ABOTT LAB., PHILS. ET.AL VS PEARLE ALCARAZ system for all of its employees.
system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given copies
FACTS:
On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott)
caused the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its
need for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager who
would: (a) be responsible for drug safety surveillance
operations, staffing, and budget; (b) lead the development and
implementation of standard operating procedures/policies for
drug safety surveillance and vigilance; and (c) act as the primary
interface with internal and external customers regarding safety
operations and queries.
Alcaraz – who was then a Regulatory Affairs and
Information Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines,
Incorporated (another pharmaceutical company like
Abbott) – showed interest and submitted her application on
October 4, 2004.
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the
above-mentioned position which was an item under the
company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU)
department.
In Abbott’s offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be
employed on a probationary basis.
Later that day, she accepted the said offer and received an
electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbott’s Recruitment Officer,
Teresita C. Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the
same. Attached to Bernardo’s e-mail were Abbott’s
organizational chart and a job description of Alcaraz’s
work.
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment
contract which stated that she was to be placed on
probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February
15, 2005 to August 14, 2005.
During Alcaraz’s pre-employment orientation, Allan G.
Almazar, Hospira’s Country Transition Manager, briefed her on
her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs
Manager:
(a) she will handle the staff of Hospira ALSU and will directly
report to Almazar on matters regarding Hopira’s local
operations, operational budget, and performance evaluation
of the Hospira ALSU Staff who are on probationary status;
(b) she must implement Abbott’s Code of Good Corporate
Conduct (Code of Conduct), office policies on human
resources and finance, and ensure that Abbott will hire people
who are fit in the organizational discipline;
(c) Kelly Walsh, Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance
Drug Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate supervisor;
(d) she should always coordinate with Abbott’s human
resource officers in the management and discipline of the
staff;
(e) Hospira ALSU will spin off from Abbott in early 2006 and
will be officially incorporated and known as Hospira,
Philippines; and
(f) the processing of information and/or raw material data
subject of Hospira ALSU operations will be strictly confined
and controlled under the computer system and network being
maintained and operated from the United States. For this
purpose, all those involved in Hospira ALSU are required to
use two identification cards: one, to identify them as Abbott’s
employees and another, to identify them as Hospira
employees.
On March 3, 2005, Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa, Abbott’s
Human Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail
which contained an explanation of the procedure for
evaluating the performance of probationary employees and
further indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation
of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance
Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence
Orientation Modules (Performance Modules) which she had to
apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.
Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of
a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and
discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third
month and second on the fifth month from the date of
employment. The necessary Performance Improvement Plan
should also be made during the third-month review in case of a
gap between the employee’s performance and the standards
set. These performance standards should be discussed in
detail with the employee within the first two (2) weeks on
the job. It was equally required that a signed copy of the PPSE
form must be submitted to Abbott’s Human Resources
Department (HRD) and shall serve as documentation of the
employee’s performance during his/her probationary
period. This shall form the basis for recommending the
confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some
of the staff had disciplinary problems. Thus, she would
reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior such as non-
observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect of
Abbott officers. However, Alcaraz’s method of management was
considered by Walsh to be "too strict." Alcaraz approached Misa
to discuss these concerns and was told to "lie low" and let Walsh
handle the matter. Misa even assured her that Abbott’s HRD
would support her in all her management decisions. On April 12,
2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting
immediate action on the staff’s performance evaluation as their
probationary periods were about to end. This Alcaraz eventually
submitted.
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with Cecille Terrible,
Abbott’s former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding
staff performance standards. In the course thereof, Alcaraz
accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-mail sent by Walsh
to some staff members which essentially contained queries
regarding the former’s job performance. Alcaraz asked if
Walsh’s action was the normal process of evaluation. Terrible
said that it was not.
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh
and Terrible where she was informed that she failed to meet the
regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs
Manager. Thereafter, Walsh and Terrible requested Alcaraz
to tender her resignation, else they be forced to terminate
her services. She was also told that, regardless of her
choice, she should no longer report for work and was asked
to surrender her office identification cards. She requested to
be given one week to decide on the same, but to no avail.
