LAW111:

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

CASE DIGESTS
First Semester Academic Year 2016-2017

GROUP 1
Alvaro, Michelle
Bunquin, Ma. Angelica
Gener, Francess Louise
Larin, Christian John
Macob, Johanne Margarette
Masarate, Jose
Motilla, Alvin
Ordinario, Mark Fevy
Rabang, Janelle
Remular, Karmelo Angelo
Sabaoan, Angela Louise
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

 DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

Tañada v. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27
April 24, 1985

Facts:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

Ruling:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
 The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
 Basa v. Mercado
G.R. No. L-42226
July 26, 1935

Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator
of the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa,
et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because
there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing.
They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first
publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the Ing Katipunan where the notice was
published was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law.

Issues: 1. Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
2. Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the
hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
before the day appointed for the hearing. The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of
general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and
general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is
published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing
Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
 PASEI v. Torres
G.R. 101279
August 6, 1992

Facts:
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong.” The DOLE itself, through the
POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30,
Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul
the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the
following reasons:
1. That the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. That the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and
3. That the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

Issues:
Whether or not the respondents complied with the requirements of publication and filing
as demanded by the Office of the National Administrative Register.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court found that the questioned circulars to be legally invalid, defective
and unenforceable for lack of publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative
Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1)
and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in
a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make
emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Additionally, citing the ruling on Tañada v.
Tuvera: . . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.) For lack of proper publication, the
administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.
 National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga
G.R. No. 158761
December 4, 2007

Facts:
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano Gonzaga filed his certificate of candidacy
fir the position as Board of Director in Zamboanga, Del Sur Electric Cooperative. The screening
committee then disqualified the respondent due to the fact that his spouse was an incumbent
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dipalahan, Zamboanga Del Sur. According to the Electric
Cooperative Election Code (ECEC) promulgated by the National Electric Cooperative (NEA),
spouses having elective government position higher than the Barangay Captain is prohibited to
run as a Director in the Electric Cooperative. On November 21, 2000, the respondent filed a
Motion of Prohibition and Damages with the Pagadia Regional Trial Court.
On November 24, 2000, ZAMZURECO filed a Motion to Dismissed the motion of the
respondent, in which the RTC denied, but issued a temporary restraining order in conducting an
election of Directorship. The RTC said that the motion of the respondent is dismissible because
of the respondent’s failure to comply to the administrative remedies in Section 2 of the Electric
Cooperative Election Code, “required that a protest arising from disqualification shall be filed
with the screening committee in not less than FIVE (5) days before the election. The screening
committee shall decide the protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from receipt thereof. Failure
of the applicant to file his/her protest within the above-cited period shall be deemed a waiver of
his right to protest.”
On December 12, 2000, the respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw the amend petition
and file a second amended petition that the National Electric Administration (NEA) be a
indispensable party. Moreover, the respondent contend that the ECEC is null and void because of
its failure to comply with the publication requirement. On December 20, 2000, the RTC admitted
the second amended petition and required the NEA to answer if the ECEC is published to any
newspapers for general circulation.
On July 23, 2000, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismissed of the petitioners and
noted the failure of the petitioner, NEA, to prove the ECEC is indeed published in newspapers for
general circulation as required to the new Civil Code of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the Electric Cooperative Election Code failed to comply to the publication
requirement.

Ruling:
Yes. Due to the fact that NEA offered no proof of publication in the Official Gazette or in
any newspapers for general circulation. Without the compliance of the publication requirement,
the rules and regulations of the ECEC is null and void. In accordance to the New Civil Code of
the Philippines, Article II.
 Philippine International Trading Corp. v. Angeles
G.R. No. 108641
October 21, 1996

Facts:
Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the People‘s Republic of
China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products.
PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that
they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter
they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the
trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends
further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27,
1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

Issue:
Whether or not PITC‘s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the
said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada
vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall
be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.
 Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc.
v. Energy Regulation Commission
G.R. No. 192117
September 18, 2012

Facts:
Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are
rural electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National
Electrification Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a
member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in
the distribution of . On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit
on the recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their
consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural
electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an
application for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate
of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the
ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not
inconsistent with the provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the
applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All
electric cooperatives were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy
Regulatory Board had prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22
March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order
of the ERC directing the refund of over-recoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective
and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-
submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive application.

Issue:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended
by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process.
Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that
"laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided." Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there are several exceptions to the requirement of
publication such as an interpretative regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general public. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy
guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it‘s IRR, particularly on the computation of the
cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR.
Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.
 Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173423
March 5, 2014

Facts:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed for an application for registration for a 2,597
- square meter land located at Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando La union, Lot No. 4457. Lot No. 4457
was originally owned by a Pastora Vendiola and then succeded by Clemente and Emeteria then
was sold to a Rodolfo Cuenca dated May 23, 1975 and few years thereafter sold the lot to spouses
Fortuna. Spouses Fortuna claimed with their predecessors-in-interest that they have been in quite,
peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the lot for more than 50 years. Spouses Fortuna
were able to submit lot survey plan, technical description and certificate of assessment as
evidences in proving that they possessed the lot.

RTC granted the petition of spouses Fortuna for a registration of the lot and declared that
spouses Fortuna possessed the lot with a registration including their predecessors-in-interest since
1948 or for a period of 50 years. On May 16, 2005, Court of Appeals set aside the decision of
RTC towards the case identified as LRC No. 2372 and argued that the spouses Fortuna failed to
meet the cut-off required by the law that they should have possessed the lot since June 12, 1945
as stated to PD No. 1073, although spouses Fortuna argued that the applicable law is Section 48
(b) of the Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA) as amended by R.A. No.
1942. The R.A. 1942 states that in order for the spouses Fortuna to acquire an imperfect title for
an agricultural land of the public domain they must meet a 30 years of open, continous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the lot but this act was amended by PD No. 1073 stating that the
possession of the lot should be since June 12, 1945 as carried to Section 14 (1).
The spouses Fortuna claimed that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 225, 1977 and
Published on May 9, 1977 and PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 12,
1979. In the case of Tanada, et al. V. Hon. Tuvera, etc. Et al., PD No. 1073 should take its
~
effectivity only on May 24, 1977 and PRD should take its effectivity only on january 17, 1979.
Base on the date of the effectivity of both PD NO. 1073 and the PRD, spouses Fortuna already
satisfied the 30 years period as required by the law.

Issue:
Whether or not the applicable law for the registration of a 2,579-square meter land
identified as Lot No. 4457 in favor to the spouses Fortuna is Section 48 (b) of the Commonwelath
Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.

Ruling:
No. the petition is denied. Court of Appeals denied the spouses Antonio and Erlinda
Fortuna’s application of registration of title due to insufficiently prove their compliance with the
requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain. Although Section 6
of PD No. 1073 states that “the Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation,” In the case of
Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. Publication of the law is absolutely required for its
effectivity. “All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.” Base on this, Section 6 of PD No. 1073
should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9,
1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947, note that the court
proved that the Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain, still, spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May
8, 1947.
 Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services –
Philippines Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense
G. R. No. 187587
June 5, 2013

Facts:
In 1957, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation no. 423, reserving parcels of land
in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Rizal, and Pasay City for a military reservation – commonly known
now as Fort Bonifacio.
In 1967, Proclamation No. 423 was amended by President Ferdinand Marcos, reserving
portions of Fort Bonifacio for a National Shrine, which is now known as the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Proclamation No. 423 was further amended when on 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, excluding some barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan, and Signal
Village from the military reservation. With a handwritten addendum at the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos included Western Bicutan in the excluded areas.
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette on that same year but without the
addendum.
In 1999, Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. members, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476, filed a petition to convert the areas they were occupying in Western
Bicutan from public land to alienable land. The Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
granted their request despite the non-publication of the addendum. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed this decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the hand written addendum has any legal force and effect despite its non-
publication

Ruling:
 On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the CA decision, noting that the addendum in
Proclamation No. 2476 was not only “irrelevant but speculative.” Courts cannot rely on a
handwritten note that wasn’t published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
and effect.
Citing Tañada vs. Hon. Tuvera, The SC also reiterated that requirement of publication is
indispensable in order to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The
phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette. Nevertheless, this
does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
 COMPUTATION OF TIME

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.

G.R. No. 162155
August 28, 2007

Facts:
On May 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. He explained in his letter
to the petitioner Revenue District Officer Arturo Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that he suffered loses and caused industry to slow down.
On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer Elizabeth Santos required the respondent to submit
additional documents to support its claim. Respondents complied but its claim was not acted
upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeal (CTA) but
was dismissed because it was filed beyond two-year prescription period for filing a judicial claim
for tax refund based on Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Art. 13 of
the Civil Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeal which reversed the decision of Court of Tax Appeal because Art. 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a leap year and a regular year.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus, petitioners ask for review on
certiorari to Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Sec. 229 of the NIRC.
Ruling:
The court affirms the decision of the CTA but the basis is however not correct. Article 13
of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, EO 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 provides that “year”
shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. Both deal with the same subject matter- the
computation of legal periods. There obviously exists incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold
that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Applying Section 31,Chapter VIII, Book 1 of Administrative Code of 1987, the
respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month
from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
period.
 People v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. L-7234
May 21, 1955

Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The
information was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the infor
mation to ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90
and 91 of theRevised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the
case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.

Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does
not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil
Code which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article
13 of the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme
Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the
new provisions should apply.
 PRESUMPTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001

Facts:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. PO3 Rogelio
Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that: the victim was rushed to the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig,
Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr.
Errol de Yzo , at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
1. Victim died : fell from elevator WHILE PERFORMING HIS DUTY IN THE SAID
COMPANY.

