5701 TheoriesOfKnowledge

Topic
Rethink everything you know about the world as you delve into the fascinating Philosophy Subtopic
field of epistemology. & Intellectual History Applied Philosophy
Theories of Knowledge
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How to Think about
What You Know
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Professor Joseph H. Shieber
Lafayette College
Joseph H. Shieber is an Associate Professor of Philosophy

at Lafayette College. He studied philosophy at the Freie
Universität Berlin and earned AM and PhD degrees in
Philosophy from Brown University. Dr. Shieber regularly
teaches courses in theory of knowledge, history of 20th-
century philosophy, logic, and metaphysics. He is the
author of Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction as well as
numerous articles in epistemology, philosophy of language,
and the history of modern philosophy in some of the top
journals in the field of philosophy.
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PROFESSOR BIOGRAPHY
Joseph H. Shieber, PhD

Associate Professor of Philosophy
Lafayette College
J oseph H. Shieber is an Associate Professor in

the Department of Philosophy at Lafayette College, where
he has taught since 2003. Before arriving at Lafayette, he
taught philosophy at Brown University, Connecticut College, and
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Shieber earned a
BA in Literature from Yale University, studied mathematics and
philosophy at the Freie Universität Berlin, and earned AM and
PhD degrees in Philosophy from Brown University.
Dr. Shieber has published numerous articles in epistemology,
philosophy of language, and the history of modern philosophy in
some of the top journals in the field of philosophy. He is also the
author of Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction as well as a monthly
Monday columnist for 3 Quarks Daily (www.3quarksdaily.com).
Dr. Shieber is a recipient of the Thomas Roy and Lura Forrest
Jones Faculty Lecture Award in recognition of excellence in
teaching and scholarship from Lafayette College. He regularly
teaches courses in theory of knowledge, philosophy of language,
history of 20th-century philosophy, logic, and metaphysics as well
as a first-year seminar on propaganda. y
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
P r o f e s s o r B i o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
C o u r s e S c o p e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
GUIDES
1 P h i l o s o p h y a n d Tr a n s f o r m a t i v e E x p e r i e n c e s . . . . . . . . . 3
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
2 K n o w l e d g e , Tr u t h , a n d B e l i e f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8
3 F o u n d a t i o n a l i s m : D e s c a r te s ’s E v i l D e m o n . . . . . . . . . . 1 9
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6
4 T h e C o h e r e n c e T h e o r y o f K n o w l e d g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
5 E x te r n a l i s t T h e o r i e s o f K n o w l e d g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4
6 P r o b l e m s w i t h S e l f- K n o w l e d g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
7 D o e s S e n s e P e r c e p t i o n S u p p o r t K n o w l e d g e? . . . . . . . . 5 4
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3
8 P e r c e p t i o n : F o u n d a t i o n a l i s m a n d E x te r n a l i s m . . . . . . . 6 4
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
9 T h e I m p o r t a n c e o f M e m o r y f o r K n o w l e d g e . . . . . . . . . 7 2
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 0
10 C o n f a b u l a t i o n s a n d Fa l s e M e m o r i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1
11 T h e E x te n d e d M i n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8
12 D o We H a v e I n n a te K n o w l e d g e? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 7
13 H o w D e d u c t i o n C o n t r i b u te s to K n o w l e d g e . . . . . . . . . 1 0 8
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 6
14 H u m e ’s A t t a c k o n I n d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 7
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 5
15 T h e R a v e n P a r a d ox a n d N e w R i d d l e o f I n d u c t i o n . . . . 1 2 6
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 5
1 6 K n o w - H o w v e r s u s P r o p o s i t i o n a l K n o w l e d g e . . . . . . . 1 3 6
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 4
17 K n o w l e d g e D e r i v e d f r o m Te s t i m o n y . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 45
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 2
1 8 S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y a n d S o u r c e M o n i to r i n g . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 8
19 Te s t i m o n y t h r o u g h S o c i a l N e t w o r k s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 9
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 5
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
20 T h e R e l i a b i l i t y o f S c i e n t i f i c Te s t i m o n y . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 6
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 3
21 Te s t i m o n y i n t h e M e d i a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 74
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 2
22 P r a g m a t i c a n d M o r a l E n c r o a c h m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 3
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9
23 R a d i c a l S ke p t i c i s m : T h e B r a i n i n a Va t . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 0
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 8
24 T h e F u t u r e o f E p i s te m o l o g y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 9
Q U I Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 6
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A n s w e r K e y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 7
B i b l i o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 8
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iv
COURSE SCOPE
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
How to Think about What You Know
These lectures are intended as an introduction to the philosophical

analysis of knowledge. You can think of them as organized into roughly
four sections.
1 The section on the basic theories of the structure of knowledge—the theories
lectures—comprises lectures 1 through 6.
2 The section on the personal sources of knowledge—the personal sources
lectures—spans lectures 6 through 16.
3 The section on the social source of knowledge—the social sources lectures—
encompasses lectures 17 through 21.
4 The section that introduces some special topics and cutting-edge research
in the study of knowledge—the special topics lectures—runs from lectures
22 to 24.
The theories lectures discuss the main divisions in philosophical theories of
knowledge. Roughly, there are two divisions that are explored.
]] The first division is between theories that seek to explain knowledge as
a hierarchical system of beliefs, with more-certain beliefs serving as a
foundation for other, less-certain beliefs; and theories that seek to explain
knowledge as an interconnected, mutually supporting web of beliefs. The first
type of theories are known as foundationalist theories while the second type
are called coherentist theories.
]] The second division is between internalist theories and externalist theories.
Internalist theories stipulate that the resources that knowers can appeal to in
order to support their knowledge consist solely of mental states, states that are
in principle available to the awareness of the knowers themselves. In contrast,
externalist theories allow that at least some of the resources on which knowers
depend in order to support their knowledge involve states of the brain, body,
or perhaps even the world and that knowers don’t need to have any access to
those states in awareness.
After getting that theoretical heavy lifting out of the way, the course turns
to a discussion of different sources of knowledge. The personal sources
lectures discuss different sources of knowledge that have traditionally
been thought to depend only on the resources of individual knowers.
1
COURSE SCOPE
These include your knowledge of your own internal mental states, your
knowledge on the basis of sense perception, your memory knowledge,
your knowledge on the basis of reason, and the knowledge that you derive
through inference. This group of lectures concludes with a discussion of
the topic of know-how, or ability knowledge.
The social sources lectures tackle the topic of knowledge acquired through
communication with others. The philosophical term for such knowledge
is testimony. Though the topic of testimony was ignored for much of
the history of Western philosophical thought, it has recently enjoyed a
resurgence of interest. The lectures on testimony examine three theories of
testimony that are currently popular. You will discover that there is a great
deal of data from social psychology that casts doubt on whether any of
those theories can be workable, and you will be introduced to a theory that
better fits the data. Then, that theory will be illustrated by applying it to
discussions of how the sciences and the media contribute to our acquisition
of knowledge.
The special topics lectures consider a few areas of cutting-edge interest in
the theory of knowledge. These include the topic of pragmatic and moral
encroachment—roughly, whether our pragmatic or moral commitments
could influence whether we acquire knowledge on the basis of the evidence
that we have. The lectures also include the age-old topic of skepticism and
a recent philosophical theory, contextualism, that was formulated to deal
with the skeptical challenge. The lectures end with a consideration of the
future of philosophical reasoning about knowledge.
There is a wealth of rich topics and puzzles concerning the nature of
knowledge, any number of which could serve as the theme for a whole
series of lectures in their own right. At the conclusion of these lectures,
you’ll be well positioned to explore further to discover more of the
fascinating features of any of the topics in the discussion of knowledge that
interest you. y
2
1 LECTURE 1
Philosophy and
Transformative
Experiences
C o ntrary to what you might think, the theory of

knowledge couldn’t be more topical nowadays. Within
the last week, have you heard a report, read an article,
or had a conversation about fake news? What about
artificial intelligence? Or big data? All of these pressing
issues in contemporary society have to deal with
knowledge: how we acquire it, how we preserve it,
how we communicate it. And thinking philosophically
about knowledge will help you formulate rational
solutions to real-world problems.
3
Lecture 1 Philosophy and Transformative Experiences
RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

^^ Arecent challenge to common views ^^ There seem to be two principles here:
about the extent of our knowledge ]] Transformative experience: Some
and rationality was formulated experiences (such as becoming a
by philosopher L. A. Paul in her parent for the first time) change
book Transformative Experience and your life in a fundamental way.
an accompanying article, “What ]] Expected experiential value:
You Can’t Expect When You’re
In deciding whether to pursue
Expecting.”
transformative experiences, you
should make that decision based
^^ Paulasks us to consider a common
on your expectation of the overall
way of thinking about transformative
value of such experiences.
decisions—for example, the decision
whether or not to have a child. It is
^^ Suppose there really are
a common piece of advice to suggest
transformative experiences. The
that you should approach this weighty
problem is that, if there are, then
decision carefully. In particular,
making decisions about such
people usually recommend that you
experiences based on what you expect
decide in large part on the basis of
the value of such experiences to be
considering what it would be like to
is irrational. In other words, the two
have a child.
principles that we formulated are
mutually inconsistent.
^^ In fact, this seems to be a paradigm
of rational decision making. First,
^^ There are really two separate
you need to ensure that you are in a
problems with using your imagination
situation in terms of your maturity,
about future experiences to decide
financial security, and physical health
whether to pursue transformative
to have a child. After that, you and
experiences.
your partner imagine what it would
be like to have a child, as well as what
]] The first problem is perhaps easier
it would be like to remain childless, to explain, but it is actually the
and compare the two possible futures. less significant challenge. If an
Only then—when you have decided experience is genuinely novel,
which of those possible scenarios then you won’t in fact be able to
seems to promise a more fulfilling use your imagination to know
and happy life—would you choose what that experience is like. In the
which course of action to pursue. case of these future experiences
that you have absolutely no
knowledge about, it’s hard to see
4
A necdotally, there has long been a recognition

that the love of a parent for his or her child
changes the parent in profound ways. But we
don’t need to rely only on anecdotal evidence of
the transformative effect of becoming a parent.
Scientists have been able to trace such effects in the
physiology of the brain.
In a 2015 review article in the journal Cell, Dr. Ruth

Feldman discusses the ways that the brains of both
men and women change as a result of becoming
new parents. She notes that such changes include
not only hormonal changes, but also changes
in the activity
of the brain, as
measured by fMRI.
Dr. Feldman takes
such brain activity
to be evidence
of a “parental
caregiving” network
in the brain.
5
how imagination can give you any ^^ Let’s consider the full implications
knowledge of what such experiences of Paul’s challenge. Initially, you
are like. might wonder how terrible it would
]] The second problem is not as be if choices about transformative
easy to state, but it’s actually the experiences were limited to a few
more serious difficulty for the dramatic cases like the choice
experiential knowledge view. The whether to become a parent.
problem is that transformative However, if the conclusion we’ve
experiences change the way that arrived at so far is all we’re left
you value the experiences that you with, that would in fact be a terrible
acquire. result. This is because even though
the choice as to whether to become
^^ What it means for an experience a new parent is a particularly
to be transformative is in part that dramatic example of a transformative
it changes the way you conceive of experience, there are many other
a good life. In other words, having experiences that must also be
that transformative experience will described as transformative—such
change what things you take to as whether to move to a new city
be part of a good life and how you or whether to date or marry a
would rank those things in order certain person.
of importance. For this reason, it’s
^^ Economists speak of opportunity
not possible to decide whether to
pursue a life-changing experience by costs: the costs that result from
imagining how that experience will the fact that pursuing one course
bear on the quality of your life. of action means that you can’t
simultaneously pursue other,
^^ Philosopher L. A. Paul has incompatible courses of action.
convincingly argued that two Often, when those opportunity costs
commonsense principles for making involve the threat of missing out
rational decisions are in conflict. on new experiences, your decisions
It can’t be the case both that about acting will result in the kind
some experiences are genuinely of troubling situation that Paul
transformative and that rationality describes. In other words, our lives
demands that we decide whether to are filled with many such situations
pursue transformative experiences in which we must decide whether to
by imagining what those experiences pursue what Paul calls transformative
are like. Does that mean that there is experiences, so the threat of not being
no rational way to decide whether to able to decide rationally in such
pursue such experiences? situations is a very great threat.
6
THE IMPERSONAL STRATEGY

^^ Trying to decide whether to pursue some studies suggest that, if anything,
a transformative experience by childless couples—in the United
imagining that experience and then States, at least—are happier than
deciding whether that imagined couples with children living at home.
experience is, all things considered,
worth pursuing is not rational. There ^^ Let’sleave aside these issues, however.
is, however, another way that we There’s a deeper worry for those
might try to decide whether to pursue who might encourage us to adopt the
a transformative experience. impersonal way of deciding about the
pursuit of transformative experiences.
^^ Rather than imagining the experience, Consider the following case:
we could instead try to gather evidence 1 Suppose the evidence is clear that
about people who have pursued the couples who have children are
transformative experience. Then, we happier than those who don’t.
could see whether those who have
2 And suppose you are a person
pursued the experience are better
who, when you imagine what it
off than those who have not pursued
would be like to have children,
the experience. In other words, we
finds no appeal in that imagined
could completely ignore our subjective
experience.
experiences and preferences and try to
gather evidence impersonally in order 3 Suppose furthermore, however,
to arrive at a decision. that you’re familiar with Paul’s
argument about the irrationality
^^ It
turns out that, in the case of of using imagined experience
deciding whether to become a parent, to decide whether to pursue
we might not yet have good enough transformative experiences.
evidence to allow us to reach a 4 Finally, suppose you’re very
decision in this way. When comparing committed to employing a rational
the happiness of two different groups, procedure to decide whether to
you have to control for other features become a parent.
that contribute to happiness, such
as income, health, and having a ^^ In such a case, it would seem that the
committed romantic relationship. rational course of action would be
Once you control for those factors, to decide to have a child. And this is
most studies suggest that there is true despite the fact that the prospect
no difference in happiness between of becoming a parent holds no appeal
parents and childless couples. Indeed, for you.
7
^^ The good news is that there is, in rational, rather than emphasizing
fact, a way of deciding available to the counterintuitive aspects of such
us—the impersonal strategy—that is rational decision-making strategies.
rational. The bad news is that now,
according to Paul, we’re faced with ^^ Indeed, there has now been a
a dilemma: two options, neither great deal of evidence from social
of which is appealing. We have a psychology regarding the ability
commonsensical way of deciding of human beings to predict their
that has turned out not to be rational future happiness on the basis of
and a rational way of deciding that their imagined future experiences.
conflicts with common sense! Psychologists call such predictions
affective forecasting. Suppose
^^ Paul is certainly correct that many we forget about whether it’s
people would find it funny to decide impossible to decide rationally
based on impersonal decision making. about transformative experiences
Most people would rather rely on on the basis of imagining our future
their own subjective impressions when experiences. Social psychologists have
making important life decisions. It gathered a great deal of evidence
can be argued, however, that our that the fact is that we are very poor
goal should be to make people more affective forecasters when we rely on
comfortable with employing decision- our imagined future experiences.
making strategies that are, in fact,
I n a 2009 paper in the Journal of Experimental

Psychology: Applied, psychologists Emma Walsh
and Peter Ayton present a series of experiments to
demonstrate that, when given access to both forms
of evidence—impersonal reporting and subjective
imagining—those who ignored their own imagined
experiences performed better at predicting their
future experiences.
8
^^ Infact, studies have shown that if the strangers’ reports. This suggests
you’re given both types of evidence— that our imaginations about our own
evidence that would allow you to experiences are simply sources of
imagine your future experience as error that we should avoid, rather
well as evidence about the reports than evidence that ought to be taken
of strangers who have had the into account—even in combination
experience already—you would do with impersonal reporting.
better deciding simply on the basis of
T hree lessons from this discussion can be drawn

that will carry forward in subsequent lectures.
vv Common sense is not always an accurate guide as
to which strategies are actually useful in arriving at
accurate information or reaching rational decisions.
vv Subjective experience is not necessarily a source of
useful evidence upon which to base your beliefs or
decisions.
vv Abstract, philosophical discussions can be enriched
by considering evidence from empirical disciplines—
for example, in the case of transformative
experiences, from social psychology.
]]
Musgrave, Common Sense, Science and Scepticism.
Paul, Transformative Experience.

]
READINGS
9
Lecture 1 QUIZ
QUIZ TIP: To go back to the page you came from,

1 TRUE OR FALSE PRESS ALT + ← on a PC or ⌘ + ← on a Mac.
The most rational way to decide On a tablet, use the bookmarks panel.
whether to pursue some experience is
to imagine that experience and then 4 According to experimental results in
to see whether what you imagined is social psychology, which method is
something that you’d like to pursue. the best way for you to predict your
future happiness?
2 Which of these are challenges to a Simulating a future experience
using expected experiential value and imagining how it would
to make decisions about whether to make you feel
pursue transformative experiences?
b Relying on other people’s reports
a If an experience is genuinely about their experiences
transformative, you can’t imagine
c Weighing your own simulation
in advance what that experience
of the future experience as well
is like.
as others’ reports about their
b A transformative experience experiences and coming to some
also changes how you value your judgment that combines the two
experiences, so the significance
that you assign to the experience 5 According to Plato’s allegory of
itself can change. the cave, why is it difficult for
c Both a and b. philosophers to convey their
d Neither a nor b. knowledge to others?
a Philosophers have trouble adjusting
3 TRUE OR FALSE their eyes after transitioning from
Even if it’s not possible to decide the bright light of truth to the dim
about transformative experiences shadows of the cave.
using expected experiential value, at b Those who remain in the cave
least transformative experiences are have better knowledge of the
not very common. shadows cast by the puppets on
the cave walls.
c Both a and b.
d Neither a nor b.
CLICK to navigate.
]Answer key can be found on page 207.


10
2 LECTURE 2
Knowledge, Truth,
and Belief
P h ilosophers have been studying knowledge for

thousands of years. In fact, one of the writings on
knowledge that is still read today was written around
369 BC. It’s one of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, the
Theaetetus, in which Plato has Socrates discuss the
nature of knowledge with some young Athenians,
among them the nobleman Theaetetus. At the end of
the dialogue, Plato, speaking through the character
Socrates, arrives at a definition of knowledge as “true
belief with logos,” the Greek word meaning “a reason”
or “an account.”
11
Lecture 2 Knowledge, Truth, and Belief
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE

AND TRUE BELIEF
^^ There is a great deal of evidence strikingly consistent results. The
from developmental psychology that widely accepted implication of these
the ability to recognize instances of results is that children at the age of
beliefs and knowledge in others is a three to four years are unable to form
fundamental ability for children. In beliefs concerning the false beliefs
fact, this ability is essential to what of others.
psychologists call a child’s theory of
mind—their ability to use reasoning ^^ One reason why the results regarding
about other people’s mental states to false belief are particularly significant
explain and predict their behavior. is because of a connection they
suggest between understanding
^^ Research into the development belief and understanding truth and
of theory of mind in children has knowledge. It turns out that children’s
exploded since the 1980s, in no abilities to make sense of belief
small part due to the initial work of develops at about the same time as
Austrian developmental psychologists their abilities to understand what it
Josef Perner and Heinz Wimmer. is to deceive someone intentionally.
Their first experiment, published This would suggest that children
in Cognition in 1983, has now been begin to acquire a more sophisticated
reproduced numerous times, with understanding of the meaning of
truth at this stage.
^^ It
is also at this same time that
children develop the ability to
recognize the connection between a
person’s sources of information and
that person’s knowledge.
^^ Inhis 2012 book Trusting What

You’re Told: How Children Learn from
Others, the Harvard developmental
psychologist Paul Harris spells out
a number of ways in which children
between the ages of three and
six begin to be sensitive to which
informants are knowledgeable.
12
^^ AsHarris argues, even newborn ^^ Wimmerand Perner offer a good

children look to adults to gain summary of these connections:
information both about their
environment and how to act. At the bb[A] novel cognitive skill seems to
earliest stages, however, children base
emerge within the period of 4 to 6
their trust on social and emotional
cues: Am I familiar with this years. Children acquire the ability
adult? Do I already have a positive to represent wrong beliefs and to
emotional attachment to him or her? construct a deceitful or truthful
^^ Beginning
utterance relative to a person’s
in the preschool years,
however—in that crucial transition wrong beliefs. Within this period
from ages three to six that Wimmer several other related abilities also
and Perner also explore—children emerge: children start to understand
begin to search more for evidence
another person’s absence of
of accuracy and reliability when
deciding who to trust: Was the person knowledge … . They become able to
in a good position to perceive the construct a deceitful utterance …
event he or she is reporting about? and to infer a deceptive plan from
Has the person been accurate in the
a critical utterance in the context of
past? Does the person use names for
objects that I’m familiar with in the conflicting goals.
way that I expect they should?
P lato’s 2,000-year-
old theorizing
and contemporary
developmental
psychological research
agree: There’s an intimate
connection between
knowledge and
true belief.
13
INEXISTENCE AND INACCESSIBILITY ARGUMENTS

^^ The analysis of knowledge as he does not in his essay explain
involving true belief faces a significant what is wrong with the argument.
challenge, however. There’s a very To be fair to Lynch, he’s more
commonly held notion that belief— concerned with arguing in favor
being by its nature a subjective, of intellectual humility and an
individual representation of reality—is openness to evidence.
incompatible with objective truth.
^^ However, it is a shame that he
^^ Infact, contemporary society seems doesn’t debunk the argument against
to be full of controversies that rest objective truth. It’s one that seems to
on different perspectives on the be very appealing to many people,
fundamental objectivity of truth. In perhaps because they associate
a 2017 essay in The Chronicle of Higher the notion of objective truth with
Education entitled “Teaching Humility dogmatism or close-mindedness. That
in an Age of Arrogance,” philosophy association, however, is a mistake.
professor Michael Lynch criticizes In fact, the idea that it’s possible
the idea that there is no such thing as that we could be very confident and
truth. He puts the argument against believe ourselves to have very good
the notion of objective truth this way: evidence but nevertheless be mistaken
about the truth is the opposite of
bbThere just is no way of escaping dogmatism. But that possibility
is exactly what objective truth
your perspective or biases. Every
guarantees! So, arguing for the notion
time you try to get outside of your of objective truth serves Lynch’s
own perspective, you just get more broader goal of making the case for
information filtered through your intellectual humility.
own perspective. As a consequence, ^^ Thequote from Lynch contains two
objective truth is just irrelevant— arguments:
either we’ll never know it or it ]] One argument begins with the
doesn’t exist in the first place. idea that we always only have
access to information from our
own subjective impressions and
^^ Unfortunately,although Lynch does concludes with the claim that
not endorse this argument against objective truth doesn’t exist. Let’s
the relevance of objective truth, call this the inexistence argument.
14
]] The other argument also begins with grant that we always only have access
the idea that we always only have to our own subjective impressions.
access to information from our own
subjective impressions but concludes ^^ We’llallow, then, for at least the
with the claim that we’ll never know possibility that truth exists. For our
objective truth. Let’s modify the purposes, we may characterize truth
conclusion of this argument slightly as involving a certain kind of state of
by making it that we’ll never grasp affairs—for example, a state of affairs
objective truth. This modification consisting of a claim and something
doesn’t really affect the point of the claim is about. And, to continue
the argument; it doesn’t seem to the example, what it is for a claim
be an argument about knowledge. to be true is for what is claimed
It’s really about truth and its actually to be the case. So, the claim
inaccessibility, so let’s call this the “Washington wintered at Valley
inaccessibility argument. Forge in 1777–1778” is true so long
as Washington really did winter at
^^ The problem with the inexistence Valley Forge in 1777–1778.
argument is that it involves a pretty
obvious non sequitur, which is a fancy ^^ What is a claim? It’s something that
way of saying that the conclusion of some individual person makes. There
the argument doesn’t follow from its can’t be a claim without someone
premises. In this case, the glaring claiming it—even if that person is
problem is that how we access only claiming it, say, for the sake of
information has no bearing on argument. States of affairs, however,
whether or not truth exists. are not claims. They are ways that
the world is. And, as such, they are
^^ Suppose someone argues that, independent of claims.
because architectural photography
always only records information ^^ States of affairs, then, are objective
from the subjective impressions of the and independent of anybody’s
photographer, buildings don’t exist. thoughts or claims. Claims, on the
This is ridiculous. But it’s exactly other hand, are subjective; they are
what the inexistence argument acts—speech acts—that an individual
attempts to do in the case of truth. person performs. So, what it means
for something to be true always
^^ So,the inexistence argument fails: involves a subjective component. And
There is no reason to think that what it means to grasp an objective
objective truth does not exist, even truth is simply to endorse a claim that
if—for the sake of argument—we is true.
15
T here are at least three distinct kinds of

knowledge.
vv Know-how is the knowledge that craftspeople have;
they know how to pilot a ship or cure disease.
vv Knowledge-wh—knowledge-who, -what, -where, or
-why—is the knowledge that enables you to answer
a who, what, when, where, or why question.
vv Knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge, is
knowledge that a certain fact is true.
Most philosophical discussions of knowledge have
traditionally focused on propositional, or factual,
knowledge—knowledge-that.
^^ Forour purposes right now, we can compatible with our ability to grasp
treat beliefs as on a par with claims; objective truth, then the argument
roughly, beliefs are claims that you should equally show that the
endorse silently to yourself, or claims subjectivity of beliefs is completely
that you would endorse silently to compatible with our ability to grasp
yourself if they were brought to your objective truth.
attention, or claims that you would
endorse publicly if they became a ^^ Inother words, rather than its being
topic of interest. incompatible with the subjectivity of
belief that we grasp objective truth,
^^ So,if our argument shows that the our grasping objective truth always
subjectivity of claims is completely involves an aspect of subjectivity.
16
ARGUMENT FOR THE IRRELEVANCE OF TRUTH

^^ This argument has been proposed in ^^ We can see this most clearly by
slightly different versions by a number considering how Rorty is thinking
of thinkers, but the version we’ll of truth for his argument to work.
consider is that offered by philosopher In order for the argument to work,
Richard Rorty, who begins by noting the only use of truth can be when
that, whenever we ask ourselves we ask ourselves whether something
whether some claim is true, we is true. But this is not the only use.
answer that question by looking at the Sometimes you want to know not
evidence that we have for thinking whether you think something is true,
that it is true. If that’s the case, he but whether someone else thinks
continues, then there is no way to something is true.
determine truth independently of
our evidence. So, he suggests, truth is ^^ Once you consider those sorts of
irrelevant—all that we really ought to cases, it’s obvious that grasping the
concern ourselves with is our evidence truth and having evidence for the
for endorsing a given claim. truth can come apart—in either
direction. In other words, sometimes
^^ There are reasons to question the you can tell that someone happened
premises of Rorty’s argument, but for upon the truth but believes it on
now we don’t even need to do that. the basis of not very good evidence;
This is because the biggest problem other times you can see that someone
with Rorty’s argument is that it is a thinks he or she has good evidence
non sequitur. As with the inexistence that something is true, but you can
argument, in Rorty’s argument the tell that it isn’t true. So, Rorty’s
conclusion simply doesn’t follow from argument for the irrelevance of truth
the premises. fails as well.
]]
Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth.
Audi, Epistemology.
]
READINGS
17
Lecture 2 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which of the types of knowledge 3 TRUE OR FALSE
involves factual knowledge? According to Josef Perner and Heinz
a Know-how Wimmer, most three- to four-year-
olds already possess a well-developed
b Knowledge-wh
theory of mind.
c Propositional knowledge
4 TRUE OR FALSE
2 What definition of knowledge does The subjective component of belief
Socrates arrive at by the conclusion ensures that there is no possibility for
of the Theaetetus? accessing objective truth.
a True belief with techne
b True belief 5 TRUE OR FALSE
Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner’s
c Truth
false belief task provides us with
d True belief with logos evidence against Richard Rorty’s
argument that truth is irrelevant.


18
3 LECTURE 3
Foundationalism:
Descartes’s
Evil Demon
I n 1619, René Descartes experienced a revelation that

caused him to seek to find a way to discover a “universal
method for the discovery of truth.” The method that he
propounded is considered by many scholars—and many
of the thinkers who came after Descartes—to be the
beginning of modern philosophy. Descartes compares
the sciences as they have traditionally been practiced
to a building erected on a shaky foundation. Just as we
wouldn’t continue to renovate and improve a building
that we knew to have a shaky foundation, Descartes
suggests that we shouldn’t continue to increase the store
of our scientific knowledge until we have shored up
its foundation.
19
Lecture 3 Foundationalism: Descartes’s Evil Demon
THE EVIL DEMON ARGUMENT

^^ One way to think about the
“universal method” that Descartes
discovered is the way that Descartes
himself later argued for the
implementation of his method, which
has come to be known as the evil
demon argument.
^^ Descartes begins by noting that often,

in dreams, we experience things that
aren’t real. Within dreams, however,
we believe that the things we are
dreaming are real. Of course, even
in dreams we might still be said to
know very general facts about the
world—for example, that the earth
revolves around the sun or that fire
is hot. If his goal is to find a way to
find a new basis for all of the sciences,
then, Descartes knew that he would
need a way to tear down the entire
edifice of knowledge so that he could
rebuild it from the ground up using
his new method.
^^ Todo this, Descartes asks us to

imagine a very powerful demon,
one so powerful that he can not only
make us experience things that aren’t
there, as we do in particularly vivid
dreams, but also to believe things that
aren’t true—even that 2 + 2 = 5, for
example.
^^ If
we imagine that we are in the
clutches of such a powerful demon,
20
^^ Thisis the origin of Descartes’s well- beliefs. If you are doubting, then you
known assertion Cogito ergo sum: “I are thinking. If you are thinking,
think, therefore I am.” Even if the then you exist. Using Descartes’s new
demon can deceive you about the method, we have now established
content of your beliefs, he cannot definitively the fact of our own
deceive you about the fact that he existence upon the firmest of all
is now causing you to doubt those possible foundations.
INTERNALISM AND DUALISM

^^ Asthe great logician, philosopher, ^^ Philosophers since Russell would
peace activist, and Nobel Prize quibble with the use of the term
winner Bertrand Russell writes “subjectivism” to characterize
regarding Descartes, Descartes’s position. Instead,
contemporary usage would
bbThere is thus, in all philosophy characterize Descartes as an
internalist, because according
derived from Descartes, a tendency
to Descartes, all of the evidence
to subjectivism, and to regarding upon which we build our edifice
matter as something only knowable, of knowledge is internal to
if at all, by inference from what is the mind of the knower.
known of the mind. ^^ Atthe core of Descartes’s method is
a focus on what you are experiencing
right now, in the moment. In other
^^ Asthis quote from Russell’s A History
words, Descartes’s method builds the
of Western Philosophy illustrates,
foundation for all knowledge out of
Descartes’s theory of knowledge is
the states of your mind at the given
characterized by two components:
instant in which you are experiencing
what Russell terms “subjectivism”
those states—what philosophers call
regarding the source of the beliefs
occurrent mental states, because
that serve as the foundations of
the states are only experienced
knowledge and how all of the other
as they are occurring. So, what
knowledge that we have derives
Descartes is really saying is that all
from the foundations by means of
of our knowledge ultimately rests on
inference. This lecture will focus on
our occurrent mental states for its
the first component, while the next
foundation and that these occurrent
lecture will focus on the second.
mental states are more certain for us
21
than any other information about ^^ This is obviously true for Descartes
which we might form beliefs. himself. Descartes was what
philosophers call a dualist, which
^^ Itis important to stress that the sort means that he believed that minds
of evidence available to the internalist and brains are two separate and
like Descartes is what is present to the distinct substances. In particular,
mind—not what occurs in the brain. Descartes believed that minds had
no spatial location—though they did
^^ AsDescartes notes, a mind is a interact with the brain.
thinking thing, one that “doubts,
understands, conceives, affirms, ^^ Fewphilosophers are Descartes-style
denies, wills, refuses, which also dualists anymore. Many philosophers,
imagines and feels.” What the mind however, still subscribe to internalism
feels, however, is distinct from any about the ultimate sources of
information that, say, the human knowledge.
sense organs gather.
S trangely, Descartes thought that mind-brain

interaction took place at the pineal gland, a small
gland at the center
of the brain, right
between the two
halves of the thalamus.
Scientists now know
that the pineal gland
produces melatonin,
a hormone essential
to maintain our sleep
cycle, although in
Descartes’s day, the
true function of the
pineal gland was
unknown.
22
^^ Let’ssuppose that contemporary ^^ There are a number of different

internalists agree with Descartes that types of occurrent mental states.
the foundational evidence on which Descartes himself speaks of doubting,
all knowledge rests concerns occurrent understanding, conceiving, affirming,
mental states and that they disagree denying, willing, refusing, imagining,
with Descartes about the separation and feeling. It isn’t very plausible that
of mind and body. So, let’s say that our knowledge of all of these mental
they either think that the mind just is states will be equally certain.
some part of the body—some part of
the brain, perhaps—or that the mind ^^ For now, let’s give Descartes the benefit
is the result of the operation of some of the doubt and focus on the most
part or parts of the body. promising case for certain knowledge
of occurrent mental states: feelings—in
^^ Clearly,what constitutes the mind particular, the feeling of having a
doesn’t necessarily involve all of the certain visual sensory experience.
body. A limited number of parts of
the brain make up the mind. ^^ Phenomena from vision science—
such as foveal vision, saccades,
^^ Contemporary theories of knowledge change blindness, and inattentional
that embrace internalism—even blindness—demonstrate that if we
those that don’t follow Descartes were forced to rely on our awareness
in radically separating mind from of our occurrent visual experiences,
body—still must limit the sources of we would be in trouble. These and
evidence. Those sources that serve as other phenomena demonstrate that
the foundations of knowledge for the in the case of vision, we have very
internalist will be limited to occurrent little awareness of the quality of our
mental states that are at best a very occurrent visual experiences.
small subset of the larger number of
states of the brain, central nervous ^^ Ifthis is true of vision, then there
system, or peripheral nervous system. is little hope of Descartes’s strategy
working for other forms of sensory
^^ Descartes’sview of knowledge awareness either. For most people,
requires that our occurrent mental visual experiences are our most vivid
states be the most certain type of and rich. If, as the evidence shows,
knowledge that we can have. This is we are misled about the extent of
something we can test: Is it plausible our awareness of visual experience,
that our knowledge of our occurrent this does not suggest that we should
mental states reaches the level of be optimistic about our awareness of
certainty that Descartes’s theory the phenomenal qualities of sounds,
requires? smells, tastes, or touches.
23
R easons for skepticism about the certainty of our awareness of

occurrent sensory experiences come from the field of vision study.
You’ve probably heard of peripheral vision, but you may not have
heard of its complement: foveal vision. The fovea is a small region of
very tightly packed cones, the cells responsible for color and shape
detection in the eye. Almost half of all the information that reaches
the brain comes from this one region, and only the part of the scene
captured by foveal vision is seen with any detail.
We’re unaware of this, of course.
When we think about our visual
experience, it seems to us as if
we see an entire scene in rich
detail. This is because our eyes
are constantly moving, even when
we’re examining a still image. These
movements, called saccades, are
extremely fast. They allow our brain
to gather detailed information
about different parts of the visual
scene as our foveal vision scans
it for interesting features, all of
which occurs without our conscious
awareness or control.
The area captured by foveal vision is extremely small—the width of one
thumbnail when viewed at arm’s length. So, the detailed visual scenes
that we seem to experience are actually composed of a number of
these thumbnail-sized images captured by our eyes, which constantly
move, or saccade, to take in different areas of the visual scene. Our
brains then piece these together to form a larger whole.
In the case of change blindness, there are many features of the visual
scene that, despite being evident, go unregistered from moment to
moment—even features as obvious as the person you’re talking to.
The phenomenon of inattentional blindness demonstrates one potential
cause of this lack of sensitivity to features of the visual scene: We fail to
register features of our experience that we’re not paying attention to.
24
^^ Ifyou think about this even briefly, it these phenomena from cognitive
should be no surprise that this is the psychology call into question
case. If you reject Cartesian mind- how well we pay attention to the
body dualism, then presumably you qualitative features of our subjective
think that the existence of mind has consciousness, they don’t call into
an evolutionary explanation: Minds question our ability to track features
have survived as an evolved trait in of our environment that we find
humans either because having minds significant.
confers an evolutionary advantage or
because having minds is a by-product ^^ Of course, this is still bad news for
of some other trait that confers an Descartes’s internalism. Descartes
evolutionary advantage. wanted to establish the entire edifice
of knowledge on what he took to be
^^ Ineither case, it seems doubtful that our certain awareness of our own
being highly attuned to one’s internal, internal mental states. And what
subjective phenomenology would we’ve discovered so far suggests that
confer an evolutionary advantage. our knowledge of those internal
Imagine the caveman so captivated mental states is far from certain.
by the experience of color that
he gets from gazing at a tropical
flower that he is promptly
eaten by the tiger he’s failed to
observe. T he failure of Descartes’s
internalist project needn’t
force us to abandon the
^^ Rather, what would confer an project of putting knowledge
evolutionary advantage would on a secure footing. Rather, it
be the ability to keep the world just suggests that we need to
in mind: to pay attention not find a different strategy. This
to your subjective experience, is the project that we’ll pursue
but to significant features of
in subsequent lectures.
your environment. And though
]]
Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge.
Conee and Feldman, Evidentialism.

