DIGEST POOL : Class VI
LABOR RELATIONS
ATTY. MEL SAN LUIS
Part 6
1. BANGALISAN vs. CA, Gr. No. 124678, July 31, 1997
2. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS vs.
OVEJERA, Gr. No. L-59743, May 31, 1982
3. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC AND NESTLE
Gr. No. 91025, December 19, 1990
4. ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 91980, June 27, 1991
5. SAN MIGUEL vs. NLRC, Gr. No. 99266, March 2, 1999
6. PHIL. STEAM NAVIGATIONAL CO. vs. PHILIPPINE
MARINE OFFICERS GUILD
Gr. No. L-20667, October 29, 1965
7. PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION vs. NLRC
Gr. No. L-58341, June 29, 1982
8. TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 123276, August 18, 1997
9. NUWHRAIN DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER vs. CA
Gr. No. 163942, November 11, 2008
10. GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. GLOWHRAIN
Gr. No. 153664, July 18, 2003
11. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE vs. TORRES
Gr. No. 100158, June 29, 1992
LABOR RELATIONS
12. TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES
UNION-FFW vs. SEC. OF LABOR
Gr. No. 122743, December 12, 1997
13. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-
FFW vs. CA, Gr. No. 169632, March 28, 2006
14. LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. PERMANENT
CONCRETE WORKERS UNION
Gr. No. L-25003, October 23, 1981
15. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
Gr. No. 31195, June 5, 1973
16. GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 103560, July 6, 1995
17. PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
vs. CIR, Gr. No. L-10095, October 31, 1957
18. CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND
LABORERS UNION vs. CIR
Gr. No. L-19778, September 30, 1964
19. CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. MARSMAN
Gr. No. L-17038 July 31, 1964
20. ABARIA vs. NLRC, Gr. No. 154113, December 7, 2011
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BANGALISAN vs. CA
Gr. No. 124678, July 31, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800
public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on September 17
to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning the alleged
failure of the public authorities to implement certain laws and
measures intended for their material benefit.
The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to
comply with said order, thus the Secretary charged petitioners with
“grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations;
refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without
official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines.” They were simultaneously placed
under preventive suspension.
Petitioners failed to give their answer to the complaint
filed against them despite due notice. Thus, the DECS secretary
found them guilty of the offenses and ordered their dismissal from
service.
The secretary, acting on petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, modified its ruling. Instead of dismissal, petitioners
would be suspended from service for nine months without pay.
Petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The
latter reduced the suspension period from nine months to six
months with automatic reinstatement in the service but without
payment of back wages.
Petitioners appealed the case to CA but dismissed the
same for lack of merit.
Petitioners’ main argument is that they were merely
exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
Issue:
Whether or not Government employees can engage in a
strike.
Held:
No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees
in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to
organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The
right of government employees to organize is limited only to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage
and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term
“strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
LABOR RELATIONS
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
“It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but
the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in
various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are
efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for
redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services,
however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public,
which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had
valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,”
but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an
illegal work stoppage.
As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory
prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are
denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a
public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or
work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at
common law. Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules
which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision,
simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule.
To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike,
there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the
absence of any express legislation allowing government employees
to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise
of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the
private sector.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS vs. OVEJERA
Gr. No. L-59743, May 31, 1982
Facts:
Petitioner NSFW (bargaining agent of the rank and file)
and respondent company (CAC) entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) wherein parties agreed to maintain the present
practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and
amelioration (improvement) bonus.
On Nov. 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent entered into
a compromise agreement two days after the strike to compel
th
payment of the 13 month pay, agreeing to abide by the final
decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th month
pay if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay the same
separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining Corporation which sought to
annul the decision of the Labor Deputy Minister granting the 13th
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month pay to its employees in addition to mid-year and Christmas
bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on June 11, 1981 and became
final and executory on December 18, 1981.
On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the MOLE a notice
to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days
after, NFSW commenced a strike.
One day after the commencement of the strike, or on
January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with
MOLE.
CAC filed a petition the Regional Arbitration Branch, MOLE
to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the
expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice
(ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven
days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote.
Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal.
CAC filed for a restraining order for the enforcement of the of LA’s
decision. No restraining order was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal.
Held:
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the deputy
of labor minister, ruled that the failure of the NFSW to abide with
the mandatory cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban made the
strike illegal and the NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its
members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the
bonuses already paid by CAC.
Language of the law. — The foregoing provisions hardly
leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c)
and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in
Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the
dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of
days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice,"
the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before
the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory
character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote
is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall
furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-
off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off
period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although
the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within
the statutory cooling-off period.
LABOR RELATIONS
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC AND NESTLE
Gr. No. 91025, December 19, 1990
Facts:
On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro
Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-
file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a
Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA deadlock
and unfair labor practice. Private respondent assailed the legal
personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to
represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This
notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to
attend the conciliation meetings and to which private
respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a
negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with
the UFE Constitution and By-laws.
Thereafter, Company terminated from employment all
UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for
instigating and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the
Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11,
1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for
the purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA
upheld the validity of the dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed.
Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the general
membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units;
Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of
ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch
Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but
yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a motion asking the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute of
deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties.
On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
“certified” to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and
Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: “The NLRC is further
directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA
deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for
resolution.” Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution
granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle’s employees,
ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private
respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds said
resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree
therewith. It filed a motion for reconsideration, denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent nlrc seriously erred in
holding that the cba to be signed by the parties shall cover solely the
bargaining unit consisting of all regular rank-and-file employees of
the respondent company.
Held:
No.The Court is convinced that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving only the sole
issue certified to by the Secretary and formulating a CBA which
covers the bargaining units consisting of all regular rank-and-file
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
employees of the respondent company at Makati, Alabang and
Cabuyao only.
In its assailed resolution, public respondent stated:
"A perusal of the records and proceedings of this case
reveals that after the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of his Order
dated 28 October 1988 certifying the dispute to Us, the Union filed
an Urgent Manifestation seeking the modification of the certification
order to include the Cebu Davao and Cagayan de Oro divisions, the
employees/workers therein being all bonafide members of the
Union which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the regular rank-and-file workers of the company nationwide. Their
non-inclusion in the certification order, the union argues, would give
premium to the alleged unlawful act of the Company in entering into
separate 'Collective Bargaining Agreements' directly with the
workers thereat.
"In the same vein, the union manifested its intention to
file a complaint for ULP against the company and its officers
responsible for such act, which it eventually did.
"Considering that the Union had reserved the right to
prosecute the Company and its officers responsible for the alleged
unlawful execution of the CBA directly with the union members in
Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, as it has in fact filed a case
which is now pending with our Arbitration Branch, the issue as to
whether such acts constitute ULP is best heard and decided
separately from the certified case, not only because of the
evidentiary need to resolve the issue, but also because of the delay
that may ensue in the resolution of the present conflict.
"Furthermore, the consolidation of the issue with the
instant case poses complicated questions regarding venue and
joinder of parties. We feel that each of the issues propounded by
the parties shall be better dealt with separately according to its own
merits.
"Thus, We rule to resolve the sole issue in dispute certified
to this Commission, i.e., the deadlock in the collective bargaining
negotiations in Cabuyao/Alabang and Makati units." (Rollo, pp. 174-
176)
We agree. Public respondent's resolution is proper and in
full compliance with the order of the Secretary of Labor. The
concomitant delay that will result in resolving petitioner's motion for
the modification of the certification order to determine whether to
include Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro Divisions or not will defeat
the very purpose of the Secretary of Labor's assumption of
jurisdiction and his subsequent certification order for compulsory
arbitration.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor
over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a
police power measure. It cannot be denied that the private
respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public
interest being one of the largest manufacturers of food products.