On May 17, 2005, Alcaraz told her administrative assistant,
Claude Gonzales (Gonzales), that she would be on leave for that
day. However, Gonzales told her that Walsh and Terrible
already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that Alcaraz
already resigned due to health reasons.
On May 23, 2005, Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo personally
handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that her services had been
terminated effective May 19, 2005. The letter detailed the
reasons for Alcaraz’s termination – particularly, that Alcaraz:
(a) did not manage her time effectively;
(b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective
rapport with them;
(c) failed to train her staff effectively; and
 (d) was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to make
sound judgments on case processing and article review which
were necessary for the proper performance of her duties.
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her
employment and thus, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers, namely,
Misa, Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist. She
claimed that she should have already been considered as a
regular and not a probationary employee given Abbott’s
failure to inform her of the reasonable standards for her
regularization upon her engagement as required under
Article 295 of the Labor Code. In this relation, she contended
that while her employment contract stated that she was to be
engaged on a probationary status, the same did not indicate
the standards on which her regularization would be
based. She further averred that the individual petitioners
maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her when:
(a) they threatened her with termination;
(b) she was ordered not to enter company premises even if
she was still an employee thereof; and
(c) they publicly announced that she already resigned in order
to humiliate her.
Abbott maintained that Alcaraz was validly terminated from her
probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the
prescribed standards for her regularization which were made
known to her at the time of her engagement.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in Abbott’s favor. The NLRC reversed,
upholding Alcaraz’s allegations. The CA affirmed the NLRC
decision.
ISSUES:
1) WON Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable
standards to qualify her as a regular employee
MAJORITY: YES. Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties
and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to,
during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of
her employment. On this score, the Court finds it apt to detail not
only the incidents which point out to the efforts made by Abbott
but also those circumstances which would show that Alcaraz
was well-apprised of her employer’s expectations that
would, in turn, determine her regularization:
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the publication in a
major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory
Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job description for as
well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the
aforesaid position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit her
application to Abbott on October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated
that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment
contract which specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to
be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months
beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer,
Bernardo sent her (d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s
employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott’s
organizational structure and her job description through e-
mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment
orientation where Almazar informed her that she had to
implement Abbott’s Code of Conduct and office policies on
human resources and finance and that she would be reporting
directly to Walsh;
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as
part of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and
Performance Modules from Misa who explained to her the
procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary
employees; she was further notified that Abbott had only one
evaluation system for all of its employees; and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another
pharmaceutical company and had admitted to have an
“extensive training and background” to acquire the necessary
skills for her job.
Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances,
Alcaraz was well-aware that her regularization would depend on
her ability and capacity to fulfill the requirements of her position
as Regulatory Affairs Manager and that her failure to perform
such would give Abbott a valid cause to terminate her
probationary employment. Verily, basic knowledge and
common sense dictate that the adequate performance of
one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied
standard for a probationary employee to be regularized;
such is a regularization standard which need not be literally
spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every
case.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): NO. The Offer Sheet was designed to
inform Alcaraz of the compensation and benefits package
offered to her by Abbott and can in no way be read as a
statement of the applicable probationary employment
standard. It was communicated even prior to engagement when
the parties were negotiating, not at the point of engagement as
the law requires.
The pre-employment orientation on Alcaraz’s duty to implement
Abbott’s Code of Conduct, office policies and training
program likewise cannot be characterized as performance
standards; they simply related to activities aimed at
acquainting and training Alcaraz on her duties and not for
the purpose of informing her of the performance standards
applicable to her. What stands out is that they do not pertain
specifically to Alcaraz and the required performance
standard applicable for her qualification for regular
employment; they related to the staff Alcaraz managed and
supervised. Additionally, these were all relayed prior to or
after Alcaraz was engaged by Abbott.