]
READINGS
25
Lecture 3 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 4 Which of the following provides
According to Descartes, if you’re counterexamples to Descartes’s
being deceived by the evil demon, claim that we have certain
the demon could even make you knowledge of our own occurrent
believe that 2 + 2 = 5. visual experiences?
a Foveal vision
2 TRUE OR FALSE
b Saccades
According to Descartes, all of the
evidence for knowledge must be c Change blindness
internal to the mind. d All of the above
e None of the above
3 TRUE OR FALSE
The door study, reported in 1998
by psychologists Daniel Simons
and Daniel Levin, is an example of
saccading.


26
4LECTURE 4
The Coherence
Theory of Knowledge
W h ere Descartes suggested that all knowledge

should be built up on secure foundations, his
19th-century opponents, along with their 20th-
century descendants, rejected the idea that such
foundations were possible—or necessary. In the
place of such foundations, these opponents of
Descartes’s foundationalism suggested that the
route to knowledge involves the way beliefs come
together to form a system in which reasons are
interconnected and mutually supporting. The idea
was that knowledge has to do with the way beliefs
cohere with each other. For this reason, this theory
came to be known as coherentism.
27
Lecture 4 The Coherence Theory of Knowledge
INFALLIBILISM VERSUS FALLIBILISM

^^ The first problem that Descartes’s picture of the extent of knowledge. If
successors raised for his theory knowledge requires certainty, then
of knowledge was his view that almost none of the facts that we take
all knowledge must be certain ourselves to know are facts that we
knowledge. Descartes thought that actually know.
this was true for two reasons.
^^ For most philosophers, this seems like
]] He thought that the foundations of
knowledge were facts that we could too drastic a step to take. This is why
know with certainty. The paradigm most philosophers—including almost
example of this is the fact that you all contemporary philosophers who
are now thinking. There is no way study knowledge—are fallibilists.
you can be mistaken about that This means that they think that your
fact at the very moment you are knowing a fact is compatible with its
thinking it. being possible that you are wrong
about that fact.
]] He thought that we build up our
knowledge on our foundational
^^ Ofcourse, because knowing
beliefs by means of deductive
something requires that what you
reasoning.
know is true, knowing a fact isn’t
compatible with the fact’s actually
^^ Deductive reasoning, however,
being wrong. It’s just compatible with
is certain: If the premises of a
the possibility that the way you know
deductive argument are true, then the
the fact doesn’t guarantee the truth of
conclusions arrived at on the basis of
that fact with certainty.
those premises must be true as well.
This means that if we have certain
^^ Many philosophers were convinced
foundations and further beliefs built
that Descartes’s commitment to
up on those certain foundations by
infallibilism was wrong. A number
means of deductive reasoning, then
of them thought the answer was
we have certainty all up and down
simply to abandon infallibilism
the edifice of knowledge! Because of
but still maintain a commitment to
this, Descartes’s view is considered to
Descartes’s foundationalism. On
be a version of infallibilism, the view
this view, our knowledge requires
that knowledge must be known with
foundations, but the way we build up
certainty.
our knowledge on those foundations
doesn’t guarantee certain truth.
^^ Theproblem with this is that it
provides us with a very limited
28
^^ Many philosophers, however, the higher-level beliefs supported

were distrustful of the idea that by the beliefs on the levels below.
we could make sense of building Instead, they suggested that we think
up all knowledge on the basis of of the structure of knowledge like a
foundational beliefs. Because of this web—where each node of a web is
distrust, these philosophers rejected mutually supporting and any tear in
that the structure of knowledge ought the web, at any point, can cause the
to be thought of as a building, with whole structure to fail.
P hilosophers who were distrustful of the idea

that we could make sense of building up all
knowledge on the basis of foundational beliefs
noted, for example, that much of our perceptual
knowledge is dependent on the other beliefs
we have.
Without a knowledge of tools and
their functions, for example, you
wouldn’t know that a piece of wood
connected in a T shape to a piece of
metal is a hammer. With that knowledge of
tools and their functions, on the other hand,
you immediately see a hammer and not a mere
piece of metal and wood.
^^ Thesephilosophers—such as notion of coherence. The view

Willard Van Orman Quine, Donald that the structure of knowledge
Davidson, and Keith Lehrer— should be understood in this way
suggested that this weblike, mutually is known as the coherence theory,
supporting structure of knowledge or coherentism.
could be understood in terms of the
29
COHERENTISM
^^ Inone sense, the intuition behind including explanatory power as a
coherentism is unquestionable. If requirement for coherence.
one’s beliefs are going to count as ]] Even consistency and explanatory
knowledge, it would seem that they power, however, are too weak.
must, at the very least, be consistent. Consider the example of ancient
And presumably coherence must, at Greek mythology. The myths
the very least, include consistency. that the ancient Greeks told were
consistent. Furthermore, they
^^ Think about the ways in which we provided an explanation for the
provide positive arguments to others phenomena that they observed
in favor of our theories: We do so on around them. If it thundered, it
the basis of other characteristics of was because a particular god was
those theories that philosophers have angry. The problem, however, is
counted as part of coherence. These that ancient Greek mythology is not
include properties of theories such as very useful in making predictions.
predictive and explanatory power and ]] Although explanations from Greek
simplicity.
mythology might help explain
why a certain event occurred, it
^^ Thisgives us, then, at least four
wouldn’t be very good in foretelling
properties that belong to coherence:
what events have yet to occur.
consistency, predictive power,
Although Zeus’s anger might be a
explanatory power, and simplicity.
good after-the-fact explanation for
]] At a minimum, you would assume a thunderstorm, it is more useful to
that a defensible belief would measure current temperature, wind
have to be consistent with the direction, barometric pressure,
other beliefs that you have. You and humidity if you’re interested in
can’t believe that it’s snowing, for forecasting what the weather will
example, unless you also believe be like in the next few hours. In
that it’s cold enough to snow. other words, a theory of weather
]] Of course, just having a consistent that takes such facts into account
set of beliefs is a fairly weak will have greater predictive power
standard to satisfy. This is where than Greek mythology.
the other conditions come in. ]] You might sometimes have two
If you have a consistent set of theories that are on equal footing
beliefs that also does a good job of with respect to their consistency,
explaining the world, then that’s explanatory power, and predictive
even better. This is the point of power. When that occurs, you
30
should choose the simpler of the problem here is that nobody

two theories. You may have heard actually has completely consistent
an expression that characterizes beliefs. In fact, it’s common
the intuition behind including for people to hold inconsistent
simplicity as a criterion: “When sets of beliefs, and if we require
hearing hoofbeats, think horses, consistency for coherence—and
not zebras.” coherence for knowledge—then
we’d have the undesired result
^^ There are two small issues plaguing that nobody knows anything.
coherence theory. Neither of these Presumably, however, there may be
issues by itself is devastating for some way to weaken the consistency
coherence theory. They show that requirement. What the coherence
the theory needs work, but they don’t theorist would have to do is find
show that it’s unworkable. some way to require a certain
]] The first problem for coherence level of consistency but not perfect
theory is that the theory requires consistency. The first problem,
that you have consistent beliefs then, says that the requirements of
in order to have knowledge. The coherence theory are too strong.
P erhaps you believe that a politician that you

admire is a good person, that nobody who
cheats on his or her spouse is a good person, and
that the politician you admire cheated on his or her
spouse. That’s an inconsistent set of beliefs.
]] The second problem says that different theories. But in the case
they’re unclear. Due to the of knowledge, our theory should
notion that coherence involves give us the one correct theory—and
the four criteria of consistency, it’s hard to see, given the fact that
explanatoriness, predictive we can weigh the components of
power, and simplicity, there will coherence differently, how we can
be different ways to weigh the do that with coherence theory.
four criteria that will result in
31
^^ There are three arguments against that there’s no room for unexpected
coherence theory that raise serious evidence in a theory that makes
difficulties for it: the problem of coherence with existing beliefs
surprising evidence, the problem of the standard for knowledge.
experience, and the problem of truth. The problem, then, focuses
]] For the coherentist, what makes on the coherence criterion for
one of your beliefs well supported coherence theory.
enough to be a candidate for ]] The problem of experience targets
knowledge is for that belief to a different aspect of the coherence
cohere with the other beliefs that theory. This problem has to do
you already have. One challenge with the fact that the only elements
for the view, then, is what to do that coherence theory evaluates are
about surprising beliefs. What it beliefs. According to the problem
means to be a surprising belief of experience, the exclusive focus
is precisely that it doesn’t fit well on beliefs as the only source of
with the other beliefs that you evidence forces the coherence
already have. theorist to misunderstand the many
]] The way to make sense of a cases in which it is experiences,
surprising belief in a way that fits rather than beliefs, that are the
with coherence theory would be main source of evidence for
to explain away the belief so that knowledge.
it isn’t surprising. The problem ]] Even more serious is the problem of
for the coherence theory, then, is truth. According to this problem,
that it suggests we should dismiss even the most coherent system
or explain away surprising of beliefs can still fail to achieve
experiences or evidence. As many truth. If this is correct, however,
cases from the history of science then coherence cannot be the
and technology demonstrate, property of beliefs that, in optimal
this is often precisely the wrong conditions, results in knowledge.
attitude to take. We should embrace Coherence alone—even a very
the surprising evidence. New high degree of coherence—is not
discoveries and the development sufficient to ensure truth. Thus, the
of new theories depend on our theory is unworkable: One can have
working on coming up with new a highly coherent theory and have
explanations to make sense of the beliefs that cohere extremely well
evidence that surprised us. with that theory, but those beliefs
]] So, the problem of surprising can still be false.
evidence for coherence theory is
32
S urprisingly, one of the clearest statements

of the problem of truth was offered by a
defender of coherence theory, the early 20th-
century philosopher Brand Blanshard, who noted
that the notion of coherence theory as a theory
of justification stands in tension with a notion of
objective truth.
Someone might hold that coherence with

a set of beliefs is the test of truth but
that truth consists in correspondence to
objective facts. If, however, truth consists
in correspondence to objective facts,
coherence with a set of beliefs will not be a
test of truth. This is the case since there is
no guarantee that a perfectly coherent set
of beliefs matches objective reality.
Blanshard thought that, if faced with the choice

between coherence theory and an objective notion
of truth, we would choose coherence theory.
However, abandoning an objective notion of truth is
not a good strategy to pursue. Instead, we should
reject coherence theory.
]]
BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.
Lehrer, Knowledge.
]
READINGS
33
Lecture 4 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 3 TRUE OR FALSE
Descartes thought that some of our That there is no single best way
knowledge could be fallible. to balance the conflicting ideals
of consistency, predictive power,
2 Which of the following is not a explanatory power, and simplicity is
property that belongs to coherence? a problem for coherentism.
a Consistency
4 Which of the following is a serious
b Infallibility
problem for coherence theory?
c Predictive power
a The problem of surprising
d Explanatory power evidence
b The problem of experience
c The problem of truth
d All of the above
e None of the above


34
5 LECTURE 5
Externalist Theories
of Knowledge
O n e of the ways in which philosophers attempted to

deal with the difficulties faced by Descartes was to
reject his foundationalism. The result was the theory
of coherentism. However, coherentism faces its own
challenges. There are two further challenges faced
by both traditional foundationalist and coherentist
theories that we have not yet considered. Thinking
about these will help us formulate a new type
of theory, one that wasn’t anticipated until the
beginning of the 20th century.
35
Lecture 5 Externalist Theories of Knowledge
CHALLENGES FOR FOUNDATIONALISM

AND COHERENTISM
^^ One of the further challenges for ^^ Now consider the second
both traditional theories is that they problem facing both traditional
ignore how a person’s beliefs are foundationalism and coherentism.
actually formed and sustained. In Both traditional foundationalism and
philosophical terms, both are theories coherentism are usually considered
of propositional justification. This fallibilist theories in modern times.
means that they only look at purely This means that they hold that you
logical relations between a person’s can know some fact even without
evidence and beliefs. certain evidence; that is, they say
that you can know that fact even if
^^ Modern philosophers generally your evidence doesn’t give you an
accept that, in order for you to be absolutely certain guarantee that
justified in your belief, it’s not enough it’s true. This leaves these theories
for you to have good evidence. open to the challenge of so-called
Rather, your belief must be based Gettier cases, named for philosopher
on the good evidence that you have. Edmund Gettier.
The fact that you have that good
evidence should explain why you hold ^^ There are versions of both
the belief. coherentism and traditional
foundationalism that attempt to give
^^ Many philosophers characterize an account of the basing relation and
this idea by saying that theories of solve the Gettier problem. However,
knowledge must include a basing a new class of theories of knowledge
relation; that is, adequate theories emerged in the 20th century that
must include an account of what it is offer an elegant way of achieving both
for beliefs to be properly based on the of these goals at the same time. These
evidence so as to count as knowledge. are known as externalist theories.
PROCESS RELIABILISM
^^ There are now many versions the main features of externalist views
of externalist theories. One of and is capable of explaining many of
the simplest—known as process the features of knowledge that we seek
reliabilism—is both representative of to explain.
36
A simple version of a Gettier case comes from

Bertrand Russell:
vv Suppose you’re rushing to
a meeting at noon in an
unfamiliar building. You
check the time on the clock
in the hallway and it reads
11:55, so you believe that
you have five minutes to get
to the meeting location.
vv Unbeknownst to you, however, the clock has
stopped working hours before. Famously, though,
even a stopped clock is right twice a day, and it just
so happens that this clock stopped working exactly
12 hours ago, at 11:55 pm.
Here’s the problem: You believe it’s 11:55. It’s
true that it’s 11:55. Your evidence for your belief
is that the clock says it’s 11:55, and for all you
know, you have no reason to suspect that the
clock isn’t working. You’re even basing your belief
appropriately on your evidence.
Most philosophers, however, agree that you don’t
have knowledge in this case, because it’s purely an
accident that your evidence points you toward the
truth. Had you looked at the clock a few minutes
earlier or later, it would still have read 11:55 and your
belief would be mistaken.
37
^^ One of the earliest statements of ^^ With the exception of the inclusion

process reliabilism can be found of what Ramsey terms “certainty,”
in the work of mathematician this account of knowledge is very
F. P. Ramsey, who wrote in a similar to ones that we would
1929 paper, encounter today.
bbI have always said that a belief ^^ Ifwe reformulate the account to make
it compatible with fallibilism, we’re
was knowledge if it was (i) true,
left with this: Knowledge is true belief
(ii) certain, and (iii) obtained by a on the basis of a reliable process.
reliable process. Here, the term “reliable” roughly
means “consistent.” And a “reliable
process” is a process that reliably
results in true beliefs.
P sychologists use the term “reliability” roughly to

mean “consistency.” In psychology, a measure is
reliable if, given the same inputs, it’ll yield the same
outputs.
For psychologists, then, something could be reliable
but wrong—as long as it’s wrong consistently. For
example, if your watch is running well but is set 23
minutes fast, then your watch is reliable, despite not
being accurate.
When psychologists talk about the accuracy of
a measure, they use the term “validity.” So, for a
psychologist, the best measures would be those that
are both reliable and valid.
It’s this that philosophers are aiming at with the
notion of “reliable process.”
38
^^ It’sobvious how the process environments does not mean that it

reliabilist theory can answer the isn’t reliable, but rather that it’s only
first challenge—the challenge of reliable in the environments for which
explaining the basing relation. it was designed to function.
According to the process reliabilist,
knowledge is true belief formed on the ^^ So,our account of knowledge in
basis of a reliable process, a process terms of reliable processes would
that reliably yields true beliefs. And have to include a reference to the
the answer to the question of how environment as well. We could, more
to determine the basing relation is properly, say something like this:
baked right into the reliabilist theory: Knowledge is true belief based on a
A belief that counts as knowledge process that is reliable (in the sort of
will be appropriately based on the environment in which that belief was
grounds that justify it because what it produced).
is for a belief to be justified is precisely
to be caused by a process that reliably ^^ The challenge is to come up with an
yields true beliefs. account of justified true belief that
explains why Gettier cases—such as
^^ With regard to the second the stopped clock—are not cases of
challenge—that of the Gettier cases— knowledge. And the process reliabilist
we need to consider the notion of theory allows us to do just this.
“reliable process.” Note that in order
to think about reliability accurately, ^^ Even though we have a true belief
we’ll have to suppose that we’re in the clock case, we don’t have
considering a process to be reliable knowledge. The reason for this is
with respect to a certain environment. that the process we’ve used—looking
This is important, because processes at a clock in the vicinity and relying
that are reliable with respect to one on the information it conveys—is
environment may not be reliable with unreliable in an environment where
respect to a different environment. the clock in the vicinity has stopped.
^^ Consider a car whose engine is ^^ Forthe process reliabilist, someone

designed to function properly on who believes on the basis of an
generally well-paved roads in an unreliable process is not justified. We
industrialized nation. In a different have a true belief, but no justification.
environment—for example, in a And without justification, there is no
desert with few roads—the engine knowledge. So, the process reliabilist
might clog and become useless. can explain why Gettier cases aren’t
The fact that the car’s engine cases of knowledge.
doesn’t function reliably in desert
39
E xternalism, represented by process reliabilism,

seems to enjoy two advantages over traditional
foundationalism and coherentism. Unlike those
theories, the process reliabilist has a simple answer
to the challenges posed both by the basing relation
and by Gettier cases.
EXTERNALIST VERSUS INTERNALIST THEORIES

^^ Despite the fact that they are ]] Both theories can only conceive of
rival views, foundationalism and the sorts of relations that provide
coherentism have two key features support for beliefs in terms of
in common. logical, conceptual, or explanatory
]] The first feature is that what counts relations. This, then, is the second
as support for beliefs are states that feature shared by both views. The
are internal to the believer. In the ways that beliefs are supported
case of coherentism, the supports are the sorts of ways that make
for your beliefs are just other beliefs sense upon reflection: deductive
and the way that the totality of and inductive logic, conceptual
your beliefs fit together to form connection, or coherence.
a coherent whole. In the case of
^^ Think of the justification that leads
foundationalism, the support for
your beliefs would include beliefs, to knowledge as a process governed
but also your experiences, as well as by two types of rules. The first
the logic-based and content-based type of rule—let’s call them input
relations that connect them. The rules—tells you what kinds of inputs
relations of logic would characterize you can introduce into the process.
the ways in which beliefs might be The second type of rule—let’s call
logically or inductively supported them transition rules—tells you
by other beliefs. The relations of what you can do to the inputs or to
content would characterize the ways other intermediate results within the
in which your experiences support process. The output of the process
your beliefs. will be justified beliefs.
40
^^ The inputs may include not just the
I
variety of inputs that the traditional
n the case of tax
foundationalist allows, but also
software, there are nonmental states. The transition
two kinds of inputs: rules can also be broader than
one for the type of either coherentism or traditional
foundationalism includes. They can
entry and the other for encompass the sorts of transitions
some number amount. that foundationalists and coherentists
The transition rules are describe—just as long as those
transitions are in fact reliable
the rules governing processes in the environments where
what effect those they’re deployed—but they can also
types of entries and include additional reliable processes
not countenanced by the coherentist
number amounts have or foundationalist.
on the tax you must
pay, and the output of ^^ The input rules involved in both
coherentism and foundationalism
the process is your tax
limit the inputs to justification to
owed or tax refund. states that are internal to your mind—
either beliefs alone or beliefs and
other types of mental states, such as
experiences. And the transition rules
^^ With this way of thinking, we can that coherentism and foundationalism
characterize traditional coherentism allow are supposed to be the sorts of
as the view of justification that rules that you can recognize, simply
involves one type of input—beliefs— through reflection, to be the sorts
and one type of transition rule— of rules that promote the discovery
coherence formation, however of truth.
coherence theorists are able to make
sense of that notion. Traditional ^^ Incontrast, the input rules in process
foundationalism will have more reliabilism allow for states of your
inputs—beliefs, but also experiences brain and nervous system, other states
of various types—and more transition of your body, or even states of the
rules—deductive inference, inference world outside of your body potentially
based on probability, and perhaps to serve as inputs to the processes that
various other types of inference. result in justified beliefs.
41
^^ And as for the transition rules, that the basis for your beliefs must be
process reliabilism allows for the internal to your mind and that the
possibility that there might be reliable way your beliefs are justified must be
processes leading to the formation of something you can recognize, purely
justified beliefs that we cannot know on the basis of reflection, as being a
in advance, through reflection alone; legitimate source of justification.
that is, for the process reliabilist,
empirical research into the processes ^^ Process reliabilism is externalist
that humans (or nonhuman animals) both because it allows that at least
use to discover true information part of the basis of your beliefs
about the world will be relevant in may include states outside of your
determining whether a certain way mind and because it allows for the
of forming beliefs should count as possibility that you might not be able
justification or not. to recognize, on the basis of pure
reflection alone, why the actual basis
^^ This means that traditional for your beliefs is in fact a legitimate
foundationalism and coherentism source of justification.
are internalist because they stipulate
C onsider again that you see the clock read 11:55

and form the belief that you have five minutes
to get to your meeting. Remember, the clock has
stopped, though you don’t know that it has stopped.
According to both the
foundationalist and the
coherentist, you are justified
in this case. According to
the process reliabilist, you
are not.
42
^^ The advantage for process reliabilists explanation for why Gettier cases
is that they have a very simple don’t amount to knowledge. They’ve
explanation for why the Gettier case offered various explanations, all of
is not a case of knowledge: Although which involve adding conditions to
you, looking at the stopped clock, the analysis of knowledge. Rather
have a true belief in the case where than saying that knowledge is justified
the clock happens to be right, you true belief and then explaining
don’t know because you are not that justification is understood in
justified. terms of either foundationalism
or coherentism, they must add an
^^ Thefoundationalist and coherentist additional condition that explicitly
must give a more complicated rules out Gettier cases.
]]
BonJour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification.
Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition.

]
READINGS
43
Lecture 5 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 3 TRUE OR FALSE
The example of Jeeves the butler Reliability in psychology means
provides support for the necessity of exactly the same thing as it does for
a basing relation for knowledge. philosophers.
2 TRUE OR FALSE 4 Which of the following is an

The stopped-clock example from externalist theory?
Bertrand Russell is an example of a a Descartes’s foundationalism
Gettier case that predates Edmund
b The coherence theory
Gettier’s famous article by almost
40 years. c Process reliability
d All of the above
e None of the above


44
6LECTURE 6
Problems with
Self-Knowledge
I n traditional epistemology, self-knowledge is the

most important form of knowledge. The “self” in self-
knowledge refers to your mind—the states of your mind
(the thoughts, feelings, emotions, and experiences)
that Descartes wrote about as being the content of
your mind. When they talk about self-knowledge, the
epistemologists who think we have special knowledge
of our own minds might be referring to transparency,
which is the idea that your mind is transparent to you—
that whatever is part of the content of your mind, you
can know that it’s part of the content of your mind. Or
they might be referring to the infallibility thesis, which
means that you’re never wrong about the mental states
you have.
45
Lecture 6 Problems with Self-Knowledge
TRANSPARENCY VERSUS INFALLIBILITY

^^ Because, according to coherentism, beliefs we form about our mental
the only way for a belief to be justified states. However, at least for internalist
is to be part of a set of coherent coherentism, the transparency thesis
beliefs, the coherentist will certainly is very important.
not endorse infallibility about the
T ransparency is
the claim that
if your mind
contains mental
state M, then you
know that your
mind contains
mental state M.
Infallibility says that
if you believe your
mind contains mental
state M, then your
mind does contain
mental state M.
46
W hen we talk about internalist coherentism, the

“coherentism” part just refers to the fact that
coherentists stress the importance of the coherence
of your beliefs for your justification. Beliefs aren’t
justified individually but are justified by being
members of sets of beliefs that cohere together, are
useful in providing explanations and predictions, and
are the simplest sets of beliefs that provide useful
explanations and predictions.
The “internalist” part means two things.
vv The bases for your justification are internal to your
mind: They’re mental states of yours. In the case of
coherentism, they’re beliefs.
vv The ways you build up your justification are
ways you can appreciate as contributing to your
justification. In the case of coherentism, you can
come to appreciate that you are justified, because
you can, if you check, establish to your own
satisfaction that your beliefs are in fact members
of a coherent set of beliefs that is comparatively
simple, explanatory, and useful for predictions.
If the coherentist is an internalist, then he or she
thinks that to be justified you need to be able to
check to see that your beliefs are part of a coherent
set that is comparatively simple, explanatory, and
useful for predictions. But that means that you need
to have knowledge of what your beliefs are—you
have to know what you believe.
47
^^ For any belief, if you believe it, then experience, in such cases, just hands
you know that you believe it—and this you your justification.
is just the transparency thesis applied
to the case of beliefs. So, in order ^^ For an experience to be foundational,
for coherence theory to work, the it must provide you with very strong
transparency thesis has to be true, at evidence for some belief. The
least in the case of beliefs. strongest evidence it could provide,
the traditional foundationalist
^^ The coherentist wants us to survey our suggests, is for a belief that you’re
beliefs and see how they hang together. having that sort of experience. And
The better they fit, the more justified it’s that belief about your experience
they are. In some ways, then, the that justifies your belief.
coherentist thinks that searching for
justification is like trying to tell a good ^^ But how much justification does your
story. You’re looking for connections, experience provide you for the belief
trying to provide a picture that makes that you’re having that experience?
sense of all the component parts. When you believe that you have a
headache, for example, how justified
^^ Storytelling is an activity. It are you?
requires work on the part of the
storyteller, looking for connections ^^ If the infallibility claim is true, then
and drawing parallels. In contrast, if you believe you have a certain
the foundationalist doesn’t think experience, then you really do have
that our foundational justification that experience. Your justification,
requires much work on our part. In in other words, is infallible. This is
fact, the traditional foundationalist the sort of certain justification that
has a name for this foundational Descartes was after.
justification that makes the believer
seem like just a passive recipient of his ^^ Of course, the certainty stops for
or her justification: the given, which you at your beliefs about your
refers to the sensory experiences that experiences. Those are certain, but
are just given to us when we engage what isn’t certain is whatever you
with the world through our senses. might infer from those beliefs.
^^ Because of this, the foundationalist ^^ Regardless, however, what is certain

doesn’t think that you need to survey is that the infallibility claim, at least
your beliefs or other mental states in with regard to our own phenomenal
order to be justified in having those experiences, is of great significance
beliefs. When you’re justified on the for the traditional foundationalist.
basis of experience, that’s the most It is our supposed infallibility about
obvious thing in the world! Your sense our own experiences that provides
48
the secure foundation on which the support them. If you’re going to be an

traditional foundationalist thinks we internalist foundationalist and suggest
must build up the entire structure of that all your knowledge is based on
our justification and knowledge. a foundation of experiences—and
beliefs about those experiences—to
^^ An additional mental phenomenon to which you have privileged access,
which the foundationalist might say then presumably you’ll also think that
we must have infallible access is the you have privileged access to the fact
relations between our mental states that your experiences support the
and the more foundational states that beliefs about them.
THE TRANSPARENCY CLAIM

^^ When thinking about the
transparency claim, the first thing
that we need to do is try to consider
only those mental states for which
the claim is even remotely plausible.
P hilosophers call
states of your mind
that are occurring to
It should be pretty obvious that you right now occurrent
there are many aspects of our mind
that aren’t transparent to us at
mental states.
any given time. For example, your States that aren’t
mind plausibly contains a whole occurrent are called
host of memories that you’re not dispositional states.
even considering—and if you’re not
considering those memories, then
you’re also not currently believing
that you have those memories.
occurring to you right now. There
^^ So,the transparency claim only is one further way that we can limit
applies to states of your mind that the transparency claim. Because the
are occurring to you right now. For claim is important for coherentism
example, if you now have a headache, but not for foundationalism, and
then that is a state that is occurring to because coherentists only care
you right now. about the transparency claim with
respect to beliefs, we can limit our
^^ Let’s
assume that we’re limiting the discussion to the question of whether
transparency claim to occurrent it is plausible that our beliefs are
mental states, the states that are transparent to us.
49
^^ Inother words, is it plausible to ]] There are plenty of beliefs that

suppose that whenever you are you’re unaware of at the moment
currently believing something you at which you’re having them.
are aware that you are believing it? An instant’s consideration would
That is what the limited transparency demonstrate that this is obvious.
claim amounts to. According to the transparency
claim applied to occurrent beliefs,
^^ Even if we limit the transparency if you currently believe something,
claim in this way, it’s still not likely to then you know that you believe it.
be plausible. The following are two Knowledge, however, is a form of
reasons for this: belief. So, we would have to apply
]] It’s common for people to believe the transparency claim to that
the opposite of what they know to belief. So, if you currently know that
be true. The starkest example of you believe something, then you
this is the phenomenon of denial— know you believe that you believe
for example, when a cancer patient it—and so on. In other words, the
knows that he or she is facing death transparency claim for beliefs
but refuses explicitly to admit it to means that any instant, you have an
him- or herself. infinite number of occurrent beliefs.
That’s not a very palatable result!
THE INFALLIBILITY CLAIM

^^ There is good reason to doubt that experiences. And the internalist
your mental states—even the beliefs foundationalist needs the infallibility
you’re having right now—are all claim to be true in order to argue
transparent to you. But suppose that our current experiences form
you’re attending to an experience of an infallible foundation on which to
yours and form a belief about it. Isn’t build up the rest of our knowledge.
it plausible to suppose that any belief
about an experience to which you’re ^^ Unfortunately for the internalist
now attending would have to be true? foundationalist, however, there
How could you be wrong in a belief are good reasons to question the
about your own current experiences? infallibility claim, even when applied
to our current experiences. Two such
^^ This is the intuition behind reasons come from philosophical
the internalist foundationalist considerations and psychological
endorsement of the infallibility claim, studies.
at least with respect to occurrent
50
The Philosophical Argument

^^ Although the spectrum of color, ]] You have the experience that
from red to violet, is effectively color 2 is the same as color 3.
continuous, humans’ ability ]] You have the experience that
to distinguish colors from one color 1 is different from color 3.
another is not. This means that if
the range of colors is depicted as a ^^ So,experiencing two colors as
gradient, observers will perceive being the same is not a transitive
two different colors that are relation—one like identity in math,
sufficiently close to one another where if a = b and b = c, then a = c.
on the gradient as being the But the problem is that sameness
same color. of color is a transitive relation. If
color a is the same as color b and
^^ Consider three colors: The first color b is the same as color c, then
color and the third color are as color a must be the same as color c.
close as possible on the gradient
while still being distinguishable, ^^ One way to deal with this problem
and the second color is halfway is to suggest that the properties
between the first color and the third of experiences are somehow
color. Suppose that because the indeterminate, so that even though
second color is so close to the first transitivity applies to sameness
color, it’s indistinguishable from the of color, it doesn’t apply to
first color. Similarly, because the experiences of sameness of color.
second color is so close to the third But let’s focus on the other way to
color, it is also indistinguishable deal with the problem, which is to
from the third color. deny that beliefs about experiences
are infallible. In other words, when
^^ It
would seem that the following you believe you’re experiencing
things are true of you if you’re two colors as the same, there’s no
observing the three colors: guarantee that this really is the
]] You have the experience that content of your experience.
color 1 is the same as color 2.
51
The Psychological Argument

^^ There is a flood of evidence from ^^ Despite the wealth of such studies,
cognitive psychology and brain our own subjective experience
science that substantiates the claim is that we are good judges of
that we are often mistaken about the subjective qualities of our
the character of our experiences experiences—and of the ways in
and the causes of those experiences which we base our judgments
and that we are unaware of the on those experiences. Yet if the
prevalence of those mistaken arguments described here are
beliefs. The widely studied placebo correct, we have good reason to
effect is one example. question that subjective experience
about our own infallibility.
]]
Gertler, Self-Knowledge.
Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, Describing Inner Experience?

