CRIM1 ATTY.
GARCIA Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW
Definitions / Characteristics / Underlying Philosophies
Doctrine of Pro Reo / Lenity Rule / Equipoise Rule
Utilitarian Theory
Case: Magno vs. CA 210 SCRA 471 June 26,
1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they
were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under
CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the
offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the
Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public
respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in
April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his
venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was
going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase
the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus,
petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation,
approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of
repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp.
40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully
bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the
former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and
provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up
a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value
of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00.
Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey
Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him
the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to
petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on
condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest
(Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of
Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance
of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory
completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of
clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a
leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage
equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the
option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the
equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated
check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured,
Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he
(Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6)
postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited
and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four
counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held
momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not
covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check
Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and
006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and
No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87.
(Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals,
thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion
that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never
came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned
for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on
the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693,
Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts
reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of
the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks
subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on
the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the
"warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing
company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of
the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high
financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair
service equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from
the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00
corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments
subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs.
Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the
equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase
the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the
lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional
amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the
purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but
remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which
were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to
continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure,
then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he
did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with
LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least,
since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said
amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is
managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and
employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks
he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose
operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone
evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se,
hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the
"warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know
that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey
Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it
unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry
and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs.
Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation,
Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at
the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many
instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need
protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty
deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under
the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed
to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the
threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with
a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in
question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the
law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee
referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of
P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere
accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez,
petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from
LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To
argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty
deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he
did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is
to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account
user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the
system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of
the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also
as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some
color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen
who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms
that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society
against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner
could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be
punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely
said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential
wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in
time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a
vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol.
I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal
law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are
immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally
founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all.
. . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of
emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality
the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan
Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v.
Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment
imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged
society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers."
In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were
used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of
an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore
petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the
"potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society,
should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of
the accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court
below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of
doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the
accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the
leasing agreement — by the terms of which the warranty deposit
advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee —
and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said
amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that
the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these
allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant
and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally
issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in
order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section
2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of said offense that the
check should have been made and issued on account or for value — it is
sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the
check must have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the
issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the
checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar
beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is
no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the
present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced
any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the
complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been
returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded
the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even
expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he
was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents
showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs.
Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the
transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her
side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the
accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner
since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real
nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following
pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused
violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which
are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated,
proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the
accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the
postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or
issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of
B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the
catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks
were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have
been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise
that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will
remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security
for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails
in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that
extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe-
keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules
and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit
which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public,
includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates,
whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or
on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is
inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never
hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the
warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the
vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was
introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament
was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease
agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance
Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the
accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
II. THE REVISED PENAL CODE - BOOK ONE and RELATED
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
A. Territorial and Extra-territorial Jursidiction
B. Article 3: Felonies
a. Rogelio Roque vs. People (GR 193169: APRIL 6 2015)
ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of
frustrated homicide in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of
Pandi, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot
with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the latter on his right
ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face and back, causing serious
physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said
Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, that is[,] by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said
Reynaldo Marquez which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”
During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the identity of
petitioner; that he is a Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan;
and that the day of the incident, November 22, 2001 was the
Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay. Trial thereafter ensued where
the parties presented their respective versions of the incident.
The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers
Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in
the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo
spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them.
At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a
tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo’s shout was directed at him, petitioner
stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for the
misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he
warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them
if they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao
(Tayao) to ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because
of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by dela Cruz
and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer
around, Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner’s house to follow Tayao
and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner’s
residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the latter did not
reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came out, he
was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was
hit in his right ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground
after being hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the
face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since
petitioner warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately,
Reynaldo’s parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for
emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on and confined for
three weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a
medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo’s
skull and exited at the back of his right ear.
Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on
November 22, 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a
tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers
Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored
the two and just went home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in
front of his house still shouting invectives against him. Petitioner’s
brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not
without threatening that they would return to kill him. Petitioner thus
asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back,
entered petitioner’s yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner
requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm
down and instead fired his gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense,
petitioner fired back twice.
On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 84, rendered its Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged,
viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision correccional, as
minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an
Order4 dated August 16, 2007.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its
Decision5 dated February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC’s
Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a
Resolution8 dated July 30, 2010.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court where petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS
NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED WITH A GUN.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT
RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT THAT
THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER WAS
NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT
RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER WAS
PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT WOUNDS, AND (B) THE
PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGAY OFFICIALS FROM
INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.
The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to “appreciation of
evidence” or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already explained
in Batistis v. People11 that:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of
Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the
CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1,
Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any
time during its pendency.
Petitioner’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and
re-examination of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.12
The Petition must therefore be denied on this basis because “one, the
petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal
questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb
the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd,
speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary
to the findings reached by the court of origin,”13 which was not shown to
be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial
evidence, its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA,14 as in this case. After
all, the RTC “had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand
and detect if they were telling the truth.”15 “To [thus] accord with the
established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s findings
of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC,
particularly after their affirmance by the CA”16 as petitioner was not able
to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a
departure from the said doctrine.17
In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s
ruling that petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide and not merely of less
serious physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly stated by the CA:
In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to
kill the victim. If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is
liable for physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of whether the
victim only suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days,
if intent to kill is sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is frustrated
homicide (Arts. 263-266).
Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the
offender and the parts of the victim’s body at which the weapon was
aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly
weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter’s abdomen, the
intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH
ED., P. 431).
It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the
head. Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon
used are ready indications that the accused-appellant’s objective is not
merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor. Verily, had the
accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets
surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further
exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant even prevented barangay
officials from intervening and helping x x x the bleeding victim. Indeed,
the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live through the
ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the crime
ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical
injuries. After all, as was mentioned above, what should be
determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the resulting injury but the
criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger.18
The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant
is also proper, there is a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that
awards of damages must be made in favor of the victim Reynaldo.
The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be
awarded to Reynaldo due to the absence of receipts to prove the medical
expenses he incurred from the incident. “Nonetheless, absent competent
proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of
claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where,
from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss.”19 Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo
was hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit
as observed by the RTC there was no evidence offered as to the
expenses he incurred by reason thereof, Reynaldo is entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Aside from this, he is
also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards of
damages are in accordance with settled jurisprudence.20 An interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on the awarded
damages to commence from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully paid.21
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its
entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002
convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the crime of frustrated homicide, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to pay
the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral damages and temperate damages in
the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

b. De Guzman, Jr. vs People (GR 178512: NOVEMBER
26 2014)
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR.,​ Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, ​J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender.
Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical
injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and external
acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or
by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated
on September 27, 2006,​1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo
under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No.
191-MD.​2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten o’clock in the evening,
Alexander Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below his
rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City
when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of
his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape.
Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila
apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told
the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a
rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M.,
Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water
into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and
stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the
left portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino
that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his
motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical
Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered
medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency
room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to
the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days.
Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital
where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was
on the zygoma, left side, and aboutone (1) cm. long. The other is on his
upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the
proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed
(sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which
resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the
insertion of a thoracostomy tube toremove the blood. According to Dr.
Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could
have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn,
July 8, 1998, p.8).
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According
to him, on December 25,1997 at around midnight, he passed by
Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he
accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw invective
words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between
them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek
causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.​3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis
a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the
Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6)
Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM
to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered topay the private complainant
compensatory damages in the amount of ₱14,170.35 representing the
actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.
SO ORDERED.​4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the
crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by
Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heatof anger during the
fist fight between them; that he did not inflict the stabwounds, insisting
that another person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had
caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be
accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmedthe petitioner’s conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
The September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.​5
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2,
2007.​6
Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide?
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill
his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2)
the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of
timely medical assistance; and (3) noneof the qualifying circumstances
for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.​7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the
qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we
immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the
fistfight between him and Alexander.1âwphi1 He claims that the
heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of
them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained.
Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because
the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as
homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intentto kill
is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from
the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to
kill is competently shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of
the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with
the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must
allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.​8 Intent to kill, being a
state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of
the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,​9 we
considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to
kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature,
location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct
of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed
and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as
determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered
at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.​10
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was
present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission,
the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in
the heat of anger or as the result ofa fistfight between them. The
petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical
records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds,
specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of
his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly
proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to beno doubt about
the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death
were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already
performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of
homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to
Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of
the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It
is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy
witness sufficed to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline
finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the victim
himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost
always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural
tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to
remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the
latter committed the crime.​11 Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s
mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the
credible physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under
the circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for
frustrated homicide. The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we
find the indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of
PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One
(1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"​12 fixed by the RTC erroneous
despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed
on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.13
The maximum term is the penaltyproperly imposed under the Revised
Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed.
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,​14 frustrated
homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to reclusion
temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present,
however, prision mayorin its medium period – from eight years and one
day to 10 years – is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years
and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA
was not within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the
correct indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as
the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of
₱14,170.35 as compensatory damages "representing the actual
pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."​15 We
need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules
of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,​16 we
emphatically declared to be "imperative that the courts prescribe the
proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery." We explained why in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have
the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of
the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;
(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act
or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas
we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their
omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action
because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the
authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and
justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting
reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under
the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name
unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the
litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of
administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and
cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases.
They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution
and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the
wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto
of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are
always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been
reserved or waived.​17
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries
because the offender committed violence that nearly took away the
victim’s life. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission."​18 Indeed,
Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the
victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries.​19 Towards that end, the
Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a
reasonable award of moral damages.​20 In addition, AAA was entitled to
recover civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00.​21 Both of these awards did not
require allegation and proof.
In addition, the amounts awarded ascivil liability of the petitioner shall
earn interest of 6% per annumreckoned from the finality of this decision
until full payment by the accused. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo
De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to
Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00; moral damages of
₱30,000.00; and compensatory damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest of
6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until
full payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

c. Rivera vs People (GR 166326: JANUARY 25 2006)
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,
Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., ​J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision​1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision​2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 90, in Criminal Case
No. 6962-99, entitled ​People of the Philippines. v. Esmeraldo Rivera, et
al.​
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite,
charging Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of
attempted murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of
Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow
block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on
his head and on the different parts of his body, the accused thus
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed
to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (​sic)​ away and
the timely response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.​3
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped
driving in April 1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was
even given a citation as a ​Bayaning Pilipino by the television network
ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living as a
manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro
Labrador II, Dasmariñas, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera
and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food.
Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for
support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A
heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to
buy food and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with
him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo,
emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that
helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on
the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben.
People who saw the incident shouted: "​Awatin sila! Awatin sila!​" Ruben
felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting
him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived,
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto
Cagingin, Jr., signed a medical certificate in which he declared that
Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal area, cerebral
concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple
abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.​4 The doctor
declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and
superficial and would heal from one to seven days.​5 The doctor
prescribed medicine for Ruben’s back pain, which he had to take for one
month.​6
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben
arrived at his house and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his
brothers to come out and fight. When he went out of the house and
talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each other.
He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife
arrived, and he was pulled away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother
Esmeraldo, but Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free
himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went home afterwards. He did
not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was
throwing garbage in front of their house. Ruben arrived and he went
inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged the gate and
ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him.
His brother Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the
problem was. A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and
pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he stood up, he
pulled at Edgardo’s shirt and hair, and, in the process, Ruben’s head hit
the lamp post.​7
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of ​prision mayor as the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the
accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally, civil
indemnity to the private complainant in the amount of ​P​30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.​8
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the
accused and their witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA, which
rendered judgment on June 8, 2004 affirming, with modification, the
appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 90, is MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of
ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2
years of ​prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of ​prision
mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.​9
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari,​ alleging that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They
insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill
Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners
aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only
a superficial wound in the parietal area; hence, they should be held
criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if petitioners had the intent
to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they
should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove
petitioners’ intent to kill Ruben:
On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature
of the wound inflicted and the kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was
established by victim Ruben Rodil in his testimony as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what
happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a
piece of hollow block xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit
with a hollow block by Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while
Dagol was hitting, Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim
had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly
intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped
each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already
fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a cement hollow
block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and
that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants
desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.​10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the
decision of the CA is correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the
presumption of innocence raised by petitioners. The crime has been
clearly established with petitioners as the perpetrators. Their intent to kill
is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and
categorically declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St.
Peter Avenue when he was suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera.
They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his two brothers Ismael and
Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, coming from St. Peter II, ganged up on the
victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they saw
Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it
three (3) times. A careful review of their testimonies revealed the
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners. In this case,
the victim did not even have the slightest warning of the danger that lay
ahead as he was carrying his three-year old daughter. He was caught
off-guard by the assault of Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera and the
simultaneous attack of the two other petitioners. It was also established
that the victim was hit by Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, while he was lying on
the ground and being mauled by the other petitioners. Petitioners could
have killed the victim had he not managed to escape and had the police
not promptly intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the
victim was superficial and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the
injury does not negate the intent to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim
had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly
intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers
helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had
already fallen to the ground; that one of them picked up a cement hollow
block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and
that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants
desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.​11
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their
consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to
kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove
by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is
presumed from the commission of a felony by ​dolo.​
In ​People v. Delim,​ 12
​ the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to
kill in crimes against persons may consist, ​inter alia​, in the means used
by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which
the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim
dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the
ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.
Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit
the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and
cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial
and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners’
criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the
victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an
attempt to commit a felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.​13
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements,
namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to
be committed.​14
​ elaborated on the concept of an overt or
The Court in ​People v. Lizada15
external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The ​raison d’etre for the law
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of
the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to
be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the
act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long
as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the
intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It
is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to
the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.​16
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the
felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a
hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head.
If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
We reject petitioners’ contention that the prosecution failed to prove
treachery in the commission of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim
in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with his
three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He
had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by
the synchronized assault of the three siblings. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim.​17 Even if the attack is
frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim
to repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery.​18 Obviously,
petitioners assaulted the victim because of the altercation between him
and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being conspiracy by
and among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.​19
The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years of ​prision correccionali​ n its minimum period, as
minimum, to six years and one day of ​prision mayor in its maximum
period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for
murder is ​reclusion perpetua to death. Since petitioners are guilty only of
attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by two degrees,
conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2
of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a
penalty is ​prision mayor.​ In the absence of any modifying circumstance in
the commission of the felony (other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery), the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from
the medium period of ​prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, the penalty of ​prision mayor should be reduced by
one degree, ​prision correccional​, which has a range of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.
Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from two (2) years of ​prision correccional in its minimum
period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of ​prision
mayor​ in its medium period, as maximum.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING​, the petition is ​DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is ​AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from two (2) years of ​prision correccional in its minimum
period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of ​prision
mayor​ in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED​.
d. U.S. vs Ah Chong (GR L-5272: MARCH 19 1910)
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES,​ plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG,​ defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, ​J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is
limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very
nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the
incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to
these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the
weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which
there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters,
No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or ​muchacho​.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as
an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along
the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other
part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for
its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with
a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the
habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door
by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window,
which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who
had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice,
"Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the
porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above
the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the
door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow
had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable
that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen
knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28,
and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's
wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the
date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it
was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to
have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the
door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters
No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their
walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their
room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments
after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the
back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran
back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his
roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was
"a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of
Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief
was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say
who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being
attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed
to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on
the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and
found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor​,
the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right
of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the
following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that
defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for
the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the
darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the
thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have
been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself
from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief
to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a
"ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the
property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck
the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part
of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting,
and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend
his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction
one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability
if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question
we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or
mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the
law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny,
animus furendi;​ in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law,
sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit ​vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth
vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates ​vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham ​vs. State,
38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth ​vs.​ Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the
only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent
is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly
declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed
with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it
appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But
while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in
the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the
Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or
criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying
the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different
from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal,
and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little
difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to
do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure
of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is
done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has
been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt
mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one
particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by
law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be
voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from
that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the
word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free,
intelligent,​ and ​intentional a
​ ct, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and
that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "​con malicia​,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the
code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco
insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime
can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act
which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in
the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code
that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p.
16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that
where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without
fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no
act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral
injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made
use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to
cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of
his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the
parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the
necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action
or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made
use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or
malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and
punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be
an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein
defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of
article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done
with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the
penalty of ​arresto mayor i​ n its maximum degree, to prision correccional i​ n
its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of ​arresto mayor ​in its
medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to
their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the
first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to
the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is
that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of
malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose
any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem
to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and
American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said
that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally
or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further
and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it
signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said
to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the
thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it
means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice,"
"malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating
intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference
between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood
to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a
condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various
modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must
combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in
the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the ​quo
animo w ​ ith which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always;
but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other
words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can
not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this
doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims​. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the
modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us
such maxims as ​Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea​, "the act itself
does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" ​Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus​, "an act done by me against my will is not my
act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment t​ each the same thing. "By reference
to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an
action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard
around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes
the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God
to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did
from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not
his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to
the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want
of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the
utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as
good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that
no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent
departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of
the arbitrary rule that ​Ignorantia juris non excusat (​ "Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our
tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the
courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited
class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
(cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in
fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing
necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise
that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary,
the maxim here is ​Ignorantia facti excusat (​ "Ignorance or mistake in point
of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any
such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from
no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as
laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. ​vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C.,
387; P. ​vs. ​Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. ​vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs.
P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson ​vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. ​vs. Cohen, 8 Cox
C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley ​vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was
made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has ​reasonable cause to
believe ​the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of
an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the
facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he
thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are
in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of
cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised
as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life,
but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real
one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and
property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt
from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when
he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime
of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his
innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or
criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established
in article 1 of the code, that the "​act punished by law"​ was committed
"voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person
slain had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition
killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as
follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward
him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over
the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only​, and
that the real design of B was only to ​terrify A. Will any reasonable man
say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a
bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain
how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the
essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury
who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from
this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts
are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his
hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than
reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not
see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on
the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave
the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the
floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his
father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his
identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral
congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the
facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as
having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia o ​ f Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for
the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419
and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have
been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his
house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck,
and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have
executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire
light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the
acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant
was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the
same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of
self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary,
particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one
which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death,
and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which
they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering
that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed
rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of
supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was
situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there
was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and
almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before
simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing
that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and
observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he
be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this
homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances
defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and,
therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of ​prison
mayor,​ etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from
this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and
excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him,
and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc.,
the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is
awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this,
he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be
burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the
mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead
on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites
of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch
of the ​Audiencia o ​ f Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the
accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means,
employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of ​prision
correctional ​for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar
convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged
in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the
door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted
in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be
said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court
should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which
he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both
instance ​de oficio​. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ.,​ concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J.,​ dissent.
Separate Opinions
​ issenting:
TORRES, ​J., d
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court,
believes that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide
by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal
Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
(​voluntariomente)​ killed, and while the act was done without malice or
criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the
acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the
defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the
person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was
accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the
undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year
and one month of ​prision correctional,​ to suffer the accessory penalties
provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of
the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort
judgment appealed from. to wanton violence is never justified when their duty could be performed
otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place
in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of
law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of
e. Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan (GR 120744-46: JUNE 25
human life.
2012)
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012
Court assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for murder,
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively.
vs.
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva
(Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco)
x-----------------------x
and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who
were members of the Integrated National Police (INP)2 stationed at the
G.R. No. 122677
Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan
(Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A.
Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes
MANGUERRA, Petitioners,
and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises
vs.
Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
(David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
(CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del
Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple
x-----------------------x
attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
inculpatory portions of which read:
G.R. No. 122776
Criminal Case No. 16612:
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,
vs.
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Respondents.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
DECISION
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
PERALTA, J.:
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince
S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the
green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different
parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the
latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 16613:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores,
Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with
automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney
ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G.
Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of
murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the
murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva,
attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and having
performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder,
but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’
will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C.
Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities,6 the accused – except Pabalan who died earlier on June
12, 1990,7 and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed8 – entered
individual pleas of not guilty.9 A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a
negative plea.10 In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David,
Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to
Criminal Case No. 16612.11 Said motion was heard on the premise, as
previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that
these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said
hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the
merits.12 On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal
Case No. 16612.13 Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991
and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991.14 Pamintuan died on
November 21, 1992,15 and accordingly, the charges against him were
dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived
the pre-trial inquest. 16 Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked
up from where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the
bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988,
Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the
residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations
between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around
7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were
all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel,
to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road.
With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10
kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a
curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva
and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.17
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim,
allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down.18 In open
court, Flores executed a sketch19 depicting the relative location of the
Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they
had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right
after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said
house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly
took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell
how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he,
unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the
jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the
yard of Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously
introduced himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel
Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when
flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and
told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup
were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed
and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also
there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney
to be taken to the hospital.20 This was corroborated by Villanueva who
stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together
with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to
another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.21
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which
very rapidly succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning
shot at all contrary to what the defense would say.22 He professed that
he, together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney
on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each
holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as
soon as he and his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the
driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two
armed companions.23 He further narrated that the day after the shooting,
he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired
on April 7, 1988.24 He claimed that all the accused in the case had not
been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he
identified to be his wife’s uncle and with whom he denied having had any
rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have
otherwise inspired ill motives. 25 He claimed the bullet holes on the
Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no
other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.26
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant,
affirmed the presence of his companions at his residence on the subject
date and time, and corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’ narration of the
events immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after
seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his house
and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads,
he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a
distance which was shortly followed by Flores’ frantic call for help. He
immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan
by the lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s house where, inside, he
noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not
recognize. 27 At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being
loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be
in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from
Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but before
driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of
an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the
same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by
Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his
mother’s house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him
with whom, however, he was not able to talk.28
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because
the electric post in front of Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he
arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He
admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyuco’s group or the
group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the hospital,
but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously
identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to
the hospital.29
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined
the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the shooting
and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however,
determine exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she
tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative
positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer
paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the
opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed
having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet
holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger side
of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained,
rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been
fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward in a
straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road.30
Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the
INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms
and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and
CVO members, identified in court the memorandum receipts for the
firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra,
Pabalan and Yapyuco.31
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical
Center, examined the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988.
He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of
Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he
noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last
between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front
lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would
be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the
assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the
firearm was fired from the level of the assailant’s waist; but if the victim
was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the
shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward.
He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet
would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level.32
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when
examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right
temporal region of the head – one consistent with being hit by a hard and
blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the
locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from
the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect
of the middle portion of the right leg; another, through-and-through wound
at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the
abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the
intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger
seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant
must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the
level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the
abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at
the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at
Licup’s left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead
of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup
had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He
said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at
the victim’s back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting
any hard surface prior.33
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have
been caused by a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the
right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being
hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed position
following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than
one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw
jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having
changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He
could not tell which of Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could
be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others
because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with
his head lying low and steady.34
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with
and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting
incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon
sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from
service.35 Dolly Porqueriño, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified
that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the
report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had
previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the
sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and
the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to
the NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration.36 The Sandiganbayan,
in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with the joint
counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He
identified himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in
San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners
Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included
Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the
afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical
injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance
from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a
reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco
allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement
but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and
bring their M-16 rifles with them.37
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met
with Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men
carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan
allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby
Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there
were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron.
Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects,
hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at
the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make
an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan
announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno
behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He
claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to
its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan
and Puno,38 to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing
forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of
Naron’s house directly at the subject jeepney.39
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted
and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation
employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately
searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby
St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene
supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the
jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.40
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay
Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several
law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed
supposedly by rebel elements,41 and that he frequently patrolled the
barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men
therein.42 That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene
were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the
Sindalan Police Substation, 43 the team composed of Pamintuan and his
men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted
that all of them, including himself, were armed.44 He denied that they
had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of
the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. 45 He said that the shots
which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from
him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members
assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired
only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they
were assembled.46
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any
one of the accused after the incident because he was at the time very
confused; yet he did know that his co-accused had already been
investigated by the main police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries
did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.47 He admitted an
administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which
they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the
decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to
an investigation independently conducted by their station commander,
S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. 48
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San
Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order
situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen
victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has
actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel
elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel
Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted "clearing
operations" in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that
days prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted of
the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s
declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and
making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached
Pamintuan’s statement referring to Flores as being "married to a resident
of Barangay Quebiawan" and found after surveillance to be "frequently
visited by NPA members." He affirmed having found that guns were
indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather
bullet shells from the scene. 49
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the
testimony of Yapyuco as well as the latter’s documentary evidence.50
Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived
their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum as
told.51
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had
acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the
maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as
members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in
the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the
intent of killing them.52 With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco,
Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as
co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of
Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of
attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of
frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted
the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder
charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De
Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y
David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased
victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages
and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate shares of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused
charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y
David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y
Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple
Attempted Murder charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y
David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249,
in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and
crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel
Villanueva in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay
their proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.53
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to
Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been
committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining
peace and order;54 that the acts performed by them preparatory to the
shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to
themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject
vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and
consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of
official duty;55 that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit
petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had
sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that
the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by
evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
when they acted as they did;56 that there was insufficient or total
absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney
were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and
well-coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden
agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan,
or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.57
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements
of prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly
on the circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan
pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it
had truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since –
as it turned out after the search of the vehicle – they had no firearms with
them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of.58 It observed that
while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of Barangay
Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain
no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which
were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence
of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that
evening could not have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it
noted that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not
sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well
as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject
Tamaraw jeepney. 59 It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco
in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed
men – which allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring
barangays – were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how
petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target
vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had already known that their
suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsang’s
house – such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by
which they advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to afford
a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the
house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to
by prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.60
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting
the position of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and
concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney
and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets
that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of
Naron’s residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was
slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the
report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been
tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore
indicating that they had indeed been discharged.61
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming
circumstantial evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the
nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot
wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused
such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and
trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney;
the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street and
inside the front yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the
lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic
findings on the firearms of petitioners. 62
This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only
fortified petitioners’ admission that they did discharge their firearms, but
also provided a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with
one another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm
the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive
proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots
that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan
imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to have
discharged their firearms that night – petitioners herein.63 Interestingly, it
was speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and
individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the
shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of
them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;64
and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence adduced by the
defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the
incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as
well as by the NAPOLCOM.65 It likewise found very consequential the
fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand;
this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to individually
explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the
prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of
lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in
their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in
the front yard of Naron’s residence from which the volley of gunfire was
discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.66
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved
because first, it was supposedly not shown how the aggression
commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally
injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must
be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the
mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from
circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding
holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco
received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and
the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to be
no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that
circumstance.67
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required
leave from work for 60 days which were all charged against his
accumulated leave credits;68 that he was earning ₱8,350.00 monthly;69
and that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw
jeepney.70 Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent
₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during the wake,
₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the
prosecution of these cases.71 He also submitted a certification from San
Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.72 On
these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and
severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and
compensatory damages and ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,
plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased
Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00
as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present
recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding
of conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that
the court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts
intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the other
accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal object
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is
belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the
shooting incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the
hospital on his jeepney.73 He also points out the uncertainty in the
Sandiganbayan’s declaration that the incident could not have been the
product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of
either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay
officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn
commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he
could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. 74
He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be
exonerated because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona
fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of
the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in
the lawful performance thereof – a fact which has been affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for
gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.75 He also invokes
the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the
responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had
entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.76
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes claim that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was based on acts the
evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously
attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in
the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and
Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David,
Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of
evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the
acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay
officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf.
They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and
CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the
accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired
upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.77
Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were
based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the
court itself and those presented in a separate trial. They label the
assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious and,
hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
prosecution.78 Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no
basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they
were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were
among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as
among the perpetrators of the crime.79
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of
conspiracy. They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion
of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a
legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to
obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as
far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever been part of
such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the
assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely
followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the
conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before
the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had
community of criminal design with the rest of the accused.80 They affirm
Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots at the subject
jeepney,81 but only after it had passed the place where they were posted
and only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became
apparent that it was going to speed away – as supposedly shown by
bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney.