The compelling consideration of the Secretary's assumption of
jurisdiction is the fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to
the national economy and thus, the need to implement some
measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company's
essential productions is indispensable for the promotion of the
common good. Under this situation, the Secretary's certification
LABOR RELATIONS
order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the
immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was proper.
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 91980, June 27, 1991
Facts:
IBM representing 4500 employees of SMC working at
various plants, offices and warehouses in NCR presented to the
company a demand for correction of the significant distortion in the
workers’ wages pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act.
Demand unheeded by company hence the union members
refused to render overtime services until the distortion has been
corrected by SMC.
It appears that the employees working hours/schedule has
been freely observed by the employees for the past 5 years and due
to the abandonment of the longstanding schedule of work and
reversion to the eight-hour shift substantial losses were incurred by
SMC.
SMC filed a complaint with arbitration branch
of NLRC then before the NLRC for the latter to declare the strike
illegal.
Union’s contention: workers’ refusal to work beyond 8
hours was a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct
distortion.
SMC: The coordinated reduction by the Union’s members
of the work time in order to compel SMC to yield to the demand was
an illegal and unprotected activity.
Issue:
Whether or not the strike was legal
Held:
No. It is illegal. The strike invoking the issue of wage
distortion is illegal. The legality of these activities depends on the
legality of the purposes sought to be attained. These joint or
coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or
contract.
The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage
distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration,
and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the
employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing
RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant
to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16,
Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy
that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and
eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, “Any issue
involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout.”
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between
the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by
the former without the latter’s demurring to the accuracy of the
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quotation, also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other
similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving
disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating
that settlement of “all disputes, disagreements or controversies of
any kind” should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure
and ultimately by arbitration.
SAN MIGUEL vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 99266, March 2, 1999
Facts:
San Miguel Corporation (SMC), which allegedly needed to
streamline its operations due to financial losses shut down some of
its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant. Consequently,
the private respondent union (SMCEU) filed several grievance cases
for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of
the said employees to the other divisions of the company. During
the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were
redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result,
only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the
third level of the grievance procedure.
The private respondent filed with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike. Petitioner, on the other
hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike, but the NCMB failed to
act on the motion. Petitioner SMC filed a complaint with the
respondent NLRC praying for the dismissal of the notice of strike,
and an order compelling the respondent union to submit to
grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike, and
the recovery of the expenses of litigation.
Respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution
dismissing the complaint. Aggrieved by the resolution, petitioner
found its way to this Court via the present petition.
In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon
by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. Their grounds
appear more illusory than real. The Court held that the violation of
the CBA is chargeable against the private respondent union.
The Supreme Court granted the instant petition. SMCEU-
PTGWO was directed to complete the third level of the Grievance
Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if
necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of a no strike clause.
Held:
Yes. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as “the
situation between the labor and the management of the company
where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations
resulting in a stalemate.”
The situation is non-existent in the present case since
there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance
LABOR RELATIONS
machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of
asking the conciliation decide the conflict, petitioner declared a
deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to
exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration
proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private
respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and
arbitration proceedings.
In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly
refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent
(union) violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA.
Petitioner (employer) having evinced its willingness to
negotiate the fate of the remaining employees affected , there is no
ground to sustain the notice of strike of the union.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private
respondent San Miguel Corporation Employees Union - PTGWO are
hereby directed to complete the third level (Step 3) of the Grievance
Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if
necessary.
PHIL. STEAM NAVIGATIONAL CO. vs. PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS
GUILD
Gr. No. L-20667, October 29, 1965
Facts:
PHILSTEAM is engaged in inter-island shipping, PMOG is a
labor-union affiliated with Federation of Free Workers (FFW)
representing and which represented some of PHILSTEAM’s officers.
The Cebu Seamen’s Association (CSA) is another labor union that
represents some of PHILSTEAM’s officers.
PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands with a request
for collective bargaining but PHILSTEAM required PMOG to first
prove its representation of a majority of PHILSTEAM’s employees
before its demands will be considered. PHILSTEAM started
interrogating and investigating its captains, deck officers, and
engineers, to find out directly from them if they had joined PMOG or
authorized PMOG to represent them.
PMOG filed a notice of intention to strike stating
PHILSTEAM’s alleged refusal to bargain and unspecified ULP.
The CSA also transmitted its own set of demands to
PHILSTEAM where the latter considered its demands. PHILSTEAM
and CSA signed a CBA. On that same day, PMOG declared a strike
against PHILSTEAM
Issue:
Whether or not PHILSTEAM committed ULP.
Held:
The acts found by respondent court constituting the
foregoing unfair labor practice are: (1) the interrogation and
investigation by PHILSTEAM's supervisory officials of its captains,
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deck officers and engineers, to determine whether they had
authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent; (2) the subjection
of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the participation of PHILSTEAM's pier
superintendent in soliciting membership for a competing union.
PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an
investigation of its officers as to their membership in PMOG and
whether they had given PMOG authority to represent them in
collective bargaining. The reason for this, PHILSTEAM was merely to
ascertain for itself the existence of a duty to bargain collectively with
PMOG, a step allegedly justified by PMOG's refusal to furnish proof
of majority representation. The asserted reason for the investigation
cannot be sustained. The record discloses that such investigation
was started by PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG's reply
stating a refusal to submit proof of majority representation.
Specifically, the investigation was put under way on June
29, 1954 the same day PHILSTEAM sent its request that PMOG
submit proof of majority representation whereas, PHILSTEAM knew
of PMOG's refusal to furnish said proof only on July 6, 1954, when it
received PMOG's reply letter.
PMOG's refusal to submit evidence showing it represented
a majority had nothing to do with PHILSTEAM's decision to carry out
the investigation.
An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its
employees as to their union affiliation, provided the same is for a
legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the employer that no
reprisals would be taken against unionists. Nonetheless, any
employer who engages in interrogation does so with notice that he
risks a finding of unfair labor practice if the circumstances are such
that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the
company of its employees to a series of questionings regarding their
membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as to
hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair
labor practice. The respondent court has found that PHILSTEAM's
interrogation of its employees had in fact interfered with, restrained
and coerced the employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization.
LABOR RELATIONS
PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION vs. NLRC
Gr. No. L-58341, June 29, 1982
Facts:
On December 11, 1979, a certification election was held at
the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company's (PEPSI) plant in Naga City. Out of
131 votes which were cast, the UNION got 128 so it regarded itself
as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit. The losing labor group
contested the election at various levels but it was unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the UNION filed a notice of strike with
MOLE's Regional Office in Legaspi City on the ground that PEPSI
refused to bargain. PEPSI countered that it was willing to bargain but
there was yet no final decision on the appeal of the other labor
union as to who is the EBR. Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao issued a
resolution stating that the Notice of Strike under consideration,
being premature, is illegal and should, therefore, be dismissed. The
Union disregard the resolution and staged a strike.
On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal strike. Labor Arbiter Fulleros, declared that the
strike staged by the respondents herein was beyond doubt illegal
and therefore all officers and member of the union whose names
appear on the complaint be considered to have lost their
employment status effective May 7, 1890.
Issue:
Whether or not Strike is illegal so as to declare that all the
officers and members of the union whose names and positions
appear on Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo
Bariso and Mauro Nieto be considered to have lost their
employment status effective May 7, 1980. "
Held:
No. It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically
carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were
committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is
entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike."
(Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees, Assn. vs. Tandayag, G.R.
No. L-29217, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 56, 72. And it has also been
held that the members of a union cannot be held responsible for an
illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership or even on
account of their affirmative vote authorizing the same. They become
liable only if they actually participated therein. (ESSO Philippines,
Inc. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (MME), G.R. No. L-36545,
January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 73.)
In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed illegal,
We cannot discount the presence of good faith on the part of the
rank and file members of the UNION considering that in the
certification election the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131 votes
cast so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole bargaining
representative. Moreover, there is no proof that the members of the
UNION all participated in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve
what Justice Barredo calls "capital punishment" in the Esso
Philippines case, supra, are the officers of the UNION who staged
the strike in defiance of the ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao
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WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the private
respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate all of those persons
whose names and positions appear in Annex "A" which is mentioned
in the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dated November 20,
1980, under the same terms and conditions of employment existing
prior to May 7, 1980, except for the officers of the UNION. No costs.
TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 123276, August 18, 1997
Facts:
RBS (company) had a CBA with GMAEU (union) which took
effect on July 2, 1989. RBS observed that a huge amount of overtime
expenses incurred which moved the president to form guidelines on
the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work. On June 11,
1991, RBS furnished GMAEU a copy of the said guidelines and
requested the latter to comment thereon. The union did not file any
comment. RBS then implemented the said guidelines. GMAEU then
send a letter to the president. The union argued that, the union was
not consulted in the formulation of the said guidelines which
violates their CBA, the guidelines would render nugatory the CBA
provision of the same subject and the diminution of benefits being
enjoyed by all employees with respect to the mid-year bonuses
(from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months constitutes a withdrawal of an
existing company policy). RBS management and GMAEU officials
met on 3 July 1991 and on 10 July 1991 to thresh out the issues
raised by GMAEU in its 26 June 1991 letter. Both talks, however,
were short lived as the union refused to hold further talks with RBS.
On 12 July 1991, GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on unfair labor
practices allegedly committed by RBS on grounds of violation of
existing CBA, employees coercion, union interference and
discrimination. The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July
1991, but as early as 16 July 1991 the Union held a strike vote
among its members and submitted the results thereof to the NCMB
on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the union members
voted to go on strike.
During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS,
through counsel, informed GMAEU’s officers that RBS did not violate
any provision in the collective bargaining agreement since the
issuance of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly
recognized in their agreement. As regards GMAEU’s charges of
coercion, union interference and discrimination, RBS argued that
these alleged unfair labor practices were neither raised by the union
in its 26 June 1991 letter nor during their 3 July and 10 July 1991
talks. RBS’ counsel requested GMAEU’s officers to name the persons
or officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices and
to state the specific act or acts complained of so that RBS
management could adequately refute said allegations or impose
appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers. GMAEU’s
LABOR RELATIONS
officers, however, ignored both RBS’ and the labor conciliator’s
requests for a bill of particulars.
In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS
reiterated its request to GMAEU’s officers to furnish RBS the details
of the alleged unfair practices committed by RBS’ officers. Again, the
Union denied RBS’ request and refused to hold any further talks with
RBS management. On the same day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss
GMAEU’s notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the
consequences of an illegal strike. On 2 August 1991, the union
struck. On the same day, RBS filed a complaint for illegal strike and
unfair labor practice against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers
with the NLRC. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor immediately
assumed jurisdiction over the case, issued a return-to-work order,
and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In the
certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and legal ground to
hold RBS guilty of unfair labor practices against the Union. On
appeal (docketed as NLRC-NCR CC No 00076-01), the NLRC affirmed
the labor arbiter’s decision in a resolution dated 31 July 1992.
Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the illegal
strike case filed by RBS against GMAEU. On 18 February 1994, the
labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal and the
union officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike to
have validly lost their employment status. 10 of them did not
appeal. Tiu and Hayuhay appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it upheld the labor arbiter’s decision that
petitioners staged an illegal strike.
Held:
The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB on
12 July 1991 contained general allegations that RBS management
committed unfair labor practices by its gross violation of the
economic provisions in their collective bargaining agreement and by
alleged acts of coercion, union interference and discrimination
which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who
had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support
these allegations.
It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union
treated RBS’ issuance of the “guidelines on the availment of leaves
and rendering of overtime services” as “gross” violations of the
existing collective bargaining agreement. In its talks with the union,
RBS painstakingly explained that the said allegation was unfounded
because the issuance of said guidelines was RBS’ management
prerogative. Up to that point, the union never raised the issue of
unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS’ official under
Article 248 of the Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two
days later, the union raised issues of coercion, discrimination, and
union interference for the first time.
Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory meetings
arranged by the NCMB at which it could have substantiated these
additional allegations. However, the fact that it had submitted the
results of the strike vote even ahead of the conciliatory meetings,
and continuously refused to substantiate its allegations in its notice
of strike thereafter, lends credence to the NLRC’s observation that
meikimouse
DIGEST POOL : Class VI
these charges were indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a
semblance of validity to its notice of strike.
The bottom line is that the union should have immediately
resorted to the grievance machinery established in their agreement
with RBS. In disregarding said procedure the union leaders who
knowingly participated in the illegal strike “have acted unreasonably,
and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from
the consequences of their behavior.”
NUWHRAIN DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER vs. CA
Gr. No. 163942, November 11, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) is the certified bargaining
agent of dusit hotel nikko located in Makati city. On October 24,
2000 they submitted their CBA proposal to the hotel. The
negotiations started but they failed to arrive at mutually acceptable
terms and conditions (DEADLOCK).
December 20, 2001 they filed a notice to strike to the
National conciliation and mediation board (NCMB) on the ground of
the bargaining deadlock. Conciliation hearings were conducted but
was unsuccessful, On January 14, 2002 they decided to wage a
strike.
On January 17 and 18 some members of the union started
to have cropped or clean shaven hair, Eventually the hotel
prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that
they violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards.
The union later on staged a picket outside the premises of
the hotel which eventually led to severe lack of manpower to the
hotel and temporarily ceasing their operations in 3 restaurants.
On January 20, 2002 the hotel issued notice to the union
preventively suspending them and charging them with the following
offense ((1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal
picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's
Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal
acts during the illegal strike)
The next day the union filed a second notice to strike on
the ground of ULP and violation of article 28(a). On January 26,
2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union
officers and sixty-one (61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81)
employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four
(4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days.
On January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of
Strike this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-
busting.
The case was later on compulsory arbitrated to the NLRC
which eventually decided that the Hotel and the Union to execute a
CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRC also
held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike
in which illegal acts were committed by the Union; and that the
strike violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA,
which thereby caused the dismissal of 29 Union officers and 61
LABOR RELATIONS
Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61
dismissed Union members financial assistance in the amount of ½
month's pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits
under their retirement plan whichever was higher.
Upon appeal the CA promulgated its January 19, 2004
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which dismissed the Union's
petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the union, may be adjudged guilty of
staging an illegal strike despite respondents' admission that they
prevented said officers and members from reporting for work for
alleged violation of the hotel's grooming standards.
Held:
First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming
Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to
undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was,
therefore, not a protected action. The Hotel does not need to
advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from
the records before us that the Union officers and members
deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped
their hair. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on
grooming was designed and calculated to place the Hotel
management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union's
proposals. Thus, we hold that the Union's concerted violation of the
Hotel's Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary
cessation and disruption of the Hotel's operations is an unprotected
act and should be considered as an illegal strike.
Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the
Hotel's operations clearly violated the CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout"
provision, The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted
action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted "no
strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibition is squarely applicable
and legally binding.
Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action
to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the Hotel's
Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and
responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving their heads and
cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then
Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor
Code.20 This rule prohibits the commission of any act which will
disrupt or impede the early settlement of the labor disputes that are
under conciliation.
Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day
cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it conducted
the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the
Union failed to observe the mandatory periods before conducting or
holding a strike.
Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its
strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as shown by
the pictures21 presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and
members formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of
the Hotel.
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. GLOWHRAIN
Gr. No. 153664, July 18, 2003
Facts:
Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Industries – Silahis International Hotel Chapter
and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel executed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the period from July 10, 1985
up to July 9, 1988. The petitioner thereafter dismissed some of its
employees and suspended others who were members of the
respondent union. On May 26, 1987, the respondent union filed a
notice of STRIKE with the Department of Labor and Employment,
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), based on the following grounds
of illegal suspension, violation of CBA, and harassment.
The Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment issued a
status quo ante bellum order certifying the labor dispute to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code; and further
directing the employees to return to work within forty-eight hours
from receipt of the order, and for the petitioner to accept all
returning employees under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the labor dispute. The respondent union
complied with the order of the SOLE. The respondent union filed
another notice of strike against the petitioner on account of alleged
violations of the CBA and the illegal dismissal of nine employees.
The SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order
certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, directing
the nine employees to return to work and enjoining both parties
from engaging in any strike or lockout that would exacerbate the
situation. The parties were also directed to sign a CBA within fifteen
days from notice of the said order.
The petitioner placed the respondent union’s Director for
Grievances Apolonio Bondoc, Jr. under preventive suspension. The
respondent union filed a manifestation and motion praying that the
petitioner be held in contempt for violating the May 23, 1990 Order
of the SOLE.
Michael Wilson, the petitioner’s general manager, wrote
the SOLE informing him of the petitioner’s decision to retrench
seventeen less senior employees on a staggered basis, spread over a
period of sixty days, to lessen the daily financial losses being
incurred by the petitioner.
The next day, the respondent union, through its president,
informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will conduct a strike vote
referendum on October 23 and 24, 1990.
The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement
its retrenchment program to stem its huge losses. On November 5,
1990, the petitioner disseminated a circular to all the employees,
informing them that the personnel plantilla would be decreased by
two hundred employees to be implemented on a staggered and
“last in, first out” basis. It terminated the employment of sixty
employees and two officers of the respondent union effective
December 6, 1990. Moreover, the said employees, including the
two union officers, were immediately barred from working. On
November 7, 1990, the respondent union protested the actions of
the petitioner invoking Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. The
respondent union filed an urgent motion for a reconsideration by
LABOR RELATIONS
the SOLE of the Certification Order dated October 31, 1990. On
November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of
eighty-six more employees effective December 14, 1990. The
remaining employees were also informed that it will close in six
months. On November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the
employment of Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990.
By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on
November 16, 1990 another notice of strike because of what it
perceived as the petitioner’s continuing unfair labor practices (ULP).
On the same day, at about 12:00 noon, the officers of the
respondent union and some members staged a picket in the
premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress and egress
thereto. At 3:00 p.m., the police operatives of the Western Police
District arrived and dispersed the picket line.
On November 28, 1990, the SOLE issued an order
certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for consolidation with the
previously certified case. The SOLE issued a return-to-work order,
excluding those who were retrenched, and enjoined all parties from
committing any act that would aggravate the already tense
situation. The SOLE further stated that the validity and propriety of
the retrenchment program of the petitioner should be ventilated
before and resolved by the NLRC. The SOLE denied the respondent
union’s motion to reconsider.
The petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Office
of the NLRC for illegal strike against the union, its members and
officers. The petitioner alleged inter alia that the union members
and officers staged a strike on November 16, 1990 which lasted until
November 29, 1990 without complying with the requirements
provided under Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter, although sympathetic with the
respondent union, held that for the latter’s failure to comply with
the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor
Code, the strike that was staged on November 16, 1990 up to
November 29, 1990 was illegal.
The respondent union and the individual respondents
therein interposed an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter
to the NLRC. The respondent union pointed out in its appeal that it
had complied with the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and
264 of the Labor Code because its November 16, 1990 notice of
strike was a mere reiteration of its September 27, 1990 notice of
strike, which, in turn, complied with all the requirements of the
aforementioned articles.
The NLRC ratiocinated that the compliance by therein
respondents of the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264
of the Labor Code respecting the September 27, 1990 notice of
strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the November
16, 1990 notice of strike. Resultantly, for failure of the union to
comply with the aforementioned requirements for its November 16,
1990 notice of strike, the strike staged on November 16 up to
November 29, 1990 was illegal. Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 153664. Edna Dacanay, another officer of the union, filed a
similar petition before this Court.
Issue:
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
Whether or not the strike staged by the respondent union
on November 16 up to 29, 1990 is legal.
Whether or not the dismissals of the private respondent’s
officers of the respondent union as a consequence of the strike on
November 16 to 29, 1990 are valid.
Held:
The requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice
of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before the intended date
thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at
least seven days before the intended strike.[37] The requisite seven-
day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify
whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the
majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the
cooling-off period were intended to provide an opportunity for
mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.[38]
A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strike
will render the requisite periods nugatory.
Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance
by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a
prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended.
In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike
with the DOLE on November 16, 1990 and on the same day, staged
a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law. Police
operatives of the Western Police District had to disperse the
picketers and take into custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and
the other officers of respondent union, Henry Babay and Dennis
Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of
strike on November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those
contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which
complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off
period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike
staged by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters
contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had already
been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October
31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining the respondent
union from intending or staging a strike. Despite the SOLE order, the
respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16,
1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating Article
264(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the
officers of the respondent union from working and had terminated
the employment of Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars of its
decision to retrench its employees effective December 16, 1990, the
same were not valid justifications for the respondents to do away
with the statutory procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It
behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the remedies
under the CBA or file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the
Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by agreement of the parties,
submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that the
matter may be subjected to voluntary arbitrary proceedings instead
LABOR RELATIONS
of resorting to an immediate strike. There was no immediate and
imperative need for the respondents to stage a strike on the very
day that the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed
because the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to
take effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the
respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted upon by
the SOLE before December 14, 1990.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE vs. TORRES
Gr. No. 100158, June 29, 1992
Facts:
St. Scholastica College and Samahan ng Manggagawang
Pang Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika (NAFTEU) initiated for a first ever
collective bargaining agreement but the negotiations fail and the
union file for a motion to strike.
The union declared a strike and it paralyzed the whole
operation of the college which affected the students. The
respondent issued a back to work order but instead of returning to
work the union then filed for a motion for reconsideration.
The college sent each member of the union a letter to
enjoin them to return to work but the union continued to defy the
return to work order. Conciliation meetings were held but this
proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that
any return to work order should be unconditional.
The college sent termination letters to the individual
strikers and filed a complaint for illegal strike against the union. The
respondent issued an order directing the reinstatement of striking
union members and holding union officers responsible for the
violation of the return to work order and were correspondingly
terminated.
Both parties moved for the partial consideration of the
return to work order.
Issue:
Whether or not the striking union members terminated for
abandonment of work after failing to comply with the return to
work order of the secretary of labor reinstated.
