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Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and

INTRODUCTION/PRELIMINARIES permanent injunction. Section 1, Rule 58 provides for the definition of


DIGEST BY: YANEE preliminary injunction:
CASE 1. G.R. No. 197802, November 11, 2015 SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
ARAIN, M.D. DBA ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners,
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
v.NATRAPHARM, INC., Respondent.
act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
FACTS:
On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent
 NATRAPHARM, INC. is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company
injunction in this wise:
which manufactures and sells a medicine bearing the generic
name "CITICOLINE," under its registered trademark SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the
"ZYNAPSE," which is indicated for heart and stroke patients. action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or
 With its registration, the trademark "ZYNAPSE" enjoys acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a
protection for a term of 10 years from September 24, 2007, final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
and has also obtained from the Bureau of Food and Drugs enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts
(BFAD) all necessary permits and licenses. or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis
 Allegedly unknown to respondent, since 2003 or even as early supplied)
as 2001, petitioners have been selling a medicine bearing the
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and
generic name "CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-convulsant
incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an
indicated for epilepsy, under the brand name "ZYNAPS,"
application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or
which trademark is however not registered with the IPO.
complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of
 Respondent sent petitioners a cease-and-desist demand
the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
letter, which petitioners refused to heed, claiming that they
the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a
had prior use of the name "ZYNAPS."
court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory
 Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for
in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced
trademark infringement for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
or terminated.
8293, or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC),
with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of
writ of preliminary injunction. the Rules of Court, forms part of the judgment on the merits and it
o RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary can only be properly ordered only on final judgment. A permanent
injunction, for the reason that neither party is, at this injunction may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the
point, entitled to any injunctive solace. Plaintiff, merits of the case and a decree granting or refusing an injunction
while admittedly the holder of a registered should not be entered until after a hearing on the merits where a
trademark under the IPC, may not invoke verified answer containing denials is filed or where no answer is
ascendancy or superiority of its CTR [certificate of required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an answer.
trademark registration] over the CPR [certificate of
As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any
product registration of the BFAD] of the defendants,
interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an
as the latter certificate is, in the Court's opinion,
incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses
evidence of its "prior use".
its force and effect after the decision in the main petition.
 CA, in its April 18, 2011 Decision,granted the Petition for
Certiorari, permanently ENJOINING defendants- Here, this Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by
respondentsfrom manufacturing, importing, distributing, issuing a permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety
selling and/or advertising for sale, or otherwise using in of the denial of an ancillary writ. But with the RTC's December 2, 2011
commerce, the anti-convulsant drug CARBAMAZEPINE under Decision on the case for "Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages
the brand name and mark "ZYNAPS." and Destruction," the issues raised in the instant petition have been
rendered moot and academic. We note that the case brought to the CA
 On December 2, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision on the on a petition for certiorari merely involved the RTC's denial of
merits of the case. It found petitioners liable to respondent for respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, a mere
damages. Moreover, it enjoined the petitioners from using ancillary writ. Since a decision on the merits has already been rendered
"ZYNAPS" and ordered all materials related to it be disposed and which includes in its disposition a permanent injunction, the proper
outside the channel of commerce or destroyed without remedy is an appeal36 from the decision in the main case.
compensation.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby
ISSUE: DENIED for being moot and academic.

Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a DIGEST BY: YANEE
petition for certiorari against the denial of an application for a
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC? CASE 2 G.R. No. L-252 March 30, 1946

HELD: NO
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 1 of 49
TRANQUILINO CALO and DOROTEO SAN JOSE, petitioners, property is more interested than persons in preserving and
vs. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, administering it.
REGINO RELOVA and TEODULA BARTOLOME, respondents.
The provisional remedies (attachment, preliminaryinjunction,
receivership, delivery of personal property provided in Rules 59-62)
FERIA, J.:
are remedies to which parties litigant may resort for the
preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no
FACTS:
other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an
 Plaintiff spouses, as owners and possessors of certain parcels action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation,
of land in Laguna, filed against defendants a complaint, said remedies cannot be applied for and granted. To each kind of
alleging that the latter, through the use of force, stealth, action/s a proper provisional remedy is provided for by law.
strategy and intimidation, intend or are intending to enter and
(a) Attachment: issued only in the cases specifically states in
work or harvest whatever existing fruits found on the land,
section 1, Rule 59, in order that the defendant may not dispose
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
of his attached property and thus secure the satisfaction of any
to be issued ex parte to restrain, enjoin and prohibit
judgment that may be recovered by plaintiff from defendant.
defendants from entering, interfering with or harvesting
For that reason, a property subject of litigation between the
the lands belonging to plaintiff spouses and that judgment
parties, or claimed by plaintiff as his, cannot be attached upon
be rendered, after due hearing, declaring the preliminary
a motion of the same plaintiff.
injunction final. An accompanying bond in the amount of
(b) Preliminary prohibitory injunction: lies when the relief
P200 was also filed with the CFI.
demanded in the complaint consists in restraining the
 The defendants filed an opposition to the issuance of the writ commission/continuance of the act complained of, either
of preliminary injunction on the ground that they are owners perpetually or for a limited period, and the other
of the lands and have been in actual possession thereof since conditions required by sec 3 of Rule 60. Purpose is to
the year 1925; and their answer to the complaint reiterated preserve the status quo of the things subject of the
that they are the owners and were then in actual possession action or the relation between the parties, in order to protect
of said property, and that the plaintiffs have never been in the rights of plaintiff respecting the subject of the action during
possession thereof. the pendency of the suit.
(c) Receiver: may be appointed to take charge of personal/real
o CFI:Denied the Petition for the Writ of PA on the
property which is the subject of an ordinary civil action, when it
ground that the defendants were in actual
appears that the party applying for the appointment of a
possession of said lands. A MR was filed but had not
receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the
yet been decided by the judge as he was assigned to
subject of the action or litigation, and that such property or
another court.
fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured
 On Dec 17, plaintiffs filed an urgent petition ex-parte praying unless a receiver is appointed to guard and preserve it.
that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the order denying The property or fund must be in litigation according to the
their petition for preliminary injunction be granted and or for allegations of the complaint, and the object of appointing
the appointment of a receiver of the properties described in a receiver is to secure and preserve the property or thing
the complaint, on the ground that in controversy pending the litigation.

a. the plaintiffs have an interest in the properties in


(d) Delivery of personal property: consists in the delivery, by
question, and the fruits thereof were in danger of
order of court, of a personal property by the defendant to the
being lost unless a receiver was appointed; and that
plaintiff, who shall give a bond to assure its return or
b. the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient payment of damages to the defendant in the plaintiff’s
and feasible means of preserving, administering and or action to recover possession of the same property fails, in
disposing of the properties in litigation which included order to protect the plaintiff’s right of possession over said
their fruits. property, or prevent the defendant from damaging, destroying
or disposing of the same during the pendency of the suit.
New Judge: Judge Roldan, now the judge, on the same date, granted
the petition for appointment of and appointed a receiver in the case.
Hence, this petition. DIGEST BY: YANEE

ISSUE: WON the appointment of a receiver is proper. CASE 3. G.R. No. 144755. June 8, 2005
HELD: No. Appointment of a receiver is not proper or does not lie in SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES, petitioners,
an action of injunction such as the one filed by the plaintiff. The vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAMASO HERRERA as Presiding
litigation or issue raised by plaintiffs in their complaint is not the Judge of the RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna PROMINENT LENDING
ownership or possession of the lands and their fruits. It is whether or & CREDIT CORPORATION, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA and
not defendants intend or were intending to enter or work or harvest Sheriff IV ARNEL G. MAGAT, respondents.
whatever existing fruits could then be found in the lands described in
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
the complaint, alleged to be the exclusive property and in the actual
possession of the plaintiffs. It is a matter not only of law but of plain FACTS:
common sense that a plaintiff will not and legally cannot ask for the
appointment or receiver of property which he alleges to belong to him  On May 21, 1999, petitioner Spouses Eliseo F. Estares and
and to be actually in his possession. For the owner and possessor of a Rosenda P. Estares (Estares spouses for brevity) filed a
complaint for Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 2 of 49
against private respondent Prominent Lending & Credit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Corporation (PLCC) before the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Estares spouses application for a writ of preliminary
alleging thatthey obtained a loan from PLCC for P800,000.00 injunction since the latter failed to prove the
secured by a real estate mortgage over a 363-square meter requisites for the issuance thereof.
parcel of land with improvements situated in the Municipality
 Estares spouses filed the present petition for certiorari and
of Santa Rosa, Laguna; the promissory note and the real
prohibition.
estate mortgage were falsified because they affixed their
signatures on two blank documents; the monthly interest of ISSUE: WON the Estares spouses were able to establish their right to
3.5% and 3% penalty on each delayed monthly interest are injunctive relief.
different from the 18% interest per annum to which they
HELD: NO
agreed to; for failure to pay their obligation despite repeated
demands, PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure In any event, we find that this petition must still be dismissed as the
with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna; and on June Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
8, 1999, the Sheriff sent a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition.
Estares spouses.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of
 Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but
void the promissory note and the real estate mortgage for not merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling
reflecting their true agreement. In the interim, they prayed for reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable
injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when
sale scheduled on July 13, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
 On July 12, 1999, the trial court issued a TRO in favor of the
application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency
Estares spouses. The parties subsequently agreed to maintain
or of a special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly
the status quo until August 20, 1999.
heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary
 At the hearing on the Estares spouses application for a writ injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be
of preliminary injunction, they did not question PLCC in sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the
writing why they only received P637,000.00; when they entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the
received the Statement of Account, they did not question the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the
figures appearing therein; when they received PLCCs demand legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
letter, they went to the formers office not to question the
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the
loans terms and conditions but merely to request for
following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a)
extension of three months to pay their obligation.
the existence of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against
 In opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary which the injunction is to be directed are violative of such right. To be
injunction, PLCC presented its manager, Rey Arambulo, who entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the
testified that the Estares spouses were duly apprised of the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and
terms and conditions of the loan, including the rate of paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, an
interest, penalties and other charges, in accordance with the injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing
Truth in Lending Act or Republic Act No. 3765. necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard compensation.
 On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied the Estares
spouses application for a writ of preliminary injunction, In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to
holding that the latter failed to establish the facts necessary injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but
for an injunction to issue. only question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice
encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the
 Estares spouses filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is
in the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion
properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
upon the trial court order which denied their prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in
respectively. the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of
facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. As
 Without giving due course to the petition, the Court of
such, a trial courts’ decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not
Appeals issued a Resolution requiring the PLCC to file its
be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In
comment to the petition. The action on the Estares spouses
granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when
application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction was
it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors
deferred and held in abeyance until after receipt of the
relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual
comment.
findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives
 With no restraining order enjoining him, Sheriff Magat too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law
conducted an auction sale on January 5, 2000, with PLCC as or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.
highest bidder for P1,500,000.00.
In the present case, the Estares spouses clearly failed to prove that they
o On April 17, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed have a right protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
the petition for lack of merit, holding that the trial directed are violative of said right. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 3 of 49
commit a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The court may grant equitable reliefs to breathe
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari. life and force to substantive law such as Article 1385 of the
Civil Code since the provisional remedies under the Rules of
Court do not apply to this case. REYES points out that deposit
DIGEST BY: YANEE is not among the provisional remedies enumerated in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and invokes the principle that
CASE 4: G.R. No. 134241. August 11, 2003 (408 SCRA 560)
equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
DEPOSIT AS A PROVISIONAL REMEDY IN THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY statutory law or x xx judicial rules of procedure.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court could issue the questioned Orders
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), petitioner, requiring petitioner David Reyes to deposit the amount of Ten
vs. Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the action,
JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, when deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated
INC., respondents. in Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
CARPIO, J.: RULING: YES

 The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a


hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left alone, THE
FACTS OF THE CASE:
HIATUS will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the
 PETITIONER DAVID REYESfiled before the trial court a expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which
complaint for annulment of contract and damages against is a precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that
respondents Jose Lim (Lim), Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of equity overruling a
Harrison Lumber, Inc. (Harrison Lumber). The COMPLAINT positive provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that
alleged that REYES AS SELLER AND LIM AS BUYERentered into governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or
a contract to sell a parcel of landlocated along F.B. Harrison insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this case,
Street, Pasay City. HARRISON LUMBER occupied the Property Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to
as lessee with a monthly rental of P35,000. make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
 The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison the laws. This calls for the application of equity, which fills the
Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of January 1995 open spaces in the law.
and if KENG AND HARRISON LUMBER failed to vacate by 8
March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of  Thus, the TRIAL COURT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS EQUITY
P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. The JURISDICTION may validly order the deposit of the P10 million
complaint further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison down payment in court. The PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE OF
Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly EQUITY JURISDICTIONin this case is to prevent unjust
penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid enrichment and to ensure restitution. EQUITY
purchase price of P18,000,000. JURISDICTIONaims to do complete justice in cases where a
 KENG AND HARRISON LUMBERdenied that they connived court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
with Lim to defraud Reyes. Moreover, Reyes approved their circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its
request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to statutory or legal jurisdiction. EQUITY is the principle by which
their difficulty in finding a new location for their business. substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
Harrison Lumber claimed that as of March 1995, it had already prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
started transferring some of its merchandise to its new (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, 2012, PAGE 7)
business location in Malabon.
 LIM (buyer), on the other hand,stated that that he was ready  On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for Reyes to object
and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price on or to the deposit of the P10 million down payment. The
before 8 March 1995. On 9 March 1995, REYESoffered to APPLICATION OF EQUITY always involves a balancing of the
return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes equities in a particular case, a matter addressed to the sound
was having problems in removing the lessee from the discretion of the court. Here, we find the equitiesweigh heavily
Property. LIMrejected Reyes offer and proceeded to verify the in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million down payment in
status of Reyes title to the Property. LIM learned that Reyes good faith only to discover later that Reyes had subsequently
had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation. sold the Property to another buyer.
 LIM prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes.  The PRINCIPLE THAT NO PERSON MAY UNJUSTLY ENRICH
The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary HIMSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER is embodied in
attachment in an Order dated 7 October 1996.LIM Article 22[38] of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only
alsorequested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One
the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The trial court granted this party has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
motion. crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. Courts can
 The TRIAL COURTdirected Reyes to deposit the P10 million extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where
down payment with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 the aggrieved party, during the pendency of the case, has no
October 1997. other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the Rules
 The COURT OF APPEALS ruled that the trial court could validly of Court. In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the
issue the assailed orders in the exercise of its equity trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 4 of 49
payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the produce the originals sought by respondents for inspection since
expense of Lim. they were not in the former’s possession.

ISSUES:
RULES 57- PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT 1. WON the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary
RULE 57 – PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (NATURE OF attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in the Main Case, and
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT) thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA; YES

DIGEST BY: KJ 2. WON the CA erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner


and the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment found by said
CASE 1: G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015 commissioner. YES
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC., VS SPOUSES GARCIA, PERLAS- RULING:
BERNABE, J
 In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC’s
FACTS: September 21, 2011 Decision resolving the Main Case through the
 Petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc. filed a Complaint with timely filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011,
application for a writ of preliminary attachment, before the RTC together with the payment of the appropriate docket fees. The RTC,
against respondents. It alleged that: (a) from March to July 2004, in an Order dated January 25, 2012, had actually confirmed this fact,
PETITIONER caused the delivery to respondents of various and thereby ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA.
appliances in the aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17; (b) the WITH THE RTC’S LOSS OF JURISDICTION OVER THE MAIN CASE
goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio Lines, necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters merely
Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition by ancillary thereto. Thus, the PROPRIETY OF CONDUCTING A TRIAL
respondents’ representatives; (c) the parties agreed that the goods BY COMMISSIONERS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE
delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the unpaid EXCESSIVENESS OF THE SUBJECT PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT,
amounts would earn interest at a rate of eighteen percent (18%) being a mere ancillary matter to the Main Case, is now mooted by
per annum; (d) however, the VALUE OF THE GOODS were not its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
paid by respondents despite repeated demands; and (e)  Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, the Court, in view of the
respondents fraudulently asserted that petitioner had no proof nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the
that they had indeed received the quantity of the subject goods. ATTACHMENT ITSELF cannot be the subject of a separate action
 In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary independent of the principal action because the attachment was
attachment, PETITIONER posted a bond, through Visayan Surety only an incident of such action, viz. :ATTACHMENT is defined as a
and Insurance Corporation, in the amount of 8,040,825.17. On provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is
November 7, 2005, the RTCissued the writ sought for. taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action
 RESPONDENTS filed on November 11, 2001, an Urgent Motion for or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any
Extension of Time to File Proper Pleading and Motion for Discovery judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
(Production and Inspection) (November 11, 2001 Motion), asking party.
the RTC to allow them to photocopy and personally examine the  It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence
original invoices, delivery cargo receipts, and bills of lading apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against
attached to the Amended Complaint, claiming that they could not the defendant. BEING MERELY ANCILLARY TO A PRINCIPAL
“come up with an intelligent answer” without being presented with PROCEEDING, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be
the originals of such documents. maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
 Thereafter, RESPONDENTS filed a Motion to Discharge Excess  The consequence is that WHERE THE MAIN ACTION IS
Attachment, alleging that the attachment previously ordered by APPEALED, the attachment which may have been issued as an
the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also
of the attached properties, including the garnished bank accounts, removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment
as assessed by their appraiser, Gaudioso W. Lapaz (Lapaz), itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the
amounted to P17,273,409.73, while the attachment bond is only principal action because the attachment was only an incident of
in the amount of P8,040,825.17. such action.
 RTC denied the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, finding  That being said, it is now unnecessary to discuss the other issues
that the appraisal made by Lapaz was not reflective of the true raised herein. In fine, the petition is granted and the assailed CA
valuation of the properties, adding too that the bond posted by rulings are set aside.
petitioner stands as sufficient security for whatever damages
respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment. On the
RULE 57 – PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (NATURE OF
other hand, the RTC granted the Motion for Discovery in
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT/STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING WHEN
accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. However, no
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT MAYBE APPLIED FOR)
production or inspection was conducted on July 10, 2006 as the
RTC directed since respondents received the copy of the above
order only on July 11, 2006. DIGEST BY: KJ
 CA partly granted the certiorari petition of respondents. It held
that: (a) on the ISSUE OF ATTACHMENT, trial by commissioners CASE 2: G.R. No. 93262 December 29, 1991 (204 SCRA 343)
under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court was proper so that the parties
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
may finally settle their conflicting valuations; and (b) on the
QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or QUEENSLAND TOURIST INN,
MATTER OF DISCOVERY, petitioner could not be compelled to
and TEODORICO ADARNA,
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 5 of 49
NARVASA, J. BOOK OF RIANO)
 Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the
FACTS:
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." The phase,
 DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. filed a verified complaint for "AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION," obviously refers to
recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, the date of the filing of the complaint— which, as above pointed out,
etc. and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex is the date that marks "the commencement of the action;" and the
parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the
 JUDGE NARTATEZ, to whose branch the case was assigned by raffle, defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying
issued an Order granting the ex parte application and fixing the quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced — by
attachment bond at P4,600,513.37. The attachment bond having the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite
been submitted by Davao Light, the writ of attachment issued. docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a
 The SUMMONS AND A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT, as well as the writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent
writ of attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either
served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant to the before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this
writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter. indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
 DEFENDANTS QUEENSLAND AND ADARNA filed a motion to courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the
discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate
because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May pleading (counter-claim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the
3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the
Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and
persons of the defendants. substance. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO- STAGE OF THE
 Davao Light filed an opposition to the motion to discharge PROCEEDING WHEN PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT MAYBE
attachment. APPLIED FOR)
 Trial Court issued an Order denying the motion to discharge.  The relative ease with which a preliminary attachment may be
 The Court of Appeals in a special civil action of certiorari obtained is matched and paralleled by the relative facility with which
instituted by the respondents, declared the issuance of a writ of the attachment may legitimately be prevented or frustrated. WHEN
preliminary attachment, as well as all other orders emanating PROPERTY HAS ALREADY BEEN SEIZED UNDER ATTACHMENT,
therefrom, specially the Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on the attachment may be discharged upon counter bond in accordance
Preliminary Attachment as null and void. Hence, this appeal filed by with Section 12 of Rule 57. SEC. 12. DISCHARGE OF
the petitioner. ATTACHMENT UPON GIVING COUNTERBOND. — At any time
after an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose
ISSUE: WON a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued ex-parte
property has been attached or the person appearing in his behalf,
against a defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's
may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who
person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the
granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is
Court's authority. YES
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on
RULING: the security given . . . in an amount equal to the value of the property
attached as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any
 The Court ruled that with regard to the PROVISIONAL REMEDIES judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,  BUT EVEN BEFORE ACTUAL LEVY ON PROPERTY, seizure under
RECEIVERSHIP OR REPLEVIN, they may be validly and properly attachment may be prevented also upon counter bond. The
applied for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or defendant need not wait until his property is seized before seeking
is heard from. the discharge of the attachment by a counter bond. This is made
 The Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that WRITS OF possible by Section 5 of Rule 57. SEC. 5. MANNER OF ATTACHING
ATTACHMENT may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court PROPERTY. — The officer executing the order shall without delay
is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the
the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the
on the application with notice to the defendant; but that LEVY ON province, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be
PROPERTY PURSUANT TO THE WRIT thus issued may not be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes
validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order
accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an
complaint(and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an
application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be
separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgment which
plaintiff's attachment bond. he may recover in the action.
 A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules  Aside from the filing of a counter bond, a preliminary attachment
of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or may also be lifted or discharged on the ground that it has been
other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time irregularly or improperly issued, in accordance with Section 13 of
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the Rule 57. SEC. 13. DISCHARGE OF ATTACHMENT FOR IMPROPER
custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment OR IRREGULAR ISSUANCE. — The party whose property has been
that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in attached may also, at any time either BEFORE or AFTER the release of
respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been
provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor,
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. (CITED IN THE
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 6 of 49
court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the be to sanction that formalism and that technicality which are
attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or discountenanced by the modern laws of procedure for the
irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of sake of speedy and substantial justice. In the present case we
the party whose property has been attached, but not otherwise, the see no reason why the order of the trial court should be
attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or disturbed, this question being a matter within its discretion
other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was and we find no grave abuse of that discretion.
made.

