PRINCIPLES & DOCTRINES for SUCCESSION ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid
he heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim
General Provisions
> Transmissible rights and obligations
Alvarez v. IAC
It is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity (mutual or successive
relationship to the same rights of property) with them in law or estate.
General transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs.
Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
Article 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. (transmissible right
and obligations)
Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
The heis is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case
of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is
not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased
must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is
in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
patrimonial
rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape
the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present
claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of
no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into
the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the
extent of the value of their inheritance.
Rabadilla v. CA
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law.
The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.
 Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
---
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to
take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of
the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.
In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case
under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate
the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of
the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve
clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."
> Rights & obligations extinguished by death
NHA v. Almeida
xxx all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in
the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article
774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety
Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil
Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that —
“Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.”
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the
debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from
him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and
Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming
Article 1311 already quoted.
“ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.”
“ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.”
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:
“Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession
are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and
cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased
was a party, touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
xxxxxxxxx
 “The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the
provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle,
the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be “third persons” in relation to any
contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by
right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting
thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.”
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not
altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must
be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said
heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is
ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled
to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence
of the progressive “depersonalization” of patrimonial rights and duties that, as
observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From
the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved
into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly
personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the
imprisonment for debt.
Three exceptions fixed by Article 1311:
(a) the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not
warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a
principal inducement for the contract. (stipulation)
(b) intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional
and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied,
but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the
provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere
indicate that they are non-transferable.
(c) not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes
reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority
(Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726),
partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the
Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no
provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the
surety. (Therfore, guaranty and suretyship is transmissible. The possession of integrity,
capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligations which
he guarantees are required only by law AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION. Therefore, it will
then become binding upon the parties, their assigns and their heirs.)
Solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in
such even had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement.
Testamentary Succession
Wills
> Characteristics
(disposition of property)
Seangio v. Reyes
The critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to
no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An
intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the
testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to
ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.
Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the
Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute
an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name
of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as
the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.
THE LAW FAVORS TESTACY OVER INTESTACY, the probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the
right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
(mortis causa)
Vitug v. CA
WON survivorship agreements are of mortis causa which should be
embodied in a will. - NO
A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or
complies with duties to take effect after his death." In other words, the bequest (gift
of real property if the T's intention to dispose of real property is clearly demonstrated
in the will) or device must pertain to the testator.
The monies subject of savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it
must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the
marita. relations. Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for
obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly,
it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a
spouse's own properties to the other.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its
"survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation
with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the
other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is
to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract
depends on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to
occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake
ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been
held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under
Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. In either case, the
element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
> Law governing form (as to time of execution)
Enriquez v. Abadia
1. WILLS; PROBATE OF WILL; VALIDITY OF WILLS AS TO FORM DEPENDS
UPON LAW IN FORCE AT TIME OF EXECUTION; TITLE OF EXECUTION. — The validity of
a will as to form is to be judged not by the law in force at the time of the testator’s
death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of testator, the wishes of the testator
about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act.
2. ID.; EXECUTION OF WILLS; LAW SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED ADDING NEW
REQUIREMENTS AS TO EXECUTION OF WILLS; FAILURE TO OBSERVE FORMAL
REQUIREMENTS AT TIME OF EXECUTION INVALIDATES WILLS; HEIRS INHERIT BY
INTESTATE SUCCESSION; LEGISLATURE CAN NOT VALIDATE VOID WILLS. From the day
of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees
under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of will, which would invalidate
such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure
to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon
his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs
will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights
in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am.
Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
> Law governing content
Jimenez v. Fernandez
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; CIVIL CODE OF 1889; GOVERNS RIGHTS TO
INHERITANCE PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE (R.A. No. 386). — It is
well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263
of the Civil Code provides as follows: "Rights to the inheritance of a person who died
with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . ." (Rollo, p. 17).
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of
land then covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936
(Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with
the Civil Code of 1889.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFIED CHILDREN; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.
— Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically
held that: "To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in
force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so far as
the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child
legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child — for
illegitimate not natural are disqualified
to inherit." (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935). Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab
was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab)
and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child
because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana
Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently
Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any
successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Miciano v. Brimo
1. FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION. — In the absence of evidence to the
contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of
the Philippines. (Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472) - DOCTRINE OF
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
 3. SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW;
NULLITY OF. — If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the
testator’s order that his property be distributed in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition
is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his
testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus
making the institution unconditional. - NATIONALITY THEORY (ARTICLE 15)
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of

Cayetano v. Leonidas
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the the decedent must apply.
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner
and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2).

xxx xxx xxx

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect

to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and

regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Art. 1039.