They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have
otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since
none of the victims had been personally or even remotely known to either
of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe,
shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the
passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their
fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel
Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could
have easily fired at the victims directly.82
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
stands by the finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all
accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited
the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be
coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that the manner by which
the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and
design to commit the crimes charged.83 It believes that criminal intent is
discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road
that would give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the
trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.84 This intent was
supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and
Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening
consequence.85 It refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty,
mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of the
accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they
have not shown that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the
suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely
responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through
David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof
when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by
innocent individuals instead.86
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that
the evidence adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings
based thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said
petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had
previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later
on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their
memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said
petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence
on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation
to forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present
witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies
in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the
latter has failed to register his objection thereto.87
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and
inferences that seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over
the records of the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to
support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners
were at the situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the
Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony – which was adopted by
Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the
prosecution,88 explained that their presence at the scene was in
response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that
armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied
by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on
the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification
under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of
mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake
but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent
that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as
to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the
eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify
the criminal.89 To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in
evidence the joint counter-affidavit90 of Andres Reyes and Manguerra;
the counter-affidavit91 of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit92 of
Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit93 of Yapyuco; and the joint
counter-affidavit94 of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed
immediately after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno
stated therein that "[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle"
when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it
ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to stop;95 in their earlier affidavit they,
together with Yapyuco, declared that they were "constrained x x x to fire
directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle."96 Yapyuco’s open court
declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice
discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it
allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires
thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape.97 He suggested –
substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was "the whole team
[which fired] at the fleeing vehicle" 98 – that the bullets which hit the
passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the
CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes
and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival
of the suspect vehicle.99
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that
it was only Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only
into the air to give warning shots,100 and that it was the "policemen [who]
directly fired upon" the jeepney.101 Manguerra himself shared this
statement.102 Yet these accounts do not sit well with the physical
evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney
which Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come
from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This
evidence in fact supports Yapyuco’s claim that he, Cunanan and Puno
did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had
already moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers
thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his
claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the
jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken
post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of
Naron’s house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and
where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such
that the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.103
While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being
inconclusive as to who among the accused actually discharged their
firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated
Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted
within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said
vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate
themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is
evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may
not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate
trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on
them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.104
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is
admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the
other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his
extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and
the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the
admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because
then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.105 It is thus perplexing
why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and
Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident,
they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in
fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or
non-participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim
that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not
to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness
in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of
their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance
of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office.106 The justification is based on the complete absence of intent
and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony
connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.107 Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to
an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be
penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary
consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of
his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused
relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the
burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is
a legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to
defeat the claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay
officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and
order – were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected
rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to
identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms
inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even
effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their
suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a
crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing
offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the
accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the
suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the
absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as
would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited
such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused,
particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms
in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to
show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence
of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were
armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA
members and whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial
in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the
prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the
accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law
enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that
arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules
of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest
caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his
weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit
without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal
feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the
lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process
pertains to other government officers or agencies.108
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force
as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome
his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm.109 United States v. Campo110 has laid
down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case
when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other
means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and
obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise
of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing
the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force.111 He
is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the
offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when
the arrest could be effected otherwise.112 People v. Ulep113 teaches
that –
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a
last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot
otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police
officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be
true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when
pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal,
action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and
discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within
the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence
upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind
that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom
society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with
human rights.114
Thus, in People v. Tabag,115 where members of the Davao CHDF had
killed four members of a family in their home because of suspicions that
they were NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by
invoking among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them
liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6,
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals
can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no
evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their
children were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of
the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night,
they were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn
of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden
and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre
was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.116
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney
by claiming that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well
as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that
the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark
road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners’ signal to stop, and
compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk
from the party they had just been to,117 still, we find incomprehensible
petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at
least one other vehicle at the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned by
Yapyuco – which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects
whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute
necessity justifies the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein
petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that petitioners
failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does
not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not
seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at
the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered
why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their
suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their
careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the
fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve,
thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to
Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to
grave danger to life and limb – all of which could not have been the
necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of
fact faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact"
is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act
or omission which is the subject of the prosecution.118 Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
negates the intent component of the crime.119 It may be a defense even
if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.120 The
inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and it does not
look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.122 A proper
invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;123 (b) that it be a matter of fact;124 and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the
offense.126
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found
in United States v. Ah Chong,127 but in that setting, the principle was
treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of
the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it
was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was
woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and,
receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded
identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill
the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had
placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized
a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his
roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his
honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to
commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any
such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from
no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as
laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally
guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the
facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he
thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are
in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme
measure. x x x 128
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the
justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a
mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the
accused.131 Thus, Ah Chong further explained that –
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one
can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state
of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we
think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.132
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and
frustrated homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The
precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the
invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the
defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its
responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.133 By
reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind
rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.134 The overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it
entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.135
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.136 Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act
and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.137 In
homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death
was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and
was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that
defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of
homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is,
with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by
the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.138 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal
law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and
holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. 139
Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and
attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these
offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as
that required of the other elements of said offenses.140
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the
prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had
by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn
to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense
evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well as
Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan
alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who
their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a
mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in
court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of
his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the
San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was
being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim
that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members
of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas
supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died
during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify
in court emerged.141
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades
relevance and materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial
inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains significance when
the commission of a crime is established by evidence purely
circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.142 The question of motive is
important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or
is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt that
the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is
not so important to know the reason for the deed.143
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they
did not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully
discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets
concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other
conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along
the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the
discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a
finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the
attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was
not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the
intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and
necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.144
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand
rifle and .30 caliber carbine.145 While the use of these weapons does not
always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently
lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is
not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit
and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired
upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much
too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril
to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the
gunfire was aimed at the tires – especially considering that petitioners do
not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in
encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney
and the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the
driver – and in fact even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or
even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to
be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire
directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was
proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their
natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the
tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt.
The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’
actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on
Licup who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was
occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from
their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference
than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident
or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State146 tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and
natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases.
Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their
own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes
that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore,
when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the
homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was
accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed
by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was
otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with
the deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss
Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his
co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
the incident of another act performed without malice.147 People v.
Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that a deliberate intent to
do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,150 we held that that there can be
no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless
negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime
of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly
found by the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of
reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the
object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.151
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable
period prior to the occurrence.1a\^/phi1 From the legal viewpoint,
conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.152 The
instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among
petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon their
suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from
the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had
converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by
Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the
common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their
authority when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was
attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it
to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were
confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by
preventing the jeepney’s supposed escape even if it meant killing the
driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by
their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the
jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate
environment of the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to
target the driver, they did achieve their object as shown by the
concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at
angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof
that tells which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that
night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and
fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that
since only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of
their service firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be
held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law
enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.153
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as
co-principals in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only,
respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained
by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other
accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the
unharmed victims.154 The allegation of evident premeditation has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is
consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds
of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be
attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery,
inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of
attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by
reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in
relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these
cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has
properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from
six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as
prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614
had committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in
order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that
of a consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional,
whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six
(6) months of arresto mayor.
damages and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary
damages should be deleted, there being no aggravating circumstance
that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated
June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the
indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual
damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in
the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and
₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance

with prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and
severally, to indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of
₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With
respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly
and severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory

f. Loney vs. People (482 SCRA 195: FEBRUARY 10
2006)
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ,​ Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ​Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, ​J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review​1 of the Decision​2 dated 5 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5
November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed
against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper
Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the
province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings​3 from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading
to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed
a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed
out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners
in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of
Article 91(B),​4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067
or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),​5 Section 8​6 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of
1976 ("PD 984"),​7 Section 108​8 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),​9 and Article 365​10 of the Revised Penal
Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.​11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1)
the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged
more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney
and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations
contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC​12 initially
deferred ruling on petitioners’ motion for lack of "indubitable ground for
the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners’
arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners’ motion, the MTC
issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"),
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained
the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The
MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to
"mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit
and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel
due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent
pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very
term and condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the
Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence
necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the
elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant
to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In
other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of
the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the
parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the
Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water
Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements
which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and
96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and
96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be
tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the
common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic]
damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes
not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for
the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.​13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the remaining charges
on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners
manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of
RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record
petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and
ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA
7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional
Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners’
petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an
ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067
and PD 984. Public respondent’s appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On
public respondent’s motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s
appeal consolidated with petitioners’ petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution​14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
respondent’s appeal but denied petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set aside
the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated.
Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch
94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion
that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other
offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct
from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same
with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings
which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the
basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a
distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction
that –
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require
[sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not
although they stemmed from a single act.​15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the
Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article
365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident
of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings"
and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling
in People v. Relova.​16​Petitioners further contended that since the acts
complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.​17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Branch 94’s ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash
the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the
grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3,
Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public
respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for
being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People’s argument with
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being
charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the
context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution
(now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than
the first sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to
the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are
for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in
character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s understanding that the
laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly
absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of
these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence
that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
reversing the Municipal Trial Court’s quashal of the Informations against
the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally
finds no error in the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to quash
R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.​18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their
motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR
IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE
(P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A
SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND
MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED
SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER
ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR
OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND
IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER
CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.]​19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information
charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110​20 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense​. – A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single
Information charges more than one offense.​21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117​22 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense.​23 Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously
invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On
this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only —
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property — because (1) all
the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single
act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping
of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack of necessary or
adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is
common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused
for more than one offense.​24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
"the same offense."​25 In People v. Doriquez,​26 we held that two (or more)
offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.​27
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
present.​28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners’
claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with
approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA
7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on
which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not
required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and
the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities
concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the
proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not
indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution
Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code
even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with
the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if]
it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is
the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In
the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this
law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and
Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused
satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does
not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water
Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element
of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required
under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of
mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system,
much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished
by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.​29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners,
although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
prosecution contravenes this Court’s ruling in People v. Relova. In
particular, petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that the law
seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal
in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric
power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a
City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it
did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same
but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an
ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription
against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second
sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section
21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas
City] is ​not the same a ​ s theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal
Code]; that the ​second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a
​ nd that the second offense is not ​necessarily included
frustration thereofa
in the offense charged in the first information.​ "
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This
is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision
involved – which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioner’s position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of
the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22)
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x
x​30​ (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of
double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national
statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
incident. the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of
Appeals. Chief Justice

SO ORDERED. C. ARTICLE 4: PROXIMATE CAUSE THEORY AND IMPOSSIBLE

CRIME DOCTRINE
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
a. Rogelio Roque vs. People (GR 193169 APRIL 6 2015)
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009
WE CONCUR:
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA,​ Petitioner,
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
vs.
Associate Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Respondent.
Chairperson
DECISION
DANTE O. TINGA
QUISUMBING, ​J.:
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ATTESTATION For review on certiorari is the Decision​1 dated December 20, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision​2 dated
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri,
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable
the Court’s Division. doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate court’s Resolution​3
dated March 13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.​4
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an
Associate Justice Information that alleges as follows:

Chairperson The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @

Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
CERTIFICATION
[248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel
K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.​5
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel
Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of
Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At
around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise
from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a
second time that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner
irate and petitioner was heard to have said in the ​Ilocano vernacular,
"​Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta.​ " (This Manny is
arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)​6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage
of Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised
the group to stop singing lest they be told off again. This further infuriated
petitioner who remarked, "​Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a
pagbayagen daytoy​," meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not
let him live long."​7
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group
convened at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and
Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the 26th and 28th of
September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory,
petitioner blurted out "​Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny
ikabbut ko ita.​ " (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)​8
Later that afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz
where they drank until petitioner proposed that they move to Punta. On
their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel,
Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who,
incidentally, was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being
summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly punched him
in the face. Chy cried out, "​Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman
[inaano]​ ?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing anything to you.)​9 But
petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but
was himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to parry the blows.
Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back
portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and
phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the
mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s
house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered. Josefina
arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious
on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE​, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and after applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the wake
and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as
moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND
(₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
​
SO ORDERED​.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision
dated December 20, 2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [​DENIED​] and the
July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is hereby ​AFFIRMED IN
TOTO​.
SO ORDERED.​11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a
Resolution dated March 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS
THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED
MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS
MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED
CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED
THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE
TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE
MALTREATMENT."
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER
ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.​12
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of
Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,​13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual
findings of the trial court because the judge who penned the decision was
not the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. He adds that
the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred from, misread and overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.​14
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he
implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily,
he challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified
concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility
for Chy’s demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial
infarction. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C.
Antonio​15 that Chy’s medical condition could have resulted in his death
anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be held liable for slight
physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s assessment
of the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the
proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution
as well as the defense in this case, we are unable to consider the
petitioner’s appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
yet, petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate
that this Court is not the proper forum from which to secure a
re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings of the trial
court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the judgment
appealed from was based on a misapprehension of facts.​16 Neither
exception applies in the instant case as would justify a departure from the
established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on
non-interference with the determination of the credibility of witnesses. He
points out that the judge who penned the decision is not the judge who
received the evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the situation
obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that
Judge Conrado F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion
of no less than the petitioner himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot
seek protection from the alleged adverse consequence his own doing
might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this
argument would be to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was
designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the
fact that the ​ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier
presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not
present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and
just decision.​17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after
Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge
Cipriano not only heard the evidence for the defense, he also had an
opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who was recalled to clarify
certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that
Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz,
Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its
entirety to decide it on the basis of the records on hand.​18 He can rely on
the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of
witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common experience,
knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not
violate substantive and procedural due process of law.​19
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following
injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions​, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., ​lower portion of the left
ear​; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip;
2.7 x 1.0 cms., ​lower lip​; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of ​left hand​.
Lacerated wound​, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the ​upper lip
on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No
hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections
show a reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the
whole posterior wall, the lower portion of the anterior wall and the inferior
portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with the caliber of the
lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological
findings show ​mild fibrosis of the myocardium​.
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark
purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with reddish brown central
portion with fluid oozing on pressure with some reddish frothy materials
noted. Histopathological examinations show pulmonary edema and
hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion.
Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic
infiltration.1avvphi1
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other
partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - ​Myocardial Infarction.​ (Emphasis supplied.)​20
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated
Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased,
albeit,​ limited his liability to slight physical injuries. He argues that the
superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his death.​21 Quite the
opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would
acquaint us with the causal connection between the death of the victim
and the mauling that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the
immediate cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is
because there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing
of blood into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the
hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us
[think] or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial infarction, and
most likely the cause is ​occlusion of the blood vessels itself.
(Emphasis supplied.)​22
By definition, coronary occlusion​23 is the complete obstruction of an artery
of the heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis​24 or the thickening
and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result from sudden
emotion in a person with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart
attack will not occur.​25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination
relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,]
considering that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of
hypertension, no previous history of myocardial [ischemia], ​no previous
[arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries​, then excitement [cannot]
cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)​26
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the
myocardium​27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis​28 or
formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and thickest
layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary
occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the
testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of
the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the
mouth and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional
crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so
much so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.​29
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died
because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the
deceased, do you agree with his findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.​30
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the
emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution
and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the
myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall
be incurred "by any person committing a felony ​(delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The
essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c)
the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts.​31​lawph!l
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim
and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted
with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death.
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the case of
United States v. Brobst​32​ that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the
injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility.​33
​ enunciates that:
In the same vein, ​United States v. Rodriguez34​
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some
internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, ​his
death was hastened​, beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor
who produced the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary
and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)​35
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful
act performed is different from the one he intended;​36 "​el que es causa de
la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused).​37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did
not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt
him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act
prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance
with Article 13(3)​38 of the Revised Penal Code.​39 Nevertheless, we must
appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that
the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted
naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart
was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the
imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, ​reclusion
temporal in its minimum period,​40​or anywhere from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,​41 the trial court properly imposed upon
petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of ​prisión mayor,​ as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of ​reclusion
temporal a​ s maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel
Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱332,000. In fixing
the indemnity, the victim’s actual income at the time of death and
probable life expectancy are taken into account. For this purpose, the
Court adopts the formula used in ​People v. Malinao​:42
​ Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the
victim at the annual net income which time of this death) would have
been received
by the heirs for support.​43
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary
which Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of
his death, Chy was 51 years old and was earning a gross monthly
income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of ₱127,200. But, in view of
the victim’s delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy
to 10 years. It also deducted ₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable
living expense. However, the records are bereft of showing that the heirs
of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate actual living expenses. And in
the absence of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence​44 approximates net
income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his
death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should be awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of
earning capacity, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2 (₱127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600
= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600
= ₱1,229,600
We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as
stipulated by the parties​45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.​46 Anent moral
damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide,
without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.​47
However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral
damages should be reduced to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE​, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the
No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity;
₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial; and
₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
B. Urbano vs. IAC (597 SCRA 392: AUGUST 28, 2009)
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, ​petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ​respondents.
GUTIERREZ, ​JR​., ​J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened
and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the
handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm
of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was
then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of
said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and
inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from
hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo
Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman
Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As
suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The
group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian,
who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr.
Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions
returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C"
dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20
years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the
lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This
wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was
already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied
by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their
amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police
blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both
parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman
Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and
close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted
forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in
his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will
never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each
other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November
3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in
the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to
the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the
latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the
presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.
The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged
with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court
found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of ​prision mayor,​
as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal,​ as maximum, together with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo
Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the
New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in
view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano
on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The
motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such
position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon
that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San
Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation
dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or
controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches
were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to
the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in
said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected,
with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late
Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that
said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is
criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who
used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound
on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day
after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious
condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death
was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act.
Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the
appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which
supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his
death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious
consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his
wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing
got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with
tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with
tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981).
Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound
which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
(Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v.
Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a
desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive
that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled
hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the
death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with
tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the
wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was
infected is not clear from the record.
In ​Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the
following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx tite xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants
in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14
days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches
100 percent​.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity,
and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact,
trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for
the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved,
rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an
interval referred to as the onset time.​ As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms
are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and
excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be
both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system
damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days
and an onset time of more than 6 days. ​Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period
and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are
present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle
of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a
man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This
incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November
14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day ​after the
hacking incident or ​more than 14 days a ​ fter the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the ​onset time should have been more than six days​. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the ​onset time.​ The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after
the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the ​direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused​.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind ​beyond reasonable doubt.​ The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote c​ ause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in ​Manila
Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al​. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability
in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking
incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while
Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of
minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential
Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127
SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and
remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual
case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil
liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of ​People v.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al.​ (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence
is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt
him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by
the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning
followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate
and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line
of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and
the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There
may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to
be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will
close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment
on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed
by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was
based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs
of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide. Costs​ de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
c. People vs Villacorta (GR 186412: SEPTEMBER 7 2011)
G.R. No. 186412 September 7, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA,​ Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, ​J.:
On appeal is the Decision​1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision​2 dated
September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of
Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant
Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz
(Cruz) the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information​3 was filed against Villacorta charging
him with the crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon
one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim
serious wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.​4
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja
(Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari
store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and
Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s store. At around two
o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz
on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The
bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the
stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch
Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor
Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body.​5 Mendeja and
Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.​6
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro
Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he
was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an
out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on
February 14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15,
2002. While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres
was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that
Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.​7 Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruz’s death in the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x – spurs concerted, the patient developed
difficulty of opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain
and the cause of death is hypoxic encephalopathy – neuro transmitted –
due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.​8
The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias),
who attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution
and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias’ testimony based on the
stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres’ testimony on Cruz
dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied
stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from
work at around two o’clock in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon
arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes
at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put
his arm around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box
Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz
got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on
July 31, 2002.​9
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta
guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito
Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of said victim plus the costs of suit.​10
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
filed a notice of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.​11 The Court of
Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacorta’s brief, within thirty days from
receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellant’s Brief​12 on May 30, 2007; while the People,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's
Brief​13​ on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as
he was adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of
Appeals.​14 The OSG, likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a
​
supplemental brief. 15
In his Appellant’s Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of
errors:
I We are not persuaded.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A
CRIME, HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES.​16
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing
incident. It was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one
who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta
asserts that Mendeja’s account of the stabbing incident is replete with
inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human
experience, such as: (1) instead of shouting or calling for help when
Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and
catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendeja’s own account, there were other
people who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after
Villacorta, yet, oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly
and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been physically
improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who
immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both
Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said
that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left at her store,
although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left
embedded in Cruz’s body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned
inconsistencies are neither trivial nor inconsequential, and should
engender some doubt as to his guilt.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of
the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is
accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive
effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its
first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their
conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial
court in the unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to
appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.​17
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of
Appeals rejected Villacorta’s attempts to impugn Mendeja’s testimony,
thus:
Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s testimony is
incredible because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after
the appellant, fails to impress the Court because persons who witness
crimes react in different ways.
"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react
differently and there is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s second reason which is, other
persons could have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As
explained by witness Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as
Aron was left to assist the appellant who was wounded. Further, the
stabbing occurred at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, a time when persons
are expected to be asleep in their house, not roaming the streets.
His [Villacorta’s] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing
incident rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the
assailant cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission that he was in
the store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the
morning and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot
support appellant’s argument. Appellant and the victim were known to
witness Mendeja, both being her friends and regular customers. There
was light in front of the store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and ¼
meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly
those buying articles from the store. The victim was in front of the store
buying bread when attacked. Further, immediately after the stabbing,
witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity
to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.​18
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for
Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing
Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have ruled time and again that where the
prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and accused,
and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no
improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the
accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight.​19
The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja’s testimony pointed out by
Villacorta are on matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact
which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early
morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendeja’s store.
