G.R. No.
127240 March 27, 2000 Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at
the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he
found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four
children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after
stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law,
stated — 17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General,
Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the
said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution
such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the
sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on
our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a
citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or
refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the
names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and
his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to
support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which petitioner
stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as
"Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The state also annexed income tax
returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then
again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from
1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage
contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a
Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner
married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance
with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as
husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his
claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed
the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court
and brought up for the first time on appeal. The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . .
This is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names
to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his
application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the
applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice
their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is
depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with
his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that
the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her
three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the
Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because
he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses
as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in
their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their
children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION
CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS
OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER
NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION
AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A
PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued, because under Rule
132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides
that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented
by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We are not
persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did,
in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly
filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged
petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for
as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which
was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than
this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the
State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast
doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err
in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all
the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M.
Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989
petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but
argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with
the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is
allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such
requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. It is
settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that
the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
SUPREME COURT preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
Manila and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The
TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against
SECOND DIVISION the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,

vs. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents. injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
DECISION
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
MENDOZA, J.:
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after
SO ORDERED.
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person
acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using
them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's
decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were
admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took
note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for
respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against
him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission
and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to
P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the
occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and
violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba,
were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel
Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that
morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm
in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told
Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she
would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was
left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel.
They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the
kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he
was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing
back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing
a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber
he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and
sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him.
Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house
of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house
were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open.
She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She
went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the
door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a
lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked
body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder
of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50
meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer
Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured
him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant
pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his
Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS
CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant.
This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of
witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-entrenched is the
rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal
unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same;
the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses
and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. 14 Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect
the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest
respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised,
were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of
her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at
9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between
nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated
time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the
timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was
testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan
C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in
her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is
the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left.
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. 26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s
body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. 27Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that
there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim,
crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene
of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used
the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis.
With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours.
Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably
amplify small samples using the PCR method.
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the
use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel,
we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he
is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and facto law.
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.29
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. 30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject
of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house
taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places
at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay. 40 He
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error
in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus
its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value"
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to
genetics and molecular biology.
balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its
admission.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the
trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting
doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else,
ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time
committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that
wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching;
the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
(7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of
Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the
intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her
culprit.44
stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination
revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in
the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed the
detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt. 35 appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same
house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to
her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim told Judilyn
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998. 48 In addition, Judilyn also testified
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were
not contradicted by appellant.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on
the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense,
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on
the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by
stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat
or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the
victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was
committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen
are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of
hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. 56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by
affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy
over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain
their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of
the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages
cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the
family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00
in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated February 22,
2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122,
which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch
60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot,
containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of
Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena
Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in
the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate
taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. 6 However, the land remained in
possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer
title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the
subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that
Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena
cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos
and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the
sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding
from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. 9 Nena did
not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint
with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and
issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. 10 The complaint also prayed
for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On
March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of
excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died intestate and without issue in March 1991.11 He
left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of
actual, exemplary and moral damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969 (Exh. "Q")
executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and
further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in
the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion of the property; Felicidad
Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-
fourth (¼) portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56
after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu thereof
issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating
Marcella, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, ¼ Pro-
indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of
the persons mentioned in the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral
damages, ₱10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and
₱3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC.14
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22, 2002. 15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant case
without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and
also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is
even against the evidence on record."16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA finally
disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. On the
other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the
proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed within
the reglementary period for filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests on the
proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because Daniela’s
actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with
a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in
holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28,
1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the
lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence,
thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn
Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the
death of Daniela in 1994.18Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would
have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the
time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a
word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and
again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance is
required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and
the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust
relationship between them because of the settled rule that where the terms of a contract are clear, it
should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that
the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that
Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and between her
and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and
Daniela created a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated.
A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated). 19 The primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. 20 Such intention is determined from the
express terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation
that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn
statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as
part of private respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative
weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. 22 The admissibility of evidence depends on
its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and
its tendency to convince and persuade.23Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 25 Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she
is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated
and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of
sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed
to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their
witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of
sale with petitioner.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of
ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that
petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has
shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it
was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations
and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or
declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership
thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in
evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy. 34 Even the said Tax Declaration
contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really
reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told
any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to
make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977,
the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she
is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to recover
the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.