An important distinction to remember at this point is
that Alcaraz’s knowledge of the duties that her work
entailed, and her knowledge of the employer’s performance
standard, are two distinct matters separately requiring the
presentation of independent proof.
MAJORITY: Keeping with [the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code], an employer is deemed to have made
known the standards that would qualify a probationary
employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted
reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is
expected to do to accomplish during the trial of probation.
This goes without saying that the employee is sufficiently made
aware of his probationary status as well as the length of time of
the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-
descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids,
cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also in Aberdeen Court, Inc v.
Agustin, it has been held that the rule on notifying a
probationary employee of the standards of regularization
should not be used to exculpate an employee in a manner
contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard
to which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard
to be met. In the same light, an employee’s failure to perform
the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly
made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a
probationary employee’s non-regularization.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): Based on these premises, the ponencia
then deftly argues that because the duties and
responsibilities of the position have been explained
to Alcaraz, an experienced human resource specialist, she
should have known what was expected for her to attain
regular status. The ponencia’s reasoning, however, is badly
flawed.
1st. The ponencia impliedly admits that no performance
standards were expressly given but argues that because
Alcaraz had been informed of her duties and responsibilities (a
fact that was and is not disputed), she should be deemed to
know what was expected of her for purposes of
regularization. This is a major flaw that the ponencia
satisfies only via an assumption. The ponencia apparently
forgets that knowledge of duties and responsibilities is
different from the measure of how these duties and
responsibilities should be delivered. They are separate
elements and the latter element is missing in the present
case.
2nd. The ponencia glosses over the communication aspect. Not
only must there be express performance standards; there must
be effective communication. If no standards were provided, what
would be communicated?
3rd. The ponencia badly contradicts itself in claiming that actual
communication of specific standards might not be necessary
“when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the
case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers.” Alcaraz, in the
first place, was never a maid, cook, driver or a messenger
and cannot be placed under this classification; she was
hired and employed as a human resources manager, in short, a
managerial employee. Plain and common sense reasoning by
one who ever had been in an employment situation dictates
that the job of a manager cannot be self-explanatory, in the
way the ponencia implied; the complexity of a managerial job
must necessarily require that the level of performance to be
delivered must be specified and cannot simply be assumed
based on the communication of the manager’s duties and
responsibilities.
4th. The ponencia also forgets that what these “performance
standards” or measures cannot simply be assumed
because they are critically important in this case, or for that
matter, in any case involving jobs whose duties and
responsibilities are not simple or self-descriptive. If
Alcaraz had been evaluated or assessed in the manner that the
company’s internal rules require, these standards would have
been the basis for her performance or lack of it. Last but not the
least, Alcaraz’s services were terminated on the basis of the
performance standards that, by law, the employer set or
prescribed at the time of the employee’s engagement. If none
had been prescribed in the first place, under what basis
could the employee then be assessed for purposes of
termination or regularization?
2) WON Alcaraz was validly terminated from her
employment
MAJORITY: NO. Abbott failed to follow the above-stated
procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of
evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz’s PPSE form was
submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE form
was completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was
the performance evaluation discussed with her during the third
and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come up
with the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly
gauge Alcaraz’s performance with the set company standards.
The Court modified Agabon v. NLRC in the case of Jaka Food
Processing Corporation v. Pacot where it created a distinction
between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause,
on one hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on the
other.
If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 296 of the
Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the
notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him
should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in
effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee
If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article
297 but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the
dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise
of his management prerogative.
Alcaraz’s dismissal proceeded from her failure to comply
with the standards required for her regularization. As such,
it is undeniable that the dismissal process was, in effect,
initiated by an act imputable to the employee, akin to
dismissals due to just causes under Article 296 of the Labor
Code. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to fix the
amount of nominal damages at the amount of P30,000.00,
consistent with its rulings in both Agabon and Jaka.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): YES. Alcaraz was dismissed as she
“failed to qualify as regular employee in accordance with the
prescribed standards set by the Company.” Even granting for
the sake of argument that Abbott had apprised Alcaraz of an
applicable performance standard, the evidence failed to show
that Alcaraz did not meet this standard in a manner and to
the extent equivalent to the “just cause” that the law
requires.