RTC DECISIONS: May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.

P100,000.00 as moral damages.

P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

Issue:
 Whether or not Maria Guego can still claim for compensation thru civil code even if she
had already claimed a compensation thru labor.


Ruling:
Yes, Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course
of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor
of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the
provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude
a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who
has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under
the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the
first remedy.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

ART. 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic
Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten,
as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act,
provided that:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest
of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury
This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in
the Floresca ruling.The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts,
but of her rights as well: Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary
school for her educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered
from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from
the Civil Code than from the ECC.
 PEOPLE VS GASACAO
G.Rr No. 168445
November 11, 2015

Facts:
Capt. Florncio O. Gasacao, Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a
licensed local manning agency, while his nephew and co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the
President. As the crewing manager, appellants duties included receiving job applications,
interviewing the applicants and informing them of the agencys requirement of payment of
performance or cash bond prior to deployment.
He was charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment defined under Section 6, paragraphs
(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, and penalized under Section 7 (b) of the same law, before the RTC of Quezon City.
The complainants, namely, Lindy M. Villamor, Dennis Cabangahan, Erencio C. Alaba,
Victorino U. Caderao, Rommel B. Patolen, Joseph A. Demetria and Louie A. Arca, as overseas
seamen/seafarers, the said accused thereby charging, exacting and collecting from the said private
complainants cash bonds and/or performance bonds in amounts ranging from P10,000.00 to
P20,000.00 without any authority to do so and despite the fact that the same is prohibited by the
POEA.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued. On March 5, 2001, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, rendered its Joint
Decision convicting appellant of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240

Issue:
Whether or not the accused did knowingly and illegally recruited and asked for
unauthorized payment.

Ruling:
Yes,
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240, the prosecution having established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds Florencio O. Gasacao GUILTY of
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment punishable under Section 7, (b) of R.A. 8042. He is
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. He shall also indemnify
Dennis C. Cabangahan in the amount of P8,750.00; Lindy M. Villamor for P20,000.00;
Victorino U. Caderao for P20,000.00; Rommel B. Patolen for P20,000.00; and Erencio C.
Alaba for P20,000.00. Complainants Louie A. Arca and Joseph A. Demetria did not
testify.

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241, complainants Melvin I. Yadao, Frederick Calambro and
Andy Bandiola did not testify. Moreover, the Court believes all these complainants should
have been grouped in just one (1) information. Hence, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds Florencio O.
Gasacao NOT GUILTY of the offense charged.

Section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042[13] which state
that: SEC. 60. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. In no case shall an employment agency require
any bond or cash deposit from the worker to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her
repatriation.
 IGNORANCE OF LAW VS. IGNORANCE OF FACT



Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo
G.R. No. L-21076
March 31, 1965

Facts:
On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding WONG
WOO YIU alias NG YAO to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the
country as a non-quota immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on
July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the
Secretary of the Board. On June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed
entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. On August 9, 1962,
petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in
the decision, but the same was denied for lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962,
petitioner initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court
of First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition forcertiorari.
Their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that petitioner is
legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-
quota immigrant. PERFECTO BLAS declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married
petitioner in 1936. Perfecto Blas himself, in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry
in connection with his entry on January 23, 1947, that he was married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say,
Chingkang, China in 1936, his first visit there being in 1935; he could not therefore have been
married to herein applicant in 1929.

Issue:
 Whether or not Wong Woo You is legally married to Perfecto Blas.

Ruling:
NO.Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the
status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is
well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it
must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the
peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine
Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the
marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not
one of those authorized in our country. But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General
orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new
Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the
country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to
this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such
being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a
foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. The statutes of other
countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as any other fact. Courts cannot take
judicial notice of what such laws are. In the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign
country or state will be presumed to be the same as our own. (Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46). In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign
law, it will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. (Lim and Lim
vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472). In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws
on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867). Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the
officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's
marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
 Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales
G.R. No. L-55960
November 24, 1988


Facts: 

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00
more or less. Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in
China. Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with
Sy Mat . Ida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego. Declaring oppositors
Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the
alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of
the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic). Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on
December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the
Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be
excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and Affirming the appointment by the lower
court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. Yao kee and sy kiat
got married thru a CHINESE CUSTOM. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory

10.The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence"
Article 12, Civil Code. 

12.a. Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if
any: give number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" Exhibit "SS-1";
b. the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat, only
three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan TSN, December
12, 1977, pp. 9-11; and an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license,
wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter. With respect to the AVENUE
TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
e. The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided into two
equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own one-half of the total and the
other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy. The business name and premises ... shall be retained by
Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same building now
occupied by Everett Construction. With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the 

common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and properties
registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime.

Issue:
1.Whether or not Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were legally married.

2. Whether or not children of Asunsion Gillego and yao kee are natural children of Sy
Kiat.

3. Whether or not the division of Sy Kiat’s properties should be divided equally for the
natural children of Sy Kiat to Yao Ke and Asunsion Gillego.





Ruling:

1. Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922). In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court.
With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Yet, Yao Kee wasn’t able to proof that
she was married to Sy Kiat.


2. Yes, failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of
China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged
natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another See Art.
269, Civil Code. And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's
recognition of Sze Sook Wah Exhibit "3" and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen
who are her sisters of the full blood See Art. 271, Civil Code. Private respondents on the other
hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina
with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their
favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein
Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made
provisions for their support and future inheritance



3. Yes, made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus: the parties also
acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of such relationship,
which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they
begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953;
Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956;
and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL
PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that - 

(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided into two
equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own

one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.

(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his
obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 )
monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.

With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the common-law husband-and-
wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and properties registered and/or
appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the
said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely,
Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego
during her lifetime.

 Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam v. Glow Laks Enterprises, Ltd.
G.R. No. 156330
November 19, 2014

Facts:
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam (Nedlloyd) is a foreign corporation engaged in the
business of carrying goods by sea, whose vessels regularly call at the port of Manila. It is doing
business in the Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-petitioner East Asiatic Co., Ltd. Bills of
Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and MHONX-34 arrived in good condition in Hong Kong and were
transferred to M/S Amethyst for final carriage to Colon, Free Zone, Panama. Both vessels, M/S
Scandutch and M/S Amethyst, are owned by Nedlloyd represented in the Phlippines by its agent,
East Asiatic. Custody was turned over to the National Ports Authority in accordance with the
laws. Unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of lading and on the basis of the
falsified documents, the ports authority released the goods. On July 16, 1988, respondent filed a
formal claim with Nedlloyd for the recovery of the amount of US$53,640.00 representing the
invoice value of the shipment but to no avail.6 Claiming that petitioners are liable for the
misdelivery of the goods.



Issue:
1. Is Panamanian law accepted to the court?

2. Whether or not the Nedlloyd is still liable to the lost goods of Glow Laks even if they
were already delivered to the Panamanian port.



Ruling:
1. No, it is not accepted foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.13 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court14 which read:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.

1.For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his
deputy; and (2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the
seal of his office.15 Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.16
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Panamanian laws, particularly Law 42
and its Implementing Order No. 7, were not duly proven in accordance with Rules of Evidence
and as such, it cannot govern the rights and obligations of the parties in the case at bar.



2. Yes, Nedlloyd is still liable. Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the
common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice
to the provisions of article 1738.

Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even
during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until
the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity
thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.
 PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

Aruego v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112193
March 13, 1996

Facts:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsary Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, Antonia
F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, born on October 5, 1962 and September 3,
1963, respectively, represented by their mother, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint prayed for an
order praying that Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of Jose Aruego, Sr.
who died on March 30, 1982; that the petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge
them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased; and that their share and participation in the estate
of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the
action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the status
of illegitimate children.”
On June 15, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego, declaring
her as the illegitimate daughter of the deceased. Petitioners filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. No. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. Said
motion was denied. Another petition to the Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family Code of the Philippines or E.O. 209 be given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
No. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of the respondent, Antonia Aruego, to
have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact
that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
The trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209. The ruling reinforces
the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events. The Supreme Court denied the petition and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 Bernabe v. Alejo
G.R. No. 140500
January 21, 2002

Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On
May 16, 1994, Carolina on behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he be given his share in
Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestine as the sole surviving heir.

Issues:
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgement of paternity by the latter.
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents ha four
years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of
the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the provision of the Family Code and the
applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is fatally defective for
failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.

Ruling:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the
civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and
only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. The
failure of the petitioner to implead the Court of Appeal as a party is not a reversible error; it is in
fact the correct procedure.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders Intercity Savings and Loan Bank
G.R. No. 181586
December 14, 2009

Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, filed on June17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidationof Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging
that said bank was alreadyinsolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss
to depositors, creditors andthe general public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner
Philippine Deposit InsuranceCorporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner,
liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that ―
After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay
any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to
creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to
the shareholders of the closed bank. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8,
2005 a Motion for Approval of the FinalDistribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied
retroactively in order to entitleIntercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in
their operation,they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence,
the legalmaxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for
the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: ―Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive
legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or
disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing
indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear
legislative intent to the contrary, Section 28.
Effectivity Clause. ―This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulationǁ‖.
 Montaez v. Cipriano
G.R. No. 181089
October 22, 2012

Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes
re-married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the
Regional Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Fa
mily Code. On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004,
Silverio‘s daughter filed a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Lourdes then contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the
Family Code, Article 40 cannot be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry
without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the
complaint ruling that the existing law at the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The
complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor
of the respondent. Hence, this petition was filed.