It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the subject
Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact,
Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime,
petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and possession
are two entirely different legal concepts.35Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil
Code states that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the
vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. 36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the
present case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation
of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already
able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity of
the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn statement
earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to cross-examine
the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.

However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance of
evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal
presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the
burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving
their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid
and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a
trust relationship was created between them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
private respondents is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying
declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny
Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila
on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through
its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who had incriminated him.
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan
Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon
was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle
rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told
Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital
at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally
witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. 2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the
warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the
Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim
while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing the latter
with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s death. Not only
because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s uncle
who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and
even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon
was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him. 3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how
Salafranca had effected his attack against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm,
while behind the victim on the latter’s neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,"
Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself."4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in
Salafranca’s and his witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day
after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that
had he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the
crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in
relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating
circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 representing death
indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying declaration made
to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit
by Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident
did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the stabbing,
leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt. 10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and
the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable. The determination of
the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due
to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of assessing
their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the
reviewing court was bound by such assessment and conclusions,11considering that the CA as the
appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a
persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary
matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or
omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the
findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.13
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the
assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza
considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to
testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14
Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled his left
arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from
went (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left
nipple."15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found
treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CA’s
concurrence because Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested
by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed
constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical
control of the latter’s movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or
defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code, 16 treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying
Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod
Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of
₱50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such
indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26

We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were different
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just suffer
from the death indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but
more.
appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.28Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
Q What happened when you told him that?
the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless
strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given
A He kept silent. the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH? the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature
and experience having shown that:
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened? the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
A He was brought to Emergency Room. the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support,
but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. 30

Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the
heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for burial and
A He was pronounced dead.17
related expenses are not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 are
warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, compensation by way of actual damages.31
to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his
nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of
asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had been
the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 32 The
Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing,
Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good,
causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." 33 Conformably with such
the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such
legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim
circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res
to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery
gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his
was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The
death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of
Court explained so in People v. Catubig:34
the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule. 18

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. 19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño,
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency
room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is
ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by
the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. 20 Bolanon would have been
competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration
was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is
to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and
proper,35because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 24,
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
death indemnity the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from
attending circumstances.21
the finality of this decision.

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his
stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital,
and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about SO ORDERED.
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 22 In a general way, res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001 signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the
original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and
LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent. On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in
its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled "State Investment I
House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation." The questioned decision
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
Civil Case NO. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
II
the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the following: a) To pay
plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE
reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s) of
suit.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:

SO ORDERED.1
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent SIHI
had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27, 1997,
denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorney's fees to SIHI.

The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the
testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private
truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of
respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals
Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual
to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to
interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal
have seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its
upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo
genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2,5 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
requires proof of due execution and authenticity of private documents before the same can be
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan
received as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the
when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt
documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was
thereof, no payment was made.
in violation of the requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of
law on the part of the appellate court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
production of the originals of the documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into
play.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note
upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure
Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
of consideration.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle
dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was
the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed
supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges
upon:
the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in
evidence of said testimony pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has Rules of Court.
jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the
capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify
April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were both received by the
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
herein defendant; and
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting
through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December
13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984. 2
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to the
plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed
several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared
several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was
finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the latter
had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its claim was
insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no showing that he
had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay
evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. 8 However, the rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. 9 The rationale for this
exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity
to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to
cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several
opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed
to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when
it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing
party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI
was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were
satisfied.
Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through
private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 411 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule" 12 advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no
need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at
pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for
petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was
sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed
by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the
Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith.

On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having sustained
the trial court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v.
Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where we held that when attorney's fees are awarded, the
reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision. Petitioner
submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of
attorney's fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

We find for petitioner in this regard.

It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is necessary
for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within the exception
and justify the grant of the award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly
state the rationale for the award of attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a
perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorney's fees. We hold
that the same should thereby be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees to private
respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.