In defense of Abbott’s failure to observe the two-notice
requirement, the ponencia argues that a different procedure
applies when terminating a probationary employee; the usual
two-notice requirement does not govern, citing for this purpose
Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code. The ponencia, however, forgets that the single
notice rule applies only if the employee is validly on
probationary basis; it does not apply where the employee
is deemed a regular employee for the company’s failure to
provide and to communicate a prescribed performance
standard applicable to the probationary employee.
3) WON the individual petitioners herein are liable
MAJORITY: NO. Other than her unfounded assertions on the
matter, there is no evidence to support the fact that the individual
petitioners herein, in their capacity as Abbott’s officers and
employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by ill will in
terminating Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was made
to resign and not allowed to enter the workplace does not
necessarily indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient
ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with her
termination. On the alleged loss of her personal belongings,
records are bereft of any showing that the same could be
attributed to Abbott or any of its officers.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): YES. The NLRC exhaustively discussed
Abbott’s bad faith, as demonstrated by the actions of the
individual petitioners:
First, Alcaraz was pressured to resign:
(1) she was threatened with termination, which will surely
damage her reputation in the pharmaceutical industry;
(2) she was asked to evacuate her Commission and ordered not
to enter the Company’s premises even if she was still an Abbott
employee; and
(3) Terrible and Walsh made a public announcement to the staff
that Alcaraz already resigned even if in reality she did not.

The CA also described in detail the abrupt and oppressive
manner in which Alcaraz’s employment was dismissed by
Abbott:
On May 23, 2005, Alcaraz still reported for work since Abbott
had not yet handed the termination notice to her. However, the
security guard did not allow her to enter the Hospira ALSU
office pursuant to Walsh[’s] instruction. She requested
Walsh that she be allowed to enter the company premises to
retrieve her last remaining things in her office which are mostly
her personal belongings. She was allowed to enter.
However, she was surprised to see her drawers already
unlocked and, when she opened the same, she discovered
that her small brown envelope x x x, white pouch containing
the duplicate keys, and the staff’s final evaluation sheets
were missing.Alcaraz informed Bernardo about the
incident. The latter responded by saying she was no longer
an employee of the company since May 19, 2005.
Alcaraz reported the matter to the Pasig Police Station and
asked for help regarding the theft of her properties. The Pasig
Police incident report stated as follows:
x x x x When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one
SOCO officer and staff, named Christian Perez, Kelly Walsh
allegedly admitted that she was the one who opened the drawer
and got the green folders containing the staff evaluations. The
Reportee was told by Kelly Walsh that her Rolex wristwatch will
be returned to her provided that she will immediately vacate her
office.
On the same date, Alcaraz’s termination letter dated May 19,
2005 was handed to her by Walsh, Almazar and Bernardo.
RESULT: CA reversed. In favor of Abbott.
2014 Resolution
A. Manner of review.
Alcaraz contends that the Court should not have conducted a
re-weighing of evidence since a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) is limited to the
review of questions of law. She submits that since what was
under review was a ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court
should only determine whether or not the CA properly
determined that the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion
. before it, the reversal of its ruling was thus in order.
The assertion does not justify the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision.
A careful perusal of the questioned Decision will reveal that the
Court actually resolved the controversy under the above-stated
framework of analysis. Essentially, the Court found the CA to
have committed an error in holding that no grave abuse of
discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC since the latter arbitrarily
disregarded the legal implication of the attendant circumstances
in this case which should have simply resulted in the finding that
Alcaraz was apprised of the performance standards for her
regularization and hence, was properly a probationary
employee. As the Court observed, an employee’s failure to
perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly
made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a
probationary employee’s non-regularization. As detailed in the
Decision, Alcaraz was well-apprised of her duties and
responsibilities as well as the probationary status of her
employment:
(a) On June 27, 2004, [Abbott Laboratories, Philippines
(Abbott)] caused the publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager,
indicating therein the job description for as well as the duties
and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position; this
prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to Abbott on
October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated
that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment
contract which specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to
be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months
beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer,
Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott’s organizational structure
and her job description through e-mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment
orientation where [Allan G. Almazar] informed her that she
had to implement Abbott’s Code of Conduct and office policies
on human resources and finance and that she would be
reporting directly to [Kelly Walsh];
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as
part of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and
Performance Modules from [Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa] who
explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance
of probationary employees; she was further notified that
Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees;
and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another
pharmaceutical company and had admitted to have an
"extensive training and background" to acquire the necessary
skills for her job.