Issue:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab
initio, the first and second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also,
Art. 40 should beapplied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of anyone.
The petition isthereby granted.
 Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 188056
January 8, 2013

Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates
in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands
for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao
City on February 6, 2009. On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of
Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial
Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et
al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the
petitioners directly went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing
DOES No 182. They further argued that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation
of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does
not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be
applied retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.
 WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Guy v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006

Facts:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent – minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a pertition for letters of administration before the Regional
trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10,
000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are surviving spouse
Guy, children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners argued
that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged that private
respondents’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished by reason of Remedios’ June
7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of
Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

Issue:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming
their hereditary rights?

Ruling:
Remedios’ Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming
succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and equivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her
children, such waiver does not bar the latter’s claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires
judicial authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private
respondents as co heirs to Sima Wei’s Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.
 F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. v. HR Construction Corporation
G.R. NO. 187521
March 14, 2012

Facts:
FFCCI entered into a contract with DPWH for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct.
FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HRCC for the supply of materials,
labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project.
Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress
billing which the latter would then pay within 30 days from receipt thereof. The parties agreed
that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completed
works as approved by FFCCI. Eventually, FFCCI did not pay the amount stated in the second and
third progress billing, even though HRCC submitted its progress billings claiming that it had
already paid HRCC for the completed works for the period stated therein. HRCC demanded
payment but still was not paid so HRCC halted the construction of the subcontracted project.

Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI’s non-compliance with their contract make HRCC rescission valid.

Ruling:
No, HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract agreement. The determination
of the validity of HRCC’s work stoppage depends on a determination of the following: first,
whether HRCC has the right to extra-judicially rescind the Subcontract Agreement; and second,
whether FFCCI is already barred from disputing the work stoppage of HRCC. HRCC had waived
its right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement. The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in
reciprocal obligations. Article 1191 of the Civil Code pertinently reads: Art. 1191. The power to
rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible. Contrary
to the respective dispositions of the CIAC and the CA, we find that HRCC had no right to rescind
the Subcontract Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waived such right in
its Subcontract Agreement, Hence, in spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the
parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC had agreed to continue the
performance of its obligations pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. In view of the provision of
the Subcontract Agreement quoted above, HRCC is deemed to have effectively waived its right to
effect extrajudicial rescission of its contract with FFCCI.
 People v. Morial
G.R. No. 129295
August 15, 2001

Facts:
On the 6th day of January 1996, the above named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with intent to gain entered into the house of
Paula Bandipas and Benjamin Morial. Once inside did then and there willfully and feloniously
stab Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas with the use of a pointed weapon and stones which was
used by the accused in inflicting mortal wounds which caused their instantaneous death, said
accused took and stole P11, 000.00
The next day, the accused went with the police officers to the police station. There
Leonardo Morial was forced to confess about the death of Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas.
Leonardo’s statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were
going to contact the lawyer to assist him during the investigation but in truth, Leonardo was not
informed of his rights even before the investigation started.

Issue:
Whether or not the custodial investigation conducted to Leonardo Morial without a
counsel a valid waiver of constitutional right?

Ruling:
A person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception so
does he enjoy such right until its termination. Even granting that accused consented to Atty.
Aguilar during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyers’ absence, such
consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The right
cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and with the presence of a counsel.
 Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra judicial confession executed by Leonard
Morial, the conviction of accused is fully supported by other pieces of evidence. The accused is
truly guilty and nevertheless faces conviction.
 SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

Bartolome v Social Security System

G.R. No. 192531
November 12, 2014

Facts:
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he
was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to
petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no
longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO
COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic)
that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the
deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-
related demise.

Ruling:
The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended,
which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied). Concurrently, pursuant to the
succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the
processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the
System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the
above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined
atthe time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he
remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried
not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital
or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall
be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are
qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more
acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution,
but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated
and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the
deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
 REPEAL
(EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL)

CIR V. Primetown
G.R. No. 162155
August 28, 2007

Facts:
On May 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. He explained in his letter
to the petitioner Revenue District Officer Arturo Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that he suffered loses and caused industry to slow down.
On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer Elizabeth Santos required the respondent to submit
additional documents to support its claim. Respondents complied but its claim was not acted
upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeal (CTA) but
was dismissed because it was filed beyond two-year prescription period for filing a judicial claim
for tax refund based on Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Art. 13 of
the Civil Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeal which reversed the decision of Court of Tax Appeal because Art. 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a leap year and a regular year.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus, petitioners ask for review on
certiorari to Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Sec. 229 of the NIRC.
Ruling:
The court affirms the decision of the CTA but the basis is however not correct. Article 13
of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, EO 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 provides that “year”
shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. Both deal with the same subject matter- the
computation of legal periods. There obviously exists incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold
that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Applying Section 31,Chapter VIII, Book 1 of Administrative Code of 1987, the
respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month
from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
period.
 Magkalas v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 138823
September 17, 2008

Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as
TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa
Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years. On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315
was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the
National Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss
Project Power of demolition. Census: TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the
NHA determined that the area where plaintiffs structure is located should be classified as an area
center (open space). The Area Center was determined in compliance with the requirement to
reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development. They field against NHA. NHA
wanted to remove the structure she erected on the area within 30 days and to transfer her
residence to Lot 77, Block 2. It was stressed in said letter that no Judicial Order was required to
remove the plaintiffs structure pursuant to P.D. No. 1472. Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton, and Mr.
& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan had already transferred to their allocated lots at Lot 2, Block 1,
and Lot 78, Block 2, respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioners structure will violate
the vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice
clause of the constitution.

Ruling:
 Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject
of this case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years
already. Thus, to order her relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the
social justice clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
However, the Court ruled that petitioner’s contentions must necessarily fail. The NHAs
authority to order the relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.[5] Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio
in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and was thereby declared expropriated. The
properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included petitioners property. The NHA, as the decrees
designated administrator for the national government, was empowered to take possession, control
and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their
improvements.
 EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 165835
June 22, 2005

Facts:
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer II of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, for
violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,3 violation of Art. 183
of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service
Law. Petitioner’s wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and
Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No.
1379, conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using
and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth. On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the
Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed before the
Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0193. DURING THE INCUMBENCY OF GARCIA, ALLEGEDLY
ACQUIED LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY AND PROPERTIES. R.A. No. 1379, maintaining
that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 2 of the
law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate
actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and
cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended, and
Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411 and 14-A.

Issue:
Whether or not the law affected the repealing law?
Ruling:
Petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this motion was only brought
to the attention of this Court by respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A scrutiny
of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed
for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments and
Discussion89 in the Petition of petitioner’s thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted
from theMotion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner
raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural
requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachmentdated 2
November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to
Dismisshave the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife
and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is
incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition outright, without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.90 The
brazenness of this attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004. Petitioner
should have waited for the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the petition at
hand. Petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs to be reminded that his
primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. As an officer of the court, his
duties to the court are more significant and important than his obligations to his clients. Any
conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes his oath
of office.91 Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the legal
profession and the mission of our courts of justice. For this, he should be penalized. Penalties
imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-shopping range from severe censure to suspension
from the practice of law.92 In the instant case, we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount
of P20,000.00 to be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of
the judicial process.
 JUDICIAL APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

Ting v. Velez-Ting
G .R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first
met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.[5] They fell in love, and they were wed
on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer. Benjamin Ting is an anaesthesiologist. The couple
begot six (6) children, On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years Carmen
filed for annulment of her marriage to Benjamin because of , as stated to: Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. Benjamin has
many vices such as gambling and drinking, she is also physically and sexually abusing Carmen.
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations: 1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, 2. Benjamin Is violent, 3. His compulsive
gambling habit, 4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal
to give regular financial support.
According to Benjamin, he is not violent, only when provoke, he is also a highly
respected person attested by his peer, he also gamble and drink occasionally and for leisure and
not as a vice, he is also supporting he’s family in all of his ability to do so. Dr. Pureza Trinidad-
Oate, a psychiatrist. - through enographic notes taken by Benjamin - Dr. Purexa concluded that
Benjamin suffers from a personality disorder. Dr. Renato D. Obra - a psychiatrist concluded that
there is nothing wrong with Benjamin’s personality.
RTC ruled that Benjamin is psychologically incapacitated. And so the marriage is null
and void. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis is applicable in this case.

Ruling:
No, the Molina ruling cannot govern the case because it was promulgated five
years ago after RTC’s decision so it cannot have a retroactive effect. And it violates the
principle of stare decisis, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary
for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
 Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110398
November 7, 1997

Facts:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife,
daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets
were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980.
The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22,
1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil
tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her
passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought
to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families were never found. Private
respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34,
against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la
Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la
Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers
74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest;
and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night
after being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision,
some of the passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four
relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies
were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by
a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the
M/T Tacloban City. On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the
payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and
releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently
held by the trial court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents
did not join in the agreement.

Issues:
1. Whether the members of private respondents‘ families were actually passengers of the Don
Juan
2. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to
be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case
3. Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner‘s liability
4. Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.

Ruling:
1. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don Juan
was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased
tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of
petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22,
1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the
tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
2. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court
relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate
cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the
Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter‘s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban,
was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate
Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent
danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan
failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise
the abandoning of the ship.
3. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total
loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-owner.
4. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case,
the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under
petitioner‘s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la Victoria
spouses should receive P97, 714.28
 Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa
GR NO. 208566
November 19, 2013

Facts:
”Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in
reference to certain funds of the Pre- Martial Law Era (1922-1972). Act 3044, or the Public
Works Act of 1922, is considered as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" i
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986). "Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in
1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,” 1982, the
Batasang Pambansa = General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units".
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992). "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
"Visayas Development Fund" BECAME "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998). = "Countrywide Development
Fund" (CDF) Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001). = "Food Security
Program Fund," the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund, YEAR 2000 "Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).YEAR 2002 PDAF
Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. On the one hand, the Malampaya
Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910, issued
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law,
Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate
government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth. V. Controversies in the Philippines.
Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of
"any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
"JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers;

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to
the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.

