UST DC 2016 Legal Ethics Report

Dean’s Circle 2016
University of Santo Tomas

Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
LEGAL ETHICS
Supreme Court decisions penned by Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Table of Contents
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Legal Ethics ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer ............................................................................................. 1
To Society ......................................................................................................................................................... 1
To the Legal Profession .............................................................................................................................. 5
To the Courts .................................................................................................................................................. 6
To the Clients .................................................................................................................................................11
Notarial Practice ..........................................................................................................................................14
Judicial Ethics ...............................................................................................................................................16
Discipline of the Members of the Judiciary ......................................................................................16
Disqualification of Judges and Justices ..............................................................................................22
Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers .......................................................................25
Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographers ..........................................26
Retirement of Members of the Judiciary ..........................................................................................27
Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer

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To society
CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA
A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
There is gross misconduct when there is a transgression of some established or definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or
persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules.
Facts:
Atty. Rodolfo represented himself as an administrator of Mt. Crest Hotel before a certain
Jung Jong Chul, for purposes of leasing an office space at the hotel. A lease contract was
entered between Atty. Rodolfo and Jung without the knowledge of Corazon, the principal
stockholder of the family corporation which owns Mt. Crest Hotel. Notably, Atty. Rodolfo
signed over the printed name of one of the principal stockholders and even notarized the
document himself. Atty. Rodolfo also received the sum of P90,000.00 as rental deposit.
In the course of their dealings, Corazon also delivered jewelries worth P300,000.00 and a
Rolex watch worth P12,000.00 to Atty. Rodolfo for purposes of selling them. Despite
repeated demands, Atty. Rodolfo failed to deliver either the proceeds of the sale or the
items themselves.
The IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Rodolfo guilty of gross
misconduct, violation of the notarial law, and misappropriation of funds and property of the
client.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rodolfo is guilty of (1) gross misconduct, (2) violation of the notarial
law, and (3) misappropriation.
Ruling:
(1) YES. There is gross misconduct when there is a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the
corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules. Here, Atty.
Rodolfo took advantage of his apparent close relationship with Corazon by misrepresenting
himself to be authorized to enter into a contract of lease, and even receiving the benefits of
the said contract. Atty. Rodolfo’s acts therefore constitute gross misconduct.
(2) YES. The notarial law disqualifies a notary public from performing a notarial act if he or
she is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized. In this case, Atty.
Rodolfo became a party to the contract of lease when he affixed his signature above the
printed name of one of the principal stockholders without any qualification. When he
notarized the same contract, he went against the function of a Notary Public to guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangement.
(3) YES. Rule 16.03 of the CPR demands that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Having been tasked to sell such
valuables, Atty. Rodolfo was duty-bound to return them upon demand. Sure enough, the
absence of a lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Casuga and Corazon does not
exonerate the former. Both the CPR and case law penalize not only malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also gross misconduct not connected with the
professional duties of the lawyer.
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VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO

A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Facts:
Respondent borrowed from petitioner two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) to
secure the payment of the loan. Atty. Espejo (respondent) simultaneously issued and
turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five
thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due
date, the check was dishonoured. When respondent still refused to pay, petitioner filed a
criminal complaint against her for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa.
However, respondent disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office which she personally received and continued to ignore petitioner’s
demands. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant administrative case against respondent
before the CBD.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the
worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment.
As the Court has held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his
professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s
professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear
at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP
which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed
the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1,
Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA

A.C. No. 7434, August 23, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character.
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession.
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Facts:
A disbarment case was initiated by petitioners-spouses Tejada before the IBP against Atty.
Antoniutti K. Palaa for his continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation. It
was alleged that Atty. Palaa borrowed money from the petitioners in the amount of
P100,000 so that he may have the Torrens title of a parcel of land owned by him
reconstituted. The parties executed a written agreement stipulating that after Atty. Palaa
has already reconstituted such Torrens title, he will deliver the same to the petitioners as
security for the amount financed and that he will pay P70,000 by way of interest on top of
the P100,000 borrowed by him. Atty. Palaa assured the petitioners that he will comply with
his obligations within 3 months from the execution of said written agreement. However, he
failed to fulfill the same. Legal demands had already been made to Atty. Palaa but to no
avail. Moreover, he failed to participate in the proceedings before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP despite notice. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that
he be suspended from the practice of law for 3 months.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Palaa is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
YES. The Court found that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the
representations of respondent. He knew that his representations were false since the filing
fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only P3,145, and other expenses including
the publication of the filing of the petition could not have cost more than P20,000. It is clear
that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money
and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his
misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar. He also failed to pay his
just and legal obligation.
His disobedience to the directives of the IBP in failing to participate in the proceedings
before it is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Failing in this duty as a
member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, the SC
found that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent. Thus, penalty is increased to 6
months suspension from the practice of law.
To the legal profession

