Republic of the Philippines After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
SUPREME COURT Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECIS ION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double
Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC),
with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
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(S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration
but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC
the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No.
2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning
dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC
was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a
judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A.
2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No.
82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision
forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage
to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s
motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely
a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803;
and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation
of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of
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its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to
death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman
fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he
failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records.
Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for
which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner
sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether
Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall
be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
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2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such
help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to
(1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence"
(paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses
set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal
laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to
bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga
the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in
quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat
quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-
crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating
only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating
circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range
all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the
actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that
their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear
a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being
limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal
code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The
contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is
not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades
after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of
crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in
post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and
the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
4|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes.
Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or
acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same
reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving,"
arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before
the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences
alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.),
People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.),
People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People
v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.),
People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en
banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by
the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under
the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the
accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with
both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific
act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same
act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its
logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of
authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from
the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution
was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence
suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to
rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an
accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of
Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the
pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the
case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific
act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same
act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
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xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for
the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier
stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the
Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION
dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals
erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding
petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set
aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless
act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must
perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not
death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a
motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also
involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with
"Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former,
the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we
quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People
v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and
dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and
Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with
the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision
between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection
with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the
collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these
two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal,
Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was
convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the
meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one
of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court
of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion
of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On
appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed
by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the
accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving
under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in
a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government
to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property
thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50.
Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr.
Justice Montemayor —
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The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the
offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court
of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether
the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions
of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention
might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant,
the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been
previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and
hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We
declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the
ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP
court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said
State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely
on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower
court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said
ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the
present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there
is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of
the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views
expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-
12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from
its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of
the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony
but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine
in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human
interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that
of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons
and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave
offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-
crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences
of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which
involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one
quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a
light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second
7|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and
filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the
MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under
Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to
impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its
medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing"
of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or
less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light
offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case
Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution
of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of
their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles
v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge
alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property
the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there
should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into
two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53
(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article
365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the
"complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its
present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz
lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2)
we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number
and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain
the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction
between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge
for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva]
x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to
press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of
the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54
(Emphasis supplied)
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Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of
charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting
acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are
avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to
proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct
concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article
365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect
of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2
February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner
Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECIS ION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to
this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the
Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18,
in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1)
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to
Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act);
(2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation
of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun
Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of
origin respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish
crystalline substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent
plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
license or prescription therefor.
9|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm,
automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic
backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having secured
the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm
automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same
along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date which is
covered by an election period, without first securing the written permission or
authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the COMELEC
Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations
and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not
Guilty" be entered for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases
followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo
Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for
unlawful possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly
known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons,
Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the
drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to
call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested
while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and
company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police
operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor,
respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they
were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery
of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer
(Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police
operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then
proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m.
of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of
the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he
(witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached
Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon
hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open
the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the
front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380
9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other
members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the
following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later
analyzed as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally
known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of ₱650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one
mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then
and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused
Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer
to Evidence.9 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the
effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as
regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991)
and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly,
trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest
10|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against
him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the
demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January
1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the
warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven
its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued
the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the
accused is acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section
16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and
Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a
total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380
9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government
and the branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous
Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and
Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the
officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local Government, is
ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the
confiscated BMW car to its registered owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial
court erred -
I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND
THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED
AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A
RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH
AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND
OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the
petition, required the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten
days from notice. Private respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply,18 which the
Office of the Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial
court’s resolution granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all
the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the
police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a
search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41,
Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law,
11|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of
appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege
which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of
Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same
provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in
double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records
of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from
a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the
very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows
appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on
the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some
exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule
on double jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-
Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military
men) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial
court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.
This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents
accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories,
that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the
erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory
of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of
the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases
herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law
and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor
and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our
judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy
had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in
the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In
death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the
relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the
century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal
cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs.
Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage,
L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
12|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence. In point
is the fairly recent case of People v. Uy,23 which involved the trial court’s decision
which granted the two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused
therein, both with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective
charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for
certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double
jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United
States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and
irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas,
Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are
illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final
repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As
held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there. (Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed the accused’s acquittal upon demurrer to evidence
filed by the accused with leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due
execution and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which
supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime
charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained the CA’s power to review
the order granting the demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment
or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave
abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order
amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the
rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-
acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court
cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights
13|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green
expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to
the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose", a desire to know the exact extent of one’s
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only
instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the
trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of
Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III,
filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,25 we have enumerated
the distinction between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions
which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we
explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot
be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of
the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally
beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an
error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original
jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the
proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit,
while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part
of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties
to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the
petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties
(the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.
14|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review
should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the
petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days
from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of
the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the
tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a
plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not
required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are
two different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor
successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of
a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal
will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this
case, this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed
dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondent’s
right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of
certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, the instant
petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest
and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be
conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.26
However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which
thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may
be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar,
the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of
all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial
court’s ratiocination is quoted as follows:
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.