In the face of Mendeja’s positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz’s
stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial,
like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.​20
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in
the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be
held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon
Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."​21
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early
morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an
out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz
was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus
infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical
treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits
by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up
medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January
23 to February 14, 2002.
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,​22 the Court was confronted
with a case of very similar factual background as the one at bar. During
an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo,
inflicting an incised wound on Javier’s hand. Javier was treated by Dr.
Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with
lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that
Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus infection. The next day,
on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed against
Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death
was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act.
Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that Javier’s own negligence
was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr.
Meneses examined Javier’s wound, he did not find any tetanus infection
and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned
to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The
Court granted Urbano’s appeal.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14
days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches
100 percent​.
"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In
fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is
responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles
are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle
involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local
signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast
majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the
signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms,
an interval referred to as the onset time.​ As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms
are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and
excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be
both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system
damage and death.
"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days
and an onset time of more than 6 days. ​Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period
and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are
present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle
of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a
man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This
incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November
14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day ​after the
hacking incident or ​more than 14 days a ​ fter the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the ​onset time should have been more than six days​. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the ​onset time.​ The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after
the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.​23
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time
between the hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus
infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the
severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in
Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the ​direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused​.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind ​beyond reasonable doubt.​ The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote c​ ause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in ​Manila
Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al​. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)​24
We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set
aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval
of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was
rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing,
then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later.
As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short
incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms
with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was
merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might
have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.1âwphi1
Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the
Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although
the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the
lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that
the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential
ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those
constituting the offense of murder.​25
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated
murder because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s
intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly observed the lack of
evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick,
hitting him on the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The
instrument used is not as lethal as those made of metallic material. The
part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can
ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was done only
once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the
victim, which should be resolved in favor of the appellant. x x x.​26
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude
every possible doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the
aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the
prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were
inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.​27
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical
Center for medical treatment immediately after the stabbing
incident.1avvphi1 Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz was then
released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no
other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or
required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without such
evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.​28
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being
sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during trial.
The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened
bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising
from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets
out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed,
namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2)
the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To
reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness,
surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus,
depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.​29
Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.​30
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly
proven in this case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was
attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two
o’clock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out
buying bread at Mendeja’s store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down
and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta
suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo
stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his
body, then swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left
Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine
days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.​31
The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes
from its coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed one
(1) year.​32 With the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can
sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in
the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days.
Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty
(30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since
July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed
sentence, we order his immediate release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may
be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral
damages compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral
shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a proximate result of
the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant
to previous jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00)
moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical
injuries.​33
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September
22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal
Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30)
days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated
well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacorta’s immediate release,
unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the
compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the
late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
D. People vs. Flora (GR 125909: JUNE 23, 2000)
G.R. No. 125909 June 23, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA,​ accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, ​J.
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision 1​ ​dated November
7, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in
Criminal Case Nos. SC-4810, 4811 and 4812, finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of double murder and attempted murder,
and sentencing them to ​reclusion perpetua​, payment of P50,000.00 for
indemnity, P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P619,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity in Crim. Case SC-4810 for the death of Emerita Roma​;
reclusion perpetua​, payment of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P14,000.00 for
burial expenses and P470,232.00 for loss of earning capacity for the
death of Ireneo Gallarte i​ n Crim. Case SC-4811; and imprisonment from
2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional ​as minimum to 10
years of ​prision mayor a ​ nd payment of P15,000.00 ​to Flor Espinas for
injuries sustained ​in Crim. Case SC-4812.
On February 26, 1993, Prosecution Attorney Joselito D.R. Obejas filed
three separate informations charging appellants as follows:
Criminal Case No.​ ​ 4810
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning
thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan,
province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with
accused Edwin Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while
conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
firearm one EMERITA ROMA y DELOS REYES, thereby inflicting upon
the latter gunshot wounds on her chest which caused her immediate
death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation are present. 2​
Criminal Case No.​ ​ 4811​.
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning
thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan,
province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused HERMOGENES FLORA @ Bodoy, conspiring and
confederating with accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually
helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38
handgun, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one IRENEO GALLARTE
y VALERA, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his chest
which caused his immediate death, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.1âwphi1.nêt
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation are present. 3​
Criminal Case No.​ ​ 4812
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning
thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan,
province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with
accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one
another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said firearm one FLOR ESPINAS y ROMA, hitting the
latter on her shoulder, and inflicting upon her injuries which, ordinarily,
would have caused her death, thus, accused performed all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a
cause independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance given the said Flor Espinas y Roma, which prevented her
death, to her damage and prejudice. 4​
During arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued. Resolving jointly Criminal Cases Nos. SC-4810, SC-4811 and
SC-4812, the trial court convicted both appellants for the murder of
Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and the attempted murder of Flor
Espinas. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as follows:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4810, for the death of Emerita Roma, the
Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery
and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua,​
with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00
as expenses for wake and burial; and (c) P619,800 for lost (​sic​) of
earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4811, for the death of Ireneo Gallarte, the
Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery
and with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua,​ with
all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as
expenses for wake and burial; and (c) P470,232.00 for lost (​sic)​ of
earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4812, for the injuries sustained by Flor
Espinas, the Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin
Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder
and sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional,​ as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,​ as
maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her
injuries and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5​
The facts of the case, borne out by the records, are as follows:
Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora ​alias "​ Bodoy," had
a violent altercation with a certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscar's uncle,
Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two.
On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to celebrate
the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos,
Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of
Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with his brother and co-appellant
Edwin Flora, ​alias "​ Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then
a high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor
Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.
The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted.
On signal by Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver
twice. The first shot grazed the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit
Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte
who slumped onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter,
"si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora
approached her and, poking a knife at her neck, threatened to kill her
before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in
Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died. 6​
Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested Edwin
Flora at his rented house in Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna.
Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the arrest of his brother, proceeded
first to the house of his aunt, Erlinda Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but later
that day, he fled to his hometown in Pipian, San Fernando, Camarines
Sur.
The autopsy conducted by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Ricardo R.
Yambot, Jr., revealed the following fatal wounds sustained by the
deceased:
EMERITA ROMA
a) Gunshot of entrance at the posterior chest wall near the angle of the
axillary region measuring 1 cm. in diameter with clean cut inverted edges
involving deep muscles, and subcutaneous tissues and travel through
both lobes of the lungs, including the great blood vessels.
About 400 cc of clotted blood was extracted from the cadaver. The bullet
caliver 38 was extracted from the lungs.
The cause of her death was attributed to "Hypovolemic" shock secondary
to massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound of the posterior chest
wall.​7
IRENEO GALLARTE
Gunshot wound of entrance at the left arm, measuring 1 cm. in diameter
with clean cut inverted edges involving the deep muscles, subcutaneous
tissues traveling through the anterior chest wall hitting both lobes of the
lungs and each great blood vessels obtaining the bullet fragments.
About 500 cc. of clotted blood was obtained from the cadaver.
His cause of death was attributed to "Hypovelemic" shock secondary to
massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound of the left arm. 8​
Flor Espinas submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. Dennis
Coronado. Her medical certificate 9​ ​disclosed that she sustained a
gunshot wound, point of entry, 2 x 1 cm. right supra scapular area mid
scapular line (+) contusion collar; and another gunshot wound with point
of exit 1 x 1 cm. right deltoid area.
Three criminal charges were filed against the Flora brothers,
Hermogenes and Edwin, before Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution presented two
eyewitnesses, namely, (1) Rosalie Roma, daughter of one of the victims,
Emerita Roma, and (2) Flor Espinas, the injured victim. Rosalie narrated
the treacherous and injurious attack by Hermogenes Flora against the
victims. Flor detailed how she was shot by him.
Felipe Roma, the husband of Emerita, testified that his wife was
forty-nine (49) years old at the time of her death and was a paper mache
maker, earning an average of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos a week.
He claimed that his family incurred fourteen thousand (P14,000.00)
pesos as expenses for her wake and burial.
Ireneo Gallarte's widow, Matiniana, testified that her husband was
fifty-two (52) years old, a carpenter and a substitute farmer earning one
hundred (P100.00) to two hundred (P200.00) pesos a day. Her family
spent fourteen thousand (P14,000.00) pesos for his wake and burial.
The defense presented appellants Hermogenes and Edwin Flora, and
Imelda Madera, the common-law wife of Edwin. Appellants interposed
alibi as their defense, summarized as follows:
Version of Edwin Flora​:
Edwin Flora, 28 years old, testified that accused Hermogenes Flora is his
brother. On January 10, 1993, around 1:30 in the morning, he was at
Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna in the house of Johnny
Balticanto, sleeping with his wife. Policemen came at said house looking
for his brother Hermogenes. Replying to them that his brother was not
living there, policemen took him instead to the Municipal building of Paete
and thereafter transferred and detained him to (​sic​) the Municipal building
of Kalayaan.
He recalled that on January 9, 1993, after coming from the cockpit at
about 3:00 p.m. he and his accused brother passed by the house of Julito
Malubago. His brother Hermogenes was courting the daughter of Julito
Malubago. At about 6:00 p.m. he went home but his brother stayed
​
behind since there would be a dance party that night. 10
Version of Hermogenes Flora​:
Hermogenes Flora, 21 years old, testified that he did not kill Ireneo
Gallarte and Emerita Roma and shot Flor Espina on January 10, 1993 at
about 1:30 in the morning of Silab, Longos Kalayaan Laguna.
On said date, he was very much aslept (​sic​) in the house of his sister
Shirley at Sitio Bagumbayan, Longos, Kalayaan. From the time he slept
at about 8:00 in the evening to the time he woke up at 6:00 in the
morning, he had not gone out of her sister's house. He knew the victims
even before the incident and he had no severe relation with them.
xxx xxx xxx
He also testified that in the morning of January 10, 1993, Imelda Madera
came to their house and told him that his brother Edwin was picked-up by
the policemen the night before. Taken aback, his sister told him to stay in
the house while she would go to the municipal hall to see their brother
Edwin. Thereafter, his aunt and sister agreed that he should go to Bicol
​
to inform their parents of what happened to Edwin. 11
​
Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12
As earlier stated, the trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime
of double murder and attempted murder. Appellants now raise this sole
assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR IDENTITIES AND
GUILT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED.
