounded that Visitacion should have filed an appeal and not a petition for certiorari.
The appellate court opined that it should have been through an appeal where she could have raised the
issues in the present petition for certiorari. It noted that at the time Visitacion filed her petition, the period
to file an appeal had yet to expire. Thus, the CA elucidated that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is
cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal. It ruled:

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.7

Visitacion moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its 18 October 2010 resolution.

Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW WHEN IT, IN EFFECT, BRUSHED
ASIDE PETITIONER'S ALTERNATIVE PLEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF PREFERENCE OF FINE OVER
IMPRISONMENT AS PENALTY FOR LIBEL;

II

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW WHEN IT, IN EFFECT, AFFIRMED
THE COURT A QUO'S IMPOSITION OF MORAL DAMAGES UPON PETITIONER IN THE EXCESSIVE
AMOUNT OF THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00); AND

III

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW IN NOT TREATING PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AS APPEAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH PETITION
WAS FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TIME TO FILE AN APPEAL AND DESPITE
EXISTENCE OF VALID REASONS TO TREAT IT AS AN APPEAL.8

OUR RULING

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we resolve certain procedural matters.

Petition for certiorari

treated as an appeal
Visitacion assails that her petition for certiorari should have been treated as an appeal. On the other hand,
both public and private respondents counter that the CA correctly dismissed Visitacion's petition for
certiorari because it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal and that a wrong mode of appeal is dismissible.

In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,9 the Court had extensively differentiated an
appeal from certiorari. Thus, it is settled that appeal and certiorari are two different remedies, which are
generally not interchangeable, available to litigants. In Butuan Development Corporation v. CA,10 the Court
held that the special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal:

A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of
the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse
of discretion.

Nevertheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not interchangeable admits exceptions.
In Department of Education v. Cuanan,11 the Court exercised liberality and considered the petition for
certiorari filed therein as an appeal:

The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c)
when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the
present case.

Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.
These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for certiorari in the CA.

At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition for review, the
petition having been filed on November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9, 2004
of CSC Resolution No. 041147, clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a
petition for review. Such move would be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules
of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.12 (emphases and underslining supplied)

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the interest of substantial justice warrants the relaxation of the rules
and treats Visitacion's petition for certiorari as an appeal. This is especially true considering that the same
was filed within the reglementary period to file an appeal. It is noteworthy that in the litany of cases13 where
the Court did not consider certiorari as an appeal, the former remedy was filed beyond the 15-day period to
interpose an appeal.

Issues raised for the first

time on appeal; exceptions

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that Visitacion merely raised the issue of the correctness of
the penalties and liabilities imposed in her supplemental motion for reconsideration before the CA. It bewails
that in her petition for certiorari, she merely questioned the propriety of the denial of her motion to inhibit
before the RTC; the exclusion of some of her exhibits; and the alleged lack of personal service of the notice
of the promulgation of judgment. Thus, the OSG laments that the issues put forth in Visitacion's petition for
review before the Court were raised for the first time on appeal.
It is axiomatic that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained because to do so would
be anathema to the rudiments of fairness and due process.14 Nonetheless, there are also exceptions to the
said rule. In Del Rosario v. Bonga,15 the Court explained that there are instances that issues raised for the
first time on appeal may be entertained, viz:

Indeed, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be raised for the first time on
appeal. Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered
by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court may also consider an issue not
properly raised during trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there
are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public
policy.

Further, the matters raised in the present petition warrant the relaxation of the rules concerning issues
raised for the first time on appeal especially considering the jurisprudential developments since the RTC
decision and the needs for substantial justice. In liberally applying the rules in the case at bar, the Court
does not wish to brush aside its importance; rather, it emphasizes the nature of the said rules as tools to
facilitate the attainment of substantial justice.16

Having settled procedural matters, the Court finds the petition meritorious.

Penalty imposed for libel

In her present petition for review on certiorari,17 Visitacion no longer questions her conviction for the crime
of libel. Rather, she assails the decisions of the courts a quo in sentencing her to one (1) year imprisonment
and to pay Punongbayan P3,000,000.00 as moral damages.

Relevant is Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 08-0818 which provides for guidelines in the imposition of
penalties in libel cases. The pertinent portion thereof reads:

The foregoing cases indicate an emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than
imprisonment in libel cases under the circumstances therein specified.

All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference set by the
Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the
following principles:

1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the
crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of
a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.

A review of A.C. No. 08-08 reveals that it was issued to embody the Court's preference, as espoused in
previous jurisprudence, to impose only a fine for conviction of libel. The said circular, however, does not
remove the discretion of courts to sentence to imprisonment the accused in libel cases should the
circumstances warrant. In other words, judicial policy states a fine alone is generally acceptable as a penalty
for libel. Nevertheless, the courts may impose imprisonment as a penalty if, under the circumstances, a fine
is insufficient to meet the demands of substantial justice or would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

Thus, pursuant to the policy in A.C. No. 08-08, the Court finds that the imposition of a fine, instead of
imprisonment, is sufficient in the present case. It is noteworthy that Visitacion is a first-time offender with
no other criminal record under her name. Further, the degree of publication is not that widespread
considering that the libelous letter was circulated only to a few individuals.

Moral damages in libel cases

Visitacion likewise assails the award of moral damages. She does not question the basis for the award of
moral damages per se but bewails the unjust amount set by the trial court.

Moral damages is the amount awarded to a person to have suffered physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury.19 It is given to ease the victim's grief and suffering, and should reasonably approximate the extent of
the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.20

The RTC found Punongbayan entitled to moral damages because Visitacion's libelous act caused her to suffer
ridicule, sleepless nights, and moral damage. In Tulfo v. People,21 the Court explained that moral damages
can be recovered in cases of libel or slander, viz:

It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty. So deserves the award of moral
damages. Justification for the award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219 (7) of the Civil Code,
which states that moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form
of defamation. As the cases involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within the ambit of Art.
2219 (7).

Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. The fact that no
actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect the offended
party's right to recover moral damages.22 (emphasis supplied)

For moral damages to be awarded, proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary but the factual basis of damages
and its causal connection to the defendant's acts must be satisfactorily established.23 In short, the
complainant's injury should have been due to the actions of the offending party.

Here, the evidence on record justify the award of moral damages to Punongbayan. She was a high-ranking
officer of an educational institution whom Visitacion accused of criminal or improper conduct. Such
accusations were not made known only to the victim but also to other persons such as her staff and
employees of a bank the school had transactions with. Thus, Punongbayan's reputation was besmirched and
she was humiliated before her subordinates and other people. Clearly, her reputation was tarnished after
being accused of unsavory and questionable behavior, primarily attributable to Visitacion's act of circulating
the letter imputing wrongdoing of Punongbayan.

In addition, it is noteworthy that in her present petition for review on certiorari before the Court, Visitacion
simply challenges the unreasonable amount of moral damages awarded and prays for its reduction. By
inference, she admits she had caused Punongbayan injury, thus, the issue remains to be the amount of
moral damages warranted under the circumstances.

In Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation,24 the Court explained that in awarding moral
damages, the surrounding circumstances are controlling factors but should always be commensurate to the
perceived injury:

While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral
damages, the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.Moral damages are not intended
to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.

Even petitioner, in his Comment dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral damages "are not awarded in order
to punish the respondents or to make the petitioner any richer than he already is, but to enable the latter to
find some cure for the moral anguish and distress he has undergone by reason of the defamatory and
damaging articles which the respondents wrote and published." Further, petitioner cites as sufficient basis
for the award of damages the plain reason that he had to "go through the ordeal of defending himself
everytime someone approached him to ask whether or not the statements in the defamatory article are
true."

In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People's Journal) v. Thoenen, citing Guevarra v. Almario, We noted that
the damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound
discretion of the court, although appellate courts were "more likely to reduce damages for libel
than to increase them." So it must be in this case.

Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant's grief and suffering.
Moral damages should be reasonably approximate to the extent of the hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done. The Court, therefore, finds the award of moral damages in the first and
second cause of action in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and P25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too
excessive and holds that an award of P1,000,000.00 and P10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages
are more reasonable.25 (emphases supplied)

With this in mind, the Court finds the award of P3,000,000.00 as moral damages to be unwarranted. Such
exorbitant amount is contrary to the essence of moral damages, which is simply a reasonable recompense to
the injury suffered by the one claiming it. It was neither meant to punish the offender nor enrich the
offended party. Thus, to conform with the present circumstances, the moral damages awarded should be
equitably reduced to P500,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 12 May 2003 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 7939 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Marilou
Punongbayan-Visitacion is sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay private respondent Carmelita P. Punongbayan
P500,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017

GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL, Petitioner, v. ANIANA LAWAS SON, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

In law, nothing is as elementary as the concept of jurisdiction, for the same is the foundation upon which
the courts exercise their power of adjudication, and without which, no rights or obligation could emanate
from any decision or resolution.

The Case

Challenged before this Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226 promulgated on March 12, 2015, which
affirmed in toto the Decision2 dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 of
Mandaue City. Likewise challenged is the subsequent Resolution3 promulgated on October 19, 2015 which
upheld the earlier decision.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Magay,
Municipality of Compostela, Province of Cebu. The latter derived his title over the property from a successful
grant of a Free Patent (Free Patent No. VII-519533), which is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. OP-37324, more particularly described as follows:

A PARCEL OF LAND (lot 1280, Case 3, Pls .962) situated in the Barrio of Magay, Municipality of Compostela,
Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by Lot 707 (As 07-01-000033-
amended); along line 2-3 by Lot 1275; on the SW., along line 3-4 by Lot 1281; on the NW., along line 4-5
by Lot 1315; along line 5-6 by Lot 1314; on the NE., along line 6-7 by Lot 1392, along line 7-1 by Lot 1279,
all of Compostela, Cadastre x x x.4

On March 15, 1999, Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance and damages
against Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that, for twelve and a half years, she has been the
lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from a certain Eleno
T. Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a sum of P200,000.00. According to her, since her acquisition, she has
been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was
issued under her name.5

According to the respondent, the issuance of the Free Patent in favor of the petitioner's father was "due to
gross error or any other cause."6 In support thereof, the respondent alleged that "there is no tax declaration
in the name of patentee Eddie Foronda" and that this "goes to show that Eddie Foronda is not the owner of
lot 1280 and neither has payment of real estate taxes been made by him when he was still alive or by his
heirs."7

On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2)
venue is improperly laid, (3) action has prescribed, and, (4) lack of cause of action. A week thereafter, the
RTC issued an Order dated April 20, 1999,8 which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
asserted that the "market value of the subject property per Tax Declaration No. 16408 (Annex B, Complaint)
is P2,830.00" and thus, jurisdiction over the case lies with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-
Compostela, Cebu.

However, in yet another Order9 dated July 23, 1999, issued by the RTC following herein respondent's motion
for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered and set aside its earlier ruling based on the following ratiocination:
(1) Paragraph III of the Complaint stated that the property was worth P200,000.00; (2) the Court has
"judicial knowledge that under the BIR zonal valuation, the property located at Magay, Compostela, Cebu
carries the value that may summed (sic) up to more than P20,000.00 for the property with an area of 1,570
square meters";10 and (3) the "tax declaration, sometimes being undervalued, is not controlling."11 Hence,
trial ensued.

On November 24, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent. The Register of Deeds of
Cebu was ordered to cancel OCT No. OP-37324, and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new one under the name of
the respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:

1) Declaring the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. OP-37324 (Free Patent No. VII-519533) in the
name of Eddie Foronda a grave error since he is not the owner of Lot 1280, and therefore null and void;

2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. OP-37324 (Free Patent
No. VII-519533) and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new one in the name of Aniana Lawas Son of Compostela,
Cebu. No pronouncement as to damages and costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved, petitioner herein elevated the case to the CA. The material allegations that she presented
included the following: (1) the RTC rendered its decision with undue haste considering that the same was
promulgated even before the expiration of the period within which the parties' respective memoranda were
to be filed; (2) the respondent was not able to prove that the lot she acquired from Arias was Lot No. 1280;
(3) the respondent failed to prove that she was in actual physical possession of the subject property
whereas the petitioner was able to do so since 1972; (4) the RTC erred in its order to cancel OCT No. OP-
37324 and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new title in herein respondent's name; and (5) the action filed by the
respondent was already barred by prescription and laches.

On March 12, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, which affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, Mandaue City dated November 24, 2006 in Civil Case No. MAN-3498, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.13

On October 19, 2015, the Resolution14 issued by the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issues

The petitioner anchors her plea for the reversal of the assailed decision on the following grounds:15

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC OF MANDAUE CITY OVER THIS CASE AS THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS P1,030.00 AND THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN
COMPOSTELA, CEBU.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE PROCEEDINGS AS WELL AS THE
JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE RTC AS VOID

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 434 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE CASE
AT BAR

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT LOT NO. 1280 WAS A PUBLIC GRANT TO
WHICH EDDIE FORONDA WAS ISSUED A FREE PATENT

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION (SIC) VII. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE VALIDITY
AND INTEGRITY OF THE DECISION OF THE RTC IS QUESTIONABLE BECAUSE IT WAS RENDERED
WITH UNDUE HASTE.

The foregoing assignment of errors could be summarized in three main issues: (1) whether or not the RTC
validly acquired jurisdiction over the case, and whether or not the RTC decision was void ab initio; (2)
whether or not the Original Certificate of Title issued under the name of petitioner's father should be
canceled and set aside on the strength of the respondent's allegations of ownership over the same; and (3)
whether or not the action is already barred by prescription.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

On the Issue of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.16 In order for
the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire,
among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter.17 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter
is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of
the court that it exists.18
What is relevant in this case, therefore, is the delineation provided for by law which separates the
jurisdictions of the second level courts—the Regional Trial Courts—and the first level courts—the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC), and
Municipal Trial Courts in the Cities (MTCC).

This can be easily ascertained through a reading of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691.19

According to this law, in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property
exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00.20 For those
below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC, MCTC, or MTCC.21

For a full discourse on the resolution of the present petition, emphasis must be given on the assessed
values22—not the fair market values—of the real properties concerned.

According to the case of Heirs of Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,23 the law is emphatic that in determining
which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be
computed. Heirs of Concha, Sr. averred this definitive ruling by tracing the history of the The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. It said:

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296, as
amended, gave the RTCs x x x exclusive original jurisdiction. x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no
substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2).

The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in
1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts. x x x. Thus, under the
present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real
property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second
level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This
amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the
speedier administration of justice."24 (Emphasis, underscoring and formatting supplied, citations omitted)

Time and again, this Court has continuously upheld Heirs of Concha, Sr.'s ruling on this provision of law.25 In
fact, in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al.26 the Court said that "the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word 'shall' and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00."27

To determine the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with appropriate jurisdiction, an
examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary. It is a hornbook doctrine that the court should
only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction.28 According to the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et al.,29 only these facts can be the
basis of the court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set
forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby
initiated.30

It is not a surprise, therefore, that a failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in the complaint
would result to a dismissal of the case. This is because absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of the land.31 This is the same ratio put forth by the Court in the case of Spouses
Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et al.,32 where the case was dismissed partly on the basis of the following:

The complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed value of the property. There is no
showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of petitioners. Indeed,
absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined
whether it is the RTC or the MTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners'
action.33 (Citations omitted)

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court had no qualms in dismissing the case for failing to allege the
assessed value of the subject property. Similar to Spouses Cruz,35Quinagoran36 held that: "Considering that
the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC
seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void,
and the CA erred in affirming the RTC."