Cited in the Book of Riano:


DIGEST BY: KJ
Who may avail Preliminary Attachment?
(WHO MAY AVAIL PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT)
Section 1 of Rule 57 provides that the plaintiff or any
Case 3: G.R. No. L-48080 , August 31, 1942 (73 Phil. 659) proper party may have the property of the adverse party
JOSE DE BORJA vs. SERVILLANO PLATON and FRANCISCO DE attached. Hence, it is not only the plaintiff who may apply for
BORJA, the issuance of WPA. The pertinent provisions of Sec. 1 of
Rule 57 also make reference to any proper party. The terms
BOCOBO, J.: are broad enough to refer also to a defendant who files a
FACTS: counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint. Hence,
the proper party may also refer to the counter-claimant,
 On August 12, 1936, petitioner brought a civil action in the cross-claimant or the third-party plaintiff as long as the
Court of First Instance of Rizal against Hermogena Romero, application for the writ is supported by the proper
Francisco de Borja, Josefa Tangco and Crisanto de Borja to ground.
annul a second sale by Francisco de Borja to Hermogena
Romero, of a large estate known as the Hacienda Jalajala, and
to recover damages in the amount of P25,000. On August 29, DIGEST BY: Angelli
1936, Francisco de Borja and his wife Josefa Tangco filed an
answer with three counterclaims, and on September 29, 1936, Case 4. GR. No. L-61011 October 18, 1990
they presented two more counterclaims. INSULAR BANK OF ASIA & AMERICA, INCORPORATED
vs. CA & COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION
 It was alleged that petitioner Jose De Borja, being a son of J. Padilla
defendant Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, had been
entrusted with the administration of the extensive interests of FACTS
his parents, but had been unfaithful to his trust. o Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) made a money market
placement with respondent Commercial Credit Corporation (CCC) on
 Defendants prayed that spouses Borja and Tangco be
12 December 1980 in the amount of P1,877,053.03. In consideration
declared owners of the said hacienda. They asked that
of such placement, Commercial Credit Corporation executed a Non
petitioner be required to render accounting of products of the
Negotiable Repurchase Agreement whereby it conveyed to IBAA
hacienda that he had received, as well as the proceeds of rice
securities issued by International Corporate Bank (Interbank) with a
and bran, and a payment for a certain sum of money which he
face value of P2,000,000.00 and with a maturity date of 22 April 1981.
allegedly retained illegally.
The parties (IBAA and CCC) also executed a resale agreement which
 Spouses Borja and Tangco filed their petition for preliminary bound IBAA to re-sell to CCC the Interbank securities for
attachment to cover their third, fourth, and fifth, grounds for P2,000,000.00 on 22 April 1981. On due date (22 April 1981), CCC
cross-complaint, involving a total of P69,035. In said motion, caused to be issued to IBAA a Commercial Bank and Trust Co. (CBTC)
the defendants Borja and wife stated that they did not include cashier's check for P2,000,000.00 which was, however, dishonored
the first and second causes for cross-complaint because the upon presentment for being drawn against uncollected deposits.
visible property of plaintiff that could then be attached was
o Petitioner advised respondent of the dishonor and demanded cash
only worth about P2,000.
payment. CCC admitted difficulty in replacing dishonored checks and
 The order for preliminary attachment is questioned upon proposed payment on a staggered basis. Attached was a proposal of
several grounds, among which are: (1) that no writ of a copy of a Central Bank letter approving the request of CCC for
attachment can be issued in favor of a defendant who additional standby credit facility to meet its maturing money market
presents a counterclaim; (2) and the defendants' affidavit was placements.
fatally defective.
o IBAA, however, after CCC’s failure to meet its obligation, filed before
ISSUE: CFI Rizal an action for recovery of sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. IBAA claims CCC has
WON writ of attachment can be issued in favor of a defendant who
intent to defraud its creditors. CFI of Rizal issued an order granting
presents a counterclaim. YES
the preliminary attachment against real and personal properties of
RULING: CCC.

 YES. For the purpose of the protection afforded by such o CCC filed a petition for certiorari with CA alleging grave of abuse of
attachment, it is immaterial whether the defendants Borja and discretion on the part of CFI Rizal. Despite the issuance of a status
wife simply presented a counterclaim or brought a separate quo order from the Court of Appeals, deposits of CCC with Bank of
civil action against Jose de Borja, plaintiff in the previous case the Philippine Islands and Far East Bank and Trust Co. were
and petitioner herein. To lay down a subtle distinction would garnished. Heavy equipment used in the construction of CCC's

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 7 of 49


building in Makati and its office equipment were attached. o The RTC granted the applicationand issues the writ ex parte. Mr.
Alejandro then filed a motion to quash the writ contending that the
o The CA set aside CFI’s order of attachment stating that there was no
withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was
showing that the petitioner was performing acts to defraud its
approved by petitioner. He also alleged that petitioner knew that he
creditors or by disposing its assets to the prejudice of its creditors or
maintains a permanent residence in Quezon City, and an office
persons who may have a claim to its assets. Hence, the instant
address in Makati City at the Law Firm Romulo Mabanta
petition.
Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles, where he is a partner.
ISSUE Respondent added that he is the managing partner of the Hong
Kong branch of said Law Firm and that his stay in Hong Kong is only
WON CA’s decision setting aside CFI Rizal’s granting of a writ of
temporary, and that he frequently travels back to the Philippines.
preliminary attachment upon a complaint for collection of a sum of
money which CCC allegedly fraudulently contracted and now has o RTC issued an order quashing the writ and there was no intent on the
difficulty paying, is in accordance with law or a reversible error. part of petitioner to defraud when he withdrew his unassigned
deposits.
RULING
o Meanwhile, respondent filed a claim for damages for the wrongful
o The CA decision is in accordance with the law. CA decision is affirmed
garnishment of his deposits. RTC awarded the damages of P25M. CA
in toto.
affirmed but reduced the amount of damages to P8M. Hence, the
o The purpose of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on present petition.
defendant's property until plaintiff can obtain a judgment and have
ISSUE
such property applied to its satisfaction or to make provision for
unsecured debts in such cases where the means of satisfaction WON PCIB is liable for damages for the improper issuance of the writ
thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction or of attachment against respondent.
improperly disposed of (by fraud or otherwise) or concealed or
placed beyond the reach of creditors.
RULING
o Petitioner’s contention that CCC had the fraudulent intent not to pay
the obligation or indebtedness at the time the obligation was o YES.
incurred is not borne out by the records. On other hand, respondent
o Based on the findings of the court, it is obvious that PCIB already
CCC has not denied that it was undergoing financial difficulties and
knew from the beginning the deficiency of its second ground for
had in fact called a creditor's meeting to make full disclosure of its
attachment [i.e.,] disposing properties with intent to defraud his
business condition and negotiate for payment of its outstanding
creditors, and therefore plaintiff had to resort to this
obligations.
misrepresentation that defendant was residing out of the Philippines
o There was no dissipation of assets. CCC’s withdrawal of money from and suppressed the fact that defendant’s permanent residence is in
Far East was intended to finance its operations. Inability to pay is not METRO MANILA where he could be served with summons.
necessarily synonymous with fraudulent intent not to honor an
o The circumstances under which a writ of preliminary attachment may
admitted obligation.
be issued are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
DIGEST BY: Angelli
o (f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or
CASE 5. G.R. No. 175587 September 21, 2007 on whom summons may be served by publication.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK
vs. JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO o The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the
J. Ynares-Santiago property of the debtor in advance of final judgment and to hold it for
purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds stated in
paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or (2)
FACTS to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive
o PCIB filed against Alejandro a complaint for sum of money with seizure of the property in those instances where personal or
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. In the substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected,
complaint, PCIB alleged that on September 10, 1997, respondent, a as in paragraph (f) of the same provision.
resident of Hong Kong, executed in favor of petitioner a promissory o Corollarily, in actions in personam, such as the instant case for
note obligating himself to pay P249,828,588.90 plus interest. In view collection of sum of money, summons must be served by personal or
of the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the substituted service, otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction
insufficiency of the deposits assigned by respondent as security for over the defendant. In case the defendant does not reside and is not
the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up additional security found in the Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service
for the loan. Respondent, however, sought a reconsideration of said cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court
request pointing out petitioner’s alleged mishandling of his account to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a
due to its failure to carry out his instruction to close his account as proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the
early as April 1997. defendant. Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in
o According to PCIB, respondent fraudulently withdrew his unassigned personam where defendant resides out of and is not found in the
deposits notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB Assistant Vice Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the
President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to withdraw the same prior to action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the
their assignment as security for the loan. They also alleged that Mr. defendant’s property. The service of summons in this case (which
Alejandro is not a resident of the Philippines. may be by publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 8 of 49
the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known o On July 20, 1994 the RTC (not informed of the SC decision) rendered
address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring judgment in favor of Te for the collection of sum of money.
jurisdiction but for compliance with the requirements of due process. o Sps Yu filed a MR with the RTC. It was denied. Sps Yu filed Notice of
Appeal with RTC, which was also denied.
o However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of
o Sps Yu filed an appeal with the CA, questioning only the RTC’s
the Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an action in
decline to rule on their counterclaim for damages. CA affirmed in
personam, is not always necessary in order for the court to acquire
toto the RTC decision. Sps Yu filed a MR, but CA denied. Thus, this
jurisdiction to hear the case.
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.
o In the instant case, it must be stressed that the writ was issued by the
trial court mainly on the representation of petitioner that respondent ISSUE
is not a resident of the Philippines. Obviously, the trial court’s WON Sps Yu may recover damages for the wrongful attachment over
issuance of the writ was for the sole purpose of acquiring jurisdiction their properties.
to hear and decide the case. Had the allegations in the complaint
disclosed that respondent has a residence in Quezon City and an RULING
office in Makati City, the trial court, if only for the purpose of o Yes.
acquiring jurisdiction, could have served summons by substituted o When there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may
service on the said addresses, instead of attaching the property of the recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment
defendant. The rules on the application of a writ of attachment must plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if it
be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. For attachment is is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely
harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature; it is a rigorous remedy wrongful but also malicious, the attachment defendant may recover
which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. It should moral damages and exemplary damages as well. Either way, the
be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy. wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic
award of damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first
o In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals properly sustained the
discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or
finding of the trial court that petitioner is liable for damages for the
injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment.
wrongful issuance of a writ of attachment against respondent.
o In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of properties of Sps Yu
was wrongful did not relieve Sps Yu of the burden of proving the
DIGEST BY: Angelli factual basis of their counterclain for damages.
o To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful
CASE 6. G.R. No. 155868 February 6, 2007 attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best
SPOUSES GREGORIO & JOSEFA YU evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the
vs. NGO YET TE (ESSENTIAL MANUFACTURING) amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not
J. Austria-Martinez only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable
FACTS based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In
o Spouses Yu purchased bars of detergent soap worth P594,240 from particular, if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits,
Te, and issued 3 postdated checks as payment. When Te presented the amount of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported
these checks at maturity for encashment, they were returned and by independent evidence of the mean income of the business
dishonored and stamped ACCOUNT CLOSED. Te made demands but undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.
these were unheeded. Acting through her son and atty-in-fact, Charry o The petition is partly granted. The CA decision is affirmed with
Sy, Te filed a complaint before the RTC of Valenzuela for collection of modification that Sps Yu’s counterclaim is partly granted. They are
sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment. awarded P50,000 temperate damages and P30,000 attorney’s fees.
o In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment, Te attached to
her complaint an affidavit executed by Sy that Sps Yu were guilty of
fraud for they never inteded to pay and they were about to move DIGEST BY: Vincent
their properties to defraud their creditors.
o Te posted an attachment bond. RTC then issued an order of CASE 7. G.R. No. 84481 April 18, 1989
attachment/levy dated 29 march 1993. Sheriff Constacio Alimurung
of RTC Cebu levied and attached Sps Yu’s properties in Cebu City: 1 MINDANAO SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (formerly
parcel of land (Lot 11) and 4 motor vehicles-Ford Fierra, jeep, Canter Davao Savings & Loan Association) & FRANCISCO
delivery van, and passenger bus. VILLAMOR, petitioners,
o Sps Yu filed a counter-claim and damages for the wrongful vs.
attachment of their properties. Sps Yu filed an urgent motion to HON. COURT OF APPEALS, POLY R. MERCADO, and JUAN P.
dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and they filed a claim against MERCADO, respondents.
the surety bond.
o RTC did not resolve the claim against the surety bond, it issued an
Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
order discharging from the attachment the ford fierra, jeep, and
delivery van for humanitarian grounds.
o Sps Yu filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA ordered the 172 SCRA 480
lifting of the preliminary attachment over the Lot 11 and passenger Facts:
bus.
o Te filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. SC denied on On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial
June 8, 1994. However the resolution was made on July 22, 1994. Court of Davao City, a complaint against defendants D.S. Homes, Inc.,
and its directors for "Rescission of Contract and Damages" with a prayer
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 9 of 49
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. On September 28, and ZENAIDA ANZURES; and REYNALDO R. BUANZON, in his
1986, Judge Dinopol issued an order granting ex parte the application official capacity as Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
for a writ of preliminary attachment. Manila,
Respondents
D. S. Homes. Inc., et al. and the Davao Savings & Loan Association (later
renamed Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. or "MSLA") and Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Francisco Villamor filed separate motions to quash the writ of
468 SCRA 526
attachment. When their motions were denied by the Court, D.S. Homes,
Inc., et al. offered a counterbond in the amount of Pl,752,861.41 per
certificate issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines, a banking partner
Facts:
of petitioner MSLA The lower court accepted the Land Bank Certificate
of . Deposit for Pl,752,861.41 as counterbond and lifted the writ of Reynaldo Anzures filed a complaint in RTC against Teresita Villaluz for
preliminary attachment on June 5, 1987. BP 22. Anzures filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Preliminary Attachment,
praying that pending the hearing on the merits of the case, a Writ of
On July 29, 1987, MSLA and Villamor filed in the Court of Appeals a
Preliminary Attachment is to be issued ordering the sheriff to attach the
petition for certiorari to annul the order of attachment and the denial of
properties of Villaluz in accordance with the Rules.
their motion to quash the same. The CA dismissed the petition.
RTC issued a WPA upon complainant’s (Anzures) posting of a bond
Issues:
(P2.1M). Sheriff attached certain properties of Villaluz and were duly
(a) Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued ex- annotated on the corresponding certificates of title. RTC acquitted
parte? Villaluz of the crime charged (BP22) but held her civilly liable. Villaluz
appealed but decision was affirmed.
(b) Whether or not objections against the writ may be invoked once a
counterbond is filed for its lifting and dissolution. The case was elevated to the SC and during it’s pendency, Villaluz
posted a counter-bond of P2.5M issued by Security Pacific Assurance
Held:
Corporation, as well as filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge
(a) YES. No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is Attachment.
required. As a matter of fact a hearing would defeat the purpose of this
Anzures moved for execution of judgment. Pursuant to a writ of
provisional remedy. The time which such a hearing would take, could be
execution issued, Sheriff Reynaldo R. Buazon tried to serve the writ of
enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property
execution upon Villaluz, but the latter no longer resided in her given
before a writ of attachment issues. Nevertheless, while no hearing is
address. Sheriff sent a Notice of Garnishment to Security Pacific
required by the Rules of Court for the issuance of an attachment (Belisle
Assurance Corporation’s office in Makati City, by virtue of the counter-
Investment & Finance Co., Inc. vs. State Investment House, Inc., 72927,
bond posted by Villaluz with said insurance corporation in the amount
June 30, 1987; Filinvest Credit Corp. vs. Relova, 11 7 SCRA 420), a
of P2.5M but refused to assume it’s obligation on the counter-bond it
motion to quash the writ may not be granted without "reasonable
posted for the discharge of the attachment made by Villaluz on the
notice to the applicant" and only "after hearing" (Secs. 12 and 13, Rule
ground that the bond was not approved by SC and that the condition
57, Rules of Court).
by which the bond was issued, did not happen.
(b) NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that objections to
Issues:
the impropriety or irregularity of the writ of attachment "may no longer
be invoked once a counterbond is filed," when the ground for the 1. WON CA committed an error in affirming the decision of RTC to
issuance of the writ forms the core of the complaint. allow execution on the counter-bond issued by Security Pacific.
Indeed, after the defendant has obtained the discharge of the writ of 2. WON CA correct in ruling that the that the mere act of posting the
attachment by filing a counterbond under Section 12, Rule 57 of the counter-bond was sufficient to discharge the attachment on the
Rules of Court, he may not file another motion under Section 13, Rule property.
57 to quash the writ for impropriety or irregularity in issuing it. The writ
Ruling:
had already been quashed by filing a counterbond, hence, another
motion to quash it would be pointless. Moreover, as the Court of 1. NO. When a judgment which has become executory, is returned
Appeals correctly observed, when the ground for the issuance of the unsatisfied, liability of the bond automatically attaches in failure of the
writ is also the core of the complaint, the question of whether the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand
plaintiff was entitled to the writ can only be determined after, not therefore, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the
before, a full-blown trial on the merits of the case. This accords with our obligation of the bond.
ruling G.B. Inc. vs. Sanchez, 98 Phil. 886 that: "The merits of a main
action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment, otherwise Security Pacific was saying that although, it has a surety agreement with
an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial on the merits of the Villaluz, it is one which merely waives its right of excussion. This is
case on this motion." wrongThe counter-bond itself states that the parties jointly and
severally bind themselves to secure the payment of any judgment that
DIGEST BY: Vincent the plaintiff may recover against the defendant in the action.

In a contract of suretyship, surety agrees to be answerable directly,


CASE 8. G.R. No. 144740, August 31, 2005
primarily and absolutely to the principal’s debt, default or miscarriage
of another. This means that the surety is equally bound with the
SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner
principal regardless of his interest in the obligation or receipt of
vs. THE HON. AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE, in her official capacity as
benefits. Security Pacific therefore cannot deny liability as a surety.
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila; THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Spouses REYNALDO 2. YES, CA correct in ruling that attachment discharged without need of
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 10 of 49
court approval pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the RTC
granted the same bond in the amount of Three Million Two
There are two (2) ways to secure the discharge of an attachment. 1. -
Hundred Thirty-One Thousand Five Hundred and Eighty-Nine and
the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on
25/100 Pesos (Php3,231,589.25)
his behalf may post a security (Sec 12 Rule 57). 2.- party whose
property is attached may show that the order of attachment was  Wolfe's two vehicles, a gray Mercedes Benz with plate number XGJ
improperly or irregularly issued. 819 and a maroon Toyota Corolla with plate number TFW 110,
were levied upon. By virtue of the Notice of Attachment and
The mere filing of the counter-attachment bond by Villaluz has
Levy dated September 5, 2005, a white Dodge pick-up truck with
discharged the attachment on the properties and made the petitioner
plate number XXL 111 was also levied upon. However, a certain
corporation liable on the counter-attachment bond.
Jeremy Simpson filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene,
This can be gleaned from the “DEFENDANT’S BOND FOR THE claiming that he is the owner of the truck as shown by a duly-
DISSOLUTION OF ATTACHMENT”, which states that Security Pacific notarized Deed of Sale.
Assurance Corporation, as surety, in consideration of the dissolution of
 Wolfe filed a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment but the
the said attachment jointly and severally, binds itself with petitioner
RTC denied for lack of merit. Wolfe filed a motion for
Villaluz for any judgment that may be recovered by private respondent
reconsideration, but the RTC also denied it for lack of merit.
Anzures against petitioner Villaluz.
 CA granted Wolfe's petition. Accordingly, the Writ of Attachment,
the Notice of Attachment and the Notice of Attachment and
REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT Levy were declared null and void, and private respondent is
DIGEST BY: Vincent DIRECTED to return to their owners the vehicles that were attached
pursuant to the Writ. Thus, in this case, Watercraft failed to meet all
CASE 9. G.R. No. 181721, September 09, 2015, the requisites for the issuance of the writ. Thus, in granting the
WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS same, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.CA
VICE-PRESIDENT, ROSARIO E. RAÑOA, v.ALFRED RAYMOND denied Watercraft's motion for reconsideration of its Decision.
WOLFE, ISSUE: Whether or not the ex-parte issuance of the preliminary
Ponente: PERALTA, J.: attachment by the trial court in favor of the petitioner is valid.

FACTS OF THE CASE: HELD

 Petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft) is  A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional
engaged in the business of building, repairing, storing and remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending
maintaining yachts, boats and other pleasure crafts at the Subic to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant
Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales. therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for
the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the
 In connection with its operations and maintenance of boat storage said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
facilities, it charges a boat storage fee of Two Hundred Seventy- However, it should be resorted to only when necessary and as a
Two US Dollars (US$272.00) per month with interest of 4% per last remedy because it exposes the debtor to humiliation and
month for unpaid charges. annoyance. It must be granted only on concrete and specific
 Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a grounds and not merely on general averments quoting the words
British national and resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Zambales, of the rules. Since attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and
as its Shipyard Manager. summary in nature, the rules on the application of a writ of
attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.
 During his empolyment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull,
within Watercraft1 s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the  For the issuance of an ex-parte issuance of the preliminary
storage fees. attachment to be valid, an affidavit of merit and an applicant's
bond must be filed with the court in which the action is pending.
 On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of
Wolfe. June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's  In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment
storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated June does not contain specific allegations of other factual
29, 2002 where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the
obligation of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Four obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
and 82/100 US Dollars (US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why
storage fees for the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite he was guilty of fraud in the performance of such obligation. To be
repeated demands, he failed to pay the said amount. specific, Watercraft's following allegation is unsupported by any
particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how
 Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum such inference or conclusion was arrived at, to wit: "For failing to
of Money with Damages with an Application for the Issuance of a pay for the use [of] facilities and services - in the form of boat
Writ of Preliminary Attachment. storage facilities - duly enjoyed by him and for failing and refusing
to fulfill his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the
 Wolfe claimed he was hired as Service and Repair Manager,
Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud x xx." It is not an allegation of
instead of Shipyard Manager. He denied owing Watercraft the
essential facts constituting Watercraft's causes of action, but a
amount of US$16,324.82 representing storage fees for the sailboat.
mere conclusion of law.
 Meanwhile, finding Watercraft's ex-parte application for writ of
 Furthermore, the other ground upon which the writ of preliminary
preliminary attachment sufficient in form and in substance
attachment was issued by the RTC is not at the same time the
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 11 of 49
applicant's cause of action. Assuming arguendo that the RTC was attachment. NO
correct in issuing such writ on the ground that Watercraft's
RULING:
complaint involves an action for the recovery of a specified amount
of money or damages against a party, like Wolfe, who is about to  The respondent is not liable to the petitioners for damages caused
depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, the by the issuance and enforcement of the writ of attachment.
Court stresses that the circumstances cited in support thereof are
 Rule 57, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states
merely allegations in support of its application for such writ. Such
that: SEC. 4. Condition of applicants bond. - The party applying
circumstances, however, are neither the core of Watercraft's
for the order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse
complaint for collection of sum of money and damages, nor one of
party in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the
its three (3) causes of action therein.
issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the
 All told, the CA correctly ruled that Watercraft failed to meet one costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages
of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court
attachment, i.e., that the case is one of those mentioned in Section shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto
1 of Rule 57, and that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in (italics for emphasis).
improvidently issuing such writ. Watercraft failed to particularly
 Indeed, actual and compensatory damages may be recovered for
state in its affidavit of merit the circumstances constituting intent
wrongful, though not malicious attachment. At the same time, it
to defraud creditors on the part of Wolfe in contracting or in the
was held by the court in the previous cases that the mere
performance of his purported obligation to pay boat storage fees,
existence of malice and bad faith would not per se warrant the
as well as to establish that he is a flight risk. Indeed, if all the
award of actual or compensatory damages. To grant such
requisites for granting such writ are not present, then the court
damages, sufficient proof thereon is required.
which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.
 However, both the RTC and the CA held that the complaint had
merit and that the respondent is entitled to a writ of preliminary
DIGEST BY: Erwin
attachment as a provisional remedy by which the property of the
CASE 10: G.R. No. 154106 June 29, 2004 petitioners is taken into custody of the law as a security for the
satisfaction of any judgement which the respondent may recover.
D.M. WENCESLAO and ASSOCIATES, INC., and/or DOMINADOR S.
 Aside from that, if the petitioners suffered damages as a result, it
DAYRIT, petitioners, vs. READYCON TRADING AND CONSTRUCTION
is merely because it did not heed the demand letter of the
CORP., respondent.
respondent in the first place. The petitioners could have averted
such damage if it immediately filed a counter-bond or a deposit in
QUISUMBING, J.:
order to lift the writ at once. It did not, and must bear its own loss,
FACTS OF THE CASE: if any, on that account.

 The petitioners herein had a contract with the Public Estates
 DISCHARGE OF ATTACHMENT UPON GIVING COUNTER-BOND
Authority (PEA) for the improvement of the main expressway in the

R-1 Toll Project along Coastal Road in Paranaque. To finish the said
 DIGEST BY: Erwin
project, the petitioners entered into a contract with the
respondent for the selling of Asphalt materials. As stipulated in the
said contract, after securing the down payment, the petitioners CASE 11: G.R. NO. 123638 June 15, 2005
will pay the remaining balance within 15 days thereof. 