Held:
The labor code provides that if a strike has already taken
place at the time of assumption, all striking employees should
immediately return to work. This means that a return to work order
is immediately effective and executor, notwithstanding the filing of a
motion of reconsideration, it must be strictly complied with even
during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. After all,
the assumption and certification order issued in the exercise of the
secretary’s compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside, must
therefore be complied immediately.
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
The college correspondingly had every right to terminate
the services of thos who chose to disregard the return to work order
issued by the secretary of labor in order to protect the interest of
the students who form part of the youth of the land.
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. SEC.
OF LABOR
Gr. No. 122743, December 12, 1997
Facts:
Two petitions comprise this case. The first is the Union’s
petition questioning the exclusion of union officers, among others,
in the order of the Sec. of Labor directing the company to accept
back all striking workers, and the second is filed by Company seeking
to set aside the writ of execution issued to implement the order.
The Union and the Company reached a deadlock in their
negotiations for a new CBA. Hence the Union struck. Sec. Brillantes,
the Sec. of Labor, intervened and assumed jurisdiction. He ordered
the strikers to return to work but the strikers failed to return.
Pending resolution of the issue involving the legality of the strike,
Sec. Brillantes directed the Company to accept back all striking
workers, except the Union Officers, shop stewards, and all those
with pending criminal charges, whose termination shall be among
the issues to be heard by Atty. Genilo.
Issue:
Whether or not the exclusion of the Sec. of Labor in the
order of the Sec. of Labor directing the company to accept back all
striking workers is correct
Arguments:
In these twin petitions, the UNION argues that the exclusion of
union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal
charges from the directive to the COMPANY to accept back the
striking workers is tantamount to illegal dismissal since the workers
are in effect being terminated without due process of law. The
COMPANY on the other hand maintains that the dismissal of those
who failed to comply with the assumption and return-to-work
orders is valid and in accordance with jurisprudence
Held:
No. It may be true that the workers struck after the
Secretary of Labor and Employment had assumed jurisdiction over
the case and that they may have failed to immediately return to
work even after the issuance of a return-to-work order, making their
continued strike illegal. For, a return-to-work order is immediately
effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. But, the liability of each of the union officers and
the workers, if any, has yet to be determined. Thus, did all or some
of the UNION leaders knowingly participate in the illegal strike? Did
LABOR RELATIONS
any or all of the members of the UNION who then had pending
criminal charges knowingly participate in the commission, if any, of
illegal acts during the strike? The records do not bear the answers to
these questions, but not expectedly so, for Atty. Genilo of the DOLE
has yet to hear and receive evidence on the matter, and to submit a
report and recommendation thereon.
Thus to exclude union officers, shop stewards and those
with pending criminal charges in the directive to the COMPANY to
accept back the striking workers without first determining whether
they knowingly committed illegal acts would be tantamount to
dismissal without due process of law. The Court therefore holds that
the Honorable Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in
excluding union officers, shop stewards and those with pending
criminal charges in the order to the COMPANY to accept back the
striking workers pending resolution of the issue involving the legality
of the strike.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. CA
Gr. No. 169632, March 28, 2006
Facts:
This is a case between the University of San Agustin
Employees Union-FFW (UNION) and The University of San Agustin
(UNIV).
Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year CBA,
the economic provisions of which are effective for 3 years only. After
the lapse of 3 years, the parties negotiated on the economic
provisions but did not agree on the terms during the remaining 2
years of the CBA and beyond.
Since the parties did not agree on the computation of
tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) which shall be the basis for the
increase of salaries, they underwent a preventive mediation
proceedings at the NCMB.
Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock
and thereafter filed a Notice of Strike at the NCMB, which was
expectedly opposed by the Univ through a Motion to Strike-out
Notice of Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration, since
the CBA contained a "no-strike, no-lockout" provision, and a
grievance machinery for settling disputes, including a voluntary
arbitration mechanism should the grievance machinery fail to settle
the dispute. The NCMB, however, failed to resolved the Univ's
Motion
Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute.
On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and
with such assumption of jurisdiction, any strike or lockout was
strictly enjoined.
The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and on the
same day that the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was
supposedly served to both parties, the Union staged a strike. Union
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
members refused to receive a copy of the AJO assailing that only the
Union President is authorized to receive the same. The Union filed a
Petition Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status of the
striking employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC. Such
Petition was later on consolidated with the case pending before the
SOLE, at the request of the Univ.
The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various
economic issues over which the parties had a deadlock in the
collective bargaining, and likewise dismissed the Petition to Declare
Illegal Strike.
The University elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the SOLE.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It
declared the strike as illegal, but affirmed the SOLE's decision
regarding the economic issues.
Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective Motions
for Reconsideration.
Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the Univ
served the striking employees with their notices for termination and
concurrently, the Union filed with the NCMB a second notice of
strike, this time on ground of alleged union busting.
On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps to
negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved futile. Hence, on
April 25, 2005, the Union went on strike. In reaction, the University
notified the Union that it was pulling out of the negotiations
because of the strike.
On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties'
respective motions for reconsideration, promulgated the herein
challenged Partially Amended Decision. Finding merit in the
respondent University's motion for partial reconsideration, the CA
ruled that the SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the economic
issues on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the
grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently,
the CA directed the parties to refer the economic issues of the CBA
to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however, stood firm in its finding
that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal and its
officers were deemed to have lost their employment status.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the strike was illegal and the Union Officers
deemed to have lost their employment status on their failure to
return to work immediately upon the service of AJO issued by the
SOLE.
2. Whether or not the economic provisions of the CBA should be
referred to Voluntary Arbitration.
Held:
On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the Labor
Code provides: ."..Such assumption or certification (of the SOLE)
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The phrase
LABOR RELATIONS
"immediately return to work" indicates an almost instantaneous or
automatic compliance for a striker to return to work once an AJO
has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the striking employees is
violative of the foregoing provision.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that
economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in
computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from
the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and these matters
should be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator, as provided in Art. 261
and 262 of the Labor Code. The peculiar facts of the instant case
show that the University was deprived of a remedy that would have
enjoined the Union strike and was left without any recourse except
to invoke the jurisdiction of the SOLE.
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE
WORKERS UNION
Gr. No. L-25003, October 23, 1981
Facts:
Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the CFI-Manila
against Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when
its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of
newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the
premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000
Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a first
lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the plaintiff is
separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own entrance and road
leading to the national road. This entrance is separate and distinct
from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its
newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for its printing and
publishing business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its
printing plant is taken from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. declared a strike against their company.
October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal
justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its members
picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the
compound to load newsprint from its bodega.
The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily
harm the employees who were in the truck. On October 6, 1964,
union members stopped and prohibited the general manager,
personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the
plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega.
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to
intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to
blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint
in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give
in to the demands of the plaintiff.
meikimouse
DIGEST POOL : Class VI
As a consequence, plaintiff rented another bodega during
the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees
from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega
rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary
bodega.
The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their
employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading
and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent
Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a
sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
Issue:
May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?
Held:
Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not
be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship,
is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize
the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the
context of the dispute. Thus the right may be recognized at the
instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor
dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an
impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the
picketing union.
Notes:
Picketing is a form of protest in which people (called
picketers) congregate outside a place of work or location where an
event is taking place. Often, this is done in an attempt to dissuade
others from going in ("crossing the picket line"), but it can also be
done to draw public attention to a cause. Picketers normally
endeavor to be non-violent. It can have a number of aims, but is
generally to put pressure on the party targeted to meet particular
demands and/or cease operations. This pressure is achieved by
harming the business through loss of customers and negative
publicity, or by discouraging or preventing workers and/or
customers from entering the site and thereby preventing the
business from operating normally.