The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his xxx xxx xxx
warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful
as asserted by the defense.
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a
person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street,
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when Ermita, Manila.
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
one confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa xxx xxx xxx
Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers
arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of
visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was
the accused?
about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed
AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession
was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom
bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed we have previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu
gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an
unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to xxx xxx xxx
his arrest.
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car A. We waited for him.
were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the
Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver’s seat of the car. The police officers had xxx xxx xxx
no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the
accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein. Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?

On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito
Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL’S TESTIMONY
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.

15|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place? A. Yes, Sir.

A. That was when the accused arrived. Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?

Q. How many of your approached him. A. Yes, Sir.

A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives. xxx xxx xxx

Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness? Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling
Agency, is it not?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him
to open the back compartment of his car. A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that? .Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?

A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and
likewise when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol
at the place under the seat of the driver.
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee
of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and
your companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu
by Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then what happened? Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as
Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
examination.
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
xxx xxx xxx
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8,
November 15, 1996). Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it
not?
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on
May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
16|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
it not?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
COURT: The same date?
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated,
A. Yes, Sir. Teck mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.

Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not? COURT: Why were these people, arrested?

A. Yes, Sir. A. For violation of R.A. 6425.

Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it COURT: How were they arrested?
not?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996) another previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.

SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL’S TESTIMONY COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?

PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons,
SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they
Q. What is you role or participation in this case? were arrested they divulged the name of the source.

A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir. COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?

xxx xxx xxx A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the
name of the person from whom they get shabu.
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested
him, Mr. Witness? COURT: Whose name did they mention:

A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let
inside his car. them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to
order another supply of shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please
tell us the antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these A. Yes, Your Honor.
items?
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio. A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
17|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source A. We approached him.
of the shabu?
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: What was the information?
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang. you do with that?

COURT: What did you do when you were told about that? A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the
one who inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN,
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning. pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996).

COURT: When? CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT

A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996. COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this
Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men
that your team arrested. One of whom is a police officer.
COURT: At what place?

A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria A: Yes, Sir.
Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were
COURT: What happened during the stake out? confiscated from them?

A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car A: Yes, Sir.
together with his driver.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him? discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug
that were confiscated from the three men that you have arrested?
A. Probably, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also
these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside
the compartment of the car.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?

18|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
your team?
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the
A: I was the one whom investigated them. gun is when he was bodily search?

xxx xxx xxx A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo
handed to me the gun.
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from
them at the time of the (their) arrest? Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?

A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were A: None, Sir.
working for the accused.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of something unlawful or illegal?
shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that
is scheduled on? A: No, Sir.

A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on
the matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did
you and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that
lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team
from searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person
and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the
accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless
arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory
of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded
the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the
incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a
consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the
case for lack of evidence.

xxx xxx xxx Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that
"inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant
of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accused’s possession had been
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
was carrying a gun?
19|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been
made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and
therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the
People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest.
Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant
prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the
private respondent to open his BMW car’s trunk to see if he was carrying illegal
drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is
a matter of credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be
done in an appeal of a criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for
review, but not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of the
trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order consequent to a
demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the
factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The
only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of
the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal
basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on
warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be
lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect
where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause
that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest
20|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a)
of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.291awphi1.nét
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would
reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to
open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his
friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there
can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section
5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is
not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5.
What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang
was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of
shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of
the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that
there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17,
which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the
description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless
arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is
likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the
marijuana found in appellant’s possession during a search without a warrant, because
it had been illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of Rights:

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted
his arrest and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing
objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the
arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.