Ruling:
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: 

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; 

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; 

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and 

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case
law states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
judicial power Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that
"judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
 LAW OF THE CASE


Fulgencio v. Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 141600
September 12, 2003

Facts:
Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they
received notice of the NLRC‘s June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date when they filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under Section
11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted
to; hence, the dismissal thereof by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the
Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.

Ruling:
Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It
is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case
on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice
 OBITER DICTUM

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.142947
March 19, 2002

Facts:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress
forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and
that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her
but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand
denied Orly‘s allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and
she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.

Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

Ruling:
The SC ruled that Orly‘s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it
is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly‘s allegation of fear was not
concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-grounded
reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by
Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the
threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an
erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a
prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file
an action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146486
March 4, 2005

Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The
Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable. On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1)
sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees:
James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing
P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for
release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report
was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially
recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment.
However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the
stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor
are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private
respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed
Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an
impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman‘s Deputies are impeachable.
2. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.
Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case
No.OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the
Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases.
The Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution states that ―The President, the Vice - President, the members of the Supreme Court,
the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachmen.
Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in
Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his
Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or
not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable
officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor
presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the
previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented. Criminal and Administrative Liability
of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue
in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for
the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in
office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does
retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent,
given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former‘sretirement benefits have been placed on
hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 134284
December 1, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married
to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala
and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special
Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the
vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter‘s approval b) the construction of the building
shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion,
neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall
have been fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent
any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of
restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that
is, for the payment of damages.
 DUTY OF THE COURTS TO DECIDE
G.R. Nos. 119987-88
October 12, 1995

Facts:
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the
necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and
Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged
with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-138071. After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and
the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry
Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all
the accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor
of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be
"modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in
place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying
the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an
accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the
judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

Ruling:
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should
impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is not
a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law
clearly imposes the penalty of Death. The instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private
respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the
instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by
this Court of the decision imposing the death penalty.
 CUSTOMS

Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales

L-55960
November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in Caloocan City leaving behind real
and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300, 000.00 more or less. Thereafter, Aida
Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration in said petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge Sy-Kiat’s marriage to Yao-Kee.
The petition was opposed by Yao-Kee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Kiat. After the
hearing, the probate court affirmed that Sy-Kiat was legally married to Yao-Kee. On appeal, the
CA held that respondents are the acknowledged natural children of Sy-Kiat and that Sy-Kiat’s
marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both the Philippine and Chinese
laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19, 1931, in Fookien, China;
that she is not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their marriage was an agreement of
their parents who were as well the signatories of the certificate; that they were wed by a village
leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing the signatures of the couple’s
parents and that she cannot provide any legal document proving that their wedding was indeed
part of China’s custom or China’s laws.

Issue:
Whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven?
Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Accordingly,
in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same
as ours. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao-Kee and Sy-Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.
 EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

Ursua v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112170
April 10, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended
by RA 6085 otherwise known as ―An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliasesǁ‖ by the RTC of Davao
City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his
letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm‘s messenger Oscar Perez
had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name ―Oscar Perezǁ‖
when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint
was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the
matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.

Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.
 APPLICATION OF LAWS

Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs

G.R. No. L-24170
December 16, 1968

Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.

Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid
on the contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.

Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to
protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high
seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only
within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction
while on Philippine ship.
 APPLICATION OF LAW ON FAMILY RIGHTS, DUTIES, STATUS , CONDITIONS,
AND LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS

Llorente v. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO. 124371
November 23, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo
Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo
departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an
American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo
was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was
living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with
the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father‘s name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union,
suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore three
children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property
to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzo‘s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo‘s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted
her petition, stating that Lorenzo‘s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines
and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate– the two-thirds would be divided equally among
the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by
foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred
back to the law of the decedent‘s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow
the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo‘s will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the
will of the deceased.
 ARTICLE 17 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

Van Dorn v. Romillo

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is
a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8,
1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita, Manila is
their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that
private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari
proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

Ruling:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner‘s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country‘s court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property
 Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation
G.R. No. 133976
December 29, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and
financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records,
BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US)
Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El
Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private. As security, the
latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is
a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July
1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759,
T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763. The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed
collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff
to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted. On 12 February 1993, private
respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages against the petitioner,
for the latter‘s act of foreclosing extra -judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency
of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner‘s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for
the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Ruling:
Yes. In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself.In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus, when the
foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
 LAW ON PROPERTY

Miciano v. Brimo
GR NO. L-22595
November 1, 1927

Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano,
the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo‘s opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo‘s will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
disposition.

Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must
govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the
testator. Therefore, the testator‘s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the
Civil Code. Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that ―it be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Islandǁ‖, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre
Brimo, as one of the legatees.
 REVOI

Aznar v. Garcia
G.R. NO L-16749
January 31, 1963

Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided
for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until
his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the
deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only
 Bellis v. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967

Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills,
his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on
the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights
of the illegitimate children.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that
the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Article 16,
par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
 FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation

v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.
G.R. No. 140047
July 13, 2004

Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and
Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy
Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting
Company, a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce. On March 7, 1981, in
behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex International, Inc a local contractor
engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However
since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, it had to assign and
transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an agreement that the execution of the project will
be under their joint management. To comply with the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex
and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial
institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the
performance of approved service contracts abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued
by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was engaged to
provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its
favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety Bond was later amended to increase the amount of
coverage and to change the bank in whose favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from
Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed
the service contract for the construction of the project. However, they were not able to start the
project on schedule because of that surety bond was also extended and the Advance Payment
Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement. On 26
October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full payment
of its performance bond counter-guarantee. VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay Al Ahli
Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project. VPECI
received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain
Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al
Ahli Bank. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli Bank, and
reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for
the advances made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq‘s laws should be applied in determining
VPECI’s failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract.

Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the
parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the
problem of whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of
Iraq. However, those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the
doctrine of processual presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held
that the petitioner guarantor should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a
guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI
has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the
creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the
principal debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and
remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due
the creditor and demandable of the principal debtor.
HUMAN RELATIONS

 PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. 81262
August 25, 1989

Facts:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in dual
capacity as purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
In 1972, the respondent discovered fraudulent anomalies and transactions in the said corporation
for which it lost several hundred thousands of pesos. The private respondent reported to his
superiors including Henry, the petitioner. However, he was confronted by Hendry stating that
Tobias was the number one suspect. He was ordered to take a one week forced leave. When he
returned to work, Hendry called him ‘crook’ and ‘swindler’, and left a scornful remark to the
Filipinos. The petitioners also charged six criminal cases against the respondent—five cases of
estafa and one for violating Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets through Seizure of
Correspondence). The petitioner also sent a poison letter to RETELCO causing the respondent to
be unemployed.

Issue
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent.

Ruling:
Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the damage or loss which does
not constitute a violation of legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. However,
this is not applicable in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have
had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must be held liable. The court awarded Tobias
the following: Php 80, 000 as actual damages, Php 200, 000 as moral damages, Php 20, 0000 as
exemplary damages; Php 30, 000 as attorney’s fees; and, costs. Petition was denied and the
decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
 University of the East v. Jader
G.R. No. 132344
February 17, 2000.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Romeo A. Jader was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law from 1984 up to
1988. In the first semester of his last year (SY 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled fro the
second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, his
grade of five (5) was submitted by Professor Ortega.
In the deliberations conducted by the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of
Law, the plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws. Plaintiff’s name also appeared in the invitation for the 35th
Investitures and Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws.
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies on April 16, 1988. during the program of
which he went up the stage, his mother and brother placed his Hood, his Tassel turned from left to
right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical
of the Law Diploma.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence from
his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination.
Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s
negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff-appellee can claim for moral and exemplary damages for the
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

RULING:
The Supreme Court ordered that petitioner should pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35, 470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid but not entitled to moral
damages. The court does not believe that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain because he
could not graduate and could not take the bar examinations. The court stated that it behooved on
respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be
eligible for the bar examinations. Respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that
all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
 GF EQUITY , INC. VS. VALENZONA
G.R. No. 156841
June 30, 2005

Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired
Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of
employment. He was tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team,
coach exhibition games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event
conducted, play-off games, etc. He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to
the conduct of its team and players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as
fixed by the corporation in good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly
and fully attired in public and to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest
standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to
the best interest of the corporation. He also agreed to endorse the corporation‘s products in
commercial advertising, promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still
photographs, motion pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of
taxes, provide him with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2)
years starting January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during
the contract, the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the
contract can be terminated by the corporation. (Paragraph 3) Before signing the contract,
Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the contract was one-sided, but still,
Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who
recommended him to GF Equity. Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA
Conference in 1988, he was advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated
September 26, 1988, invoking their right as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return
the service vehicle no later than September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75,
868.38 for his services. Six (6) years
after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzona‘s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of
compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF
Equity refused the claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of
contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of
the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and
legal and factual basis. He prayed award for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney‘s fees and cost of the suit. He challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the
elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance
thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal. GF Equity maintained that it
merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate Valenzona due to incompetence,
and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be instituted before a labor
arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it declared Valenzona as
fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC‘s decision and ordered GF Equity to pay
him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating
Valenzona‘s employment, finding Valenzona‘s claim for damages as valid. The court
ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney‘s fees. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative of
applicable laws and established jurisprudence.