a.) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO
A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Facts:
Respondent borrowed from petitioner two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) to
secure the payment of the loan. Atty. Espejo (respondent) simultaneously issued and
turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five
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thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due
date, the check was dishonoured. When respondent still refused to pay, petitioner filed a
criminal complaint against her for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa.
However, respondent disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office which she personally received and continued to ignore petitioner’s
demands. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant administrative case against respondent
before the CBD.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the
worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment.
As the Court has held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his
professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s
professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear
at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP
which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed
the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1,
Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
b.) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members.
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. As such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator. For her part, Senator Santiago averred that
those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity
as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust act of the JBC which calls for future
remedial legislation.
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Issue:
1. Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is actionable.
2. Whether or not Senator Santiago violated the provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
1. NO. Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court.
2. YES. The lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar
and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the
people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
To the courts
a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
ANTONIO CONLU v. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR.
A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of
uncertainty. The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes
inexcusable negligence.
Facts:
Conlu was the defendant in a civil case for quieting of title and recovery of a parcel of land
before the RTC of Silay, Negros Occidental. He hired Atty. Aredonia, Jr. to represent him in
the case. The RTC rendered judgment adverse to Conlu. Therefrom, Atty. Aredonia, Jr.
appealed to the CA, the recourse being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. The CA, per
its resolution, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellant’s brief within
the reglementary period. Antonio only got wind of the dismissal from his wife who verified
the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila.
When confronted about the dismissal, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. promised to seek reconsideration,
which he did, but which the CA later denied for belated filing of the motion. In that motion,
Atty. Aredonia, Jr. averred that he only received the disputed February 10, 1997 CA
resolution on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who
initially received the copy of the resolution was not authorized. Conlu got the records of the
case back and personally filed another motion for reconsideration on October 13, 1997,
which the CA again denied. Conlu’s petition for certiorari before the SC was also
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Aredonia, Jr. should be held administratively liable.
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Ruling:
YES. It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with
competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to
the counsel’s care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing
the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not
be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to file
a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. This
default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Conlu was not abhorrent
enough, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of
its February 10, 1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He
denied personally receiving such copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself
received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty.
Aredonia, Jr.’s signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the registry return card.
Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to stress, Atty. Aredonia, Jr.
had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory
prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
The Court cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Aredonia,
Jr.’s defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less
than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak,
communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause
directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension but the
required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him,
he just left his last known address and could not be located. Manifestly, he has fallen short
of the diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which he also violated is Canon 12.
b) Respect for courts and judicial officers

ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members.
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. As such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator. For her part, Senator Santiago averred that
those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity
as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust act of the JBC which calls for future
remedial legislation.
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Issue:
1. Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is actionable.
2. Whether or not Senator Santiago violated the provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
1. NO. Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court.
2. YES. The lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar
and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the
people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

Facts:
dismissed.
Issue:
Ruling:
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d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influence upon the courts
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON
K. ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A. BISUA,
and ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge evincing a willingness to

discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge’s sala cannot be over-
emphasized. A Lawyer shall refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives
the appearance of influencing the court.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a disbarment charge against Atty. Manuel Singson on the grounds of
attempted bribery and serious misconduct. The documentary evidence submitted provide
(1) the transcript of the stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of
Judge Reyes in Civil Case 4537-R when the judge made it of record about the attempt to
bribe; (2) the affidavit of Judge Reyes dated December 23, 2004 narrating in some detail
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how and thru whom the attempt to bribe adverted to was made; and (3) the affidavit of Atty.
Sevilla who admitted having been approached by Atty. Singson to intercede for his case
pending with Judge Reyes. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted having made phone calls
to Judge Reyes, either in his residence or office in Baguio City during the period material.
However, he said that he was merely following up the status of a temporary restraining
order applied for and sometimes asking for the resetting of hearings.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Singson should be disbarred.
Ruling:
NO. Matters touching on case status could and should be done through the court staff, and
resetting is usually accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court. The highly
immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge evincing a willingness to discuss, in
private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge’s sala cannot be over-emphasized.
The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a
mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, is determinative that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to
influence the judge to rule in his clients favor. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influencing the court. The possibility of an attempted bribery is not
far from reality considering Atty. Singson’s persistent phone calls. However heeding the
injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction would suffice to
accomplish the desired end, a suspension for one year from the practice of law was found
to be appropriate.
To the clients
ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR. v. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL
A.C. No. 7820, September 12, 2008, Velasco, J.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the
courts order and processes.
Facts:
Atty. Frial was the counsel of Lucy Lo in a case against Atty. Salomon. A writ of attachment
was issued in favor of Lo for Salomon’s Volvo and Nissan Sentra. In a complaint for
disbarment, Atty. Salomon alleged that instead of depositing the attached cars in the court
premises, the attaching sheriff of Manila turned them over to Atty. Frial. On several
occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals. It was
seen in front of a battery shop in Quezon City, in a Shell station in Manresa, and another
Shell station near Kamias St., Quezon City. It was also spotted being driven by bondsman
Liquigan with Atty. Frial’s consent. Atty. Frial also allegedly withheld information as to the
whereabouts of the Volvo. It turned out that the car was totally destroyed by fire in front of
Atty. Frial’s house and the latter failed to inform the court about such. The IBP Commission
concluded that Atty. Frial failed to observe the diligence required of him as custodian of the
cars and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Frial failed to observe the diligence required as custodian.
Ruling:
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YES. He is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the CPR
which provides that “money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property
coming into the profession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly
and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.”
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the
courts order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He
trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued. Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of
taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by
persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of
the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without so
much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, the Court found Atty. Frial
guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must
mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without legal
recourse in recovering the Volvo's value from Atty. Frial should they desire to do so.

Facts:
items themselves.
client.
Issue:
Ruling:
13
a.) Competence and diligence

Facts:
dismissed.
Issue:
Ruling:
14
Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)

Facts:
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items themselves.
client.
Issue:
Ruling:
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE

V. LEGASPI and JUANITO V. LEGASPI v. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document
unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally
appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein.
Facts:
In a complaint for disbarment, Dela Cruz, et. al. alleged that Atty. Dimaano notarized an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights where their signatures were forged,
they did not appear and acknowledge the same before Atty. Dimaano as notarizing officer,
and the community tax certificates in the document were not theirs. This document enabled
their sister, Zenaida Navarro, to sell the property to the DPWH. Atty. Dimaano admitted that
he notarized the document, relying in good faith on Navarro’s assurance that the
signatures and tax certificates were correct. The Commission on Bar Discipline found that
Atty. Dimaano violated the Notarial Law.
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Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Dimaano violated the Notarial Law.
Ruling:
YES, Atty. Dimaano violated the Notarial Law. Notaries public should refrain from affixing
their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the
same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to
attest to the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who
actually executed the document in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party’s free act or deed. Furthermore, notaries public are required by the
Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented
before the notaries public the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of certification.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present
competent evidence of identity: (a) at least one current identification document issued by
an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; (b) the oath or
affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who
is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who
each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary
identification. For failing to meet such requirements, Atty. Dimaano’s notarial commission
was revoked. He was disqualified from being commission for 2 years and was suspended
from the practice of law for 1 year.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Discipline of members of the Judiciary
RICKY GARAY, et al. v. JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1703, June 17, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets. For
when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of
the public in the competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily,
failure to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of
which no one is excused, and surely is not an embodiment of a judge.
Facts:
Complainants are the accused in a criminal case wherein they were charged with qualified
theft of bus starters and different tools amounting to P187,000. Judge Nicasio Bartolome,
the MTC judge handling the case, issued a warrant of arrest against them and detained
them in the provincial jail. In the clarificatory hearing conducted during the preliminary
investigation, only Garay attended. Three (3) months after, Judge Bartolome issued the
disputed resolution subject of this case.
In this administrative complaint filed by the complainants before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), the latter found that a criminal case for qualified theft involving
P187,000 falls clearly within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC. The OCA found
Judge Bartolome guilty of violating Sections 3 and 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Moreover, note that Judge Bartolome issued the Order submitting the
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cases for resolution on September 23, 2005. It was only on December 27, 2005, more than
three (3) months after, when he issued the Joint Resolution ordering the return of the cases
to the provincial prosecutor for further preliminary investigation. Section 5 of the rules
requires that Judge Bartolome submit his resolution of the case within ten (10) days after
the preliminary investigation and transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor. There is no question that Judge Bartolome took inordinate delay of three (3)
months in submitting his resolution of the preliminary investigation. Section 5 also requires
that Judge Bartolome state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action which he
did not.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Bartolome should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES. As can be gleaned from his Joint Resolution, Judge Bartolome made no
determination on whether or not there was sufficient ground to hold complainants for trial.
He did not recommend the dismissal of the criminal complaints nor the filing of the
appropriate informations against complainants. Neither did he state the law upon which he
based his order. Judge Bartolome's failure to follow the procedures outlined in Secs. 3 and
5 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is a clear indication of his gross
ignorance of the rules on preliminary investigation, and his delay of more than three (3)
months in resolving the investigation only to order that it be re- investigated specially when
the accused are detention prisoners deserves serious sanction from the Court.
When a judge shows utter unfamiliarity with fundamental rules and procedures, he
contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. Ignorance of the law
is a mainspring of injustice. When judges show professional incompetence, and are
ignorant of basic and fundamental rules, they are guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 11(A) of
Rule 140 punishes the offense.
JOSEFINA NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTCC,