]
READINGS
52
Lecture 6 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 4 Which of the following is called
Transparency is important for into question by the color gradient
coherence theory but not for and the just-noticeable-difference
foundationalism. threshold?
a Transparency
2 TRUE OR FALSE
b Infallibility
Infallibility is important for
coherence theory but not for
5 Which of the following is called into
foundationalism.
question by psychological studies
that provide evidence against our
3 Which of the following is called
reliability in judging the subjective
into question by the phenomenon
qualities of our experiences?
of denial?
a Transparency
a Transparency
b Infallibility
b Infallibility


53
7 LECTURE 7
Does Sense
Perception Support
Knowledge?
O n e of the most significant sources of our

knowledge—and particularly our knowledge of the
world—is sense perception. One of the oldest debates
in philosophy involves the implications of our reliance
on perception for our contact. Do the senses serve
as an obstacle, standing between us and the world?
This way of thinking about the role of the senses is
misleading. Worse, this way of thinking is ultimately
irrelevant to the question of whether—and how—the
beliefs that we form on the basis of perception are
justified. However, this way of thinking about the
senses is common, even among scientists who study
sense perception.
54
Lecture 7 Does Sense Perception Support Knowledge?
I n Making Up the Mind: How the Brain Creates

Our Mental World, noted British psychologist and
neuroimaging pioneer Chris Frith explains:
Even if all our senses are intact and our brain

is functioning normally, we do not have direct
access to the physical world. It may feel as if
we have direct access, but this is an illusion
created by our brain.
INDIRECT PERCEPTUAL REALISM

^^ In philosophy, the view that you only ^^ One further argument one might
ever perceive the world indirectly is point to in order to support the idea
called indirect perceptual realism. that our senses create our mental
It’s realism because the view doesn’t world is this: Different animals have
deny that there really are objects in different perceptual abilities. For
the world that we’re perceiving; it just example, bats and dolphins use sonar
holds that whenever we perceive those to navigate and to locate and track
objects in the world, it’s through the prey. Given this, it’s not implausible
intermediary step of perceiving our to suppose that different animals have
experiences. experiences that feel very different.
P hilosopher Thomas Nagel has a

celebrated essay entitled “What Is
It like to Be a Bat?” in which he argues
that the radically different way in which the
bat takes in information about the world
through sonar means that we humans actually
have no way of knowing what it’s like to be a bat.
55
^^ It’s
easy, then, to appreciate the particular phenomenal quality—and
popularity of the view that the because this experience is distinct
senses are an obstacle between us from the world beyond it—that there
and the world—or, at the very least, is the possibility that the experience
to appreciate why you might see could be misleading us about the true
the senses as potentially unreliable nature of the world.
informants. The problem with all of
these arguments, however, is that they ^^ So, the indirect perceptual realist
completely misrepresent what sense picture of perception is one in which
perception does. the primary function of the senses
is to provide us with experiences
^^ The arguments all share two features: with their own unique phenomenal
They suggest that what sense qualities. Then, on the basis of these
perception really gives us is a feeling experiences, we infer the existence of
or experience with a particular objects in the world that correspond
phenomenal quality and that this to those experiences or, at the very
feeling or experience is what serves as least, cause them.
evidence for some further belief about
the world. But these phenomenal ^^ There are two main problems with
qualities are in our minds. They’re this picture of perception—problems
all feelings in the mind, even if they so central that they make it difficult to
might seem to be located somewhere see how the indirect perceptual realist
outside of our heads. picture could be at all plausible.
^^ Furthermore, the arguments also ^^ The first problem is that this picture
suggest that, because the feeling of perception, according to which we
or experience is obviously distinct infer the existence of objects in the
from the world, this introduces world based on our sense experiences,
the possibility that the feeling doesn’t fit with our understanding
or experience could actually be of how the brain actually processes
misleading us about the true nature perceptual information.
of the world. In fact, part of the way
that our senses mislead us is precisely ^^ There are many stages of perceptual
by making us think that what is in our information processing in the brain
heads is actually in the world. before that information reaches a
stage at which it can plausibly be
^^ The first of these features is more called an experience. By the time it
fundamental, then. It’s because what reaches that stage, however, it is no
sense perception immediately gives longer the sort of purely phenomenal
us is an experience with its own experience that the indirect
56
perceptual realist is talking about. of brain processing already contains

Instead, the sort of experience that a great many assumptions about
results from those many earlier stages external world objects.
I t’s hard to imagine a more phenomenal kind of

experience than a pain experience. But even a
pain experience cannot be understood as a pure
phenomenon.
For one thing, you don’t experience a pain as being
located somewhere in your mind. Rather, you
experience a pain as located somewhere in physical
space—it’s a headache or backache.
For another thing, even the way we
describe the type of pain generally
refers to the types of external
world causes that lead to the
pain. It’s a “stabbing” pain or a
“pounding” pain.
This suggests that even with
experiences as raw as
pains, by the time your
brain has processed the
information that goes
into the experience, the
experience itself already
contains a great deal of
information.
57
^^ Thisis obvious in the case of sense information already processed and

experience. For healthy perceivers, ready for use, no inference on our
our visual experience, for example, part required.
comes to us with a great deal of
C onsider the case of perceivers who are not healthy.

Certain brain injuries, resulting from tumors or
trauma, can affect centers of the brain responsible
for processing visual information and categorizing it
according to the objects it contains. People with damage
to these areas are said to suffer from visual agnosia.
Here’s one of the scenarios that researchers who study
visual agnosia have observed.
First, the researchers present the sufferers of agnosia
with pictures of common objects, such as pens, and ask
them to sketch what they see. They’re able to do so with
no difficulty. Then, researchers ask them to label the
objects that they’ve drawn. The agnosics are unable to
do this.
Furthermore, if you ask agnosics to define those
objects—”What are pens for?”—they are able to do that.
If perception simply involved inference, then this
condition shouldn’t exist. Agnosics should easily be
able to infer that the experiences they have correspond
to these common, everyday objects and then to name
those objects they see. Because they cannot do this,
this suggests that the brain processes visual information
prior to experience—so that healthy perceivers already
enjoy experiences of the objects in their environment as
experiences of those objects.
58
^^ The second problem with indirect That’s not what we’re primarily
perceptual realism is that it sees the concerned with. We’re interested in
role of the senses as being able to knowledge and how to get it. So, we’re
provide us with phenomenal sensory interested in the building blocks
experiences. But this is simply of knowledge, such as beliefs, and
mistaken. Rather, the role of the senses what makes some beliefs count as
is to provide us with information about knowledge.
the world around us.
^^ And the point now is that the
^^ These two problems may seem beliefs we form on the basis of sense
bad enough for indirect perceptual perception are not primarily beliefs
realism, but there is an even bigger about our experiences. They’re
problem for the view, at least from beliefs about phenomena in the world
our perspective: According to that we care about: people, places,
indirect perceptual realism, all we and things.
immediately perceive is our own
perceptual experiences, rather than ^^ Butindirect perceptual realism is
the objects that those experiences are a theory about the objects of our
about. But that’s a claim about the perceptual experiences, not about
immediate objects of our experiences. the objects of the beliefs based on
those experiences. So, even if indirect
^^ The technical term for that subject perceptual realism were true, that
matter is metaphysics—the study of would have no direct bearing on the
the basic building blocks of reality relation between sense perception and
and their relations to each other. knowledge.
SENSE PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE

^^ The biggest problem with indirect ^^ There are different ways to
perceptual realism is that the theory answer this question. One is to ask
is simply irrelevant to perceptual whether the relation between sense
knowledge. So, the question that perception and knowledge supports
we should focus on isn’t whether a foundationalist or a coherentist
indirect perceptual realism is true theory. The other is to ask whether
but, rather, how sense perception the relation between our senses and
supports knowledge. When we know our knowledge supports internalism
something on the basis of what we or externalism.
perceive, how is our knowledge based
on that perception?
59
I n the remainder of this lecture, we’ll begin to

tackle the first question. In particular, we’ll
consider whether there is a good reason to suppose
that coherentism offers the best explanation for how
sense perception supports knowledge.
In the next lecture, we’ll first consider whether
there is good reason for thinking that internalist
foundationalism offers the best explanation for how
sense perception supports knowledge or whether
we ought to endorse some form of externalist
explanation instead.
^^ There are two different types of ^^ The second distinction is between

distinctions that we can make when we what cognitive psychologists refer
talk about perceptual processes, and to as top-down and bottom-up
the relation between those two types of processes.
distinctions is liable to cause confusion.
^^ A bottom-up process is one that
^^ First,it’s important to distinguish arrives at a result from more basic
between computations that you inputs, where each of those inputs is
perform and computations that your computed independently. A bottom-
brain performs but that you have no up theory of visual perception
access to. Philosophers sometimes call would suggest that information is
the first type of processes—the ones transmitted in one direction from
that you normally have access to and the retina to the visual cortex. On
at least some control over—personal this type of theory, each stage in
processes. And they call the second the mechanism for the processing
type of processes—the ones that are of visual information involves
performed by organs or systems of increasingly complex analysis of the
organs in the body, without direct information transmitted from the
access or control by the person whose immediately preceding stage.
body it is—subpersonal ones.
60
^^ Common versions of bottom-up ^^ There seems to be at least some

theories include the idea that the evidence for top-down processing of
neurons involved in each stage of sensory information in the brain. And
visual information processing are top-down processing involves taking
highly specialized to perform a very context into account before deciding
specific type of computation. For how to interpret information. And
example, there are neurons that just this, in turn, should remind you of
perform detection of light versus dark, coherentism—about the way in which
or of edges that are oriented in a beliefs can be justified enough to
certain direction, or of motion. count as knowledge.
^^ Inopposition to bottom-up views of ^^ Remember, coherentism says that

perceptual information processing are what makes an instance of true
top-down views. According to top- belief count as knowledge is that the
down theories, the brain is able to use belief fits together with the rest of
higher-level information as feedback your information. And the top-
for more basic sensory processing down theory says that your sensory
mechanisms in the brain. Top-down processing system takes different
theorists reject the idea that the pieces of information and interprets
processing of sensory information in them based on how they best fit
the brain moves in only one direction, together given the context.
from the more basic to the more
complex. Instead, they suggest that ^^ Does that mean that the cognitive
the more complex computational science of perception supports
mechanisms in the brain can provide coherentism? That would be very
feedback for earlier mechanisms. strong support for the theory, but
unfortunately for coherentism, top-
^^ A number of the pieces of evidence down theories don’t offer support
cited in favor of top-down theories for any theory of the structure of
have to do with the fact that your knowledge.
semantic knowledge—your knowledge
of concepts and meaning—can affect
what you perceive.
61
I f all sense perception involved top-down processing,

then we would expect newborns not to be able
to perceive anything at all until they developed the
concepts to help them make sense of what William
James called the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of their
immediate sensory stimuli.
This, however, is not the case. For example, newborn
human infants seem to show a preference for face
shapes over scrambled stimuli—as early as a few minutes
after they’re born.
^^ One problem is that top-down that are plugging away below the
theories cannot tell the whole story surface of your awareness or control.
of sense perception. There must be
at least some room for bottom-up ^^ The debate between top-down and
explanations as well. bottom-up explanations, however, is
best understood as involving just those
^^ The second problem for coherentism sorts of subpersonal mechanisms.
is even more serious. In order for That’s because the debate is supposed
some empirical evidence to support to involve the sorts of computational
one of the theories of internalist processes to which you normally have
justification, such as coherentism, no access and over which you normally
it would have to involve personal have no control. So, even if the best
computational mechanisms. That’s explanation of sense perception is top-
because coherentism is a theory about down—and there is reason to question
what goes on in the mind, rather than whether that’s even the case—it would
about the subpersonal mechanisms still not support coherentism.
]]
Lehrer, “Coherence, Truth, and Undefeated Justification.”
Russell, The Problems of Philosophy.

]
READINGS
62
Lecture 7 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 4 What does the discussion of the
The argument from illusion Citizen Kane example tell us?
attempts to establish that what a Indirect perceptual realism really
you immediately perceive in sense is the only correct view of sense
perception is your own subjective perception.
experiences.
b Indirect perceptual realism
only makes sense in the case of
2 TRUE OR FALSE
viewing movies, photographs, etc.
People with visual agnosia can
accurately sketch the features of the c Even if indirect perceptual
objects that they see, but they cannot realism is true as a theory in
recognize those objects. metaphysics, it is in fact irrelevant
to discussions in epistemology.
3 TRUE OR FALSE
The most plausible understanding of 5 David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel’s
our sensory systems is that their role research establishing the existence of
is to provide us with phenomenal specialized neurons for the detection
sensory experiences that enrich our of very specific features of visual
inner mental lives. stimuli would seem to be an example
of which of the following?
a Subpersonal, top-down
processing
b Subpersonal, bottom-up
processing
c Personal, top-down processing
d Personal, bottom-up processing


63
8 LECTURE 8
Perception:
Foundationalism
and Externalism
I n the previous lecture, we ruled out the internalist theory of

coherentism to provide the best explanation of the support for
knowledge based on sense perception. This leaves us with one
more type of internalist theory to consider: foundationalism.
There are two types of foundationalism to evaluate:
experience-based internalist foundationalism and naive
foundationalism. Experience-based internalist foundationalism
isn’t very plausible; in fact, it suffers from many of the same
problems that plagued indirect perceptual realism. And naive
foundationalism doesn’t provide us with an explanation of
why sense perception provides evidence for knowledge; it
doesn’t tell us, in other words, why finding out that someone
believes some event occurred because he or she saw it
him- or herself makes us more confident that the person has
knowledge that the event occurred. If the internalist theories
64
Lecture 8 Perception: Foundationalism and Externalism
don’t work, that leaves us with externalism, and the evidence

from the cognitive psychology of perception supports the idea
that an externalist theory of how perception contributes to
knowledge is indeed the most plausible.
EXPERIENCE-BASED INTERNALIST
FOUNDATIONALISM
^^ Experience-based internalist rather than experiences of the objects
foundationalism is the view that all that produce the stimulations of our
of our beliefs on the basis of sense sense organs that result in perception.
perception are actually based on
beliefs about the immediate qualities ^^ There are at least two big reasons
of our experiences—experiences of why an experience-based internalist
things like color patches and shapes— foundationalism won’t work.
B oth reasons why an experience-based internalist

foundationalism won’t work are related to
points made in the previous lecture about what’s
wrong about indirect perceptual realism.
]] It suffers from the same problem picture, our knowledge on the

as internalist coherentism when basis of perception is ultimately
it comes to the issue of where founded on our knowledge
computation, or conscious of more basic facts about our
inference, takes place in the process experience. So, every instance
from perceptual stimuli in the of perception actually involves
sense organs to perception-based an inference—an inference that,
knowledge. if we pay close enough attention
[[ On the experience-based to our own mental processes, we
internalist foundationalist can be aware of. But this idea is
simply absurd.
65
[[ As explained in the previous the way experience involves

lecture, there is in fact a great interpretation on the part of
deal of computation that the perceiver. In order for
occurs at the early stages of experience-based foundationalists
perception. And we can call these to be truly scientific, however,
different types of computation they must be able to specify
“inferences” if we wish, but it is exactly what the basic building
simply a mistake to think that blocks of our experiences are—
we can access those “inferences,” the colors, shapes, and so on
however closely we attend to our that make up those foundational
mental processes. experiences on the basis of which
[[ Much of the computation—or we construct everything else.
inference, if you’d like—in [[ The problem is that the
perception happens prior to experience-based foundationalist
our awareness. Much of that can’t do this. There is the fact
computation is something your about what sort of information
brain does, not something you do. hits the retina and the fact
]] It is also wrong about the content, about how that information is
or nature, of our experiences in processed at various stages of
perception. the perceptual process, but those
different types of information
[[ According to the standard
aren’t the experiences that the
experience-based foundationalist
foundationalist is talking about.
picture, our experiences are the
This means that the experience-
basis of our inferences about
based foundationalist story
the objects in the world that
is actually just that—a story,
cause those experiences, and
or fairy tale, with no basis in
those inferences then form our
science. Science tells us that the
knowledge about the world.
information recorded by the
We’ve already seen reasons why
retina, to take one example, is
this picture is inaccurate in
nothing like the sort of visual
the previous lecture, when we
scene that even plausibly
discussed the various problems
describes your experience.
faced by indirect perceptual
That visual scene is the result
realism.
of a number of computational
[[ Experience-based processes in the brain, none
foundationalists like to act as if of which are accessible to
their position is more scientific awareness.
and that it better accounts for
66
NAIVE FOUNDATIONALISM
^^ Why not just abandon the part of and it turns out that you’re relying
experience-based foundationalism on a misleading perception. On the
that we find objectionable? That naive foundationalist view, there’s
is the idea that the ultimate basis nothing to explain the difference
of our perceptual knowledge is our in the support you have when you
experiences, described as highly misleadingly perceive something to
abstract sensory qualities like color, be the case and when you correctly
shape, and so on. If we abandon perceive something to be the case.
that objectionable part of the
experience-based foundationalist ^^ That’s why we can’t simply accept
view, what we’re left with is naive naive foundationalism. Externalism
foundationalism. will allow us to explain why certain
perceptions support knowledge
^^ Naive foundationalism rejects whereas other, misleading perceptions
the idea that we must ground our don’t. The difference the externalist
perceptual knowledge in beliefs about can point to—but the naive
the qualities of our experiences. It foundationalist can’t—is the reliable
involves the claim that we can base accuracy of the perceptual systems
our perceptual knowledge simply on that lead to knowledge.
the perception of the objects in the
world that our knowledge concerns. ^^ Whether a perceptual system
is reliably accurate or not is a
^^ According to the naive fact external to the mind of any
foundationalist, the basis of your particular believer. And the naive
perceptual knowledge that something foundationalist can’t appeal to
is the case just is the perception that reliable accuracy because, as an
it’s the case. The problem with this internalist, he or she can’t appeal to
view is that sometimes it seems to any criteria that are outside of the
you that you perceive something mind of the believer.
I f the information presented in the previous lecture and this

lecture is correct, neither coherentism nor foundationalism
does a good job of explaining how sense perception gives us
evidence for knowledge.
67
EXTERNALISM
^^ Two aspects are essential to processing of visual information, and
externalist theories. another involves what neurologists
]] They make reliable accuracy the call brain bilateralization, the fact
central quality for determining that the two halves of the brain are
whether a certain cognitive process specialized for different tasks that
is a source of knowledge. In the they can perform independently.
case of sense perception, this means ]] One way that brain functions are
that only those sensory processes specialized is between the dorsal
that reliably give us accurate and ventral streams. The visual
information about the world cortex, the region of the brain
will count as potential sources of that is responsible for receiving
knowledge. information from the eyes, is
]] They don’t require us to be aware of located at the back of the brain.
the operations of the processes that The dorsal stream—or the “where”
give us information. This means pathway—runs along the top of
that externalist theories—in contrast the cortex. It’s the visual system
with internalist theories—allow that that aids in determining the spatial
it is possible that we can be unaware location of the objects around us,
of the process we are employing to preparing us for any actions that we
acquire information and of whether might want to perform with those
that process is in fact reliably objects. The other pathway is called
accurate. In the case of sense the ventral stream—or the “what”
perception, this means that we at pathway—and it is located on the
least sometimes acquire information underside of the cortex. It’s the
on the basis of sensory processes of network responsible for the visual
which we’re unaware or about whose identification of objects.
accuracy we’re unaware.
^^ There is a great deal of support

from cognitive psychology and
neurobiology for both of these
components of externalism.
E vidence for the dual streams
of visual information
processing comes from studies
One example is the existence of conducted by neuroscientists
dual streams of cognition for the
David Milner and Melvyn Goodale.
68
]] The brain has two halves, or ^^ The phenomena of dual-stream

hemispheres, which are joined by a pathways for visual information
very densely packed strand of nerve processing and of split-brain cases
cells called the corpus callosum. seem to provide evidence for both of
There are some neurosurgical the aspects of sense perception that
procedures, called split-brain support externalism.
surgeries, that require cutting ]] Both involve evidence that some
the corpus callosum so that the cognitive systems are more reliably
two hemispheres of the brain accurate in either gathering
can no longer communicate. For or evaluating information in
many years after the first split- perception.
brain surgeries were performed, ]] Both support the idea that we are
neurosurgeons didn’t think that
often unaware of the processes we
cutting the corpus callosum had
actually employ in sense perception
any effect on brain function.
and that we are often equally
Certainly, split-brain patients didn’t
unaware of whether or why the
claim to notice any difference
processes we employ are reliably
before or after the surgery. That
accurate.
was the thought until neuroscientist
Michael Gazzaniga began studying
^^ This suggests that, at least in the
split-brain patients and found
case of sense perception, externalism
that the two sides of the brain are
provides the best account for
unable to make sense of what the
explaining the structure of knowledge.
opposite side is aware of.
T o study the inability of the two sides of the brain to

make sense of what the opposite side is aware of,
Michael Gazzaniga and his team of researchers flashed
an image to each eye of a split-brain patient while
keeping that image hidden from the other eye. At the
same time, they gave each patient’s hand an option to
choose from one of four pictures that best matched the
image. In other words, the left hand could choose from
the pictures that matched the image that the left eye
saw, and the right hand could choose from the pictures
that matched the image that the right eye saw.
69
One very dramatic illustration of the results of

Gazzaniga’s research with split-brain patients is the case
of a subject referred to as P.S.:
P.S. had seen a chicken claw with his left brain,

and his right hand chose a picture of a chicken.
His right brain had seen a picture of a snow
scene, and his left hand picked up a picture of a
shovel. When asked why he had done all of this,
he said from his left hemisphere, ‘The chicken
claw goes with the chicken, and you need a
shovel to clean out the chicken shed.’
This suggested to Gazzaniga that there is a special

mechanism in the brain—which he calls the interpreter—
that is responsible for explaining our behavior to
ourselves. It concocts a plausible story for us about what
is going on in our heads when we pause to think about
what we’re perceiving or thinking. But importantly, what
the interpreter concocts is just a story—one that’s often
not very accurate.
]]
Jackson, Perception.
Noe, Action in Perception.

]
READINGS
70
Lecture 8 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 What is the type of foundationalism 4 If you see an object in your vicinity
that claims that the basis of sensory and track its location relative to you,
knowledge is our immediate, that’s a result of what?
qualitative experiences of a Your brain’s dorsal stream
phenomena like color patches,
b Your brain’s ventral stream
shapes, or regions of light?
a Experience-based internalist 5 According to Michael Gazzaniga,
foundationalism our conscious experiences are a
b Naive internalist foundationalism result of which of the following?
a The intrinsic experiential
2 TRUE OR FALSE qualities in the objects themselves
Patrick Cavanagh’s work on
b A special module in the left
the physics of shadows provides
hemisphere of the brain that
evidence in favor of the claim that
makes up an explanation of
the inferences on which our sensory
the information processed in
knowledge is based are the result of
the brain
the sort of personal processes that
the experience-based internalist c Brain activities distributed across
foundationalist suggests. both brain hemispheres
d All of the above
3 TRUE OR FALSE e None of the above
The problem for naive internalist
foundationalism is that the naive
foundationalist cannot appeal to the
reliable accuracy of sense perception
to explain why sense perception
supports knowledge.


71
9LECTURE 9
The Importance
of Memory for
Knowledge
O u r faculty of memory is central to our knowledge,

and philosophers have had a number of things to say
about the topic. Some of the philosophical theories
are specific to the topic of memory while others
are more related to the kinds of questions we have
considered across a number of lectures. This lecture
will address questions raised by the topic of memory
specifically, including questions about what the
objects of memories are. Are they stored experiences
in the mind, or are they past events themselves?
The questions also include whether memory
merely preserves beliefs and knowledge that we’ve
already acquired or whether we can ever gain new
knowledge on the basis of memory.
72
Lecture 9 The Importance of Memory for Knowledge
TYPES OF MEMORY
^^ Thereare three main types of procedural, semantic or declarative,
memory: long-term, short-term, and and episodic.
working memory. ]] Procedural memory supports the
]] Short-term memory stores small ability to perform skilled actions.
pieces of information for no more For example, if you know how
than a few seconds or so. to play a certain musical piece
]] Working memory, like short-term on the piano, that skill relies on
memory, also has to do with storing procedural memory.
information for very short periods ]] Semantic or declarative memory
of time to aid with both reasoning involves the memory of events
and action. in terms of their descriptions. It
]] The type of memory that involves information stored with
philosophers are concerned the aid of language.
primarily with is long- ]] Episodic memory involves the
term memory. memory of experiences. Instead
of being stored with the aid of
^^ There are three different types of language, episodic memory is
long-term memory, roughly based what allows us to replay previous
on the type of information stored: experiences at a later time.
T hough psychologists nowadays generally distinguish

the concept of working memory from that of short-
term memory, those differences don’t concern us here.
The summary of the reason for distinguishing between
them is that short-term memory was initially thought
to be a single, undifferentiated short-term information
storage mechanism, whereas theories of working
memory generally involve more specialized types
of short-term storage for accomplishing different
cognitive tasks.
73
I nterestingly, the three types of long-term memory

seem to be distinct, in that you can have one type
without having either of the other two.
A phenomenon in cognitive psychology called
aphantasia involves having little or no ability to form
or manipulate mental images—no vivid imaginations
or daydreams, for example. One of the phenomena
often associated with aphantasia is severely deficient
autobiographical memory, which is basically a lack of
episodic memory capacity.
EPISODIC MEMORY
^^ Episodicmemory—memory of ^^ Bertrand Russell believed that he
previously experienced objects and had an argument to demonstrate
events—forms the basis of central that our memories are themselves not
uses of memory, such as eyewitness dependent on the past but are simply
accounts and autobiographical stored experiences:
memory. For that reason, it has been
the most-discussed type of memory bbThere is no logical impossibility in
among philosophers.
the hypothesis that the world sprang
^^ What are the contents of our episodic into being five minutes ago, exactly
memories? Are they the current as it then was, with a population
memory experiences, or are they that “remembered” a wholly unreal
the past objects and events that we
past. There is no logically necessary
experienced? Do our memories
themselves exist wholly in the present, connection between events at different
or are they in part dependent on past times; therefore, nothing that is
objects or events? happening now or will happen in the
future can disprove the hypothesis that
the world began five minutes ago.
74
^^ Russelltakes from this argument actual memories in terms of the past

that because there is no logical either. For Russell, the difference
impossibility in imagining a scenario between our memory states and mere
in which all of the mental states imagination lies solely in the fact that,
that we take to be memories might in the case of memories, we believe
actually refer to a supposed past that them to be about the past.
never took place, we should not define
S umming up, Russell suggests:
Memory demands (a) an image, (b) a belief

in the past existence …. The believing is a
specific feeling or sensation or complex
of sensations, different from expectation
or bare assent in a
way that makes the
belief refer to the
past; the reference
to the past lies in
the belief-feeling,
not in the content
believed.
75
^^ There’sa fatal problem with Russell’s ^^ That’sbecause, according to both

view, however. The problem is that Russell and Hume, “memory
Russell’s view actually relies on the is nothing but a present idea or
traditional view of memory that he impression.” In contrast to Russell’s
claims to reject. view, for Thomas Reid the object
of our memories are the past events
^^ Scottishphilosopher Thomas Reid themselves that we remember. In fact,
made this point very forcefully. He as Reid has argued, this is precisely
was arguing specifically against his what distinguishes memory from
contemporary David Hume’s theory perception or mere imagination.
of memory, which was a forerunner of
Russell’s. ^^ Because your current experiences
don’t belong to the past but rather
^^ Reid first notes that the commonsense are currently occurring, Reid argues
view of memory is that it is an in particular that the objects of your
immediate knowledge of something memories cannot be your current
that occurred in the past. And he experiences. If Reid is right about
notes that the view he’s arguing this, then the Russell-Hume view of
against—the view held by both memory is wrong. Memories are not
Russell and Hume—is that there isn’t simply a type of current experience.
any such knowledge in the mind. Instead, they essentially involve a link
to some previous object or event.
THE CAUSAL THEORY OF MEMORY

^^ Despite the fact that Thomas Reid and Max Deutscher provided an
offered a devastating criticism of argument in favor of what is known
Russell’s view of memory almost 150 as the causal theory of memory.
years before Russell proposed his According to that theory, memory
theory, it wasn’t until the middle of involves a certain type of causal
the 20th century that philosophers connection between your current
began to appreciate Reid’s idea that cognitive state and the object or event
memory requires a connection to a that you remember. Since the article’s
past object or event. publication, the causal theory has
become widely accepted within the
^^ Then,
in a 1966 article entitled philosophical community.
“Remembering,” C. B. Martin
76
I n a 2017 article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, philosophers of memory Kourken
Michaelian and John Sutton wrote,
The idea that remembering is characterized

by an appropriate causal connection has
... taken on the status of philosophical
common sense.
^^ Although the broad idea of some ^^ Suppose Harry visited Disneyland

sort of connection between the past when he was four with his family.
event and your current cognitive While there, he got separated
state is important for memory, recent from his family. Years pass and
discussions in philosophy have Harry forgets that experience. One
continued to pick away at specific day, Harry reads a book about a
components of the causal account. character who, at the age of four,
visits Disneyland with his family and
^^ Consider a case in which it seems gets separated from them. The story
to you as if you remember a certain makes an impression on Harry, so
object or event. What makes that much so that years later, he comes to
apparent memory a genuine instance take the memory of the experience of
of memory is if your seeming memory the character in the book as if it’s his
has a reliably stable, continuous own. When Harry later remembers
brain-based connection to the past the experience of getting lost at the
object or event that you seem to age of four at Disneyland, it’s because
remember. This “reliably stable he read it in the book—not because it
connection” view has two advantages really happened to him. In a case like
that it inherits from the classic Martin this, even though Harry really did get
and Deutscher account. lost at Disneyland at the age of four,
we wouldn’t want to call that seeming
^^ First,
it allows us to distinguish a memory a genuine memory. It lacks
number of cases of merely apparent the reliably stable connection to the
memories from those of genuine actual event.
memories.
77
^^ The second kind of case, taken from but the reliably stable connection
Martin and Deutscher’s 1966 article, consists in part in Gray’s recollection
is described as follows: and testimony to Kent as to what
occurred in that first accident. What’s
bb[L]et us say that [Kent] has told missing from the case of Kent is the
“continuous brain-based connection.”
his friend Gray what he saw of an
This is why Kent’s seeming to
accident in which he was involved. remember also can’t count as a
Kent has a second accident in which genuine instance of remembering.
he gets a blow on the head which
^^ Because many philosophers found
destroys all memory of a period in
Reid’s criticisms of Hume (and by
his past, including the time at which extension Russell) compelling and
the first accident occurred. When because of the popularity of the
Gray finds that Kent can no longer causal theory of memory, in the years
since the publication of Martin and
remember the first accident, he tells
Deutscher’s article, a great many
him those details which Kent had philosophers have come to think that
told Gray in the period between the memory has a very specific sort of
first and second accidents. After a limitation when it comes to providing
support for knowledge.
little while Kent forgets that anyone
has told him about the first accident, ^^ To see that, let’s look back at some
but still remembers what he was told other sources of knowledge, such as
by Gray. It is clear that he does not self-awareness and sense perception.
remember the accident itself. ... Kent
]] If you’re currently experiencing
a certain mental state—say, a
witnessed the first accident, can now
headache—and you ask yourself
recount what he saw of it, but does whether you are, you can form
not remember it. the belief that you are currently
experiencing a headache. That’s a
new piece of information, one that
^^ Martin and Deutscher introduce you didn’t previously have.
this example to demonstrate that the ]] If you look outside and see that
reliably stable connection component there are now two robins in the
of the theory isn’t enough. There is shrub outside your window, that’s
a reliably stable connection between also a new piece of information.
Kent’s experience of the first The only way that you could now
accident and his later memory of it, know that there are currently two
78
robins in that shrub would be to time on the basis of some other source
check and see for yourself, or to of knowledge.
have somebody else tell you.
^^ Take the case of your headache again.
^^ This suggests to philosophers that If your current knowledge that you
both self-awareness and sense had a headache at some earlier time
perception are generative sources of is based on memory, then that can
knowledge—both can generate new only be because at that earlier time
knowledge, or give you knowledge you knew about your headache on the
that you didn’t previously have. basis of self-awareness.
^^ Fora long time, the common view ^^ Recently, however, some philosophers
among philosophers has been have begun to question the received
that memory is not a generative view that memory is a purely
source of knowledge. Instead, most preservative source of knowledge.
philosophers hold that memory is a For example, philosophy professor
preservative source of knowledge. Jennifer Lackey has offered a number
This means that you can’t know of examples of cases that she takes to
something on the basis of memory illustrate the possibility of memory as
unless you knew it at some previous a generative source of knowledge.
]]
Bernecker, Memory.
Locke, Memory.
]
READINGS
79
Lecture 9 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which type of memory do we rely 4 TRUE OR FALSE
on when we remember a specific Bertrand Russell thought that his
fact, such as a date from history? five-minute hypothesis was evidence
a Procedural that memories are not dependent on
the past.
b Declarative
c Episodic 5 TRUE OR FALSE
Thomas Reid objects that David
2 TRUE OR FALSE Hume’s view of memory—like
The phenomena of aphantasia and Bertrand Russell’s—is objectionable
severely deficient autobiographical because it actually relies on the view
memory provide an example of the of memory that it rejects.
independence of declarative and
episodic memory. 6 Which view of memory suggests
that it relies on a reliably stable,
3 The fact that H. M., who had no continuous brain-based connection
ability to store long-term semantic to a past object or event?
or episodic memories, was able to
a The Russell-Hume view
learn the mirror-drawing skill is an
example of which of the following? b Thomas Reid’s view
a The independence of procedural c The Martin-Deutscher causal
memory from the other types theory of memory
of memory
b The independence of episodic
memory from the other types
of memory
c The independence of semantic
memory from the other types
of memory