This is not to say, however, that there is no room for a liberal interpretation of this rule. In Tumpag v.
Tumpag,37 the Court, through Justice Brion, provided for an instance when an exception to the strict
application could be allowed. It said:

Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is
within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid application of this rule may result in
defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party's substantial right.38

In that case, there was also no allegation of the assessed value of the property. However, the Court pointed
out that the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property, which was attached to the complaint, could
have facially resolved the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered the lengthy litigation on that
very point unnecessary.39 In essence, the Court said that the failure to allege the real property's assessed
value in the complaint would not be fatal if, in the documents annexed to the complaint, an allegation of the
assessed value could be found.

A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would invariably guide both the bench and the
bar in similar situations. Based on the foregoing, the rule on determining the assessed value of a real
property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is concerned,
would be two-tiered:

First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property as alleged
in the complaint; and

Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the
complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the
complaint.

Indeed, it is by adopting this two-tiered rule that the Court could dispense with a catena of cases specifically
dealing with issues concerning jurisdiction over real properties.

In upholding these afore-quoted rule, however, the Court is not unmindful of the cases of Barangay Piapi v.
Talip40 and Trayvilla v. Sejas41 where the market value of the property, instead of the assessed value
thereof, was used by the Court as basis for determining jurisdiction.

In Barangay Piapi,42 the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the subject property. What it alleged
was the market value thereof. The Court held that, in the absence of an allegation of assessed value in the
complaint, the Court shall consider the alleged market value to determine jurisdiction.

Notably, this case referred to Section 7(b), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which deals with Legal Fees, to
justify its reliance on the market value. It said:

The Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant." It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is
the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a
parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have
alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value, which
is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.43 (Italics in the
original, and emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the rule alluded to above, while originally containing the sentence: "In a real action, the assessed
value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and
shall be the basis in computing the fees," has already been deleted through an amendment by A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC. As it currently stands, Section 7 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 7 Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—

a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim

against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a
complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES,
DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in
cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR
THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is: x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Two things must be said of this: first, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed
filing and docket fees, the payment of which bestows upon the courts the jurisdiction to entertain the
pleadings to be filed;44 and second, the latest iteration of the same provision already deleted the phrase
"estimated value thereof," such that the determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees
are now based on the following: (a) the fair market value of the real property in litigation stated in the
current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or (b) the stated value
of the real or personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.

A reading of the discourse on this would indicate that the jurisdiction referred to above does not deal with
the delineation of the jurisdictions of the first and second level courts, but with the acquisition of jurisdiction
by the courts through the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.

This is the same tenor of the Court's decision in Trayvilla. In that case, where no assessed value was
likewise alleged in the complaint, the Court determined jurisdiction by considering the actual amount by
which the property was purchased and as written in the Amended Complaint. The Court stated that:

However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the declaration made in
the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000,00. The handwritten document sued upon
and the pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by petitioners for the price of
P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case against respondents, this amount should be the
stated value of the property in the absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the
BIR.45(Emphasis supplied)

But then again, like the discussion on Barangay Piapi above, Trayvilla was one which dealt with the payment
of the required filing and docket fees. The crux of the case was the acquisition of jurisdiction by payment of
docket fees, and not the delineation of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts. In
fact, Trayvilla interchangeably used the terms "assessed value" and "market value" in a manner that
does not even recognize a difference.

Like Barangay Piapi, therefore, Spouses Trayvilla must not be read in the context of jurisdiction of first and
second level courts as contemplated in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,46where the
assessed values of the properties are required. These cases must perforce be read in the context of the
determination of the actual amount of prescribed filing and docket fees provided for in Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court.

Having laid out the essential rules in determining the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts for civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, the Court now shifts
focus to the specific circumstances that surround the current case.

In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject property. Rather,
what she included therein was an allegation of its market value amounting to P200,000.00.47 In the course
of the trial, the petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration
was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.

The question thus posed before this Court was whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction, and in the affirmative, whether or not the RTC decision should be rendered void for being
issued without jurisdiction.

As discussed above, settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
required the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the complaint. That the complaint in the
present case did not aver the assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be
dismissed because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.

However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag,48 would necessitate an
examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the complaint referred to Tax
Declaration No. 16408A, attached therein as Annex "B," which naturally would contain the assessed value of
the property. A perusal thereof would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00.

On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over the case. The RTC
should have upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed the same. Consequently, the
decision that it rendered is null and void.

In the case of Maslag v. Monzon,49 the Court had occasion to rule that an order issued by a court declaring
that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has
none cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced.
Since the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC
and the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard
the same.

In yet another case, Diona v. Balangue,50 the Court ruled that void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void. As said by the Court in Cañero v. University of the
Philippines:51

A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded
or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding
effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled
to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. In other words, a void
judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment.52

Thus, considering the foregoing, it would be proper for the Court to immediately dismiss this case without
prejudice to the parties' filing of a new one before the MTC that has jurisdiction over the subject property.
Consequently, the other issues raised by the petitioner need not be discussed further.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226 dated March 12, 2015,
and the Resolution dated October 19, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, as well as the Decision dated November
24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55 of Mandaue City, are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE for being issued without jurisdiction. This is without prejudice to the filing of the parties of the proper
action before the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 180321 : March 20, 2013

EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner, v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN, Respondents.

DECISION
 PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, and the Resolution2 dated October 23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.3cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: chanro blesv irt ualawl ibra ry

Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 625 of the
Limay Cadastre which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-105602, with an aggregate area
of 82,972 square meters. While on board a jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a
conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura
was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura.
Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-O, under the name
of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan (Felicisimo).

Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo, Maura
was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna Ong
(Lorna), who later caused the issuance of TCT No. 134932 for the subject property under her name. A few
months later, or sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00.
Thus, TCT No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.

After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of Lot No.
625-K, but the latter refused. Respondents were then forced to file a case before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil
Case No. 438-ML. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.

On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they be allowed
to present evidence ex parte.4 chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

On January 17, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default with
Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of Defendant.5 Petitioner claimed that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, because the summons was not validly served upon her person,
but only by means of substituted service through her mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been
residing in Japan after she married a Japanese national and only comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation
once every two years.

On April 5, 2001, Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, testified that his sister is still in Japan and
submitted a copy of petitioner's passport and an envelope of a letter that was allegedly sent by his sister.
Nevertheless, on April 5, 2001, the RTC issued an Order6 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and
declared her in default. Thereafter, trial ensued.

On July 1, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and,
consequently, dismissed the complaint.

Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. NO. CV No. 86983.

On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision8 in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed
and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Lorna
and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents' own title, to wit: c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July

1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 4, Mariveles, Bataan (Stationed in Balanga,
Bataan) in Civil Case No. 438-ML is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134932 issued in the name of Lorna Ong and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 137466 issued in the name of defendant-appellee Editha Padlan are CANCELLED and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 134785 in the name of the plaintiffs-appellants is REVIVED.

SO ORDERED.9 chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

The CA found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna. The CA opined that although a
purchaser is not expected to go beyond the title, based on the circumstances surrounding the sale,
petitioner should have conducted further inquiry before buying the disputed property. The fact that Lorna
bought a 5,000-square-meter property for only P4,000.00 and selling it after four months for the same
amount should have put petitioner on guard. With the submission of the Judgment in Criminal Case No.
4326 rendered by the RTC, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, entitled People of the Philippines v. Maura
Passion10 and the testimonies of respondents, the CA concluded that respondents sufficiently established
that TCT No. 134932 issued in the name of Lorna and TCT No. 137466 issued in the name of petitioner were
fraudulently issued and, therefore, null and void.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint
lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the person
of the petitioner.

On October 23, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution11 denying the motion. The CA concluded that the rationale
for the exception made in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy12 was present in the case. It reasoned
that when the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner neither
moved for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules. Instead,
she kept silent and only became interested in the case again when the CA rendered a decision adverse to
her claim.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors: c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

III

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13 chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

Petitioner maintains that the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy finds no application in the case at bar, since the
said case is not on all fours with the present case. Unlike in Tijam, wherein the petitioner therein actively
participated in the proceedings, petitioner herein asserts that she did not participate in any proceedings
before the RTC because she was declared in default.

