2003: Why India and Pakistan formally agreed to a Ceasefire

Vihaan Bhatnagar

IR 207: Diplomacy and Statecraft in South Asia

May 3, 2019
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Abstract

The Ceasefire Agreement between India and Pakistan, which formally came into effect

on November 25th, 2003, had proven to be highly successful and durable. Even though it held

very little legal utility, and was in fact a verbal agreement, it has arguably been the most

successful example of cooperation between the two states in the 21st Century. The aim of this

paper is to attempt to provide a coherent understanding of a combination of factors that were

responsible for the formal recognition of a ceasefire in 2003. This paper analyzes three broad

factors. These factors are a structural shift by the United States and other states across the world

post 9/11, the feeling among the polity of both the countries that conflict is counterproductive

and unacceptable, and the unilateral gestures for peace made by the leaders of both the states.

By analyzing changes at the systemic, domestic, and individual levels, this paper aims to

highlight the above-mentioned factors in detail.

India and Pakistan: A Cyclic Relationship

For over seventy years, the relationship between India and Pakistan has passed through

several cyclic phases. “From wars to peace parleys, dialogue to deadlock and then back to

crisis”1, it has been mired by trust deficit, mutual apprehensions and to some extent,

deliberately nurtured misunderstanding. This has been substantially manifested in the form of

border violence in Kashmir that has remained periodically ‘hot’ since the First Kashmir War

in 1947. However, it was with the onset of the Kashmir insurgency in 1989 that the violence

on the border escalated to new heights. 2 “By the mid-1990s, the two armies were not only

exchanging gunfire and artillery shelling but were also attacking each other’s posts.”3

1 Nabiha Gul, ‘Pakistan-India Peace Process 1990-2007: An Appraisal’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 60, No. 2, (PIIA,
2007), p. 64.
2 Sandeep Bhardwaj, ‘India-Pakistan Ceasefire Agreement: An Overlooked Success Story’, South Asian Voices.
3 Ibid.
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This violence became even more fierce after both the states conducted nuclear weapons

tests in 1998 because lower-level conflicts could now be carried out under the umbrella of

nuclear deterrence – referred to as the stability-instability paradox4. Under these circumstances,

the trust deficit between both the sides increased significantly and there was an urgent message

to opt for peace by many world leaders. By elucidating on how India and Pakistan bridged the

trust deficit, this paper highlights the factors that led to the formal recognition of a ceasefire by

both the states in 2003.

A.G. Noorani, a reputed Indian lawyer and political commentator, says that “a durable,

guaranteed formal ceasefire must be the first step on the pyramid of peace with Confidence

Building Measures (CBMs) being the second and Kashmir/terrorism the final step for peace

between the two [states]”5. The sine qua non, then, to any buildup of trust and confidence is

the initiation of dialogue. And a sine qua non to any dialogue, between conflict-ridden states,

is the agreement on a bilateral ceasefire. Therefore, it is more or less agreed that a ceasefire is

the most important initial step in any peace process. As in the case of India and Pakistan, the

Ceasefire agreement, formally recognized by both sides in November 2003, was a verbal

agreement. Yet, the fact that it outlived the very peace process that it had started, which

collapsed in 2007, is astonishing. As this paper highlights in detail, factors at the systemic,

domestic and individual level put in place a formally recognized ceasefire – arguably the most

successful example of cooperation between the two states.

4 The Stability-Instability paradox states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability
of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between
them increases.
5 Saeed Ahmed Rid, ‘India and Pakistan: Formalizing the 2003 Ceasefire Agreement’, E-International Relations.
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At the Systemic Level

“After the 9/11 incident, a strong feeling of terror had seized the world.”6 The regional

security environment in South Asia had undergone significant changes. As Sanjeeb Mohanty

notes, “the US attack on Taliban forces in Afghanistan post-9/11, had altered the security

environment in the region, which might have compelled Pakistan to engage herself in the peace

process with India”7.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, both India and Pakistan realized that courting

American patronage was of significant importance. Since the mid-1990s, Pakistan slyly

assisted the Taliban to secure power in Afghanistan and resurrected the idea of protecting its

western border, while India put its weight behind demonstrating Pakistan as an untrustworthy

ally of the United States. 8 Therefore, a post-9/11 shift in the United States’ policy vis-à-vis the

Taliban forces, supported and sponsored by the ISI and the Pakistani Army, came as a shot in

the arm for the Indian state. Even President Musharraf, who soon realized that the Taliban had

failed spectacularly in maintaining power, was obliged to collaborate in the war against terror. 9

Although the United States’ shift in policy in South Asia was based primarily on its own

national security interests, it also had to uphold its image as the world’s sole superpower by

acting as an influential mediator between two nuclear weapon states.10

Moreover, following the 9/11, two important incidents took place in India the very same

year. First, the car bomb blast outside the State Assembly in Srinagar on October 1 st, and

second, the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on December 13 th. As a result, the Indian

state took stringent measures against Pakistan. In addition to dubbing the Pakistani state as the

sponsor of terrorism against India, the Indian state mobilized its troops along the LoC and its