 However, the petitioners failed to pay the remaining balance INSULAR SAVINGS BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE OMAR U.
amidst the countless demands. This prompted the respondent to AMIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 135 of the
file a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for the Regional Trial Court of Makati, and FAR EAST BANK AND
collection of a sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of TRUST COMPANY
preliminary attachment against the petitioners. GARCIA, J.:

 The writ of preliminary attachment was granted which was FACTS OF THE CASE:
countered by the petitioners with a motion for the release of the
 The case involved two checks that were drawn against the
property attached together with the posting of a counter-bond.
Respondent and were presented by the Petitioner for clearing. As
The motion prayed by the petitioners was granted.
respondent Bank returned the checks beyond the
 As a defense, the petitioner alleged that their contract was merely reglementary period, the petitioner refused to refund the money
of service and not of sale. At the same time, by way of to the Respondent Bank.
counterclaim, the petitioners prayed for the payment of damages
 With this, the Respondent Bank instituted an Arbitration case
caused by the filing of the respondent’s complaint and the
before the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House
issuance of the writ of attachment despite lack of cause.
Corporation (PCHC). While the dispute was pending Arbitration,
 The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Dissatisfied with the respondent bank instituted a civil case in the Regional Trial Court
decision, the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the
 During the hearing of the civil case, petitioner and respondent
lower court. Hence, the present petition.
bank agreed to temporarily divide between them the disputed
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable to the petitioners for amount of 25,200,000.00 while the dispute has not yet been
damages caused by the issuance and enforcement of the writ of resolved. With this, the petitioner filed a motion to discharge
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 12 of 49
attachment by counter-bond in the amount of 12,600,000.00. makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond . . . in an amount
equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment,
 However, the respondent Judge denied the motion. The
exclusive of costs.
petitioner went to the Court of Appeals and filed a petition for
certiorari ascribing on the trial court the commission of grave Hence, it was held that a writ of preliminary attachment cannot be
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court of issued for moral and exemplary damages and other unliquidated
Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s ruling. Hence, the present and contingent claims.
petition. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the  DIGEST BY: Erwin
Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond in CASE 12. G.R. No. L-48756 September 11, 1982 (116 SCRA 563)
the amount of 12,600,000.00.YES
K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., petitioner,
RULING: vs. THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and ANTONIO D. PINZON, respondents.
 The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the Trial Court
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond in the amount of Facts:
12,600,000.00.
- Main action: Recover sum of money worth P37,190.00
 The then pertinent provision of Rule 57 (Preliminary representing the backrentals of the truck and value of spare
Attachment) of the Rules of Court under which the appellate parts which have not been returned upon the termination of
court issued its assailed decision and resolution, provides as the lease; filed by Priv.Res Pinzon against Kenneth Glass.
follows: SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving
counter-bond. At any time after an order of attachment has been - Also prayed for writ of attachment against the property of
granted, the party whose property has been attached, . . . may Kenneth consisting of collectibles and payables with Phil.
upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who Geothermal; Grounds: (a) Kenneth is a foreigner, (b) he has
granted the order or to the judge of the court which the action is sufficient cause of action, (c) no sufficient security against
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part Kenneth for his claim in case of favorable judgment.
on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the - Kenneth moved to quash the writ; Grounds: (a) He never
discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a intended to leave the Phil, (b) the transaction entered was
counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf between KO Glass Construction as a company and Pinzon -
of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the not with him, (c) the said company has sufficient property in
application is made in an amount equal to the value of the case of adverse judgment.
property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover - CFI: ordered the writ
in the action. xxx . Should such counter-bond for any reason be Issue: WON the issuance of the writ was proper
found to be, or become insufficient, and the party furnishing the
same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party Ruling: No.
may apply for a new order of attachment. - 1st, there were no sufficient ground for the issuance.
 It is a well-settled rule that the amount of the counter- - Rule 57, Sec. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue-A
attachment bond is to be measured against the value of the plaintiff or any proper party may, at the commencement of
attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the
payment of any judgement that the attaching creditor may recover adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any
in the action. judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
 As things stood, therefore, respondent’s principal claim against (a) In an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of
petitioner immediately prior to the filing of the motion to action arising from contract, express or implied, against a party
discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud
12,600,000.00. The trial court was fully aware of this reality. his creditor;
Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the
attachment on a counter-bond based on the reduced claim of (b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
respondent. If a portion of the claim is already secured, the misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an
court sees no justifiable reason why such portion should still be officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or
subject of counter-bond. clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other
person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
 The trial court, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners motion to discharge attachment by (c) In an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly
counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00, an amount more detained, when the property, or any part thereof, has been
than double the attachment bond required of, and given by, concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or
respondent. As a necessary consequence, the Court of Appeals taken by the applicant or an officer;
committed reversible error when it dismissed petitioners recourse (d) In an action against the party who has been guilty of a fraud in
thereto in CA-G.R. SP No. 34876. contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the
 The present less stringent Section 12 of Rule 57 provides that action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for
the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant the taking, detention or conversion of which the action is brought;
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 13 of 49
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his Ruling: No.
property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors;
- In CA-GR SP 32863, to have a valid attachment, there must be
(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on specific allegations of the facts warranting its issuance.
whom summons may be served by publication.
- Section 1(b) and (d), Rule 57 of the then controlling Revised
- Pizon did not allege that Kenneth is a foreigner who may at Rules of Court, provides, to wit
any time leave the country with intent to defraud the former.
SECTION 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. A plaintiff or
He merely stated that he was a foreigner.
any proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at
- 2nd, the affidavit did not follow the requirement. any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may
- He did not state therein that "the case is one of those
be recovered in the following cases:
mentioned in Section 1 hereof; that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and x xxxxxxxx
that the amount due to the applicant is as much as the sum
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
for which the order granted above all legal counter-claims."
misapplied or converted to his use by a public officer, or an officer
- 3rd, KO Glass Constr. already filed a counterbond. This would of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in
have prompted the lower judge to discharge the attachment the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
as required by the Rules. fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

- Hence, the writ was improper. x xxxxxxxx

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in


DIGEST BY: KRISTEL contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the
action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for
CASE 13. G.R. No. 115678 February 23, 2001 the taking, detention or conversion of which the action is brought;

- While thisinvolves trust receipts, the violation of the terms of


PHILIPPINES BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner vs. which is qualified by law as constituting estafa, it does not
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BERNARDINO follow that a writ of attachment can and should automatically
VILLANUEVA, respondents. issue. Petitioner cannot merely cite Section 1(b) and (d), Rule
57, of the Revised Rules of Court, as mere reproduction of the
x ---------------------------------------- x rules, without more, cannot serve as good ground for issuing
G.R. No. 119723 February 23, 2001 a writ of attachment. An order of attachment cannot be issued
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. on a general averment.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS TEXTILE MILLS, - He cannot further insist that the failure to remit the proceeds
INC., respondents. of the entrusted goods warrants the issuance of the writ of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: attachment.

Facts: - It must be shown that the incurring of the obligation was


intended to defraud the creditor. The admission of Petitioner
- Main action: Claim of payment worth P2,244,926.30 on the fact that Priv.Res paid partially the debt even weakened
representing the proceeds of various textile goods which were his ground. This shows that they were willing to pay at the
covered by the credit and trust receipts executed by petitioner first place.
with Priv.Res Filipinas Textile as obligor, which in turn were
covered by surety agreements executed by Priv.Res - In CA-GR SP 32762, the lower court should have conducted a
Villanueva. hearing to substantiate the allegations of fraud,
embezzlement, or misappropriation. Again, these are merely
- Petitioner also moved for an attachment contending that general averments and specific allegations are needed to
violation of the trust receipt law constitutes estafa, thus a valid warrant the issuance of the subject writ. Also, Priv.Res were
ground for the issuance. Also, the attachment was necessary not afforded with opportunity to ventilate their defenses.
since both Priv.Res were disposing of their properties to the
detriment of Petitioner. - Final note, strict rules should be followed in issuance of a writ
of attachment being a harsh, extraordinary, and summary
- Both Priv.Res countered that they had already made partial remedy. Hence, construed strictly against the applicant.
payments.
- Therefore, the writ was improper.
- RTC: grant the writ

- Both Priv.Res filed for separate petition for certiorari. DIGEST BY: KRISTEL
- CA: In CA-GR SP 32762, ruled that lower court gravely abused
CASE 14 G.R. No. 184666, June 27, 2016
its discretion in issuing the writ since petitioner failed to
substantiate its allegations of fraud, embezzlement or
misappropriation. In CA-GR SP 32863, no sufficient basis for REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MEGA PACIFIC
the issuance since there were merely general averments. ESOLUTIONS, INC., WILLY U. YU, BONNIE S. YU, ENRIQUE T.
TANSIPEK, ROSITA Y. TANSIPEK, PEDRO O. TAN, JOHNSON W.
Issue: WON the writ of attachment was proper
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 14 of 49
FONG, BERNARD I. FONG, AND *LAURIANO A. creation of MPC was, after all, merely an ingenious scheme to
BARRIOS, Respondents. feign eligibility to bid.
11. Pursuant to Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
FACTS: attachment against the properties of MPEI and individual
respondents. The application was grounded upon the
1. Republic Act No. 8436 authorized the COMELEC to use an
fraudulent misrepresentation of respondents as to their
automated election system for the May 1998 elections.
eligibility to participate in the bidding for the COMELEC
However, the automated system failed to materialize and
automation project and the failure of the ACMs to comply
votes were canvassed manually during the 1998 and the 2001
with mandatory technical requirements.
elections.
12. The trial court denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
2. For the 2004 elections, the COMELEC again attempted to
preliminary attachment,29 ruling that there was an absence of
implement the automated election system. For this purpose, it
factual allegations as to how the fraud was actually
invited bidders to apply for the procurement of supplies,
committed.
equipment, and services.
13. The trial court further ruled that the allegations of fraud on
3. Respondent MPEI, as lead company, purportedly formed a
the part of MPEI were not supported by the COMELEC, the
joint venture - known as the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) -
office in charge of conducting the bidding for the election
together with We Solv, SK C & C, ePLDT, Election.com and
automation contract. It was likewise held that there was no
Oracle. Subsequently, MPEI, on behalf of MPC, submitted its
evidence that respondents harbored a preconceived plan not
bid proposal to COMELEC.
to comply with the obligation; neither was there any evidence
4. After due assessment, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)
that MPEI's corporate fiction was used to perpetrate fraud.
recommended that the project be awarded to MPC. The
Thus, it found no sufficient basis to pierce the veil of
COMELEC favorably acted on the recommendation and issued
corporate fiction or to cause the attachment of the properties
Resolution No. 6074, which awarded the automation project
owned by individual respondents.
to MPC.
14. Petitioner moved to set aside the trial court's Order denying
5. Despite the award to MPC, the COMELEC and MPEI executed
the writ of attachment,30 but its motion was denied.
on 2 June 2003 the Automated Counting and Canvassing
15. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
Project Contract (automation contract)5 for the aggregate
16. The CA in its First Decision32 reversed and set aside the trial
amount of P1,248,949,088.
court's Orders and ruled that there was sufficient basis for the
6. MPEI agreed to supply and deliver 1,991 units of ACMs and
issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of petitioner.
such other equipment and materials necessary for the
17. The appellate court explained that the averments of petitioner
computerized electoral system in the 2004 elections. Pursuant
in support of the latter's application actually reflected
to the automation contract, MPEI delivered 1,991 ACMs to the
pertinent conclusions reached by this Court in its 2004
COMELEC. The latter, for its part, made partial payments to
Decision. It held that the trial court erred in disregarding the
MPEI in the aggregate amount of P1.05 billion.
following findings of fact, which remained unaltered and
7. This Court in its 2004 Decision declared the contract null and
unreversed: (1) COMELEC bidding rules provided that the
void.6 We held that the COMELEC committed a clear violation
eligibility and capacity of a bidder may be proved through
of law and jurisprudence, as well as a reckless disregard of its
financial documents including, among others, audited
own bidding rules and procedure.
financial statements for the last three years; (2) MPEI was
8. All in all, Comelec subverted the essence of public bidding: to
incorporated only on 27 February 2003, or 11 days prior to the
give the public an opportunity for fair competition and a clear
bidding itself; (3) in an attempt to disguise its ineligibility,
basis for a precise comparison of bids.
MPEI participated in the bidding as lead company of MPC, a
putative consortium, and submitted the incorporation papers
THE INSTANT CASE
and financial statements of the members of the consortium;
and (4) no proof of the joint venture agreement, consortium
Complaint for Damages filed by respondents with the RTC
agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan
Makati and petitioner's Answer with Counterclaim, with
executed among the members of the purported consortium
an application for a writ of preliminary attachment, from
was ever submitted to the COMELEC.
which the instant case arose
18. According to the CA, the foregoing were glaring indicia or
9. Upon the finality of the declaration of nullity of the
badges of fraud, which entitled petitioner to the issuance of
automation contract, respondent MPEI filed a Complaint for
the writ.
Damages before the RTC Makati, arguing that,
19. Respondents moved for reconsideration36 of the First Decision
notwithstanding the nullification of the automation contract,
of the CA.
the COMELEC was still bound to pay the amount of
20. The CA reconsidered its First Decision37 and directed the
P200,165,681.89. This amount represented the difference
remand of the case to the RTC Makati for the reception of
between the value of the ACMs and the support services
evidence of allegations of fraud and to determine whether
delivered on one hand, and on the other, the payment
attachment should necessarily issue.
previously made by the COMELEC.
21. The CA explained in its Amended Decision that respondents
10. By way of a counterclaim, petitioner demanded from
could not be considered to have fostered a fraudulent intent
respondents the return of the payments made pursuant to the
to dishonor their obligation, since they had delivered 1,991
automation contract.26 It argued that individual respondents,
units of ACMs.
being the incorporators of MPEI, likewise ought to be
22. Petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition,45 arguing that the
impleaded and held accountable for MPEI's liabilities. The
CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 15 of 49


for the reception of evidence to determine the presence of recovered in the following cases:
fraud.
x xxx
ISSUE: Whether a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued against
the properties of individual respondents, considering that they were not (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
parties to the 2004 case. contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action
is brought, or in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under the above-quoted
HELD:
rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
The Petition is meritorious. A writ of preliminary attachment should
alleged fraud.
issue in favor of petitioner over the properties of respondents MPEI,
Willy Yu (Willy) and the remaining individual respondents, namely:
Metro, Inc. v. Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc., To sustain an attachment on
Bonnie S. Yu (Bonnie), Enrique T. Tansipek (Enrique), Rosita Y. Tansipek
this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or
(Rosita), Pedro O. Tan (Pedro), Johnson W. Fong (Johnson), Bernard I.
incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud
Fong (Bernard), and Lauriano Barrios (Lauriano). The bases for the writ
must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been
are the following:
the reason which induced the other party into giving consent
which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for
1. Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was sufficiently attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should
established by the factual findings of this Court in its 2004 be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is
Decision and subsequent pronouncements. fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a
2. A writ of preliminary attachment may issue over the preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. x xx.
properties of the individual respondents using the doctrine of The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently
piercing the corporate veil. show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent
3. The factual findings of this Court that have become final intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the
cannot be modified or altered, much less reversed, and are debt or failure to comply with his obligation. (Emphasis supplied)
controlling in the instant case.
4. The delivery of 1,991 units of ACMs does not negate fraud on
An amendment to the Rules of Court added the phrase "in the
the part of respondents MPEI and Willy.
performance thereof" to include within the scope of the grounds for
5. Estoppel does not lie against the state when it acts to rectify
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment those instances relating to
mistakes, errors or illegal acts of its officials and agents.
fraud in the performance of the obligation.
6. The findings of the Ombudsman are not controlling in the
instant case.
In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon demonstrating the commission of fraud by respondent MPEI in the
the order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the execution of the automation contract in the two ways:
property or properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever A. Respondent MPEI had perpetrated a scheme against
judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the petitioner to secure the automation contract by using MPC
defendant.61 The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order as supposed bidder and eventually succeeding in signing
that the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus the automation contract as MPEI alone, an entity which
prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the was ineligible to bid in the first place.
plaintiff from the former. B. B. Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was further
shown by the fact that despite the failure of its ACMs to
pass the tests conducted by the DOST, respondent still
The purpose and function of an attachment or garnishment is twofold.
acceded to being awarded the automation contract.
First, it seizes upon property of an alleged debtor in advance of final
judgment and holds it subject to appropriation, thereby preventing the
loss or dissipation of the property through fraud or other means.
Second, it subjects the property of the debtor to the payment of a CASE 15 IS SAME WITH CASE 5
creditor's claim, in those cases in which personal service upon the
DIGEST BY: KRISTEL
debtor cannot be obtained.63 This remedy is meant to secure a
contingent lien on the defendant's property until the plaintiff can, by CASE 16 G.R. No. 158271 April 8, 2008
appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have the property
applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner vs ASIAN CONSTRUCTION and
debts in cases in which the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or
concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court


FACTS:
1. China Bank granted respondent Asian Construction and
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the
Development Corporation (ACDC) an Omnibus Credit Line in
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a
the amount of P90, 000,000.00. Alleging that ACDC failed to
plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party
comply with its obligations under the Omnibus Credit Line,
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 16 of 49
China Bank filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money In Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Denmark, an order of the lower court in
and damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of directing the sale of attached properties, consisting of 20 automobiles
preliminary attachment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and 2 airplanes, was reversed by the Supreme Court ofLouisiana. In
of Makati. support of its contention that automobiles are
2. The RTC issued an Order granting China Banks prayer for writ perishable, Mossler offered testimony to the effect that automobile tires
of preliminary attachment. Consequently, as shown in the tend to dry-rot in storage, batteries to deteriorate, crankcases to
Sheriff’s Report, the writ of preliminary attachment was become damaged, paint and upholstery to fade, that generally
implemented levying personal properties of ACDC, i.e., vans, automobiles tend to depreciate while in storage. Rejecting these
dump trucks, cement mixers, cargo trucks, utility vehicles, arguments, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that while there might
machinery, equipment and office machines and fixtures. be a depreciation in the value of a car during storage, depending
3. Upon motion of China Bank, the RTC issued a Summary largely on existing economic conditions, there would be no material
Judgment[ in favor of China Bank. China Bank filed a Motion deterioration of the car itself or any of its appurtenances if the car was
to Take Custody of Attached Properties with Motion for Grant properly cared for, and therefore it could not be said that automobiles
of Authority to Sell to the Branch Sheriff[10] with the RTC, were of a perishable nature within the intendment of the statute, which
praying that it be allowed to take custody of ACDCs could only be invoked when the property attached and seized was of a
properties for the purpose of selling them in an auction. perishable nature.
4. ACDC filed its Opposition to the June 15, 2000 Motion
arguing that there can be no sale of the latter’s attached China Bank argues that if the CA allowed the attached properties to be
properties in the absence of a final and executory judgment sold, whatever monetaryvalue which the attached properties still have
against ACDC. According to the CA, selling the attached will be realized and saved for both parties. China Bank further claims
properties prior to final judgment of the appealed case is that should ACDC prevail in the final judgment of the collection suit,
premature and contrary to the intent and purpose of ACDC can proceed with the bond posted by China Bank. The Court
preliminary attachment for the following reasons: first, the finds said arguments to be specious and misplaced.
records reveal that the attached properties subject of the
Section 4, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:
motion are not perishable in nature; and second, while the sale
of the attached properties may serve the interest of China Section 4. Condition of applicants bond. - The party applying for the
Bank, it will not be so for ACDC. order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the
amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ,
ISSUE: conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all the damages which he may sustain by
Whether or not the honorable COURT OF APPEALS rendered reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
the questioned resolutions in a manner not in accord with the applicant was not entitled thereto.
provisions of section 11, rule 57 of the rules of civil procedure, as it It is clear from the foregoing provision that the bond posted by China
shelved the demands of equity by arbitrarily disallowing the sale of the Bank answers only for the payment of all damages which ACDC may
attached properties. sustain if the court shall finally adjudge that China Bank was not entitled
to attachment. The liability attaches if the plaintiff is not entitled to the
HELD: attachment because the requirements entitling him to the writ are
Section 11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides: wanting, or if the plaintiff has no right to the attachment because the
facts stated in his affidavit, or some of them are untrue. Clearly, ACDC
Sec. 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on attachment
can only claim from the bond for all the damages which it may sustain
and before entry of judgment.- Whenever it shall be made to appear to
by reason of the attachment and not because of the sale of the
the court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice to
attached properties prior to final judgment.
both parties, that the property attached is perishable, or that the
interests of all the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale Sale of attached property before final judgment is an equitable remedy
thereof, the court may order such property to be sold at public auction provided for the convenience of the parties and preservation of the
in such manner as it may direct, and the proceeds of such sale to be property. To repeat, the Court finds that the issue of whether the sale
deposited in court to abide the judgment in the action. (Emphasis of attached properties is for the convenience of the parties and that the
supplied) interests of all the parties willbe subserved by the said sale is a question
of fact. Again, the foregoing issue can only be resolved upon
Thus, an attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and
examination of the evidence presented by both parties which the Court
before entry of judgment whenever it shall be made to appear to the
cannot do in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice to
Court.
bothparties, that the attached property is perishable or that the
interests of all the parties to the action will be subserved by the DIGEST BY: ED
sale of the attached property.

The issue hinges on the determination whether the vehicles, office Case 17 G.R. No. 203530, April 13, 2015
machines and fixtures are perishable property under Section 11, Rules
57 of the Rules of Court, which is actually one of first impression. No LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, TOMAS CLEMENTE, JR., AND OSCAR
local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this RAMIREZ, Petitioners, v.ERLINDA KRISHNAN, Respondent.
matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence,
particularly those of the United Stateswhere some of our laws and rules PERALTA, J.:
were patterned after, is in order.