Ruling:
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to
law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty
of laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years. In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF
Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness,
fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its opinion. To validate the paragraph would
open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used
as justification therefor. Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed
within the statutory period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was
filed for breach of contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering
he filed the action six (6) years from the date of his cause of action. Valenzona is entitled to
recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages, exemplary damages, must be set
aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
manner. Attorney‘s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to pay the balance of
Valenzona‘s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.
 HEIRS OF NALA V. CABANSAG
GR NO 161188 JUNE 13, 2008

FACTS:
Artemio Cabansag BOUGHT A 50 SQUARE METER LAND FROM EugenioGomez, Jr.
and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990 from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in
behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he
leaves the premises, Purisima Nala IS NOT AWARE THAT THE SPOUSES GOMEZ SOLD
THE LAND TO CABANSAG, ON Purisima Nala VIEW, CABANSAG IS ONLY RENTING
THE LAND, AND WHEN GOMES SPOUSES FAILED TO REMIT THE RENTALS IT WAS
WHEN NALA ACTED A HER LEGAL RIGHTS TO SEND ALETTER TO CABANSAG
THRU ATTY. DEL PRADO.
The Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision
of law under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations
in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article
19 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be
no intention to injure another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Injury is the legal invasion of a
legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.[14] Thus, there
can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Ruling:
Nala’s acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact
that the property has already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision
datedMarch 8, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the property to petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was
declared canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated March 18,
2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became final and executory on July 27, 2005.
 Go v. Cordero
G.R. No. 164703
May 4, 2010

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing
Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.
After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to
meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). After negotiations with Felipe Landicho
and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of
Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2)
SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997.
Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed
catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and
Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase
price, from the sale of each vessel. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing
directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go
was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship
engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested
quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying.
Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be
found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to
clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in
Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no
explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe
there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. On August 21, 1998,
Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho
liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due
commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person
and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the
distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999.
Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period granted
by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause
of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed
their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero‘s
authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero
who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from
AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client‘s griev
ances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia
and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. In any case,
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under
the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority
by AFFA‘s lawyers on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and
setting aside the trial court‘s orders of execution pending appeal.The ca
se before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45
separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach
of contract
2. Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.
Ruling:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. The presence of
the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting
that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly
aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence on
record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive
dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive
distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract
No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of
interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which
the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho
and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero‘s
commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso
equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully
paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219
of the Civil Code.
 Villanueva v. Rosqueta
G.R. No. 180764
January 19, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the
Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her
courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her
resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her
will on orders of her superior. Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed
Gil Valera to be Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the
Bureau of Customs. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo
warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner
of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from implementing Valeras appointment.
On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.
Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties,
deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner
by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. According to Villanueva he just
followed the command of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on dismissing Rosqueta in
the position.

ISSUE:
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner
Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction
order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of
the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as
such public officer.

RULING:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,[9] a person must,
in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in
bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20[10] and
21[11] of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such
abuse of right or duty. Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave
him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace
respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the
injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the
Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not
an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from
assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,[13] a
partys refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful,
constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.
 Ardiente v. Pastofide
G.R. No. 161921
July 17, 2013

Facts:
Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at
Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153)
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.

On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement selling,
transferring and conveying in favor of Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the
housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement
carries a stipulation: “4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the
account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994.” (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by
Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. “A”, pp. 468-469)

For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March
12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the
office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) … it Was Joyce who ask for the
disconnection of the water line, the COWD disconnected the line without noticing Ma. Theresa.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be

ISSUE:
Will the victim be entitled with compensation

Ruling:
Proper. Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.” It speaks of the
general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth
in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for
its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would
be proper. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned
provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply
disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such
intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the
impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water
supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.

 Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Gomez
G.R. No. 199601
November 23, 2015

Facts:
Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB
when a certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch
in January 1985. The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated
January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US
$724.57 payable to "C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76
payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington.” The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that it was a
certain Sophia La'O, as a representative of Harrington, who presented the bank drafts for deposit.
Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the
savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, JOSPHINE
CONTINUED THE TRANSACTION.
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington
withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the
person who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington
P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name. BECAUSE OF THIS
INSTANCE, PCIB DEDUCTED JOSEPHINE SALARYIES, BONUSES AND OTHER
BENEFITS TO PAY THE 50,600 .

Issue:
Whether or not there was an abuse of right.

Ruling:
 Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual, moral, exemplary, and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse
of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in
Articles 209 and 2110 of the Civil Code. We explained how these two provisions correlate with
each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona: [Article 19], known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper. Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear
violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB
has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly
and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the
investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to
Harrington's impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of
negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on
Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses.
 DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100
February 9, 1996

Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said
property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and
spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters
distant from Mabasa‘s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the
previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and
length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru
said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in
length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making
it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence
and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result,
the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street.
Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court
ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in turn,
the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent
use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were
given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach
of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In the instant case, although there was
damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of respondents, petitioners could not be
said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right
provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes
in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that ―(e)very owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. At the time of the construction
of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in
favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court
granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only
that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment
of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for
which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has
been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An
injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress
for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful
means.
 EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON
G.R. No. 156168
December 14, 2004

Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad,
either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who
travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable
Banking Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines,
engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit
card facilities, among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an
Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar
transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty
thousand pesos; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account
with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit
limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates went
to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon
accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement
of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-
shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or
equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect
payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who
promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the
presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him
that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa
card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into
pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid
further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Issue:
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.

Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty
and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of
such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
 VOLENTI NON FIT INJURA

HOTEL NIKKO MANILA v. REYES

G.R. No. 154259
February 28, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the
Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for
damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as
exemplary
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney‘s fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October
13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend,
approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel‘s former manager‘s
birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter‘s present. At the party, when
he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and
asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a
Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse. Ruby
Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She
said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the
party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied
Amay Bisaya‘s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim‘s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners
liable for damages caused to plaintiff.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lim‘s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone. The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It
was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they
nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she
requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was
plaintiff‘s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired
between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to
take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code.
 LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the
crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July
18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in
January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in BaguioCity without Gandalera‘s knowledge of Manuel‘s first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of ―singleǁ‖ in his
marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount
0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged
that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he
did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but
with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to
ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner‘s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article
390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact
or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged
and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith
of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is
later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court rules against the petitioner. The Court rules that the petitioner‘s collective acts of fraud
and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the
petitioner‘s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private
complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
 ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES

Pe v. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396
May 30, 1962

Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town
of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her
parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a
collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name,
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family.
Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only
their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship.
The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and
since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The
plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The
affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless. Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was
staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City.
On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters
checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note
on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita’s aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper
approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. The
disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present
there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. The trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this
point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such
relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries
of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with
each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in
full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita,
being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory, exemplary and
corrective damages.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her
to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family
who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion
can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a
clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having
illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
21 of the new Civil Code.
 BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

HERMOSISIMA vs. CA 

G.R. No. L-14628
September 30, 1960

Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher
in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life
insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private
maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner
admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having
ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on
October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on
February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered,
declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the
order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty
pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory
damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of
five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On
appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the
petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of
damages.
 Galang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.L-17248
January 29, 1962

Facts:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's
mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her
house and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother,
appellant Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the
marriage, with the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the
marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the
latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made
them alight from the bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino
agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for
their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to
act as their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and
Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on
May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage
license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both prospective
contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he
going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never
returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that
Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was
unsavory. The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals
considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.

Issue:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged
breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent
of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of
moral damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.
 Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97336
February 19, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met
the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou‘s house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the
apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the
petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement
and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He
claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and
approval of Marliou‘s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment
since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed
for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

Ruling:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioner‘s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood. Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to
have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the
country. Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
 Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089
December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-
to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is
leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed,
that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 Natividad v. Tunac
G.R. No. 143130
July 10, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay
Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two
became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to
get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon
arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside
his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa
cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her. Their
intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992. Ronald
reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his
parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and
asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families agreed to have the wedding in
January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa
started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born.
Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five
(5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that
Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal
period. During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house. It seems that after Elsa's
miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the former occurred. In January of
1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no
longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not
merely because Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her
after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town.
Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less
by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became
lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by
the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a
position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances
in this case. In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the
families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's
miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a
relationship gone awry. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
 UNJUST ENRICHMENT

SHRINYO COMPANY, INC. V. RRN INC.

G.R. No. 172525
October 20, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic
corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter
respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed
a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which
consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of
P5, 275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim
for overpayment in the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts before the
CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of
Sub-contract. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of
its projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-
Contract and other Sub-contract documents. On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of
Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment
Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project)
covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300-000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to
P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties
also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders in the Project. In connection with the
Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against respondent. Respondent was not able to
finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a
total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003], respondent, through its
former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance
amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges in the amount of
P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as
material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another letter to
petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another
letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding. Thereafter,
on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account and the
failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement.

Issue:
Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials is constitutes to
unjust enrichment.