We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.34

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

21|CrPRO-R-117|Manco

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88889 October 11, 1990
MARIETTA SALDANA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
R.P. Nogales Law Offices for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence, may
the case be remanded for further proceedings?
Petitioner Marietta Saldana was charged with the crime of estafa under the following
information:
That on or about and during the periods comprised of from April,
1982 to December, 1983 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then a Collecting Officer
of the Valle Verde Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc.,
represented by Miguel Roberto and Mercedes Tan, President and
Director, respectively, and as such, she was authorized to collect
from the members of the association payments representing their
amortization dues and other association fees, received from the
members the amount of P642,538.00 with the obligation on the
part of the accused to remit said collections to the said association,
but the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from
complying with her obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply, misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and
benefit the amount of P642,538.00 and despite demands to remit
22|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
and/or turn over the said collections, she failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the aforementioned amount of P642,538.00.
(Emphasis supplied; pp. 4-5, Rollo.)
The petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
At the trial on May 27, 1986, the prosecution presented Mercedes Tan, vice-
president of the complainant Association, as its witness. She Identified certain
exhibits, including a Consolidated Financial Report dated February 24, 1984
allegedly submitted by the petitioner to the Association. The report showed that
petitioner had collected a total of P2,855,133.93 as occupancy fees and association
dues from members of the Association and disbursed P1,915,719.50 from April 25,
1982 to December 31, 1983, leaving a balance of P939,414.43. She issued three (3)
checks to cover the balance, one of which, for P 642,538.86, bounced, and became
the subject of Crim. Case No. 64758.
On June 13, 1986, the trial court, upon request of the prosecution, issued a subpoena
duces tecum and ad testificandum ordering the Manager of the Citytrust Banking
Corporation, Ortigas Branch, to appear and testify on June 17, 1986. The Manager
was also required to bring the ledger of Current Account No. 32-00066-9 for the
period of March 1, 1982 to March 1, 1984, the signature card for the account, the
Board resolution authorizing the opening of the account, and the deposit slips of the
account for the period of March 1, 1982 to March 1, 1984. The People and the
Association alleged that the account was opened by the Association and the
petitioner was instructed to deposit her collections therein.
The Bank Manager did not come to court on June 17, 1986. The prosecution asked
that a show-cause order be issued to him. In the meantime, the prosecution called
Linel Garcia Cuevas to testify that as a member of the Association she paid her
amortizations and association dues to the petitioner, and to Identify the receipts
issued to her by the petitioner. The defense objected to the presentation of Cuevas
because she was not the offended party. The trial judge sustained the objection,
ruling that "granting that she (accused) received the money from the members and
did not give the amount to the Corporation, it should be the individual members who
will file the necessary complaint, not the corporation." (p. 8, Rollo.)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution. Memoranda were
submitted by both sides.
The trial was reset. At the prosecution's behest, another subpoena was served on the
Bank Manager to bring the records of Current Account No. 32-00066-9 for the
hearing on July 29, 1986, but he again failed to appear in court. The prosecution
manifested that it had a ready witness and other evidence besides. However, the
court reset the trial because the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the
court's order sustaining the defense' objection to Cuevas' testimony, was still
unresolved.
On August 8, 1986, the prosecution received a copy of the accused's "Motion to
Consider the Prosecution to Have Rested Its Case and to Dismiss the Case for
Insufficiency of Evidence." The prosecution promptly opposed it.
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the prosecution informed the court that it had
other witnesses to present and that it would file a petition for certiorari should the
trial court deny its pending motion for reconsideration of the order disallowing
Cuevas, and other association members from testifying.
On September 9, 1986, the court denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration
of the order barring Cuevas and other members of the Association from testifying.
The court also terminated the presentation of further evidence for the prosecution and
dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence.
The People elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
(CA-G.R. SP No. 10227).
On February 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the respondent Judge dated
September 9, 1986 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 64758 is REINSTATED and the respondent
Judge is DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to proceed with the
further presentation of their evidence including but not limited to
the testimony of members/homeowners of the complainant
Association regarding payments made by them to the accused.
Costs against the private respondent. (p. 44, Rollo.)
The petitioner seeks a review of that decision alleging that the Court of Appeals:
1. failed to "capture" the facts and the issues involved;
2. erred in stating that it is immaterial whether it was the
Association (as a corporate entity) or its members who suffered the
damage and prejudice, and consequently erred in ordering the
presentation of evidence on a matter not alleged in the information;
23|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
3. erred in granting the petition for certiorari despite the failure of
the prosecution to file a motion for reconsideration of the
questioned order of dismissal of September 9, 1986 of the trial
court; and
4. erred in ordering the reopening of the case, violating the rule on
double jeopardy.
The petition has no merit. Petitioner's insinuation that the Court of Appeals did not
"capture" or comprehend the facts and issues in this case is officious and impertinent.
The reason for the defense's objection to the presentation of Cuevas as a prosecution
witness was "its assumption that she would be presented to testify as the party
damaged or prejudiced." (p. 2, Petition, p. 14, Rollo.) That assumption was baseless
for the prosecution had clearly manifested that Cuevas would "prove that she is one
of the members of the association who paid amortizations and association dues to the
accused and also to Identify receipts which bear the signature of the accused." (p. 4,
TSN, June 17, 1986, cited on p. 7 of the Petition.) The error of the trial court's theory
that even if Cuevas testified, she would be unable to prove that damage or prejudice
was suffered by the Association was pointed out by the Court of Appeals as follows:
Whether the Association is prejudiced by the acts of the accused
can be resolved only if the prosecution is allowed to present the
members/homeowners as witnesses and the official receipts as
evidence. Assuredly the Association stands to suffer if it can no
longer collect the amortization and association dues from
members/homeowners who have already paid the same to the
accused. If the testimony of the members/homeowners is not
admitted, how can the Association prove that the accused received
the money in its behalf? How can it prove that the accused was
able to collect from the members/homeowners because they
recognized her as collecting officer or agent of the Association? If
the receipts are not admitted, how can the Association prove that
the accused received payments in its behalf? (p. 43, Rollo.)
As the offended party, the Association, is an artificial person, the only way it can
"testify" on the damage and prejudice that it suffered is through the testimony of its
members.
In this case, it was established that petitioner was employed by the Association as its
collector, hence, she occupied a fiduciary position in relation to the Association. The
By-Laws or Executive Order No. 535 did not prohibit her appointment as such by the
Association subject to the Treasurer's direction and control.
People vs. Yu Chai Ho, 53 Phil. 874, is still sound doctrine. The law is clear that
"another" (hence, not necessarily the owner of the money or goods misappropriated)
should have been prejudiced by the breach of trust committed by the accused. The
onus of the offense is the infidelity of the accused to his trust by which another
suffers damage or prejudice.
The prosecution's failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the trial court before
commencing certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals, was not fatal to the
