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Cobra Effects
pparently, the officials of the British government were terrified by a large number of venomous cobra snakes in the
city. To solve the problem, someone came up with a brilliant idea of an exchange offer to the people of Delhi. Money
for dead cobras.
Guess what happened next? Soon, the enterprising Delhiites were breeding cobras. When the government found out,
they scrapped the bounty scheme, whereupon the cobra breeders set the snakes free. And the cobra population went
up, not down.
Why did both situations backfire? Because well-intentioned people who created the bounty schemes didn’t think
about second order effects. They didn’t pause, reflect and ask how people will respond to their brilliant-sounding idea.
It’s fascinating to observe how this problem keeps on repeating over and over again. One variant is called “you get
what you measure.” For instance, if hospitals are asked to publish their mortality rate, the ones with the highest
mortality rates are incentivised to turn away terminally ill patients.
If someone is paid on a cost-plus basis (e.g. for generating electricity), you can be confident that there will be plenty
of gaming in the form of cost padding. Businesses which pay their m ..
Thinking about first order effects is easy. Thinking about second or higher order effects is hard. But just because it’s
harder, doesn’t mean one shouldn’t do it. Indeed, the practice of routinely thinking about second and higher order
effects by asking “and then what?” should not be limited to chess players and regulators. It should be adopted by
investors as well.
Discarded Kidneys
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
• To consider all costs, identify hidden costs; do not commit the hidden cost fallacy
• To consider only the relevant costs, identify sunk costs; do not commit the sunk cost fallacy
• Accounting profit (costs) usually differ from Economic profit (costs) in how they treat durable
assets
Chapter 1:
One thing that unites economist is their use of ration-actor program paradigm.
To change behavior, you have to change one self-interest, do that by chaging incentive
You would have to find a way to better align managers incentive with company goals. By rewarding
management for increasing profitability not just acquiring reserves.
Problem solving
Who? made bad decision- figure out why people hbehave rationally, optimally, self-interstedly, bad
occurs for 1 of 2 reasons
Summary
- Rational-actor paragigm model of behavior that which assumes ppl act rationally, optimally, and
self-interestdly that is they respond to inceitives.
Chapter 2
- Hidden-cost fallacy—when you ignore rerlevant costs, those costs that do vary with the
consequences of your decision.
Final warning
- It is not much of stretch to predict that you will make some of same mistakes, and for same
reasons, either you will lack information necessary to make good decision or you don’t have
incentive to do so.
- When struggling with decision—remember
o 1st recognize relevant benefit and costs of decision—shard to do because easy to get
lost in data. Decision get distracted by irrelevant number and forget why they are
analyzing the numbers.
o 2nd consider the conequences of decision from your organization point of view.
Summary
Intro
Price discrimination
Chapter 19
Summary
- Insurance is wealth creating transaction that moves risk from those who don’t want it to those
who willing to bear it for a fee
- Adverselection is problem arise from info asymmetry or hidden info. Anticipated it and if you
can figure out how to consummate the unconsummated wealth creating transation.
- Adverse selection disappear if info asymmetry disappear.
- Screen uninformed party effort to learn about info that the more informed party has. Successful
screens have characteristic that is unprofitable for bad types to mimic the behavior of goods
types.
- Signaling the informed party effort to communication her info to less informed party. Every
successful screen can also be used as signal.
- Online auction and sales sites, Ebay address adverse selection problem with authentication and
escrow services, insurance and online reputation.
Chapter 20 problem of moral hazards
Intro
- Moral hazard—post contractual increase in risky or negative behavior. Ex: reduce incentive to
excersi care once you purchase insurance and reduce incentive to work hard once you have
been hired. Moral hazard is similar to adverse selection in that it is caused by info asymmetry; it
differs is that is caused by hidden actions rather than hidden types.
Insurance.
Moral hazard means that insured customer exercise less care because they have less incentive to do
so.
- Adverse selection arises from hidden info regarding of the type of person (high v. low risk) who
is purchasing insurance
- Moral hazard arise from hidden action by person purchasing insurance.
- Adverse selection is problem separating you from someone else.
- Moral hazards is problem separating the good you from the bad you.
Shrinking—type of maral hazard cauased by difficulty or cost of monitoring employee behavior after
firm has hired them. Without good info, ensure high lv effort become more difficult.
- Borrowers take bigger risks with other money than they would with their own money.
- To control thisi kind of moral hazard, lenders must try to find ways to better align incentives of
borrowers with goal of lenders.
- Do this by requiring borrowers put some of their own money at risk
- Investment doesn’t pay off, lenders want to maker sure borrowers share downside.
- This is why bank are much more willing to lend to borrowers who have great deal of their own
money at risk.
Summary
Moral hazard- reduced incentive to exercise care once you purchase insurance
Adverse arise from hidden info about type of individual you are dealing with.