Petitioner insists that summons was not validly served upon her, considering that at the time summons was
served, she was residing in Japan. Petitioner contends that pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, when the defendant does not reside in the Philippines and the subject of the action is
property within the Philippines of the defendant, service may be effected out of the Philippines by personal
service or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, summons was served only by
substituted service to her mother. Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.

Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, considering that from the
complaint, it can be inferred that the value of the property was only P4,000.00, which was the amount
alleged by respondents that the property was sold to petitioner by Lorna.
Finally, petitioner stresses that she was a buyer in good faith. It was Maura who defrauded the respondents
by selling the property to Lorna without their authority.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the CA was correct in ruling in their favor.

The petition is meritorious.

Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.14 chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction on the following actions: chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," is hereby amended to read as follows: chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; cralaw lib rary

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts, thus: chanroblesv irtualawl ibra ry

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as follows: chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry

xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any further with any other issues
raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this case based on the above-quoted provisions.

However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint
is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.15 c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.16chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry

Respondents' Complaint17 narrates that they are the duly registered owners of Lot No. 625 of the Limay
Cadastre which was covered by TCT No. T-105602. Without their knowledge and consent, the land was
divided into several lots under their names through the fraudulent manipulations of Maura. One of the lots
was Lot 625-K, which was covered by TCT No. 134785. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold the subject lot to
Lorna. By virtue of the fictitious sale, TCT No. 134785 was cancelled and TCT No. 134932 was issued in the
name of Lorna. Sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner for a consideration in the amount
of P4,000.00. TCT No. 134932 was later cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.
Despite demands from the respondents, petitioner refused to surrender possession of the subject property.
Respondents were thus constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and incur expenses for litigation.
Respondents prayed for the RTC (a) to declare TCT No. 137466 null and to revive TCT No. T-105602 which
was originally issued and registered in the name of the respondents; and (b) to order petitioner to pay
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00, plus cost of suit.18 chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a claim that
he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property
itself." "Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership under the Torrens
system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right
or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.19 chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in their complaint can be
granted, the issue of who between the two contending parties has the valid title to the subject lot must first
be determined before a determination of who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title
covering the property in question.

From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the cancellation of a particular
certificate of title and the revival of another. The determination of such issue merely follows after a court of
competent jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties is the
lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The action is,
therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction over
which is determined by the assessed value of such lot.20 chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over
the action.21 In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the
complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was
even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents' counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next
hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor's Office.22 However, they did
not present such copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.23Since the
amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the
RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.24 chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

Consequently, the remaining issues raised by petitioner need not be discussed further.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, dated
June 29, 2007, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, dated July I, 2005, is declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No.
438-ML is dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016 - PHILIP YU, Petitioner, v. VIVECA LIM YU, Respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016

PHILIP YU, Petitioner, v. VIVECA LIM YU, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated September 30, 2011 and Resolution2 dated January 5, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414 which granted the petition for the annulment of the
Decision3 dated August 20, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 10,
Balayan, Batangas.

The factual antecedents are as follows.

Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984. They had four
children and maintained their conjugal home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig,
Metro Manila. In 1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and filed a Petition
for Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, for repeated physical violence,
grossly abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life. She prayed
for permanent custody over the children, support, and the dissolution and distribution of their conjugal
partnership valued at approximately P5,000,000.00.4 chanroble slaw

Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who actually attacked him a few times.
He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was arranged according to the Chinese tradition and that it was
much later when he discovered Viveca's excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure behaviour. He countered
that since she abandoned the family home, taking their four children away, she was not entitled to support.
She was, likewise, unqualified to become the administrator of their conjugal funds, which had outstanding
obligations. Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to
Viveca's psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her marital obligations.5 c hanro bles law

On April 24, 2007, however, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage revealing that he no longer had the desire to have his marriage declared void. Despite Viveca's
fervent opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the motion.6 chanrobleslaw

On July 1, 2009, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision7 dismissing the Petition for Legal Separation in
the following wise:ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court finds that the parties are in pari
delicto warranting a denial of this petition. Respondent's illicit relationship with Linda Daet and his
repeated verbal and physical abuses towards petitioner come within the purview of pars. 8 and 1 of Art. 55
of the Family Code of the Philippines whereas petitioner's unjustifiable abandonment bringing with her their
children without the knowledge and consent of respondent and her assaulting respondent with a 10-inch
knife are those contemplated in pars. 10 and 9 of the same code.
Notwithstanding the foregoing Court's findings, the same becomes moot with the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of the parties, on the ground of the psychological incapacity of petitioner,
Viveca Yu, pursuant to the Decision of Branch 10, RTC of Balayan, Batangas, which attained its
finality on October 13, 2008. Since the marriage of the parties was declared a nullity there is, therefore,
no legal basis to issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses whose marriage has already been
declared of no force and effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas, nullifying her
marriage with Philip on the ground of her psychological incapacity, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment9 before the CA seeking to annul the Decision dated August 20, 2008 of said court. According to
Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons. She
alleged that she was deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared that her address
upon which she may be duly summoned was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she had
long left said address for the United States of America. Viveca likewise maintained that had Philip complied
with the legal requirements for an effective service of summons by publication, she would have been able to
rightly participate in the proceedings before the Batangas court.

On September 30, 2011, the CA granted Viveca's petition ruling as follows: ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the personal status of private respondent is in the
nature of an action in rem. This is so because the term "personal status" includes family relations,
particularly the relations between husband and wife.

With this premise in mind, it is beyond cavil that the court a quo was justified in resorting to Summons by
publication. Petitioner is a nonresident defendant who left the Philippines with her children way back in 1997
and has now been living in the United States of America. The court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case given that as adumbrated, in a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.

Still and all, there is more to this case than meets the eye. Private respondent knew that
petitioner left the conjugal home on account of their marital difficulties. She temporarily resided at
her parent's house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. But during the pendency of the Legal
Separation case, she lived in Quezon City. This much was revealed by private respondent himself
in the Amended Answer with Counterclaim filed in the Legal Separation suit-
"10. After abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, petitioner resided at her parent's
house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until
she moved to her present address in October 1993. x x x x
This knowledge notwithstanding, private respondent declared before the court a quo that the
"last known address" of petitioner was still her conjugal abode at Unit 1603 Horizon
Condominium, Mcralco Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. While private respondent knew that it was
well-nigh impossible for petitioner to receive Summons and other court notices at their former
conjugal home, still, he supplied the aforesaid address.

We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that private respondent moved for the dismissal of his
counterclaim for nullity of marriage in the Legal Separation case in 2007 as he had by then had
the sinister motive of filing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the court a
quo. Private respondent knew that if he breathed a word on the filing and pendency of the
latter Petition, petitioner would vigorously resist it as revealed by her tenacious opposition in the
proceedings before the RTC-Pasig.

The deceitful scheme employed by private respondent deprived petitioner of her constitutional
right to due process which ensued in her failure to participate in the proceedings before the
court a quo. To Our mind, this compelling justification warrants the annulment of judgement.10 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

In its Resolution dated January 5, 2012, the CA denied Philip's Motion for Reconsideration finding no cogent
and persuasive reason to revise or reverse its Decision. Hence, this petition invoking the following
grounds: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE COURT
A QUO DESPITE ITS ACCURATE FINDINGS THAT THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE ACTION IN REM THROUGH SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION.

II.

THE PUBLICATION OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO, SUMMONS, THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE
DECISION RENDERED THEREIN IS NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD INCLUDING RESPONDENT.
RESPONDENT WAS THEREFORE CONSTRUCTIVELY NOTIFIED OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND WAS NOT DENIED
DUE PROCESS HAVING BEEN DULY NOTIFIED BY PUBLICATION.

III.

RESPONDENT HAS BEEN DOMICILED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR MORE THAN TEN (10)
YEARS AND WHOSE ADDRESS IS UNKNOWN TO PETITIONER. AS FAR AS PETITIONER IS CONCERNED, UNIT
1603 HORIZON CONDOMINIUM, MERALCO AVENUE, PASIG CITY IS THE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS OF
RESPONDENT, BEING THE CONJUGAL HOME.