petition for this rule does not apply "where the proceeding in which the error
occurred is a patent nullity," or "where the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental
right to due process taints the proceedings against him in the court below not only
with irregularly but nullity," or "when special circumstances warrant immediate and
more direct action" (Matute vs. CA, 26 SCRA 768). Since the prosecution was
deprived of due process, the case is an exception to the rule requiring a previous
motion for reconsideration before a petition for certiorari may be filed.
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by
the trial court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of
double jeopardy is a competent court. The trial court in this case was ousted from its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting
its right to complete the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had
not been terminated. The remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a
continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166).
In Bocar, an information for theft was filed against the three accused therein who,
upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty." Respondent Judge conducted a "summary
investigation" questioning the complainant and the accused, after which he issued an
order dismissing the case. Acting upon a special civil action seeking the annulment
of said order, this Court found that the prosecution was denied due process as it
never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In setting aside the order of dismissal and remanding the case for trial on the
merits, this Court held:
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974];
Serino vs. Zosa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People
vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs.
Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's light to due process raises a serious
24|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered
in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen
vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs.
Enage,
L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded
as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa,
supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand
of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. (at pp. 170-172.)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied, and the decision dated February 28,
1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10227 is affirmed. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
25|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
G.R. No. 158157 September 30, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and VILMA CAMPOS, Petitioners,
vs.
LOUEL UY, TEOFILO PANANGIN, HON. JUDGE MAMINDIARA P.
MANGOTARA, Acting Judge, Br. 44, Initao, Misamis Oriental, Respondent.
DECIS ION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Decision dated April 7, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 44, granting the separate demurrer to evidence of accused Louel Uy and
Teofilo Panangin resulting in their "acquittal" for murder due to insufficiency of
evidence, but nevertheless holding them jointly and severally liable to pay ₱35,000
to the heirs of the victim Rabel Campos representing "vigil and burial expenses" is
being assailed in the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court by the People and the mother of the victim.
The victim, Rabel Campos, was found dead with several stab wounds in the morning
of March 23, 2001 along the National Highway of Maputi, Naawan, Misamis
Oriental.
A suspect in the commission of the crime, Teofilo Panangin (Panangin), was arrested
on January 22, 2002 by elements of the Special Operation Group and Police
Community Precinct 1 of Iligan City.
During the investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation-Iligan
District Office (NBI-ILDO) on January 23, 2002, Panangin executed a Sworn
Statement1 with the assistance of Atty. Celso Sarsaba of the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO).
In his January 23, 2002 Sworn Statement, Panangin related as follows:
On March 22, 2001, around 8:00 p.m., while he was at the Justy Inn, Tibanga, Iligan
City, his former employer Louel Uy (Uy), in whose house he stayed from 1993 to
1997, arrived, telling him that he had a problem and that it was he (Panangin) who
could help him.
26|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
He and Uy thereafter repaired to the Sanitarium Hospital where Uy’s grandmother
had just died, after which they proceeded to the house of Uy where the latter gave
him a stainless steel knife, instructing him to keep it as they had "work to do."
Later that night, he and Uy, on board a red Isuzu vehicle, proceeded to Quezon
Avenue near the Cathedral where they stopped. Uy then called by cellular phone his
live-in partner Rabel, who later was to be the victim of a gruesome death, and
instructed her to proceed to where they were. As instructed, Rabel repaired to where
they were and joined them on board the vehicle. The three of them thereupon
proceeded to the direction of Pagahan, Initao, Misamis Oriental and on reaching this
place, Uy negotiated a U-turn.
Upon reaching the National Highway in Naawan, Misamis Oriental, Uy stopped the
vehicle and alighted. Uy then forcibly pulled Rabel out of the vehicle and as Uy was
holding Rabel tightly, he instructed him to stab her. Albeit he was hesitant, as Uy
shouted at him and threatened to shoot him with his cal. 45 pistol tucked at his waist,
he had no choice but to follow Uy’s instruction. He thus stabbed Rabel once at the
stomach.
After he stabbed Rabel, she was able to run away. Uy, however, took the knife from
him and chased Rabel. On catching up with her, Uy dragged her to the ground and
stabbed her several times until she expired. He and Uy then left for Iligan City,
arriving thereat at 1:30 a.m. of March 23, 2001.
At the time Panangin gave his Sworn Statement, he was shown a pair of sandals,
found and taken by the police at the scene of the crime, bearing the markings
"Neckersman Switzerland" which he confessed to be his, he adding that it was given
to him by Edgar Uy, a cousin of Uy. He was also shown a pair of sandals, also
recovered from the crime scene, bearing the markings "WAGON & RACKS," which
he identified to be Rabel’s.
Following the execution by Panangin of his sworn statement-extrajudicial confession
on January 23, 2002, Atty. Patricio S. Bernales, Jr., District Agent-in-Charge of the
NBI-ILDO, filed on even date a case for murder against Panangin and Uy before the
10th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Lugait-Manticao-Naawan.
During the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, Panangin’s sworn statement
and witnesses were presented.
After the preliminary investigation of Panangin was concluded or on January 24,
2002, MCTC Investigating Judge Jose U. Yamut, Sr. issued a Resolution, 2 the
pertinent portions of which read:
From the evidence adduced or submitted, we are of the OPINION that the killing of
CAMPOS was attended by (a) craft; (b) superior strength and evident premeditation
(For UY x x x).
The OVERT ACTS OF UY AND PANANGIN show that BOTH had the UNITY OF
DESIGN and both agreed to kill CAMPOS and decided to kill CAMPOS.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, let a WARRANT OF ARREST issue against TEOFILO
PANANGIN, for the FELONY of MURDER with NO BAILBOND
RECOMMENDED. PANANGIN is principal by direct participation in the killing of
CAMPOS. (Citations omitted)
xxx
The investigating judge then directed the issuance of subpoena to Louel Uy for him
to appear at a preliminary investigation scheduled on February 4, 2002. The records
do not show if the preliminary investigation scheduled on February 4, 2002 pushed
through and if it did, what the result was. The records, however, show that Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Mayorico M. Bodbod found the evaluation of the investigating
judge to be in order, hence, he affirmed the same by Resolution3 dated March 19,
2002 and recommended the indictment of Uy and Panangin for murder.
An Information4 was thus filed on April 5, 2002 charging Uy and Panangin with
murder as follows:
That on March 22, 2001 at around 11:30 o’clock more or less in the evening at
Maputi, Nawan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, Louel Uy and Teofilo Panangin with
intent to kill and treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one Rabel Campos, several
times which resulted to her untimely death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Republic Act No. 7659.
When arraigned, both accused entered a plea of not guilty.5
Aside from the sworn statement-extrajudicial confession of Panangin and
photographs6 of the victim Rabel taken when she was found dead lying on a grassy
area, the prosecution presented 11 witnesses, the most vital of which insofar as the
resolution of the petition at bar is concerned are the testimonies of PAO Atty. Celso
Sarsaba, NBI agent Gerardo Tamayo, Uy’s girlfriend Iris Paumar and her mother
Julieta Paumar which follow after their respective names.
27|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
Atty. Celso Sarsaba7 of the PAO: He assisted Panangin during the investigation