At the outset, it may be noted that the trial court found both appellants
have been positively identified. However, they challenge the court's
finding that they failed to prove their alibi because they did not establish
that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the crime
scene. According to the trial court, by Hermogenes' own admission, the
house of his sister Shirley, where appellants were allegedly sleeping, was
only one (1) kilometer away from Sitio Silab, where the offenses allegedly
took place. The sole issue here, in our view, concerns only the plausibility
of the appellants' alibi and the credibility of the witnesses who identified
them as the perpetrators of the crimes charged.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused
establish two elements: (1) he was not at the ​locus delicti ​at the time the
offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene at the time of its commission. 13​ ​The defense of alibi and the
usual corroboration thereof are disfavored in law since both could be very
easily contrived. 14 ​ ​In the present case, appellants' alibi is patently
self-serving. Although Edwin's testimony was corroborated by his
common-law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive testimonies of
eyewitnesses and surviving victims who contradicted his alibi. Moreover,
an alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and
sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate
relative or relatives. 15​ ​Appellants' defense of alibi should have been
corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. 16​ ​ Said
uncorroborated alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification made
by eyewitnesses. 17​
In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not
categorically and clearly identified by the witnesses of the prosecution.
They claim that the testimonies of the said witnesses were not entitled to
credence. They assail the credibility of two eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie
Roma and Flor Espinas, because of the alleged inconsistencies in their
testimonies. For instance, according to appellants, Rosalie Roma testified
she was in the dance hall when the gunshots were heard, and that she
was dancing in the middle of the dance hall when Hermogenes shot
Emerita Roma, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas,
Q Where were you when Hermogenes Roma shot these Ireneo Gallarte,
Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas?
A ​I was dancing,​ sir. (Emphasis ours.)
Q And how far were you from Hermogenes Flora when he shot these
persons while you were dancing?
​
A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18
However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,
Q And where were these Emerita Roma, Your mother, Ireneo Gallarte
and Flor Espinas when Hermogenes Flora shot at them?
A They were beside each other.
Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?
A Because they were standing beside the fence and ​I was only seated
​ ​(Emphasis ours.)
near them, sir. 19
On this issue, we do not find any inconsistency that impairs her credibility
or renders her entire testimony worthless. Nothing here erodes the
effectiveness of the prosecution evidence. What counts is the witnesses'
admitted proximity to the appellants. Was she close enough to see
clearly what the assailant was doing? If so, is there room for doubt
concerning the accuracy of her identification of appellant as one of the
malefactors?
Appellants argue that since the attention of witness Flor Espinas was
focused on the dance floor, it was improbable for her to have seen the
assailant commit the crimes. On cross-examination, said witness testified
that while it was true she was watching the people on the dance floor,
nonetheless, she also looked around (gumagala) and occasionally looked
behind her and she saw both appellants who were known to her. 20 ​
Contrary to appellants' contention that Flor did not have a sufficient view
to identify the assailants, the trial court concluded that Flor was in a
position to say who were in the party and to observe what was going on.
On this point, we concur with the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve respect, for it had the opportunity to observe first-hand
the deportment of witnesses during trial. 21 ​ ​Furthermore, minor
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
22​
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance
​ ​Such
of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 23
minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard
against memorized falsities.1avvphi1
Appellants assert that Flor Espinas and Rosalie Roma were biased
because they are relatives of the victim Emerita Roma. However, unless
there is a showing of improper motive on the part of the witnesses for
testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim
does not render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of credit.
On the contrary, their natural interest in securing the conviction of the
guilty would deter them from implicating other persons other than the
​
culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 24
Here, appellants did not present any proof of improper motive on the part
of the eyewitnesses in pointing to the Flora brothers as the perpetrators
of the crime. There is no history of animosity between them. Emerita
Roma and Flor Espinas were merely innocent bystanders when hit by
gunfire. Where eyewitnesses had no grudge against the accused, their
testimony is credible. 25​ ​In the absence of ulterior motive, mere
relationship of witnesses to the victim does not discredit their testimony.
26
Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the present
case, when Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed,
and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for
Emerita's death and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape
​ rinciple. Criminal liability is
culpability on the basis of ​aberratio ictus p
incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be
​
different from that which he intended. 27
We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by
treachery. In order for treachery to exist, two conditions must concur
namely: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution
which would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory
act on the part of the offended party; and (2) such means, method or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen by the
​ ​When Hermogenes Flora suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo,
offender. 28
both were helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths were murders,
not simply homicides since the acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we
are compelled to conclude that appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita
Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and guilty of attempted murder of Flor
Espinas.1âwphi1.nêt
Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother,
Hermogenes? For the murder of Ireneo Gallarte, was there conspiracy
between appellants? For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there
be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is
sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused
and co-accused had the same purpose and were united in execution. 29 ​
Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but his conduct indicated
cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence
unquestionably gave encouragement and a sense of security to the latter,
​ ​To hold an accused guilty as a
his liability is that of a co-conspirator. 30
co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he had
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. 31 ​
Edwin's participation as the co-conspirator of Hermogenes was correctly
appreciated by the trial court, ​viz​.:
Edwin Flora demonstrated not mere passive presence at the scene of the
crime. He stayed beside his brother Hermogenes, right behind the victims
while the dance party drifted late into the night till the early hours of the
morning the following day. All the while, he and his brother gazed
ominously at Ireneo Gallarte, like hawks waiting for their prey. And then
Edwin's flick of that lighted cigarette to the ground signaled Hermogenes
to commence shooting at the hapless victims. If ever Edwin appeared
acquiescent during the carnage, it was because no similar weapon was
available for him. And he fled from the crime scene together with his
brother but not after violently neutralizing any obstacle on their way.
While getting away, Edwin grabbed Rosalie Roma and poked a knife at
her neck when the latter hysterically shouted "si Bodoy, Si Bodoy," in
allusion to Hermogenes Flora, whom she saw as the gunwielder. All told,
Edwin, by his conduct, demonstrated unity of purpose and design with his
brother Hermogenes in committing the crimes charged. He is thus liable
​
as co-conspirator. 32
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death
of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows
conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside
the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are
liable. In ​People v​.​ De la Cerna​, 21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
. . . And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for
acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and
logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators
are liable. Here, only Serapio killed (​sic​) Casiano Cabizares. The latter
was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away
when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of
Emerita Roma nor for the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his
co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
(1) Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Ireneo Gallarte and
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua ​and to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Ireneo Gallarte in the sum of P50,000.00
as death indemnity; P14,000.00 compensatory damages for the wake
and burial; and P470,232.00 representing loss of income without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2) Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
MURDER of Emerita Roma and the ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor
Espinas. For the MURDER of EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua​, to indemnify the
heirs of Emerita Roma in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial, and P619,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. For the ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas,
Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
​ s minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor​, as maximum,
correccional a
and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries.
(3) Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita Roma
and the attempted murder of Flor Espinas.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED
E. People vs Adriano (GR 205228: JULY 15 2015)
G.R. No. 205228 July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA
SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE,​ Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON,​ Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, ​J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision​1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May
2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision​2 of the
Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant
Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case
No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the
crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo
Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y
Sales."
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of
Information read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with
assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her
body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.​3
Crim. Case No. 13160-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with
assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of
his body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.​4
Version of the Prosecution:
On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew
Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), in
civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a
motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.​5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding
blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards
the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon
Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.​6
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front
seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall
in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly
alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who
was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander,
Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a
stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and
immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos
followed the Corolla but lost track of the latter.​7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds:
Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan
General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his
chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was
registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry,
Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the
Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business,
which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's
shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1
Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the passenger's
seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was
immediately arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations
Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.​8
In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office recovered one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45
caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.​9
Version of the Defense
Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of
the incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga,
washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his
motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there.​10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari
(Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After
having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went home and brought his
child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his
brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his
mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights,
where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the
cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.​11
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store
and stayed there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a
while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who
borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented from Rivera.​12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping
Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was
arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought
to a place where he was tortured.​13
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga,
and Dizon corroborated Adriano's testimony.​14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean
Adriano alias "Denden," Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter
Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1
Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V.
Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6) P03
Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8)
Ricky Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga,
Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's
defense of alibi on the ground that it was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail
over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively identified
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the
allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC
determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate
that PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives
to testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the assessment of
damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay
the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of ₱222,482.00 based on the following:
(1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses;
(2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as expenses for the food served
during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
(1!12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty
Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the
CRV.​15
The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00
and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and
Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.​16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred
when it failed to appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies
of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred
when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred to the
following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the
victim's vehicle was still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did the
shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal
shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to
Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of
the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the
precise minutes of the shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Adriano as one of the
perpetrators of the crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in
their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in
fact constitute signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R
TC that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at
the time of the incident does not convince because it was not impossible
for Adriano to be physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less
than an hour.​17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07
and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of
Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay
the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia
Bulanan the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.​18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the
following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of
the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan;
(2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the
crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as
generic aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is
carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to
eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the
victim—​19​ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to
be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him.​20 The "essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself
and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself."​21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed
defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano, together with the other
accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along
the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes
and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of
multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane,
Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to the road
embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped,
precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical
conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano,
together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in
conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their
safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and
consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate.​22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was
committed with the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of
escaping or defending himself.
Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely
a bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the
wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning,
precluding the unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending
himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much
less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death
was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she
was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless,
Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code,​23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes
criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not
have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano
was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera​24 citing People v. Hilario,​25 "[t]he
fact that accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no
moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes.
However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit
and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his
act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.​26
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v.
Nelmida.​27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants
should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two
counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing
and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of
several acts.​28​ The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound
crime, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction
that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes,"​29​ not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm.
This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate
shots are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes,
killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious
acts resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere
to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,​30 where
the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In
Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for
the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder.