BR. 1, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1807-MTJ], March 23, 2011, Velasco,
Jr., J.
In ejectment cases, the first duty of a judge is to examine the allegations in the complaint
and the evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds
apparent for the dismissal of a civil action. If there is a ground for dismissal existing and
apparent upon the filing of the complaint, and yet the judge allowed the case to
unnecessarily drag on, the judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Facts:
Judge Capellan was administratively charged with Delay in Rendering Judgment relative to
an ejectment case. He dismissed the said case on the ground that the plaintiff’s
representative lacked the personality to file the case because his authority, as reflected in
the corporate secretary's certificate appended to the complaint, was for another case. As
alleged, it took the respondent judge six years to resolve, on technicality, a case governed
by the rule on summary procedure.
18
Issue:
Whether respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
Ruling:
YES. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the first duty of the respondent upon the
filing of the case for ejectment was to examine the allegations in the complaint and the
evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent
for the dismissal of a civil action. In this case, the ground for dismissing the Civil Case
existed and was apparent upon the filing of the basic complaint. The representative’s lack
of personality was reflected in the corporate secretary's certificate appended to the
complaint. Yet, respondent judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on for more than
five years. Further, respondent having allowed several and doubtless unnecessary
postponements which contributed to the delay in the resolution of what was otherwise a
simple case. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious
offense for which respondent is subjected to a fine.
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C. CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL

EMPLOYEES OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS against ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS, CA - Mindanao Station
A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J, January 11, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J.
Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the ways on how to institute
administrative proceedings against judges. Under this rule there are three ways: first, motu
proprio by the Supreme Court; second, upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or third, upon an anonymous complaint supported by public
records of indubitable integrity.
Facts:
The present case was brought about by a letter-complaint filed by a litigant in the case
entitled Algabre v. RTC, Branch 15, Davao City, which was raffled to Justice Elbinias as
ponente. Justice Elbinias assigned complainant Atty. Cayetuna to draft the letter-reply
explaining what transpired with the case. Justice Elbinias likewise asked Atty. Cayetuna to
sign the letter-reply and explained to him that he would simply note it. Atty. Cayetuna,
however, refused to sign the letter-reply. This earned the ire of Justice Elbinias who
peremptorily terminated Atty. Cayetuna’s employment with the CA.
Subsequently, Atty. Cayetuna, together with the other complainants, filed the instant
unverified complaint against Justice Elbinias charging the latter with Gross Inefficiency;
Bribe Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of Government
Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employee’s Daily Time Record;
Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through Intemperate, Oppressive and
Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of Authority. For his part, Justice Elbinias merely
denied the allegations against him and likewise assailed the fact that the complaint filed
against him was not verified as well as the fact that the Omnibus reply and manifestation of
the complainants’ were not under oath.
Issue:
Whether or not the fact that the complaint filed against Justice Elbinias was not verified is
fatal to the case of the complainants.
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Ruling:
YES. Both the letter-complaints of April 30, 2008 and June 18, 2008 are unverified, while
the June 3, 2010 Omnibus Reply and Manifestation of complainants is not under oath. It
must be noted that most of the complainants are lawyers, and are presumed and ought to
know the formal requirement of verification for administrative complaints as stated under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, complainants not only failed to execute a verified complaint but also never
submitted their affidavits showing personal knowledge of the allegations embodied in their
letter-complaints. To cover this procedural deficiency, they assert that the Court properly
recognized their letter-complaints as an anonymous complaint, relying on Sinsuat v.
Hidalgo.
In Sinsuat, the Court took cognizance of the unverified motion and subsequent letters of
complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator since the unverified
complaint was properly considered as an anonymous complaint and the material
allegations were not only admitted by respondent judge but are also verifiable from public
records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records of the trial court, as aptly found by the CA.
This is not the case in this instant. Complainants’ reliance on Sinsuat is misplaced. For
one, even a passing perusal of the Comment and Supplemental Comment does not show
respondent Justice Elbinias admitting the allegations in the letter-complaints. For another,
the averments and material allegations of complainants are neither verifiable from public
records of indubitable integrity nor supported or substantiated by other competent evidence
submitted by complainants.
The formal faux pas of complainants could have been remedied by the submission under
oath of their subsequent pleadings, particularly the Omnibus Reply, where they traversed
the points and defenses raised by respondent vis-à-vis their allegations. They could have
appended thereto their respective affidavits attesting to their personal knowledge of the
facts of their material allegations. But, as it is, complainants chose not to place their
Omnibus Reply under oath, much less submitted their affidavits. Verily, after receiving
copies of respondent’s Comment and Supplemental Comment, they had ample opportunity
but chose not to correct the deficiencies of their complaints while submitting the instant
case for resolution based on the pleadings filed sans their affidavits.
PROSEC. JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BR. 36,
CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, September 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
In administrative cases against judges, it is the complainant’s duty to substantiate his
allegations with evidence.
Facts:
Prosec. Baculi filed an information for qualified theft against Capacete but Judge Belen
dismissed the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Prosec. Baculi stated: “The
dismissal of the information by the court was motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice
against Asst. State Prosecutor II Jorge Baculi, the Investigating Prosecutor at the
Preliminary Investigation.” Judge Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt and indirect
20
contempt for the contemptuous nature of pleadings Baculi filed in his sala. In both direct
and indirect contempt proceedings, Prosec. Baculi filed manifestations and motions to
postpone or cancel hearings. Prosec. Baculi then filed two administrative complaints
against Judge Belen for gross ignorance of law, gross misconduct and issuance of
fraudulent and unjust orders. Baculi argues that he was not formally charged and that no
notice of hearing was conducted to afford him the opportunity to air his side.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Belen should be held administrative liable for holding Prosec. Baculi
in contempt.
Ruling:
NO, Judge Belen is not administratively liable. Aside from his bare allegations, the
complainant has not presented any credible evidence to support his allegations against
Judge Belen. The fact that Judge Belen had initiated contempt proceedings against him,
and in fact convicted him in such contempt proceedings, does not by itself amount to ill
motives on the part of Judge Belen. The initiation of the contempt proceedings stemmed
from the acts of the complainant himself. His unsupported claim that the prior libel case he
filed against Judge Belen created animosity between them is not sufficient to prove his
claim of evil motives on the part of Judge Belen.
The complainant has also failed to adduce evidence in support of his claim of evil or
corrupt motives on the part of the judge. That, and the fact that the subject decisions are
already final and executory, leads the Court to conclude that no administrative liability can
arise on the part of Judge Belen, if the contempt proceedings that he conducted followed
the required procedure under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Baculi was also afforded the opportunity to present his defense but he failed to do so.
Baculi blatantly refused to answer the charges of indirect contempt initiated against him.
Instead, he filed numerous motions and manifestations to postpone or cancel the hearings.
Instead of answering the charges however, Baculi filed several motions, reiterating his
argument that Judge Belen should be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Not once in his
submissions did he controvert the charges against him, opting instead to merely harp on
his contention that Judge Belen harbored a personal resentment against him. However, the
Court had already adjudged Judge Belen guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of law in a previous administrative case, which warranted his dismissal from
service
GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial

Court, Branch 24, Cebu City
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which
tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he
personifies.
Facts:
Geoffrey Beckett (Beckett), an Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa
Densing Beckett (Eltesa), a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born, Geoffrey Beckett, Jr.
21
(Geoffrey, Jr.). Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of RA 7610, followed by a
suit for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both cases ended in the sala of Judge
Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. (Judge Sarmiento). Judge Sarmiento rendered judgment based on
a compromise agreement in which Eltesa and Beckett agreed, to cause the dismissal of all
pending civil and criminal cases against each other and that Beckett shall have full and
permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then 5 years old, subject to the visitorial rights of
Eltesa.
In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in Australia. In the 2010 visit, Beckett
consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she
return the child on January 9, 2011. January 9 came and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained
with Eltesa, prompting Beckett to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Beckett said that while waiting for the pre-trial conference to for the petition, he saw one
Helen Sy, purportedly a close friend of Eltesa, enter Judge Sarmiento’s chambers. Then,
during the conference itself, Eltesa moved for reconsideration of the court’s order, praying
that it be set aside insofar as it directed her to return the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett.
However, instead of enforcing said order and/or waiting for Beckett’s comment, Judge
Sarmiento, in open court, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody over
Geoffrey, Jr.
Beckett filed the instant complaint and alleges that Judge Sarmiento is liable for (1) gross
ignorance of the law for granting Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr.; and (2)
partiality by committing acts of serious misconduct and irregularities in the performance of
official duties, such as but not limited to allowing one Helen Sy to enter his chambers
before hearing. Beckett predicates his charge of dereliction and neglect of duty on
respondent’s alleged failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration of the order giving
provisional custody of his child to his mother.
In his answer, Judge Sarmiento denied Beckett’s allegations of partiality and of being
biased against the latter, particularly describing his order granting Eltesa provisional
custody as proper. Judge Sarmiento stated that Beckett did not cry "bias" when he
approved the compromise agreement and when he later urged Beckett to commence
habeas corpus proceedings.
The OCA regards the complaint meritorious insofar as the charges for gross ignorance of
the law is concerned given that respondent judge issued his order granting provisional
custody in favor of Eltesa despite the existence of the judicial compromise. The OCA
recommended that respondent judge be adjudged liable for gross ignorance of the law and
fined with stern warning.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
NO. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which
tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he
personifies. Not to know the law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or
22
acting in disregard of established rule of law as if he were not aware of the same
constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is excused, especially an RTC judge.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother,
Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal
situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the
child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to
jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it
were, the matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals," is not permanent
and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted." And as aptly observed in a
separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as
"permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and
even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no
longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the
custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HON. LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, September 27, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
No less than the 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 15(1), Article VIII, mandates lower
courts to decide or resolve all cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of
submission. In relation to this mandate, the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to
dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. The Court,
in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, likewise requires judges to
scrupulously observe the periods provided in the Constitution. Failure to decide cases
within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
Facts:
Judge Leodegario C. Quilatan requested for a certificate of clearance with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) in support of his application for compulsory retirement benefits
under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, effective July 21, 2003. However, the monthly
report cases for 2009 revealed that he had left forty-eight (48) cases (all criminal)
submitted for decision at the time of his retirement. Of the said number, thirty-four (34)
cases were already beyond the reglementary period to decide and no reason or
explanation is indicated in the monthly report for this occurrence. Thus, the OCA found
Judge Quilatan liable for gross inefficiency for failure to decide the 34 cases submitted for
decision within the required period. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter and that the erring judge be fined fifty thousand pesos
(PhP 50,000). Acting on the said recommendation, the Court re-docketed the case as a
regular administrative matter and required Judge Quilatan to manifest whether he would
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Judge Quilatan failed to file a
manifestation; thus, he is deemed to have waived the filing of his manifestation.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Quilatan is guilty of gross inefficiency for failure to decide the 34
cases submitted for decision within the required period.
Ruling:
23
YES. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to resolve their cases with
dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious violation of the parties’ constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in
the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Without doubt, Judge
Quilatan violated his mandate when he failed to decide 34 cases within three (3) months
from their submission, for which he should be administratively sanctioned.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision is a less serious
offense punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but
not exceeding PhP 20,000.
Since Judge Quilatan failed to decide 34 cases, a fine of PhP 50,000 is proper in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.
Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO
G.R. No. 147923, October 26, 2007, Velasco Jr. J.
Grounds raised outside the five (5) mandatory disqualification of judges enumerated in the
first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 are properly addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court judge hearing a case as pertinently provided for in the second paragraph of Sec.
1, Rule 137.
Facts:
Jimmy Go (Go), herein petitioner, filed a criminal case for estafa against Alberto Looyuko
(Looyuko), herein respondent, alleging that the latter misappropriated the stock certificates
belonging to Go by converting the said shares of stocks for his own (Looyuko’s) personal
benefit by causing the transfer of the aforementioned stock certificates to Looyuko’s name
after receiving the aforementioned stock certificates in trust from Go. Thereafter, during the
pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution on behalf of Go, wanted to present certain
witnesses to strengthen the case of the prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need
for the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses. This prompted Go to file an
administrative complaint against Judge Nemesio Felix (Judge Felix) for partiality.
The CA dismissed the complaint of Go. It rationalized that Judge Felix had the discretion to
inhibit himself from the case unless the ground for his inhibition is that which calls for
mandatory inhibition of the same, and in this case no such ground exists. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid ground for the inhibition of Judge Felix.
Ruling:
NONE, there was no manifest partiality. Indeed, the adverse rulings on the denial of the
proposed testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses are judicial in nature. Absent proof that
the trial court judge had acted in a wanton, whimsical or oppressive manner or for an illegal
consideration, and similar reasons, in giving undue advantage to respondent, inhibition is
not a remedy to oust the judge from sitting on the case.
24
Second, the other two (2) grounds raised by petitioner are also baseless. It is an age old
rule in civil cases that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.
Verily, the assailed orders were issued with judicial discretion and no administrative liability
attaches absent showing of illegal consideration or giving undue advantage to a party, and
much less can the Court compel the trial court judge to inhibit himself absent valid grounds
therefor.
Lastly, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to
inhibit himself lies within the sound discretion of Judge Felix. Grounds raised outside the
five (5) mandatory disqualification of judges enumerated in the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of
Rule 137 are properly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge hearing a
case as pertinently provided for in the second paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137.
JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
Affinity is defined as the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood
relatives of the other. There is no relationship by affinity between two persons if they are
not in-laws of each other. In such cases, the judge who is alleged to be related to the
person involved in the case handled by the former is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule
137 to hear the election case.
Facts:
Johnwell W. Tiggangay (Tiggangay) ran for mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga in May 2007
election but lost to Rhustom L. Dagadag (Dagadag). Tigganay filed an electoral protest
with the RTC of Tabuk City, Kalinga which was raffled to Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge
Wacas). Judge Wacas rendered a decision declaring that Tinggangay lost in the election
and which was affirmed by the COMELEC. Tinggangay filed a verified letter-complaint
charging Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas) with Impropriety and Partiality for not
inhibiting himself in the case alleging that Judge Wacas is Dagadag’s second cousin by
affinity, the former’s aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. Judge Wacas denied being
related by affinity to Dagadag, adding that Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of
"some reliable sources," not from his personal knowledge. Judge Wacas maintained that
Tiggangay never moved for his inhibition during the entire proceedings.
Acting on the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court referred the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA), through Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting (Justice Inting), for
investigation and report with appropriate recommendations. Justice Inting transmitted to
the Court her Report, recommending the dismissal of the instant complaint for lack of
substantial evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag will result in the
automatic disqualification of Judge Wacas to hear the case.
Ruling:
25
NO. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present
substantial evidence to prove his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of
proof and mere allegation is not evidence.
The supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and Dagadag, unsubstantiated as it