80
10
LECTURE 10
Confabulations
and False Memories
H o w does memory knowledge fit into the general

picture of knowledge that has been developed so
far? Is it best understood as having a coherentist or
foundationalist structure? Can internalist or externalist
theories explain how our memories provide us with
evidence for knowledge?
81
Lecture 10 Confabulations and False Memories
F lashbulb memories involve the feeling of

particularly clear memories that arise at a time
of heightened public emotion—such as the JFK
assassination, the moon landing, the O. J. Simpson
verdict, or 9/11. But although these memories feel
incredibly clear and precise, they’re actually not.
They can involve embellishments and alterations as
they are recalled and re-recalled over time.
COHERENTISM AND MEMORY

^^ Onthe coherentist picture, what what we—or our brains—actually
makes your true belief count as do in remembering a past object or
knowledge is that it forms part of a event and what we would have to
coherent framework of other beliefs do to provide memory support for
that you have. In order to evaluate our knowledge.
the coherentist picture of memory ]] In the lectures on how sense
knowledge, there are two points perception supports knowledge,
to consider. we distinguished between tasks
]] We need to distinguish a descriptive that you perform and tasks that
account of what goes on in only your brain performs. The
remembering from a normative distinction is that the tasks that
account of what would need to only your brain performs, called
go on for that remembering to subpersonal tasks, are ones that
count as knowledge. Basically, you’re not aware of and that you
a descriptive account says what have no control over.
actually happens while a normative
account says what should happen. ^^ Researchersin the cognitive
Applying that to memory, we need psychology and neurobiology of
to distinguish two separate things: memory have a pretty clear idea
82
that the act of recalling a memory is count as evidence for a coherentist

less like pulling up an old file from a structure of knowledge, the process
drawer and more like reconstructing would have to be a personal process,
a picture from stored pieces according rather than a subpersonal one.
to schematic instructions. In other
words, the way our brains bring up ^^ The issue of the distinction between
memories of previous events fits well subpersonal and personal processes
with the coherentist picture. seems to pose a problem for the
coherentist, but the next issue is, if
^^ Inthe 2010 article “Why Science anything, even worse. This involves
Tells Us Not to Rely on Eyewitness the descriptive versus normative
Accounts” in Scientific American Mind, distinction.
psychology professors Hal Arkowitz
and Scott Lilienfeld review some of ^^ The problem is that what Loftus
the literature on episodic memory, describes is how our brains actually
particularly as it relates to eyewitness reconstruct memories. However, it’s a
testimony. They note: separate question as to whether that
way of reconstructing memories is
bbThe act of remembering, says reliably accurate. And there is good
reason to be skeptical about whether
eminent memory researcher and
mere coherence is sufficient to
psychologist Elizabeth F. Loftus of guarantee accuracy.
the University of California, Irvine,
^^ AsArkowitz and Lilienfeld
is “more akin to putting puzzle
emphasize, something as simple
pieces together than retrieving a
as questioning from a lawyer can
video recording.” change an eyewitness’s memory of
events. That’s because the witness can
unwittingly change the memory by
^^ One issue with appealing to the way adding information that the lawyer
the brain puts puzzle pieces together provides during questioning.
to reconstruct memories is that this
seems to be something that often just ^^ The problem for the coherentist is
the brain does, rather than something that if you make having knowledge
that we do. In other words, it seems dependent on being able to spin a
to be one of those cognitive processes good yarn, then sometimes the best
that is subpersonal rather than or most believable yarns aren’t in
personal. However, for a process to fact true.
83
^^ An extreme example of what’s remember that confabulation is a

wrong with the coherentist picture subpersonal process; the person isn’t
of memory knowledge is the case intentionally making things up and
of confabulations—the stories that isn’t aware that he or she is doing
people unknowingly make up to fill anything other than recalling a
in the holes in their memory. They past event.
are particularly common in people
with cognitive or mental disorders, ^^ It
doesn’t seem plausible to think of
but otherwise healthy individuals the structure of memory knowledge in
also confabulate. It is important to coherentist terms.
FOUNDATIONALISM AND MEMORY

^^ There are two basic types of 1 I seem to remember that
foundationalist theory of memory Washington was the first president
knowledge—the inferential theory of the United States of America.
and the naive foundational theory— 2 In the past, whenever I have
and they are similar in structure seemed to remember something, it
to the two types of foundationalist has usually turned out that what I
theory of knowledge on the basis of remembered is true.
sense perception.
3 Therefore, it’s probably true
that Washington was the first
^^ According to the inferential theory,
president of the United States
the way that you acquire knowledge
of America.
on the basis of memory is that you
have a memory experience and then
^^ This model seems very implausible
you argue that, given that experience,
as described. It just doesn’t seem
what you seem to remember probably
that memory works like that. But
did occur.
there’s a more serious problem with
this model: It is viciously circular. In
^^ Forexample, consider a case of
order to establish the second step of
discursive knowledge. Suppose you
the argument, you have to remember
seem to remember that George
what happened in the past. This
Washington was the first president of
is the problem that Reid raised for
the United States of America. You’d
the Hume and Russell model of
then reason as follows:
memory presented in the previous
84
lecture. So, the inferential form of because you’re viewing it in the

foundationalism is a nonstarter. context of a film festival of fictive
documentary films. At a later
^^ According to the naive theory, date, you remember what you
memory gives you a good reason to experienced previously, but you’ve
believe something when you seem to forgotten the reasons you had at the
remember it and you are not presently time to doubt what you saw. As far
aware of anything that suggests that as the naive theory is concerned,
what you remember is false. this would be a case in which you
have good reason to believe the
^^ In some ways, this seems a much children really did knock down the
more plausible picture of how grown man and steal his briefcase.
memory actually works—as a That’s because your memory now
personal process. In other words, meets the two conditions required
when you ask yourself how it feels by the naive theory: You seem to
to remember something, it doesn’t remember the children committing
feel like you’re putting puzzle pieces the theft, and you are not presently
together, nor does it feel like you’re aware of anything that suggests
formulating an argument. Instead, what you remember is false. This
it feels like you remember something seems strange, however. It would
and—unless you have some specific be odd if your forgetfulness of the
reason to question that memory—it’s evidence rebutting your experience
okay simply to rely on what you would actually help you. But that’s
remember. exactly what the naive theory
suggests in this case.
^^ However, there are two very ]] When we remember something,
significant problems for the our brains fill in the remembered
naive theory. experience with plausible details.
]] Consider a case in which you see Rather than being a recording
some event but have reason at the of the details of the experience
time to doubt that what you’re that is simply recalled in the
seeing is genuine. For example, brain, a memory is more like a
suppose you see a very well- reconstruction. This is one of
executed fake documentary in the ways that our memories can
which a group of children seems mislead us, and it is the source
to knock down a grown man of one of the problems for the
and steal his briefcase, but you coherentist picture of memory.
know that it’s a fake documentary
85
P sychologists call our ability to remember where

we acquired a particular piece of information
source monitoring. The problem is that we’re really
bad at source monitoring. It’s maybe not surprising
that we’re bad at remembering the specific source
of information—say, whether we read something
in The New York Times versus The Wall Street
Journal. However, it turns out that we’re even bad
at remembering whether we actually read the
information at all—rather than, say, hearing it during
a 10-minute gossip session at the water cooler.
86
Even more dramatically, we often mistake the source

of our memory as involving our own experiences
when the source was actually something we read or
heard or a photo we saw.
Our difficulties with source monitoring pose a
problem for foundationalism. Part of the plausibility
of naive foundationalism is that when you have a
seeming memory, the memory experience you have
isn’t devoid of additional information. In other words,
it’s not merely a seeming memory experience of a
past object or event (if it’s an episodic memory) or
of a supposed fact (if it’s a declarative memory).
Instead, the seeming memory experience also
contains information of its supposed source; that
is, you remember it as something you experienced
yourself or as something you heard or read. And the
fact that you remember it as having come from a
certain source seems to be part of what makes the
supposed memory so believable.
But if it’s true that we are subject to source
monitoring failures we’re unaware of, this suggests
that the naive foundationalist theory is just that—
naive. We should look for something better.
87
I f what’s been presented so far in this lecture is correct,

neither form of internalism—neither coherentism nor
foundationalism—does a good job of explaining how memory
provides us with support for knowledge.
But there are some ways in which both coherentism and
foundationalism add to our understanding of how memory
contributes to knowledge.
It is in fact likely that the computational processes involved
in the retrieval of memories from the information encoded in
the brain operate according to coherentist principles. Because
of this, it is plausible that an investigation of how coherence
can contribute to accurate reconstructions of information
will be useful for cognitive scientists. It will help them better
understand how the brain supports the encoding, storage,
and retrieval of memories. In other words, paying attention to
the lessons we learn from coherentism can help us understand
the subpersonal mechanisms involved in memory.
Furthermore, the way it feels to rely on memory for
information seems to be best explained by a foundationalist
account. For that reason, when it comes to explaining why
someone might behave in a certain way on the basis of his
or her memory, it would be good to pay attention to lessons
we’ve learned from foundationalism. In other words, appealing
to foundationalism can help us understand how memory
contributes to the personal factors that can help explain
someone’s behavior.
The problem is that neither coherentism nor foundationalism
is sufficient to explain how memory can support knowledge.
That’s because neither of them does a good job of accounting
for if and when memories are reliably accurate. In order to do
that, we’ll need to turn to a consideration of externalism.
88
EXTERNALISM AND MEMORY

^^ Remember, there are two aspects that accurate in encoding, storing, or
are essential to externalist theories. retrieving information in memory.
]] They make reliable accuracy the ]] Both support the idea that we are
central quality for determining often unaware of the processes that
whether a certain cognitive process we actually employ in memory and
is a source of knowledge. In the that we are often equally unaware
case of memory, this means that of whether or why the processes we
only those memory processes employ are reliably accurate.
that reliably give us accurate
information about the remembered ^^ Thissuggests that, as was the case
facts, objects, or events will count as with sense perception, externalism
potential sources of knowledge. provides the best account for
]] They don’t require that we explaining the structure of knowledge
be aware of the operations in the case of memory.
of the processes that give us
^^ There’sone further reason why the
information. This means that
externalist theories—in contrast phenomenon of memory provides
with internalist theories—allow us with a strong motivation for
that we can be unaware of the embracing externalism. It’s known
process we are employing to within philosophy as the problem of
acquire information and ignorant forgotten evidence.
of whether that process is in fact
^^ Often, we retain a particular well-
reliably accurate. In the case of
memory, this means that we at least justified belief without remembering
sometimes acquire information on the evidence that originally led us
the basis of memory processes we’re to form the belief in the first place.
unaware of or whose accuracy we Two related phenomena are forgotten
cannot confirm. negative evidence and source
monitoring failures. But in each
^^ It
seems that the phenomena of of these cases, the problem is that
confabulation and source monitoring foundationalism is forced to say that
failures provide evidence for both of a belief that shouldn’t count as well
the aspects of memory that support justified does count as well justified.
externalism.
^^ The problem of forgotten evidence is
]] Both involve evidence that some
the mirror image of those problems
cognitive systems are more reliably
for foundationalism. This is a
89
problem because the belief is well by evidence you no longer possess.

supported; it’s just not well supported Externalist theories, however,
by any belief or experience that the require a reliably accurate process
believer still possesses. But because to explain what makes a belief well
all internalist theories—whether supported. Because a process can
coherentist or foundationalist—base involve components that are no
the support for your belief on what’s longer present, externalist theories
currently in your mind, they cannot don’t seem to have a problem with
account for a belief that is supported forgotten evidence.
A ll of this suggests that considerations of

memory knowledge provide further support for
externalist theories of knowledge in general.
]]
Bernecker and Michaelian, eds., The Routledge Handbook of
Philosophy of Memory.
Michaelian, Debus, and Perrin, eds., New Directions in the

Philosophy of Memory.
]
READINGS
90
Lecture 10 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 The fact that episodic memory works 3 TRUE OR FALSE
more like reconstructing a picture The problem for the inferential
from stored pieces would seem to foundationalist memory theory is
provide some support for which of that it is viciously circular.
the following?
a Coherentism 4 Which of the following would seem
to pose a problem for the naive
b Foundationalism
internalist foundationalist theory?
2 TRUE OR FALSE a The problem of forgotten
The phenomenon of confabulation evidence
suggests that there are reasons for b The problem of confabulation
questioning whether coherentism c The problem of the unreliability
can explain the reliability of source monitoring
of memory.
d All of the above
e None of the above


91
11LECTURE 11
The Extended Mind
W ith the rise of interest in the extended mind,

philosophers and cognitive scientists have begun
to question whether memory is limited to a
brain-based connection to some past object or
event or whether other types of processes for
recording information outside of the brain could
count as forms of memory. The 1998 paper in the
philosophy journal Analysis written by professors
of philosophy Andy Clark and David Chalmers
entitled “The Extended Mind” gave the hypothesis
its name. Even if you remain skeptical about the
notion of extending the mind, the lessons you
learn in this lecture will nevertheless be significant
for the discussion of the structure of knowledge.
92
Lecture 11 The Extended Mind
USE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AS A COGNITIVE AID

^^ Actions like using pen and paper the system’s behavioral competence
for a mathematical calculation
will drop, just as it would if we
or using Scrabble tiles to aid in
brainstorming possible words to removed part of its brain.
spell are called epistemic actions
by Clark and Chalmers. Epistemic
^^ By appeal to the dual notions of
actions are, as they put it, actions
that “alter the world so as to aid and epistemic actions and coupled
augment cognitive processes such as systems, Clark and Chalmers define
recognition and search.” their position as active externalism.
By this term, they mean that when we
^^ Some of the epistemic actions are are engaged in epistemic actions, we
such that they essentially involve (at least sometimes) count as coupled
environmental aids to successfully systems with external entities that are
complete the cognitive task. Using a genuinely cognitive.
pen and paper for long division seems
like one such action.
^^ Thosecases involve what Clark

and Chalmers call coupled systems, C lark and Chalmers
sum up the central
composed of a human reasoner claim of the extended
and some portion of his or her mind hypothesis like so:
environment. They define a coupled
“If, as we confront some
system as a case where
task, a part of the world
bbthe human organism is linked with functions as a process
an external entity in a two-way
which, were it done in
interaction, creating a coupled
the head, we would
have no hesitation in
system that can be seen as a cognitive
recognizing as part of
system in its own right. All the
the cognitive process,
components in the system play an
then that part of the
active causal role, and they jointly
world is (so we claim)
govern behavior in the same sort of
part of the cognitive
way that cognition usually does. If
process.”
we remove the external component
93
^^ The main strategy Clark and information, he looks it up. Otto

Chalmers pursue in the extended hears about the exhibition at the
mind hypothesis is argument by MoMA and also wants to see it.
analogy. They try to present a case in He looks up the address of MoMA
which a process that extends outside in his notebook and reads in the
of the brain has all the marks of a notebook that it is located on 53rd
cognitive process and then argue that Street. So, Otto heads to 53rd
we should therefore recognize that Street and waits in line to enter
case as a genuinely cognitive process. the museum.
^^ An analogy that Clark and Chalmers ^^ What Clark and Chalmers want to
develop in some detail has two cases underscore is that Inga’s brain-based
(although they also discuss a third belief and Otto’s notebook-based
case that we won’t consider). belief function the same way in
]] The first case involves Inga and explaining their actions. Just like
a normal brain-based belief. Inga Inga, Otto headed toward 53rd
hears about an exhibition that Street because he wanted to go to the
she wants to see at the Museum MoMA and that’s where he believed
of Modern Art. She recalls that the MoMA to be. In Inga’s case,
MoMA is located on 53rd Street, so philosophers would naturally say that
she heads there and waits in line to she possesses the dispositional belief
enter the museum. In other words, that the museum is on 53rd Street
Inga represents a typical case of even when she’s not considering it. So,
declarative memory. Clark and Chalmers argue, we should
also say that Otto believes that the
]] The second case involves Otto,
museum is on 53rd Street even when
who has Alzheimer’s disease. Like
he isn’t consulting what he’s recorded
many people with Alzheimer’s,
in his notebook. The key point,
Otto relies on environmental
according to Clark and Chalmers, is
supports to provide him with aids
that the information that Inga and
in structuring his daily life. In
Otto have stored functions in exactly
particular, Otto carries a notebook
the same way for both of them. For
with him that he uses as a support.
that reason, it shouldn’t matter if that
Whenever he learns something
information is stored in the brain or
new and significant, he records it
in a notebook.
in the notebook. If he needs some
94
C lark and Chalmers suggest that there are no

relevant differences between Inga’s brain-based
memory belief and Otto’s notebook-based belief.
Otto’s external “memory” is just as integral to his
daily functioning as Inga’s internal, brain-based
memory is to hers.
^^ But are there really no relevant do we often lose individual memories,

differences between the Inga case and but there is also the more dramatic
the Otto case? possibility that, through disease or
injury, we could experience more
^^ Clark and Chalmers suggest that significant memory loss.
we might raise four worries about
whether the cases really are that ^^ Theother two differences—
similar. There might be differences phenomenology and accessibility—
in reliability, stability, accessibility, or are more serious.
phenomenology.
^^ Inthe case of phenomenology, it
^^ The first two potential differences doesn’t seem that there is a relevant
between Inga and Otto are reliability difference between the phenomenology
and stability. You might worry that of brain-based declarative memory
Otto’s method for remembering using and Otto’s notebook-based memory.
his notebook is less reliable or stable The reason for this is that there is
than Inga’s. This, however, seems to be no phenomenology of brain-based
obviously wrongheaded. If anything, declarative memory.
the method of using a notebook as an
external “memory” is more reliable ^^ Suppose someone asks you who the
and stable than using your internal, 13th president of the United States
brain-based memory—not less. was. When you remember a fact or
piece of information, it just comes
^^ Ofcourse, using the notebook as an to you—or it doesn’t. Perhaps you
external memory does open you to have the feeling of making an effort
the possibility that it might get lost. to remember, but there’s no special
But this possibility exists for your feeling associated with remembering
brain-based memory as well. Not only the information itself.
95
^^ There does seem to be a difference objection. They grant that the brain
in phenomenology for episodic and body can be thought of as a
memory. Brain-based memories in self-contained set of fundamental
which you imaginatively “relive” cognitive resources. Furthermore, we
a past experience seem to be more obviously take our brains and bodies
difficult to “offload” onto the with us wherever we go, so there’s
environment. But perhaps with the no question that those resources are
rapid improvements of interactive optimally accessible to us. Given this
technologies, even that difference will fact, it seems natural to distinguish
become less significant. cognitive tasks that we can perform
with our brains alone—or even with
^^ The difference in accessibility is a the aid of our fingers, say, in the case
more serious objection. Inga can of arithmetic—from cognitive tasks
access her memory in the dark or that we perform with a portable
when her hands are full, whereas electronic device.
Otto cannot access his notebook in
those types of situations. ^^ Nevertheless,Clark and Chalmers
don’t think that the accessibility
^^ Clark and Chalmers recognize issue ultimately is a problem for the
the seriousness of the accessibility extended mind hypothesis.
EXTERNALISM AND THE EXTENDED MIND

^^ Recent studies seem to demonstrate to the more general topics we’ve
that there is growing empirical been discussing. Instead, we can
evidence that fits well with the take lessons from our discussion of
extended mind hypothesis. But even the phenomena surrounding the
if you are still unsure about whether topic of the extended mind for the
you find the hypothesis ultimately more general questions concerning
convincing, the question of whether knowledge, regardless of how we feel
the extended mind or extended about the specific issue of whether the
cognition is a genuine phenomenon is mind really is—or can be—extended.
interesting in its own right.
^^ If
our discussion of the extended
^^ Certainly,it might be very relevant mind has taught us anything, it’s
to the specific topic of memory that the specific process that leads
knowledge that we’ve been examining to forming a belief matters. Suppose
over the past few lectures. But you’re trying to evaluate whether to
the question is not all that central believe your friend Bill when he tells
96
you that 53,735 divided by 29 equals about the solution to a particular long
1,852 with a remainder of 27. Unless division problem counts as knowledge
you know that your friend is some sort will quite likely depend on which of
of savant, it will make a difference to those processes you use.
you if you know whether he solved the
problem using pencil and paper or ^^ This means that the externalist has
had to try to do it in his head. an advantage when describing the
kinds of knowledge you acquire when
^^ Inthe case of long division, in other you employ processes that extend out
words, the process of using pencil into the world outside of your brain
and paper makes you more reliably and body. And because the claim
accurate in your calculations. For that the process extends out into the
that reason, an externalist about world doesn’t depend on any claims
knowledge will want to describe the about the extended mind or extended
process you employ when you solve cognition, the externalist has this
a long division problem using pencil advantage even if you insist that the
and paper as a different process than mind is not extended but is limited to
the one that you employ if you’re the confines of your brain—or your
forced to try to solve the problem in brain and body.
your head. And whether your belief
]]
Adams and Aizawa, The Bounds of Cognition.
Menary, ed., The Extended Mind.

]
READINGS
97
Lecture 11 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which of the following is an 3 TRUE OR FALSE
example of using the environment as Despite the similarities between
a cognitive aid? Inga’s normal, brain-based belief
a Using a pencil and paper for long and Otto’s atypical, notebook-
division based belief, Andy Clark and David
Chalmers ultimately think that
b Rearranging Scrabble tiles to see
Otto’s belief is too different from
what words you can spell
Inga’s to count as a genuine case of
c Using a nautical slide rule to the extended mind.
compute problems involving
time, speed, and distance on 4 Which of the following are potential
the water worries for the possibility of the
d All of the above extended mind?
e None of the above a Reliability and stability
b Accessibility
2 TRUE OR FALSE
c Phenomenology
Andy Clark and David Chalmers
call systems in which human d All of the above
reasoners are linked with some e None of the above
portion of their environment in
a two-way interaction for the 5 TRUE OR FALSE
purposes of information processing a The results of Betsy Sparrow, Jenny
coupled system. Liu, and Daniel Wegner suggest that
Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s
thesis of the extended mind is similar
to the psychological phenomenon of
transactive memory.

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98
12
LECTURE 12
Do We Have Innate
Knowledge?
C o nsider the claim that equilateral triangles have three

equivalent angles. Presumably, you can figure out that
this claim is true. But how? Certainly, you don’t have
to draw a triangle and examine it to check. And even
if you did draw a triangle to check, that would actually
only tell you that at least one equilateral triangle—the
triangle you just drew—has three equivalent angles.
It wouldn’t give you evidence that all equilateral
triangles have three equivalent angles. It turns out
that there are deep philosophical issues surrounding
the question of how we know the truth of the claim
that all equilateral triangles have three equivalent
angles and other claims like it.
99
Lecture 12 Do We Have Innate Knowledge?
RATIONALISTS VERSUS EMPIRICISTS

^^ The traditional philosophical answer. You would have to look and
controversy about how we know that see how the world actually is—or
all equilateral triangles have three remember what you saw when you
equivalent angles involves a debate did look.
between two diametrically opposed
schools of thought. One school of ^^ On the opposite end of the
thought, the rationalists, argue that spectrum from the rationalists are
humans possess a distinct faculty of the empiricists, including such
reason and that humans could know philosophers as John Locke and
truths of reason—such as the truth David Hume—according to whom
about the angles of an equilateral all knowledge is derived from
triangle—by exercising their faculty experience.
of reason.
^^ Their situation looks like a mirror
^^ Infact, at the extreme, rationalists image of the rationalists’ situation.
believe that all knowledge is derived The empiricists seem to do well
from reason. For example, Descartes with our knowledge of facts about
holds that in order to have knowledge the world. It seems pretty obvious
of something, you have to have to think that those are the kinds of
infallible evidence—evidence that things that we learn from experience.
could not be false. Because the senses But you can know about the angles of
are fallible, Descartes does not think an equilateral triangle without ever
that the senses can provide you with seeing a triangle.
knowledge. Only reason can provide
you with infallible evidence. So, for ^^ This is how the debate stood until
Descartes, only reason can provide the middle of the 18th century, when
you with knowledge. Immanuel Kant entered the picture.
He suggested that the debate between
^^ Descartes and the other rationalists rationalism and empiricism was a
seem to do okay with our knowledge fruitless one because the two sides
of the truths of reason, but they don’t had thought about their disagreement
do so well with our knowledge of facts too simplistically. Kant hoped to show
about the world, such as whether it’s that by thinking more clearly about
hot outside. These facts do not seem what the debate involved, we would
like the types of things you could also be able to find a solution to the
know by reasoning your way to an conflict.
100
D efenders of rationalism include René Descartes,

Benedict de Spinoza, and Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz; defenders of empiricism include Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, and
David Hume.
KANT’S DISTINCTIONS
^^ Where rationalists thought in terms ^^ Contrast that with the claim “some
of truths known by virtue of reason poodles are white.” That’s a synthetic
alone and empiricists thought in claim. It’s also true, but you can’t
terms of truths known in virtue of know that it’s true simply by knowing
experience alone, Kant suggested the meaning of the words in the
that we introduce two different claim. You also have to actually get
distinctions: one between analytic out in the world and look at some
and synthetic claims and another poodles.
between a priori and a posteriori
knowledge. ^^ The second distinction is one that gets
directly at the disagreement between
^^ The distinction between analytic rationalists and empiricists. It’s based
and synthetic claims has to do with on whether the evidence you have
whether the truth of a claim depends comes from experience.
on the meaning of the words used to
make the claim. ^^ The knowledge that we have of things
on the basis of specific experiences
^^ An analytic claim is a claim that you is called a posteriori knowledge by
can know to be true solely on the Kant. If you look outside and see that
basis of the meaning of the words it’s sunny outside where you are, that’s
in it. For example, if you know what a posteriori knowledge. As a nod
“poodle” means and you know what to the empiricists, Kant was happy
“dog” means, then you know that the to admit that we have that kind of
claim “all poodles are dogs” is true. knowledge.
101
^^ However, Kant also thought it ^^ Kant thought that there

obvious that some things you know was knowledge that we have
are based on evidence that doesn’t independently of experience that isn’t
come from experience. He called simply implied by the meanings of the
those cases of a priori knowledge— words we use to state that knowledge.
knowledge that you have independent In particular, Kant thought that there
of any specific experience that were two big branches of knowledge
supports it. that involved the synthetic a priori:
mathematics and philosophy.
^^ Empiricists can be happy with some ]] According to Kant, when you
of that type of knowledge. Take the discover that 17,361 divided by 27
claim “all poodles are dogs.” Suppose equals 643, you’re doing something
you grew up on an island where more than simply relying on the
there were no poodles, let alone any meanings of the terms in that
other type of dog. You’ve never seen statement. Another way of saying
a canine of any type. Nevertheless, if this is that you can understand the
you know English, you can still know meanings of 17,361, 27, and 643
that all poodles are dogs. and still wonder whether 17,361
divided by 27 is equal to 643.
^^ Inother words, some of our a priori That’s not the case with analytic
knowledge is knowledge that we gain truths, according to Kant. If
simply by knowing the meaning of you understand the meaning of
words, even if we don’t have any “poodle” and “dog,” you won’t
specific experience with the things or still wonder whether all poodles
qualities named by those words. are dogs.
]] Kant believed that if he could
^^ This sort of a priori knowledge also
convince you that mathematics
involves analytic claims—claims that
involved synthetic a priori
you can know are true simply because
claims, then you would have
of the words they involve.
no reason to argue against the
idea that philosophy involves
^^ This might seem a bit strange, but
synthetic a priori claims as well.
it shouldn’t be. There are many
In other words, Kant saw his
cases in which we can learn a lot
argument for the existence of the
about something without directly
synthetic a priori as providing
experiencing it, simply by learning
proof of philosophy as a well-
facts about language.
founded discipline, on a par with
mathematics.
102
A PRIORI SYNTHETIC TRUTHS

^^ Suppose you agree with Kant because it doesn’t claim that we learn
that we do have at least some a everything through reason. Instead,
priori knowledge. Where does that these more modest rationalists
knowledge come from? How do we just suggest that it is reason that
know, for example, that all equilateral explains how we learn the a priori
triangles are equiangular— synthetic truths of mathematics and
particularly because we can know philosophy. These modest rationalists
that without physically examining suggest that we recognize those truths
any equilateral triangles? through the use of a rational faculty,
or faculty of reason. There are two
^^ The point of introducing the big problems with this idea.
synthetic a priori is to reject one way ]] The first problem has to do with
of answering that question. For the how the faculty of reason comes to
empiricist, one thing that would be know the things it knows. Modest
acceptable would be to say that you rationalists like to suggest that
can have a priori knowledge as long reason “recognizes” or “perceives”
as it is knowledge derived from the a priori synthetic truths. But this is
meaning of words or concepts. So, just a metaphor, and it isn’t helpful.
as long as all a priori knowledge is Modest rationalists explicitly reject
analytic, then it would be okay for the the notion that a brain-based
empiricist. explanation of how we come to
know a priori synthetic truths is
^^ Once you introduce the synthetic something we ought to seek. That’s
a priori, however, it is no longer as just not a strategy that is worth
easy for the empiricist to explain pursuing.
where that knowledge comes from— ]] The second problem is that modest
the synthetic a priori knowledge
rationalists are very unclear about
that doesn’t ultimately come from
what a faculty of reason might
knowledge of meaning.
be. The one thing that modest
rationalists do seem to suggest is
^^ So,
where does this knowledge come
that the faculty of reason can’t
from? Let’s examine three answers.
just be a mechanism or collection
of mechanisms in the brain. And
^^ The first suggestion for where our
rejecting an appeal to brain-based
a priori knowledge comes from
mechanisms for understanding
is a form of rationalism. It’s less
human knowledge isn’t a promising
extreme than Descartes’s rationalism,
explanatory. But even if you’re
103
not opposed in principle to we can appeal to either one or both

explanations that ignore the role of of the strategies to help explain our
the brain and brain mechanisms in knowledge of a priori synthetic truths.
knowledge, certainly you shouldn’t ]] The innate strategy involves
be satisfied with a name that stands innate brain mechanisms. Such
for nothing. And unfortunately, in mechanisms almost certainly play a
the case of modest rationalism, it role in our knowledge of basic facts
seems that that’s all we have. Just a about numbers.
label—the faculty of reason—with ]] According to the language strategy,
no further detail about what such a
mathematical thinking is a result of
thing might be.
our use of language.
^^ Modest rationalism doesn’t seem ^^ Both of these suggestions are
very plausible. Luckily, the other two
plausible. The good news is that we
explanatory strategies—the innate
don’t need to choose between them;
strategy and the language strategy—
we can accept that both innate brain
are based on mechanisms in the
structures and language play a role in
brain. Furthermore, the strategies
synthetic a priori knowledge.
are compatible with each other, so
T he evidence that innate mechanisms in the brain

play a role in our knowledge of mathematics
is strong. Beginning in the 1980s, developmental
psychologists introduced what became known as
the violation-of-expectation paradigm to investigate
the innate cognitive abilities of preverbal children,
even very young infants. Using that research
technique, researchers have been able to establish
that very young infants—as young as three or four
days old—have a number of innate mental abilities
that are relevant to our discussion of a priori
synthetic knowledge.
104
N ewborns have the ability to recognize when

different collections of objects have differing
numbers of objects. Psychologists refer to this as the
ability to subitize, and developmental psychologists
suggest that this ability is evidence that infants
have an innate conception of number. In fact, by
the age of a few months, babies behave as if they
have an intuitive
understanding
of very simple
arithmetic
operations, such
as 1 + 1 = 2.
O ne of the pioneers of the suggestion that our

ability to think abstractly is a result of our use
of language was Soviet psychologist Alexander
Luria. In a groundbreaking series of studies, he
interviewed a number of Central Asian peasants and
found that the ability to think and reason abstractly
depended on the level of language learning that the
peasants had attained.
105
R esearch conducted by cognitive neuroscientist

Stanislas Dehaene shows that there are at
least two separate brain systems responsible for
mathematical cognition: one involves approximate
arithmetic and the other is employed when we
compute exact arithmetic. Dehaene suggests that
this second system is tied to the language that a
person has learned.
This indicates that the best explanation of
our a priori synthetic knowledge—such as our
knowledge of mathematics—might involve both
innate brain structures that provide us with the
most fundamental concepts that we depend on
for such knowledge and structures contained
within our language that allow us to build on those
fundamental concepts.
]]
Casullo, A Priori Justification.
Moser, ed., A Priori Knowledge.