[I]n holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her
status as a regular and not a probationary employee, the Court
finds that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision on
the premise that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and
Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not
equivalent to being actually informed of the performance
standards upon which she should have been evaluated on. It,
however, overlooked the legal implication of the other attendant
circumstances as detailed herein which should have warranted
a contrary finding that Alcaraz was indeed a probationary and
not a regular employee – more particularly the fact that she was
well-aware of her duties and responsibilities and that her failure
to adequately perform the same would lead to her non-
regularization and eventually, her termination.
Consequently, since the CA found that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion and denied the certiorari petition
At this juncture, it bears exposition that while NLRC decisions
are, by their nature, final and executory4 and, hence, not subject
to appellate review,5 the Court is not precluded from considering
other questions of law aside from the CA’s finding on the NLRC’s
grave abuse of discretion. While the focal point of analysis
revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with ancillary issues
– such as, in this case, the question of how a probationary
employee is deemed to have been informed of the standards of
his regularization – if only to determine if the concepts and
principles of labor law were correctly applied or misapplied by
the NLRC in its decision. In other words, the Court’s analysis of
the NLRC’s interpretation of the environmental principles and
concepts of labor law is not completely prohibited in – as it is
complementary to – a Rule 45 review of labor cases.
Finally, if only to put to rest Alcaraz’s misgivings on the manner
in which this case was reviewed, it bears pointing out that no
"factual appellate review" was conducted by the Court in the
Decision. Rather, the Court proceeded to interpret the relevant
rules on probationary employment as applied to settled factual
findings. Besides, even on the assumption that a scrutiny of
facts was undertaken, the Court is not altogether barred from
conducting the same. This was explained in the case of Career
Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna6 wherein the Court
held as follows:
Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of
fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in
its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our "own judgment for
that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence
lies or what evidence is credible." The factual findings of the
NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on
this Court.
Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the
exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction may be urged
to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition. For
instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that there is
insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support the
factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo, as Section 5, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in cases
filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established only if supported by substantial evidence.
B. Standards for regularization; conceptual underpinnings.
Alcaraz posits that, contrary to the Court’s Decision, one’s job
description cannot by and of itself be treated as a standard for
regularization as a standard denotes a measure of quantity or
quality. By way of example, Alcaraz cites the case of a
probationary salesperson and asks how does such employee
achieve regular status if he does not know how much he needs
to sell to reach the same.
The argument is untenable.
First off, the Court must correct Alcaraz’s mistaken notion: it is
not the probationary employee’s job description but the
adequate performance of his duties and responsibilities
which constitutes the inherent and implied standard for
regularization. To echo the fundamental point of the Decision,
if the probationary employee had been fully apprised by his
employer of these duties and responsibilities, then basic
knowledge and common sense dictate that he must adequately
perform the same, else he fails to pass the probationary trial and
may therefore be subject to termination.