Ruling:
No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC
award for the values of inventoried materials considering that respondent RRN has no basis to
claim because Engr. Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the
materials came from respondent or from petitioner and that it was petitioner that actually installed
the said materials as part of remaining works that the petitioner took over from respondent rrn.
The claim for the value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because in
the computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the full contract price and the
cost of variations which included the inventoried materials. Despite petitioner's attempts to make
it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this
Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC. It insists that its evidence
sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and
even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent
for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on the principle of unjust
enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts awarded by the CIAC for inventoried
materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the work left unfinished by respondent.
 CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC.,
v. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 138088
January 23, 2006

FACTS:
On December 19, 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporations (Ushio Realty) filed
an ejectment case against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover possession of a
parcel of land (property) located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue corner of Victory Avenue,
Quezon City.
USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the property, spouses Hector and Gloria
Hizon Lopez (“Spouses Lopez”), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990, the
Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a written lease agreement over the property for two
years. On the expiration of the agreement, the Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to continue
renting the property. Thus, the agreement went on by a verbal month-month agreement. Hector
Lopez wrote CAR COOL to inform of his intention to sell the property and te former gave the
latter the option to buy the property before offering it to other prospective buyers. CAR COOL
failed to respond to the offer. Thus, the property was bought by USHIO.
USHIO gave CAR COOL a specific time to which to vacate the property. But after three
notice and failing, however, to comply te demands of USHIO, filed a complaint for ejectment on
December 19, 1995. The Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of USHIO REALTY. CAR
COOL filed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, but still the latter affirm the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and attorney’s
fees in favor of USHIO.

RULING:
 The petition is partly meritorious.
CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust
enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. CAR COOL claims that it never benefited from its
occupation of the property after USHIO Realty’s agents enetered the property on October 1, 1995
and unlawfully destroyed CAR COOL’s office, equipment and spare parts. Because of the
destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its business, CAR COOL asserts
that it was no longer possible to continue its business operations. The Supreme Court, however,
was not convinced basing from the Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically under
Sections 17 and 19.
 ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 181995
July 16, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial
pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL
embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts.
Subsequently, PAL posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir
was one of those awarded with the opportunity. Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for
training in Seattle, Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary
training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new aircraft. He completed his training on
September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of
continuous service, the petitioner applied for an optional retirement authorized under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in that the company has yet to
recover the cost of his training. In the event that he finally decides to leave, PAL will deduct the
unrecovered cost of his training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave there
after. Elegir‘s counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training
should not be deducted from his retirement pay.

Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir‘s retirement pay
the amount unrecovered from his training.

Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the New Civil Code,
they had the right to demand payment since Elegir will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
PAL.
Unjustly enriching is unduly profiting one‘s self on something which does not meritoriously
belong to him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, ―Nemo cum
alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotestǁ‖. Elegir has the right to retire since he has reached a certain
number of flight hours which is considered a long stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his
subsequent training sponsored by PAL was put to waste when he decides to have an early
retirement from PAL after his training. It would be unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills
for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL has still not even recovered the cost of
training.
 BEUMER v. AMORES
G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, are married. The RTC declared
the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed
a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership. In defense, respondent averred that, with the
exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A
and 2055-I by way of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner
attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money. Petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch
government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for
their acquisition.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entiled to the land as partitioned

RULING:
The Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning
Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony36 and it is
this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
 HULST v. PR BUILDERS INC.
G.R. No. 156364
September 3, 2007

FACTS:
The Petitioner and his spouse, both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sellwith
PR Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m residential unit in the respondent'stownhouse project in
Batanagas. When PR Builder's failed to comply with their verbalpromise to complete the project,
the spouses Hulst filed a complaint for recession of contract with interest, damages and attorney's
fees before the Housing and LandRegulatory Board (HLURB), which then was granted. A Writ of
Execution was thenaddressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, but
upon thecomplaint of the respondent, the levy was set aside, leaving only the
respondent'spersonal properties to be levied first. The Sheriff set a public auction of the said
leviedproperties, however, the respondent filed a motion to quash Writ of levy on the groundthat
the sheriff made an over levy since the aggregate appraised value of theproperties at P6,500 per
sq m is P83,616,000. Instead of resolving the objection of therespondent's regarding the auction,
the Sheriff proceeded with the auction since therewas no restraining order from the HLURB. The
15 parcels of land was then awarded toHolly Properties Realty at a bid of P5,450,653. On the
same day, the Sheriff remittedthe legal fees and submitted to contracts of sale to HLURB,
however, he then receivedorders to suspend proceedings on the auction for the reason that the
market value of the properties was not fair. There was disparity between the appraised value and
thevalue made by the petitioner and the Sheriff, which should've been looked into by theSheriff
before making the sale. While an inadequacy in price is not a ground to annulsuch sale, the court
is justified to such intervention where the price shocks theconscience.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Sheriff erred in the value that was attached to the propertiesduring the
auction and as well as disregarding the objection made by therespondent's?
2. Whether or not the market value of the said property was inadequate?
RULING:
No. According to the Rules of Court, the value of the property levied is not requiredto be
exactly the same as the judgment debt. In the levy of property, the Sheriff doesnot determine the
exact valuation of the levied property. The Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He should be
allowed a reasonable margin between the value of theproperty levied upon and the amount of the
execution; the fact that the Sheriff leviesupon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the
execution does not render hisactions improper.In the absence of a restraining order, no error can
be imputed to the Sheriff inproceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash
the levy filed bythe respondents with the HLURB. Sheriff’s, as officers charged with the task of
theenforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must act with considerable dispatchso as
not to unduly delay the administration of justice. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to
consider and resolve respondent's objection to the continuation of theconduct of the auction sale.
The Sheriff has no authority, on his own, to suspend theauction sale. His duty being ministerial,
he has no discretion to postpone the conductof the auction sale.
 GONZALO V. TARNATE, JR.
G.R. No. 160600
January 15, 2014

FACTS:
After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on July 22,
1997 the contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain
Province-Benguet Road in the total amount of 7 014 963 33 to his company, Gonzalo
Construction,1 petitioner Domingo Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate,
Jr. (Tarnate) on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the project under the latter
s business known as JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate
would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, respectively, upon
Tarnate s first and second billing in the project.2

In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment

whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total
collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee (equivalent to P233,526.13)
was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project. In the deed of
assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of Gonzalo
Construction in the processing of the documents relative to the collection of the 10% retention fee
and in encashing the check to be issued by the DPWH for that purpose.3 The deed of assignment
was submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the documents for the
retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of
assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of assignment dated April 19, 1999
filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999;4 and that the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention
fee had then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him.5
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he
brought this suit against Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Mountain Province to recover the retention fee of P233,526.13, moral and exemplary damages
for breach of contract, and attorney’s fees.6

In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of assignment and the authority given therein to
Tarnate, but averred that the project had not been fully implemented because of its cancellation
by the DPWH, and that he had then revoked the deed of assignment. He insisted that the
assignment could not stand independently due to its being a mere product of the subcontract that
had been based on his contract with the DPWH; and that Tarnate, having been fully aware of the
illegality and ineffectuality of the deed of assignment from the time of its execution, could not go
to court with unclean hands to invoke any right based on the invalid deed of assignment or on the
product of such deed of assignment.7

Issues:
Gonzalo contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC because: (1) both parties were
in pari delicto; (2) the deed of assignment was void; and (3) there was no compliance with the
arbitration clause in the subcontract.
Gonzalo submits in support of his contentions that the subcontract and the deed of
assignment, being specifically prohibited by law, had no force and effect; that upon finding both
him and Tarnate guilty of violating the law for executing the subcontract, the RTC and the CA
should have applied the rule of in pari delicto, to the effect that the law should not aid either party
to enforce the illegal contract but should leave them where it found them; and that it was
erroneous to accord to the parties relief from their predicament.

Ruling:
We deny the petition for review, but we delete the grant of moral damages, attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.
There is no question that every contractor is prohibited from subcontracting with or assigning to
another person any contract or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary
has approved the subcontracting or assignment. This is pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1594, which provides:
Section 6. Assignment and Subcontract. – The contractor shall not assign, transfer, pledge,
subcontract or make any other disposition of the contract or any part or interest therein except
with the approval of the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the
Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be. Approval of the
subcontract shall not relieve the main contractor from any liability or obligation under his
contract with the Government nor shall it create any contractual relation between the
subcontractor and the Government.
 PARENS PATRIA DOCTRINE

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-56168
December 22, 1988

Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated
a loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel
of land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena
experienced financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian‘s shareholders.
It was found out in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had
resorted to unsound banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and
its creditors. Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders to turn
its non-monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it decides to
liquidate was the Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a
demand letter asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes the bank
only Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the demand received.
Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in January 13, 1968. The rural bank claiming that the payment
was not fully paid petitioned the foreclosure the Telosa‘s land to satisfy the claim. The lot was
then sold to the highest bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds on
September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the annulment of the land back to them because they
have already paid the loan of Php 300.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the return of the Telosa‘s land.

Ruling:
 The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time
the rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa‘s by making a
document that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard
the particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the
officer of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene because there has been a
preponderance of proof that the loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue
of the power of the state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially settled
 RIGHT TO PRIVACY

CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120706
January 31, 2000

FACTS:
The spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, the respondents, were residing in an
apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion at Pasig City. Nestor Nicolas
was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office
equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined after contributing capital
with the condition that she will receive half of the profit earned.
Rodrigo Concepcion, the petitioner and brother of the deceased husband of Florence,
went to Nestor’s apartment and accused him of committing adulterous relationship with Florence.
Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence even ceased to do business with
the spouses. The spouses started to quarrel as Allem became doubtful of her husband’s fidelity.
Nestor forced then Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. The latter
ignored that triggered the spouses to file civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. He reasoned out
that he did such to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family.

ISSUE:
Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, spouses
Nicolas.