]
READINGS
106
Lecture 12 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 The fact that Nicholas Saunderson, 4 According to Kant, philosophical or
the famous blind Lucasian professor mathematical truths are some of the
of mathematics at Cambridge, could few claims that can both be which of
know facts about geometry would the following?
seem to provide some evidence a Analytic a priori
against which of the following?
b Synthetic a priori
a Pure rationalism
c Synthetic a posteriori
b Pure empiricism
5 Karen Wynn’s experiments on
2 Which of the following did the mathematical abilities of very
Immanuel Kant think involved young infants provide at least
claims that are true in virtue of logic some evidence that some human
and meaning alone? mathematical knowledge is which of
a A priori the following?
b A posteriori a The result of rational intuition
c Analytic b Due to innate mathematical
d Synthetic brain modules
c Due to linguistic knowledge
3 Which of the following did
Immanuel Kant think involved 6 Soviet psychologist A. R. Luria’s
claims that were known research suggests that at least some
independently of experience? human mathematical knowledge is
a A priori which of the following?
b A posteriori a The result of rational intuition
c Analytic b Due to innate mathematical
brain modules
d Synthetic
c Due to linguistic knowledge

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107
13
LECTURE 13
How Deduction
Contributes to
Knowledge
M u ch of what we know is not something that

we’ve experienced directly. In many cases, what
we know is inferred. In fact, as in the case of
the foundationalist position, many philosophers
think that inference is essential to the structure of
knowledge.
108
Lecture 13 How Deduction Contributes to Knowledge
DEDUCTION VERSUS INDUCTION

^^ Deduction involves inference based ^^ This
remarkable power, however,
on the purely logical relationships comes with two significant costs.
that hold among the steps that make ]] Deductive validity gives us a
up the inference. A classic example guarantee that if our premises are
is the syllogism, a form of inference true, our conclusion will also be
that Aristotle studied more than true, but if any of the premises
2,000 years ago. This syllogism is a are false, then all bets are off—the
paradigmatic example of deductive conclusion could be false, but it
inference: could also be true.
1 All men are mortal. ]] The conclusion of a deductively
2 Socrates is a man. valid argument will always contain
3 Therefore, Socrates is mortal. no more information than the
premises of the argument. In
^^ Consider this significant attribute fact, the conclusion of a deductive
of the inference. There is no way argument generally contains
for the steps of the inference—what dramatically less information than
philosophers call the premises—to the premises of that argument. You
be true and the conclusion to be could actually think of this as the
false. The conclusion, in other words, function of a deductive argument:
necessarily follows from the premises. Its conclusion allows you to focus
on the particular implication of
^^ Thisis the central attribute of the information contained in the
deduction. A well-formed deductive premises that interests you.
inference is one in which the
^^ Ifwhat you want is an argument
conclusion necessarily follows
from the premises. Such well- whose conclusion contains
formed inferences are referred to as information that is not contained in
deductively valid. the premises, then what you want
is a nondeductive argument. There
^^ This is a remarkable property are a number of different types of
of deductive inference. It offers nondeductive arguments, but we’ll
a guarantee that you can be focus on inductive arguments.
sure, purely based on the form
^^ Inductivearguments are ones
of the inference, that if you have
true premises, you’ll have a true whose premises merely make their
conclusion. conclusion highly probable. Consider
the following argument.
109
1 In the past, I have often observed stronger support for their conclusion.
cardinals, and they have always The strength of inductive arguments
been red. depends on the level of support
2 Therefore, the next time I observe that their premises provide for the
a cardinal, it will also be red. conclusion, whereas deductively
valid arguments with true premises
^^ You can think of the first step of the always guarantee the truth of their
argument as a shorthand for a list conclusion.
of all of the individual occasions on
^^ The trade-off for the fact that
which you’ve observed cardinals and
they’ve been red. If you think of that inductive arguments cannot
step in this way, then the support guarantee their conclusions is that
for the conclusion of the inductive inductive arguments can involve
argument—that the next cardinal you conclusions that provide information
see will also be red—will presumably not contained in the premises. In
be stronger the more observations of fact, any generalization in science—
cardinals you’ve had in the past. for example, that all electrons have
less mass than any proton—is the
^^ Thisfact about inductive arguments conclusion of an inductive argument.
allows us to appreciate the key aspect This is because any general statement
about them that distinguishes them would necessarily go beyond the
from deductive arguments: Inductive individual observations on which it
arguments can involve weaker or must be based.
DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS
^^ Deductive arguments are central to a guarantee that its conclusions
both foundationalist and coherentist are true. But even other forms of
internalist theories. fallible foundationalism still regard
]] In the case of Descartes’s form deductive inference as an important
of internalist foundationalism, source of knowledge.
deduction is the only way in which ]] It’s not exactly clear what goes into
knowledge can be supported by the relation of coherence. However,
the foundational beliefs you have. one of the components would have
This is because Descartes required to involve something like logical
that knowledge be infallible, and consistency, and logical consistency
only deductive inference provides involves deductive inference.
110
^^ In other words, particularly for have often been blind to a number

the internalist, deductive inference of complications having to do with
is of central importance. It is deductive inference. We’ll focus on
surprising, then, that philosophers three representative problems.
T he logical connectives used in deductive reasoning

are defined in terms of how they affect the truth
values of sentences.
If you add the logical “not” to a true sentence, you get a
false sentence. And if you add the logical “not” to a false
sentence, the result is true.
The logical “and” joins two sentences. The resulting
compound sentence is true only when both sentences
joined by the “and” are true. In all other cases, the “and”
is false.
The logical “or” is also used to join two sentences, but in
the case of the “or,” the resulting sentence is true as long
as at least one of the components is true. The sentence is
also true when both are true. This is because the logical
“or” is called the nonexclusive “or.” That means if a
logician wants to use “or” to mean “one or the other, but
not both,” then he or she explicitly has to stipulate that.
The “if-then,” also called a conditional statement, also
joins two sentences—like the logical “and” and the logical
“or.” Unlike these two, however, the position of the
sentences joined by the “if-then” matters. Let’s call the
“if” sentence the antecedent (A) and the “then” sentence
the consequent (C). If A, then C is only false when the
antecedent A is true and the consequent C is false. In all
other cases, the “if-then” is true.
111
^^ Despite the fact that some of these ^^ As

Johnson-Laird and Wason
difficulties have been studied since the emphasize,
1960s, psychologists and philosophers
still have differing explanations for bbVery few highly intelligent [people]
why these problems in deductive get the answer right spontaneously;
reasoning persist. However, there is
some take a considerable time to
universal agreement that the existence
of these difficulties provides proof grasp it; a small minority even
that humans are not naturally gifted dispute its correctness, or at least
at abstract deductive reasoning. Even remain puzzled by it.
highly intelligent people make very
basic mistakes when they attempt to
think deductively. ^^ Intheir words, this is the answer to
the selection task:
^^ An example demonstrating the
fact that humans are not innately bbThe most frequent answers are “A
strong abstract reasoners is the
and 4” and “only A.” They are both
Wason selection task, a psychological
experiment first conducted by wrong. The right answer is “A and
psychologist Peter Wason in the mid- 7” because if these two stimuli were
1960s. Here’s a description from an to occur on the same card, then the
article cowritten by Wason and his rule would be false but otherwise it
collaborator Philip Johnson-Laird: would be true.
bbYou are presented with four cards
showing, respectively, “A,” “D,” “4,” ^^ The results of the Wason selection
“7,” and you know from previous task are some of the most widely
experience that every card, of which replicated in the history of modern
psychology. When presented with
these are a subset, has a letter on
abstract problems testing their
one side and a number on the other intuitive grasp of “if-then” deductive
side. You are then given this rule reasoning, only less than 25 percent—
about the four cards in front of you: in some experiments as few as 7
If a card has a vowel on one side, percent—of people complete the
selection task correctly.
then it has an even number on the
other side. Next you are told: Your ^^ Laterexperiments have found that
task is to say which of the cards you the subject matter can make an
need to turn over in order to find out enormous difference in how well
whether the rule is true or false.” people do in completing the selection
112
task. The issue of why and how is that they contradict our self-image
different versions of the selection task as strong logical reasoners.
can yield such different results still
has researchers puzzled. ^^ If
many of us are in fact so poor at
reasoning deductively, why are we
^^ Butwhat is unquestioned is that not more aware of that fact? The
humans are abject failures, by and answer can be found in one of the
large, at the abstract version of the most famous social psychological
selection task. And given that for experiments of the last quarter
formal logic the content of the rules century.
shouldn’t matter—only their structure
should matter—this shows that ^^ The experiment was performed by
humans are not naturally gifted at a professor of psychology at Cornell
deductive reasoning. University, David Dunning, and a
graduate student in psychology, Justin
^^ According to further research Kruger. Their article reporting on the
conducted by Wason, it turns out experiment, “Unskilled and Unaware
that humans are not all that good at of It,” which appeared in 1999 in
applying the rules governing “or” and the Journal of Personality and Social
“and” statements either. Psychology, has racked up more than
4,000 citations on Google Scholar.
^^ Ifwe’re not all that good at
deductive logical reasoning, why ^^ In the version of their experiment that
would traditional internalists—both is relevant to deductive reasoning,
foundationalists and coherentists— Dunning and Kruger gave a group
make deductive logical reasoning an of Cornell undergraduate psychology
essential component of justification? students a 20-item logical reasoning
If the goal of epistemology is to test drawn from study questions for
explain how we have knowledge, the LSAT.
rather than to demonstrate that
we lack knowledge, then requiring ^^ On average, the students placed
deductive logical ability in order themselves in the 66th percentile on
to have knowledge seems like a the logical reasoning test. Remember
bad strategy. that the average has to be the 50th
percentile.
^^ When most people think about
themselves, they likely tend to think ^^ Dunning and Kruger tried to figure
that they’re actually pretty good at out the source of this misdiagnosis
logical reasoning. In fact, one of the of logical ability, so they divided the
surprising aspects of Wason’s research test takers into quartiles and found
113
that the top 25 percent of the students ^^ Dunning and Kruger suggest that
actually underestimated their “those with limited knowledge in
performance on the test. a domain suffer a dual burden:
Not only do they reach mistaken
^^ What accounted for the overestimate conclusions and make regrettable
of logical ability on the part of the errors, but their incompetence robs
student participants was the worst them of the ability to realize it.”
performers. In particular, the bottom This phenomenon has become so
25 percent of the students, who scored widely recognized that it has entered
on average in the 12th percentile, the literature as the Dunning-
believed themselves to be in the 68th Kruger effect.
percentile of all test takers.
B oth internalist foundationalists and coherentists

require deductive reasoning as a central
feature of how we are supposed to construct
our knowledge. However, we are not only bad
at deductive reasoning, but also insensitive to
what poor logical reasoners we are. This is a bad
combination for internalist theorists.
According to the externalist, there is no requirement
that you can know something only if you can
support your knowledge on the basis of reasons
you have access to. That requirement—coupled
with the suggestion that the way you must support
your knowledge will at least sometimes involve
deductive inference—is what leads to problems for
the internalist.
114
Without that requirement, the externalist faces

no challenge due to the fact that our deductive
reasoning skills are not as good as we intuitively
assumed. In this way, the externalist theorist is able
to have a more clearheaded assessment of our
actual reasoning abilities.
A consideration of deductive reasoning suggests at
least some support for an externalist theory.
]]
Harman, Change in View.
Mercier and Sperber, The Enigma of Reason.

]
READINGS
115
Lecture 13 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Inferences that have the property of 4 Suppose you are told to evaluate
having true conclusions whenever all the rule that if a basketball player
of their premises are true are which is a forward, then the player is
of the following? more than 6 feet tall. Which of
a Deductively valid the following would you need to
examine to know if the rule is true?
b Inductively strong
a The height of a guard
2 Generalizations in science are b The position of a player who is 5
examples of the conclusions of which feet 9 inches tall
type of arguments? c The position of a player who is 6
a Deductive feet 2 inches tall
b Inductive d All of the above
e None of the above
3 Suppose it’s true that it’s sunny in
Seattle and it’s false that it’s raining 5 Which of the following is an example
in Tucson. Which of the following of the Dunning-Kruger effect?
sentences is true?
a People who are the worst at
a It’s sunny in Seattle, but it’s not logical inference think that
raining in Tucson. they are among the best at such
b Either it’s raining in Seattle or it’s inferences.
not raining in Tucson. b People are not good at
c If it’s raining in Tucson, then it’s understanding conditional
cloudy in Seattle. statements.
d All of the above. c Valid deductive arguments
e None of the above. cannot give you more
information than you put
into them.


116
14
LECTURE 14
Hume’s Attack
on Induction
T h ere is a long philosophical tradition of questioning

whether inductive inference is at all useful in
generating knowledge. We can also ask the separate
question of whether humans are actually good
inductive reasoners. This means that we have two
challenges to consider: whether inductive inferences
are ones that we should rely on in increasing our
knowledge and whether we humans are in fact
able to reason inductively in ways that increase our
knowledge. This lecture focuses on the first question
while the next tackles the second.
117
Lecture 14 Hume’s Attack on Induction
INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS
^^ Recall that two of the main features 2 Therefore, if you smoke a pack
of deduction are that it is certain and of cigarettes a day or more, you
it can’t add to the information that will likely develop serious health
we already have. Induction differs problems and die prematurely.
from deduction along both of these
dimensions. ^^ Much of the strength of this argument
will depend on the support you have
^^ First,
induction is not certain. for the first claim. And that support
Inductive arguments involve will require at least two things.
probability. The point of introducing ]] Presumably, the larger the
the notion of probability is to be able percentage of people who develop
to discuss events that may not be health problems when smoking,
certain—events that have a chance of the stronger the link is between the
occurring but also a chance of failing data you’ve gathered about smoking
to occur. in general and the chance that
your friend, in particular, will also
^^ Suppose you have a friend who suffer negative health effects from
smokes a pack of cigarettes a day. smoking.
You tell him that if he keeps that up, ]] The more evidence you’ve gathered
he’s likely to develop serious health
that links smoking to poor health,
problems and to die prematurely. He
the better the support for your first
responds by saying, “My grandfather
claim will be.
smoked a pack of cigarettes a day,
never had any health issues, and lived
^^ Suppose you’re satisfied that you have
to be 100 years old.”
good evidence for your first claim.
Unlike in the case of a deductive
^^ Aninductive argument—even a
argument, even an inductive
good one—doesn’t guarantee that its
argument that seems strong doesn’t
conclusion will apply in every case.
guarantee the truth of the conclusion
given the truth of the premises.
^^ Theargument you give to your friend
would look like this:
^^ Atbest, your first claim just tells
1 Many of those people who smoked you that you have a great deal of
a pack of cigarettes a day or more evidence that there has been a
developed serious health problems strong connection observed between
and died prematurely. smoking and poor health. This
observed connection, however,
118
cannot guarantee that there actually It’s only by looking at vast amounts
is a connection between smoking of data that you could assess whether
and ill health, nor can it guarantee, the estimate of the likelihood was
for example, that smoking causes ill accurate or not. And if you’re dealing
health. It merely makes it likely that with a one-off event, that’s not always
such a connection is real and that terribly helpful.
such a causal relationship exists.
^^ This is the first complication: The

truth of the premises of an inductive
argument do not guarantee the truth
of the argument’s conclusion, even
I nductive arguments
are much less
straightforward and
when the argument enjoys a great
deal of evidential support. much more difficult
to deal with than
^^ Here’sthe second complication.
In almost all inductive argument deductive arguments.
conclusions, there will be an element
of probability in the statement of the
conclusion. For example, you argued
that your friend will likely develop ^^ Given the problems with inductive
serious health complications and die arguments, you might suggest that
prematurely. The problem here is we simply stop dealing with them.
that your inductive evidence could be In some ways, this is a typical
strong and the conclusion could even philosophical reaction. When you
be true, but your friend still might not read most works of philosophy,
develop serious health complications all you’ll encounter are deductive
and die prematurely. arguments, not inductive ones.
The reason for this is at least in
^^ Sometimes the less likely event does part that philosophers prefer the
in fact occur. This means that it is clean simplicity and elegance of
much harder to demonstrate that the deductive arguments to the messiness
conclusion of an inductive argument introduced by inductive arguments.
is false. Suppose you are told only that
a certain event is likely to happen—or ^^ The reason inductive arguments
even highly likely to happen. The are useful, however, is that—unlike
mere fact that it doesn’t happen on deduction—inductive arguments can
a single occasion doesn’t actually actually add new information to the
demonstrate that the claim was false. information that we already have.
119
^^ Suppose you notice, on a number ^^ So,that general claim—that where

of occasions, that whenever you there’s smoke, there’s fire—is
light a campfire, smoke rises from new information. It’s not actually
the logs. You find yourself hiking in information you’ve ever simply
the woods during a forest fire alert perceived, although it is based on
and see, over the rise of the next information that you’ve perceived—
hill, smoke wafting up. You think, namely the information about
Where there’s smoke, there’s fire, and your previous experiences with fire
head back to your car to alert the and smoke.
park rangers. That thought goes
beyond any experience you’ve ever ^^ That’sthe power of induction. It can
had. All of the experiences you’ve allow you to derive new information
had have been of particular events, from your existing storehouse of
including particular campfires, so experience. And then, using that new
all of your evidence has been of the information you’ve derived, induction
form of specific camping trips and allows you potentially to predict
campfires. future observations or to manipulate
future events.
HUME’S INDUCTIVE CHALLENGE

^^ Given the great power and usefulness ^^ The goal of Hume’s argument is
of inductive arguments, it’s no to show that, despite its power and
wonder philosophers have had a usefulness, inductive arguments are
great interest in showing that those not in fact based on reason at all.
arguments work and how they can According to Hume, the correct
be improved. conclusion to draw about induction is
that it provides us with no reason for
^^ One of the great challenges faced by our beliefs or actions at all!
those who attempt to explain and
defend the use of inductive inference ^^ How does Hume establish such a
was given by David Hume in a series seemingly radical conclusion?
of works. In the first of those works, A
Treatise of Human Nature, he introduced ^^ He begins by noting that in order for
an attack on induction that became inductive arguments to be successful,
one of the most influential arguments the uniformity principle—which says
in the history of philosophy. that unobserved instances resemble
120
observed instances—must be true. ^^ Hume’s uniformity principle seems

The uniformity principle requires to be extremely plausible. Inductive
this: For an inductive argument to reasoning can only work as long as
be successful, past performance must the unobserved cases that you’re
at least resemble the future results in trying to predict resemble the
ways that make generalizations about observed cases on which you base
those future results possible. your argument.
T he uniformity principle is one of the basic

assumptions at the root of scientific inquiry. As
astrophysicist Brian Greene noted,
Science is not describing a

universe out there, and we’re
separate entities …. We’re
part of that universe, we’re
made of the same stuff as
that universe, of ingredients
that behave according to
the same laws as they do
elsewhere in the universe.
^^ Hume’s argument is as follows: perspective. The uniformity

1 In order for someone to have principle is neither self-evident
reason to believe any matter-of- nor something we can know
fact claim about the unobserved, on the basis of immediate
he or she must first have reason experience. Therefore, if you’re
to believe that the uniformity an internalist—whether a
principle is true. To make this foundationalist or a coherentist—
claim plausible, it would help Hume’s first claim seems very
to think from an internalist plausible.
121
I f you’re an internalist, then you think that

everything you have reason to believe has to be
supported by something else you also have reason
to believe, with a few potential exceptions.
If you’re a coherentist, then there are no exceptions;
everything you have reason to believe has to be
supported by its coherence with everything else you
have reason to believe.
If you’re a foundationalist, then the exceptions
are the foundational beliefs. Typically, for
foundationalists, this would include things that are
self-evident or things you believe on the basis of
immediate experience.
2 All claims are either what Hume observed instances that would
calls relations-of-ideas claims or guarantee the truth of that claim.
matter-of-fact claims. Matter-of- If all claims are either relations-
fact claims can be either true or of-ideas claims or matter-of-fact
false. Relations-of-ideas claims claims and if the uniformity
are made true by the concepts, or principle is not a relations-of-
ideas, they involve; they are claims ideas claim, then the uniformity
you can know without going out principle must be a matter-of-
into the world and checking. The fact claim.
claim that all statements can be 4 Because the uniformity principle
divided into one of these types, says that unobserved instances
sometimes called Hume’s fork, resemble observed instances, that
seems at least somewhat plausible. means the uniformity principle is a
3 The uniformity principle is not a claim about the unobserved.
relations-of-ideas claim. There is 5 Because the uniformity principle is
nothing about the meaning of the itself a matter-of-fact claim about
ideas involved in the claim that the unobserved, that means that
unobserved instances resemble in order for you to have reason
122
to believe that the uniformity good reason to believe that food and
principle is true, you must already drink will nourish us rather than
have reason to believe that the poisoning us—or even that the sun
uniformity principle is true. will rise tomorrow as it’s always done
in the past.
^^ Because the support for the uniformity
principle comes from the uniformity ^^ Clearly,this is a terrible result. If
principle itself, the justification for there is any way to avoid accepting
the uniformity principle is viciously the force of Hume’s argument, we
circular. And if that’s the case, then should see if we can seek it out.
Hume has the conclusion that he’s
^^ One strategy for rejecting Hume’s
argument is to attack the first
premise: that in order for you to have
B ecause pretty
much all of
science depends on
reason to believe any matter-of-fact
claim about the unobserved, you
must first have reason to believe the
uniformity principle is true.
inductive reasoning,
in a nutshell Hume’s ^^ This claim is not obvious. What is
obvious is that for you to have good
conclusion means reason to believe the result of an
that we have no good inductive argument, the uniformity
reason to believe any principle has to be true. But that’s
a far cry from Hume’s claim, which
of the information
is that for you to have reason to
science gives us. believe in the result of your inductive
inference, you have to have reason to
believe that the uniformity principle
is true.
after: We have no good, noncircular ^^ If

you’re an externalist, you’ll
reason for believing in the conclusions reject Hume’s claim. Just because
of inductive arguments. our having reason to believe in
the conclusions of our inductive
^^ Hume’s conclusion is devastating for inferences requires the truth of the
our everyday beliefs. Hume himself uniformity principle, that doesn’t
emphasizes that the results of his mean we have to give any thought to
conclusion mean that we don’t have the uniformity principle itself.
123
S o much for Hume’s attack on induction.

Unfortunately, we’re not in the clear yet. In the
20th century, a number of philosophers returned
to the question of why we’re allowed to believe the
conclusions of our inductive inferences.
]]
Stroud, Hume.
Swinburne, ed., The Justification of Induction.

]
READINGS
124
Lecture 14 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which of the following is not a 3 David Hume’s argument against
way that induction differs from the rationality of induction relies on
deduction? which of the following?
a Induction doesn’t provide certain a The truth of internalism about
support for its conclusions. knowledge
b The support that the premises of b The idea that all claims involve
an inductive argument provide either relations of ideas or
for the conclusion often involve matters of fact
probabilities. c The idea that induction relies on
c Even if the conclusion of an the uniformity principle
inductive argument is well d All of the above
supported by the argument,
e None of the above
the conclusion still allows for
exceptions.
4 TRUE OR FALSE
d The conclusions of inductive A coherence theorist can accept all
arguments cannot contain more of the premises of David Hume’s
evidence than is contained in the argument against the rationality
premises. of induction but still reject Hume’s
conclusion.
2 TRUE OR FALSE
David Hume’s uniformity principle,
according to which unobserved
instances resemble observed
instances, lies at the foundation of
the natural sciences.


125
15
LECTURE 15
The Raven Paradox
and New Riddle
of Induction
A s introduced in the previous lecture, David Hume

raised skeptical worries about the rationality of
believing on the basis of inductive inference, and
his argument—though ingenious—can be rejected
in a variety of ways. There are problems involved
with inductive inference that are not as easily solved
as Hume’s argument, but thinking about a solution
to these problems provides valuable lessons about
inductive inference.
126
Lecture 15 The Raven Paradox and New Riddle of Induction
HEMPEL’S PARADOX
^^ Hempel’s paradox was formulated the “all ravens” claim will also count,
in the 1940s by German philosopher logically, as evidence for the “all non-
Carl Hempel. It is often referred to as black things” claim—and vice versa.
the raven paradox because Hempel
formulated it by discussing the ^^ The problem is that you can get a ton
claim that all ravens are black and of evidence for the claim that all non-
considering what types of experiences black things are non-ravens without
would support that claim. ever seeing a single raven. Suppose, for
example, that you’re in a factory that
^^ Consider the claim that all ravens are mass-produces white printer paper.
black. If you want to find evidence Each sheet of paper is both non-black
for it, presumably the best way would and not a raven, so each sheet of paper
be to find all the ravens you can and provides evidence for the claim that all
show that all the ravens you’ve been non-black things are non-ravens.
able to find so far have been black.
Furthermore, it’s intuitively plausible
that the more black ravens you’ve
found, the stronger your evidence is
for the claim.
^^ Logically,the claim that all ravens

are black is equivalent to the claim
that all non-black things are non-
ravens. “Equivalent” here means
that the two statements are true in
exactly the same circumstances.
^^ Whenever the “all ravens”

claim is true, so is the “all
non-black things” claim.
And whenever the “all
ravens” claim is false, so is
the “all non-black things”
claim. And this means
that any evidence for
127
^^ Butremember that the claim that all ^^ Scheffler and Goodman suggested
non-black things are non-ravens is that we shouldn’t just focus on the
equivalent to the claim that all ravens fact that because the claim that all
are black and that evidence for one ravens are black and the claim that all
claim should therefore count logically non-black things are non-ravens are
as evidence for the other. But this logically equivalent, both an instance
means that you can acquire a great of a black raven and an instance of a
deal of evidence in support of the non-black non-raven would offer some
claim that all ravens are black without confirmation for either claim. Instead,
ever laying eyes on a single raven! we should look at the claims that the
instances of the black raven and the
^^ Also,remember that the more non-black non-raven can disconfirm.
instances you have that support your
claim, the stronger your evidence is ^^ The instance of a black raven
supposed to be. So, it would seem that confirms the claim that all ravens
you can gather stronger evidence for are black, and it also provides reason
the claim that all ravens are black by to reject the claim that all ravens
flipping through a ream of printer are non-black. The instance of a
paper than you can by observing a non-black non-raven, however, is
few black ravens. This is absurd! compatible both with the claim that
all ravens are black and with the
^^ The raven paradox demonstrates claim that all ravens are not-black.
that there is more to the way that
inductive arguments provide evidence ^^ Scheffler and Goodman characterize
for their conclusions than we can this difference by saying that the
express using logic alone. Beyond instance of a black raven selectively
this, though, philosophers disagree confirms the claim that all ravens are
about the best way to deal with black, while the instance of a non-
Hempel’s raven paradox. black non-raven doesn’t selectively
confirm that claim.
^^ One solution, proposed by
philosophers Israel Scheffler and ^^ Although we weren’t able to deal with
Nelson Goodman, drew on a Hempel’s paradox quite as easily as
famous insight of Karl Popper’s. Hume’s challenge to induction, there
Popper argued that in science, is nevertheless a pretty tidy solution
evidence against a hypothesis, called that we can appeal to.
disconfirmation, is much more
important than evidence for that
hypothesis, called confirmation.
128
GOODMAN’S PROBLEM
^^ Goodman’s problem for induction is general hypothesis that all emeralds
often referred to as the new riddle of
are grue. Thus according to our
induction (the old riddle of induction
is Hume’s) or as the grue problem. definition, the prediction is that all
emeralds subsequently examined will
^^ Goodman begins by defining a be green and the prediction that all
description-word, “grue.” The
philosophical term for a description- will be grue are alike confirmed by
word is predicate; it is basically a evidence statements describing the
term used to describe something. For same observations. But if an emerald
example, “tall” and “wears glasses”
subsequently examined is grue, it is
are predicates. And, after Goodman
introduced the term in his 1955 work blue and hence not green.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, so is “grue.”
^^ Goodman ^^ Let’sgive a slightly more concrete

defines grue by saying that
example by defining grue as
bbit applies to all things examined something that, whenever we
examine it before midnight on
before [some future time] t just in January 1, 2100, appears green, but
case they are green but to other things that were we to examine it on or after
[after that future time] just in case midnight on January 1, 2100, would
appear blue.
they are blue. Then at time t we
have, for each evidence statement ^^ Because of the way we’ve defined
asserting that a given emerald is grue, all of the experience that we’ve
had so far of green things is also
green, a parallel evidence statement
evidence that those things are grue.
asserting that that emerald is grue.
And the statements that emerald ^^ In particular, the following two
a is grue, that emerald b is grue, statements are both true:
and so on, will each confirm the I All observed emeralds are green.
II All observed emeralds are grue.
129
^^ If
observed correlations provide ^^ Obviously, the blue-prediction
us with reasonable beliefs about contradicts the green-prediction.
unobserved cases, we have equal
reason to believe the following ^^ So, by introducing grue, Goodman
two claims: demonstrates that it seems induction
I' The first emerald observed on or can be used to support outlandish
after midnight, January 1, 2100, beliefs—such as the belief that
will be green. (Let’s call this the emeralds will appear blue when
green-prediction.) observed on or after January 1, 2100.
And induction can even be used to
II' The first emerald observed on or
support contradictory claims. This is
after midnight, January 1, 2100,
because, by using grue, we’ve shown
will be grue. (Let’s call this the
that both the claim “All emeralds will
grue-prediction.)
appear green when observed on or
after January 1, 2100” and the claim
^^ Butnow we have a problem. Because
“All emeralds will appear blue when
of how we’ve defined grue, the grue-
observed on or after January 1, 2100”
prediction implies the following:
are equally well supported by the
II" The first emerald observed after evidence.
t will be blue. (Let’s call this the
blue-prediction.) ^^ Goodman doesn’t think we can find
a solution to the grue problem by
focusing on the logic of the predicates
themselves. Instead, he thinks the
130
best way to distinguish between the ^^ Green and grue conflict with
predicates we want to employ and the each other because they support
ones we don’t is to focus on our own contradictory predictions. So, if we
psychology. How do we use predicates have to choose between two claims
in formulating inductive arguments? that we’re testing against the evidence
Goodman thinks it’s the answer to and one of those claims involves the
this question that provides the key to predicate “green” while the other
solving his new riddle of induction. involves the predicate “grue,” then
Goodman says that we should choose
^^ Goodman observes that the claims the claim that involves the better-
we want to test through induction entrenched predicate, “green.” In this
don’t exist individually, in a vacuum. case, the predicate “green” overrides
Instead, those claims are often related the predicate “grue.”
to a number of other claims. And one
of the ways in which different claims ^^ This gives Goodman a way to
are related to each other is that we characterize the kinds of predicates
often employ the same predicates to he thinks make good candidates
formulate them. Goodman describes for inductive inference—and offer
those predicates that are used in a wide a solution to the grue problem. It’s
variety of claims that we test through the predicates that override other
inductive inference as entrenched. predicates that conflict with it without
being overridden themselves. He calls
^^ Nowwe have a way to distinguish those predicates projectible.
between green and grue: Green is
very well entrenched while grue is not ^^ Goodman’s solution to the grue
entrenched at all. problem might seem too easy.
What justification could we give for
characterizing certain descriptions,
such as “green,” as projectible?
Why are others, such as “grue,”
non-projectible? Wasn’t the whole
point of Goodman’s puzzle that
both descriptions fit our evidence
equally well?
131
Bayes’s Theorem
^^ One way to defend Goodman’s for a very rare but very deadly
type of solution is to see it disease. Let’s say it’s so rare that
as part of a larger theory of only one in 10,000 people ever
inductive inference. That’s get it. The test for the disease is
the strategy a number of 99 percent reliable. A few days
contemporary philosophers later, you get a call from the
pursue, by suggesting that doctor, saying that you have this
the solution to Goodman’s rare deadly disease. How should
grue problem is just a special you feel about your chances of
application of a rule of inference actually having the disease?
known as Bayes’s theorem,
named for the reverend Thomas ^^ You might think that you have
Bayes, who formulated the a 99 percent chance of having
theorem. the disease. But you’d be wrong.
And this is where Bayes’s
^^ The insight that Bayes captured theorem comes in.
was that when we learn
new information about the ^^ Imagine that we have a random
probability of the occurrence sample of 100,000 people. One
of some event, we often already in 10,000 of those people will
have information about how have the disease, so that means
likely that event is. Bayes’s that 10 will have it and 99,990
theorem presents a precise won’t have it.
mathematical formula for how
to interpret the new information ^^ The test is supposed to be 99
about likelihoods in light percent reliable. For simplicity’s
of the information that we sake, let’s say that means that for
already have. every 100 people who actually
do have the disease, the test only
^^ Suppose that your doctor gets it wrong one time—called
suggested that you get tested a false negative—and that for
132
every 100 people who actually 99-percent-reliable test says you

do not have the disease, the test have it—are actually only 10 out
again only gets it wrong one of 1,010, or about one percent.
time—called a false positive.
^^ This example shows the power
^^ In
other words, one out of 100 of using what we already know
people that the test says doesn’t about the world—called prior
have the disease actually does probability—to interpret any
have it, and one out of 100 new information that we learn.
people that the test says does In this example, the prior
have the disease actually doesn’t probability has to do with just
have it. how very infrequently that
deadly disease occurs. Without
^^ That means that out of our taking the prior probability
sample of 100,000 people, into account, when you get the
the test will say that all 10 of bad news of the test results for
those who do have the disease the disease, you would think
actually do have it. However, that you are almost certainly
it will also—wrongly—say a goner. Actually, though,
that one percent of those who 99 out of 100 people who get
don’t have the disease actually similar bad news go on to live a
do have it. That means it will long life.
falsely diagnose 1,000 people as
having the disease when they ^^ A number of philosophers have
actually don’t have it. suggested that Bayes’s theorem
is the basis for the correct
^^ Let’sput those numbers understanding of how to deal
together. That 99-percent- with Goodman’s grue problem.
reliable test diagnoses 1,010 In fact, many philosophers
people out of 100,000 as having think that by applying the
the rare deadly disease, but only insights that Bayes introduced,
10 of those people actually have we may solve a number of
the disease, so your chances of problems in both epistemology
having the disease—even if that and the philosophy of science.
133
W e’ve seen reasons for thinking that induction

can in fact be a powerful tool for acquiring
new information. This tells us that internalist
philosophers who develop rules for good inferential
practices are making important contributions to our
understanding of induction and how to improve it.
However, we’ve also seen reasons for thinking that,
as with deduction, human beings are just not very
reliable inductive reasoners. This suggests that if
we’re trying to evaluate the structure of human
knowledge, externalism still seems like the best
theory for explaining the contributions of inference
to knowledge.
]]
Skyrms, Choice and Chance.
Stalker, ed., Grue.