The determination of "adequate performance" is not, in all
cases, measurable by quantitative specification, such as
that of a sales quota in Alcaraz’s example. It is also hinged
on the qualitative assessment of the employee’s work; by its
nature, this largely rests on the reasonable exercise of the
employer’s management prerogative. While in some instances
the standards used in measuring the quality of work may be
conveyed – such as workers who construct tangible products
which follow particular metrics, not all standards of quality
measurement may be reducible to hard figures or are readily
articulable in specific pre-engagement descriptions. In these
kinds of occupation, the best that the employer can do at the
time of engagement is to inform the probationary employee of
his duties and responsibilities and to orient him on how to
properly proceed with the same. The employer cannot bear out
in exacting detail at the beginning of the engagement what he
deems as "quality work" especially since the probationary
employee has yet to submit the required output. In the ultimate
analysis, the communication of performance standards should
be perceived within the context of the nature of the probationary
employee’s duties and responsibilities.
The same logic applies to a probationary managerial employee
who is tasked to supervise a particular department, as Alcaraz
in this case. It is hardly possible for the employer, at the time of
the employee’s engagement, to map into technical indicators, or
convey in precise detail the quality standards by which the latter
should effectively manage the department. Factors which gauge
the ability of the managerial employee to either deal with his
subordinates (e.g., how to spur their performance, or command
respect and obedience from them), or to organize office policies,
are hardly conveyable at the outset of the engagement since the
employee has yet to be immersed into the work itself. Given that
a managerial role essentially connotes an exercise of discretion,
the quality of effective management can only be determined
through subsequent assessment. While at the time of
engagement, reason dictates that the employer can only inform
the probationary managerial employee of his duties and
responsibilities as such and provide the allowable parameters
for the same. Verily, as stated in the Decision, the adequate
performance of such duties and responsibilities is, by and of
itself, an implied standard of regularization.
In this relation, it bears mentioning that the performance
standard contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be
contained in a specialized system of feedbacks or
evaluation. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that not
all employers, such as simple businesses or small-scale
enterprises, have a sophisticated form of human resource
management, so much so that the adoption of technical
indicators as utilized through "comment cards" or "appraisal"
tools should not be treated as a prerequisite for every case of
probationary engagement. In fact, even if a system of such kind
is employed and the procedures for its implementation are not
followed, once an employer determines that the probationary
employee fails to meet the standards required for his
regularization, the former is not precluded from dismissing the
latter. The rule is that when a valid cause for termination
exists, the procedural infirmity attending the termination
only warrants the payment of nominal damages. This was
the principle laid down in the landmark cases of Agabon v.
NLRC9 (Agabon) and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v.
Pacot10 (Jaka). In the assailed Decision, the Court actually
extended the application of the Agabon and Jaka rulings to
breaches of company procedure, notwithstanding the
employer’s compliance with the statutory requirements under
the Labor Code. Hence, although Abbott did not comply with
its own termination procedure, its non-compliance thereof
would not detract from the finding that there subsists a
valid cause to terminate Alcaraz’s employment. Abbott,
however, was penalized for its contractual breach and thereby
ordered to pay nominal damages.
As a final point, Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v.
Feliciano12 (Aliling) since the same is not squarely applicable to
the case at bar. The employee in Aliling, a sales executive, was
belatedly informed of his quota requirement. Thus, considering
the nature of his position, the fact that he was not informed of
his sales quota at the time of his engagement changed the
complexion of his employment. Contrarily, the nature of
Alcaraz's duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs
Manager negates the application of the foregoing. Records
show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did not
manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her
staff and to build an effective rapport with them; (c) failed to train
her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain the
knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case
processing and article review which were necessary for the
proper performance of her duties.13 Due to the nature and
variety of these managerial functions, the best that Abbott could
have done, at the time of Alcaraz's engagement, was to inform
her of her duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance
of which, to repeat, is an inherent and implied standard for
regularization; this is unlike the circumstance in Aliling where a
quantitative regularization standard, in the term of a sales quota,
was readily articulable to the employee at the outset. Hence,
since the reasonableness of Alcaraz's assessment clearly
appears from the records, her termination was justified. Bear in
mind that the quantum of proof which the employer must
discharge is only substantial evidence which, as defined in case
law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.14 To the Court's mind, this threshold of evidence
Abbott amply overcame in this case.

All told, the Court hereby denies the instant motion for
reconsideration and thereby upholds the Decision in the main
case.