IV.

PETITIONER IS CURRENTLY NOT A RESIDENT OF THE CONJUGAL HOME.

V.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF BALAYAN,
BATANGAS, APPEARED AS COUNSEL FOR THE STATE AND FULLY PROTECTED THE INTEREST OF THE STATE
INCLUDING THE INTEREST OF RESPONDENT.

VI.

PETITIONER CANNOT BE FAULTED FOR MOVING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS COUNTER-CLAIM FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, WHICH IS ALLOWED BY SECTION 2, RULE 17 OF THE NEW
RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED, AND SAID WITHDRAWAL WAS EVEN APPROVED BY THE RTC OF PASIG.

VII.

THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF DECISION FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS DEFECTIVE
AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 47 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED, FOR HAVING
FAILED TO STATE AND ALLEGE THE DEFENSES THAT RESPONDENT HAS AGAINST PETITIONER.

VIII.

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DEFENSES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENT ARE THOSE
THAT WERE PRESENTED IN THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE THAT WAS DISMISSED BY THE RTC OF PASIG
CITY, SAID GROUNDS ONLY BOLSTER THE FACT THAT THE DECISION DATED AUGUST 20, 2008 OF THE
RTC OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS, CORRECTLY NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE DUE TO RESPONDENT'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

IX.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT OBSERVE AND FOLLOW SECTIONS 6 AND 7 OF RULE 47 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED.
In essence, Philip questions the appellate court's judgment of setting aside the decision of the Batangas RTC
despite its own finding that said court validly acquired jurisdiction when Summons was duly served on
Viveca by publication. He maintains that since service of summons was properly accomplished by publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation as well as its personal service on Viveca at her last known
address, it logically follows that any and all resolutions rendered by the trial court are valid and binding on
the parties. Thus, the decision of the Batangas court which acquired jurisdiction over the res should be
immutable as it is already final and executory.11
chanroble slaw
Philip also questions the appellate court's choice of supporting jurisprudence alleging them to be inapplicable
to the instant case. He asserts that the teachings in Spouses Belen v. Judge Chavez,12Biaco v. Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank,13 and Ancheta v. Judge Ancheta14 fail to be instructive simply because they involve
substituted service of summons whereas the mode of service in this case is by publication. Philip further
asserts that said jurisprudential doctrines even teach us that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such as
the case at hand, jurisdiction over the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court for
as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, summons must be served upon the defendant
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements, which in this case was duly complied with when Viveca, who is a non-resident, not found in
the Philippines, was served with summons by publication.15 chanro bleslaw

Hence, Philip faults the CA in finding that due to his bad faith in maliciously supplying the Batangas court
with an erroneous address wherein Viveca may supposedly be summoned, she was deprived of her
constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the subject judgment. According to him, as
far as he was concerned, Viveca's last known address was their conjugal home. This is because the
addresses supplied in the proceedings of the Legal Separation case before the RTC of Pasig City were merely
temporary in nature.16 Philip recalled that when Viveca left their conjugal abode on August 24, 1993, she
temporarily stayed at her parents' house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, for less than two months then,
thereafter, stayed at her temporary residence at Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City, in October 1993.
Considering that said addresses were merely temporary, Philip claims that he should not be faulted for using
their conjugal abode as Viveca's "last known address." According to him, what is mandated by the rules as
the defendant's "last known address" is his or her last known permanent address, and certainly not one of
temporary nature.17 chanrob leslaw

The petition is bereft of merit.

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process.18 The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside
the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to
ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside
without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or
resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.19 chan rob leslaw

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.20 Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party had
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by means of fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from
court, or by a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
Ultimately, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court.21 chanro bleslaw

In the present case, We find that Viveca was completely prevented from participating in the Declaration of
Nullity case because of the fraudulent scheme employed by Philip insofar as the service of summons is
concerned.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Through its service,
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.22 As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a
defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
however, enumerates the actions in rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential.23 Said section provides: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffor relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any
order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer. (17a)
Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may
be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.24 chan rob leslaw

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the
summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, also with leave of
court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.25 cra lawred chan robles law

In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United States of America.
Thus, extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is the proper mode
by which summons may be served on Viveca, a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines.
In compliance therewith, Philip claims that Viveca was duly served summons because: (1) copies of the
summons, complaint, and order of the Batangas court were published in Tempo, a newspaper of general
circulation on March 27, 2008 and April 3, 2008;26 and (2) the sheriff served copies of the summons,
complaint, and order of the Batangas court on Viveca at their conjugal home in Pasig City, her last known
address.27 Thus, he contends that the second mode of extraterritorial service of summons mentioned above
- by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant's last known address - was sufficiently complied with. The Court finds, however, that such service
of summons on their conjugal home address cannot be deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules
and is even tantamount to deception warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.

Philip fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as Viveca's "last known address," well
within the true meaning and intent of the rules. But as borne by the records of the instant case, not only is
he mistaken, factual considerations herein belie his claims of good faith. First and foremost, it is undisputed
that the parties herein are also parties in a Legal Separation case, previously filed by Viveca way back in
1994. There was, in said case, a disclosure of their basic personal information, which customarily includes
their respective local addresses, wherein they may be served with court papers. In fact, as pointed out by
the appellate court, Philip knew that Viveca had already left their conjugal home and moved to a different
local address for purposes of the pendency of the Legal Separation case, as shown by his stipulation in his
Amended Answer with Counterclaim that "after abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993,
petitioner resided at her parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she moved to her present address in October 1993." Thus, Philip cannot
be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally abandoned their conjugal
abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at, their conjugal home in Horizon Condominium is
her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be considered as the address she is least likely to be found
considering the circumstances in which she left the same. Note that from the very beginning of the Legal
Separation case in 1994, all the way up until the promulgation by the Pasig RTC of its decision thereon in
2009, there is no showing that Viveca had ever received any document in relation to said case, nor is there
any proof that Philip had ever sent any pertinent file to Viveca, at the conjugal address. There is, therefore,
no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that said address is in truth and in fact Viveca's "last known
address" at which she may receive summons. His contention that the rules require the defendant's "last
known address" to be of a permanent, and not of a temporary nature, has no basis in law or jurisprudence.

In addition, the Court is curious as to why Philip filed the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage28 before the RTC of Batangas City on February 15, 2008 when less than a year before filing the
same, he had motioned the RTC of Pasig City on April 24, 2007 to withdraw his counterclaim for the same
declaration of nullity of marriage.29 In his petition before the Court, Philip explained that he withdrew his
counterclaim in the Legal Separation case in his "desire to explore the possibility of having a so-called
'universal settlement' of all the pending cases with respondent and her relatives for the sake of his love for
his four (4) children."30 Yet, in an apparent, direct contravention of this so-called "desire," he filed an
identical action which sought the same nullity of his marriage with Viveca. Thus, while there may be no
outright admission on Philip's part as to a sinister motive, his inconsistent actions effectively negate his
claims of good faith.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that as pointed out by Viveca, Philip does not even reside in Batangas,
the city of the court wherein he filed his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In a
Certification31issued by Ricardo V. Bautista, Barangay Chairman of Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas, it was
categorically stated that "the name Philip Yu is not a resident of Barangay Poblacion 1, Calatagan,
Batangas." Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, otherwise known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
provides:Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election
of the petitioner.32 c hanro blesv irt uallawl ibra ry

It is, therefore, evident that not only did Philip contradict his previous Motion to Withdraw his Counterclaim
for the Declaration of Nullity of marriage, he even violated a basic mandate of law so as to be able to file the
same action before a different court in a city he was not even a resident of.