Anticipate moral hazard and if you can figure out how to consummate the implied wealth creating
transaction.
Borrowers who have notohing to lose exacerbate this moral hazard problem.
Chapter 4:
- Marginal cost (MC) is th additional cost incurred by producing and selling one more unit.
- Marginal revenue (MR) additional revenue gain from selling one moroe unit
- If benefit of selling another unit (MR) is > than MC then sell another unit
- Sell more if MR>MC, sell less if MR<MC if MR=MC you are selling at the right maximum amount
(maximizing profit).
- Typically MR falls and MC rises, the more you do.
Incentive
Summary
Average cost (AC) total cost (FC and VC) divided by total units produced. The FC portion of AT is
irrelevant to an extent decision
An incentive compensation scheme that increase MR or reduce MC will increase effort. Fixed fees have
no effects on effort.
A good incentive compensation scheme links pay to perf measure that reflect effort.
Chapter 5
Intro
- All investment decision involve trade off btw current sacrifice and future gain
- Before investing need to know future benefit are more than current cot
- Discounting tools allows to figure this out
- (FV, one period in future)= PV (1+r)
-
FV, k period in future e= (PV) (1+r)k
- If you invest at a rate of return r, divide 72 by r to get number of years it takes to double your
money
-
PV= FV, k period in future/ (1+r)k
- If NPV of sum of all discounted CF is larger than 0 then the projected earns more than Cost of
capital.
- NPV illustrated link btw economic profit and investment decision.
- IRR is discount rate that sets NPV = 0
- Post investment hold up, sunk cost are unadvoidable even in long run. So after u incure them,
you become vulnerable to post investment hold up.
Chapter 7
Intro
- Law of diminishing of marginal returns—you try to expand output, your marginal productivity (
extra output associated with extra inputs) eventually declines.
- Several reasons DMR occurs,
o Difficulty of monitoring and motivating larger workforces
o Increasing complexity of larger systems, or fixed nature of some factos.
o Popular jargon called bottlenecks.
o Often rises when more workers, or any variable input, must share fixed amount of
complementar input. When productivity fall from bottlenecks, costs increase
- Diminishing marginal productivity implies increasing marginal cost
- Increasing MC eventually lead to increasing average costs
Economies of scale
- Law of diminishing of marginal return is primary short run phenomenon arising from fizity of at
least one factor of product, like capital or plant size.
- In long run, increase size of plant, hire more workers, buy more machines, remove product
bottlenecks. FC become variable in long run
- If LR average cost are constant with respect to output, you have constant return of scale
- If LR average cost rise with output, u have decreasing return of scare or diseconomies of scales
- If LR average cost fall with output, you have increasing return to scale, economies of scales.
- Learning curves—characteristic of many processes. Current production lower future ecost. Look
over life cycle of product when working with product characterize by learning curves.
-
Economies of scope
- If cost of producing two products jointly is less than cost of producing those two product
separately economies of scope btw 2 product.
- Diseconomies of scope—if cost of producing 2 product together is higiher than cost of producing
them separately
Chapter 8
Shift in demand
Shift in supply
Market equilibrium
- S=D
- In market equil, no unconsummated wealth creating transaction
-
- Chapter 9 market structure and LR equil
- Firm produce product or service with very close substituts mean demand is very elastic
- Firms may have rival and no cost advantages
- Industry has no entry or exit barriers
Demand curve for output of perfectly competitive firm us flat (perfectly elastic)
- Competitive firm cannot affect price little a competitive can do except react to industry price.
- Price above MC, sell more
- Price below MC sell less.
- Competitive firm fortunes closed tied to those of industry in which it compete.
- Profit attract capital to industry, existing firm expand capacity, new entrants, come into
industry increase S decrease in price.
- Entry and capacity expansion continue, P falling until firm in industry are no longer earning
above average profit. Capital stop flowing into industry industry has reached Long run equil
- Length of SR depend on how quickly assets can move into or out of industry
- In LR, no competitive industry earn more than average rate of return.
- Competitive efirm earn + or – economic profit in SR but only until entry or exit cocurs.
- LR, competitive firms earn only average rate of return.
Indifference principle
Chapter 10
-
- Strategy is how to increase size of profit box.
- Box get bigger firm lower its costs or raise its price.
- Strategy is about raising price or reducing cost
- Successful company manage to do both
- Extremely successful firm do it over a long period of time reflecting a sustainable competitive
advantage
3 basis strategies
- Cost reduction
o Generate increase in LR profitability only if cost reduction is difficult to imitate
o Other easily imitate duplicate action, CR will not give you sustainable competitive
advantage
- Product differentiation
o Reduction in elasticity of demand for product
o Less elastic demand increase in price (P-MC)/P= 1/ |e|
- Reduction in competitive intensity
o Reduce lv of competition and keep new competitors from entering, able to slow erosion
of profitability
o One easy way ask gvt to do it