The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow
the Flora doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not
established, a perusal of the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of
death was duly established as the prosecution offered in evidence
Bulanan's death certificate.​31
On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials,
are inherently weak and unreliable because they can easily be
fabricated.​32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must convincingly prove
that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed
and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.​33 In
the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As
admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour
away from the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.
Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime
scene at the time of the incident.
It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when
corroborated not by credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and
friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of
Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's
positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed
in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the
claimant must establish with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual
amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable.​34​Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages
in this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual damages as
₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount
of award of actual damages should be ₱232,482.00 as duly supported by
official receipts.​35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual
damages from ₱222,482.00 to ₱232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y SAMSON is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No.
13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES
the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages,
and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
{₱232,482.00) as actual damages.
Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No.
13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN
in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum
from the date of finality until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
F. People vs Noel Sales (GR 177218: OCTOBER 3 2011)
G.R. No. 177218 October 3, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Appellee,
vs.
NOEL T. SALES,​ Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, ​J.:
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed.
However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries
under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision​1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the
August 3, 2005 Joint Decision​2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and
RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes
of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information​3 for
parricide contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00
o’clock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times,
the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales,
a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one
meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said
victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter’s heirs in such amount
as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.​4
On the other hand, the Information​5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789
alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following
manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00
o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one
Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical
attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of
the victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.​6
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded
not guilty for the charges of parricide​7 and slight physical injuries​8
respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the
prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.​9 During the
pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the
father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr.
(Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in
the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.​10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and
eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial
procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their
parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and
Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them.
Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that
he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s
hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them
with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the
house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house
with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior
fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in
his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left
cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained
motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was
already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told
appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told
them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus
proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for
a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because
another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is
already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the
following day. His body was never examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence
on three separate occasions without the permission of their parents.
Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the
misdeed since something untoward might happen to them. During those
times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’
permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days.
Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As
they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could
search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8
o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit
them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and
Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his
sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling
and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to
bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the
crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed
his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving
up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw
him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a
vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus
decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could
kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in
breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him.
Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more
than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak
heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy.
Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes
out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures
normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay
captain.​11​ Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.​12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Joint Decision,​13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by
the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of
committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the
manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial
court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to
kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven
the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of
parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00
as moral damages; ₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No.
RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of
Arresto Menor in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as
provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein
accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided
for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.​ 14
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal​15 which was given due course in an
Order​16​ dated September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of
the trial court. The dispositive portion of its Decision​17​ reads as follows:
WHEREFORE​, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos.
RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries,
respectively, is ​AFFIRMED​.
Pursuant to ​Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,​ appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a
Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED​.​18
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold
issues:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.​19
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a
disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes
that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a
weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness
and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they
traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a
hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of
chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not
during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his
wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this
was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental
discipline on children of tender years must always be with the view of
correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise
restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must
not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor
children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from
being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A
deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them
because they left the family dwelling without permission and that was
already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further
aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him
in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had
to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them
home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not
by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an
evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from
the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when
Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and
lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar
lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his
sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for
Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the
child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would
never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of
discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely
intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant
portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. ​Criminal liability.​ – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (​delito)​ although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from
that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was
committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the
direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.​20 Here,
there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon
him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the
beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for
the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his
death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and
uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr.
Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to
cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death
was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s
cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife,
Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latter’s testimony did not
help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified
that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while
Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly,
Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of
parricide are present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the
appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua​ to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."​21
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first
element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar
did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from
the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar
dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar
the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemar’s Death
Certificate​22​ was also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that
the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the
positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on
September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were
whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping
continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied
side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a
tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the
attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost
consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is
his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented, oral
evidence of filial relationship may be considered.​23 As earlier stated,
appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the
pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under
oath.​24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with
appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this
case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of
Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that
he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported
the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the
police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his
intent "to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be
incurred for his search and capture"​25 which is the essence of voluntary
surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to
ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their
wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered
with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in
his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. "The
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed
by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually
produce the death of the victim."​26
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums
of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
However, the award of exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 should be
increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.​27 "In
addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."​28
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by ​reclusion perpetua to
death. The trial court imposed the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua when it
considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even
if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain
the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating
circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of
only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of r​eclusion
perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
xxxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of
reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of
the lesser penalty of ​reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on
appellant was thus proper.​29
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother
Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were
tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and
right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.​30 Maria
corroborated her son’s testimony.​31
Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr.
(Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for
physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and
testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with
hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on
both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard
object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color
circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained
by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked
how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered
one to two weeks.​32 But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal
in a week.​33
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony
of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he
sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the
same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and
supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly
held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.1awphil
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera
testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week
upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant
the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:
ART. 266. ​Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – ​The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By ​arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine
days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the
commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The
RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty
(20) days of ​arresto menor i​ n its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T.
Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is
increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all
monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G. Intod vs CA (215 SCRA 52: OCTOBER 12 1992)
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, ​petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ​respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., ​J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals ​1 affirming ​in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of
attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian,
Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with
them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner,
Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived
at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that
Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused
fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses.
One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina
Palangpangan and we will come back if (​sic)​ you were not injured". ​2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that
Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this
Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, ​citing​Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, ​were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the
night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the
crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute
an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent
alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition,
respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal
Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., ​Ibid​.) Palangpangan did
not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime
is possible, not impossible. ​3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation ​4 of the Revised Penal Code. This
seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced,
that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the
deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become
a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law
and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. ​5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. ​6 The
Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability, ​7 and now penalizes an act which were it not
aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which
prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. ​8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies. ​9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. ​10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. ​11
There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act ​12 in
order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime. ​13​ Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. ​14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead ​15​ falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. ​16 One example is the man who
puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. ​17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place
where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was
not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In
People vs.​ Lee Kong​, ​18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired
at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out,
however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit
him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an
attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party
imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it
no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished
simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated
upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of ​Strokes vs.​ ​State​, ​19 where the accused failed to
accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by
the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for
attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only
became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane
did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it
is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a
case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either
by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has
no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous
acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of ​Clark vs.​ ​State, ​20 the court held defendant liable for
attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the
case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason
of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the
public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the
unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime.
Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done
is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil;
intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt
takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In ​State vs​. ​Mitchell,​ ​21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window
of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that
moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted
the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon
by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted
murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions
to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine
and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of
impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly
provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in
the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent
regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt
charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. ​22​ In ​U.S. vs.​ ​ Wilson​ ​23​ the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If
the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime
was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked
to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In ​U.S. vs​. ​Berrigan, ​24 the
accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of
prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done
without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender
intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and
the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was
achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held
the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility
as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model
Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the
overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court
held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus,
following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for
an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal
impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take
place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be
committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot
escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is
legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for
any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only
reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an
impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to
a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes
are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is
not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. ​Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.​
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility
which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted
Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article
4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances
which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted
and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby
GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby
hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in
Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of ​arresto mayor,​ together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
 H. Jacinto vs People (592 SCRA 426: JULY 13 2009)
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO,​ Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, ​J.:
Before us is a petition for review on ​certiorari ​filed by petitioner Gemma
T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision​1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming
petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution​2
dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia
y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified
Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan
City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such
had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of
trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own
account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the
sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby
Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.​3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be
more credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby
Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649
postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was
payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check
was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the
husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam,
received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from one of their
customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could
issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing
the checks payable to ​CASH.​ Said customer had apparently been
instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam
payable to ​CASH​. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone
call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was
looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform
Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been
dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former
employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline
Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced
check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message
through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they
could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee
of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino,
and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with
cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide
it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for
₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from
Mega Foam.​4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.​5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner
never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino
said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.​6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing
the subject BDO check in his bank account, but explained that the check
came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his
house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted.
He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering
to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it
as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its
agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked
and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were
given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along
with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house.
Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over
said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby
Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not
push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where
she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and
Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle
decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It
was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then
boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only
Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby
Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino.
However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the
₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.
Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave
₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the
Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal
aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia
handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified
theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as
Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check
and presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she
resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting
payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation
from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at that
time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's
house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese
General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and
her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City.
She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their
jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very
surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI
agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect
payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August
21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia)
could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino.
Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during
cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as
she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and
proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place,
Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After
ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave
her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents
arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4,
1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE​, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused ​Gemma
Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle ​GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of ​FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11)
DAYS, ​as minimum,​ to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
TWENTY (20) DAYS, ​as maximum​.
SO ORDERED.​7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision
was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING​, the decision of the trial court is
MODIFIED​, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months
arresto mayor ​medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was
filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied
per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on ​Certiorari filed by petitioner
alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised
in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in
the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.​8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to
constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under
Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1)
the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as
collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to
her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property
belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her
payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to
gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown
by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of
petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent –
petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her
employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it
was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to
petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the
company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner
is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the
Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must
have some value, as the intention of the accused is to ​gain f​ rom the
thing stolen.​This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law
provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on
the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to
Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9​ is highly instructive and applicable to the
present case. In ​Intod,​ the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered
the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not
home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was
adjudged guilty only of an ​impossible crime as defined and penalized in
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal
Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime.
Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). ​Criminal Responsibility.​ - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the ​inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. ​Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible.​ - When
the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not
produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature
one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by
such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by
him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of
arresto mayor​ or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed
would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended
crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained
by the Court in ​Intod​10​ in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
​
consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In ​Intod​, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved
factual impossibility, ​i.e.​, a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing
since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual
impossibility given in ​Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts
to consummate ​the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against
property​. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check
bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance
of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
the value of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00
marked money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the
dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in ​Valenzuela v.
People12​ that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another." Elucidating
further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that
theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of
another without the latter’s consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation
of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able
or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x
xx
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property,
is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x
13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that ​as of the time
that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft,
had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to
convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.
Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of
receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored
check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate
fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or
covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due
process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could
have been another possible source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is ​GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution
dated March 5, 2004, are ​MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found ​GUILTY of an ​IMPOSSIBLE CRIME ​as defined and penalized in
Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of ​arrresto
mayor​, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.