]
READINGS
134
Lecture 15 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which of the following is equivalent 4 TRUE OR FALSE
to the claim that all NBA players A solution to Nelson Goodman’s new
are tall? riddle of induction is that “grue” is
a Everyone who is tall is an a time-indexed predicate whereas
NBA player. green is not.
b All non-NBA players are non-tall.
5 According to Bayesian reasoning,
c All non-tall things are non-NBA if a person who is almost always
players. reliable—say 99 percent reliable—
d All of the above. tells you that a one-in-a-million
e None of the above. event occurred, then the chance that
the event actually occurred is which
2 TRUE OR FALSE of the following?
According to Karl Popper, a 99 percent
confirmation is more important than b Greater than 99 percent
disconfirmation.
c Less than 99 percent
3 TRUE OR FALSE
According to Israel Scheffler and
Nelson Goodman, the solution to
Carl Hempel’s paradox relies on
the fact that the existence of a black
raven not only provides evidence for
the claim that all ravens are black
but is also incompatible with the
claim that all ravens are non-black.


135
16
LECTURE 16
Know-How versus
Propositional
Knowledge
I n addition to propositional knowledge, another type of

knowledge is know-how. The objects of know-how are of
a different type than those of propositional knowledge.
Rather than taking as its object a proposition, or the sort
of thing that could serve as the content of a claim, know-
how involves a skill or performance.
136
Lecture 16 Know-How versus Propositional Knowledge
PERFORMATIVE VERSUS
ACQUAINTANCE KNOW-HOW
^^ Consider the following cases: ^^ Carl doesn’t have a mere disposition;
]] Steve is a tennis coach who knows he is actually able reliably to
how to serve a tennis ball over 120 distinguish male from female chicks.
miles per hour, though he is unable
^^ Inboth cases, we attribute the
to do so that fast himself.
disposition or ability to the people
]] Carl knows how to tell the sex of
performing the actions—to Steve
baby chicks, though he does not
or Carl.
know how he knows.
^^ Recallthat when discussing self-
^^ Each of these is a case in which we
knowledge, we distinguished between
naturally say that Steve or Carl
computations or inferences that
possesses know-how. They each differ
you perform and computations or
in a variety of ways, but there are
inferences that your brain performs,
also a number of similarities—two of
without any awareness or intention
which are particularly significant.
on your part. That distinction applies
again here. Neither of these cases
^^ First,
both cases involve a reliable
involves mere actions of Steve’s or
disposition or ability on the part of
Carl’s bodily organs or muscles.
Steve and Carl. Here, a disposition
is simply a tendency to act, speak, or
^^ Inaddition to these similarities
believe as long as certain conditions
among the example cases, there
are met; this is important because a
are some important differences. In
person may have certain dispositions
particular, while Carl’s knowledge
that never become apparent.
of how to sort baby chicks involves a
reliable ability to sort those chicks,
^^ This explains the case of Steve.
Steve’s knowledge of how to serve a
Although he cannot serve the ball
tennis ball more than 120 miles per
over 120 miles per hour himself, his
hour does not involve a reliable ability
knowledge of how to serve the ball
to serve a ball that fast. While Steve
that fast manifests itself, for example,
can recognize the mechanics needed
in his disposition to tell his tennis
to achieve that velocity on serve and
students how to alter their serve
can tell his students how to achieve
mechanics so that they can improve
those mechanics, he isn’t able to
their service speed.
replicate the mechanics himself.
137
^^ Todistinguish Carl’s know-how from ^^ Insome cases, people can have both
Steve’s, we can say that Carl has performative and acquaintance
performative know-how. know-how. In fact, in some cases, it
would probably be correct to explain
^^ There is a second major difference someone’s performative know-how
between Steve’s know-how and in terms of their acquaintance
Carl’s. It seems plausible to explain know-how. But it’s also possible for
know-how like Steve’s in terms of a somebody to have performative know-
reliable recognitional ability. When how without having acquaintance
he perceives different mechanics of know-how. In fact, Carl is an example
serving, he is reliably able to say which of that. Although some part of Carl’s
will result in a serve of at least 120 brain performs calculations based
miles per hour. When we discussed on a certain way the chicks appear,
different kinds of knowledge, we Carl himself is not acquainted with
characterized this type of ability to any particular way of distinguishing
recognize something in perception between male and female chicks. He
as acquaintance knowledge. For this just knows that he’s good at it.
reason, we can say that Steve has
acquaintance know-how.
KNOWLEDGE-HOW VERSUS KNOWLEDGE-THAT

^^ There is some parallel between the knowledge in a way that is helpful to
performative sense of knowledge-how the players he coaches.
and the externalist, reliabilist view of
knowledge-that. Carl, for example, is ^^ Relatedly, internalism about
reliable at distinguishing male from knowledge-that supports the idea that
female baby chicks, without knowing the justifications of our knowledge
how he’s able to be so reliable. are the sorts of things we’re often
aware of. Because we’re aware
^^ Analogously, there are some parallels of our justifications, we can not
between the acquaintance sense only verbalize them and transmit
of know-how and internalist views our knowledge to others but also
of knowledge-that. Steve’s know- explain to them the reasons for
how is closely tied to his having our knowledge.
a representation of the kind of
mechanics necessary to serve a ^^ Britishphilosopher Gilbert Ryle
tennis ball over 120 miles per hour. was the first to argue explicitly for
And Steve is able to verbalize his the claim that know-how is a form
138
of knowledge utterly distinct from

factual or propositional knowledge—
knowledge-that. He suggests that
there’s a threat of infinite regress if
we think all knowledge is knowledge-
T he expression
“the ghost in the
machine” is one of
that, or propositional knowledge.
Because that would be bad, Ryle Ryle’s colorful ways of
thinks we’re forced to acknowledge dismissing the idea of
that there’s another type of
internal, unobservable
knowledge that is different in kind
from knowledge-that. He thinks mental states.
this different type of knowledge is
knowledge-how.
I n his book The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues that

knowledge-how is a form of knowledge utterly
distinct from knowledge-that:
To put it quite generally, the absurd assumption

made by the intellectualist legend [i.e., the idea
that all knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-
that] is this, that a performance of any sort
inherits all its title to intelligence from some
anterior internal operation of planning what to
do. … By the original argument, therefore, our
intellectual planning process must inherit its
title to shrewdness from yet another interior
process of planning to plan, and this process
could in its turn be [analyzed with respect to its
shrewdness]. The regress is infinite.
139
^^ Inour discussion of Steve and Carl, that they know. Contemplating a

we saw a number of independent proposition, however, is itself an
reasons for thinking that at least action. And now we’re trapped in the
one sense of knowledge-how, the beginning of the regress.
performative sense, is not a form of
knowledge-that. This would seem to ^^ Stanley and Williamson object to
provide some support for Ryle’s claim. Ryle’s argument. To do so, they
appeal to an earlier reply to Ryle
^^ An influential challenge to Ryle was given by philosopher Carl Ginet in
published in the Journal of Philosophy his book Knowledge, Perception, and
in 2001 by philosophers Jason Stanley Memory. They argue that Ryle is
and Timothy Williamson, who making a mistake if he’s suggesting
read Ryle as trying to show that the that whenever anyone employs
assumption “all knowledge-how is propositional knowledge they’re
really just propositional knowledge” also performing the distinct action
leads to a contradiction. Ryle does of contemplating the proposition
this by suggesting, first, that if you that they know. Why think that
perform some action intentionally, contemplating a proposition is itself a
then you’re employing knowledge- distinct and separate action?
how to perform that action. From
there, he suggests that if you employ ^^ That does indeed seem plausible.
some of your knowledge-that, or And the only way Ryle can dispute
propositional knowledge, it means Ginet’s argument, Stanley and
that you must be contemplating the Williamson suggest, is by interpreting
proposition that you know. the contemplation of propositions as a
nonintentional—or otherwise deflated
^^ Here, according to Stanley and sense—of action. But the whole point
Williamson, is how Ryle thinks the of Stanley and Williamson’s reading
problematic regress gets started. of Ryle’s argument requires that the
According to this reading of Ryle, actions we’re looking at be intentional
everyone who performs some action actions. Without that, the regress
intentionally is employing knowledge- won’t get off the ground.
how. And if the “intellectualist
legend” is true, this means that by ^^ Inother words, according to Stanley
employing knowledge-how, they’re and Williamson, Ryle needs two
actually employing knowledge-that. fundamental claims to make his
infinite regress argument against the
^^ Everyone who employs knowledge- intellectualist legend: Ryle needs it to
that, according to this reading of Ryle, be the case that when you contemplate
must contemplate the proposition a proposition, you’re performing an
140
action, and he needs it to be the case ^^ If

Stanley and Williamson are reading
that it should count as an intentional Ryle correctly, then it seems that Ryle’s
action. But those two things together, argument rests on a mistake. The
according to Stanley and Williamson, regress that Ryle tries to use against
just aren’t plausible. So, it seems that what he calls the “intellectualist
Ryle’s argument just won’t work. legend” can’t even get started.
UNDERSTANDING RYLE’S ARGUMENT

^^ Stanley and Williamson take Ryle to action, but you don’t yet know how
be talking about intentional actions. to do it. That’s the only way you can
But in the passage, Ryle never uses acquire know-how in the first place.
the words “intend,” “intention,” or
“intentional.” Instead, he talks about ^^ Here’show we ought to understand
“intelligent” actions. Ryle’s argument.
^^ Stanley and Williamson do Ryle a ^^ First,we should characterize the

disservice by taking his argument “intellectualist legend” that Ryle is
to be dealing with all intentional attempting to criticize. According
actions, more broadly. Rather, Ryle to the “intellectualist legend,”
is focusing on the narrower category all knowledge-how is a type of
that he refers to as “intelligent.” knowledge-that. The intellectualist
presumes that whenever you perform
^^ In the context of his discussion, Ryle an action on the basis of your
is using the term “intelligent” to knowledge-how, there is a certain way
characterize the actions that display you have for performing that action—
knowledge-how. This also makes let’s call that your method. With that
more sense. Stanley and Williamson’s assumption, we can characterize
version of Ryle’s argument relied the “legend” as the thesis of
on the claim that every intentional intellectualism, like this:
action involves knowledge-how. But
that’s just not a plausible claim. bbIntellectualism says that know-how
^^ Here’s
involves guiding your performance
why it’s not plausible to think
that every action that you intend on the basis of your knowledge of
involves know-how. When you’re a proposition. The proposition you
learning how to perform some action know is that your method is a way to
skillfully, you intend to perform the
perform the action.
141
^^ The argument then seems to run ^^ It

also doesn’t seem that the
as follows: intellectualist can reject the thesis
1 If your action is a knowledgeable of intellectualism, because the
one, then you perform that intellectualist will need that thesis to
action on the basis of your rule out the types of cases, like Carl,
knowledge-how. that motivated us to introduce the
performative sense of knowledge-how
2 Intellectualism is true.
in the beginning of the lecture.
3 So, then you must have a method
on which your performance of ^^ This is because for the intellectualist
the action is based, and you must view of knowledge-how to work,
guide your performance on the intellectualists would have to claim
basis of your knowledge of the that the only sort of knowledge-how
fact that your method is a way to is captured by the acquaintance sense
perform the action. of knowledge-how. Then, they could
4 If you guide your performance say this: When you perform an action
on the basis of your propositional on the basis of know-how, it’s because
knowledge, then that guidance you’re acquainted with a method for
itself must be knowledgeable. performing that action and you know
that the method you’re acquainted
^^ But now we have to apply the with is a way to reliably perform the
intellectualism thesis again, to the action. That’s just what it means to
fourth premise, and so on. That looks say that knowledge-how is a species
like an infinite regress. of knowledge-that, or propositional
knowledge. And in fact, that’s exactly
^^ This version of Ryle’s argument Stanley and Williamson’s view.
does not rest on any independently
implausible theses concerning what ^^ That’swhy it looks like the opponents
is involved in employing knowledge- of Ryle’s position would have to
that, or propositional knowledge. In accept the intellectualism thesis—and
fact, it seems to employ only claims the second step of the argument.
that a defender of the intellectualist
legend would accept. ^^ The next step of the argument we
have to consider is the fourth claim.
^^ The intellectualist would not object to Why think that your guidance of
the first claim. All it does is capture the your performance also has to be
difference between action on the basis knowledgeable? The reason is that
of knowledge-how—i.e., knowledgeable there has to be a connection between
action—and action that accidentally the acquaintance knowledge you have
achieves the desired result. and your performance of the action.
142
Otherwise, you wouldn’t actually be that Ryle’s infinite regress argument

performing the action on the basis of is a strong one after all. And this
your knowledge-how. means that there is a type of know-
how, such as the procedural know-
^^ We’vecovered all of the steps in the how possessed by Carl, that isn’t a
argument that the intellectualist form of propositional knowledge.
could possibly try to criticize. It seems
A s with our discussions of externalism, the

discussion of the performative sense of know-
how suggests that it would be a mistake to place
too much emphasis on the role of our internal
mental states in knowledge.
]]
Bengson and Moffett, eds., Knowing How.
Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests.

]
READINGS
143
Lecture 16 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 H. M. had no long-term memory 3 TRUE OR FALSE
but was taught the mirror-drawing According to Jason Stanley and
skill. H. M. doesn’t know that he Timothy Williamson, the root of
has that skill and doesn’t remember the problem with Gilbert Ryle’s
learning the skill. Plausibly, we can argument against the equivalence of
describe his know-how as which of knowledge-how and knowledge-that
the following? is that Ryle mischaracterizes the
a Acquaintance know-how nature of intentional action.
b Performative know-how
4 According to a more charitable
reading of Ryle’s argument, which
2 Suppose that you are a golf coach
of the following is not true of that
who knows a great deal about
argument?
golfing mechanics, but because of
nerve damage, you are no longer a It suggests that we must
able to hold a golf club. Your ability distinguish knowledge-how from
to instruct your students on putting knowledge-that to avoid a vicious
technique can plausibly be described infinite regress.
as which of the following? b It suggests that intelligent action
a Acquaintance know-how involves knowledge.
b Performative know-how c It suggests that all actions are
intentional actions.


144
17
LECTURE 17
Knowledge Derived
from Testimony
M o st of the discussions in this course so far have

centered around individualistic sources of
knowledge; in other words, the sources have
involved skills or abilities that you could exercise
in solitude. However, much of what you know was
gained by means of consulting others’ expertise.
In philosophy, the process of acquiring information
through language-based communication with
others is called testimony. Consider all of the ways
in which testimony is woven into the fabric of our
knowledge, from large-scale science and team-
based medical research to investigative reporting—
any of which would be unthinkable without relying
on information derived from testimony.
145
Lecture 17 Knowledge Derived from Testimony
NON-PRESUMPTIVISM
^^ Suppose we grant that testimony is ^^ This may seem surprising, given
an extremely important source of that the last time we encountered
knowledge. We’re then faced with the Hume he was arguing that inductive
question of how the beliefs we form reasoning never provides us with
on the basis of testimony achieve the actual reasons for our beliefs.
level of knowledge. Someone tells you However, when it comes to testimony,
something, or you read something, Hume suggests that the evidence we
and you believe it. Is that enough derive from testimony is simply a
to count as knowledge if what you form of inductive inference.
believe turns out to be true? How
does that work? ^^ Suppose you receive testimony from
Tim. Hume thinks that you ought to
^^ Oneexplanation was given by reason according to something like
David Hume: the following basic structure:
bb[A]s the evidence, derived from 1 Tim, who has certain attributes
that are relevant to you taking
witnesses and human testimony, him seriously in this kind of
situation, gives you some piece of
is founded on past experience,
information.
so it varies with the experience,
2 Generally, when speakers who are
and is regarded either as a proof similar to Tim—and in similar
or a probability, according as the types of situations—give you some
conjunction between any particular piece of information, their reports
are reliable.
kind of report and any kind of
3 Thus, (probably) the information
object has been found to be constant
Tim has given you is likely true.
or variable.
^^ Inother words, it is not enough

simply to be told something or to
read something in order to have
good evidence. Instead, if you believe
something on the basis of someone’s
testimony, you have to support your
belief on the basis of an argument.
146
S ay you’re a detective and you’re trying to gather

information about the location of a suspect at the
time a crime occurred. You ask the suspect’s secretary,
who doesn’t particularly like the suspect and who has
no knowledge of when the crime occurred, and she
gives you information about the suspect’s activities,
from which you gather that the suspect was nowhere
near the location of the crime at the time the crime
occurred.
In this case, the relevant attributes of the testifier
include her lack of motivation to lie to give an alibi to
the suspect as well as her lack of knowledge about
the time for which the suspect would need an alibi. In
a situation like this one, you can reasonably assume
that the secretary is telling the truth and conclude that
the suspect probably has a strong alibi for the time in
question.
When you consider examples like this, Hume’s view
about testimony sounds pretty strong.
^^ Because Hume requires that you truth; you have to have positive
have positive reasons, in the form reasons for accepting someone’s
of an argument, for accepting that testimony if you’re going to rely
testimony as evidence for knowledge, on that testimony as evidence for
we can call his view inferentialist knowledge.
non-presumptivism. It’s inferentialist
because you need to support your ^^ Even though Hume’s view is one of
acceptance of testimony by means the most popular positions historically
of an inductive inference. And it’s about the nature of evidence that
non-presumptivist because testimony testimony provides for knowledge, it’s
doesn’t enjoy any presumption of not the only influential theory.
147
^^ Pretty soon after Hume proposed most experienced people would be

the theory, other philosophers noted the most trusting of testimony. As
problems with it. One of the strongest Reid notes, however, this is not the
critics of Hume’s inferentialism was case. Children are quite willing to
philosopher Thomas Reid, who raised accept the testimony of the people
a number of criticisms of Hume’s around them.
theory of testimony—of which we will
focus on two. ^^ Reid defends a rival theory about the
]] Reid criticizes Hume for getting the way that testimony provides support
phenomenology of believing on the for knowledge. Unfortunately, it is
basis of testimony wrong. Normally, not entirely clear what theory Reid
when someone tells you something advances to replace Hume’s. We’ll
and you don’t have a particular consider two options.
reason not to believe the person,
^^ Both rival theories to Hume share
then you just do believe them,
without rehearsing any sort of one big similarity: They assert that,
argument in support of your belief. at least sometimes, you can know
something on the basis of someone’s
]] Reid asks us to consider how
testimony even if you aren’t aware
children learn from the people
of any positive reasons in support of
around them and suggests that
your belief of that person’s testimony.
children aren’t capable of using
In other words, they reject Hume’s
inductive inference to support
requirement that you can’t know
their reliance on other people’s
something on the basis of testimony
testimony. Not only do they lack
unless you rehearse positive reasons
the reasoning skills, but they also
for accepting that testimony.
lack the experience needed to have
a basis for an inductive argument.
^^ Where the two challengers to Hume
If Hume were correct, Reid says,
differ, however, is in their explanation
you would expect children to be
for why they reject Hume’s positive
the most mistrustful of testimony,
reasons requirement.
while the most knowledgeable,
EXTERNALISM
^^ One motivation for rejecting Hume’s of testimony would allow that if
positive reasons requirement comes you are in circumstances in which
from externalism. An externalist the testimony you’re receiving is a
theory of knowledge on the basis reliable source of information, you can
148
acquire knowledge on the basis of that

testimony as long as the reason you
believe it is that your acceptance of the I n our discussions of
perception and memory,
we’ve seen that externalists
testimony involves a reliable method.
allow for the possibility
^^ Most externalist theories of that we might not know
testimonial knowledge think that when our perceptual
the phrase “your acceptance of the abilities are reliable but
testimony involves a reliable method” that we can still know
involves at least two components. information we acquire
using those abilities.
]] You can’t have any positive reason
to question the circumstances or For the sort of externalist
the speakers. If you’re in a used car theories we’ve been
showroom and you know that the considering, it is enough
salesperson earns most of his or her that the methods we use to
money from commissions, then you acquire information are in
shouldn’t automatically trust the fact reliable. Those theories
salesperson when he or she says the don’t require that we also
car you’re interested in has never have good evidence that
been in any major accidents. they are reliable.
]] You also have some set of
unconscious abilities that monitor
the trustworthiness or honesty of consciously aware of but that are
your sources of information. In supposed to alert you if your brain
face-to-face communication, this is triggered by anything suspicious.
would include signals the speaker Let’s call this the unconscious
gives off that you might not even be monitoring requirement.
O ur culture is full of evidence that many of

us at least intuitively accept the idea of an
unconscious monitoring requirement. For example,
you might read an interview with a policeman who
caught a serial killer during a routine traffic stop
and perhaps the policeman says, “Something just
seemed off about the guy when I stopped him.”
149
^^ An advantage of the externalist testimony. In contrast, the externalist

take on testimony is that it can treat theory only requires that someone’s
testimony as completely on par with testimony actually is a reliable source
perception or memory. As with those of information if you are going to rely
sources of knowledge, we are not on that testimony.
always aware when we are reliable or
what the mechanism is that ensures ^^ However, like Hume, the externalist
we are reliable. What is important in also thinks you have to be sensitive to
all cases, for the externalist, is the fact relevant features of the testimony that
that we are reliable. serve as indicators of its reliability.
It’s just that the externalist thinks
^^ Hume’s non-presumptivist that you can be sensitive to these
inferentialist theory differs from features unconsciously and that you
externalism, then, in one very don’t have to use them to formulate
important respect: It requires you to an explicit argument in support of
have a positive argument in support your acceptance of a given piece
of your acceptance of someone’s of testimony.
PRESUMPTIVISM
^^ Another rival view agrees with ^^ Presumptivism doesn’t seem to have
the externalist in rejecting Hume’s anything to do with knowledge. In
positive reasons requirement but order for a source of information
goes even further by also rejecting to be a source of knowledge, it
the externalist requirement of should reliably provide you with
unconscious monitoring of testimony accurate information. Hume’s
for indicators of reliability. Let’s call theory of testimony accounts for
this view presumptivism, because this by requiring you to give an
the various versions of the view all explicit argument that the testimony
involve a presumptive right to accept you’re receiving is reliably tied
someone’s testimony. to the truth. And externalism
accounts for this by requiring that
^^ These views hold that whenever you the testimony in fact be reliably
receive a piece of testimony, you accurate. But presumptivism doesn’t
have the right to assume, without seem to do anything to account
rehearsing positive evidence, that for the fact that we need sources of
what the testimony says is true, knowledge to be reliable sources of
unless you have specific evidence that accurate information.
overrides that presumption.
150
^^ The standard strategy for defending ^^ While there doesn’t seem to be a

presumptivism is to argue that good reason to accept presumptivism,
anything more than presumptivism there are good reasons to reject it.
would actually be requiring too much In particular, it doesn’t do enough to
and would make knowledge from ensure that the testimony we rely on
testimony too hard to come by. will actually be accurate enough to
support knowledge.
^^ One version of this defense of
presumptivism argues simply that ^^ Although Hume’s inferentialism does
presumptivism is the only explanation better than presumptivism in this
available for how we gain knowledge regard, there are some good reasons
through testimony. Another version not to accept it. In particular, it doesn’t
argues in particular that without do a good job of accounting for how
accepting presumptivism, we would we seem to deal with other people’s
have no explanation for how we testimony or of explaining how little
communicate with others using children learn from testimony.
language. Because language is
required to gain knowledge from ^^ That leaves us with externalism. Like
testimony, however, this version presumptivism, it doesn’t require that
is also ultimately arguing that the we give an argument in support of
only explanation for how we gain our acceptance of testimony, but like
knowledge from testimony requires Hume’s non-presumptivism, it does
that we accept presumptivism. require that we have some way to
ensure that the testimony we rely on
will be reliably accurate.
]]
Coady, Testimony.
Lackey and Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of Testimony.

]
READINGS
151
Lecture 17 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 David Hume’s insistence that you 3 If Thomas Reid thought that
can only have knowledge through you can have knowledge through
testimony if you support your testimony only if you rely on—
reliance on that testimony on perhaps unconscious—faculties that
the basis of an argument that the assess that testimony for accuracy,
testimony is accurate is an example then that would be an example of
of which of the following? which of the following?
a Inferentialist non-presumptivism a Inferentialist non-presumptivism
b Presumptivism b Presumptivism
c Externalism c Externalism
2 If Thomas Reid thought that 4 Which of the following is not a

you can have knowledge through reason for doubting inferentialist
testimony so long as the testimony non-presumptivism?
is accurate and you didn’t have any a Very young children can acquire
reason to doubt that testimony, then knowledge through testimony.
that would be an example of which
b It often seems as if we accept
of the following?
testimony without rehearsing
a Inferentialist non-presumptivism an argument in support of that
b Presumptivism acceptance.
c Externalism c David Hume didn’t think that
inductive arguments provide us
with reasons for belief.


152
18
LECTURE 18
Social Psychology and
Source Monitoring
I n the previous lecture, we discovered that neither

presumptivism nor Hume’s non-presumptivism was very
promising as a theory of how we acquire knowledge through
our belief in testimony. It looked like externalism’s notion of
unconscious monitoring offered the best of both worlds: It
allowed us to avoid having to follow Hume and require an
explicit argument in support of testimony, something that
didn’t seem very plausible, and it also allowed us to avoid
having to follow the presumptivist and advocate what looked
like excessive gullibility, something that didn’t seem very
plausible either. However, the unconscious monitoring relied
on by the externalist theory won’t work either. There is a
great deal of evidence that we try to look out for signs that
the testimony we rely on is accurate—in fact, few results in
social psychology are better supported—but we’re just not
very good at monitoring for signs that the testimony we rely
on is accurate.
153
Lecture 18 Social Psychology and Source Monitoring
MONITORING FOR SINCERITY AND DECEPTIVENESS

^^ More than 50 years of research has the area wasn’t an area of his
established that humans are quite expertise. The other actor was told
unreliable at responding to indicators to admit that the area wasn’t one
of trustworthiness or deceit. In fact, in which he was an expert and,
most people would do just as well in front of the patient, consult a
to guess or flip a coin to determine reputed textbook on the subject.
whether someone is lying or being Patients preferred the blithely
truthful. confident “doctor” to the one who
admitted his lack of expertise but
^^ Onereason why we’re so unreliable who cited the appropriate source in
at detecting truthfulness has to do the presence of the patient.
with the signs that we look for when
we’re judging whether someone is ^^ So much for trustworthiness. Perhaps,
sincere. Some of those signs include however, our unconscious monitoring
maintaining good eye contact, not is directed more at warning us when
smiling or laughing too much, and someone is being deceptive rather
projecting confidence—all of which than at reassuring us when someone
we rely on. The problem is that none is being sincere. Is that a promising
of those signs are actually reliable route to defending our unconscious
indicators of sincerity. monitoring abilities?
]] Repeated research since the early
^^ Unfortunately, decades of empirical
1980s has demonstrated that people
who are attempting to deceive you research provide no empirical support
actually sustain eye contact better for the notion that subjects are
than people who are being sincere. reliable at detecting deception. Here
is how two of the most prominent
]] Research has also shown that when
researchers in the field, Paul Ekman
it comes to keeping a straight face,
and Maureen O’Sullivan, put it:
people who are being deceptive
don’t have more nervous smiles
than truth tellers. If anything, liars
bbIn every study reported, people have
smile somewhat less often. not been very accurate in judging
]] In one of the most surprising when someone is lying. … Average
studies of confidence, patients were accuracy in detecting deceit has
asked to interact with doctors—
rarely been above 60% (with chance
actually, actors playing doctors.
One actor was told to act blithely being 50%), and some groups have
confident, despite admitting that done worse than chance.
154
^^ Even people whose careers—if not about the person’s demeanor and
their lives—depend on their ability so on, he or she is also getting more
to detect deceptiveness are not familiar with you and more able to
overall particularly reliable at it. tailor his or her way of communicating
Research conducted on customs to your particular personality.
officials, federal law enforcement
officers, and police officers suggested ^^ Two of the most prominent
that their overall reliability was so researchers on deception detection,
disappointing that, as one team David Buller and Judee Burgoon, have
of researchers concluded, “it is suggested that “deceivers in interactive
unlikely that judging deception from contexts should display increasing
demeanor will ever be sufficiently immediacy and involvement,
accurate to be admissible in the pleasantness, composure, fluency, and
courtroom” and “most of us would smooth turn taking over the course of
do well to entertain some skepticism the interaction.”
about our ability to detect deception
from demeanor.” ^^ And in fact, this is what studies seem
to suggest. For example, a study
^^ Maybe the problem is that the research conducted by Steven McCornack and
so far has had to do with people Malcolm Parks in the 1980s examined
trying to detect deceptive behavior in partners in intimate relationships.
strangers. Maybe at least we get better Though the partners actually had
at detecting deception in people we greater confidence in their ability to
know. Here’s the problem with that detect deception, they were in fact
line of thought: Just as you get more worse at detecting deception in their
familiar with someone and know more partners than in others.
MONITORING FOR COMPETENCE

^^ Although we can’t monitor for very good either. Consider a study
sincerity or deceptiveness, what conducted in the 1970s by Donald
about monitoring for competence? Naftulin and his colleagues, who
Surely we’re better at recognizing gave the name Dr. Myron L. Fox
when the people we’re speaking with to a television actor to pose as an
actually know what they’re talking authority on the application of
about, right? mathematics to human behavior. The
actor was then coached to present
^^ Unfortunately,the news about an hour-long talk on “Mathematical
monitoring for competence isn’t Game Theory as Applied to Physician
155
Education,” full of nonsense, ^^ Some of the terms used in their

made-up terms, bad reasoning, feedback included “articulate,”
and contradictions. Naftulin and “knowledgeable,” “good analysis
his associates then examined the of subject that has been personally
responses to that talk from three studied before,” “lively examples,”
separate groups. “excellent presentation,” “enjoyed
]] The first group was composed of listening,” and “too intellectual a
psychiatrists, psychologists, and presentation.”
social-worker educators attending a
^^ Naftulinand his colleagues
conference for educators of health
professionals. They attended the reference Neil Postman and Charles
talk and then had a half-hour Weingartner’s claim in their book
discussion period during which Teaching as a Subversive Activity that
they had an opportunity to question
“Dr. Fox” further. bbit is the sign of a competent crap
]] The second group consisted detector that he is not completely
of mental health educators— captivated by the arbitrary
psychiatrists, psychologists, and
abstractions of the community in
psychiatric social workers. The
second group, however, merely which he happened to grow up [when
viewed the lecture and the they conclude that] the three groups of
discussion period on videotape. learners in this study, all of whom had
]] The third group was made up grown up in the academic community
of educators and administrators
and were experienced educators,
taking a graduate-level education
course. That group also viewed the obviously failed as “competent crap
lecture and discussion on videotape. detectors” and were seduced by
the style of Dr. Fox’s presentation.
^^ Inall of the groups, a vast majority
Considering the educational
of participants responded positively
to the following questions about sophistication of the subjects, it is
“Dr. Fox” and his lecture: striking that none of them detected the
]] Did he use enough examples to lecture for what it was.
clarify his material?
]] Did he present his material in a
^^ The problem is that it is taxing to
well-organized form?
think too carefully about whether
]] Did he stimulate your thinking?
someone is competent. It is easier
]] Did he put his material across in an to rely on superficial signs of
interesting way?
156
competence—such as whether testimony itself was exactly the same