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 17 of 49


FACTS: Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Issue: W/N the bank property may be deposited instead of cash or
Oscar Ramirez are the respondents in the complaint for Collection of cash-bond
Sum of Money and Damages filed by respondent Erlinda Khrishnan on
February 7, 2001. Held: No. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that
"[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion
Erlinda Krishnan claimed that she is a client of Luzon Development Bank with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or
wherein she maintained several accounts including time deposits. On by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the
several occasions, when respondent Erlinda presented her Time sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines
Deposits Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for payment because of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as
they have become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such party
reason that they were fraudulent. Erlinda likewise applied for a makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an
Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC granted on February 27, amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount
2001. sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property
By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in BPI Family Bank, to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."
Calamba, Laguna in the amount of P28,597,472.70 and its account
amounting to P49,000,000.00 in the Central Bank were garnished. Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing
the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to
On March 9, 2001, petitioners filed an urgent ex-parte Motion to Recall await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the
Quash and/or Lift Attachment or Garnishment (in excess of amounts in property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued,
the writ). Respondent Erlinda opposed the motion. not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the
In a decision granting a Petition for Certiorari before the 7th Division, court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond
filed by Erlinda, the court ordered Luzon Development Bank, Tomas executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by
Clemente and Oscar Ramirez as defendants in Civil Case entitled Erlinda the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property
C. Krishnan v. Luzon Development Bank, et al., to file a counterbond in to be attached, exclusive of costs."
accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 57, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within
10 days from the finality of this decision; otherwise, the REGIONAL From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, in Manila shall immediately reinstate the has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is
writ of attachment issued and implemented in Civil Case No. 01- through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the
100046. Court holds that petitioner's argument that it has the option to deposit
real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to
discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, vs . Judge ENRICO A.
unmeritorious.
LANZANAS, RTC, Branch 7, Manila, Clerk of Court JENNIFER DELA
CRUZ-BUENDIA and Deputy Sheriff CARMELO V. CACHERO

BRION, J: DIGEST BY: ED


Case 18: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1999 December 8, 2010
On May 09, 2008, respondent judge issued an Order directing (Formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1903-RTJ)
respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment bond in the amount of
P35,000,000.00 and petitioners to file a counterbond within ten days
from notice of the filing and approval of the bond of respondent
Erlinda. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said Order
which respondent judge denied and granted a period of fifteen days for
respondent Erlinda to file an attachment bond.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying that a hearing


be held to determine the sufficiency of the attachment bond and they Facts: The BSP is the plaintiff in Civil Case entitled Bangko Sentral ng
be allowed to deposit Certificates of Title of real property, and the Pilipinas v. Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, et al. The BSP
issuance of the writ of attachment be held in abeyance. The petitioners alleged that, Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (presently Court of Appeals
filed a motion to admit bank property in lieu of counterbond which was Associate Justice) of the RTC, Branch 12, Manila, issued a Writ of
opposed by respondent Erlinda. Attachment against the assets and properties of the defendants, Orient
The CA reinstated the Order of the Writ of Attachment for failure of the Commercial Banking Corporation, Jose C. Go, Vicente C. Go, Gotesco
petitioners to file the required counterbond. Properties, Inc. and Go Tong Electrical Supply, Inc. The writ was served,
among others, on the various malls owned by the defendants, resulting
in the garnishment of the rentals of the tenants. By order of the court,
Note: In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to the corresponding check payments of the mall tenants were deposited
deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to secure any to the Land Bank of the Philippines account of the RTC, Manila, under
contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins the case. the management and custody of dela Cruz-Buendia. Defendant Jose C.
They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term "deposit," Go and his wife Elvy T. Go are also the defendants in Civil Case No. 01-
thus, it cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash. 101190, filed by PBCOM, which was pending before the RTC, Branch 42,
Manila.

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 18 of 49


On May 23, 2003, when the BSPs counsel, Fe B. Macalino, the proper court, the RTC, Branch 12, Manila, in Civil Case No. 99-
inquired into the status of Civil Case No. 99-95993, she was allegedly 95993. The disputed funds were clearly under the custody of Branch 12,
informed by the personnel of the RTC, Branch 12, Manila, that portions not Branch 42.
of the subject funds (P85,631,690.38) had been withdrawn and released
to PBCOM on the basis of a Notice to Deliver Garnished Amount, dated
May 12, 2003, served by Cachero,[6] based on the writ of execution As ruled in the case of Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
issued by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan of the RTC, Branch 42, Manila, in Court, property in the custody of the law cannot be interfered with
Civil Case No. 01-101190, Philippine Bank of Communications v. Spouses without the custody of the proper court and properly legally attached is
Jose C. Go and Elvy T. Go. property in custodia legis.

In compliance with the notice, Lilia C. Santiago, then cashier of DIGEST BY: ED
the RTC, Manila, prepared a disbursement voucher, in the amount
of P82,634,281.23. The amount was covered by LBP Check No. 175255,
also dated May 14, 2003, and co-signed by Judge Lanzanas and dela Case 19. G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008
Cruz-Buendia. The same was acknowledged by Atty. Cesar D. Ramirez, Fort Bonifacio Dev’t Corp. vs. Yllas Lending Corp.
PBCOMs Vice-President for the Legal Division. The BSP questioned the CARPIO, J.:
certification, claiming that as of the date of the disbursement voucher,
the records of the case had been brought to the Court of Appeals on FACTS: On 24 April 1998, Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation
April 22, 2003, in view of the spouses Go’s appeal in Civil Case No. 01- (FBDC) executed a lease contract in favor of Tirreno, Inc. over a unit at
101190. the Entertainment Center Phase 1 of
the Bonifacio Global City in Taguig. The parties had the lease contract
On May 16, 2003, LBP Check No. 175239 for P11,344,990.74, notarized on the day of its execution. Tirreno used the leased premises
signed by Judge Lanzanas, was issued in the name of PBCOM. Atty. for Savoia Ristorante and La Strega Bar. Two provisions in the lease
delos Reyes acknowledged receipt of the check. On the same day, dela contract are pertinent to the present case: Section 20, which is about
Cruz-Buendia made another withdrawal from the garnished funds for the consequences in case of default of the lessee, and Section 22, which
the amount of P29,491.94, and signed by Judge Lanzanas and dela is about the lien on the properties of the lease.
Cruz-Buendia. The payee was the Clerk of Court RTC-Manila on General
Fund. The BSP claimed that on the official receipt covering the payment Tirreno began to default in its lease payments. By 2000, Tirreno was
of the commission, Atty. delos Reyes was named as the payor, although already in arrears by P5,027,337.91. FBDC and Tirreno entered into a
the receipt referred to LBP Check No. 175296 which was issued by settlement agreement. Despite the execution of the settlement
Judge Lanzanas and dela Cruz-Buendia. The BSP also claimed that the agreement, FBDC found need to send Tirreno a written notice of
receipt was falsified by making it appear that Atty. Delos Reyes was the termination due to Tirreno’s alleged failure to settle its outstanding
payee when he did not pay any amount as beneficiary of the award. obligations. Subsequently, FBDC entered and occupied the leased
The BSP further alleged that dela Cruz-Buendia issued several premises. FBDC also appropriated the equipment and properties left
disbursement vouchers, allegedly representing withdrawal of the Sheriff by Tirreno pursuant to Section 22 of their Contract of Lease as partial
Percentage of Collection of the Garnished Account (P85,631,690.38), payment for Tirrenos outstanding obligations. Tirreno filed an action for
covered by LBP Check No. 175292 dated June 4, 2003. Official receipt forcible entry against FBDC before the MTC. Tirreno also filed a
no. 18269397 bore the name of Tan as payor.[14] The BSP wondered complaint for specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
what the connection of Tan was with the unauthorized release of its temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
garnished funds considering that Tan was not a party to the PBCOM against FBDC before the RTC. The RTC dismissed Tirreno’s complaint for
case; neither was he a party to the BSP case. forum-shopping.

The BSP protested that the withdrawals from the garnished On 4 March 2002, Yllas Lending Corporation and Jose S. Lauraya, in his
rental payments in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Orient Commercial official capacity as President, (respondents) caused the sheriff of Branch
Banking were irregular as a court has no power to lift a writ of 59 of the trial court to serve an alias writ of seizure against FBDC. On
preliminary attachment by a co-equal court. It stressed that the RTC, the same day, FBDC served on the sheriff an affidavit of title and third
Manila, Branch 42, no longer had jurisdiction over the case involving party claim. FBDC found out that on 27 September 2001, respondents
PBCOM and the Spouses Go because the case records were transmitted filed a complaint for Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage with Replevin,
to the Court of Appeals on March 7, 2003.[17] docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1452, against Tirreno,
Eloisa Poblete Todaro (Eloisa), and Antonio D. Todaro (Antonio), in their
personal and individual capacities, and in Eloisas official capacity as
Issue: W/N the case involves the alleged irregular withdrawals of funds President. In their complaint, respondents alleged that they lent a total
in custodia legis of P1.5 million to Tirreno, Eloisa, and Antonio. On 9 November
2000, Tirreno, Eloisa and Antonio executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage
Held: Rule 57, Section 7(e) of the Rules of Court provides that if the in favor of respondents as security for the loan.
property sought to be attached is in custodia legis, a copy of the writ of
attachment shall be filed with the proper court or quasi-judicial agency, The sheriff delivered the seized properties to respondents. FBDC
and notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such questioned the propriety of the seizure and delivery of the properties to
property. respondents without an indemnity bond before the trial court. FBDC
argued that when respondents and Tirreno entered into the chattel
No evidence or record in the present case exists showing that the above mortgage agreement on 9 November 2000, Tirreno no longer owned
provision had been complied with when Cachero asked for the release the mortgaged properties as FBDC already enforced its lien on 29
of the garnished funds. No copy of the writ of attachment was filed with September 2000. However, the RTC did not favor FBDC argument,
stating that Section 22 of the contract is void, it cannot vest title of
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 19 of 49
ownership over the seized properties. Therefore, FBDC cannot assert which should be deemed acquired for the benefit of the Republic, went
that its right is superior to respondents, who are the mortgagees of the to the officials of the corporation in their own individual accounts-
disputed properties. some, however, through conduits or corporations.
When the case reaches the Court FBDC alleges among others that the
trial court erred in depriving FBDC of its properties without due process On 1 March 1991, POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed separate complaints for
of law when the trial court erroneously dismissed FBDCs third party Injunction with the Sandiganbayan against the Republic to nullify and
claim, denied FBDCs intervention, and did not require the posting of an lift the sequestration order issued against them for failure to file the
indemnity bond for FBDCs protection.[12] necessary judicial action against them within the period prescribed by
the Constitution and to enjoin the PCGG from interfering with their
Issue: W/N the trial court erred by not requiring the posting of an management and operation, which the Sandiganbayan granted on 4
indemnity bond December 1991 through a Resolution.

Held: Yes, the Court stated that pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 57, the
On 23 January 1995, however, this Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
sheriff is not obligated to turn over to respondents the properties
reversed the Sandiganbayan Resolution and ruled that the filing of
subject of this case in view of respondents failure to file a bond. The
Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting and Restitution,
bond in Section 14 of Rule 57 (proceedings where property is claimed
and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 0009, was filed within the
by third person) is different from the bond in Section 3 of the same rule
required 6-month period.
(affidavit and bond). Under Section 14 of Rule 57, the purpose of the
bond is to indemnify the sheriff against any claim by the intervenor to
the property seized or for damages arising from such seizure, which the POTC also filed a complaint for Mandamus against the Republic before
sheriff was making and for which the sheriff was directly responsible to the Sandiganbayan to compel the PCGG to return POTC's Stock and
the third party. Section 3, Rule 57, on the other hand, refers to the Transfer Book and Stock Certificate Booklets.
attachment bond to assure the return of defendants personal property
or the payment of damages to the defendant if the plaintiffs action to the Sandiganbayan granted the Mandamus, and the Decision became
recover possession of the same property fails, in order to protect the final and executory.
plaintiffs right of possession of said property, or prevent the defendant
from destroying the same during the pendency of the suit. On 28 June 1996, Atty. PotencianoIlusorio (Ilusorio), one of the officials
of the petitioner, entered into a Compromise Agreement with the
Republic which was approved by the Sandiganbayan. Out of 5,400 or
DIGEST BY: LEE 40o/o of the shares of stock of POTC in the names of Mid-Pasig Land
Development Corporation (MLDC) and Independent Realty Corporation
CASE 20 G.R. No. 174462, February 10, 2016 (IRC), the government recovered 4, 727 shares or 34.9% of the shares of
stock. Ilusorio, on the other hand, retained 673 shares or 5% of the
shares of stock.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
(POTC), PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION
(PHILCOMSAT), Petitioners, The Compromise Agreement was approved by the Sandiganbayan.
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (3rd Division), REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES The PCGG, MLDC, and IRC filed separate petitions before this Court to
represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD nullify the Order of the Sandiganbayan approving the Compromise
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Respondents. Agreement, which this Court declared valid in Republic of the Phils. v.
Sandiganbayan.
PEREZ, J.:
Issue: Whether or not the continued sequestration is necessary (NO).
Facts: Pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, on 14 March 1986,
then PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz issued a letter directing Ruling: Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that if no
Officer-In-Charge Carlos M. Ferrales to: judicial action has been filed within six (6) months after the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, the writ of sequestration shall automatically
a. Sequester and immediately take over POTC and be lifted. In the case at bar, there was no judicial action filed against
PHILCO MS AT among others, and POTC and PHILCOMSAT. There has never been any appropriate judicial
action for reconveyance or recovery ever instituted by the Republic
against POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
b. To freeze all 'withdrawals, transfers and/or
remittances under any type of deposit accounts,
trust accounts or placements. I. a. Sequestration is merely provisional

POTC is a private corporation, which is a main stockholder of To effectively recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
PHILCOMSAT, a government-owned and controlled corporation. Marcos and his cronies, the President granted the PCGG, among others,
power and authority to sequester, provisionally take over or freeze
On 22 July 1987, the OSG filed a Complaint for Reconveyance, suspected ill-gotten wealth. The subject of the present case is the
extent of PCGG's power to sequester.
Reversion, Accounting and Restitution, and Damages, against officials
of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. As alleged in the Complaint, through clever
schemes, the wealth that should go to the coffers of the government,
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 20 of 49
The power of the PCGG to sequester is merely provisional. None other rendered functus officio, it is merely ministerial upon the Sandiganbayan
than Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(c) expressly provides for the to lift the same.
provisional nature of sequestration.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution issued
In the notable case of Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. (BASECO) by the Sandiganbayan dated 20 October 2005 and 2 August 2006
v. PCGG,31 the Court clearly pronounced that sequestration is are REVERSED. The writ of sequestration issued against petitioner
provisional, that such sequestration shall last "until the transactions POTC and PHILCOMSA T is hereby declared LIFTED six (6) months after
leading to such acquisition xxx can be disposed of by the appropriate the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on 2 February 1987.
authorities."32
RULES 58- PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Sequestration is akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment, or receivership. Similarly, in attachment, the property of
DIGEST BY: LEE
the defendant is seized as a security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or
lost intentionally or otherwise, pending litigation. In a receivership, the CASE 1 G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017
property is placed in the possession and control of a receiver appointed
by the court, who shall conserve the property pending final PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA), represented by Oscar M.
determination of ownership or right of possession of the parties. In Sevilla, General Manager, Benjamin B. Cecilio, Assistant Manager
sequestration, the same principle holds true. The sequestered for Operations, and Sisali B. Arap, Port Manager, Petitioner
properties are placed under the control of the PCGG, subject to the final vs
determination of whether the property was in truth ill-gotten. NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES,
INC. (NIASSI), represented by Ramon Calo, Respondent
Sequestration is a conservatory writ,37 which purpose is to preserve
properties in custodia legis, lest the dissipation and concealment of the CAGUIOA, J.:
"ill-gotten" wealth the former President Marcos and his allies may resort
to, pending the final disposition of the properties.38 It is to prevent the Facts: Sometime in November 2000, PPA, through its Pre-qualification,
disappearance or dissipation pending adjudgment of whether the Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) accepted bids for a 10-year
acquisition thereof by the apparent owner was attended by some contract to operate as the sole cargo handler at the port of Nasipit,
vitiating anomaly or attended by some illegal means.39 Thus by no Agusan del Norte (Nasipit Port). Subsequently, PBAC issued Resolution
means is it permanent in character. Upon the final disposition of the No. 005-20008 recommending that the 10-year cargo-handling
sequestered properties, the sequestration is rendered functus officio. contract be awarded to NIASSI as the winning bidder.

b. Ownership of the sequestered properties The second highest bidder, Concord Arrastre and Stevedoring
have already been finally adjudged Corporation (CASCOR) filed a protest with PPA's General Manager,
Oscar M. Sevilla10 (Sevilla), alleging that two of NIASSI's stockholders
on record are legislators who are constitutionally prohibited from
The ultimate purpose of sequestration is to recover the sequestered
having any direct or indirect financial interest in any contract with the
properties in favor of the government in case they tum out to be ill-
government or any of its agencies during the term of their office
gotten. This function to dispose of the property is reserved to the
Sandiganbayan. Until the Sandiganbayan determines whether the Notwithstanding the protest, PPA issued a Notice of Award in favor of
property was in truth and in fact "ill- gotten", the sequestration shall NIASSI.
subsist. In case of a finding that the sequestered properties are ill-
gotten, the property shall be returned to the lawful owner, to the However, instead of formally executing a written contract, NIASSI
people, through the government; otherwise, the sequestered property requested PPA to issue a Hold-Over Authority (HOA) in its favor, in view
shall be returned to the previous owner. of CASCOR's pending protest. PPA granted NIASSI's request and issued
a HOA dated August 1, 2001, effective until October 31, 2001, "or until
In the case at bar, the 34.9% ownership of the sequestered property has [such time] a cargo[-]handling contract shall have been awarded,
whichever comes first."
been finally adjudged; the ultimate purpose of sequestration was
already accomplished when the ownership thereof was adjudged to the Meanwhile, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
government by this Court in Republic of the Phils. v. issued Opinion No. 028, series of 2002 on February 7, 2002 (OGCC
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the said shares in the ownership of the Opinion) which confirmed the authority of PPA to bid out the cargo-
sequestered properties have reverted to the Government. The handling contract and affirmed the validity of the award in NIASSI's
government now owns 4,727 shares or 34.9% of the sequestered favor. Despite this, the HOA was subsequently extended several times
corporations. upon NIASSI' s request. While the exact number of extensions and their
particulars cannot be ascertained from the records, the last extension of
As the sequestered property has already been disposed, the ultimate the HOA appears to have been issued on October 13, 2004, for a term
purpose of sequestration has already been attained; the evil sought to of six months.
be prevented is no longer present. Evidently, the sequestered property
which was already returned to the government cannot anymore be However, barely two months after the last extension of the HOA, PPA
dissipated or concealed. Otherwise stated, the sequestered properties issued a letter dated revoking the extension. PPA further relayed that it
need no longer be subject of reversion proceedings because they have would take over the cargo-handling services at the Nasipit Port
already reverted back to the government. Thus, as the sequestration is beginning December 10, 2004

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 21 of 49


Proceedings before the RTC ground that NIASSI's operations for the period covered by the
HOA and its extensions should not be deducted therefrom
 NIASSI filed with the RTC a Petition (ammended)
 The Amended Petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of Issue: whether the CA erred when it issued the Amended Decision
mandamus directing PPA to formally execute a written contract, affirming the September 2011 RTC Resolution and December 2011 RTC
and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing PP A Order, and directing PPA to execute a cargo-handling contract in favor
to turn over the management and operations of Nasipit Port's of NIASSI for a full 10-year term without deducting the period covered
by the HOA.
cargo-handling services back to NIASSI.
 RTC issued a resolution granting NIASSI's prayer for a writ of
Ruling: YES
preliminary mandatory injunction, conditioned upon the posting
of a surety bond.
The CA 's findings in CA-G.R. SP No.00214 constitute the law of the
 On April 11, 2005, the RTC issued an order (April 2005 RTC
case between the parties, and are thus binding herein.
Order) granting PPA's Motion for Reconsideration. The April 2005
RTC Order immediately dissolved the writ of preliminary In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, the CA held that (i) the 10- year
mandatory injunction and directed NIASSI to surrender the cargo-handling contract had already been perfected, and (ii) the HOA
management and control of Nasipit Port's cargo-handling and its subsequent extensions constituted partial fulfillment thereof.
operations to PPA.
 NIASSI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA petition A preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary remedy to
prayed for the reversal of the April 2005 RTC Order, and preserve the status quo during the pendency of the main case. As a
ultimately, the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction. necessary consequence, matters resolved in injunction proceedings do
not, as a general rule, conclusively determine the merits of the main
 CA granted the petition. CA found that a perfected contract
case or decide controverted facts therein. Generally, findings made in
between NIASSI and PPA in respect of the cargohandling
injunction proceedings are subject to the outcome of the main case
operations in fact existed, albeit unwritten. which is usually tried subsequent to the injunction proceedings.
 RTC issued a resolution (June 2011 RTC Resolution) dismissing
the Amended Petition for being moot and academic. The June In this case, however, no further proceedings were conducted after the
2011 RTC Resolution observed that since the CA had already Decision of the Supreme Court relative to the injunction proceedings
made a definitive ruling that a contract had been perfected had become final. To be sure, the RTC directed the parties to submit
between the parties, the RTC had "nothing left to do" in respect of their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not the main
case had become moot and academic because of the finality of said
the Amended Petition
Decision and, on the basis of the memoranda, the R TC resolved to
 However, on NIASSI's Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC issued
dismiss the Amended Petition, as it had nothing left to determine. As
a Resolution (September 2011 RTC Resolution) reversing the June such, no evidence to controvert the findings of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
2011 RTC Resolution. 00214 were presented in the main case. This being the case, the factual
findings of the CA in respect of the perfected cargo-handling contract
The defendant is hereby ordered to execute a formal in the injunction proceedings became conclusive upon finality of this
ten (10) years contract in favor of the plaintiff, upon Court's decision affirming the same. These circumstances thus render
the finality of this order. The writ of preliminary the application of the law of the case doctrine proper.
injunction issued by the Court dated August 8, 2006,
will be considered dissolved upon perfection of the The term of the perfected contract has already expired.
formal arrastre service contract.
While the Court agrees with PPA's submission that the perfected
Proceedings before the CA contract has already expired, the Court clarifies that such expiration is
not because of the mere lapse of 10 years reckoned from the date when
 PPA filed an appeal before the CA the same was perfected. To hold as such would be to feign ignorance of
the events that transpired thereafter, which led to the institution of this
 CA rendered a Decision granting PPA's appeal in part by
very Petition.
annulling the September 2011 RTC Resolution and December
2011 RTC Order in so far as they failed to consider that the 10-
It bears emphasizing that PPA assumed the management and
year cargo-handling contract had been partially fulfilled.
operations of the cargo-handling services at Nasipit Port on two
 The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court to determine the separate instances- first, by virtue of its letter dated December 6, 2004
total period of time during which NIASSI was in operation of the revoking the last extension of the HOA, and second, by virtue of the
cargo handling services of Nasipit port April 2005 RTC Order lifting the preliminary mandatory injunction
 On NIASSI's Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CA granted in NIASSI's favor. The IO-year term of the perfected contract
issued its Amended Decision dated September 15, 2014.50 The must be deemed interrupted during the periods when PPA assumed
management and control over NIASSI's cargo-handling operations.
Amended Decision affirmed the September 2011 R TC Resolution
and December 2011 RTC Order directing PPA to execute the
NIASSI conducted the cargo-handling operations at Nasipit Port for a
cargo-handling contract in favor of NIASSI for a full 10-year term
total period of 3 years, 11 months and 20 days. Notably, NIASSI does
from the finality of the September 2011 RTC Resolution, on the
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 22 of 49
not dispute that it has been conducting such operations since the denied Atlocom's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
reinstatement of the preliminary mandatory injunction. prohibitory injunction and its alternative prayer for a provisional
mandatory injunction. However, in its Decision dated June 29, 2012, the
DIGEST BY: LEE CA ruled in favor of Atlocom and reversed the RTC's denial of
application for preliminary injunction.
CASE 2 G.R. No. 205875 June 30, 2015
LBNI filed its petition (G.R. No. 205875) in this Court on April 22, 2013.
Acting on LBNI's motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., now known as WI-TRIBE
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, we issued a TRO
TELECOMS, INC., Petitioner,
enjoining the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction
vs.
issued by the CA, conditioned upon LBNI's posting of a cash bond in
ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.
the sum of P300,000.00.

x-----------------------x
Issue: whether Atlocom complied with the requisites for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction (NO).
G.R. No. 208916

Ruling: The petitions are meritorious.


NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
A preliminary injunction is defined as "[a]n order granted at any stage
ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.
of an action prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts." 17 It
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: may be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from
doing a particular act, or a mandatory injunction, which commands a
Facts: Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of a party to perform a positive act to correct a wrong in the past.18 It is a
legislative franchise under R.A. No. 8605.4 On October 8, 2003, the provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued an Order in protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action.19
NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC), granting ATLOCOM
WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC. a Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:
and maintain a Multi-Point Multi-Channel Distribution System [MMDS]
in METRO MANILA, subject to the assignment of frequency by the
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A
Frequency Management Division of NTC.
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

The Provisional Authority (PA) shall be valid for a period of eighteen


(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
(18)months, or until April 8, 2005. In a letter, Atlocom thru its counsel
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
requested for "an extension of time of the PA.
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
On August 23, 2005, NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. (MC) 06-
08-200511 re-allocating several bands for broadband wireless access
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or
for fixed, nomadic and mobile networks.
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or
NTC denied Atlocom's motion for extension of PA, citing the re-
allocation of MMDS frequencies for Broadband Wireless Access in
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
accordance with MC 06-08-2005 and the unavailability of other
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
alternative frequencies.
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
Atlocom filed in the RTC a Petition to enjoin the implementation of MC judgment ineffectual.
06-08-2005 and reinstate the frequencies of Atlocom.