conducted on January 23, 2002 at Police Station I. Before Panangin gave a statement,
Gerardo Tamayo (Tamayo) of the NBI informed him of his constitutional rights and
warned him that his statement might be used against him, but Panangin went ahead
and gave his statement.
Tamayo then proceeded to investigate Panangin who was handcuffed at the inception
of the investigation, although in the course thereof his handcuffs were removed as he
was allowed to smoke. The investigation was in the form of question and answer,
and Panangin had the opportunity to review every item thereof which was translated
into the Visayan dialect.
After the interview, he asked Panangin whether he had something to replace or
amend or substitute in his statement to which Panangin replied in the negative.
Panangin thereafter affixed his signature on his statement in his presence.
NBI agent Gerardo Tamayo:8 He investigated Panangin who informed him that he
had no counsel to assist him. He thus requested PAO lawyer Atty. Sarsaba to assist
Panangin who had earlier been arrested not in connection with the death of Rabel but
with another case. In apprising Panangin of his constitutional rights, he spoke to him
in Visayan.
Iris Paumar:9 Echoing the contents of her affidavit executed on May 2, 2001,10 she
related that Uy, with whom she had a five-month romantic relationship, together with
Panangin, went to her house on March 23, 2001 for her birthday. A few weeks before
Rabel’s death, she and Rabel figured in a slapping incident.
Julieta Paumar:11 Her daughter Iris had a romantic relationship with Uy who,
together with Panangin, went to their house at Purok 8, Tipanoy, Iligan City at dawn
of March 23, 2001 for her daughter’s birthday. She affirmed the contents of her
affidavit12 dated April 10, 2001 which she executed in connection with the case.
Following the filing and the subsequent admission on February 4 and 13, 2003 of its
Formal Offer of Evidence, including Panangin’s Sworn Statement, the prosecution
rested its case.
Thereafter, Panangin, with leave of court, filed on March 3, 2003 a demurrer to
evidence13 on the ground that when he executed his extra-judicial confession, his
rights under Sec. 12, Bill of Rights of the Constitution were violated in that he was
"man-handled and detained . . . and while being handcuffed his extra-judicial
confession was taken by . . . Tamayo" who, however "failed and never informed
[him] of his constitutional rights as accused."
To the demurrer, Panangin attached his Affidavit14 dated July 1, 2002 retracting his
January 23, 2002 sworn statement-extra-judicial confession.
Uy, also with leave of court, filed a separate demurrer to evidence15 essentially
echoing the grounds-bases of Panangin’s demurrer.
More than a month from the filing of the demurrer to evidence, the trial court, by
Decision16 dated April 7, 2003, granted the demurrer, the dispositive portion of
which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, the demurrer to evidence is hereby granted and the accused Louel
Uy and Teofilo Panangin are hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
However, accused are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to pay ₱35,000.00 to the
heirs of the victim as their heirs in the vigil and burial expenses of the victim.
Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In granting the separate demurrer of the accused, the trial court held that the
testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution is hearsay, if not speculatory; that
there was no evidence adduced to the effect that Uy was the last person seen with the
victim; that Panangin’s extra-judicial confession-sworn statement of January 23,
2002 was not voluntary as it was subsequently retracted (on July 1, 2002) and
even if it were not, it is inadmissible since "[i]t is a fruit of poisonous tree" as it
was "obtained from Panangin as a result of his illegal arrest."
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the People and the victim’s mother, raising
the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION EXECUTED BY
ACCUSED, TEOFILO PANANGIN IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THAT
WOULD WARRANT HIS OWN CONVICTION FOR THE GRUESOME CRIME
OF MURDER OF WHICH HE IS BEING INDICTED[;]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;] and
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE ACTING JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHICH WOULD RESULT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ON
THE GROUND THAT THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION EXECUTED BY
ACCUSED, TEOFILO PANANGIN IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AFTER
28|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
ADMITTING THE SAME TO BE PART OF THE EVIDENCE IN CHIEF OF THE
PROSECUTION.17
Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it
granted the demurrer to evidence. They contend that when Panangin executed his
extra-judicial confession, he was fully apprised of his constitutional rights and the
basic requirements of law were fully complied with; and that in any event, since the
trial court admitted Panangin’s extra-judicial confession, the issue of its admissibility
had become moot and academic.
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals18 explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double
jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United
States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and
irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas,
Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are
illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final
repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As
held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:19
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there. (Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.20
In People v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the
special civil action of certiorari, the remedy availed of by petitioners:
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact
definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
This Court finds that the trial court committed not only gross reversible error of
judgment but also was actuated with grave abuse of discretion, exceeding the
parameters of its jurisdiction, in holding that Panangin’s retracting of his confession
shows that the execution thereof was involuntary and that in any event it was
inadmissible as it was "a fruit of [a] poisonous tree."
The trial court blindly accepted the claim of the defense that the confession was not
made voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit executed by Panangin on July 1, 2002 or
more than 5 months after his sworn statement-confession was given and after the
prosecution rested its case, which affidavit Panangin was not even called to
identify and affirm at the witness stand, hence, hearsay.
The decision of the trial court undoubtedly deprived the prosecution of due process
as it was not given the opportunity to check the veracity of Panangin’s alleged
retraction.
It bears emphasis that the State, just like the accused, is entitled to due process.
People v. Bocar so teaches:22
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded
29|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, the exclusion of the extra-judicial confession on the basis of Panangin’s
unsubstantiated claim that it was not voluntarily made is contrary to what People v.
Porio23 instructs:
A confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and
untrue. Appellant was unable to discharge this burden. He failed to present evidence
that he was "intimidated or practically forced to execute or sign his Sinumpaang
Salaysay.
xxx
All the above facts indicate that appellant executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay freely
and voluntarily. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction by appellant of his
solemnly made statements at the mere allegations of force, intimidation, violence or
torture, without any proof whatsoever. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to
overturn the presumption of voluntariness.
xxx
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
En passant, on the defense claim that in the execution of his sworn statement,
Panangin was not properly apprised of his constitutional rights by the assisting
counsel, Atty. Sarsaba’s testimony shows otherwise:
ATTY.CARASCO
Q During the time when the investigation was conducted were you present?
A Whole duration of the investigation I was sitting beside the accused.
Q Could you tell us the length of time the investigation was conducted? How many
hours?
A In so far as I can remember it started at around 1:30 and we finished at quarter to
six. So, more than four hours.
Q Before the investigation started, did you have a chance to talk to accused
Teofilo Panangin?
A Yes. After Special Agent Gerardo Tamayo had informed him of his
constitutional rights, I asked him again if he would still continue or whether his
statement is voluntary and he was not coerced to give his voluntary statement.
A As far as the contents of that voluntary statement of the accused, it was reviewed
before the final printing of the statement. All questions and answers were again
reviewed and I asked him again whether he has something to replace but he said in
negative.26
xxx