Thus, while individually and in isolation, the aforementioned doubtful circumstances may not instantly
amount to extrinsic fraud, these circumstances, when viewed in conjunction with each other, paint a
deceitful picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's constitutional right to due process. True, the service
of summons in this case is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process. But because of Philip's employment of
deceptive means in the service of summons on Viveca, said purpose of satisfying the due process
requirements was never accomplished. To this Court, when Philip declared before the Batangas court that
Viveca's last known address was still their conjugal home with full and undisputed knowledge that she had
already intentionally abandoned the same and had even established a more recent, local residence herein
evinces a clear lack of good faith. As a result, Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage suit, only finding out about the same when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its
decision on the Legal Separation case. It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons at the
erroneous address, Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings thereon.

In Acance v. Court of Appeals,33 where the extraterritorial service of summons on the non-resident, US
citizen, defendants therein were held to be defective due to the absence of proof that the summons,
complaint, and order of the court were duly served at their last known correct address, the Court ruled that
the failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of
the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.34Citing Dulap, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,35 it elucidated as follows: ChanRob lesVi rtua lawlib rary

It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the statute
permitting service by publication. Where service is obtained by publication, the entire proceeding should be
closely scrutinized by the courts and a strict compliance with every condition of law should be exacted.
Otherwise great abuses may occur, and the rights of persons and property may be made to depend upon
the elastic conscience of interested parties rather than the enlightened judgment of the court or judge.36 chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests.37 When defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly
participate in, and even be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed by the
prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of their due process rights. Any judgment issued in
violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot
be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within
their jurisdiction.38 This Court, therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment
issued without proper service of summons.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September
30, 2011 and Resolution dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

G.R. No. 194751 November 26, 2014

AURORA N. DE PEDRO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Regardless of the type of action - whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem - the preferred
mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted service, courts
must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions and a showing that the defendant cannot
be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriff's return, which contains these details,
is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the court may allow substituted service.
Should the sheriff's return be wanting of these details, substituted service will be irregular if no other
evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that
the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in CA G.R. SP.
No. 96471. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s action for annulment of the Regional Trial Court
decision, which, in turn, nullified her certificate of title.

This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates
of title, filed against several defendants.1 One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De
Pedro).2 The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on July 7, 1998.3

Respondent Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and
possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City.4 The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 236044.5

Based on respondent’s narrative, its representative, Mr. Rodrigo Ko, discovered sometime in
November 1996 that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo property.6 Mr. Ko confronted
De Pedro regarding her acts, but she was able to show title and documents evidencing her
ownership.7

Mr. Ko informed respondent about the documents.8 Upon checking with the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
it was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of respondent’s property to
the following:

a. Defendant Nora Jocson, married to Carlito Jocson - OCT No. P-723, Free Patent No.
045802-91-616;

b. Defendants Heirs of Marcelino Santos[,] represented by Cristino Santos - OCT No. P-727,
Free Patent No. 045802-91-919;

c. Defendant Aurora de Pedro marriedto Elpidio de Pedro - OCT No. 691, Free Patent No.
045802-91-914;
 d. Defendant Wilson Dadia - OCT No. P-722, Free Patent No. 045802-91-915; and

e. Defendant Prudencio Marana - OCT No. P-721, Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-923.9

(Emphasis supplied)

Based on these free patents, the Register of Deeds issued titles covering portions of respondent’s
property.10Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 691, Free Patent No. 045802-91-914 was signed by
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office in favor of De Pedro on December 9,
1991.11

Respondent further alleged in its separate complaints that the government could not legally issue the
free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land was already released for disposition to
private individuals.12 OCT No. 438, from which respondent’s TCT No. 236044 originated, was already
issued as early as August 30, 1937.13

Respondent also prayed for the payment of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.14 Attempts to
personally serve summons on De Pedro failed.15 The officer’s return, dated February 22, 1999 reads
in part:

OFFICER’S RETURN

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy
of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-
entitled case on the following, to wit;

1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of
Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.16

Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication.17

On August 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion.18 The summons and the complaint
werepublished in People’s Balita on its April 24, May 1, and May 8, 1998 issues.19 On July 15, 1999,
respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in default for
failure to file their answers.20 Respondent also moved to be allowed to present evidence ex
parte.21 The Regional Trial Court granted the motions on August 19, 1999.22

On January 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free
patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De
Pedro.23 Thus:

Accordingly the Court declares asa nullity the following titles and Free Patents issued to the
Defendants.

a. Defendant Nora Jocson married to Carlito Jocson OCT No. P-723; Free PatentN[o].
045802-91-616;

b. Defendant Heirs of Marcelino Santos represented by Cristino Santos – OCT N[o]. P-727;
Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-919;
 c. Defendant Aurora N. de Pedro married to Elpidio de Pedro – OCT No. P-691; Free Patent
No. 045802-91-914;

d. Defendant Wilson Dadia – OCT No. P-722; Free Patent No. 045802-91-915;

e. Defendant Prudencio Marana – OCT No. P-721; Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-923.

There being clear bad faith on the part of the Private defendants in obtaining said Free Patents and
titles in their names covering the portions of the property of the plaintiff, said defendants are each
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amount of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, ₱3,000.00 as
appearance fee and also ₱50,000.00 as moral damages with costs against said private defendants.

Once the Decision becomes final and in order to give full force and effect to the Decision of the
Court nullifying the titles and patents issued to the defendants, the latter are directed to surrender
the same within a period of ten (10) days from the finalityof said Decision to the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina City and failure on the part of the defendants to surrender the owner’s duplicate of the titles
in their possession, defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina City is authorized to cancel the same
without the presentation of said owner’s duplicate oftitles in the possession of the
defendants.24 (Emphasis supplied)

In so ruling, the Regional Trial Court noted that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed an
answer to respondent’s complaints.25 The Regional Trial Court also noted the committee report
admitting CENRO’s irregularity in the issuance of the free patents to the defendants in the case.26

The Regional Trial Court also found that the title and free patent issued to De Pedro were void.27 As
early as August 30, 1937, or before the free patents were issued to the defendants in the case, OCT
No. 438 was already issued to the property’s original owner.28 Hence, the property was already
"segregated from the mass of public domain" that can be disposed by the government.29

On March 30, 2000, De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for
new trial, alleging that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000 decision on March 16,
2000.30

De Pedro argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because
of improper and defective service of summons. Citing the officer’s return dated February 22,1999,
De Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally served upon her "for the reason that
according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their (sic) is no person in the saidgiven
address."31

De Pedro also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving the same property, when
respondent filed the complaints against her and several others.32

On September 30, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an order denying De Pedro’s motion for
new trial.33

The Regional Trial Court ruled that summons was validly served upon De Pedro through publication,
in accordance with the Rules of Court.34 Moreover, counting from the date of the summons’
publication beginning on March 2, 2000, the motion for new trial was filed beyond the 15-day period
within which the motion may be filed.35 Therefore, the Regional Trial Court decision had become final
and executory.36
The Regional Trial Court also ruled that the reckoning period for filing the motion for new trial cannot
be De Pedro’s counsel’s receipt of the decision. This is because at the time of the issuance of the
court’s decision, which had already become final and executory, De Pedro’s counsel was yet to
enter his appearance for De Pedro.37

De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Regional Trial
Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for new trial.38

On March 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and
affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s motion for new trial.39

The Court of Appeals noted De Pedro’s belated filing of her motion for new trial. The Court of
Appeals also noted De Pedro’s failure to allege any ground that would justify the grant of a motion
for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.40

De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals resolution dated August
24, 2006.41

De Pedro elevated the case to this court, but this was likewise denied in the resolution dated
October 4, 2006 for failure to pay the Special Allowance for the Judiciary and sheriff’s fees.42

On October 11, 2006, De Pedro filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
January 7, 2000 judgment of the Regional Trial Court43 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis
pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of her property without due process.