The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary


Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), also a grantee of a legislative injunction will issue: (1) The applicant must have a clear and
franchise for radio and television broadcasting was allowed to intervene unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a right in esse; (2) There is a
in the case, joining the defendant NTC in opposing Atlocom's claims. material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent
Pursuant to MC 06-08-2005, frequency bands were re-allocated and need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and ( 4)
assigned to LBNI, which covered the 2572-2596 MHz being claimed by No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
Atlocom as allegedly assigned to it. infliction of irreparable injury.20

On December 9, 2010, the RTC, after due hearing, issued an Order The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary
denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation of
or mandatory injunction. evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court
for its conclusive determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a
In a petition for certiorari filed before the CA, Atlocom questioned the writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it was issued
validity of the aforesaid orders of the RTC. In its Resolution, the CA
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 23 of 49
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of FACTS:
jurisdiction.
Spouses Dulnuan obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank), the total of which reached the sum
A right to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on
₱3,200,000.00. As a security for the loan obligations, the Spouses
or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.29 An injunction
Dulnuan executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land.
is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
Subsequently, however, the Spouses Dulnuan incurred default and
rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may
therefore the loan obligations became due and demandable.
never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action.30 On 22 April 2008, Metrobank filed an application for extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings over the subject property. After due notice and
From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the publication, the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction where
subject frequencies or to the extension of PA had been shown by Metrobank was declared as the highest bidder. Before the expiration of
Atlocom. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the one-year redemption period allowed by law, Metrobank filed a
the RTC in denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession.
injunction to restrain the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 insofar as
the use of the re-allocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom. The CA Thereafter, the Spouses Dulnuan instituted a Complaint seeking the
thus seriously erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom was issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary and final
entitled to injunctive relief due to alleged violation of its right by the injunction and, for the annulment of extra-judicial foreclosure and real
NTC. estate mortgage. The complaint alleged that the mortgage constituted
over the property is null and void because at the time the agreement
was entered on 18October 2000, no contract of loan was yet executed
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
by the parties. It was only on 19 December 2003 that they received the
preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that
proceeds of the loan, as evidenced by the Promissory Note. In other
although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order,
words, there is no principal obligation upon which the ancillary contract
the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause
of mortgage was attached to.
irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant
can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the After summary hearing, the court a quo issued a Temporary Restraining
former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that Order and set the hearing for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary
he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or Injunction.
the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions
must concur: first, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that RTC issued an Order dated 3 December 2008, enjoining Metrobank
the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the from taking possession of the subject property until the final disposition
defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such of the annulment of mortgage case
damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a
CA reversed the decision of RTC.
counterbond.33
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dissolving the writ
We hold that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction issued against Metrobank.
of preliminary injunction against the implementation of MC 06-08-2005
in the absence of a clear legal right on the part of Atlocom, and RULING: NO
subsequently denying LBNI' s offer to file counter bond despite
Before anything else, the writ of preliminary injunction enjoined
compliance with the requisites provided in Section 6 of Rule 58.
Metrobank from entering, occupying, possessing, using, or performing
However, with our ruling that the writ of preliminary injunction was
any act of possession and occupation over the subject property.
improperly issued, hence, null and void, the matter of allowing LBNI to
Without going into the merits of this case, the Court will confine
post a counter-bond has been rendered moot.
itself in the determination of the propriety of the preliminary
injunction, such being a preservative remedy for the protection of
The main issue presented in this case is the validity of Atlocom' s substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but
application for a writ of preliminary injunction against the NTC. This merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.
issue can be resolved without passing upon the constitutionality of
LBNI' s franchise. The resolution of the issue on LBNI's eligibility thus The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
has no bearing on whether Atlocom has the right to be granted a irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
frequency allocation for Broadband Wireless Access by the NTC. The thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
constitutional issue raised by the respondent may be raised and quo until the merits of the case is heard fully.
resolved in proper cases when necessary in the future.
The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy. The status quo should be
DIGEST BY: ERIKA that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A preliminary
CASE 3 G.R. No. 196864 July 8, 2015 injunction should not establish new relations between the parties,
but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship
SPOUSES VICTOR P. DULNUAN and JACQUELINE P. between them.
DULNUAN, Petitioners, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, Respondent. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
PEREZ, J.: directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of
the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 24 of 49
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable by Executive Order No. 418 (EO 418),9 issued by President Arroyo on 4
damage. April 2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles.
Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis
As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156.
clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the
pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid The Trial Court reversed its previous decision of grating relief, thereby
injunction are the existence of the right and its actual or lifting the injunctive writ. It grounded its ruling on Southwing which it
threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the considered as negating any "clear and unmistakable legal right" on the
right to be protected and the violation against the right must be part of respondent to receive the "protection of a writ of preliminary
shown. injunction."

In this case, Petitioner Spouses failed to establish the essential The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the trial court’s order of lifting
requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. the injunctive writ. The appellate court held that the implementation of
EO 156 "would put petitioner in a financial crisis."
First, the period of redemption has not yet expired. As the highest
bidder in the foreclosure sale upon whom a certificate sale was issued ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting preliminary
by the sheriff, Metrobank has the right to be placed in possession of the injunctive relief to respondent to enjoin enforcement of EO 156.
subject property even during the redemption period provided that the
necessary amount of bond is posted. The non-expiration of the period RULING: YES
of redemption shall not preclude the purchaser from taking possession
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a
of the property provided that the necessary is posted. The buyer can in
preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of
fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period
the applicant’s "clear legal right" being violated or under threat of
except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 721 of Act
violation by the defendant.
No. 3135, as amended. In the case at bar, Metrobank manifested its
willingness to post a bond but its application for the issuance of the "Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right
writ of possession was unjustly denied by the RTC. "clearly founded in or granted by law."Any hint of doubt or dispute on
the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive
Secondly, The pendency of the action assailing the validity of the
relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force
mortgage should not bar the issuance of the writ of possession. A
and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief
pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not stay
bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity
the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of the pendency of such
inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the
suit, the purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without
issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable
prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending
nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time,
annulment case. The writ issues as a matter of course. "The rationale for
restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse
the rule is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed
judgment is rendered against them.
property without delay, such possession being founded on the right of
ownership." The court found that whatever legal right respondent may possess vis à
vis the operation of EO 156, such legal right is doubtful by force of the
Southwing precedent. Until reversed or modified by this Court,
DIGEST BY: ERIKA Southwing makes conclusive the presumption of EO 156’s validity. Our
holding is bolstered by respondent’s failure to remove its case from the
CASE 4 G.R. No. 199324 January 7, 2013 confines of such ruling.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER There is the presumption of validity accorded to EO 156 by reason of
OF CUSTOMS, DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of Aparri, the ruling in Southwing. The burden of proof therefore is with
Cagayan, DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of San respondent to overcome such presumption. The latter, however, failed
Fernando, La Union, and HEAD OF THE LAND TRANSFORTATION to do so.
OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.

CARPIO, J.: DIGEST BY: ERIKA

FACTS: CASE 5 G.R. No. 170038 July 11, 2012

Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156), issued by President Gloria CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Macapagal-Arroyo imposes a partial ban on the importation of used vs. SPS. HARRY CIRIACO and ESTHER CIRIACO, Respondents.
motor vehicles. In a previous case, Executive Secretary v. Southwing
BRION, J.:
Heavy Industries, Inc., the court found EO 156 a valid executive issuance
enforceable throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in the FACTS:
Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales.
Spouses Harry and Esther Ciriaco (respondents) obtained a
Respondent, a corporation engaged in the importation of used motor P1,500,000.00 loan from the petitioner, secured by a real estate
vehicles sued the government in the Regional Trial Court to declare mortgage. When the respondents defaulted in the payment of their
invalid EO 156. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1) having been issued loan, the petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property
by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the Due Process and Equal and sold it at public auction where the petitioner emerged as the
Protection Clauses of the Constitution; and (3) having been superseded highest bidder.
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 25 of 49
A day before the expiration of the redemption period, the respondents complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the respondents’
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Injunction to application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
enjoin the consolidation of title in the petitioner’s favor, assailing the
redemption price of the foreclosed property. The RTC dismissed the Furthermore, a perusal of the August 1, 2000 order shows that the RTC
complaint for being moot. granted the respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction
based only on the respondents’ unsubstantiated allegations.. The
On August 17, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC of respondents have not presented evidence, testimonial or documentary,
La Trinidad, Benguet for Cancellation of Consolidation of Ownership other than the bare allegations contained in their pleadings, to support
over a Real Property, Specific Performance, and Damages. They again their claim of fraud that brings about the irreparable injury sought to be
questioned the redemption price of the foreclosed property. On March avoided by their application for injunctive relief. Thus, the RTC’s grant of
16, 2000, the respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Amend the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the respondents, despite
Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint as well as the lack of any evidence of a clear and unmistakable right on their part,
Motion for Hearing on the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), with a notice of hearing on
the omnibus motion scheduled on March 22, 2000. The petitioner Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the
subsequently filed its Opposition to the omnibus motion, arguing that freedom of the defendant’s action and should not be granted lightly or
the respondents failed to show that they have a clear right in esse that precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied
should be protected by an injunctive relief. that the law permits it and the emergency demands it; no power exists
whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and
In its August 1, 2000 order, the RTC granted the respondent’s deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, that the issuance
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a of an injunction.
TRO. The RTC also denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the RTC issued said writ of preliminary NOTE: (Ruling sa book related to the case) Injunction is not designed
injunction restraining petitioner from disposing of the foreclosed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s
property or taking possession thereof. right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA arguing right is not a ground for injunction.
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting respondent’s
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without a
hearing. Said petition was denied by the CA.
DIGEST BY: SZUR
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit
CASE 6 G.R. No. 157163 June 25, 2014
any grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondents’ application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO without a BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
hearing vs. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES
RULING: YES
XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD &
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency
BERSAMIN, J.:
or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts It is the "strong arm
of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used
with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of
the parties. DOCTRINE: Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing
that the applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts
Sections 3 and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on sought to be enjoined are violative of such right. A preliminary
preliminary injunction provide the requirements for the issuance of a injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide
writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO. Particularly, SEC. 5. Provides that controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to
“No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or
notice to the party or persons sought to be enjoined…” injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.

From the provisions, it appears clearly that before a writ of preliminary


injunction may be issued, a clear showing must be made that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is FACTS: Respondents Spouses Silverio et.al. filed a case against BPI to
to be directed are violative of an established right. The holding of a seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate
hearing, where both parties can introduce evidence and present their and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had
side, is also required before the courts may issue a TRO or an injunctive executed in favor of the petitioner.
writ.

In this case, the court finds that the RTC abbreviated the proceedings
They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a
and precipitately granted the respondents’ application for injunctive
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to
relief. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling"
prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their
of the parties’ respective evidence to give it an idea of the justification
properties.
for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. The RTC
conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000 hearings on the
respondents’ omnibus motion only – whether to admit the amended
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 26 of 49
The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be
the petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding themselves prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. But the respondents
solidarily. and constituted real estate mortgages on several parcels of failed to establish the irreparable injury they would suffer should the
land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a writ of preliminary injunction not be issued. Theyprincipally feared the
continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their loss of their possession and ownership of the mortgaged properties,
Mitsubishi Pajero as security. and faced the possibility of a criminal prosecution for the post-dated
checks they issued. But such fear of potential loss ofpossession and
ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the
requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of
The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the
the writ of injunction. "An injury is considered irreparable," according to
loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages.
Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation, x xx if it is
of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable
redress can be had therefor ina court of law, or where there is no
Petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, as standard by which their amount canbe measured with reasonable
well as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The
injunction, contending that the foreclosure of the mortgages was within provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to
its legal right to do. when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

A motion to dismiss was filed by Petitioner, but was denied. RTC


granted the application for Preliminary Injunction. Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted
lightly or precipitately because it isa limitation upon the freedom of the
defendant's action. It should be granted only when the court is fully
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision. satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it, for no
power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater
caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than
the issuance of an injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against the petitioner, its agents and representatives, was in order.

HELD: Partly meritorious. In view of the foregoing, the CA grossly erred in not declaring that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the application of
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the the respondents as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-26468. The RTC
applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought apparently disregarded the aforecited well-known norms and
to be enjoined are violative of such right. A preliminary injunction guidelines governing the issuance of the writ of injunction. Thereby, the
should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, RTC acted capriciously and arbitrarily. Grave abuse of discretion means
for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
the parties can be settled. or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty,
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
Thus, to be entitled to the writ ofpreliminary injunction, the private exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
final relief prayed for in its complaint x xx.
DIGEST BY: SZUR

CASE 7 G.R. No. 215807, January 25, 2017


It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be
exercised only where the reason and necessity therefor are clearly
established, and only in cases reasonably free from doubt. For, truly, a ROSARIO E. CAHAMBING, Petitioner, v. VICTOR ESPINOSA AND
preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or JUANA ANG, Respondents.
decide controverted facts. As a preventive remedy, injunction only seeks
to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or PERALTA, J.:
injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. As an ancillary and
preventive remedy, it may be resorted to by a party to protect or FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Victor Espinosa are siblings and the
preserve his rights during the pendency of the principal action, and for children of deceased spouses Librado and Brigida Espinosa, the latter
no other purpose. Such relief will accordingly protect the ability of the bequeathing their properties, among which is Lot B or Lot 354 with an
court to render a meaningful decision; it will further serve to guard area of 1,341 square meters, more or less, situated in Maasin City,
against a change of circumstances that will hamper orprevent the Southern Leyte, to the said siblings in the same deceased spouses'
granting of proper relief after a trial on the merits. Verily, its essential respective Last Wills and Testaments which were duly probated.
function is to preserve the status quo between the parties until the
merits of the case can be heard.

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 27 of 49


Deceased Librado and Brigida bequeathed their respective shares over those claiming rights under her from disturbing the possession of the
Lot 354 to respondent Victor Espinosa, however, Brigida subsequently defendant to the leased premises or the "status quo ante" until after
revoked and cancelled her will, giving her one-half (1/2) share over Lot this case shall have been decided on the merits and/or until further
354 to petitioner. orders from this Court. SO ORDERED... petitioner filed a petition on
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with the CA imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it granted the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by
Brigida Espinosa and respondent Victor Espinosa, after the death of
respondent Victor Espinosa. According to petitioner, respondents
Librado Espinosa, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate
themselves violated the status quo ante order when they wrested the
subdividing Lot 354 into Lot 354-A, with an area of 503.5 square meters
space rented by Pacifica Agrivet Supplies from petitioner's control and
adjudicated to Brigida Espinosa, and Lot 354-B, with an area of 837.5
that there was no compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the
square meters, adjudicated to respondent Victor Espinosa, who
writ of preliminary injunction.
eventually obtained a certificate of title in his name.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Victor Espinosa and his


representative, respondent Juana Ang, for, among others, the In particular, petitioner avers the following contentions: (1) the damage
annulment of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Property which was claimed by respondents is quantifiable at P12,000.00 per month, hence,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-2912. not irreparable; (2) respondent, Victor Espinosa is at best a co-owner of
the subject property, while respondent Juana Ang is a stranger, and a
co-owner cannot exclude another co-owner, hence, respondent Victor
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the same building had twelve Espinosa's right is not clear and unmistakable; (3) there is no urgency
(12) lessees, four (4) of whom pay rentals to petitioner, namely: Pacifica involved because the application for injunction was filed more than one
Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, Ariane's Gift Items, and Julie's Bakeshop. year after the incident in question; (4) contrary to the conclusion of the
Petitioner alleged that respondent Juana Ang prevailed upon Pacifica CA, the space occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy was voluntarily
Agrivet Supplies not to renew its lease contract with petitioner but to surrendered to petitioner by the lessee; and (5) the CA committed grave
enter into a contract of lease with respondent Victor Espinosa instead. legal errors when it failed to correct the RTC's issuance of the writ of
According to petitioner, respondent Juana Ang also threatened to do preliminary injunction.
the same thing with Julie's Bakeshop.

Respondents argue that they did not have sullied hands when they
Clerk of Court, acting as Commissioner, issued an Order dated April 16, applied for the writ of preliminary injunction. They also point out that
1998 directing the parties to maintain the status quo. Respondent the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was strictly in
Victor Espinosa filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of accordance with the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order dated March 3, 2009 against petitioner alleging that
the latter violated the status quo ante order by allowing her sons to ISSUES: HE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST DO EQUITY. PRIVATE
occupy the space rented by Jhanel's Pharmacy which is one of RESPONDENTS TOOK THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS BY
respondent Victor Espinosa's tenants. WRESTING CONTROL OF THE SPACE BEING RENTED OUT TO PACIFICA
AGRIVET SUPPLIES AND UNDER THE CONTROL OF MRS. ROSARIO
CAHAMBING. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
Respondent Victor Espinosa, through his attorney-in-fact, private LEGAL ERROR IN VALIDATING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
respondent Juana Ang, alleged that petitioner's sons constructed a GRANTED BY THE HONORABLE RTC IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
connecting door through the partition separating their cellular phone RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATTER'S CONDUCT WHICH DIRTIED AND
shop from Jhanel's Pharmacy and that the contract of lease between SULLIED THEIR HANDS.
the latter and respondent Victor Espinosa is still subsisting, hence, the
entry by petitioner's sons into the pharmacy's commercial space
disturbed the status quo ante. THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED ONLY IN
EXTRAORDINARY CASES WHERE THE REQUISITES ARE COMPLIED
WITH. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED LEGAL
Thereafter, the RTC, on September 22, 2009, issued an Order for the ERRORS IN VALIDATING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of GRANTED BY THE HONORABLE RTC OF MAASIN CITY DESPITE THE
which reads as follows: LACK OF URGENCY AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS'
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES ARE QUANTIFIABLE.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the defendant's prayer for the


issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Accordingly, RULING: The present petition is void of any merit.
upon defendant's filing, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the
TThe Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
injunction bond in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00)
Court dated November 28, 2014 of petitioner Rosario E. Cahambing is
conditioned on defendant's paying all damages, the plaintiff may
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated November 29, 2013 and
sustain by reason of this injunction in case the Court should finally
Resolution dated October 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals, affirming
decide that the defendant is not entitled thereto, let a writ of
the Order dated September 22,2009 and Resolution dated February
preliminary injunction issue enjoining or restraining the plaintiff and all
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 28 of 49
25,2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin City, Southern of injunctive relief. Though the holder of a valid trademark, it may not
Leyte, are AFFIRMED. invoke ascendancy or superiority of its CTR (Certificate of Trademark
Registration) over the CPR (certificate of product registration), as the
latter is evidence of Zuneca’s prior use.
PRINCIPLES: In this case, respondent court correctly found that private On petition for certiorari to the CA, the latter initially affirmed the RTC
respondent Victor Espinosa had established a clear and unmistakable order, but reversed itself on motion for reconsideration by Natrapharm.
right to a commercial space heretofore occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy. Thus, Zuneca elevated the case to the Supreme Court. In the meantime,
He had an existing Contract of Lease with the pharmacy up to on December 2, 2011, the RTC rendered a decision on the main case,
December 2009. Without prejudging the main case, it was established ruling in favour of Natrapaham. Because of this development,
that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order dated April 16, Natrapaham moved to dismiss the petition before the Supreme Court,
1998, Jhanel's Pharmacy was recognized as one of private respondent arguing that the RTC Decision was a full adjudication on the merits of
Victor Espinosa's tenants. In fact, petitioner identified only Pacifica the main issue of trademark infringement. It contended that the present
Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, Ariane's Gift Items and Julie's Bakeshop. petition is moot and academic, it only involving an ancillary writ. Zuneca
As such, pursuant to the status quo order, it is private respondent Victor believes otherwise, since the RTC decision had not yet attained finality,
Espinosa who must continue to deal with Jhanel's Pharmacy. thus the present petition had not been rendered moot.
Correspondingly, the commercial space occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy
must be deemed to be under the possession and control of private ISSUE: Whether or not the present petition had become moot and
respondent Victor Espinosa as of the time of the issuance of the status academic in view of the RTC Decision on the main case which ruled in
quo order. The right of possession and control is a clear right already favor of Natrapharm.
established by the circumstances obtaining at that time. Hence,
petitioner's act of entering the premises of Jhanel's Pharmacy, through RULING: We hold that the issues raised in the instant petition have
her sons, is a material and substantial violation of private respondent been rendered moot and academic given the RTC’s December 2, 2011
Victor Espinosa's right, which act must be enjoined. Decision on the merits of the case.

DIGEST BY: SZUR Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and
permanent injunction. Section 1, Rule 58 provides for the definition of
CASE 8 G.R. No. 197802, November 11, 2015 preliminary injunction:

SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary


ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
ARAIN, M.D. DBA ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v. prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency
NATRAPHARM, INC., Respondent. or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require
the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be
VILLARAMA, JR; J.; known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
FACTS: Natrapharm, an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company,
manufactures and sells a medicine with generic name “CITICOLINE” for
heart and stroke patients, and marketed under the trademark On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent
“ZYNAPSE” obtained from the Intellectual Property Office under injunction in this wise:
Certificate of Trademark Registration No. 4-2007-005596 granted on
November 24, 2007. On the other hand, as early as 2001, and unknown
to Natrapharm, Zuneca Pharmaceutical, ArramAnain and/or Venus
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it
Arain, had been selling a medicine imported from Pakistan, an anti-
appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained
convulsant under the generic name “CARBAMAZEPINE” under an
of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction
unregistered trademark, “ZYNAPS”, pronounced the same as
perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
“ZYNAPSE”. Natrapharm claims that Zuneca is selling Zynaps in
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
drugstores all over the country where Zynapse is also sold, has serious
preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
and disfiguring side-effects, and the sale of the same in drugstores may
give rise to medicine switching. When Natrapharm issued a cease-and-
desist letter to Zuneca pointing out its claims, the latter refused to heed
its demand, pointing out that it had been issued by the Bureau of Food A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and
and Drugs a Certificate of Product Registration as early as 2003, which incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an
allowed them to sell CARBAMAZEPINE under the trademark “ZYNAPS”. application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or
Natrapharm then filed a complaint against Zuneca for trademark complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of
infringement for violation of RA 8293 with prayer for temporary the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, citing Section the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a
122 of RA 8293 which gives it exclusive right to use the name court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in
“ZYNAPSE” and to exclude others. Zuneca argued otherwise, averring nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced or
that it enjoyed prior use of the brand name “ZYNAPS” by virtue of the terminated.
Certificate of Product Registration issued by the BFAD in 2003. On
By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the
March 12, 2008, the RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary
Rules of Court, forms part of the judgment on the merits and it can only
injunction, citing the reasons when it first ruled on the denial of
be properly ordered only on final judgment. A permanent injunction
issuance of a temporary restraining order, that is, that Zuneca had prior
may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the merits of the case
right over the mark. The RTC reasoned out that Natrapharmcannot avail
and a decree granting or refusing an injunction should not be entered
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 29 of 49
until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing right that must be protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights
denials is filed or where no answer is required, or a rule to show cause is over the subject property but her constitutionally protected right to due
equivalent to an answer. process. As the essence of due process lies in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may
As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any have in support of her defense, she must be properly served the
interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an summons of the court. Second, Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its the respondent bank from continuing in the possession and
force and effect after the decision in the main petition. consolidating the ownership of the subject property, petitioner's right
to be afforded due process will unceasingly be violated. Resort to the
service of summons by publication is unwarranted. She must be
DIGEST BY: JAICA properly served the summons of the court. There was no diligent effort
made to find the petitioner. Neither was it impossible to locate the
CASE 9 G.R. No. 217617 April 5, 2017 residence of petitioner and her whereabouts.
CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, Petitioner,
vs. Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly and
BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK), Respondent. issued the TRO and/or WPI posthaste to protect the constitutional
VELASCO, JR, J.: rights of petitioner, as it is duty-bound to do.