Q After appraising the right of the accused did he still continue to give his Q You were present when Investigator Gerardo Tamayo enumerated to the
voluntary statement? accused his constitutional rights?

A Yes, ma’am.24 A Yes.

xxx
Q And in the first part of the statement the language used is English. Could you
recall if the given statement was reduced into the dialect known to accused
Teofilo Panangin?
A After Special Agent Gerardo Tamayo had been through with the question
and answer I had the opportunity to review every item of the question
translated into Visayan dialect which I asked the accused whether he has
something to replace, amend or substitute and he persistedly affirmed that there
is nothing to be changed.25
xxx
Q It was Special Agent Tamayo who told the accused of his constitutional rights
and not you?
A At first, it was Special Agent Tamayo who informed him of his constitutional
rights and I again asked him whether his statement to be given by him are
voluntary and not coerced.
Q You asked the accused only if his statement are voluntary?
A Yes.
Q And that question was asked after the sworn statement was made and ready for
signing, right?

(CROSS EXAMINATION BY ATTY. MARANDA) A Before and after.

Q Compañero, you will attest to the truth in correctness of all the contents of the Q The right to which the accused had been allegedly informed by Agent
Sworn Statement given by Panangin, consisting of four pages? Tamayo of his right to remain silent and the right to choose his own counsel was
indicated in the sworn statement?
A I will attest.
A Yes.
Q And that these contents, all of these are all true and correct to the best of your
knowledge? Q No other right?

A Yes. A All the rights.