Citing Pantaleon v. Asuncion,44 De Pedro pointed out that "[d]ue process of law requires personal
service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a
voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction [so] as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process."45

De Pedro also claimed to be the real owner of the property by virtue of OCT No. P-691.46 She
pointed out that the same Regional Trial Court branch ordered the reconstitution ofher title to the
property in 1997.47 The Regional Trial Court also issued a certificate of finality stating that "an Entry
of Judgment had already been issued by the Court of Appeals dated January 16, 2006."48

On July 7, 2010, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying De Pedro’s petition for
annulment of judgment.49 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED.50

The Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioner already availed herself of the remedy of new trial,
and raised the case before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a
petition for annulment of judgment.51

De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 3, 2010:52

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.53

On January 13, 2011, De Pedro filed before this court a Rule 45 petition, seeking the reversal of the
July 7, 2010 Court of Appeals decision and the December 3, 2010 Court of Appeals resolution.54
The issues in this case are:

I. Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro; and

II. Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition
for annulment of judgment.

Petitioner argues that respondent’s prayer for attorney’s fees, appearance fees, exemplary
damages, and costs of suit sought to establish personal obligations upon petitioner in favor of
respondent.55 Hence, the case filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was an action in
personam, which required personal service upon her for the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over
her person.56 In this case, the Regional Trial Court allowed service of summons by publication
instead of ordering that summons be served by substituted service.57 Improper service of summons
rendered the trial court decision null and void.58 It means that the court could not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner.59

Petitioner also argues that respondent’s complaints were dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia,
pointing to the alleged pending case between the same parties and involving same subject matter at
the time when respondent filed its complaint before the Regional Trial Court in 1998.60 The alleged
pending case was filed in 1997 by petitioner and her spouse against respondent, seeking
"enforce[ment] of their rights as owners, and claim[ing] damages for the unlawful and illegal acts of
dispossession, terrorism and violence which they, their family and their close relatives were
subjected to by [respondent]."61

On her ownership of the property, petitioner argues that she was able to obtain OCT No. P-691 in
1991 in strict and faithful compliance with all the requirements.62 When the Register of Deeds lost the
records pertaining to the property, the Regional Trial Court ordered the reconstitution of the title on
September 23, 1997.63 The same trial court issued the certificate of finality of the order on March 16,
2006.64

Moreover, petitioner refersto a counter-affidavit issued by a certain Jesus Pampellona, Deputy

Public Land Inspector of CENRO-Antipolo, in the preliminary investigation of a case before the
Department of Justice, docketed as I.S. No. 99-503 and entitled: "Rodrigo Sy v. Maximo Pentino, et
al." Petitioner highlights Pampellona’sstatements that the free patent applicants for the property were
found to be in "actual, public, adverse and continuous possession on the specific lots applied for by
them with several improvements like the house of Mrs. Aurora de Pedro and several fruit[-]bearing
trees with an average age of 20-25 years scattered within the twelve (12) hectares area applied for
by the above named applicants;"65 Based on the affidavit, Pampellona was "unaware, at the time, of
any previous title issued in favor of any person or entity covering the subject lots above mentioned
as there was at that time, no existing record, both in the CENRO, Antipolo, Rizal, or at the Land
Management Bureau in Manila, attesting to the issuance of previous titles on the subject lots."66

Lastly, petitioner argues that the trial court decision was null and void, considering that petitioner’s
title was cancelled in contravention of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which prohibits
collateral attack upon certificates of title.67

In its comment, respondent argues that the process server tried other forms of substituted service,
including service by registered mail.68

Respondent also argues that petitioner was in evident malice and bad faith when she allegedly did
not disclose in her petition other actions taken by her after the Regional Trial Court had denied her
motion for new trial.69Particularly, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
pertaining to the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial.70

When the petition for certiorari was denied, petitioner also filed a petition for review before this court,
which was also denied.71 For these reasons, petitioner’s petition for review before this court deserves
outright dismissal.72

The sheriff’s return must show the

details of the efforts exerted to
personally serve summons upon
defendants or respondents, before
substituted service or service by
publication is availed

Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: (a)
the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d)
the remedy.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and
decidecases of a general class.73 It is conferred by the Constitution or by law.74 It is not acquired
through administrative issuances or court orders. It is not acquired by agreement, stipulation,
waiver,75 or silence.76 Any decision by a court, withouta law vesting jurisdiction upon such court, is
void.

Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court over an object or thing being litigated. The
court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under
the court’s custody.77

Jurisdiction over the parties refers tothe power of the court to make decisions that are binding on
persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their
complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction
by a valid service of summons or through their voluntary submission.78 Generally, a person
voluntarily submits tothe court’s jurisdiction when he or she participates in the trial despite improper
service of summons.

Courts79 and litigants must be aware of the limits and the requirements for the acquisition of court
jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued by courts outside their jurisdiction are void. Complaints or
petitions filed before the wrong court or without acquiring jurisdiction over the parties may be
dismissed.80

Petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because she was not
properly served with summons. After the summons had returned unserved to petitioner because
"there [was] no person in the said given address,"81 the trial court allowed the publication of the
summons to petitioner.

Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action — whether the action is in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly.82 Jurisdiction over the parties
is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability
upon a person.83

Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions.
Actions in remor quasi in remare not directed against the person based on his or her personal
liability.84

Actions in remare actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world.85 Quasi in
remactions are actions involving the status of a property over which a party has interest.86 Quasi in
rem actions are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular
parties.87

However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi
in rem actions is required.

The phrase, "against the thing," to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the "thing" that is
the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions.
"Against the thing" means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or
indirect. It also assumes that the interests — in the form of rights or duties — attach to the thing
which is the subject matter of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active vinculum
over those with interests to the thing subject of litigation.

Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be
expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting
within their jurisdiction.

Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. This court recognized this principle in
Aducayen v. Flores.88In the same case, this court further ruled that this jurisdictional defect is
remedied by a petition for certiorari.89

Similarly in Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sengbengco,90 this court held that a decision that was
issued in violation of a person’s due process rights suffers a fatal infirmity.91

The relation of due process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the
standard of evidence is relatively lower. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla:92

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that rightis void for lack of
jurisdiction.93

An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem. It is not an action "against a person on
the basis of his personal liability,"94 but an action that subjects a person’s interest over a property to a
burden. The action for annulment of a certificate oftitle threatens petitioner’s interest in the property.
Petitioner is entitled to due process with respect to that interest. The court does not have
competence or authority to proceed with an action for annulment of certificate of title without giving
the person, in whose name the certificate was issuedall the opportunities to be heard.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision
rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution
of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with authority
and competence.

Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons.95 Thus, as a rule,
summons must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent wherever he or she may be
found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or
her.96

If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall be
effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or
in-house counsel wherever he or she may be found.97

Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of summons through other
modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve summons through personal
service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for justifiable
causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time.98 Substituted
service is effected "(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof."99

Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the

defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are
"unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry."100 It may only be effected after unsuccessful
attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or
respondent’s whereabouts.

Service of summons by extra territorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or
respondentdoes not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.101

If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is

generally construed as sufficient service of summons.102

In this case, summons was served by publication.

A look into the content of the sheriff’s return will determine if the circumstances warranted the
deviation from the rule preferring personal service of summons over other modes of service. The
sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts to personally serve
summons to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of personal service of summons.
Citing Hamilton v. Levy,103 this court said of substituted service in Domagas v. Jensen:104

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal
service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made.
Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said
service ineffective.105

This court also said in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals:

The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done,
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in
the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.

....

However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned
the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher
courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at
bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad
and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the
attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the
reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken.
That such efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted in
failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.

Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would
encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service—for it would be
quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.106

A sheriff’s return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance if it contains (1) the details of
the circumstances surrounding the sheriff’s attempt to serve the summons personally upon the
defendants or respondents; and (2) the particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons
within reasonable time.107 It does not enjoy the presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro
forma.

Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders
service of summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service orservice by
publication can be valid.

This court in Manotoc explained that the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the sheriff’s
return does not apply to patently defective returns. Thus:

The court a quoheavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It
reasons out that "[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facieevidence of the facts
set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be
clear and convincing."