Myron L. Fox is called “doctor,” jargon-filled nonsense.
is dressed professionally, or seems
competent. Noted social psychologist ^^ Surprisingly,when the witness was
Robert Cialdini calls this the “click, introduced as having outstanding
whirr mode” of reacting. credentials, the jury found him almost
twice as persuasive when he presented
^^ Examples of the “click, whirr mode” his argument incomprehensibly than
abound. For example, in a 1996 when he presented the same testimony
study, Joel Cooper and his colleagues using terms that the layperson could
had a mock trial jury listen to one follow. In other words, the jury found
of two expert witnesses. The first the expert much more convincing
expert witness, who was introduced when they had no idea what he was
as having outstanding credentials, talking about!
gave a jargon-filled, incomprehensible
testimony. The other expert witness ^^ The way Cooper and his colleagues
gave exactly the same testimony made sense of this was that the
but was introduced as having shaky members of the mock trial jury
credentials. The mock trial jury actually preferred using the easier
was much more likely to believe the “click, whirr mode” of just deferring
testimony given by the expert witness to the supposed expert’s competence
introduced as having the outstanding than evaluating his arguments on
credentials—even though the their merits.
N one of this should make us very optimistic that

we’re generally all that reliable at unconsciously
monitoring competence, either. So, in other words, we’re
three for three: bad at monitoring for sincerity, bad at
monitoring for deceptiveness, and bad at monitoring for
competence.
]]
Gelfert, A Critical Introduction to Testimony.
Shieber, Testimony.
]
READINGS
157
Lecture 18 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 4 Because of their reliance on what
Evidence from psychologist Robert Cialdini calls the “click,
G. Stanley Hall suggests that Laura whirr mode,” jurors have shown that
Bridgman was not capable of the they prefer expert testimony from
sort of monitoring of testifiers that which of the following?
externalism requires. a Arguments that the jurors
themselves can follow given by
2 The case of Laura Bridgman experts with poor credentials
provides the most problems for
b Jargon-filled, incomprehensible
which of the following?
arguments given by experts with
a Inferentialist non-presumptivism poor credentials
b Presumptivism c Arguments that the jurors
c Externalism themselves can follow given
by experts with impressive
3 TRUE OR FALSE credentials
If you pay attention to signals like d Jargon-filled, incomprehensible
eye contact and demeanor, you can arguments given by experts with
tell when someone is lying. impressive credentials


158
19
LECTURE 19
Testimony through
Social Networks
T h e previous two lectures have examined the three most

prominent theories of how we can support our knowledge
on the basis of the evidence we get from the testimony
of other people: presumptivism, non-presumptivism, and
externalism. But none of these theories seems adequate.
There is an alternative picture that offers a new solution.
Like externalism and presumptivism, this new solution
rejects Hume’s requirement that we support our belief
in testimony on the basis of an explicit argument. Like
externalism and Hume’s non-presumptivism, this solution
also suggests there is an important insight in requiring
that there be a mechanism to ensure that the testimony
we’re relying on is reliably accurate. Unlike externalism,
however, this new solution doesn’t require that we base
that assurance on any of the unreliable mechanisms social
psychologists suggest we employ when we try to monitor
testimony for signs of accuracy.
159
Lecture 19 Testimony through Social Networks
DUNBAR’S NUMBER
^^ One of the most famous numbers in for tracking complex information, the
social science is Dunbar’s number, neocortex.
named after anthropologist and
evolutionary psychologist Robin ^^ From his grooming data, Dunbar
Dunbar, who first proposed it in the figured out the average social group
1990s. As a researcher working with sizes for the primate species he was
nonhuman primates, he was curious studying. From there, he hypothesized
about why the primates he was that the number of group members
studying spent so much of their time an average primate of that species
and effort grooming each other. would have in its social group could
be predicted based on the ratio of the
^^ Inthe 1980s, the view that came to be volume of the neocortex to the total
known as the social brain hypothesis brain volume of that species.
was starting to gain attention in
primate studies. According to ^^ Butwhat sparked widespread
this hypothesis, we can explain interest in Dunbar’s work was that he
the comparatively large size of extrapolated his results to humans.
primate brains because of the social Building on the ratio that he had
complexity of the groups they live in. established and based on the size of
an average human brain, Dunbar
^^ Dunbar’s idea was to link the size predicted that the number of people
of a primate’s social group—which that the average human has in his
he defined in terms of its grooming or her casual social group is around
behavior—and the size of the part of 150—the most famous of a series of
the primate brain that is responsible Dunbar’s numbers.
160
^^ Dunbar suggested that we each have need—and then about 50 people who
different-sized social groups relating are our friends but not ones we would
to each other by a precise formula think to call in an emergency.
that we can approximate with a rule
of three. As we consider the people ^^ The midpoint of those more intimate
we have more distant connections and more distant social relations is
with, we each have about 500 the Dunbar number that most people
acquaintances and up to about 1,500 know: 150. Dunbar found that you
people that we can recognize by face. didn’t have the same 5, or 15, or 50
people in those different social groups
^^ Atthe other extreme, we’re most but that the people who make up
closely connected to about 5 people— the groups can change over time.
our closest friends or family—then However, the number of people in
15 people—the ones that we would the different groups stays roughly
confide in or turn to in a time of the same.
Y ears of research have confirmed the validity of

Dunbar’s numbers.
For example, armies throughout history have been
organized roughly along the lines predicted by
Dunbar’s research. The smallest units tend to be
between 10 and 15 people, with larger organizational
units ranging up to companies of around 150
soldiers and up to battalions or regiments of
between 500 and 1,000 personnel.
^^ Two of the scholars who have done effects that social networks can have
the most to popularize the study on us, from our health to our political
of how the structure of our social affiliations to our success in finding
networks influence different aspects work. One of those effects is how we
of our lives are Nicholas Christakis can gain information through our
and James Fowler. In their book social connections.
Connected, they trace a number of
161
WEAK TIES
^^ Sociology professor Mark so on. The problem with this is that
Granovetter has emphasized the if we only pass information to those
importance of so-called weak ties, we’re closely connected with—our
which are our connections to the strong ties—the information would
friends of our friends, or even to our never travel very far.
friends’ friends’ friends.
^^ And this is where the power of weak
^^ Asimplistic picture of influence ties comes in. In an example from
would be to think of the spread of Christakis and Fowler’s Connected,
information between people like a almost 40 percent of a piano
bucket brigade. You pass information teacher’s recommendations weren’t
to your friend, who passes from direct acquaintances but from
information to his or her friend, and acquaintances three degrees removed.
NETWORK EFFECTS
^^ Not all social networks select the Matthew Salganik and Peter Dodds,
best ideas. Instead, the makeup of a in the mid-2000s suggest that, at the
social network and which components very least, structures of social networks
of that network have influence can make a difference as to the quality of
affect which ideas come out on top in the information that you draw from
that network. those networks. In particular, they
demonstrate that popularity on a
^^ This might seem surprising. Many network matters: Small differences in
people seem to have two intuitions the popularity of an idea can make
that work against the idea that a big difference with respect to the
different social networks can propel spread of that idea, and that difference
different ideas to the top: that quality can’t be explained through appeal to
always wins out in the end and that the intrinsic quality of the idea itself.
people will choose the best option
regardless of other people’s opinions. ^^ Thissuggests that the structure of a
It turns out, however, that both of social network is not irrelevant when
these intuitions are wrong. analyzing the ideas that become
popular on that social network.
^^ Results
of a study done by sociologist Furthermore, we can also use different
Duncan Watts and his collaborators, measures for distinguishing between
162
good and bad ideas. Given our interest too large for you to keep track,
in knowledge, one obvious measure in a very systematic or reliable
that we could use to distinguish way, of how accurate each of
between ideas would be in terms of those 150 people is with respect
how true or accurate they are. to all of the information he or she
passes along. The “too complex”
^^ Taken altogether, this means that part of the claim comes from
popularity on a social network is not the importance of weak ties. It’s
a guarantee of how true or accurate hard enough to keep track of
that idea is. Different social network your casual acquaintances. But
structures, in particular, can differ it’s not possible for you to keep
with respect to how well they do in track of the casual acquaintances
making the true ideas popular and of your casual acquaintances’
ensuring that the popular ideas in casual acquaintances—though it’s
the social network are also true and these acquaintances that explain
accurate. In other words, if you’re your weak ties. And given the
lucky enough to be in a social network importance of weak ties, these are
in which the successful ideas are also the acquaintances that make a
true, then you’ll end up endorsing difference with respect to the sort
many true ideas, but if you’re unlucky of information that your social
and find yourself in a social network network gives you.
in which the successful ideas aren’t all ]] The structure of our social networks
that reliably accurate, then you’ll end can contribute to our acquiring
up with a lot of misinformation. reliably accurate information just
because of our embeddedness in
^^ From the components of Dunbar’s those networks. The first reason
number, weak ties, and network is due, again, to Christakis and
effects, two big conclusions can be Fowler’s discussion of weak social
drawn about how we actually gain ties. According to them, a large
information from testimony. amount of your information will
]] The social groups in which we’re be from people with whom you
embedded are often too large and have no direct connection, not even
complex for us to keep track of casually. If you’re lucky enough,
the individual reliability of each however, to have a network such
of the members of those social that even those with whom you’re
groups. The “too large” part of only connected through weak ties
this claim is derived from the are reliably accurate informants,
discussion of Dunbar’s number. then you’ll gain a lot of reliably
Even if you focus on the most accurate information, just by
widely cited number—150—that’s being embedded in your social
163
network. The second reason is due network, you would end up believing
to the power of social networks to a lot of reliably accurate information.
influence the ideas that we accept— It might be the case that you’re
which we do so in large measure believing the information because
because they are popular rather it’s popular in your network, and
than because they are “good” not because it’s true, or because you
or true. know it’s true. But for our purposes
right now, that’s fine. The point
^^ Suppose there was a social network would still remain: The structure of
in which the popular ideas were true, your social network would contribute
and vice versa. If you were lucky to your reliably acquiring accurate
enough to be embedded in such a information.
O ur new theory is a form of externalism. It doesn’t

require that we consciously screen out unreliable
sources from reliable ones, but it’s a social externalism
in that the screening process is completely off-loaded
from the individual to the social network or networks
in which he or she is embedded.
If the components of Dunbar’s number, weak ties,
and network effects are taken together, they suggest
that a social network can serve to ensure that the
information you receive from your network is reliably
accurate. That’s the foundation of social externalism.
]]
Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, and Pritchard, eds.,
Socially Extended Epistemology.
Huebner, Macrocognition.
]
READINGS
164
Lecture 19 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 3 The spread of information across
Dunbar’s numbers were predicted by society depends on which of the
computing the ratio of the volume of following?
the neocortex, the part of the brain a Many people having a lot
responsible for tracking complex of friends
information, to the total volume of
b A few people who are
the brain.
extremely social
2 TRUE OR FALSE c Weak ties—connections
In a study of word-of-mouth with people who are a few
referrals of piano teachers reported degrees removed
in Nicholas Christakis and James
Fowler’s Connected, more than a 4 TRUE OR FALSE
third of referrals came from friends According to the work of Duncan
of friends of friends of the teachers’ Watts and his colleagues, social
clients. influence is irrelevant to the success
of, for example, a song; only the
quality of the song ultimately
matters.


165
20
LECTURE 20
The Reliability of
Scientific Testimony
W e shouldn’t give up on the idea that relying on

testimony can only produce knowledge if there is
a way to ensure the testimony we’re relying on is
accurate. Instead, we should give up on the idea
that the process ensuring that the testimony is
accurate has to be located in the person relying on
the testimony. And we should adopt a view called
social externalism, introduced in the previous
lecture. Socially distributed cognitive processes
support the idea that social externalism is a
genuine alternative both to traditional externalism
and to Hume’s non-presumptive theory of
testimony.
166
Lecture 20 The Reliability of Scientific Testimony
SOCIAL EXTERNALISM
^^ Externalist theories of knowledge person, but extended across a
suggest that what makes a true belief social network.
count as an instance of knowledge
is that the belief was formed by a ^^ Ina previous lecture, we were
reliably accurate cognitive process. hesitant to endorse the view that the
So, what makes the position of mind extends beyond the individual
social externalism different must person. But now we’re suggesting
have something to do with how it that we should appeal to socially
incorporates a social element into distributed cognitive processes. How
the theory of externalism. Thus, are these two positions compatible?
we can formulate a theory of social
externalism by adding a notion ^^ The difference between the extended
of socially distributed cognitive mind hypothesis and the current
processes to the theory of externalism proposal is that extending the mind
that we already have. beyond the boundaries of the person
does violence to the concept of mind,
^^ Simply put, a socially distributed while adopting socially distributed
cognitive process is a cognitive cognitive processes does not do
process carried out not within the violence to the concept of cognition
mind or brain of an individual or the cognitive.
167
M athematician Charles
Babbage wrote that the use of
inaccurate mathematical tables lost
the British government “between
two and three million” pounds
sterling. Had the government
invested just a fraction of that
money on scientific research,
Babbage suggested, such errors
could easily have been avoided.
SOCIALLY DISTRIBUTED COGNITIVE PROCESSES

^^ While idea of socially distributed mathematician Gaspard de Prony to
cognitive processes or systems has only use a system of human “calculators”
really become a topic of research in to compile a table of logarithms. The
the last few decades, the idea of such project was a huge success—extending
systems is more than 100 years old. over a number of years, with more
than 100 workers assigned to different
^^ Mathematician Charles Babbage was tasks—and eventually produced 18
the first thinker to analyze socially volumes.
distributed cognitive systems. In a
chapter entitled “On the Division ^^ The inaccuracy of mathematical
of Mental Labour” in his 1832 work tables was a significant impediment
On the Economy of Machinery and to scientific and technological
Manufactures, Babbage describes progress—and a source of a great
such a system in detail. In fact, it deal of financial insecurity—in the
was Babbage’s discussion of socially first half of the 19th century. This
distributed cognitive systems that was the problem that de Prony solved
gave him the idea for development of by implementing a complex system
tools for mechanical computation. of social organization designed
specifically to achieve the most
^^ Inthat chapter, Babbage describes accurate tables of mathematical
a project organized by the French results known up to his time.
168
^^ Here is Babbage’s description of de Prony’s design:
bbFirst Section.—The duty of this first Third Section.—The members of

section was to investigate, amongst the this section, whose number varied
various analytical expressions which from sixty to eighty, received certain
could be found for the same function, numbers from the second section,
that which was most readily adapted and, using nothing more than simple
to simple numerical calculation by addition and subtraction, they
many individuals employed at the returned to that section the finished
same time. This section had little tables. It is remarkable that nine-
or nothing to do with the actual tenths of this class had no knowledge
numerical work. When its labours of arithmetic beyond its two first
were concluded, the formulae on the rules which they were thus called
use of which it had decided, were upon to exercise, and that these
delivered to the second section. persons were usually found more
correct in their calculations, than
Second Section.—This section those who possessed a more extensive
consisted of seven or eight persons knowledge of the subject.
of considerable acquaintance with
mathematics: and their duty was to
convert into numbers the formulae
put into their hands by the first
section,—an operation of great
labour; and then to deliver out these C harles Babbage
was one of the
formulae to the members of the third earliest researchers
section, and receive from them the to explore the design
finished calculations. The members of computers.
of this second section had certain
means of verifying these calculations
without the necessity of repeating, or
even of examining the whole of the
work done by the third section.
169
^^ Babbage saw de Prony’s design as a it almost unbelievable. As Babbage

model for future large-scale scientific put it, the possibility of having
investigations and called the tables achieved such a task employing only
that de Prony’s workers achieved “one workers equipped with the most
of the most stupendous monuments rudimentary arithmetical skills
of arithmetical calculation which the “may appear to non-mathematical
world has yet produced.” readers to be rather too large
a postulate,” one shrouded in
^^ Babbage recognized that one aspect “apparent mystery.”
of de Prony’s achievement rendered
A POTENTIAL OBJECTION TO SOCIAL EXTERNALISM

^^ In the previous lecture, we argued ]] We humans are not very good
for social externalism because we at source monitoring, which
suggested that socially distributed means we’re not very good at
cognitive processes are potentially remembering what the sources
much better than lone individuals at of our beliefs are. Applied to the
filtering out unreliable information socially distributed cognitive
sources. Why, then, couldn’t we processes, this means we won’t
require that individual people at least remember which of our beliefs
choose which socially distributed we owe to particular cognitive
cognitive processes they are going processes, so we won’t be able to
to rely on based on how reliably correctly assess whether a cognitive
accurate those socially distributed process is reliably accurate.
cognitive processes are? ]] Even the participants in socially
distributed cognitive processes
^^ Ineffect, if we make this argument, often don’t know if they’re
we’re suggesting that we should revive successful, or why. The reason for
the Humean inferentialist theory, this is that the aspects of socially
but now—instead of applying it to distributed cognitive processes
assessing individual informants— that contribute to their success are
we should apply it to the socially not always obvious—even to the
distributed cognitive processes we participants in those processes. And
rely on. if the people intimately involved in
those processes themselves often
^^ Here are two reasons why this new don’t know why those processes
application of Hume’s inferentialist work, why would we expect
theory won’t work. outsiders to know?
170
I n 1986, cognitive science researcher Naomi Miyake demonstrated

that even a team composed only of two people, both of whom feel
they are participating in a joint activity they each fully understand,
can have very different interpretations of a relatively simple activity.
Imagine how much greater the interpretations can diverge as the
socially distributed processes become larger and more complex.
CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE
^^ Contemporary science provides us ^^ For further evidence of the role
with examples of socially distributed of socially distributed cognitive
cognitive processes. In fact, it would processes in scientific research, we
be a surprise if scientific researchers can also look to the work of John
didn’t take advantage of such cognitive Seely Brown and Paul Duguid. In
processes. The challenges facing their highly influential 2000 book The
contemporary scientists and the Social Life of Information, they suggest
advantages offered by large-scale that the complexity of knowledge
collaborations to amplify the capacities creation, sharing, and deployment
and expertise of their individual tasks involved in contemporary
members make implementing socially life favors the creation of socially
distributed cognitive systems in distributed cognitive systems over the
scientific research a natural fit. deployment of lone thinkers.
^^ Infact, this is what Babbage

predicted close to 200 years
W
ago. He argued that the proof of e think of big science—
concept in the industrialization of like big data—as a 21st
manufacturing would soon spread to century phenomenon. But
science, writing that “[t]he progress Alvin Weinberg, a prominent
of knowledge convinced the world director of Oak Ridge National
that the system of the division of Laboratory, used the term “big
labour and of cooperation was as science” in an article published
applicable to science, as it had been in Science magazine in 1961.
found available for the improvement
of manufactures.”
171
^^ So, if we consider the history of group members so as to reduce

science as it progresses from Babbage’s the complexity and computational
day to ours, individual scientists demands required for the completion
have gradually been squeezed out of those tasks. The widespread use of
of the picture in favor of the socially computers and other technological
distributed cognitive systems that aids adds another dimension to the
now account for so much of scientific extent to which the results of scientific
activity. In fact, there are entire research can no longer be traced back
cities—such as the United States’ Oak to one solitary researcher—or even a
Ridge National Laboratory, Japan’s small group of researchers.
Tsukuba Academic City, and the
Soviet Union’s Akademgorodok—that ^^ Some of the clearest examples of
arose in the 20th century to support science as a socially distributed
scientific research. The analogy cognitive process are the massive
for the 21st century might be the collaborative efforts involved in
“campuses” of Microsoft, Facebook, some of the biggest achievements
or Google, which are basically cities of contemporary science, such
unto themselves. as the sequencing of the human
genome or the confirmation of the
^^ The evolution of socially distributed existence of the Higgs boson. These
cognitive systems leads to increasingly efforts result in articles listing many
more finely drawn divisions of labor collaborators—sometimes even
within the task, thus decreasing the hundreds or more.
cognitive demands on each of the
individuals within those systems and ^^ Contemporary scientific research
taking advantage of the features of meets our definition of a socially
the cognitive system itself to create distributed cognitive process. The
expertise. example of science provides strong
support for the social externalist
^^ Incontemporary large-scale science, explanation for how testimony
tasks have been portioned out among provides evidence for knowledge.
]]
Kitcher, The Advancement of Science.
Wagenknecht, A Social Epistemology of Research Groups.

]
READINGS
172
Lecture 20 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 TRUE OR FALSE 4 Which of the following explains why
Without the mathematical expertise we can’t reformulate David Hume’s
of all of the “calculators” involved in inferentialist theory of testimony
the project, Gaspard de Prony would to apply to socially distributed
never have been able to produce the cognition?
volumes of mathematical tables that a Our unreliability at source
so impressed Charles Babbage. monitoring
b Naomi Miyake’s research that
2 TRUE OR FALSE
even very small, two-person
According to Edwin Hutchins’s
groups can have vastly divergent
study of the sea-and-anchor detail,
understandings of their joint
one officer kept constant track of all
activities
of the tasks performed by the team
involved in the position-fixing task. c Donald Norman’s observation
that socially distributed cognitive
3 Which of the following is an example systems evolve in ways that
of socially distributed cognition? people fail to recognize
a Gaspard de Prony’s production d All of the above
process for calculating e None of the above
mathematical tables
b The sea-and-anchor detail
described by Edwin Hutchins
c The high-energy particle
physics labs described by Karin
Knorr Cetina
d All of the above
e None of the above


173
21
LECTURE 21
Testimony in
the Media
I f social externalism is the correct theory of testimonial

knowledge, then we have knowledge on the basis of
the information we receive from socially distributed
processes only if relying on those processes provides us
with reliably accurate information. Do we, as theorists
attempting to test whether social externalism offers a
good theory of testimonial knowledge, have good reason
to think there are any socially distributed processes that
provide us with reliably accurate information?
174
Lecture 21 Testimony in the Media
FACT-CHECKING ORGANIZATIONS
^^ There are a small number of news
organizations that devote significant
resources to establishing a culture of
fact-checking. That includes having
T he process involved in
fact-checking is quite
rigorous. Fact-checkers
a group of employees whose job is for The New Yorker are so
dedicated to fact-checking and who obsessive that they even
are independent from the editors fact-check the cartoons
and writers, who often have a vested
and cover art, as well as the
interest in seeing a story go to press.
fiction and poetry.
^^ Not only are there very few news
organizations nowadays that have
a strong culture of in-house fact- ^^ The relative scarcity as well as the
checking, but if you look at the history decline of cultures of fact-checking
of news organizations, the practice of at media institutions means that we
having journalistic fact-checkers has can’t appeal to the practice of in-
existed for less than a century. house fact-checking to make a general
claim about the reliable accuracy of
^^ News organizations that have media organizations. What should we
such strong commitments to fact- say about the media more broadly?
checking—such as The New Yorker and Is it possible to be optimistic about
Der Spiegel—are plausible examples the sort of information that you can
of socially distributed cognitive expect to receive when you consider
processes that reliably convey the media landscape as a whole?
accurate information. Unfortunately,
however, such organizations are not ^^ Only someone who hasn’t been
the norm. In addition, the number paying attention to developments
of publications to invest in a full- over the last decade or more would
time fact-checking department has be that optimistic. However, some
decreased significantly. have pointed to the rise in popularity
of external fact-checking media
organizations as a strategy for
T he German news
magazine Der Spiegel
has the largest fact-
improving the overall accuracy of
media offerings. Might those sorts
of external checks on other media
organizations at least help improve
checking department of any
overall accuracy?
publication in the world.
175
^^ We have good reason to be skeptical ^^ The CIA trains its analysts over the
about putting too much faith in course of years to do that sort of
external fact-checking organizations. assessment of source data. Trusting
The problem is that once we rely untrained people to do that same
on an external fact-checking work is not a promising solution to the
organization to weigh in on the problem of unreliable source material.
accuracy of a particular story, we also
need to rely on individual consumers ^^ Added to this is the further problem
to consult those fact-checking of source monitoring failures—the
organizations alongside the original problem that we’re just not very good
news source they used to get their at remembering where we acquired a
information in the first place. particular piece of information. For
external fact-checking to even have
^^ But there are multiple fact-checking a chance of working, people would
organizations, and they often disagree have to read an individual story, stop,
about how to evaluate any particular fact-check it using external resources,
story. In other words, by bringing in and then decide whether to believe
external fact-checking organizations, it before going on to read the next
we are once again putting the individual story. And that’s just not a
responsibility on individuals to be plausible scenario.
able to assess information, gauge the
relative strength of individual experts’ ^^ If
that’s the situation, the more
opinions, and then arrive at a reliably plausible answer is probably to
accurate assessment of the totality of despair that we can acquire much
the information on balance. knowledge from media sources at all.
176
S ome of the publications that adhere to norms of

rigorous fact-checking include The New Yorker,
Vanity Fair, Esquire, Wired, and Popular Mechanics.
MULTIPLE MARKETS
^^ Perhapsan alternative solution to some sense, the market will do that
external fact-checking organizations for us: Whichever car sells best is the
would be to simply let the market one that had the best combination of
weed out the bad actors. price and features.
^^ People think that what markets do ^^ But when we say “best,” all that
is achieve the best-possible result at means is popular with the consumers
the best-possible price, but that is not in that car-buying market. And here’s
exactly true. Even when they work what that means: When you see what
well, markets achieve an optimal features the market rewards, you
balance of the quality of the result learn something about what sorts of
and the cost of achieving that result. features car buyers wanted, rather
But even that isn’t exactly right, than gaining information about
because it doesn’t tell us what aspects some sort of objective standard for
of a result count toward its quality. assessing which car is best, all things
considered.
^^ A car, for example, has different
measures of quality, including its fuel ^^ And actually, as the case of the
efficiency, its maximal speed, its peak car indicates, there won’t be one
acceleration, and the attractiveness combination of qualities and
of its exterior and interior design. price that will uniquely appeal to
How do we determine which of those consumers. Instead, there will be a
features is going to count toward its range of different combinations of
quality? qualities and price to attract different
subsets of the car market. So, the car
^^ Theshort answer is that we can’t. market is segmented into different
But one of the advantages of market categories that appeal to those
thinking is that we don’t have to. In different types of consumers.
177
^^ We can compare a market for ideas and the originator of that idea have
to the market for cars, and what we among other practitioners in the field.
see is that—in the case of science, at
least—we don’t have the confusing ^^ Furthermore, there can be other
range of qualities against which to reputation markets in addition to the
measure the worth of an idea. So, ones limited to individual academic
unlike with cars, we don’t have the fields. For example, certain high-
potential sources of quality that we profile researchers can enjoy a
have to weigh against each other. reputation in society more generally.
^^ In the case of science, the measure ^^ The complication introduced by

of the quality of an idea is whether the fact that there are multiple
it’s true or likely to be true. That is markets is that there isn’t a strong
the one measure of quality against connection between the monetary
which we have to weigh the worth and reputational markets. It is often
of an idea. That does seem like an the case that someone’s ideas can
advantage for science and one reason be quite successful in reputation
why we could say that in science the markets within his or her field
market is selecting for the truth of the without those ideas leading to
ideas under consideration. corresponding financial success. And
academic specialists will point out
^^ A complicating factor is that scientists cases of their colleagues who have
and other researchers—including achieved financial success for their
researchers in the humanities ideas without being able to achieve
and social sciences—are actually reputational success within their own
participating in multiple markets at field for those same ideas.
the same time. One sort of market
is monetary, in which a researcher ^^ Unfortunately, once you consider
might be able to monetize his or her what the market is aimed at
ideas and measure his or her success maximizing, it does not seem that
by the amount of money someone is a focus on the media marketplace
willing to pay for him or her to pursue would give us any reason to be
those ideas. optimistic that market mechanisms
will make media organizations
^^ Atthe same time, researchers also better sources of reliably accurate
participate in what economists call information.
reputation markets, in which the
measure of the success of an idea isn’t ^^ The reason for this is that what the
financial but reputational. It’s the media market is aimed at optimizing
quality of the reputation that the idea isn’t reliably accurate information. It
178
aims at optimizing what it rewards— and data about those consumers

either with money or reputation. to advertisers and other corporate
And it’s geared toward rewarding customers.
whatever content can capture the
attention of the greatest number of ^^ Thiswould not pose a problem if
consumers. the way to maximize the attention
of consumers was to provide them
^^ What this means for the news media with a wealth of reliably accurate
is that their goal is to maximize information. But that’s not necessarily
attention—because by maximizing what consumers want.
attention, they can deliver consumers
I n his 2016 book review “They’ve Got You, Wherever

You Are,” published in The New York Review of Books,
Jacob Weisberg describes
the problems created by the
current media market using
the example of Facebook.
His point is that making
the media landscape more
impoverished when it comes
to sources of high-quality,
reliable news may not be the
intention of Facebook or any
of the other big players in
media markets. However, it
is likely to be an unintended
consequence, given that the market doesn’t seem to
be geared toward rewarding that sort of high-quality,
reliable news.
179
SOURCES YOU RELY ON

^^ Inorder to assess whether you can ^^ Externalismabout knowledge has to
acquire knowledge on the basis of do with whether you actually possess
your consumption of news media, knowledge, not whether you or
we shouldn’t look at all news sources. anybody else is aware that you possess
Instead, we should look at the news that knowledge. So, our focus on how
sources that you actually rely on. we would figure out whether you have
knowledge is a little misleading.
^^ If
you rely on The New Yorker and
other sources that have strong ^^ For the social externalist, in the
journalistic traditions that emphasize case of your knowledge on the basis
accuracy, then you can acquire of reading a New Yorker article,
knowledge on the basis of relying on what matters is whether relying on
those sources. New Yorker articles is a good way to
receive accurate information. It isn’t
important that you know that The
New Yorker is reliable, or even that
you’re aware of that fact. Maybe you
read it because you like the cartoons,
Y our reliance
on The New
Yorker is a function
but you also check out the articles.
Or maybe you want to fit in with a
group of people who are constantly
discussing New Yorker articles.
of your position in
a network of New ^^ The fact that you’re reading The New
Yorker readers and Yorker and that it’s a source of reliably
accurate information is enough for
doesn’t at all depend you to acquire knowledge on the basis
on your awareness of your reading. And this result is seen
of—or appreciation in other well-established cases in the
social sciences.
for—the fact that
The New Yorker is
a reliable source of
accurate information.
180
S ocial externalism can be viewed as the most

promising route to explain our knowledge on the
basis of testimony.
]]
Allan, ed., The Routledge Companion to News and
Journalism.
Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World.

]
READINGS
181
Lecture 21 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which of the following is not a 4 TRUE OR FALSE
reason why social externalism is a If social externalism is true, then
form of externalism? what matters for you to have
a You don’t need to be aware of knowledge isn’t that all media
the fact that you are relying on sources are reliably accurate but
socially distributed processes for rather that the media sources on
your information. which you rely are reliably accurate.
b Whether you actually acquire
5 External fact-checking organizations
knowledge on the basis of your
are not as useful as in-house
reliance on those processes
fact-checking organizations, from
depends on whether those
the point of view of promoting
processes provide you with
knowledgeable media consumers,
reliably accurate information.
because of which of the following?
c You can acquire knowledge on
a Consumers would then have to
the basis of relying on those
keep track of different external
socially distributed processes
fact-checking organizations
even if you’re unaware that they
alongside the media that they
are providing you with reliably
consume.
accurate information.
b Accurately weighing the
d You have an unconscious
reliability of different sources is
awareness of the reliability of the
not something that we can expect
processes on which you rely.
of untrained media consumers.
2 TRUE OR FALSE c We are not good at source
In-house fact-checking is an monitoring.
institution that has existed since the d All of the above.
first newspapers and magazines. e None of the above.
3 TRUE OR FALSE
The media marketplace selects
for the most accurate, reliable
information.