were by the required substantial relevant evidence, remains a mere allegation of
Tiggangay. Tiggangay tried to assert that Judge Wacas and Dagadag are related within the
sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag.
The fact, however, is that no substantial evidence was presented to prove the relationship
angle.
Granting arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag, such
reality is not a ground for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 1of
Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity
between Judge Wacas and Dagadag. Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood
relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity
to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the
husband’s brother and the wife’s sister.
In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in
the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that
Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in
the third degree. Nonetheless, Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives
of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to
Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is
not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas. In
short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are
not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137
to hear the election case.
Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)

ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN
A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
Public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to
duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to,
hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public
trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Facts:
Complainant was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in an unlawful detainer case.
After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co-defendants. Therefrom, Rafols,
through complainant, appealed the case to the RTC. Pending appeal, the court issued an
order granting the motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. Complainant sought
reconsideration but the motion was denied. Upon the implementation of the writ of
execution, an argument took place between complainant and respondent. The former
claims that he has a pending motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of
execution, but the latter said that the motion has already been denied. Since no Temporary
26
Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the implementation, respondent
claimed that he is legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty of enforcing the writ.
Complainant countered that he has not yet received a copy of the denial of the motion,
rendering the execution premature. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with the
execution of the judgment and in enforcing, allegedly uttered words degrading to the
reputation of the complainant. He then filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent
sheriff for grave misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES, the respondent should be penalized for discourtesy in the performance of his official
duties. As a public officer and a trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of
respondent to demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public.
Public service requires integrity and discipline. At all times, employees of the judiciary are
expected to accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee.
Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and
dignity. Government service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no
place therein.
Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed
been remiss in this duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have
exercised restraint in dealing with the complainant instead of allowing the quarrel to
escalate into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been
sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainant's criticisms in the
performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondent's demeanour tarnished the image
not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary
measure.
Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer (Rule 136)
JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN v. NICOMEDES C. DELA CRUZ, Process
Server, MTCC, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan,
A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Verbally abusing co-employees and appearing at his place of work drunk can only be
regarded as simple misconduct since it has no direct relation to the performance of his
official duties.
Facts:
After complainant judge left her office a few minutes before 5:00 p.m., security guard
reported to her that process server Dela Cruz allegedly arrived in the office, apparently
drunk, and hurled invectives while pointing his fingers at other employees present.
Afterwards, respondent attempted to punch one of them.
After hearing the report, respondent was summoned into the complainant’s office where he
denied the contents of the said report. Respondent admitted taking alcoholic drink but
denied being drunk at that time. When the employees involved in the incident confronted
respondent, he called them liars and left the complainants chambers without a word.
Giving his version of the incident in question, he alleged that he was just having an
27
argument with his co-employees, adding that he raised his voice merely to stress a point. A
sanction of 1-year suspension without pay on the ground that respondent’s inculpatory acts
constituting gross insubordination and misconduct was proposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent was guilty of gross insubordination and misconduct.
Ruling:
YES. Insubordination is the refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled
to give. The respondent deported in a manner reflecting lack of restraint and disrespect
towards his superior. And if this was not enough, he rudely and unceremoniously walked
out of the meeting. He even had the audacity to ignore complainant’s requests for him to
return to the meeting. Worse, after hiding in the comfort room of the clerk, he went home
without so much as seeking leave from the judge. Without a doubt, respondent’s actions
amount to gross insubordination, not to mention gross disobedience and disrespect to the
judicial authority and the position of complainant judge.
On the other hand, respondent’s act can only be regarded as simple misconduct since it
has no direct relation to the performance of his official duties. Respondent committed
misconduct when he verbally abused his co-employees and appeared at his place of work
drunk. Drinking during office hours may constitute misconduct and is prohibited under the
Civil Service Rules. Drinking undermines efficiency and is counter-productive. It generates
an unwholesome consequence on a public servant. And when the culprit is an employee of
the court, the image of the judiciary as a whole cannot but be affected.
RETIREMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