Picketing is a common tactic used by trade unions during
strikes, who will try to prevent dissident members of the union,
members of other unions and non-unionised workers from working.
Those who cross the picket line and work despite the strike are
known pejoratively as scabs.
LABOR RELATIONS
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
Gr. No. 31195, June 5, 1973
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift
(from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and
third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
A meeting was called by the Company at the Company's
canteen. The Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny
said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang. PBMEO thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already
been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management.
The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly,
the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE' and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of
the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in
the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration,
respondent Company charged petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic
Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
In their answer, herein petitioners claim that they did
not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom
of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike
because it was not directed against the respondent firm.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) - found herein petitioners
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and dismissing the
employment of Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible
for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner PBMEO is guilty of bargaining in
bad faith by violating the provisions of the CBA particularly Article
XXIV: ‘NO LOCKOUT-NO STRIKE.’
Held:
No. The demonstration held by the petitioners was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer,
hence, it was not a violation of the said provision of the CBA.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as
well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of
herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival,
utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.
Said mass demonstration was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency. They only exercised their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they
believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union
and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was
to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they
can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the
local police.
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion
on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for
excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which
is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to
permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional
restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as
the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees
LABOR RELATIONS
to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair
labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of
the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social
justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon
the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...".
The dismissal or termination of the employment of the
petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any
penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight
(8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily
sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the
fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the
localities.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good
intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the
plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies
of local police officers.
The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over
property rights should be sustained.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition,
are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well
as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because
these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."
meikimouse
DIGEST POOL : Class VI
GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 103560, July 6, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a
mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth
month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the
Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW)
with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining
agreement.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre
services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed
operations at said port. On the same morning, the strikers filed
individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-
Welga") with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences between
petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction.
National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary
restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to
work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their
protest. Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that
petitioner required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW
before the remaining strikers could be accepted back to work.
Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-
FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From
the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the
motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into
signing the individual notices of strike. After discovering this
deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of
the union officers and members and without the approval of, or
consultation with, majority of the union members, they immediately
withdrew their notice of strike and returned to work.
The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any
objection, the Labor Arbiter granted their prayer to be excluded as
respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover,
petitioner's complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who
did not return to work and continued with the strike.
For not having complied with the formal requirements in
Article 264 of the Labor Code, the strike staged by petitioner's
workers was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. The workers
who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their
employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in
illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking
employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private
respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without
having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their
union (MLU-FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who were union
officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly
been "duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were
active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully
aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be
accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein
petitioner.
LABOR RELATIONS
NLRC affirmed with modification the Arbiter's decision. It
held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a
"protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including the six
union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to
avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations
between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of
reinstatement.
Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, NLRC
modified its previous resolution. The Commission ruled that since
private respondents were not actually terminated from service,
there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six
months' salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature
of "equitable relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for
lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation
equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
Issue
Whether or not the strike was illegal.
Held:
Yes! A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of
labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employers and employees.
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working
and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages
and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the
cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the
legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was
illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264
(now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not
conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they
were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing
collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by
secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements.
As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar
Workers v. Ovejera, the language of the law leaves no room for
doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after
the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory.
Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia: (i)t SHALL be
unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . .
without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article
or without the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.
In explaining the above provision, we said: In requiring a strike
notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to
provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a
voluntary settlement' during the cooling-off period. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing
of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code,
are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain
the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that
they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike was illegal for
failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265
(now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a distinction between
workers and union officers who participate therein.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
20
have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking worker
cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A
union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work
when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other
workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the
striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private
respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused
to submit to the "screening" required by the company.
PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION vs. CIR
Gr. No. L-10095, October 31, 1957
Facts:
In this case, PHILMAROA (petitioners) presented a list of
demands to the Association de Navieros, the Philippine Shipowners’
Association and the Luzon Stevedoring Company,the most important
of which are: (1) the standardization and increase of salaries; (2) sick
and vacation leave; (3) hospitalization and sick leave; and (4) a
closed shop agreement.
As none of the companies were willing to consider its
demands the Philmaroa gave notice of its intention to strike to the
different shipping companies and to the Chief, Conciliation Service
Division, Department of Labor.
The Chief of the Conciliation Service called the parties for
conference. At this conference the Association de Navieros and the
Philippine Shipowners’ Association gave the information that they
had no authority or power to bargain collectively and suggested that
the members of the said association be notified, so the union sent
notices to the different member companies(respondents).
The respondent companies answered, questioning the
authority of the Philmaroa to act as representative of the radio
operators and demanding that the list of the members employed
LABOR RELATIONS
who belong to the Philmaroa be furnished them. But the Philmaroa
refused to do so for fear of reprisal. The Companies also averred
that some of them had given salaries over and above that demanded
in the standardization, some have given sick and vacation leave and
hospitalization, etc.
The companies were given six days of grace within which
to act upon or answer the demands made by the Philmaroa.
Concilliation efforts failed to effect a settlement and the 6 day
period expired thus, Philmaroa declared a strike.
The President of the Philippines certified the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR allowed the strikers to go back
to their respective positions, but without backpay. They denied
standardization, vacation leave and closed shop agreement, but
granting sick leave, free hospitalization with pay.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners should be entitled to
reinstatement with backwages.
Held:
SC upheld reinstatement but rejected the claim for back
wages. The strike was by all means a voluntary act on the part of the
strikers. The strike was used as an economic weapon to compel the
grant of the conditions of employment; but it was not caused by any
illegal or unfair labor practice on the part of the respondent
companies/ employers at all.
There is no reason for granting backpay as they had
voluntarily absented themselves from work and there had been no
unfair labor practice on the part of the respondent companies. The
grant of backpay is governed by the principle “fair day’s wage for a
fair day’s labor.”
CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS UNION vs.
CIR, Gr. No. L-19778, September 30, 1964
Facts:
On July 10, 1956, Cromwell Commercial Co. and the
Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC) signed
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
The changes in the working conditions in the company and
the latter's failure to carry out its part of the agreement became a
source of complaint among the employees. The company did
nothing. The grievance machinery set up in the agreement could not
function on account of the company's refusal to name its
representatives in the committee.
Then, the company dismissed Gaddi and Andrada, leaders
of the shipping department-employees. The union dispatched
another letter to the company, protesting the dismissal of Gaddi and
Andrada.
On March 8, the company took back the keys from the
warehouseman and ordered the salesmen to put their trucks in the
garage.
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
Finally, on March 11, 1954 the union struck and picketed
the premises of the company.
The company in turn gave the strikers until 8 a.m. of
March 14, 1957 within which to return to work otherwise they
would be considered dismissed for cause. It warned them that the
strike was illegal for being against the no strike clause of the CBA.
In a conference called by the Department of Labor, the
strikers offered to return to work provided the company observed
the provisions of the bargaining contract. But the company insisted
that the strikers could be taken back only under the terms of its
March 1 order.
On September 19, 1957 this case was filed in the CIR, charging
the company, with ULP. After trial, the court rendered judgment as
follows: a) to reinstate Gaddi and the 5 salesmen with half backpay .
b) To reinstate all the strikers listed in Annex "A" of the complaint,
without backwages.
The court in banc affirmed the decision. Hence this appeal.
Issues:
(1) awarding only half back wages to Gaddi and the five salesmen,
(2) awarding no back wages to the rest of the strikers and
(3) denying reinstatement to Andrada and Dario and to those who
might have found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere.