182
22
LECTURE 22
Pragmatic and Moral
Encroachment
W e have been treating the discussion of knowledge as

only revolving around questions of truth likelihood.
On this way of looking at knowledge, what matters
for knowledge is truth and accuracy. In particular,
nothing else about the knower—including whether
he or she has an interest in the particular question
he or she is considering—is relevant to the question
of whether he or she knows. This way of looking at
knowledge as being independent of the interests of
the knower is the standard. However, recently there
have been a number of challenges to the claim that
we can evaluate whether someone knows purely
on the basis of the truth likelihood of his or her
belief. According to these new challenges, whether
someone knows something can also depend on his
or her interests.
183
Lecture 22 Pragmatic and Moral Encroachment
One challenge suggests that a person’s practical

interests can impact whether he or she has
knowledge. The other challenge suggests that a
person’s moral concerns can impact whether he or
she has knowledge. Though ultimately neither of
these challenges will prove successful, both of them
help illustrate not only the importance but also the
limits of knowledge.
PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
^^ Aparticular sort of argument for ]] Fallibilism is the claim that it
the claim that a person’s practical is possible for someone to know
interests can impact whether he or something without having certain
she counts as having knowledge knowledge. Given the fact that
has been advanced by philosophers we’ve adopted fallibilism as a
Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. working assumption for the bulk
Other notable philosophers who have of these lectures—ever since we
argued for related conclusions include rejected Descartes’s extreme version
John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. of internalism—we’ll continue with
the assumption that fallibilism is
^^ Fantland McGrath’s argument goes correct.
under the heading of pragmatic ]] According to the practical
encroachment, because it involves condition on knowledge, if you
the conclusion that pragmatic, or know some fact, then you are
practical concerns, influence or rational to act as if that fact is true.
encroach upon questions of whether
or not someone has knowledge. ^^ When you combine fallibilism and
the practical condition, you are forced
^^ The structure of Fantl and McGrath’s to accept that whether or not someone
argument is very simple. Essentially, has knowledge depends in part on his
it rests on two planks: fallibilism and or her practical interests.
a practical condition on knowledge.
184
^^ It’s
very plausible to think that the restaurant does not use peanuts or
whether it is rational to act as if peanut products in preparing its food.
some fact is true does vary according Once you see that disclaimer, you’ll
to your practical interests. The feel comfortable ordering any dish on
more significant the outcomes of a the menu.
particular act are for you, the greater
evidence you need in order to have ^^ Contrast that with a situation in
reason to act. which you have a severe peanut
allergy, one so severe that you
^^ But then, if that’s true, that would immediately go into anaphylactic
imply—because of the practical shock when you come into contact
condition—that the evidence required with even the smallest amount of
for knowledge would also vary peanut or peanut oil. If that’s the case,
according to your practical interests. then a mere disclaimer on a menu
might not be enough for you to feel
^^ That, however, just is the claim comfortable eating in that restaurant.
endorsed under the heading of Perhaps in that case you would need
pragmatic encroachment. That is to speak to the restaurant manager,
because what this conclusion means emphasize the severity of your
is that whether or not you have condition, and then double-check to
knowledge can depend on the level be sure the restaurant really uses no
of importance a fact has for you. peanut products in their kitchen.
The more important the fact is for
you, the more evidence you would ^^ Inthe first case, we might say that
need in order to know that fact. For you would be irrational to continue
trivial facts, though, you could have to ask about the use of peanuts in
knowledge with far less evidence. the kitchen after reading a clear
disclaimer on the menu. In the second
^^ Why should we accept the claim that case, however, nobody would consider
whether it is rational for you to act you to be irrational if you made
as if a certain fact is true depends on absolutely sure that the kitchen didn’t
your practical interests? use peanuts or peanut products.
^^ Suppose you believe that whenever ^^ This seems plausible. And if it’s
you eat peanuts you get headaches— correct, then it would suggest that
not debilitating headaches, but whether or not your behavior counts
annoying ones. If that’s the case, as rational does depend on your
then you might want to look out on practical interests.
menus for a disclaimer stating that
185
T he more interest you have in the outcome of

a particular question, the more rational it is
for you to invest additional time in acquiring more
evidence related to the outcome of that question.
^^ So,if we’re going to block Fantl and that someone is behaving rationally
McGrath’s argument that practical is at least in part to say that, if
interests can influence whether or the person reflects on his or her
not you have knowledge, we’ll have behavior, he or she would be able
to block the argument by focusing on to explain that behavior to him- or
the practical condition—the claim herself on the basis of his or her
that if you have knowledge of some reasons for acting. It’s no disrespect
fact, then it’s rational to act as if that to the extraordinary cognitive
fact is true. abilities of nonhuman animals
like dogs to suggest that they are
^^ When the practical condition is incapable of such reflection. If
stated like that, it might seem really that’s right, though, then such
obvious. However, there are some animals provide examples of
good reasons to be skeptical about the creatures who have knowledge but
practical condition. do not act rationally. And if that’s
]] It seems very plausible that right, then the practical condition
many nonhuman animals have is false.
knowledge. When a hound tracks a ]] According to the practical
fox to a particular tree, the hound condition, whenever you know
can know that the fox is at that tree. something, then that is enough for
At the same time, it is not plausible you to be rational in acting as if
that most of the nonhuman animals it’s true. The problem is that this
that have knowledge are rational; isn’t true. Sometimes you need
in other words, the notion of more than mere knowledge to have
rationality doesn’t really apply to reason to act.
those animals. Rather, it seems
plausible to reserve the notion ^^ It
seems plausible that there are
of rationality for creatures who certain scenarios in which action
can reflect on their reasons for requires more than mere knowledge.
behaving the way they do. To say Sometimes, you have to go above and
186
beyond, acquiring evidence greater no peanuts or peanut products used

than what is required for knowledge. in the kitchen. In fact, to go a step
further, you shouldn’t eat at that
^^ Think again about the discussion of restaurant until you double-check
the menu disclaimer that the kitchen that they really don’t use any peanuts
at the restaurant where you’re eating or peanut products in their kitchen.
is peanut-free. If the restaurant goes
to the trouble of indicating to you that ^^ If
you’re willing to go that far, too,
it doesn’t use any peanuts or peanut but you accept that the disclaimer in
products in the kitchen, then you can the menu is enough evidence for you
know that the restaurant’s kitchen is to know that there are no peanuts or
peanut-free. peanut products used in the kitchen,
then you also must reject the practical
^^ However, if you have a deadly condition. That’s because this would
peanut allergy, it’s totally rational also be a case in which knowledge
for you to speak to the manager to alone isn’t sufficient to provide you
make absolutely sure that there are with reasons to act.
MORAL ENCROACHMENT
^^ Fantland McGrath argue that the amount of evidence you need in
whether or not you have knowledge of order to have sufficient evidence to
some fact can depend in part on what believe something depends in part on
practical significance that fact has for the moral implications of that belief.
you. The more significant the fact,
the more evidence you might need to ^^ To unpack the notion of moral
have in order to know it. It’s this that encroachment, let’s emphasize that
they call pragmatic encroachment, the idea of moral encroachment
because your pragmatic interests involves the suggestion that beliefs
encroach on, or influence, the can have moral implications at all.
amount of knowledge you can have. And this may be hard for some people
to accept.
^^ There is another form of
encroachment that has begun to ^^ Tosay that beliefs can have moral
receive interest: the encroachment implications is at least in part to say
of moral concerns on evidence. In that certain beliefs can be morally
analogy to the notion of pragmatic wrong. In other words, the idea is
encroachment, we could call this view that over and above being able to
moral encroachment. It’s the idea that assess a belief as being supported
187
or unsupported by the evidence, we whom we’re debating could refuse

can also assess at least certain beliefs to accept that evidence as sufficient,
based on their moral qualities. citing the moral significance of his
or her religious injunction against
^^ If
we accept the phenomenon of women working outside of the home.
moral encroachment, we can’t limit We could imagine analogous cases
appeals to that phenomenon to people involving white supremacists, anti-
we agree with. Semites, and so on.
^^ Suppose, for example, we’re debating ^^ The underlying point is that we have
with someone who believes that his good reason to separate arguments
or her religious tradition forbids about the strength of our evidence
women to work outside of the home. from arguments about the rightness
Say we present strong evidence to of our causes wherever possible. Of
this person that children raised by course, humans are often guilty of
working mothers are as healthy, rationalization and sloppy thinking,
happy, intelligent, and well adjusted but this isn’t a reason not to try our
as children who are raised by stay- best to shield our truth-directed
at-home mothers. The person with investigations from our moralizing.
A fter reviewing the arguments that considerations

beyond simply the likelihood that our beliefs
are true might be relevant to our evidence, it doesn’t
seem that either of them is very promising.
]]
Fantl and McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World.
Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries.

]
READINGS
188
Lecture 22 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Which of the following is not a 3 The fact that your knowledge might
presupposition of Jeremy Fantl and depend on the moral implications of
Matthew McGrath’s argument that your belief is an example of which of
your knowledge depends on your the following?
practical interests? a Political correctness
a It is possible to know something b Pragmatic encroachment
without being certain.
c Moral encroachment
b If you know some fact, then you
are rational to act as if that fact 4 TRUE OR FALSE
is true. According to Rima Basu and Mark
c It is possible to know something Schroeder, there is something
without knowing that you know. wrong with your apologizing for
having a certain belief despite the
2 TRUE OR FALSE fact that you believe yourself to
The fact that small children and have epistemically unimpeachable
nonhuman animals could have evidence.
knowledge without rationality would
be a counterexample to Jeremy Fantl
and Matthew McGrath’s practical
condition.


189
23
LECTURE 23
Radical Skepticism:
The Brain in a Vat
I agine that one night after you’ve fallen asleep, an

m
evil scientist breaks into your bedroom, gives you an
anesthetic, and spirits you away to his secret lab. Once
there, he removes your brain, keeping it functioning
by placing it in a specially designed vat of nutrient
solution. He runs electrodes to your brain from a bank of
supercomputers, feeding your brain impulses identical
to those your brain would receive from your body. When
you wake up, everything will seem the same to you.
You’ll go through your morning routine as you always do,
feeling the water on your face when you wash up. What
you won’t know, however, is that you’re no longer in that
bedroom. You no longer have a face to wash. Instead,
you’re now a brain floating in a vat of nutrient solution
being fooled into thinking that you’re still waking up in
your bedroom and going about your morning routine.
190
Lecture 23 Radical Skepticism: The Brain in a Vat
Skepticism
T he word “skepticism” derives from the ancient Greek

word skeptikos, which means “questioning” or
“doubting.”
Many skeptical arguments are natural, everyday affairs—
such as when you question someone’s evidence for
a particular opinion about sports, or art, or politics.
Philosophical skeptical arguments are related to those
everyday forms of skepticism, but philosophical skeptical
arguments tend to be more general. They attack a
whole type of evidence, such as perceptual evidence, or
inductive evidence, or the evidence of testimony.
Generally, such arguments suggest that the evidence in
question isn’t good enough to give us knowledge. For
example, skepticism about sense perception suggests
that the senses fool us into thinking they are providing
us with evidence about the world around us. In reality,
the skeptic suggests, the senses offer us only a false
promise. The evidence that the senses provide is in fact
not sufficient to support knowledge of the world that
sense experience seems to describe.
Other types of skepticism work similarly. Whether you’re
dealing with skepticism about the existence of other
minds or the existence of God, the nature of skeptical
arguments is to question whether the evidence available
is sufficient to support knowledge or belief.
191
THE BRAIN-IN-A-VAT SCENARIO

^^ Let’sturn this brain-in-a-vat scenario ^^ Butthe claim that you have hands
into a skeptical argument, the was chosen because it was an obvious
conclusion of which will be that you claim about the world you think
can’t have any knowledge of the world you know through perception. So, if
that you think you perceive. the argument leads you to conclude
that you don’t even know that claim,
^^ Let’sconsider a very obvious claim then the argument would seem to be
about the world that you believe to applicable to pretty much any claim
know through perception. Take, about the world that you take yourself
for example, the claim that you to perceive.
have hands.
^^ Atleast initially, the argument seems
1 If you know that you have hands,
then you know that you’re not a pretty strong. It has the structure
(handless) brain in a vat. of a valid argument. Furthermore,
the two steps of the argument seem
2 You don’t know that you’re not a
unimpeachable.
brain in a vat.
3 Therefore, you don’t know that ^^ The first step of the argument seems
you have hands. plausible. Certainly, if you know that
you have hands, then among other
things you know that you’re not some
handless brain floating in a vat of
nutrient solution.
^^ The second step of the argument also

seems pretty strong. However the
world seems to you right now, it would
seem exactly the same even if you were
merely a disembodied brain floating
in a vat of nutrient solution and being
fed experiences by an evil scientist.
For this reason, you might think that
you can’t rule out the possibility you
actually are a disembodied brain
floating in a vat. And if you can’t rule
out that possibility, then surely you
can’t know that you’re not in fact such
a disembodied brain.
192
T wo of the most famous discussions in the history of

philosophy revolve around skepticism: Descartes’s
discussion of the evil demon and skepticism about our
knowledge of the external world, and Hume’s skepticism
about the possibility of using induction to gain
knowledge of relations of cause and effect.
^^ Butif the argument is valid and if argument, we must either reject

each of the steps of the argument is one or both of the two steps or we
plausible, then we must accept the must demonstrate that, despite
conclusion. So, it would seem that appearances, the argument isn’t in
we must accept skepticism about the fact valid after all.
world as perceived through our senses.
^^ Contemporary philosophers have
^^ Or must we? If we’re going to pursued all three of these strategies,
resist the external world skepticism and each has something to teach us.
prompted by the brain-in-a-vat
THE EXTERNALIST RESPONSE

^^ Externalistsargue that facts about are a normally embodied human
your situation—facts of which you in your standard environment,
are not aware—make a difference perceiving the world through your
with respect to your evidence. So, two bodily sense organs.
people who are the same with respect
to the way the world seems to them can ^^ One of the problems with the
in fact have different levels of evidence. externalist response to the brain-in-a-
vat argument is that if it is correct, it
^^ If
this is right, then the externalist can seem mysterious why skepticism
can reject the skeptical argument by ever seemed so challenging in the first
rejecting the second step. You do in place. In order to have an explanation
fact know that you’re not a brain in a for this, we need to look at two other
vat, assuming in fact that you really responses to the skeptic.
193
THE RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES VIEW

^^ The first of the two remaining Fred Dretske, have questioned
responses rejects the first premise of whether rejecting this premise is
the skeptical argument. It might seem actually as outrageous as it might first
outrageous to reject this premise. Isn’t appear. Nozick and Dretske reject
it just logic? the principle that underlies the first
premise of the skeptical argument,
^^ Anumber of philosophers, foremost called the closure of knowledge under
among them Robert Nozick and known entailment.
S uppose you know the proposition that p. And

suppose you further know that if p is true, then
q is true—that is, that p entails q. It’s plausible to
suppose that you then also know the proposition
that q is true.
For example, suppose you know that Georgina went
to Caltech. And suppose you further know that if
Georgina went to Caltech, then she has certainly
mastered basic arithmetic. Then, it’s plausible to
suppose that you also know that Georgina has
certainly mastered basic arithmetic.
This is the principle that knowledge is closed under
known entailment: If you know some claim and you
know that that claim entails some further claim, then
you know the further claim as well.
Although this claim seems extremely plausible, it’s
the claim that Nozick and Dretske want to reject.
194
^^ They suggest that what’s more entailment and replace it with the
plausible than the closure of relevant alternatives view.
knowledge under known entailment is
this: When you have knowledge, that ^^ If
that’s right, though, then you
knowledge lets you rule out relevant have reason to reject the skeptical
alternatives that are incompatible argument, even if you sympathize
with what you know. That’s why the with the claim that you don’t know
Nozick-Dretske view can plausibly be you’re not a brain in a vat. You can
called a relevant alternatives view. reject the argument, because you think
the radical skeptical scenario is not
^^ They don’t think that skeptical relevant to your real-world knowledge
scenarios, for example, ever count that you have hands, despite the fact
as relevant alternatives. So, even that having hands isn’t compatible
though you know you have hands, with being a brain in a vat—and you
you don’t know the claim “if you have know that it’s not compatible.
hands, then you’re not a brain in a
vat”—because the possibility that you ^^ The relevant alternatives view gives
are a brain in a vat is not a relevant you a way to concede to the skeptic
alternative to your actual situation. that you have no way to refute radical
skeptical claims but nevertheless to
^^ Nozick and Dretske reject the hang on the everyday knowledge that
closure of knowledge under known you know yourself to have.
CONTEXTUALISM
^^ Formany philosophers, rejecting ^^ The new theory suggests that
the closure of knowledge under Nozick and Dretske were wrong to
entailment is a step too far. They just apply their intuition to a particular
don’t find it plausible that you could premise—the first premise—of the
know some claim and know that that skeptical argument. Instead, the
claim entails some other claim yet fail new theory says we should apply
to know the entailed claim. the operating intuition that Nozick
and Dretske appeal to the skeptical
^^ Forthose philosophers, there is argument as a whole.
an alternate theory that employs
intuitions similar to the ones Nozick ^^ Consider a normal, everyday scenario
and Dretske appeal to but that doesn’t in which you’re not thinking about
require that you reject the closure of skepticism. Say you’re thinking about
knowledge under entailment. purchasing gloves. In a scenario
195
like that, you’d obviously know you ^^ The contextualist distinguishes

have hands—you’re contemplating between high-stakes and low-stakes
purchasing a new pair of gloves. In cases and suggests that what is
such a normal scenario, you also different between the two is the level
know, although merely unconsciously, of evidence you need to have in order
that if you have hands, you’re not a to have knowledge. In the high-
brain in a vat. This new theory says stakes case, you need a higher level of
that in such an everyday scenario, you evidence, while in the low-stakes case,
also know, also merely unconsciously, you need a lower level of evidence.
that you’re not a brain in a vat.
^^ The views of contextualism and
^^ Now consider a scenario where you’re pragmatic encroachment—and the
arguing explicitly with a skeptic. arguments used to support them—
In this scenario, you know—now are parallel. But while pragmatic
consciously—that if you know you encroachment deals with the
have hands, then you know you’re connection between knowledge,
not a brain in a vat. But now, because rationality, and action, contextualism
you’re consciously considering the deals with the connection between
skeptical possibilities, you don’t know knowledge and your ability to assert
that you’re not a brain in a vat. So that you have knowledge. The
now, when you’re arguing with the contextualist suggests that in high-
skeptic, you don’t know that you stakes cases, you need much higher
have hands. levels of evidence to be able to assert
that you have knowledge.
^^ Inother words, on this new theory,
what you know varies according ^^ One reason the contextualist answer
to the situation in which you find to the skeptic is not one we should
yourself—your knowledge varies adopt is that the same arguments
according to your context. For this that we made against pragmatic
reason, this view of knowledge is encroachment also speak against
called contextualism. coherentism. It might be that despite
the fact that you have knowledge,
^^ The advantage of contextualism you need higher levels of evidence
is that it explains the intuitive pull to assert your knowledge in high-
of skepticism without forcing us to stakes cases. But in the context of
abandon the idea that we can use skepticism, perhaps the central
inference to extend the scope of our reason for rejecting contextualism
knowledge unrestrictedly. is that as an answer to the skeptic,
the contextualist response is not a
refutation—instead, it’s a capitulation.
196
^^ Think about the contextualist lack in the high-stakes case is the

explanation of what goes on when evidence sufficient for confidence, or
confronted with a skeptical argument. assurance. So, the high-stakes case,
According to the contextualist, on this alternate explanation, would
whenever the skeptic raises his or be one where you have knowledge
her skeptical worries, we no longer but lack the confidence or assurance
have the knowledge that we would to assert your knowledge. This is a
in nonskeptical contexts. In other way to repurpose the refutation of
words, rather than showing how the pragmatic encroachment as a strategy
skeptic is misguided, as far as the for rejecting contextualism as well.
contextualist is concerned, the skeptic
always wins every argument. ^^ This alternate explanation also allows
us to explain what is happening in
^^ If
the goal is to explain where skeptical cases without capitulating to
the skeptic has gone astray, the the skeptic. When the skeptic raises
contextualist response is disastrous. his or her doubts, the context becomes
one in which we are no longer capable
^^ Luckily,we can take advantage of the of asserting with assurance that we
positive aspects of the contextualist have knowledge. However—unlike in
explanation of the strength of the contextualist explanation—this
skeptical arguments without alternate explanation does not require
conceding everything to the skeptic that we grant that we no longer have
that the contextualist does. knowledge. Instead, we can say that
we still have knowledge when arguing
^^ Inorder to explain the cases, we with the skeptic, even if we cannot
don’t need to say that you lack confidently defend the knowledge
knowledge in the high-stakes case. that we possess.
Instead, we can say that what you
]]
DeRose and Warfield, Skepticism.
Hazlett, A Critical Introduction to Skepticism.

]
READINGS
197
Lecture 23 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 Rejecting the brain-in-a-vat 3 Rejecting the brain-in-a-vat
argument because you do know argument in everyday scenarios
you’re not a brain in a vat is but accepting that the skeptic
characteristic of which of the wins whenever he or she explicitly
following? asserts the skeptical argument
a Externalism is characteristic of which of the
following?
b Rejection of the closure of
knowledge under known a Externalism
entailment b Rejection of the closure of
c Contextualism knowledge under known
entailment
2 Rejecting the brain-in-a-vat c Contextualism
argument because you could
know that you have hands without 4 TRUE OR FALSE
knowing that you’re not a brain in a One way to reject contextualism is
vat is characteristic of which of the to say that sometimes you can know
following? something without having enough
a Externalism evidence to assert what you know.
b Rejection of the closure of
knowledge under known
entailment
c Contextualism


198
24
LECTURE 24
The Future of
Epistemology
T h e sources of knowledge can roughly be divided

into personal and social sources. Epistemology can
contribute to the study of each of these types of
sources, and the future contributions of epistemology
in these areas can help us recognize that all of the
major theories of knowledge found in this course—
foundationalism, coherentism, and externalism—have
a role to play in the future development of the field.
199
Lecture 24 The Future of Epistemology
T he lectures in this course have covered a lot

of material, but there is a wealth of material
that exists that the course could not cover. Two
of the most active current areas of research in
epistemology might spark your interest in exploring
the field further after you conclude these lectures.
vv The success of Timothy Williamson’s book
Knowledge and Its Limits points to a renewed
interest in epistemology in using formal, logical,
and mathematical methods to clarify problems.
This subfield within epistemology is called formal
epistemology.
vv In 2007, philosophy professor Miranda Fricker
published a book entitled Epistemic Injustice: Power
and the Ethics of Knowing, in which she suggests
the phenomenon that she terms epistemic injustice
comes in two forms: testimonial injustice and
hermeneutical injustice.
ww Testimonial injustice harms speakers because it
prevents them from being believed for reasons
having to do with prejudice, rather than for valid
reasons having to do with their qualities as honest
or reliably accurate informants.
ww Hermeneutical injustice harms people because
it prevents them from correctly interpreting or
recognizing facts about themselves or about their
situation.
200
PERSONAL SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

^^ Personal sources of knowledge include collaboration, they have coauthored
self-awareness, sense perception, two books: Reliable Reasoning:
rational reflection, and deductive and Induction and Statistical Learning
inductive inference. Theory and An Elementary Introduction
to Statistical Learning Theory.
^^ As noted in the discussion of each
of those sources of knowledge in ^^ Statistical
learning theory is at the
previous lectures, present research in root of contemporary approaches to
philosophy benefits from extensive machine learning and is fundamental
cross-pollination with the scientific to the use of artificial intelligence in
fields investigating these phenomena. applications in image recognition,
In fact, it is very unusual nowadays speech recognition, medical
to find a philosopher working on diagnostics, and finance. When
epistemology and sense perception, Facebook tags your face in a friend’s
for example, who isn’t conversant with post or when you speak to your smart
current work on the neuroscience of home speaker, you have statistical
vision. Similarly, the best work on the learning theory to thank for those
epistemology of memory is informed applications.
by the latest studies in the cognitive
psychology and neurobiology ^^ Harman’s collaboration with
of memory. Kulkarni is just one example of the
ways in which epistemologists have
^^ Forexample, for more than a decade, directly or indirectly influenced the
philosopher Gilbert Harman and development of disciplines in related
electrical engineer Sanjeev Kulkarni fields, from cognitive science to
have been collaborating on joint computer science.
research. Since the beginning of their
SOCIAL SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

^^ Inthe study of personal sources of sciences. However, some of the most
knowledge, epistemologists have a exciting work for epistemologists in
long tradition of contributing behind the future will perhaps relate to the
the scenes to the development of investigation of the social sources of
many of the cognitive and behavioral knowledge.
201
^^ One case builds on the consideration in its infancy. One of the giants in
of the media in a previous the field is philosophy professor
lecture. Current examinations of Alvin Goldman, who, in his book
misinformation and so-called fake Knowledge in a Social World, argues
news tend to focus on the ways that for a position that he terms veritistic
individual media consumers can social epistemology. In fact, social
guard themselves against the effects externalism is a form of veritistic
of misinformation. Primarily, the social epistemology.
suggestion is that media consumers
need to become better at critical
thinking skills.
^^ For example, a Forbes magazine

V eritistic” comes
from the Latin
word for truth, veritas.
article from February 2018 entitled Veritistic social
“How to Maintain Critical Thinking epistemology suggests
in the Modern World of New Media” that we should evaluate
provides a list of tips for ways that
social institutions and
readers can become more critically
savvy. But if you remember the
processes to see whether
discussion of social psychology and they reliably contribute
testimony from a previous lecture, to the acquisition of true
you’ll know that attempts to improve beliefs by individuals.
people’s ability to detect deception
and inaccurate information just aren’t
very effective.
^^ Although it was published in 1999,
^^ The lesson from the discussion of Goldman’s book contains a wealth
testimony in a previous lecture was of discussions that are still relevant
that there is no reason to think that to our media landscape today. For
a solution to the problem of accurate example, Goldman discusses a
information transmission will be proposal to use strategic tax policy
focused on individual consumers of to alleviate the effects of advertising
that information. Instead, we ought influences on print media like
to look at social and institutional newspapers and magazines.
remedies.
^^ Let’smodify that discussion for the
^^ The subfield concerned with contemporary media landscape. The
these sorts of questions—social goal is to increase the amount of
epistemology—is a growing research reliably accurate information in the
area in epistemology that is still information marketplace.
202
^^ Currently, content purveyors like content in order to drive the new

Google and Facebook profit from, revenue stream from Google and
to put it bluntly, selling their users Facebook. From a truth-oriented
to advertisers. However, traditional perspective, that would certainly not
news sources still produce much be welcome.
of the content that Google and
Facebook provide. In other words, ^^ Theseissues are challenging.
the traditional news sources are Nevertheless, there are two
producing the content, but Google advantages to the systems-oriented
and Facebook are receiving the approach.
advertising revenue. This is not a ]] The alternative—focusing on
sustainable model. making individuals more rational
and reflective—isn’t very promising.
^^ One potential solution would be to You can’t fight human nature!
treat news content analogously to ]] There are ways that systemic
music content. Each time you listen
changes can produce positive
to a song on Spotify or iTunes, the
truth-oriented effects. For example,
artist gets a percentage of the profit
the institution of cultures of fact-
that Spotify or iTunes receives from
checking in American publications
you. Something similar could work
in the 1920s led to some more-
in the case of news organizations:
reliable media institutions.
Each time a user of Facebook or
Google reads a news story, the news
^^ The problem of the spread of
organization that produced the story
misinformation is a systemic problem.
could receive a percentage of the
And as with so many of the systemic
advertising revenue that Facebook or
challenges that we face—from global
Google earned on the story.
climate change to infectious disease
prevention—we will need to find
^^ One of the problems with
systemic solutions as opposed to
this suggestion is that
individual approaches.
although it would provide
increased financial security
for traditional news media
sources, it would create
other problems. For
example, it might increase
the already-existing
pressure on those sources
to produce clickbait-style
203
A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING

ABOUT VIEWS OF KNOWLEDGE
^^ We’ve seen two different ways ^^ Sosa had the right idea but was
to think about the structure of thinking at the wrong scale. He thinks
knowledge: the opposition between that the way to integrate coherentism,
foundationalism and coherentism, foundationalism, and externalism
and the clash between internalism is by looking at a single individual
and externalism. There is a way to thinker. That thinker has, according
reconcile some of these oppositions to Sosa, animal knowledge—his or
and take advantage of some of the her core, foundational knowledge.
best features of these views. That type of knowledge is knowledge
we should understand by appealing
^^ To do this, let’s borrow a set of ideas to externalism. Then, Sosa continues,
from philosophy professor Ernest the thinker has a higher level of
Sosa. In a highly influential essay knowledge that is validated by
entitled “The Raft and the Pyramid,” reflection. And Sosa thinks we should
published in 1980, Sosa suggests that understand that type of knowledge
the best explanation of the structure at least in part using the resources of
of knowledge would combine coherentism.
elements from both foundationalism
and coherentism. Basically, the ^^ Incontrast, when it comes to
structure that Sosa advocated knowledge, we should understand
involved having a foundational individual human knowledge largely
substructure supporting a coherentist on the model of externalism. Most
superstructure. human thinkers are not very reliable
when it comes to rational reflection
^^ Inrecent decades, in a series of books and shaping their beliefs into a truth-
and articles, Sosa has reworked that conducive, coherent whole.
earlier picture. His new emphasis is
on a distinction between two types ^^ Remember, if we’re talking about
of knowledge that he refers to as knowledge, it’s not enough merely
animal and reflective knowledge. that you have coherent beliefs.
Roughly, on this new picture, we Instead, the sort of coherence you
should think of animal knowledge as achieve also has to lead to truth.
foundationalist and externalist, while That’s a very high bar, and probably
reflective knowledge is internalist and not many people can actually
more coherentist. achieve that.
204
^^ Instead, what Sosa calls reflective have a role to play in testing whether
knowledge happens at the level implementing those processes actually
of groups, social processes, and does help with our truth-seeking
institutions. The best scientific goals and will also help us determine
research groups and the most if there are other unforeseen costs
respected journalistic organizations that might outweigh the benefits of
are examples of how groups can achieving those truth-seeking goals.
achieve the sort of reflective processes
that are conducive to truth. ^^ What we’re left with, then, is a sort of
epistemology that is both externalist
^^ The role of internalist foundationalism and foundationalist and coherentist.
and coherentism, then, will be in It is also an epistemology that sees
studying the kinds of processes that, its role in collaboration with the
when implemented at a systemic level, natural and social sciences. With
are likely to lead to truth. all of the challenges to knowledge
posed by contemporary life, it is a
^^ Of
course, we shouldn’t stop there. sort of epistemology that has a lot of
Here, too, empirical disciplines will work to do.
]]
Pritchard and Hendricks, eds., New Waves in Epistemology.
Steup, Turri, and Sosa, eds., Contemporary Debates in

Epistemology.
]
READINGS
205
Lecture 24 QUIZ
QUIZ
1 The claim that if you know 3 TRUE OR FALSE
something, then you know that you Alvin Goldman’s veritistic social
know it is called what? epistemology suggests that we need
a Infallibilism to account for aspects of social
information processes other than the
b Internalism
truth accuracy of the information
c Externalism transmitted by those processes.
d The KK thesis
4 According to Ernest Sosa, what is
2 If you refuse to believe someone’s the higher type of knowledge that
testimony solely because of should be distinguished from animal
that person’s membership in a knowledge?
disadvantaged group rather than a Foundational knowledge
because of any reasons pertaining
b Externalist knowledge
to his or her honesty or reliable
accuracy, that’s an example of what? c Coherentist knowledge
a Formal epistemology d Reflective knowledge
b Testimonial injustice
c Hermeneutical injustice


206
Answer Key
Answer Key CLICK to navigate.
LECTURE 1 LECTURE 13
1 F 2 C 3 F 4 B 5 C 1 A 2 B 3 D 4 B 5 A
1 C 2 D 3 F 4 F 5T 1 D 2 T 3 D 4 T
1 T 2 T 3 F 4D 1 C 2 F 3 T 4 F 5C
1 F 2 B 3 F 4D 1 B 2 A 3 T 4C
1 T 2 T 3 F 4C 1 A 2 B 3 C 4C
1 T 2 F 3 A 4 B 5 B 1 T 2 C 3 F 4D
1 T 2 T 3 F 4 C 5 B 1 T 2 T 3 C 4F
1 A 2 F 3 T 4 A 5 B 1 F 2 F 3 D 4 D
1 B 2 T 3 A 4 T 5 T 6C 1 D 2 F 3 F 4 T 5D
1 A 2 T 3 T 4D 1 C 2 T 3 C 4T
1 D 2 T 3 F 4 D 5 T 1 A 2 B 3 C 4T
1 B 2 C 3 B 4 B 5 B 6 C 1 D 2 B 3 F 4D
207
Bibliography
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Allan, Stuart, ed. The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism. Routledge, 2009.
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Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.
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Bengson, John, and Marc A. Moffett, eds. Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind,
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Bernecker, Sven. Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press, 2010.
Bernecker, Sven, and Kourken Michaelian, eds. The Routledge Handbook of
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BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University
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BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs.
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Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.
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Hurlburt, Russell, and Eric Schwitzgebel. Describing Inner Experience? Proponent
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Kitcher, Philip. The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without
Illusion. Oxford University Press, 1993.
Lackey, Jennifer, and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford
Lehrer, Keith. “Coherence, Truth, and Undefeated Justification.” Chap. 7 in
Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 2000.
——— . Knowledge. Clarendon Press, 1974.
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Michaelian, Kourken, Dorothea Debus, and Denis Perrin, eds. New Directions in
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“A serious force in American education.” Course Guidebook

Joseph H. Shieber is an Associate Professor of Philosophy

THE GREAT COURSES ®

Course No. 5701 © 2019 The Teaching Company. PB5701A

4840 Westfields Boulevard | Suite 500 | Chantilly, Virginia | 20151‑2299

Copyright © The Teaching Company, 2019

Joseph H. Shieber, PhD

J oseph H. Shieber is an Associate Professor in

These lectures are intended as an introduction to the philosophical

C o ntrary to what you might think, the theory of

RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

A necdotally, there has long been a recognition

In a 2015 review article in the journal Cell, Dr. Ruth

THE IMPERSONAL STRATEGY

I n a 2009 paper in the Journal of Experimental

T hree lessons from this discussion can be drawn

Paul, Transformative Experience.

QUIZ TIP: To go back to the page you came from,

]Answer key can be found on page 207.

P h ilosophers have been studying knowledge for

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE

^^ Inhis 2012 book Trusting What

^^ AsHarris argues, even newborn ^^ Wimmerand Perner offer a good

INEXISTENCE AND INACCESSIBILITY ARGUMENTS

T here are at least three distinct kinds of

ARGUMENT FOR THE IRRELEVANCE OF TRUTH

]Answer key can be found on page 207.

I n 1619, René Descartes experienced a revelation that

THE EVIL DEMON ARGUMENT

^^ Descartes begins by noting that often,

^^ Todo this, Descartes asks us to

INTERNALISM AND DUALISM

S trangely, Descartes thought that mind-brain

^^ Let’ssuppose that contemporary ^^ There are a number of different

R easons for skepticism about the certainty of our awareness of

Conee and Feldman, Evidentialism.

]Answer key can be found on page 207.

W h ere Descartes suggested that all knowledge

INFALLIBILISM VERSUS FALLIBILISM

^^ Many philosophers, however, the higher-level beliefs supported

P hilosophers who were distrustful of the idea

^^ Thesephilosophers—such as notion of coherence. The view

should choose the simpler of the problem here is that nobody

P erhaps you believe that a politician that you

S urprisingly, one of the clearest statements

Someone might hold that coherence with

Blanshard thought that, if faced with the choice

]Answer key can be found on page 207.

O n e of the ways in which philosophers attempted to

CHALLENGES FOR FOUNDATIONALISM

A simple version of a Gettier case comes from

^^ One of the earliest statements of ^^ With the exception of the inclusion

P sychologists use the term “reliability” roughly to

^^ It’sobvious how the process environments does not mean that it

^^ Consider a car whose engine is ^^ Forthe process reliabilist, someone

E xternalism, represented by process reliabilism,

EXTERNALIST VERSUS INTERNALIST THEORIES

^^ The inputs may include not just the

C onsider again that you see the clock read 11:55

Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition.

2 TRUE OR FALSE 4 Which of the following is an

]Answer key can be found on page 207.

C o ntrary to what you might think, the theory of

P h ilosophers have been studying knowledge for

I n 1619, René Descartes experienced a revelation that

W h ere Descartes suggested that all knowledge

O n e of the ways in which philosophers attempted to

I n traditional epistemology, self-knowledge is the

O n e of the most significant sources of our

I n the previous lecture, we ruled out the internalist theory of

O u r faculty of memory is central to our knowledge,

H o w does memory knowledge fit into the general