In Re: Expiration of Fixed Term of Office of Atty. Saaduddin A. Alauya, Office of the
Jurisconsult, Zamboanga City
A.M. No. 11238-Ret, August 18, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
Retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended
to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their
humanitarian purpose.
Facts:
On August 12, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Alauya as Jurisconsult
in Islamic Law for a term of seven (7) years. His term of office expired on August 20, 2003.
Atty. Alauya had rendered government service in various government posts prior to his
appointment as jurisconsult. As of August 20, 2003, Atty. Alauya who was then 65 years
old, had already rendered 33 years of government service behind him, the last seven (7) of
which served as Jurisconsult. He filed an application for retirement to retire under the
provisions of RA 910. In terms then of the requirements on age and length of service in
government, Atty. Alauya was qualified to retire under Section 1 of that law, as amended.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), recommended the denial of Atty. Alauya’s
application to so retire under that law on the postulate that Sec. 1 of RA 910 applies only to
justices or Judges. Before Atty. Alauya’s retirement papers, as Jurisconsult, could be
completely processed, however, the Court en banc, conferred upon him the rank and
privileges of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge effective October 1996. In a letter, Atty.
Alauya reminded the Court that he was allowed to and did retire on August 21, 2003 under
RA 910 – and thus was entitled to a lifetime monthly pension after August 2008, or five
28
years after his retirement. In a Resolution, the Court denied Atty. Alauya’s above request.
From the above adverse action, as subsequently reiterated, Atty. Alauya repeatedly sought
reconsideration. Premised on the Court’s previous denial resolutions, the OCA at first
urged the denial of the desired reconsideration, but later changed its earlier stance and
recommended the approval of Atty. Alauya’s request for a lifetime monthly pension.
Issue:
Whether or not the term “privileges of a judge of the RTC” also include in context lifetime
monthly pension.
Ruling:
YES. Time and again, the Court has followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing
upon retirement issues and claims, particularly of judges and justices, obviously in keeping
with the beneficial intendment of retirement laws which is to reward satisfactory past
services and at the same time provide the retiree with the means to support himself and his
family in his remaining years. On several occasions, this Court has liberally interpreted
retirement laws in keeping with its purpose. In Government Service Insurance System v.
De Leon: Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree
because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even
comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach
aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and
well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws are
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and
all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. Upon
the foregoing perspective, the term “privileges of an RTC judge” and the conferment
thereof must be considered as covering the retirement benefits under RA 910, meaning a
lump-sum payment of five years’ salary and a monthly pension until death after the 5-year
period.

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Dean’s Circle 2016

University of Santo Tomas

Legal Ethics ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer

VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO

SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA

To the legal profession

b.) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

b) Respect for courts and judicial officers

c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge evincing a willingness to

CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA

a.) Competence and diligence

Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)

DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE

JOSEFINA NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTCC,

RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C. CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL

GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HON. LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN

Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court,

The supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and Dagadag, unsubstantiated as it

Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)

RETIREMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

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