Held:
At the outset, two types of employees involved in this case
must be distinguished, namely, those who were discriminatorily
dismissed for union activities and those who voluntarily went on
strike.
# 1. To the first class belong Gaddi and Andrada,
both of whom, as earlier shown, had been dismissed for union
activities, and the five salesmen who were virtually locked out by
the company when they were ordered to put their trucks in the
garage.
#2 To the second class belong those who declared a
strike on March 11, 1957, following the failure of the company-
union conference to settle their dispute.
The denial of backpay may be justified, although on a
different ground. For this purpose, We shall advert again to the
distinction earlier made between discriminatorily dismissed
employees and those who struck, albeit in protest against the
company's ULP. Discriminatorily dismissed employees received
backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is from the
day of their discharge. On this score, the award of backpay to Gaddi,
Andrada and the salesmen may be justified. The salesmen, as
already stated, were practically locked out when they were ordered
to put their trucks in the garage; they did not voluntarily strike.
Hence, the award of backwages.
In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary
act of protest against what they considered ULP of the company.
The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the
company's ULP. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to
the employer. "When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in
protest against ULP, it has been our policy not to award them
backpay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon the
strike and apply for reinstatement despite the ULP and the employer
LABOR RELATIONS
either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their
reinstatement new conditions that constitute ULP, We are of the
opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award
backpay are no longer controlling. Accordingly, We hold that where,
as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon
their acceptance of the new conditions that discriminate against
them because of their union membership or activities, the strikers
who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused
reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay
they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's
discriminatory acts."
While it is true that the strikers in this case offered to
return to work on March 14, 1957, We find that their offer was
conditional. Their offer was predicated on the company's
observance of the provisions of the CBA - the very bone of
contention between the parties by reason of which the union
walked out. To be effective so as to entitle the strikers to backpay,
the offer must have been unconditional. The strikers must have
offered to return to work under the same conditions under which
they just before their strike so that the company's refusal would
have placed on the blame for their economic loss. But that is not the
case here. Indeed the offer of the company to accept the striker
under the conditions obtaining before the strike, without prejudice
to taking up the grievances of the strike can be considered in its
favor in denying back wages to the strikers.
Nor may it be said that the strikers could not have offered
to return to work because the company dismissed them upon their
failure to return to work on March 14, 1957. For the notice given by
the company was merely a "tactical" threat designed to break the
strike and not really to discharge the striking employees
# 3. The case of Andrada and Dario who were found
guilty of acts of violence consisting of hurling stones which smashed
glass windows of the building of the company and the headlights of
a car and the utterance of obscenities such as "Putang ina". But the
union contends that the acts committed by Andrada and Dario were
not so serious as to call for the forfeiture of their right to
reinstatement. It is not for Us to judge the effect of misconduct by
employees. That is primarily for the CIR to determine. In the absence
of proof of abuse of discretion on the part of the CIR this Court will
not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
The same thing may be said of the denial of
reinstatement to those who might have found substantial
employment elsewhere. We agree with the union that the mere fact
that strikers or dismissed employees have found such employment
elsewhere is not necessarily a bar to their
1
reinstatement. According to the Court, it is for the Board in each
case to weigh the particular facts and to determine, in the exercise
of wise administrative discretion, whether the Act would best be
effectuated by directing reinstatement despite the fact that the
given employees had found equivalent employment.
Obviously it was after considering the facts in this case
that the CIR predicated the reinstatement of the employees
concerned on the fact that they had not found substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere. Thus, it made clear in the
dispositive portion of its decision that it was ordering the taking of
affirmative acts "which the Court finds will effectuate the policy of
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
the Act". The union has not shown that in so doing the CIR abused
its discretion.
DECISION: The decision and resolution of the CIR appealed
from are hereby affirmed!
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
I can not agree to the ruling laid down in the opinion in so
far as it denies backpay to the reinstated laborers. There is no
dispute that the employer was the first to infringe the CBA by
refusing to implement its provisions, particularly by its March 1
order, and by insisting on it as a condition for taking back the
strikers. I cannot see how the objectives and policies of the
Industrial Peace Act can be said to be promoted by placing the
economic loss on the strikers, denying them backpay; the
discouraging of ULP is certainly one of unfair labor policies, and the
denial of backpay to the victims of ULP is a direct encouragement for
the employer to continue its reprobable misconduct.
While the laborers technically violated the no-strike
clause, the facts as found reveal that the employer goaded the
laborers into striking, by repeatedly violating the CBA and by
preventing the organization of the grievance committee through the
Company's refusal to name its representatives therein.
CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MARSMAN
Gr. No. L-17038 July 31, 1964
Facts:
Marsman & Company (Company) had employees of
around 320 persons, about 140 of whom where members of
MARCELA and about 20 of the National Labor Union. On December
23, 1953 the Industrial Court named Marsman & Company
Employees and Laborers Association (MARCELA) as the employees'
bargaining agent in regard to rates of pay, terms and conditions of
employment. At that time MARCELA was affiliated with the
Federation of Free Workers, or FFW, a national labor organization.
On March 17, 1954 MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a set
of proposals for collective bargaining, which the Company answered
on March 24, 1954. Despite negotiations held between the Company
and the Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so on April 8, 1954
the Union, failed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor.
Mediation by the Conciliation Service of that Department proved
fruitless.
On June 4, 1954 the Union declared a strike and at the
same time placed a "round-the-clock" picket line around the
Company's premises in Intramuros, Manila. On July 30, 1954, in a
conference called by Eleuterio Adevoso, then Secretary of Labor, the
Union officials and members then present were prevailed upon by
Adevoso to accept the proposals of Antonio de las Alas, Company
vice-president, that they stop the strike and go back to work, and
LABOR RELATIONS
that when they were already working the Company would discuss
with them their demands. Upon being informed to the Union's
acceptance of the proposal the strikers returned to work. The
Company admitted back sixteen picketing strikers on August 9, 1954
and later on, it also reemployed non-union employees and a
majority of the strikers. However, complainants herein were refused
admittance and were informed by Company officials that they would
not be reinstated unless they ceased to be active Union members
and that in any case the Company already had enough men for its
business operations. As a result the strike and the picketing were
resumed, because of which employees who had been admitted to
work since July 21, 1954 had to stay inside the Company premises,
where the Company furnished them food and quarters up to
October 1954.
Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate
the 69 complainants even after repeated requests, the
Confederation of Labor Associations of the Philippines (CLAP), to
which the Union had affiliated after seceding from the FFW initiated
the present charge for unfair labor practice. Initially the strike staged
by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it certain
economic benefits set forth in its proposal for collective bargaining.
The strike was an economic one, But the strike changed its character
from the time the Company refused to reinstate complainants
because of their union activities after it had offered to admit all the
strikers and in fact did readmit the others. It was then converted
into an unfair labor practice strike.
The Court (Judge Jose S. Bautista), after hearing, found the
Company guilty of the charge and ordered it to reinstate 60 of the
aforementioned 69 complainants to their former positions or to
similar ones with the same rate of pay, without back wages. Motions
for reconsideration were denied hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the strike was illegal
Held:
The Company claims that the complainants applied for
readmission only on June 7, 1955, more than a year after the offer,
when the CLAP, in their behalf, wrote the Company asking for their
reinstatement. Prior to said letter, however, complainants had, by
various means, sought readmission. After Delas Alas' invitation to
return to work was accepted by the Union officers and members,
they informed all the other strikers accordingly. Thereupon the
strikers terminated the strike and presented themselves for work at
the Company's premises.