FACTS: Accordingly, let a TRO be issued enjoining, prohibiting, and preventing


responden BDO, its assigns, transferees, successors, or any and all other
Petitioner spouses found out that their property has been the subject persons acting on its behalf from possessing, selling, transferring,
of a foreclosure sale as a result of being declared in default in a encumbering or otherwise exercising acts of ownership over the
complaint for sum of money filed by BDO before the RTC Makati property subject of the controversy. Said TRO shall remain valid and
against Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations effective until such time as the rights and interests of the parties shall
obtained from the bank, which includes Carmelita, who signed four (4) have been determined and finally resolved.
security agreements.
DIGEST BY: JAICA
Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an
affidavit of adverse claim and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety CASE 10 G.R. No. 172909 March 5, 2014
Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA, Petitioners,
Documents with the RTC Pasig. BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the vs.
Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to hear GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY
Eliseo's Complaint, the case was barred by res judicata given the SAYSON GOLOSENO, Respondents.
Decision and orders of the Makati RTC, and, finally, the Complaint failed
to state a cause of action. FACTS: On August 28, 1997, the CA4 ruled that among the Plaza
siblings, namely: Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and Barbara,
Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural land. The decision
RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the issuance of a became final and executory and Barbara's successors, respondents
new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the respondent bank. Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and Vicky Sayson
Arguing that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her Goloseno, have continued occupying the property.
person as the service of the summons and the other processes of the
court was defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of On September 14, 1999, Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, the
Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorney’s Fees
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA. with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City
Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping
from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the
the consolidation of BDO's ownership over the subject property
subject property. According to the petitioners, tßhey acquired the land
from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in
HELD: Yes. For a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December
and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a 27, 1996.
clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. delinquent in paying the land taxes and were in fact not aware that their
property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being
Indeed, the petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI a government employee, was disqualified to bid in the public auction.
was intended to preserve the status quo ante, and not to prre-empt the As Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she could have not
appellate court’s decision on the merits of her petition for annulment. transferred ownership to the petitioners. Equally important, the
Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of the CA to deny her of this petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the
provisional remedy. name of the petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of
the auctioned land. Armed with the falsified tax declaration, the
There is an existence of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of petitioners, as heirs of their father, fraudulently redeemed the land from
preliminary injunction. First, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable Tuazon. Nonetheless, there was nothing to redeem as the land was not
sold. For these irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the Writ of
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 30 of 49
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order prayed for Order (E.O.) No. 279. Under the said E.O., all concerned government
against them. agencies and instrumentalities of the water supply and sewerage sector,
which includes, among others, the Local Water Utilities Administration
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City denied the prayer for a (LWUA), were directed to pursue and implement reform objectives and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession and policies. The said E.O. particularly provided for the rationalization of
occupation of the land be returned to the respondents. The RTC found LWUA's organizational structure and operations.
that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a
government employee disqualified and the petitioners are not buyers in On April 13, 2005, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 421,6 specifying
good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad faith for having LWUA's core functions and providing for shifts in its policy direction,
falsified the tax declaration they redeemed the property with. functions, programs, activities and strategies. Cognizant of the effect of
the rationalization of the functions of LWUA, the E.O. gave affected
THE CA’S RULING LWUA personnel the option to either remain or retire, or be separated
from government service.
Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, the
petitioners challenged the RTC’s order before the CA. The CA affirmed Pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 421, then LWUA Administrator
the RTC’s ruling, found the petitioners guilty of forum shopping, Lorenzo Zamora came up with Task Force 421 and its Action Team. The
dismissed the case. Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed said Task Force was charged, among others, with the duty of preparing
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners, spouses Silvestre O. the LWUA's staffing pattern and the corresponding plantilla positions
Plaza and Elena Y. Plaza, seek the reversal of the decision2of Court of therein as directed by E.O. No. 421. The Action Team, on the other
Appeals (CA) hand, was given the responsibility of reporting to the Task Force and
assisting it in the execution of its duties and responsibilities. Among the
ISSUE: W/N the the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the appointed members of the Action Team was herein petitioner Melanio
writ of preliminary injunction? Cuchapin II, who was then the Chairperson of petitioner LWUA
Employees' Association for Progress (LEAP). Subsequently, Task Force
RULING: As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no 421 was able to come up with a staffing pattern, consisting of 467
ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latter’s plantilla positions which it submitted to the LWUA Board of Trustees for
reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because they were approval.
never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to establish
entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to an On April 18, 2006, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution
injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that No. 69 which approved the staffing pattern proposed by Task Force
right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued 421. Thereafter, the approved staffing pattern was submitted to the
only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for review and
during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s approval. DBM approved 447 plantilla positions out of the 467
right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right proposed positions. Twenty (20) positions were excluded from the
and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper." plantilla.

Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, On October 18, 2006, LWUA issued Office Ordered the immediate
2013, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has implementation of the following: (a) posting of the DBM-approved
become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the staffing pattern; (b) finalization by the Staffing Committee of the
question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction staffing guidelines to be submitted to the Management and the Board
automatically died with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a of Trustees for approval; and (c) finalization by the Task Analysis
provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the Committee of the job descriptions under the rationalized LWUA
determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal structure.
of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
On October 19, 2006, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the petition for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order
review on certiorari. (TRO) and preliminary injunction with the RTC of Quezon City. Alleging
that LWUA and DBM acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting
DIGEST BY: JAICA and implementing the reorganization plan of LWUA, petitioners prayed
that LWUA and DBM be restrained from implementing the following: (1)
CASE 11 G.R. No. 206808-09, September 07, 2016 DBM-approved staffing pattern; (2) Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, and (3) E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421, on the ground
LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES that petitioners will suffer injustice and sustain irreparable injury as 233
ASSOCIATION FOR PROGRESS (LEAP), MELANIO B. CUCHAPIN II, LWUA employees face immediate and outright dismissal from service.
GREARDO* G. PERU, ROLAND S. CABAHUG, GLORIA P. VELASQUEZ,
ERLINDA G. VILLANUEVA, TEODORO M. REYNOSO, FERNANDO L. Respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the petitioners' prayer
NICANDRO, JOSEPHINE P. SIMENE, LAMBERTO R. RIVERA, for TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
REYNALDO M. VIDA, and RUCTICO** B. TUTOL, Petitioners, v.
LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA) and DEPA After hearing, the RTC issued its assailed Order7 granting petitioners'
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
The facts of the case are as follows: restraining the respondents from enforcing and effecting the assailed
questioned DBM-Approved Staffing Pattern.
In 2004, the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enacted Executive

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 31 of 49


LWUA and DBM then filed separate special civil actions for certiorari rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a
with the CA questioning the subject RTC Order and Resolution. These judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
petitions were subsequently consolidated. suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary
injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.
On August 28, 2012, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set
aside the RTC decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2012 and January
Hence, this petition. 15, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 100482 and 100662 are
AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
DIGEST BY: DENISE
The respondents raised the issue that the dismissal of petitioners'
principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with the CASE 12. G.R. No. 173036 September 26, 2012
RTC results in the automatic dissolution of the ancillary writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the same court. AGOO RICE MILL CORPORATION (represented by its President,
Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr.), Petitioner,
HELD: The Court agrees with respondents. vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an BRION, J.:


action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or Facts:
acts.20 It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case  From October 1993 -October 1996 - Agoo Rice Mill
subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. The Corporation (ARMC) obtained from the Land Bank of the
writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of Philippines (LBP) a Term Loan (TL) for 2M and two (2) Short-Term
during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere Loan Lines (STLLs) amounting to 15M evidenced by promissory
incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.21 notes.
Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the  These loans were secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to ARMC’s four (4) commercial lots, including their improvements,
preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending and its rice mill machineries and generator.
rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment  ARMC paid in several payments to cover the loan’s interest but was
in the case. unable to pay the whole obligation due to company’s financial
problem, negative effect of the government’s rice importation and
It is well settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether El Nino.
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits  ARMC, thru a letter by its president requested LBP for an extension
of the case can be heard.23 It is usually granted when it is made to to pay its obligation on Feb. 28, 1997. LBP reminded ARMC thru a
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and letter of its payment.
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate  On Feb. 27, 1997 ARMC wrote LBP for a renewal of its loans, the
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the LBP allegedly replied to have it restructured instead of renewed.
status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the  ARMC requested LBP to restructure its STLLs and suggested
merits of the case.24 It persists until it is dissolved or until the payment of 5M every 6 months until the 15M STLLs to be paid in
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. full but was deferred by LBP which advised ARMC to first secure a
waiver of its penalty charges prior to the loan’s restructuring.
Indubitably, in the present case, the writ of preliminary injunction was  November 3, 1997- LBP informed ARMC that the bank’s Domestic
granted by the RTC based on its finding that there was a need to Banking Loan Committee require an additional collateral from the
protect petitioners' rights to security of tenure during the pendency of ARMC on or before November 7, 1997; otherwise, the LBP would
the principal action. After trial, however, the lower court found, among be forced to pursue legal action.
others, that, in questioning the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 279, 366  November 10, 1997 - LBP informed ARMC that its existing
and 421 as well as Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA Board of Trustees, collateral was short of 3.4M that ARMC needed to offer additional
petitioners failed to establish the existence of an actual case or collateral and to submit the necessary documents until extension
controversy which is ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the RTC date of November 25, 1997. ARMC responded by asking for a
dismissed the principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. reappraisal of its properties, but the LBP denied the request,
insisting that the valuation made by its Property Assessors was fair
The principal action having been heard and found dismissible as it was and reasonable.
in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is  LBP wrote ARMC regarding the latter’s noncompliance of
deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, additional collateral that such noncompliance on or before April
the appeal from the main case notwithstanding.26 In this regard, this 30, 1998 would result in the referral of the matter to the bank’s
Court's ruling in the case of Unionbank of the Philippines v. Court of Legal Office for appropriate action.
Appeals27 is instructive, to wit:  LBP informed ARMC that its request for loan restructuring is under
x x x "a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a evaluation and for the mean time the ARMC must settle first the
restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as payment of its loan for the month.
a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction,"
regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration Application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure by LBP
of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 32 of 49


 July 8, 1998- LBP sent the ARMC a Final Notice of  The CA denied the motion for reconsideration
Payment, informing the ARMC that it had filed, on the same date,
an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of ARMC’s ISSUE: WON ARMC is entitled to an injunctive remedy.
mortgaged properties. The extrajudicial foreclosure was set for
August 26, 1998 at nine o’clock in the morning. HELD: NO

Complaint for Injunction by ARMC  "Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
 August 24, 1998- ARMC, through its President, filed with the RTC, is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
Branch 30, San Fernando City, La Union, a complaint for injunction main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident
with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary in the main action. For an injunction to issue, the following
restraining order, and for recovery of damages. essential requisites must be present: (1) there must be a right
 ARMC mainly alleged that LBP’s proposed extrajudicial foreclosure in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act
should be enjoined for being premature, improper and in violation against which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of
of ARMC’s contractual and property rights since negotiations for such right.46
the restructuring of its loans were still ongoing.  An injunction may either be an action in itself or a provisional
 ARMC also alleged that the LBP’s petition for extrajudicial remedy. As an action in itself, it is a main action for injunction and,
foreclosure contained inconsistent statements on the total amount as a provisional remedy, it is a preliminary injunction.
of its principal obligation.  In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that no
 ARMC denied receipt of the LBP’s July 8, 1998 Final Notice of agreement was forged between the ARMC and the LBP on the
Payment. restructuring of the ARMC’s loans at the time the LBP filed an
application to extra-judicially foreclose the ARMC’s mortgaged
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction properties; the proposed loan restructuring was not approved by
 On August 24, 1998, Executive Judge Vicente A. Pacquing, RTC, La the LBP because the ARMC failed to offer an additional collateral
Union, issued a 72–hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) sufficient enough to cover its outstanding loan with the bank.
directing the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of La Union to cease and Thus, the ARMC, then, had no actual right to protect or to
desist from proceeding with the August 26, 1998 foreclosure enforce against the LBP. It failed to satisfy the first
sale. The following day, the RTC ordered the extension of the TRO requisite, i.e., the existence of a clear and unmistakable right
for seventeen (17) days. for the issuance of an injunction.
 Parties manifested to settle amicable but failed to do so, thus, the  On the other hand, the LBP had every right to foreclose on the Real
RTC proceeded with the hearing on the issuance of the writ of and Chattel Mortgage since the ARMC had defaulted in the
preliminary injunction on January 12, 1999. payment of its overdue loan obligation with the bank. The
 In an order dated March 18, 1999, Judge Adolfo Alagar, RTC, foreclosure is supported by the express mandate of P.D. 385
Branch 30, San Fernando City, La Union, issued a writ of preliminary  Section 2. No restraining order. Temporary or permanent
injunction upon the ARMC’s filing of a bond of P 4,000,000.00. injunction shall be issued by the court against any government
financial institution in any action taken by such institution in
RTC’s Ruling compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section
 (08-05-2004) RTC found no merit in the ARMC’s complaint for 1 hereof whether such restraining order. temporary or permanent
injunction. injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or
 The RTC denied the ARMC’s complaint on the ground that parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the
injunction cannot issue against the exercise of a valid right, borrower and admitted by the government financial institution
the right of the creditor/mortgagee to foreclose on the concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding
mortgage where the debtor-mortgagor has defaulted in the arrearages has been paid after the filing of foreclosure
payment of its obligations. proceedings.
 The RTC likewise ruled that the LBP’s foreclosure was not  Under these terms, the ARMC cannot secure an injunction
merely an exercise of its right, but also the performance of its against the LBP, a government financial institution.
legal obligation under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 385
 Motion for reconsideration by ARMC was denied. Injunction Became Moot and Academic
 The present petition must also be denied because the act
Foreclosure Sale sought to be enjoined by the ARMC is already a
 (05-12-2005) Sheriff of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union consummated act. The records show that the foreclosure sale
issued a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale that set the auction sale of the on the ARMC's properties was held sometime in June 2005
mortgaged properties on June 3, 2005. and the LBP emerged as the winning bidder. An injunction
 The ARMC sought to enjoin the foreclosure sale by filing with the suit becomes moot and academic after the act sought to
CA an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary be enjoined had already been consummated.
injunction and temporary restraining order, which the CA denied in
a resolution dated June 14, 2005. **WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review
 The LBP emerged as the winning bidder in the auction sale. on certiorari for lack of merit and for being moot and academic. Costs
against petitioner Agoo Rice Mill Corporation.
CA’s Ruling
 (03-28-2006) CA found no merit in the ARMC’s appeal. The CA
affirmed the RTC in ruling that, under P.D. 385, an injunction, DIGEST BY: DENISE
whether permanent or temporary, could not be issued to enjoin
the foreclosure proceedings instituted by the LBP.
CASE 13. G.R. No. 156015. August 11, 2005
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 33 of 49
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by LT. GEN. JOSE M. have been made on the land of Legaspi, hence, there is an
CALIMLIM, in his capacity as former Chief of the Intelligence urgent need to maintain the status quo to prevent serious
Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), and former damage to Legaspis land; and, (2) the SPA granted to
Commanding General, Presidential Security Group (PSG), and MAJ.
Gutierrez continues to be valid.
DAVID B. DICIANO, in his capacity as an Officer of ISAFP and
 The trial court also issued another Order denying petitioners
former member of the PSG, Petitioners,
motion to dismiss and requiring petitioners to answer the
vs. HON. VICTORINO EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Presiding complaint and it likewise denied petitioners motion for
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, Quezon City, and DANTE inhibition.
LEGASPI, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Paul Gutierrez,
 CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Respondent.

PUNO, J.: ISSUE: WON the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction is justified.

Facts: HELD: Yes.

 Private respondent Legaspi is the owner of a land located in The court held that a writ of preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. preventive remedy that is resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve
his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of
 In November 1999, petitioner Calimlim, entered into a
the principal action. It is issued by the court to prevent threatened or
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with one Ciriaco Reyes continuous irremediable injury to the applicant before his claim can be
where the latter was given a permit to hunt for treasure in a thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its aim is to preserve the status
land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner Diciano signed quo ante until the merits of the case can be heard fully, upon the
the MOA as a witness. applicants showing of two important conditions, viz.: (1) the right to be
 Reyes, together with petitioners, started, digging, tunneling protected prima facie exists; and, (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right.
and blasting works on the said land of Legaspi allegedly
bringing along with them about 80 military personnel to Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
guard and encamp the area to intimidate Legaspi and its writ of preliminary injunction may be issued when it is established:
other occupants.
(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or
 February 15, 2000 - Through an SPA, Legaspi appointed his
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance
nephew private respondent Gutierrez as his attorney-in-fact. of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an
He was authorized to deal with the treasure hunting activities act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
on Legaspi’s land and to file charges against those who may
(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
enter it without the authority. Legaspi agreed to give
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
Gutierrez 40% of the treasure that may be found in the land.
to the applicant; or
 February 29, 2000 - Gutierrez filed a case for damages and
injunction against petitioners for illegally entering Legaspi’s (c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
land. He hired the legal services of Atty. Homobono Adaza attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
who shall be given 30% of Legaspi’s share in whatever
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
treasure may be found as legal fees and P5,000.00 as judgment ineffectual.
appearance fee.
 A 72-hour TRO was issued against petitioner upon the filing of It is clear that mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish the
applicant’s rights or interests in the subject matter of the main actionat
the complaint.
the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It is not
 The case was subsequently raffled to Branch 223 of RTC of
required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a
Quezon City, presided by public respondent Judge Victorino violation of his rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main
P. Evangelista which issued another 72-hour TRO on March 2, case. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has
2000. an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
 March 14, 2000 - petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
In the case at bar, the SC found that respondent judge had sufficient
contending that (1) there is no real party-in-interest as the
basis to issue the writ of preliminary injunction. It was established,
SPA of Gutierrez to bring the suit was already revoked by prima facie, that Legaspi has a right to peaceful possession of his land,
Legaspi through a deed of revocation executed on March 7, pendente lite. Legaspi had title to the subject land. It was likewise
2000, and (2) Gutierrez failed to establish that the alleged established that the diggings were conducted by petitioners in the
armed men guarding the area were acting on orders of enclosed area of Legaspi’s land. It was necessary for the trial court to
petitioners. On March 17, 2000, petitioners also filed a Motion issue the writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the main
case in order to preserve the rights and interests of private respondents
for Inhibition of the respondent judge on the ground of
Legaspi and Gutierrez.
alleged partiality in favor of private respondent.
 March 23, 2000 - the trial court granted private respondents Hence, trial court and CA decisions were AFFIRMED.
application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the
following grounds: (1) the diggings and blastings appear to DIGEST BY: DENISE
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 34 of 49
 Under the circumstances, therefore, the title of petitioner to the 50
CASE 14. G.R. No. 197472, September 07, 2015 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains unclear and doubtful, and
[is] seriously disputed by the government.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COMMANDER  However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has
RAYMOND ALPUERTO OF THE NAVAL BASE CAMILLLO OSIAS, lawfully possessed and occupied at least five (5) hectares of
PORT SAN VICENTE, STA. ANA, CAGAYAN, Petitioner, v.REV. land situated at the western portion of the Palaui. He may
CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent. have acquired some propriety rights over the area considering
the directive of the DENR to allow to pursue his application for
DEL CASTILLO, J.: patent.
 On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision making the
“An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not injunction final and permanent. In so ruling, the said court made
be the proper object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued reference to the Indigenous Peoples' [Fight] Act (EPRA)
in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over the same.”
CA Ruling:
FACTS:  CA upheld the RTC's issuance of a final injunction
 Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary,  The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of
claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear and
about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
 On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued  There exists a clear and unmistakable right in favor [of Rev. Cortez]
Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of since he has been in open, continuous and notorious possession of
the public domain situated in Palaui Island. a portion of Palaui Island.
 On August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation  To deny the issuance of a writ of injunction would cause grave and
No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters irreparable injury to [Rev. Cortez] since he will be displaced from
situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. the said area which he has occupied since 1962
 On June 13,2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with  From the foregoing, we rule that the trial court did not err
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory when it made permanent the writ of preliminary mandatory
Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as injunction. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that if
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled
Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the
 According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party
orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act
said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
they commanded him and his men, through the use of force and
intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from
the Office of the Philippine Naval Command, he was met with ISSUE: WON Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory
sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic military action if they injunction.
do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to
leave the area. HELD: NO
 In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC Preliminary injunction vs Final injunction.
seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore  "Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a
said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent. mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from doing a
particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction.""It
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action."
 RTC issued an Order dated February 21, 2002 granting the  "The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction. “A preliminary
 However, the same pertained to five hectares (subject area) only, injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide
not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by controverted facts. Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only
Rev. Cortez seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable
 The area of 50 hectares he claimed to have peacefully and lawfully harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled." It is
possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
or accurately identified. substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is
 And so it was ruled that unless there is a clear pronouncement committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an
regarding ownership and possession of the land, or unless the act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of
land is covered by the Torrens title pointing to one of the the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of
parties as the undisputed owner, a writ of preliminary the case."
injunction should not issue to take the property out of  A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
possession of one party to place it in the hands of another x proceeding prior to judgment or final order. For its issuance, the
xx. applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a
right which is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or
contradiction.Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 35 of 49
he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
complaint. specifically prohibited by law.43
 On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a  In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject
judgment that embodies a final injunction. A final injunction is portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and
one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it
from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it
mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of
mandatory injunction. It is issued when the court, after trial on possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light,
the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the Rev. Cortez' claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His
act or acts complained of permanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept
it is only after the court has come up with a definite of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal
pronouncement respecting an applicant's right and of the act effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed
violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence in the first place. The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201
presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a and Proclamation No. 447 were made subject to private rights.
 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez
final and permanent injunction, the right and the act violative
failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the
thereof must be established by the applicant with absolute
subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the
certainty.
issuance of a final injunction.
 What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of
 We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the injunction so
its July 3, 2007 Decision is whether a final injunction should
that he could continue his humanitarian works. However,
issue. While the RTC seemed to realize this as it in fact made the
considering that inalienable public land was involved, this Court is
injunction permanent, the Court, however, finds the same to be
constrained to rule in accordance with the aforementioned.
wanting in basis.
 Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction
**WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011
between a preliminary injunction and a final injunction.
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 89968 denying
Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For one, what it
the appeal and affirming the July 3, 2007 Decision of the Regional
cited in its Decision were jurisprudence relating to preliminary
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan-Branch 08 in Spl. Civil Action Case
injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not
No. 11-2403, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the final
as a final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to
injunction issued in this case is ordered DISSOLVED and the
determine, based on the evidence presented during trial, if Rev.
Petition for Injunction in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-
Cortez has conclusively established his claimed right (as opposed
2403, DISMISSED.
to preliminary injunction where an applicant only needs to at
least tentatively show that he has a right) over the subject area.
This is considering that the existence of such right plays an
important part in determining whether the preliminary writ of DIGEST BY: KEIR
mandatory injunction should be confirmed.
 "Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must CASE 15. July 19, 2017 G.R. No. 202342
be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the AMA LAND, INC., Petitioner vs. WACK WACK RESIDENTS'
injunction is to be directed are violative of said right." 35 Thus, it is ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent
necessary that the Court initially determine whether the right
asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is CAGUIOA, J.
necessary that such right must have been established by him with
absolute certainty.
 Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based Facts:
on the right of possession (jus possesionis) by reason of his
A commercial and residential building project located at EDSA comer
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since 1962.
Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City, was proposed
He avers that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be
by AMA Land, Inc. (AMALI) in the mid-1990s.
peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if already dispossessed, is
entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory On March 18, 1996, AMALI notified Wack Wack Residents’ Association,
injunctive writ was correctly issued in his favor. Inc. (WWRAI) - a registered homeowners' association of Wack Wack
 Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner36 is one Village - of its intention to use Fordham Street as an access road and
of the two concepts of possession provided under Article 52537 of staging area of the project. As AMALI received no response from
the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession,38 this kind of (WWRAI), the former temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a
possession is one which can ripen into ownership by field office along Fordham Street. (WWRAI) claimed, however, that
prescription.39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in AMALI already converted part of the said street as barrack site and
the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption staging area even before March 18, 1996. All subsequent attempts of
that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to (WWRAI) to remove the said field office proved futile.
show or prove it. In the same manner, the law endows every
possessor with the right to be respected in his possession.41 On May 8, 1996, AMALI then filed a petition before the RTC, [wherein it
 It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which seeks the temporary use of Fordham Street belonging to WWRAI as an
are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of access road to AMALI's construction site of its AMA Tower project
possession.42 The following cannot be appropriated and hence, pursuant to Article 6565 of the Civil Code, and to establish a permanent
cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common easement of right of way in its favor over a portion of Fordham Street
pursuant to Article 6496 of the Civil Code. Aside from its prayer for the
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 36 of 49
declaration of temporary and permanent easement of right of way in its Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that:
favor over a portion of Fordham Street, AMALI is also] praying for: (a) a (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this
temporary restraining order (TRO) to immediately enjoin [WWRAI] from right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the
demolishing and removing the temporary field office, constructing a invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an
fence isolating Fordham Street, and preventing AMALI from gaining urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
access to the construction site; (b) a writ of preliminary mandatory irreparable damage.
injunction directing [WWRAI] to allow AMALI to use Fordham Street as
an access road and staging area; (c) an order making the TRO and the The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion
aforesaid writ permanent; and (d) an order declaring a permanent right of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and
of way in favor of AMALI. evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to
the conclusive determination by such court; and the exercise of judicial
AMALI continued the project, WWRAI filed in January 2010, an "Urgent discretion by such court will not be interfered with, except upon a
Motion to Set for Hearing" its application for temporary restraining finding of grave abuse of discretion.
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC denied the said
motion for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration of the above The Court agrees with the RTC that:
order was filed but was denied.
[WWRAI]'s allegation that [its members'16] right to live in a peaceful,
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was then filed before the CA, and quiet and safe environment will be violated in the event that the
the latter granted WWRAI's application for a temporary restraining condominium project of [AMALI] will be erected is untenable. The
order, and, accordingly, AMALI was commanded to cease and desist alleged noise and dust that may be caused by the construction is the
from further committing the act complained of. Then, on July 28, 2011, natural consequence thereof. However, this annoyance that may be
the application of [WWRAI] for the issuance of a writ of preliminary brought by the construction is not permanent in nature but is merely
injunction was granted as well pending resolution of the x x x petition temporary and once the building is completed, [said members'] right to
for certiorari [before the CA]. live in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be restored without
noise and dust.
Hence, this petition.
As to the allegations that [said members'] privacy may be invaded for
Issue: the reason that they may be photographed or videotaped without their
knowledge, these fears are merely speculative and cannot be taken into
Whether or not WWRAI is entitled to a temporary restraining order consideration.
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
As admitted by [WWRAI's] witness, the construction activity is
Ruling: suspended, hence, there is nothing to restrain x x x. There is no urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
No.
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and
The Court in Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation11 reiterated
unmistakable right that must be protected by the injunctive writ. The
the purpose and grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
apprehensions of its members are, as correctly ruled by the RTC,
injunction, viz.:
speculative and insufficient to substantiate the element of serious and
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct irreparable damage.
to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the
status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between
DIGEST BY: KEIR
the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties
CASE 16. G.R. No. 182758 May 30, 2011
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole
aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Listana (648 SCRA 416)
heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following grounds
CARPIO, J.
are established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole The Facts:
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
Listana owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in Inlagadian,
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
Casiguran, Sorsogon. Listana voluntarily sold the property to the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
government, through the Department of Agrarian
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
Reform, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of
Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
determine the amount of just compensation for the property.the
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
DARAB set the amount at P10,956,963.25 and ordered petitioner Land
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Listana the same.
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a writ of
execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian Operations Center