6 Nabiha Gul, ‘Post-9/11 Pakistan-India Relations’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 57, No. 3, (PIIA, 2004), p. 70.
7 Sanjeeb Mohanty, ‘Indo-Pak Peace Process: Impact of Post-9/11 Factors’, Vol. 69, No. 2, The Indian Journal of
Political Science, (IPSA, 2008), p. 395.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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International Border with Pakistan, completely halted rail, road and air links with Pakistan, put

pressure on the Pakistani state to ban alleged terrorist organizations involved in the above-

mentioned attacks and working in Pakistan, and demanded the hand over of 20 alleged

terrorists involved in the same attacks.11

Due to structural shifts in global politics and the regional security environment, as

discussed above, the Indian state had a significant advantage in concentrating its effort to

garner support against the Pakistani state for abetting and sponsoring terrorism. The Indian

state took every opportunity to utilize the growing international concern over global terrorism

to implicate the Pakistani state in every way possible. 12 And since 2000, a republican US

President, who was more supportive of India than his predecessor and went way beyond means

to secure a civil-nuclear deal with India, considered India to be the more responsible state in

maintaining peace in South Asia.

Not surprisingly, the above-mentioned measures marked the beginning of an intense

stand-off between India and Pakistan. Relations between the two states worsened and violence

on the border increased drastically. As Sandeep Bhardwaj notes, “in the years leading up to the

ceasefire, violence on the border had skyrocketed, reaching more than 5700 incidents in

2002”13. At this stage, not only the United States but also the entire world community was in a

state of nerves vis-à-vis the growing tensity between India and Pakistan on the border, in the

post-9/11 scenario. To opt for peace was the urgent message from many world leaders.

The United States, as discussed above, played a crucial role in bringing both sides

together. Even the first multinational effort in this regard, which was made by Russia at the 16-

nation Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) held at Almaty on

11 Gul, 2004, op. cit., p. 69.

12 Ibid.
13 Bhardwaj, op. cit.
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June 6th, 2002, was in fact a US pushed move.14 Russian President Vladimir Putin and the heads

of state of other participating countries, played a proactive role in bringing President Musharraf

and Prime Minister Vajpayee to the table.15 Even though the meeting was termed to be largely

inconclusive, a slight shift in the Indian state’s stern policy towards the Pakistani state was

apparent. This slight shift was attributed to the possibility of a troops’ pull back hinted by the

Indian leadership and eased the war-like situation that had been simmering for over six months.

Concentrated efforts by the United States and other countries at the systemic level was

pivotal in realizing that a peace process was not insurmountable. Hence, bridging some of the

distance between the leaders of both the countries under systemic pressure and persuasion was

an important factor in formally recognizing a ceasefire. “Intense international pressure and

diplomatic efforts moved India and Pakistan towards détente.” 16 However, a consensus among

the polities of both the countries that conflict was counterproductive was another crucial factor.

At the Domestic Level

It was believed that violence along the LoC had reached its peak during the Kargil War

in 1999, when Pakistani troops, dressed as mujahideen, captured isolated posts of the Indian

Army. However, India’s success at Kargil did not reduce the violence. Instead, the violence

along the border became fiercer. As stated above, “in the years leading up to the ceasefire,

violence on the border had skyrocketed, reaching more than 5700 incidents in 2002” 17.

14 Gul, 2004, op. cit., p. 73.

15 Ibid.
16 Gul, 2007, op. cit., p. 57.
17 Bhardwaj, op. cit.
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Source: Border incidents collated by South Asia Terrorism Portal from government sources; insurgency-related

incidents collated from Annual Reports, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

The graph above shows the ‘Trends of Violence in Kashmir and along LoC’ from the

year 1990 to 2016. The yellow line is the ‘number of border incidents’ and the blue line is the

‘number of insurgency related incidents’. The official data of the Ministry of Home Affairs

shows that violence on the border had reached its peak in 2003. The violence was so widespread

and intense that Indians and Pakistanis felt that conflict was counterproductive. As Mohanty

argues, “there was a widespread acceptance within the political establishments of the two

countries that military means cannot bring any tangible benefits” 18. This belief was rooted in

the history of the conflict and cautious of the counterproductivity of conflict because of the

stability-instability paradox that operated under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence.

Moreover, the polities of both India and Pakistan did not accept the proxy war and

armed conflict as a means to achieve a solution to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.19 There

seems to have been a realization of this unacceptability within both political establishments.

18Mohanty, op. cit., p. 399.