RULING:
The petitioner's posture that there is no legal provision that supports such award of
damages has been rejected. Article 26 of the new Civil Code stressed the sacredness of human
personality, which is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Thus, the petitioner is liable to the spouses for
P50, 000 as moral damages, P25, 000 for exemplary damages, P10, 000 for attorney’s fees, plus
costs of suit.
 PADALHIN v. LAVIÑA
G.R. NO. 183026
November14, 2012

FACTS:
Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and
Consul General, respectively.In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was
raided twice. Prior to the raids, BienvenidoPasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino
household helpers in the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer
who would come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.
The first raid was conducted while Laviña and his wife were attending a diplomatic
dinner. The second raid was conducted during which occasion, the ambassador and his spouse
were once again not present and additional photographs of the residence were taken.On April 29,
1997, the team entered Laviña’s residence unarmed with a search warrant, court order or letter
from the DFA Secretary. Laviña alleged that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed
cabinet locks, damaged furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks. Subsequently, both
Nestor and Laviña were recalled from their posts in Kenya.
Laviña sought payment of actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of suits. In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids conducted
on Laviña’s residence. As counterclaims, he alleged that the suit filed by Laviña caused him
embarasssment and sleepless nights, as well as unnecessary expenses which he incurred to defend
himself against the charges. On the other hand, Annie denied prior knowledge of and
participation in the raids.
The RTC rendered a Decision ordering Nestor to pay Laviña moral damages, nominal
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and costs of suit for the
former’s participation in the raid conducted in the Ambassador’s residence. The CA rendered a
Decision denying the appeals of both Laviña and Nestor. The CA reduced the award of attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses made in Laviña’s favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nestor’s participation in the raid conducted on Laviña’s residence was
proven by clear and substantial evidence as to warrant the award of moral, exemplary and
nominal damages and attorney’s fees in the latter’s favor.

RULING:
The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA awarding damages and attorney's fees in Lavina's
favor stating that although Lavina in keeping ivories in his diplomatic residence, deserves
condemnation it is however not the issue raised at bar. The court still ruled that Nestor violated
the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide
behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence
without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or
malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith thus the court
finds the awards of damages granted by the CA in favor of Lavina proper.
 REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OF A PUBLIC OFFICER TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES

PHILEX MINIG CORP v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 125704
August 28, 1998

FACTS:
BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities amounting to P124 million.
Philex protested the demand for payment stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/
refund amounting to P120 million. Therefore, these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied
against the tax liabilities. In reply the BIR found no merit in Philex’s position. On appeal, the
CTA reduced the tax liability of Philex.

ISSUES:
Whether legal compensation can properly take place between the VAT input credit/refund
and the excise tax liabilities of Philex Mining Corp; Whether the BIR has violated the NIRC
which requires the refund of input taxes within 60 days Whether the violation by BIR is sufficient
to justify non-payment by Philex

RULING:
No, legal compensation cannot take place. The government and the taxpayer are not
creditors and debtors of each other. Yes, the BIR has violated the NIRC. It took five years for the
BIR to grant its claim for VAT input credit. Obviously, had the BIR been more diligent and
judicious with their duty, it could have granted the refund No, despite the lethargic manner by
which the BIR handled Philex’s tax claim, it is a settled rule that in the performance of
government function, the State is not bound by the neglect of its agents and officers. It must be
stressed that the same is not a valid reason for the non-payment of its tax liabilities.
 UNFAIR COMPETITION

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION

V. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORP.
G.R.195549
September 3, 2014

FACTS:
Jesichris Manufacuring Company (Jesichris) alleges in its complaint for damages for
unfair competition that it is a company engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products. It pioneered the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive
underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabiliser bushing, and others. Willaware Products
Corporation, on the other hand is engaged in the manufacture of kitchenware items made of
plastic and metal, has an office with physical proximity to its office, and in view of the fact that
some of its employees had transferred to it, Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colours as Jesichris manufactures and distributes, but at a lower price. Willware
deliberately copied its product designs which constitute unfair competition. It thus prayed for
damages in terms of unrealised profits in the amount of P2Million. On the other hand, Willaware,
in its defense, denied all the allegations in the complaint except as to the proximity of their office
to that of Jesichris, and that some of its employees transferred to Willaware. As an affirmative
defense, Willaware posits that there was no unfair competition as the plastic products were mere
reproductions of the original parts which merely conform to their original designs and
specifications. Thus, Jesichris cannot claim that it originated the use of the plastic automotive
parts, and even assuming that it did so, it still has no exclusive right to sell these products since it
has no patent over these products. In fact, other establishments were offering them for sale. After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favour of Jesichris. It ruled that Willaware clearly invaded
the right of Jesichris by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair
competition. It enjoined Willaware from continuing its activity, and awarded damages in favor of
Jesichris. On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed with modification that RTC decision.
Willaware is now before the Supreme Court assailing the RTC and CA decisions.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage o the part of Jesichris?

RULING:
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil
Code on human relations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,1 as the
present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the
existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case. The concept of “unfair
competition” under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of “unfair competition” in
American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor,
bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a
competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.2 With that settled,
we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code. We find the petition bereft of merit. Article 28 of
the Civil Code provides that “unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage.” In order to qualify the competition as “unfair,” it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve
acts which are characterized as “contrary to good conscience,” or “shocking to judicial
sensibilities,” or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or
interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by
unconscionable means Here, both characteristics are present. In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code. However, since the award of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages was awarded, the attorney’s fees should concomitantly
be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are herebyAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00). SO ORDERED
 ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON A CRIME/DELICT

MANANTAN VS. CA
G.R. No. 107125
January 29, 2001


FACTS:
In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile,
willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep
resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted
by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability.
On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan
civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria
Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.



ISSUE:
WON the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.



RULING:
Decision affirmed. While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not
recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since
civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,
the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis
for awarding indemnity and damages. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two
actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read
in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's
acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded
from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
**Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
[14] The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.[15] This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action for damages is
for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the
judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any
fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.[17] The reason
for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are
applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment,
the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action.
 NUGUID vs. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785
September 15, 2006

Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas
PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April
to August thereof, Clarita Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked
if they could borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid
lent the Nicdao spouses money. Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos until the amount reached to an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good faith in her part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-
dated check in the same amount as the loan. The checks are to be deposited in Nuguid‘s account
upon non-payment of the amount within one year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson
Ching, demanded payment of the loan but Nicdao refused to acknowledge the indebtedness.
Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her account in Ching‘s account since it was Ching
whom Nuguid got the money to loan to Nicdao. The checks were all dishonored because of it
being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent
to Nicdao. This was to give them chance to make good on their loan as represented in the checks.
The notice was for naught. Hence, a complaint was brought against Nicdao for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional Trial Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was
sentenced to pay the principal plus interest and suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing
check for a total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision due to substantial fact
that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed for a petition to the Supreme Court
raising the issue for civil liability.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of the
violation of B.P. 22.
2. Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.

Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao
has already made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the
crime was non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon.
The criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited
upon non-compliance of the payment of the principal debt. Interest was being enforced by the
Nuguid in the case. It was one of the reasons why the debt of Nicdao was continually rising as
payment are applied first to interest. The interest was unconscionable. The Court ruled that since
the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt remained in its principal amount. The principal
was actually paid in full already as per Article 1956 of the Civil Code
 PEOPLE V. AGACER
G.R. No. 177751
January 7, 2013

Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in
preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his brother
Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvest.ing the palay that Cesario had
raised. Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of the
nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded Cesario
and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the accused started fire on
Cesario‘s harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops. While Cesario was trying to put
the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled out a shotgun from
the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left portion of his chest. As Cesario fell, they
fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds on Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The
Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brother‘s arose upon the final judgment of the
Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed
instituted in the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also Article 20
of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is strengthened finally by Article 1161 of the
Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal
laws. Underlying this principle is that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that
from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an offense against the state because
of the disturbance of the social order, and second as an offense against the private person injured by the
crime.
 ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON A CRIME/DELICT

ROMERO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167546
July 17, 2009

Facts:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero
and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose
Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga
City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in
the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and
Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained
serious injuries. As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision
dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the
heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for
death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity. Petitioner appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, claiming that the MTC erred in holding him
civilly liable in view of his acquittal. On July 17, 2001, the RTC affirmed the MTC judgment in
toto.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is also absolved from civil liability.

Ruling:
 No, while petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was
established by preponderance of evidence.[24] In other words, the failure of the evidence to
prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling
that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly
liable.
 DALURAYA V. OLIVA
G.R. No. 210148
December 8, 2014

Facts:
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information4 for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue
flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive
medical attention,she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva
(Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya,
the purported driver of the vehicle.
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an
eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA
heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette
bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who
testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s death; (b) Dr.
Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of
Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the
investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being
driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
(demurrer)9 asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution
witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and
competent evidence of how the incident transpired.

Issue:
 Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s
death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish
his civil liability. In Manantan v. CA, 32 the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal
recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY T. GO.
G.R. NO.168539
March 25, 2014

FACTS:
Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the office of the ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of r.a. 3019. among those charged was HENRY T. GO, who was
then the chairman and president of piatco, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
secretary arturo enrile (secretary enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government A KIND OF AGREEMENT FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE NAIA TERMINAL III. office of the deputy ombudsman for luzon
found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of section 3(g) of
r.a. 3019. while there was likewise a finding of probable cause against secretary enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
section 3 (g) of r.a. 3019 provides: sec. 3. corrupt practices of public officers. – in addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (g) entering, on
behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. the elements of the
above provision are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered ..The elements of
the above provision are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract
or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. henry contested that the criminal charge
against him must be squash because one element is missing which is “accused must be a public
officer” and due to the death of sec. enrile which is a public officer there is no longer public
officer who will receive the charge violating the RA 3019, and therefore, henry must not be held
criminal to the section 3 (g) ra 3019 because he is a private person, the petition to squash the
charge is granted, but the court ruled: in cases that involves conspiracy, the rule is act of one is
act of all, the death of one conspirator will not bar to the liability of the surviving conspirator to
the charges. Henry is still liable to the violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 because he conspired
with a Public officer to plan and execute a felony with a same purpose and that is to materialize
the act. A conspiracy is an act done by two or more persons, acting as one or acting together that
resulted to execute a felony.