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 37 of 49


Head Alex A. Lorayes to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. Lorayes refused. the case before RTC upon the posting of a cash bond by Land Bank.
Thus, Listana filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Thus, LBP cannot withdraw the bond pending final determination of the
Lorayes. amount of just compensation for the property.

LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition for judicial The DARAB set the amount of just compensation for the property at
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP P10,956,963.25 and ordered LBP to pay Listana the amount. On 18 June
challenged the amount set by the DARAB and prayed that the amount 1999, the PARAD issued a writ of execution ordering Lorayes to pay
be fixed at P5,871,689.03. Listana the amount. Lorayes refused and, later, LBP filed with the RTC a
petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of
The PARAD granted Listanas motion for contempt. The PARAD cited preliminary injunction.
Lorayes for indirect contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he
complied with the DARABs Decision. An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, to the effect that the
The SAC dismissed LBPs petition for judicial determination of the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may
amount of just compensation for the property. LBP appealed. sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court states:
The PARAD ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution, ordering
LBP to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. The PARAD issued a warrant of SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
arrest against Lorayes. temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when:
LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from xxxx
implementing the warrant of arrest against Lorayes. The RTC enjoined
the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the
party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
Listana filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages
Court of Appeals set aside Orders of the RTC. which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary
restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
of the Rules of Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the
preliminary injunction shall be issued.
Court set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the
Orders of the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the P5,644,773.02 bond shall
of arrest pending final determination of the amount of just answer for the damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold
compensation for the property. the P10,956,963.25 just compensation set by the DARAB. In Republic v.
Caguioa, the Court held that, the purpose of the injunction bond is to
The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from Listanas
protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the
motion for contempt.
injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not
LBP filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
bond.
In any event, the Court has reinstated the Order of the RTC enjoining
The RTCs Ruling the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property.
The RTC denied LBPs motion to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond. Consequently, LBP cannot withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond which
is a condition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
DIGEST BY: KEIR
The Court of Appeals dismissed LBPs petition and affirmed in toto the
CASE 17. G.R. No. 190134, July 08, 2015
RTC's Orders.
SPOUSES ROGELIO and SHIRLEY T. LIM, Agusan Institute of
Technology, represented by DR. SHIRLEY T. LIM, President and as
Issue: Attorney-in-Fact of FELIX A. CUENCA, MARY ANN M. MALOLOT,
and REY ADONIS M. MEJORADA Petitioners,
LBP raises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the vs.
withdrawal of the P5,644,773.02 cash bond. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWENTY-SECOND DIVISION,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MINDANAO STATION; SHERIFF
ARCHIBALD C. VERGA, and his DEPUTIES, Regional Trial Court,
The Courts Ruling Branch 33, Hall of Justice, Libertad, Butuan City; and FIRST
CONSOLIDATED BANK, Respondents.
The petition is unmeritorious.
PERALTA, J.
The Order of the RTC clearly states that the respondent Provincial
Adjudicator of the DARAB x x x is enjoined x x x from enforcing its order
Facts: Petitioner obtained several loans from respondent First
of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of
Consolidated Bank (private respondent bank) and executed several real
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 38 of 49
estate mortgages and chattel mortgage as security. Petitioners were of TRO as they only claim that their debts would have been paid had
unable to pay some of the loans, hence private respondent bank filed respondent bank not impose astronomical interests on its loans.
for an application for foreclosure of the mortgages.
DIGEST BY: DAN
Petitioners filed an action for revocation and annulment of real estate
mortgage and chattel mortgage with plea for the issuance of a CASE 18 G.R. No. 162716, September 27, 2006
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the RTC.
Honorable Secretary EMILIA T. BONCODIN vs. NATIONAL POWER
They alleged that Agusan Institute of Technology had already fully paid
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION (NECU)
its obligation with private respondent Bank if the latter did not charge
exorbitant and excessive interests and penalties and that the total PANGANIBAN, CJ:
payments they tendered constituted overpayments to the loan.
Facts:
RTC: Issued the writ ordering private respondent Bank to desist from
foreclosing the said contracts of mortgage. After trial on the merits, RTC  Board Resolution No. 99-35 granted a step increment to all
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and ruled in favor of private qualified NAPOCOR officials and employees who have been in
respondent Bank. their position for 10 years.
 Board Resolution No. 2001-113 reduced the 10 year
CA: Denied petitioners' appeal with prayer for the issuance "of a TRO
requirement to 3 years.
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
 Circular No. 2001-51 provided for the IRR of Board Resolution
No. 2001-113.
 Circular No. 2002-22 provided for additional guidelines
Issues: relative to the implementation of the step increment based on
Whether or not the CA should grant the writ of preliminary injunction. length of service in the position to qualified NAPOCOR
officials and employees.
 Petitioner held that NAPOCOR has already been granting
seniority pay based on the length of service as embodied in
Ruling:
the Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA). Consequently,
No. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a TRO may be the processing of the succeeding step increment based on
issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified length of service was suspended.
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the  Believing that NPC Circular Nos. 2001-51 and 2002-22 are
applicant be-fore the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. legal that they have already acquired a vested right in it,
respondent National Power Corporation Employees
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there
exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act Consolidated Union (NECU) filed a Petition for Prohibition
sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the with Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction before the
invasion of the right is material and substantial, and that there is an RTC.
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
RTC: Issued the writ of preliminary injunction. At that stage of the
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia: A writ proceedings, it was not shown that Circular No. 2001-51 and Board
of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and Resolution No. 2001-113, are in contravention of any law. A roll back of
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and the salaries of all the NAPOCOR employees, while the merits of the case
interests. Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an is yet to be heard, would result to a grave and irreparable damage to
urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO them. T
issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice
and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. CA: Agreed with lower court. The grim prospect of uncertainty facing
the [respondents] owing to their inevitable separation from the service
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo: Injunctive relief is resorted to only when further compels this Court to act decisively and with dispatch while the
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that main case is being heard.
cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The
Issues:
controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the
writ of injunction is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or 1) WON the preliminary injunction is proper.
continuous injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. A writ of preliminary 2) WON Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorized the
injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity, or a issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction even if the relief/protection
transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing applied for is the subject of controversy in the main action.
substantial rights.
Ruling: The Petition is partly meritorious.
In the present Case, CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' application for preliminary injunction and TRO. As 1) No. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides thus:
aptly held by the CA, it neither appears from the facts shown by the
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
TRO application that' great or irreparable injury would result to
injunction may be granted when it is established:
petitioners before the matter can be heard, nor did they show any clear
and positive right to be entitled to the protection of the ancillary relief

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 39 of 49


(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole Marcelino Lontok for appellant.
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; FACTS:

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or Golding (petitioner) alleged that he was the owner of a piece or parcel
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice of land and that Balatbat (the defendants) were illegally and maliciously
to the applicant; or interfering with the petitioner’s possession of said land. The petitioner
prayed for both a preliminary and permanent injunction. The
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is preliminary injunction was issued. Each of the defendants was served
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or with the copy of the complaint and the issued preliminary injunction.
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the None of the defendants answered the petition within the time fixed by
judgment ineffectual. law, thus the petitioner presented a motion for a judgment by default,
which was granted. The case was set down for hearing and judgment
To be entitled to a writ of injunction, a party must establish the was rendered enjoining the defendants their agents and representatives
following requisites: (a) the right of the complainant is clear and to desist in their acts of whatever character which molested or tended
unmistakable; (b) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is to molest the plaintiff in the peaceful enjoyment of the possession of
material and substantial; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount his property.
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Later, plaintiff presented an affidavit alleging that the defendant had
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is maliciously and illegally and by means of violence committed acts in
enforceable as a matter of law. Injunction is not designed to protect violation of the terms of said injunction. Balatbat confessed that he was
contingent, abstract or future rights whose existence is doubtful or guilty of violation of said injunction but attempted to excuse his acts
disputed. It cannot be grounded on the possibility of irreparable upon the theory that he was the owner of the parcel of land. He was
damage without proof of an actual existing right. found guilty and was imposed a fine.

In this case, the right claimed by respondent is far from clear. The On appeal, he alleged the following:
enforcement of the suspension order (w/c would result to rollback of
salaries) would be prejudicial to respondent members interest, but 1) that he had not been duly notified of the injunction
merely showing this fact is not sufficient. It must also be established
2) that inasmuch as the lower court had issued the injunction, it is not
that the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right that must be
just for it to consider the questions presented for a violation of the
protected. Thus, a finding that the applicant for preliminary injunction
same
may suffer damage not capable of pecuniary estimation does not
suffice to support an injunction, when it appears that the right to be 3) that there was no proof showing that the defendant had violated the
protected is unclear or is seriously disputed. terms of said injunction

2) No. The only ground relied upon for injunctive relief is the alleged ISSUE:
nullity of petitioners Memorandum and Auditor Cabibihans suspension
order. Whether or not the issuance of injunction against the defendant was
proper
By issuing a writ premised on that sole justification, the trial court in
effect sustained respondents claim that petitioner and the Auditor had HELD: YES.
exceeded their authority in ordering the suspension of the
In reply:
implementation of the step increments; and that the suspension was
patently invalid or, or of doubtful validity. Thus, the lower court 1) record shows that he had such notice
prejudged the main case and reversed the rule on the burden of proof,
because it assumed to be true the very proposition that respondent- 2) The judge who grants an injunction may punish those who violate its
complainant in the RTC was duty-bound to prove in the first place. mandates.

A court may issue a writ or preliminary injunction only when the 3) It is sufficient to say that he himself admitted that he had violated the
respondent has made out a case of invalidity or irregularity. That case terms of said injunction and attempted to excuse by claiming to be the
must be strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the owner of such property
presumption of validity; and it must show a clear legal right to the
remedy sought. The court finds nothing in the record which would justify the reversal of
the decision of the lower court. However, it reduced the amount of fine
from P50 to P5.
DIGEST BY: DAN
Moreover, the court deemed it proper to make the following
CASE 19. G.R. No. L-11130 October 8, 1917 observations:

BENITO GOLDING, plaintiff-appellee, 1) Injunction should not be granted to take property out of the
vs. possession and control of one party and to place it in the hands of
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, SERAPIA BALATBAR and ESTEFANIA another whose title has not been clearly established by law.
BALATBAT, defendants.
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, appellant.

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 40 of 49


2) It should not be issued except upon condition that no other ordinary, Judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits
speedy and adequate remedy is available to avoid or repair the damage the CIR (defendant) and his deputies from collecting and enforcing
done, or which may be done by a new violation of the plaintiff’s rights. against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax. It also enjoins
the defendant from destroying or removing any sign, signboard,
3) That an injunction, while it resemble the interdictal actions of the billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the reason that such
Spanish law, is wholly distinct therefrom billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. It decrees the cancellation
of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the
* accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry
preliminary injunction granted as soon after the commencement of this
(detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the property is
action.
illegal abinitio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico)
where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction against
so by the expiration of his right to possess – Javier v. Veridiano G.R. No. the defendant is proper
L-48050 October 10, 1994 (NOT CITED IN THIS CASE)
HELD: No.
4) The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the
probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the
compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where usual remedies. The origin and history of the writ of injunction show
facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive
of injunction should be refused remedy, as distinguished from the common course of the law to redress
evils after they have been consummated. No injunction issues as of
5) Injunctions to prevent trespass and the illegal interference with the course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is
possession of land should not be granted, when the plaintiff's title is in no adequate remedy at law.
dispute and has not been established at law, until the question of title is
settled in a proper proceeding brought for that purpose. The mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is
imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to
6) There are cases, however, where an injunction may be granted in restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further showing
order to preserve the statu quo of property until the title can be that there are special circumstances which bring the case under some
determined in a proper action. But even then it should not be granted well recognized head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable
ex parte. The defendant should be given an opportunity to be heard. injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will result,
and also that there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy at law.
7) The remedy by injunction is never the proper remedy to deprive a
person of the possession of property. If the person in possession is in Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit
possession illegally there exist other adequate, speedy and summary assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this act until the taxpayer
remedies — forcible entry and detainer and ejectment. shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . ." This
inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes
In the present action had the defendants appeared when they were
imposed by provincial boards. The inhibition was not inserted in the
cited so to do and alleged and showed that they were in possession of
Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective October 12,
the land in question as owners thereof, the action would have resolved
1907. Act No. 355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions
itself into one of ejectment, and a motion properly presented and
claimed a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied
properly supported to dissolve the temporary injunction would have
importers.
been denied. Of course, upon the theory of the plaintiff, as presented in
the record, that he was the owner of the land in question and in Section 52 of Act No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority
possession thereof — and that fact not having been denied — and that to grant an injunction restraining the collection of any taxes imposed by
the defendants were mere trespassers thereon and were illegally and virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer who
maliciously interfering and molesting the plaintiff in his quiet and claims that he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under
peaceable enjoyment of the possession of his property, then injunction protest of the sum claimed from him by the Collector of Internal
was the proper remedy for the purpose of preventing a repetition of Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been
said illegal acts. illegally collected."
The remedy by injunction is the proper remedy to prevent repeated DIGEST BY: IVY
trespass upon real property. But the trespass which will be enjoined
must be of such a nature that an action for damages will not adequately CASE 21. G.R. No. 147861 November 18, 2005
compensate the loss occasioned thereby.
PPA V. PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVE-DORING SERVICES, INC.,
DIGEST BY: DAN
Tinga, J.:
CASE 20. G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
FACTS:
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-  In the late 1990s, then President Estrada issued a directive for
appellant. the modernization of the North Harbor towards unification
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellant. and rationalization of all facility operators and service
Aitken and DeSelms for appellees. providers. It fell upon the PPA to implement the presidential
edict. However, the plan for modernization, which required
FACTS: the North Harbor to be run by a single entity, encountered

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 41 of 49


strong opposition including resistance from North Harbor
port workers. The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (a) the
 PPA received information by the Asosasyon ng mga existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
Mangagawa sa Pantalan, that it would stage a strike which protected; and (b) the act against which injunction is to be directed
would sufficiently paralyze the whole of the North Harbor. as a violation of such right. A preliminary injunction is proper only
when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his
 These circumstances prompted it to issue on 14 April 2000 complaint.
Memorandum Order No. 07-2000 creating the PPA North
Harbor Services (PPA-NHPS) to take over cargo handling PASSI admits that its contract has expired and that it is merely
operations and obviate an interruption of port operations. occupying and operating at Pier 8 in a holdover capacity.26 Thus,
PASSI’s rights over Pier 8 arise not from contractual relations with the
 On the eve of the planned strike, PPA, began forcibly PPA, or a statutory grant of authority, but merely by the tolerance of the
occupying several ports in the North Harbor. By around 1:00 PPA. Tolerance is not the surest footing on which a right in esse can be
a.m. on 16 April 2000, PPA had taken over operations at Piers established.
6, 8, 12, 14, Terminal 16 and Marine Slipway.
DIGEST BY: IVY
 On 19 April 2000, respondent Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services, Inc., (PASSI) the service provider dispossessed of Pier CASE 22. A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA March 20, 2007
8 filed a complaint for Injunction with Damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF
injunction.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
x----------------------------x
 For its part, PASSI had been rendering arrastre and
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J March 20, 2007
stevedoring services at Pier 8 since 1974. Its latest contract
expired on 14 April 1997, three years before PPA took over ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA, Complainant, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
Pier 8. PASSI filed a request for the renewal of its contract ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
which was never formally acted upon by PPA. Thus, PASSI was PER CURIAM:
operating at Pier 8 in a holdover capacity up until PPAs
takeover. PUNO, C.J., et al