Q And that you read this, particularly the Sworn Statement of Loloy Panangin and Q And what are these rights?
you see no mistakes of the statement?
A His right to independent counsel, his right to remain silent and he has the
right to choose.
30|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
Q So the constitutional rights of the accused to which he was informed were all A He still continued, Your Honor.
enumerated in the sworn statement, right?
Q Did you explain him in Visayan dialect?
A Yes.27
A Yes. All were translated into Visayan dialect.28
xxx
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Q Since it was the NBI who requested you to appear on your office, what did you do
when you arrived? The affidavit of retraction, attached to the defense’s demurrer to evidence - basis of
its thesis that Panangin’s sworn statement of January 23, 20002 was flawed due to its
COURT: involuntariness, being hearsay, the above-quoted categorical statements of Atty.
Sarsaba claiming otherwise stands unrefuted. The burden of the evidence thus passed
Witness may answer. to the defense.

A When I arrived there, I asked the NBI, Gerry Tamayo if this is the accused, sitting
beside him. I also talked to the accused and I informed him that I am his counsel, per
request by NBI, Gerry Tamayo and I also asked him if he will still continue to give
his statement voluntarily, that he was not coerced of course to give his sworn
statement.
The trial court’s ruling that even if Panangin’s confession were not retracted, it is
still inadmissible, being the "fruit of [a] poisonous tree" or illegal arrest, Sections 2
and 3 of Art. III of the Constitution read:29
xxx

ATTY. CARASCO: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
That will be all, Your Honor. any purpose shall be inviolable, . . .

COURT: SEC. 3. . . .

Q Is that the only question that you asked to the accused?
A As far as I can remember, the question and answer started right away, so I have no
opportunity to talk to him longer.
Q You did not ask him the effect of his voluntary confession?
A It w as part of the constitutional rights.
Q My question is whether or not you have told the accused regarding the effect
of his voluntary confession?
A Yes.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. . . . (Emphasis supplied),
The inadmissible evidence termed as "fruit of a poisonous tree" in jurisprudence is
that contemplated in above-quoted constitutional provisions. It refers to object, not
testimonial, evidence. And it refers to an object seized in the course of an illegal
search and seizure.
In fine, since as reflected above, the trial court committed not only gross errors of
judgment but also grave abuse of discretion in the grant of the defense’s demurrer to
evidence, no valid judgment was rendered, preventing jeopardy to attach.
A remand of the case for further appropriate proceedings is thus warranted and it
does not violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy.

Q What did he say?

31|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
This Court will not close its eyes to miscarriages of justice brought about by
precipitate actions taken by trial courts in criminal cases resulting to the acquittal of
the accused. As the court of last resort, it is its sacred duty to maintain its vigilance
against the haphazard application of the finality of acquittal rule on the ground of
double jeopardy, to insure that lawbreakers do not seek refuge thereunder to the
prejudice of public justice.

A final note. Also en passant, in holding that the extra-judicial confession of

Panangin is inadmissible and that the testimonial evidence adduced by the
prosecution amounts to mere suspicions and speculations, the trial court in effect
held that no evidence imputing authorship of the crime to the accused was presented.
But an acquittal based on that ground closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot be held
liable for such act or omission.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The April 7, 2003 Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 44 in Criminal Case No. 2002-
349 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to said court for further
proceedings in line with the foregoing disquisitions.

SO ORDERED.