The Company alleges that it was economic reasons, i.e., its
policy of retrenchment, not labor discrimination, which prevented it
from rehiring complainants. This is disproved, however, by the fact
that it not only readmitted the other strikers, but also hired new
employees and even increased the salaries of its personnel by
almost 50%.
The Union began the strike because it believed in good
faith that settlement of their demands was at an impasse and that
further negotiations would only come to naught. It stopped the
strike upon the belief they could go back to work. Then it renewed
the strike (or it started a new strike) as a protest against the
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid grounds for
going on a strike.
ABARIA vs. NLRC
Gr. No. 154113, December 7, 2011
Facts:
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Metro
Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). Under the 1987 and 1991
CBAs, the signatories were Pongasi, Sr. for MCCHI, and Atty.
Alforque and Lumapguid for NFL-MCCHI.
In the CBA effective from January 1994 until December 31,
1995, the signatories were Buot as Board of Trustees Chairman, Rev.
Iyoy as MCCH Administrator and Atty. Yu as Legal Counsel of NFL,
while Nava, President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-
MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Posting. Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy
expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA and attaching the
proposal.
Nava subsequently requested that some of the employees
be allowed to avail of one-day union leave with pay. However,
MCCHI returned the CBA proposal to secure first the endorsement
of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative
of MCCHI employees. Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the
proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and
that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person
for collective bargaining negotiations. By January 1996, the
collection of union fees (check-off) was temporarily suspended by
MCCHI in view of the existing conflict between the federation and its
local affiliate.
Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take over the room being
used as union office but was prevented to do so by Nava and her
group who protested these actions and insisted that management
directly negotiate with them for a new CBA. MCCHI referred the
matter to Atty. Alforque, NFL’s Regional Director, and advised Nava
that their group is not recognized by NFL.
In his letter addressed to Nava some of the employees’
union membership was suspended for serious violation of the
Constitution and By-Laws. Upon the request of Atty. Alforque,
MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members.
The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group
launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and
putting up placards, posters and streamers.
Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted
activities being carried out by union members which are not
sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to
submit a written explanation why they should not be terminated for
having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike,
and placed them under immediate preventive suspension.
Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a
temporary stoppage of work, explaining that employees wore their
armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating their demand for
LABOR RELATIONS
MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Rev. Iyoy,
having been informed that Nava and her group have also been
suspended by NFL, directed said officers to appear before his office
for investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they
reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the
officers of the hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them
to join the strike. Said union officers, however, invoked the
grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute
between management and the union.
The DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that
there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL
is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted
only a copy of its Charter Certificate. MCCHI then sent individual
notices to all union members asking them to submit a written
explanation why they should not be terminated for having
supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which
has no legal personality as per DOLE records. In their collective
response, it was explained that the picketing employees wore
armbands to protest MCCHI’s refusal to bargain; it was also
contended that MCCHI cannot question the legal personality of the
union which had actively assisted in CBA negotiations and
implementation.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was
deemed not filed for want of legal personality on the part of the
filer. The NCMB likewise denied their motion for reconsideration.
Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted a strike vote
during which an overwhelming majority of union members approved
the strike.
Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push
through because the striking union members insisted on attending
the same only as a group. MCCHI again sent notices informing them
that their refusal to submit to investigation is deemed a waiver of
their right to explain their side and management shall proceed to
impose proper disciplinary action under the circumstances.
Thereafter, MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and
other members who participated in the strike and picketing
activities. It also issued a cease-and-desist order to the rest of the
striking employees stressing that the wildcat concerted activities
spearheaded by the Nava group is illegal without a valid Notice of
Strike and warning them that non-compliance will compel
management to impose disciplinary actions against them. For their
continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than
100 striking employees were dismissed.
Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. The
means of ingress to and egress from the hospital were blocked so
that vehicles carrying patients and employees were barred from
entering the premises. Placards were placed at the hospital’s
entrance gate stating: “Please proceed to another hospital” and “we
are on protest.” Employees and patients reported acts of
intimidation and harassment perpetrated by union leaders and
members. With the intensified atmosphere of violence and
animosity within the hospital premises as a result of continued
protest activities by union members, MCCHI suffered heavy losses
due to low patient admission rates. The hospital’s suppliers also
refused to make further deliveries on credit.
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DIGEST POOL : Class VI
With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital
operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a
petition for injunction in the NLRC (Cebu City). A TRO was issued.
MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients),
including a security guard who was stabbed by an identified
sympathizer while in the company of Nava’s group. MCCHI’s
petition was granted and a permanent injunction was issued
enjoining the Nava group from committing illegal acts. The City
Government of Cebu ordered the demolition of the structures and
obstructions put up by the picketing employees of MCCHI along the
sidewalk.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees.
Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino rendered his decision dismissing
the complaints for unfair labor practice filed by Nava and 90 other
complainants. ELA Belarmino found no basis for the charge of
unfair labor practice and declared the strike and picketing activities
illegal having been conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a
legitimate labor organization. The termination of union leaders was
upheld as valid. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal is affirmed. Complainants elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition on
procedural ground. Hence, a petition is filed before the Supreme
Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the strike and picketing activities
conducted by union officers and members were illegal
Whether or not union officers and members who
participated in an illegal strike can be held liable thereof
Held:
Yes, the strike is illegal.
As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly
registered or an independently registered union at the time it filed
the notice of strike and when it conducted the strike vot. It could not
then legally represent the union members. Consequently, the
mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report
were ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMA-
MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code
and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.
Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the commission
of the following prohibited activities: (1) violence, coercion,
intimidation and harassment against non-participating employees;
and (2) blocking of free ingress to and egress from the hospital,
including preventing patients and their vehicles from entering the
hospital and other employees from reporting to work, the putting up
of placards with a statement advising incoming patients to proceed
to another hospital because MCCHI employees are on strike/protest.
As shown by photographs submitted by MCCHI, as well as the
findings of the NCMB and Cebu City Government, the hospital
premises and sidewalk within its vicinity were full of placards,
streamers and makeshift structures that obstructed its use by the
LABOR RELATIONS
public who were likewise barraged by the noise coming from strikers
using megaphones. On the other hand, the affidavits executed by
several hospital employees and patients narrated in detail the
incidents of harassment, intimidation, violence and coercion, some
of these witnesses have positively identified the perpetrators. The
prolonged work stoppage and picketing activities of the striking
employees severely disrupted hospital operations that MCCHI
suffered heavy financial losses.
The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as
sustained by the appellate court, clearly established that the striking
union members created so much noise, disturbance and obstruction
that the local government authorities eventually ordered their
removal for being a public nuisance. This was followed by an
injunction from the NCMB enjoining the union leaders from further
blocking the free ingress to and egress from the hospital, and from
committing threats, coercion and intimidation against non-striking
employees and patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the purpose of
seeking medical treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal strike
had lasted for almost five months.
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for
the consequences of an illegal strike to the participating workers: x
x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and
any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
The above provision makes a distinction between workers
and union officers who participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary
striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal
acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during
a strike.
Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities
despite the declaration by the NCMB that their union was not duly
registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from
NFL’s legal counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to
the national federation, and their filing of the notice of strike and
conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union has no
legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective bargaining
purposes, there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers
knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
With respect to the dismissed union members, although
MCCHI submitted photographs taken at the picket line, it did not
individually name those striking employees and specify the illegal act
committed by each of them. As to the affidavits executed by non-
striking employees, they identified mostly union officers as the
persons who blocked the hospital entrance, harassed hospital
employees and patients whose vehicles were prevented from
entering the premises. Only some of these witnesses actually named
a few union members who committed similar acts of harassment
and coercion.
meikimouse