 The RTC set aside the TRO and denied the preliminary
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J
injunction prayed for by PASSI. The RTC applied Section 1,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1818, which provides that [n]o
court shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, These are 2 administrative cases against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in the Court of Appeals.
any case, dispute, or controversy involving any public utility
operated by the government, including among others public The second case is based on a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, C. Padilla, charging Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with "culpable
stevedoring and arrastre contracts. dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and
gross ignorance of the law", in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573,
 The Court of Appeals issued the TRO prayed for by PASSI. It entitled "Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC and ErlindaArchinas".
directed PPA to cease and desist from continuing its takeover
of the operations of [PASSI] at Pier 8 and, from molesting, On May 28, 2001, with respondent Justice as ponente, the First
disturbing and/or interfering PASSIs operations thereof. Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the PNB petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, affirming
ISSUE: Whether or not PASSI is entitled to injunction relief? in its entirety the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.
On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for reconsideration. On June 25,
RULING: 2001, Archinas (private respondent in the petition for certiorari) filed her
opposition to PNB’s motion for reconsideration. On July 24, 2001, acting
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of upon PNB’s urgent motion for issuance of a TRO, respondent issued the
Appeals is DISSOLVED. resolution enjoining the public respondent from implementing the Writ of
Execution. On October 30, 2001, the resolution ordering the maintenance
As a rule, an application for preliminary injunction entails a of the status quo was issued. On November 5, 2001, Archinas filed her
determination of whether the requisites provided in Rule 58 of the motion seeking reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution.
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure for the issuance of the provisional Archinas filed four (4) urgent motions for early resolution of the pending
remedy are extant. In the instant case, however, the impact of P.D. No. motion/s for reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13, 2002,
1818—the law which proscribes court injunctions on government September 24, 2002, and August 23, 2005, Meantime, on July 5, 2004,
projects—must also be taken into account as said law specifically respondent Justice Asuncion was assigned to CA Cebu Station. With this
excludes arrastre and stevedoring contracts along with other activities transfer, respondent’s caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On
from the sphere of the injunctive power of the courts.23 Consequently, November 3, 2004, respondent was reassigned back to Manila. It was
both issues are determinants of the sustainability of the Court of only on August 7, 2006 that respondent finally resolved the PNB motion
Appeal’s decision and the parameters of its jurisdiction in the original for reconsideration. The Investigating Justicein his Report also found out
action on certiorari.
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 42 of 49
that: "His ‘interest’ in the case is ‘manifest’ in that, despite his assignment indefinitely; it has a lifetime of a non-extendible period of sixty days and
in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to Justice automatically expired on the sixtieth day.No judicial declaration that
Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the case upon it has expired is necessary, and, the lower courts, including the
his return to the CA Manila station." Court of Appeals, have no discretion to extend the same. A second
TRO by the Court of Appeals after the expiration of the sixty day
Findings of the Investigating Justice period is a patent nullity.
"Complainant Padilla contends that respondent Justice Asuncion
committed gross ignorance of the law in issuing the October 30, Issue: W/N respondent’s "deliberate act of extending indefinitely the
2001 resolution which extended indefinitely the duration of the temporary restraining order or the status quo order constitutes his
TRO issued on July 24, 2001, by ordering the parties to maintain culpable gross ignorance of the law."
the status quo, pending resolution of the PNB’s motion for
reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of THE COURT’S RULING
Court. Atty. Padilla further contends that respondent’s failure to
We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice.
speedily resolve PNB’s motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001,
Archinas’ motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001 and her
numerous motions for early resolution thereof constitute culpable The July 24, 2001 resolution, which "temporarily enjoined" the public
dereliction of duty. respondent from implementing the assailed writ of execution, was a
temporary restraining order, regardless of the nomenclature Justice
Asuncion used to characterize it. As such, its full life span can only be
Atty. Padilla stressed that respondent Justice’s reliance on Eternal
sixty (60) days. Section 5, par. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is explicit:
Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals, decided in
the Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order only for a
1988, to justify the issuance of the two resolutions constitutes gross
limited period of sixty days which cannot be renewed or extended. After
ignorance of the law, considering that the ruling thereon was set aside
sixty days, the restraining order immediately ceases, without need of
by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Santiago v. Vasquez.
any judicial order terminating it.
Further, he averred that the Eternal Gardens ruling was superseded by
Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
which states that "the petition [in the Supreme Court or in the Court of DIGEST BY: IVY
Appeals] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been CASE 23. G.R. No. 207412 August 7, 2013
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case." FLORD NICSON CALAWAG, PETITIONER,
vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS AND DEAN CARLOS
C. BAYLON, RESPONDENTS.
"Respondent Justice Asuncion stressed that the July 24, 2001 and
October 30, 2001 resolutions were the collegial acts of the First Division x-----------------------x
of the Court of Appeals, composed of three justices, unanimously
approved by them after due deliberation, and not the acts of G.R. No. 207542
respondent justice alone. He denied that the July 24, 2001 resolution
was, in fact, a TRO and maintained that the purpose thereof was MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE MARIE F. NASALGA AND CHE CHE B.
merely to remind the parties to observe the status quo while PNB’s SALCEPUEDES, PETITIONERS,
motion for reconsideration was pending resolution. He also vs. DR. CARLOS C. BA YLON, DR. MINDA J. FORMACI ON AND DR.
claimed that complainant Padilla mistook the October 30, 2001 EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO BE SUBSTITUTED BY ALFREDO E.
resolution as extending the TRO, whereas there was no indication PASCUAL, BEING THE NEW UP PRESIDENT), UNIVERSITY OF THE
in the July 24, 2001 resolution that a TRO was ever granted. PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, RESPONDENTS.
Respondent Justice stressed that the admonition to the parties to
maintain the status quo was merely directory in view of the pending FACTS:
motion in the CA, following the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Respondent justice cited Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v.  The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries
CA, Ibid., as basis for his action in issuing the July 24, 2001 and October Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship. They finished their
30, 2001 resolutions, which directed the parties to maintain the status
first year of study with good grades, and thus were eligible to
quo pending resolution of PNB’s motion for reconsideration.
start their thesis in the first semester of their second year. All
"Technically, status quo is "defined as the last actual, peaceful and
the requirements were satisfied.
uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is
existing at the time of the filing of the case"
 Thereafter, the petitioners sought the approval of Dean
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that a status quo ante order
Baylon for composition of their thesis committees. Upon
has "the nature of a temporary restraining order".Thus, the decretal
portion of the resolution of July 24, 2001, specifically ordered that the receipt of the petitioners’ letters, Dean Baylon wrote a series
public respondent is ‘temporarily enjoined’ from implementing the of memos, questioning the propriety of the thesis topics with
assailed writ of execution. Respondent justice must be playing with the college’s graduate degree program. He subsequently
words. When a judge or justice uses technical or legal terms with a well- disapproved the composition of the petitioners’ thesis
defined meaning, such as a temporary restraining order or a status quo committees and their tentative thesis topics because the
order, he must have intended those meaning; he cannot impute a petitioners’ thesis titles connote a historical and social
"directory" meaning to confuse the parties. x xxOn the other hand, he dimension study which is not appropriate for the petitioners’
ought to know that a temporary restraining order cannot exist chosen master’s degrees. The dean thereafter ordered the
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 43 of 49
petitioners to submit a two-page proposal containing an right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis
outline of their tentative thesis titles and informed them that committees.
he is forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the
role of the adviser and of the thesis committees. By necessary implication, the dean’s power to approve
includes the power to disapprove the composition of a thesis
committee. Thus, under the UP System’s faculty manual, the dean has
 The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and
complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a
mandamus before the RTC, asking it to order Dean Baylon to
thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate
approve and constitute the petitioners’ thesis committees and
Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the Guidelines for the Master of
approve their thesis titles. They also asked that the RTC issue a Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CA’s interpretation that
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon the thesis committee’s composition needs the approval of the dean
and order him to perform such acts while the suit was after the students have complied with the requisites provided in Article
pending. 51 of the Graduate Program Manual and Section IX of the Guidelines
for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.
 RTC: Granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
which Dean Baylon allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas Verily, the academic freedom accorded to institutions of
eventually assailed this order before the CA through a Rule 65 higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims
and objectives and how best to attain them.10 They are given the
petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining
exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study in them, as
order (TRO).
well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being
their graduates.
 CA: It issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTC’s
order, holding that the petitioners had no clear right to DIGEST BY: JILL
compel Dean Baylon to approve the composition of their
thesis committees as a matter of course. As the college dean, CASE 24. [ I.P.I. No. 16-241-CA-J, Nov 29, 2016 ]
Dean Baylon exercises supervisory authority in all academic CLEMENTE F. ATOC v. EDGARDO A. CAMELLO
matters affecting the college.
PEREZ, J.:
Hence, these petitions.
FACTS: On 13 March 2015,[3] William G. Guillani filed a complaint for
grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and violation of Republic
ISSUE:
Act No. 6713 against Oscar S. Moreno (Moreno) and Glenn C. Bañez
Whether or not CA erred in setting aside the preliminary mandatory
(Bañez), in their capacity as City Mayor and Officer-in-charge Treasurer,
injunction issued by the RTC.
respectively, of the Local Government Unit of Cagayan de Oro City,
before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB).
RULING:
In a Decision dated 14 August 2015; the OMB found Moreno and Bañez
CA did not commit an error in judgment in setting aside the
administratively guilty of grave misconduct.
preliminary mandatory injunction that the RTC issued against Dean
Baylon. On 3 November 2015, the OMB furnished the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) copy of the decision for implementation
"To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x xx the petitioners of the order of dismissal against Moreno and Bañez.[5]
must establish the following requisites:
(a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and In order to stay the implementation of the OMB decision, Moreno and
substantial; Bañez filed their respective Petitions for Certiorari with Extremely
(b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
(c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent Preliminary Injunction (WPI) on 11 November 2015.
serious damage.
On 12 November 2015, the DILG served a copy of the decision on
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the Moreno.[6]
performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus
more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. On even date, incumbent Vice Mayor Caesar Ian Acenas and Councilor
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction Candy Darimbang were sworn in office and assumed the positions of
[presents a fourth requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free City Mayor and Vice Mayor of Cagayan de Oro City, respectively.
from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the On 13 November 2015, the CA issued a resolution granting Moreno and
issuance of injunctive relief is improper." Bañez's prayer for issuance of a TRO. The TRO which is effective for a
period of 60 days, unless sooner revoked, enjoined the DILG, its officers
The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to and agents and all persons acting under them, from enforcing,
show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the protection of a implementing and effecting the OMB decision which dismissed Moreno
preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CA’s conclusion and Bañez from the service.[7]
that the dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the
composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had no On 17 November 2015, the DILG filed a Manifestation informing the CA
that as of 6:12 in the evening of 12 November 2015, it has already
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 44 of 49
implemented the OMB decision dismissing Moreno and Bañez from the The remedy against the issuance of the TRO is unarguably and by its
service. The DILG averred that it was only on 13 November 2015 at very nature, resolvable only thru judicial procedures which are, a motion
around 7:32 in the evening that it received a copy of the CA resolution for reconsideration and, if such motion is denied, a special civil action
granting the TRO.[8] of certiorari under Rule 65. It is the ruling granting the prayer for the
writ of certiorari that a basis for an administrative action against the
On the same date, the DILG filed a second pleading denominated as judge issuing the TRO may arise. Such happens when, from the decision
Manifestation with Urgent Motion for Clarification. The motion seeks to on the validity of the issuance, there is a pronouncement that indicates
clarify as to who should be recognized as Mayor of Cagayan de Oro gross ignorance of the law of the issuing judge. The instant
City considering that the department received the' CA Resolution on administrative complaint cannot be a substitute for the aforesaid
the granting of the TRO a day after the OMB decision was served and judicial remedies.
implemented against Moreno.[9]

On 18 November 2015, the CA issued a resolution clarifying the validity DIGEST BY: JILL
and enforceability of the TRO it earlier issued.
CASE 25. [ G.R. No. 189026, November 09, 2016 ]
On 11 January 2016,[12] the CA, through Associate Justice Camello as
ponente with the concurrence of Associate Justices Badelles and Atal-
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH TELEPHONE CORP., PETITIONER, VS.
Paño, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining and preventing
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., RESPONDENT.
the respondent DILG, from enforcing and implementing the 14 August
2015 decision of the OMB.
JARDELEZA, J.
Claiming that he was aggrieved by the resolutions issued by the CA in
the subject cases, complainant, filed a verified complaint against the
FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation
respondent associate justices of the CA who issued the latest resolution
(PT&T) and respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) entered
praying that they be disbarred and their names be deleted as members
into an Agreement[2] dated June 23, 1997 for the interconnection of
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
their telecommunication facilities. The Agreement provided for the
interconnection of Smart's Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS),
The respondent justices submit that case law has been consistent in its
Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) and Paging services with PT&T's LEC
caveat that where judicial relief is still available, whether it be ordinary
service. Starting 1999, however, PT&T had difficulty meeting its financial
or extra-ordinary remedy, resort to administrative complaint is not
obligations to Smart.[3] Thus, on November 28, 2003, the parties
allowed.[14] They maintain that the preclusive principle that bars parties
amended the Agreement, which extended the payment period and
to a pending suit from by-passing judicial remedies by resorting to
allowed PT&T to settle its obligations on installment basis.
administrative suits against judges applies even more to complainant
who is not even a party or privy, but a total stranger to the pending
petitions before the CA.[15] On April 4, 2005, Smart sent a letter informing PT&T that it increased
the access charge from P1.00 to P2.00 starting April 1, 2005 in
ISSUE: Whether or not resort to administrative complaint is allowed accordance with the amended Agreement. However, on September 2,
when judicial relief is still available 2005, PT&T sent a letter to Smart claiming that the latter overcharged
PT&T on outbound calls to Smart's CMTS.
RULING: NO.
Thereafter, on September 15, 2005, PT&T filed a letter-complaint with
We find the charges against respondent Associate Justices bereft of the NTC raising the issue that the access charges imposed by Smart
merit. were allegedly "discriminatory and not in conformity with those of other
carriers."[7]
At the outset, it is clear that the assailed resolutions were issued by
respondent Associate Justices in the proper exercise of their judicial On January 20, 2006, the NTC ordered Smart and PT&T to attend
functions. As such, these are not subject to administrative disciplinary mediation conferences in order to thresh out the issues.[8] After the
action.. We have settled the rule that a judge may not be mediation efforts failed, the NTC directed the parties to file their
administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment in the respective pleadings, after which it would consider the case submitted
absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, for resolution. But before the parties were able to submit the pleadings,
corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her Smart filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
part. (RTC) against PT&T on April 7, 2006.[9] Smart alleged that PT&T was in
breach of its contractual obligation when it failed to pay its outstanding
Moreover, we have explained that administrative complaints against debt and denied its liability to Smart. Accordingly, Smart prayed that
magistrates cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial PT&T be ordered to pay the sum of P1,387,742.33 representing its
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or unpaid obligation and to comply with the amended
judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither Agreement.[10] Smart also asked the RTC to issue a temporary
alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such restraining order against the NTC and PT&T, which the RTC granted on
review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet April 25, 2006.[11]
been resolved with finality.[20] Here, it is evident that the parties
aggrieved by the resolution can avail or may have already availed of In its answer to the complaint,[12] PT&T sought for the dismissal of the
other judicial remedies. civil case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, non-observance of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 45 of 49


remedies, litis pendentia and res judicata. It also prayed that the charges. Undeniably, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it
restraining order be immediately set aside. After several hearings, the restrained the NTC from exercising its statutory authority over the
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Smart.[13]The RTC dispute.
reasoned that allowing the NTC to proceed and adjudicate access
charges would violate Smart's contractual rights. The RTC also denied
PT&T's motion to dismiss, finding that the nature of the civil case was DIGEST BY: JILL
incapable of pecuniary estimation which squarely falls within its
jurisdiction.[14] It added that the NTC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate CASE 26. G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016
breaches of contract and award damages.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. PETITIONER, VS. PAL EMPLOYEES
PT&T elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENT.
for certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion and, consequently, denied the petition.[15] It
found that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case because it involved an PEREZ, J.:
action for specific performance, i.e., PT&T's compliance with the
Agreement, and is therefore incapable of pecuniary estimation. And
insofar as the dispute involved an alleged breach of contract, there was
FACTS: Respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) Employees Savings and
no need to refer the matter to the NTC because it had no jurisdiction
Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) is a private non-stock corporation, the
over breach of contract cases.[16]
principal purposes of which are "(t)o promote and cultivate the habit of
thrift and saving among its members; and to that end, to receive
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals,
moneys on deposits from said members; (t)o loan said deposits to
PT&T filed this petition for review.
members when in need."[4]

ISSUE: Whether regular courts can restrain the NTC from reviewing the On January 28, 1972, the BSP issued to PESALA Certificate of Authority
negotiated access charges No. C-062.[6] Since then and until the filing of the present case before
the trial court, PAL religiously complied with its arrangement with
RULING: NO. PESALA to carry-out the payroll deductions of the loan repayments,
capital contributions, and deposits of PESALA members.[7]
Here, it would be more proper for the RTC to yield its jurisdiction in
favor of the NTC since the determination of a central issue, i.e., the The controversy began on July 11, 1997, when PESALA received from
matter of access charges, requires the special competence and Atty. Jose C. Blanco (Blanco), then PAL Labor Affairs Officer-in-Charge, a
expertise of the latter. Letter[8] informing it that PAL shall implement a maximum 40% salary
deduction on all its Philippine-based employees effective August 1,
Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court 1997. The Letter stated that, as all present Philippine-based collective
where the action is pending may grant the provisional remedy of bargaining agreements (CBAs) contain this maximum 40% salary
preliminary injunction. Generally, trial courts have the ancillary deduction provision and to prevent "zero net pay" situations, PAL was
jurisdiction to issue writs of preliminary injunction in cases falling within going to strictly enforce said provision.
its jurisdiction, including civil actions that are incapable of pecuniary
estimation[41] and claims for sum of money exceeding Foreseeing difficulties, PESALA estimated that if the 40% ceiling will be
P400,000.00,[42] among others. There are, however, exceptions to this implemented, "then only around 8% (P19,200,000.00) of the total
rule. A well-recognized exception is that courts could not interfere with monthly payroll of P240,000,000.00 due to PESALA will be collected by
the judgments, orders, or decrees of a court of concurrent or PAL. The balance of around P48,000,000.00 will have to be collected
coordinate jurisdiction.[47] This rule of non-interference applies not only directly by plaintiff PESALA from its members who number around
to courts of law having equal rank but also to quasi-judicial agencies 13,000 and who have different offices nationwide. In the obtaining
statutorily at par with such courts. circumstances, PESALA's computation showed that "(t)here will remain
an uncollected amount of P38,400,000.00 monthly for which plaintiff
The Rules of Court provides that an appeal from any award, judgment will suffer loss of interest income of around P3,840,000.00 monthly."[11]
or resolution of or authorized by a quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions, including the NTC, shall be through a On August 6, 1997, PESALA filed a Complaint[12] for Specific
petition for review with the Court of Appeals.[58] Performance, Damages or Declaratory Relief with a Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction before the RTC of Pasay
It is clear that Congress intended NTC, in respect of its quasi-judicial or City,
adjudicatory functions, to be co-equal with regional trial courts. Hence,
the RTC cannot interfere with the NTC's exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers without breaching the rule of non-interference with In the Order dated August 11, 1997, the RTC issued a Temporary
tribunals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. In this case, the Restraining Order (TRO) prohibiting PAL and its representatives from
NTC was already in the process of resolving the issue of whether the implementing the maximum 40% salary deduction
access charges stipulated in the Agreement were fair and equitable
PAL failed to comply with the terms of the Order dated September 3,
pursuant to its mandate under RA 7925 when the RTC issued the
1997. In an Order dated March 11, 1998, the RTC ordered PAL to remit
assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Mediation conferences had been
to PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41.
conducted and, failing to arrive at a settlement, the NTC had ordered
the parties to submit their respective pleadings. Simply put, the NTC
had already assumed jurisdiction over the issue involving access

PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 46 of 49


Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension
In the Decision dated November 6, 2002, the RTC made the writ of order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers
preliminary injunction earlier issued as permanent. and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months
without pay; and (b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA,
Hence, the present petition. ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for
contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the TRO and WPI is proper and
therefore PAL should bear the loss for its non-compliance a. On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty.
RULING: YES. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas “Ching” Enciso VI before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati
The records of the case show, on the other hand, that the undeducted (Binay, Jr., et al.), accusing them of Plunder and violation of
amount of P44,488,716.41 came about because PAL failed to comply Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as “The
with the TRO and the injunctive writ issued by the RTC. AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
PAL cannot hope to gain anything beneficial from its deliberate refusal
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
to comply with the orders and directives of the court. PAL's obstinate
b. The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators
disobedience to the RTC's TRO and WPI led to the disruption of
the status quo and to the exposure of PESALA to deficits and losses, for to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an
which it should be liable. investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman’s
In United Coconut Planters Bank v. United Alloy Phils. Corp.,[32] the Court, directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a
quoting Capitol Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, explained that "(t)he complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al., charging
sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard." Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
In Buyco v. Baraquia,[33] we further clarified that a preliminary injunction Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for
"is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause
c. Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a
Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special
full hearing can be had on the merits of the case."
Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive
Indeed, an injunction is granted by a court in order to prevent an injury suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
or to stop the furtherance of an injury until the merits of the case can suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay,
be fully adjudged. In the case at bar, PAL's defiance of the TRO and the during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman
WPI caused PESALA to incur a shortfall in the amount of ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a
P44,488,716.41. This shortfall could have been precluded if only PAL public officer are present,54 finding that:
complied with the TRO and the WPI and preserved the status quo. Since
such loss was brought about by PAL's non-compliance with the (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.’s guilt was strong given
directives of the RTC, then fair play dictates that PAL should be held that
liable for its insolence.
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and
Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the
irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project;
DIGEST BY: ALBERT
(2) the documents on record negated the
CASE 27. G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
receipts showed the release of funds; and
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents. (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged
with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
Perlas-Bernabe, J.: (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant
removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on (3) Binay, Jr., et al.’s respective positions give them
March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity access to public records and allow them to influence possible
as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice
General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.
public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,
Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of
which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.’s (Binay, Jr.)
Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against
the implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 2015 of the Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 47 of 49
implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based
et al., upon receipt of the same. on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for
Respondent contended that he could not be held the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on
any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking building October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and
project since: imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the
a. Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and
appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive
b. Phases III to V transpired during his first term and suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the
that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It
second term effectively condoned his administrative therefore has no more purpose – and perforce, dissolves – upon the
liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the termination of the office’s process of investigation in the instant
administrative cases against him moot and administrative case.
academic.

Ruling:
In any event, Binay Jr., claimed that the Ombudsman’s
preventive suspension order failed to show that the
evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of
maintaining that he did not participate in any of the this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
purported irregularities. In support of his prayer for
injunctive relief, Binay, Jr., argued that he has a clear and
unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by
landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in (a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770
view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than
suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by
electorate of the services of the person they have the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the
conscientiously chosen and voted into office. said provision is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor;
In view of the CA’s supervening issuance of the WPI pursuant
to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental (b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the
petition before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;
irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is (c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar
strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Erwin S. Binay, Jr. 's (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr.
Jr. before it during the administrative proceeding because Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complaints, docketed
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in as OMB-C-A-15-0058 OMB-C-A-15-0059 OMB-C-A-15-0060 ' ' ' OMB-
2013. C-A-15-0061 OMB-C-A-15-0062 and OMB-C-A-15-0063· andr ' ' '

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's


Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. Condonation Doctrine: Refers to the limited empowerment of the
based on the condonation doctrine. No electorate over the accountabilities of their elective local officials. It is
Ratio: limited because it does not cover criminal accountabilities. It is a legal
fiction grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all the activities and
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA’s behavior of the elective local official. It is presumed that when the
resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were electorate exercised their right to choose, they were all aware of “all”
all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the misconducts of the public official.
the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO
was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015
Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the
RA 8975 An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and
cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia,
Completion of Gov’t Infrastructure Projects
Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation
doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained “good law,” it cannot
PROVREM Introduction | Rule 57 | Rule 58 | Case Digests Page 48 of 49
DIGEST BY: ALBERT Issues:

G.R. No. 167057 April 11, 2012 (669 SCRA 173) 1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the
basis of RA 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary
Nerwin Industries Corporation vs. PNOC – Energy Development restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued
Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, Chairman, Bids and Awards by the SC, on government projects. No
Committee
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the
entire case on the basis of RA 8975 which prohibits the
VILLARAMA, JR.,
issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as
Facts: a final remedy.

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) Held:


published an invitation to bid for its IPB-80 contract for the supply and
The petition fails. Respondent Judge gravely abused his
delivery of about 60,000 pieces of woodpoles and 20,000 pieces of
discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction
crossarms for the country’s Rural Electrification Project. On October
and in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order. The
2000, NEA’s Administrator recommended to NEA’s Board of Directors
same is a palpable violation of RA 8975. Sections 3 and 4 of RA 8975
the approval of award to Nerwin Industries Corporation on account of
states:
the following:
Section 3. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
a.) Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
b.) the price difference between Nerwin’s bid and that of the second mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
highest bidder is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private,
the government ($1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the acting under the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel
crossarms); and the following acts:

c.) the bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the xxx
woodpoles specified in the bid documents based on pre-award
b.) bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
inspection conducted.
government xxx
However, in December 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors passed
xxx
a resolution reducing by 50% the material requirements for the project.
In turn, it resolved the award of the contract at a reduced number to Section 4. Any temporary restraining order, preliminary
herein petitioner Nerwin. Petitioner protested the said 50% reduction, injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of
alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
Finding a way to nullify the results of a previous bidding, NEA officials
sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel, who upheld Respondent Judge could not have legally declared herein
the eligibility and qualification of petitioner. Notwithstanding, NEA respondent in default because, in the first place, he should not have
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 given due course to herein petitioner’s complaint for injunction.
contract, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Although judges
injunction application was granted by the RTC in Civil Case 01102000. have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the
In the interim, respondent (PNOC) issued a Requisition or an invitation performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear
to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and
project (O-Ilaw project). Upon learning of such issuance, petitioner filed renders them susceptible to administrative sanction.
a civil action (Civil Case 03106921) in the RTC in Manila alleging that
A preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy
said Requisition was an attempt to subject a portion of the items
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests
covered by IPB-80 to another bidding, and praying that a TRO issue to
during the pendency of the case. It is issued only when a.) the applicant
enjoin respondent’s proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
is entitled to the relief demanded; b.) the act sought to be enjoined is
Respondents averred that the complaint showed no cause of violative of that right; and c.) there is an urgent and paramount
action and violated the rule that government infrastructure projects necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not
cannot be subjected to TROs, seeking the dismissal of Civil Case issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent
03106921. However, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case 03106921. and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by
Respondents appealed the case to the CA in a special civil statute. A preliminary injunction is but a preventive remedy whose only
action for certiorari, alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
petitioner had been entitled to the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the
SC; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and
established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in
disqualifying respondent’s counsel from representing them. The CA
granted the petition of herein respondents.

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