The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to
apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally
serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the
Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of
suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is
flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff
Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals,it was held that "x x x the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that
the sheriff’s return is defective." (Emphasis supplied) While the Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza
case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of
Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking
in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if
Cañelas’ Return did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted
service is void.108

In this case, the sheriff’s return states:

OFFICER’S RETURN

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy
of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-
entitled case on the following, to wit;

1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of
Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.109

This return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner.
The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there was no
"Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to
locate petitioner’s whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the return that personal
service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service could no longer be made
within reasonable time.

The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally
upon petitioner is a deviation from this court’s previous rulings that personal service isthe preferred
mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made to effect
personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted service or
service by publication will be allowed based on such defective return.

The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights.
The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been dismissible had
petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would
have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment.

Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action for
annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper ground.
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may grant a new trial
based on the following causes:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or

(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.110
Petitioner insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person. She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her
rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly discovered evidence that could have altered the
trial court decision. When her motion for new trial was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari,
insisting that her motion for new trial should have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over her person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege any ground for new
trial. We cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals for this denial because, indeed,
lack of jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial.

What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondent’s action for
annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for certiorari.
At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly notified of
the action involving her title tothe property. Lack of jurisdiction could have already been raised in an
action for annulment of judgment.

Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead of
an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the
proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioner’s
failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause. We cannot
conclude now that she was denied due process.

II

Petitioner is already barred from

filing a petition for annulment of
judgment

A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character.111 It is independent

of the case112and is "allowed only in exceptional cases as where there isno available or other
adequate remedy."113

An action for annulment of judgment may be filed to assail Regional Trial Court judgments when
resort toother remedies can no longer be had through no fault of petitioner. Section 1 of Rule 47 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Coverage. – This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.

An action for annulment of judgment may be based on only two grounds: 1) extrinsic fraud; and 2)
lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 2. Grounds for Annulment. – The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments, circumstances that negate the
court’s acquisition of jurisdiction — including defective service of summons — are causes for an
action for annulment of judgments.114

However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment "may not be
invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence."115 Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always
readily available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment.

In this case, petitioner’s main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of jurisdiction over
her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were raised in the motion for new
trial filed before and denied by the Regional Trial Court.

Applying the above rules, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s petition
for annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion for new
trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground.

Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial
and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her
favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.

This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated
in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other
remedies had already been availed.

As this court explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman:116

Rule 47, entitled "Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions," is a new provision
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the remedy has long been given imprimatur by the
courts. The rule covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer beavailed of through no fault
of the petitioner." An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could soeasily
be resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted safeguards to
be put in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the remedy may not be
invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.117 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this court ruled in Sigma Homebuilding Corporation v. Inter-Alia Management Corporation,
et al.:118

A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be granted

indiscriminately by the Court. It is allowed only in exceptional cases and cannot beused by a losing
party to make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and executory. The remedy may
not be invoked where the party has availed himself of the remedy ofnew trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence.
Litigation must end sometime. It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment becomes final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that undesirable result.
Thus, we deem it fit to finally put an end to the present controversy.119 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an action for annulment of judgment "will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by
parties aggrieved by final judgments."120 Petitioner cannot abuse the court’s processes to revive a
case that has already been rendered final against her favor, for the purpose of securing a favorable
judgment. An action for annulment of judgment cannot be used by petitioner who has lost her case
through fault of her own, to make "a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long
become final and executory."121

III

Filing an action for annulment of

title is not a violation of Section 48

of Presidential Decree No. 1529

Petitioner insists that the annulment of her title was a violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, which provides:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

Petitioner is mistaken. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Court of Appeals,122 this court said:

An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the
title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On
the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.123

An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges the
judgment decree of title.

In Goco v. Court of Appeals,124 this court said that "[a]n action for annulment of certificates of title to
property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief
generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s true owner."125 Hence, there was
no violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when petitioner’s title was declared null
and void by the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner, however, points to the following statement made by this court in another case involving
these same parties:126

The resolution of the issue will not involve the alteration, correction or modification either of OCT No.
P-691 under the name of petitioner Aurora de Pedro, or TCT No. 236044 under the name of
respondent corporation. If the subject property is found to be a portion of the property covered by
OCT No. P-691 but is included in the technical description of the property covered by TCT No.
236044, the latter would have to be corrected. On the other hand, if the subject property is found to
be a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 236044, but is included in the property covered by
OCT NO. P-691, then the latter title must be rectified. However, the rectification of either title may be
made only via an action filed for the said purpose, comformably with Section 48 of Act No. 496

....

A. The action of the petitioners against respondents, based on the material allegations of the
complaint, if one for recovery of possession of the subject property and damages. However, such
action is not a direct but a collateral attack ofTCT No. 236044. Neither did the respondents directly
attack OCT No. P-691 in their answer to the complaint. Although the respondents averred in said
answer, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the subject property is covered by TCT No.
236044 issued in the name of the respondent corporation, and as suchthe said respondent is
entitled to the possession thereof to the exclusion of the petitioners, such allegations does not
constitute a direct attack on OCT No. P-691, but is likewise a collateral attack thereon...127

Petitioner misreads the import of what wesaid in that case. That case involves petitioner’s action for
recovery of possession and damages against respondents. It also involved respondent’s allegations
that the property was covered by a certificate of title in its name and, therefore, its entitlement to the
possession of the property. It does not involve an action for annulment of title. When this court said
that "such action is not a direct but a collateral attack of TCT No. 236044" or that "such allegations
does [sic] not constitute a direct attack on OCT No. P-691, butis likewise a collateral attack thereon,"
we were referring to both parties’ action for and allegations of possessory rights over the property.
This court was not referring to an action for annulment of title, which is the case involved here. To
reiterate, an action for annulment constitutes a direct attack on a certificate of title.

IV

The requisites of litis pendentia are

not satisfied when respondent filed
its action for annulment of title

Petitioner argued that the case for annulment of title was dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia
because there was a pending civil case filed by her against respondent.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: "(a) identity of parties, or interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.128

Although both cases involve the sameparcel of land, petitioner was not able to show that there was
identity of the relief prayed for. A review of the complaint in the said civil case shows that it was a
case for damages, for alleged improper conduct of respondent relating the property. The action filed
by respondent was an action for annulment of petitioner’s title.

Petitioner was also not able to show that the relief prayed for in both cases were founded on the
same facts. Petitioner’s complaint for damages was founded on the alleged misconduct of
respondent. Respondent’s action for annulment of title was founded on the alleged irregularity in the
issuance of petitioner’s title.

Hence, the petitioner was not able toshow that all the requisites for litis pendentiaare present.
Respondent’s action for annulment of title cannot be dismissed on this ground.
 V

A certificate of title does not vest ownership

Petitioner argues that her certificate of title was erroneously declared null and void because based
on OCT No. P-691, she is the real owner of the property.

It is true that certificates of titleare indefeasible and binding upon the whole world. However,
1âwphi1

certificates of title do not vest ownership.129 They merely evidence title or ownership of the
property.130 Courts may, therefore, cancel or declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds
that it was issued irregularly.

In this case, the trial court ruled based on the committee report that the free patents and original
certificate of title issued to petitioner were irregularly issued, and, therefore, invalid.

The principle of "bar by prior judgment" is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Court:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:

....

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or asto
any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest,by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.]
(Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the trial court, by annulling petitioner’s certificate of title and declaring its issuance
irregular, directly adjudged petitioner’s certificate of title as void. Because petitioner failed to appeal
and cause the annulment of the trial court’s judgment as to her title’s validity, this question is already
barred. This judgment has already attained finality and can no longer be litigated.

This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court131 the doctrine of finality of
judgment, thus:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it bemade
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle
must immediately be struck down.132

In any case, even if petitioner’s original certificate of title was not irregularly issued as she claims,
her original certificate of title was issued later than the title from which respondent’s title originated.
As a rule, original titles issued earlier prevail over another original title issued later.133

Therefore, petitioner's later-issued title cannot prevail over respondent's title, which was derived from
an earlier issued original certificate of title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; The Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in CA G.R. SP.
No. 96471 is AFFIRMED.