32|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-61079-81 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIA LOREN QUIZADA, appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is the interesting combination of double jeopardy and defamation that has brought
this case all the way up and directly to this Court.
In three separate complaints filed with the office of the provincial fiscal of Surigao
del Sur, Cipriana B. Tranquilan accused Maria L. Quizada of having spoken of her,
on the occasions therein mentioned, as follows:
Si Nanie ka eyat, boring, bardot, kabiga-on kabit sa akong bana,"
which words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a
woman of ill repute, she has a love relationship with my husband,
she has taken from me my husband that is the reason why she did
not get married because she is a woman of bad reputation. 1
Si Nanie boring, bardal ka eyat, biga-on, dili na naminggo, nagtan-
an sa sine, gikumot and iyang totoy sa akong bana," which words
when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a woman of ill
repute, she will not get married, she went to the show and her
nipples had been squeezed by my husband. 2
Si Nanie boring, bardal ka eyat, biga-on dill na naminggo, nagtan-
an sa sine, gikumot ang iyang totoy sa akong bana," which words
when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a woman of ill
repute, she will not get married, she went to the show and her
nipples had been squeezed by my husband. 3
On the basis of these complaints, and after preliminary investigation, the assistant
provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, on September
33|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
14,1981, three separate informations for grave oral defamation against Quizada for
having disparaged Tranquilan in the following language:
Si Nanie ka eyat, boring, bardot, kabiga-on, kabit sa akong bana,
nangilog sa aking bana ugsa wala na naminggo kay hugaw na
babae," which words when translated into the English language
mean: "Nanie is a flirt, a prostitute, a whore, a paramour of my
husband, she grabbed my husband from me, that's why she is not
married because she is a dirty woman. 4
Si Nanie boring, bardot, ka eyat, dili na maningyo, nagtan-an sa
sine, gikumot ang iyong totoy sa akong bana," which words when
translated into English mean: "Nanie is a prostitute, whore, flirt,
she will not get married anymore, she went to the movies and her
nipples were touched and squeezed by my husband.5
Si Nanie, boring, bardot, ka eyat, biga-on dili na namingyot,
nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot ang iyang totoy sa akong bana," which
words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a prostitute,
whore, flirt, she will not get married anymore, she went to the
movies and her nipples were touched and squeezed by my
husband.6
Upon arraignment on February 18, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to all the
three informations.7 Thereafter, she moved to quash the same on the ground that the
charges should have been initiated not by the fiscal but upon complaint of the
offended party herself.8
The argument of the accused was that the remarks allegedly made by her imputed to
the complaining witness the crime of adultery, a private crime. Under Rule 110,
Section 4 (now Section 5), of the Rules of Court and Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, no criminal action for defamation imputing such offense "shall be
brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party."
The trial judge * agreed and granted the motion.9 The charges were dismissed and
the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution was denied. 10
The prosecution then came to this Court to challenge the dismissal, and that is how
double jeopardy entered the picture. The private respondent now claims that reversal
of the dismissal and reinstatement of the cases would violate her rights under Article
IV, Section 22 (now Article III, Section 21) of the Constitution.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argued that the crime imputed by the
alleged remarks was prostitution, a public offense. As such, it could be the basis of a
prosecution for defamation through an information filed by the fiscal.11
That is doubtless true. However, the Court notes that in addition to allegedly calling
the complainant a whore the private respondent is also charged in one information
with having described the former as "a paramour of my husband," which is a clear
imputation of adultery. A paramour is "one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking
the place without the legal rights of a husband or wife. A mistress; called also lover."
12 Accordingly, that imputation was covered by the aforecited Rule 110.
It is not denied that the charges were made through the informations filed by the
assistant provincial fiscal and not formally commenced in court by the offended
party. Nevertheless, it is also clear that these informations were based on the three
criminal complaints earlier filed by Tranquilan with the fiscal's office, which
conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation litigation thereon.
Conformably to the procedural rules then in force,13 the complaints and the records
of the preliminary investigation were transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of
the corresponding informations. Hence, although the charges were not initiated
through complaint of the offended party and the informations did not state that they
were based on her complaint, such circumstances did not deprive the respondent
court of jurisdiction petition.
A similar situation arose in People v. Rondina, 14 where the Court held:
Under the rule prevailing at the time this case was commenced and
tried in 1977, the complaint was considered part of the record at
the preliminary investigation and had to be transmitted to the trial
court upon the filing of the corresponding charge. Such complaint
was in fact transmitted as required and could therefore be judicially
noticed by the trial judge without the necessity of its formal
introduction as evidence of the prosecution. This conclusion is in
keeping with the doctrine embodied in People v. Perido, decided
by the Court of Appeals through Justice Montemayor (later a
member of this Court), who declared in part as follows:
The complaint in the case at bar was duly signed
by the mother of the offended party, but the
prosecuting attorney during the trial, failed to
introduce such complaint as part of the evidence
of the prosecution. Subsequently, however, said
complaint, which is part of the record of the
justice of the peace court before whom the case
34|CrPRO-R-117|Manco
was filed, was sent up to form part of the record
in the appeal. This cured the deficiency in the
evidence. Although not introduced in evidence,
the complaint may be regarded as part of the
record in the appellate court which can and does
take judicial notice thereof. (Moran's Law of
Evidence, p. 343 and Francisco's Evidence, p.
46, both citing the case of People v. Bautista,
G.R. No. 40621 [unpublished]).' (Emphasis
supplied.)
We note further that apart from the fact that the offended party's
sworn complaint was among the papers elevated to the Court of
First Instance that subsequently tried and decided the case, the
information itself expressly stated that it was being filed 'upon a
sworn complaint signed and filed by the offended woman.
Parenthetically, it is worth observing that the original Rule 112,
Section 12, of the Rules of Court, provided that upon the
conclusion of the pre investigation the judge or corresponding
officer shall transmit without delay to the clerk of the Court of
First Instance having jurisdiction of the offense the records of the
case . . .' By contrast, it is now provided in Section 8 of the same
rule, as revised in 1985, that 'the record of the preliminary
investigation whether conducted by a judge or a fiscall shalll not
form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court'
The allegation of double jeopardy is plainly without merit. As we have repeatedly
stressed, double jeopardy will attach if (a) a valid complaint or information (b) is
filed before a competent court or tribunal, and (c) after the accused shall have been
arraigned and entered a plea, (d) he is acquitted or convicted or the case is dismissed
without his express consent.15
The first three requisites are present in the case at bar but the fourth is not. It was the
petitioner herself who moved to quash the charges against her on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction. The dismissal was made not only with her express
consent but, indeed, upon her own motion.
There are only two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to
dismiss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when the ground is
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and the second is when the
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy
trial.16 None of these exceptions is present here.
We hold in sum that the criminal informations were validly filed under the
procedural rules in force at the time of such filing; that their dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction was erroneous; and that their reinstatement willl not violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy.

ACCORDINGLY, this petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the respondent judge

dated March 31, 1982, and March 24, 1982, are SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos.
942, 943 and 944 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

35|CrPRO-R-117|Manco