19Newspaper articles in Pakistan (for example, The Dawn) and in India (for example, The Hindu), television
channels, academic journals and various other platforms disseminated public opinion on a national and
international level about the unacceptability of an armed conflict to arrive at a solution.
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As a result, a thaw in the relations between both countries was witnessed when India proposed

a set of ‘12 Confidence-Building measures (CBMs)’ on October 22, 2003 and Pakistan

reciprocated with its ‘14 CBMs’ on October 29, 2003.20

It was under this tense atmosphere, which far exceeded even the levels of violence and

concerted public opinion today, that the CFA came into effect 21 on November 25, 2003.

At the Individual Level

An important aspect of International politics is the analysis of an event at the individual

level. This aspect was a substantial factor in the formal recognition of the ceasefire agreement

between India and Pakistan. Both Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf initiated

and reciprocated gestures that indicated a bridging of the distance between the two leaderships

and a sentiment for peace. To begin with, in an unexpected move, a thaw in India-Pakistan

relations came in when Prime Minister Vajpayee offered a hand of friendship to Pakistan at a

rally in Srinagar on April 18th, 2003.22 In his speech he said that “we can change our friends

but we cannot change our neighbours”. Nabiha Gul claims that this necessity is one of the

primary factors which compels the two states to normalize their relations after every conflict 23.

However, Sanjeeb Mohanty argues that Prime Minister Vajpayee was highly inclined to

establish peaceful initiatives since 1999. He suggests that “Vajpayee’s peace initiatives since

1999 have been seen as unilateral gestures by India in mending relations with Pakistan”24. He

supplements this argument with Prime Minister Vajpayee’s peace initiatives such as the bus

trip to Lahore to sign the Lahore Declaration, the Ramazan ceasefire along the LoC on

November 26, 2000, the Agra Summit and the above-mentioned speech in Srinagar. Many

20 Gul, 2007, op. cit., p. 57.

21 Bhardwaj, op. cit.
22 Gul, 2004, op. cit., p. 73.
23 Ibid.
24 Sanjeeb Mohanty, op. cit., p. 396.
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scholars and journalists have agreed that Prime Minister Vajpayee wanted to go down in history

as “a man who wanted peace with Pakistan”. Despite opposition within the BJP-led NDA

government, Mohanty argues, Vajpayee wanted to prove to the international community and

the Kashmiris that the government was ready to go the ‘extra mile’ for the sake of peace. 25

Subsequently, these unilateral gestures were not ignored by Pakistan. In fact, in 2003,

tentative steps were taken towards a peace process by President Musharraf as well. However,

the most important breakthrough occurred when Pakistan offered “an unconditional, unilateral

ceasefire along the Line of Control in a public statement” 26. This was a highly commendable

initiative by President Musharraf despite the back and forth over the peace process in the

summer of 2003. As a result, “India announced that it was not only willing to reciprocate but

would also extend the ceasefire along the International Boundary and the Siachen Glacier”27.

This pragmatism, supplemented by unilateral gestures, strengthened the willingness of

both the leaders to agree on and formally recognize a ceasefire. Although some critics believed

that the rapprochement process with India and the ceasefire agreement was a tactical ploy by

President Musharraf28, their argument does not explain why the Ceasefire Agreement outlived

the presidency of General Musharraf and turned out to be a successful and durable step in the

peace process between the two countries.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to highlight that a confluence of systemic, domestic, and

individual-level factors has been responsible for the formal recognition of a ceasefire between

both India and Pakistan in 2003. At the systemic level, a policy shift by the United States and

25 Ibid., p. 397.
26 Bhardwaj, op. cit.
27 Ibid.
28 Mohanty, op. cit., p. 398.
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other states across the world post 9/11, led both sides to make certain concessional shifts in

their own policies vis-à-vis each other. Under immense international pressure, diplomatic

efforts were made in order to mend relations and build trust and confidence. The Ceasefire

Agreement was the first step “on the pyramid of peace” 29. At the domestic level, a widespread

acceptance within the political establishments of the two countries that military means cannot

bring any tangible benefits and the widely disseminated public opinion against conflict pushed

the leadership of both the states to negotiate a peace process. And at the individual level, the

unilateral gestures for peace made by the leaders of both the states conveyed that there was a

sentiment for peace.

Bridging the trust deficit and coming out of the shadows of the partition has been a

formidable challenge for Pakistan and India. 30 However, the delicate nature of the unresolved

disputes between Pakistan and India has always compelled them to move towards peace after

conflict.31 It is important to note that even though the traditional course of India-Pakistan

relations has time and again been marred by intense conflicts, it has also featured landmark

understandings such as the Indus Water Treaty in 1960, the Tashkent Declaration in 1966, the

Simla Agreement in 1972, the Lahore Declaration in 1999, and the Ceasefire Agreement in

2003. The larger lesson at hand is that cooperation between India and Pakistan is not

inconceivable. And that any such cooperation, even if a rarity, which shows “even a modicum

of success, needs to be nurtured and protected” 32.

29 Rid, op. cit.

30 Gul, 2007, op. cit., p. 64.
31 Gul, 2004, op. cit., p. 67.
32 Bhardwaj, op. cit.
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