ISSUE:
Whether or not by reason of death, the complaint will not prosper.

RULING:
No, the Court is not persuaded. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is
no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It
does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved
or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the
death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
 INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007
September 2, 1994

FACTS:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June
19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the
accused died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4,
1992. The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas‘ civil liability
arising from the crime. In the Solicitor General‘s comment the civil liability hasn‘t yet expired.
The solicitor general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of
the accused-appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the
criminal and civil liability shall be extinguished.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the
controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death
extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent
civil action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as
instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it
follows that the death dissolves both civil and criminal liability. The Solicitor G eneral‘s
dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego
case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is
therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil liability arising
from delict only.
 CANCIO vs. ISIP
G.R. No. 133978
November 12, 2002

FACTS:
The accused, Emerencia Isip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also
known as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was
dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other
two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were
then dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime. Meanwhile the three
cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its
second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to
file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The
criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On December 15,
1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to recover
the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal
of the criminal case of estafa.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action
was made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly
based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was the breach of the respondent‘s breach of the
contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on
the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on
the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case
filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceeding.
 HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108395
March 7, 1997

FACTS:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine
Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez,
along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring
died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the
accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that
the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from
his criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should
pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable
doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the
heirs was based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-
delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was
based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held
that the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of
estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the
civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim‘s heirs.
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused
 CIVIL ACTION IN FRAUD , DEFAMATION, PHYSICAL INJURIES

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.),INC. VS ARGOS

GR NO. 130362
September 10, 2006

FACTS:
IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin
J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the
Fragrances Division of IFFI. The office of managing director was created to head the
corporation's operation in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing
director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa. Costa and respondents
had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant,
respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a "Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a "Personnel Announcement"
which described respondents as "persona non grata" and urged employees not to have further
dealings with them. Respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two
Informations against Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.Respondentsfiled'a civil case for damages filed and docketed
as Civil Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and
IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the
complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 65026 for
respondents' failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.IFFI filed a motion to
reconsider said order. This was denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil complaint which it invoked before the
court a quo. The appellate court dismissed the petition.IFFI's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of
libel.

RULING:
YES. To reiterate, nothing could be clearer than that herein respondents are suing IFFI
civilly in its subsidiary capacity for Costa's alleged defamatory acts. Moreover, the appellate
court could not convert allegations of subsidiary liability to read as averments of primary liability
without committing a fundamental unfairness to the adverse party. Essential averments lacking in
a pleading may not be construed into it, nor facts not alleged by a plaintiff be taken as having no
existence. Justice requires that a man be apprised of the nature of the action against him so that he
may prepare his defense. A pleading must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is
presumed to have stated all the facts involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his
conscience will permit. So, if material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the
absence of an application to amend that those matters do not exist. This is a basic rule in
pleadings. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires
only a preponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court notes that by invoking the principle of
respondent superior,20 respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its
employee's defamatory statements. But we also find that respondents did not raise the claim of
primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they
sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the
accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely. Having established that respondents did
not base their civil action on petitioner IFFI's primary liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages
from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa, prematurely, we need not delve
further on the other errors raised by petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred
in failing to dismiss the complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary
liability while the criminal libel cases against IFFI's employee, Costa, were pending before the
metropolitan trial court. Nothing herein said, however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that
respondents might seek at the appropriate time.
 RUIZ VS. UCOL
GR NO. L-45404
August 7, 1987

FACTS:
The laundrywoman for plantiff-appellant Ruiz filed an administrative charge against
defendant-appellee Ucol. Ucol, in her answer, allegedly said that Tagaca was merely used as a
tool by Ruiz, who wanted to get at Ucol because of a case file by the respondent`s husband
against Ruiz. She was allegedly made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated
the Charges. When the administrative case was dismissed, the petitioner filed his own criminal
complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol`s answer.
The lower court acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. The trial court as to the civil liability of the accused made no pronouncement.
Instead of appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon
which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had
prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the
appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of
libel.

RULING:
No, the contentions of the petitioner have no merit. Article 33 of the New Civil Code
independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising
therefore may be brought by the injured party. The civil liability arising from the crime charged
may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have
adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute separate civil action against the defendant.
The Supreme Court did not find any defamatory imputation, which causes dishonor, or discredit
to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against
her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her
answer to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for
their livelihood.
 CIVIL ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

COJUANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119398
July 2, 1999

FACTS:
Eduardo M Cojuangco, a known busenessman-sportsman, won a total of P1,020,700.00
on various horse-racing. He then sent a letter demanding to the defendants the collection of the
prizes due to him. However, the demanded prizes were being withheld on advice of
Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance heeding to then
President Corazon Aquino’s Executive Order No. 2 freezing all properties of former Presidet
Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies, in which Cojuangco is a friend of
the former President Marcos. Finally, February 7, 1991, the PCGG advised defendants that it
poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings. Immediately, this was
communicated to Atty. Mendoza by Carrascoso, Jr.
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Mendoza, petitioner’s counsel, refused
to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

ISSUE:
a) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office;
b) Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his
failure to file an appeal brief;
c) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a
cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents;
d) Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by
evidence and the law
RULING:
The appellate court committed no error in dismissing the appeal since the representation
of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to act as
principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations.
With regards the alleged failure of Mr. Carrascoso to file an appeal brief, his filing is not
an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal. What is important is that respondent
Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the lower court had filed
an appeal brief on his behalf.
As to the third issue, respondent court could not reverse and set aside the RTC decision in
its entirety and dismiss the original complaint without trampling upon the rights that the accused
accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the decision. It is well-settled that only
the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be
considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case.
The controlling article regarding the fourth issue is Article 32 of the Civil Code which
states that: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates, impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The deprivationof property
without due process of law. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner, even of the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of one’s duties. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a
properly issued seaquestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without
due process of law. Mr. Carrascoso is thereby ordered to pay petitioner nominal damages.
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 182976
January 14, 2013

FACTS:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent
fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent
Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter
Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights
electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to
check the electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric
meter was tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed
the meter has been tampered with. Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO
installed a new electric meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered
unusually high readings. The petitioners are now requesting that the old electric meter be re-
installed since it shows a more accurate reading. The respondents also pray for damages since
the electric meter was allegedly removed without following the required procedure. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the electricity of Permanent
Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional
rights of the respondent.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the
violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of
Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative
of the Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of
the law or a duly authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that
the meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if
there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832
provides that even if flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the
owner of the house or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court
awards exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article
32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals,
including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
 QUASI DELICT/ TORTS

BARREDO V. GARCIA
GR No. 48006
July 8, 1942

FACTS:
On May 3, 1936, about half past one in the morning on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two
years of prision coreccional but the court granted the petition that the right to bring civil action
be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence given by the lower court in the criminal
case.
On the other hand, there arose two liabilities of Fausto Barredo: (1) the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from his criminal liability; and (2) Barredo’s
primary liability as an employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take and they preferred the second. On
March 7, 1939, Severino Garcia and Timoteo Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an action
to the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as the employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action based on cuasi delito or
culpa aquiliana against Fausto Barredo for the death of Faustino Garcia.

RULING:
Yes. The plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo because of the
separate individuality of cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana. The court held that this will make for the
better safeguarding of private rights and is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
The court also found out that defendant-petitioner is Fontanilla’s employer. There is no
proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. It is
shown that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding – violations which appeared in the Records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify
plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed wherein the plaintiffs should be
awarded for damages by defendant-petitioner P1, 000 with legal interest from the time the action
was instituted.
 SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC. VS. TANGCO
G.R. NO. 165732
December 14, 2006

Facts:
On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a
specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the
bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing
her death. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may
be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of
regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance
of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.
 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

City of Pasig vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 125646
September 1999

FACTS:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of
Pasig passed and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite
on the creation of said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996 to the Commission on Elections to
suspend or cancel the scheduled plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed
barangay involve areas included in the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for
settlement of boundary dispute, hence the plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after
the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the
City of Pasig similarly issued anotherordinance, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Again the Municipality of Cainta filed
another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel the plebiscite on the same ground as for
the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan. The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the
creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until the boundary dispute is settled
because it presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed the
petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question
since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both
cases are civil, as in the instant case. In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition for being moot because the plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and
approved by the residents. Hence, the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663)
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
twolocal governments.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the
City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still
in theinterest of good order, the Court can suspend action on one case pending the final outcome
of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first. The decision on whose
territorialjurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the creation of the proposed
Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified
territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of thegovernmental powers of the
LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover,
considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same until the resolution of the boundary dispute. In the case of
Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has
been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was already held. Theissues raised are
still pending and must first be resolved. Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan should be held in abeyance; and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the
creation of Barangay Napico should be annulled and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold
in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute.
 BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567
June 20, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage
and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on
concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial
question.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.

Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues.
Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal
action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent
courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being
prosecuted for concubinage.
 MERCED vs. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315
August 26, 1960

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging
that he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by
Elizabeth’s relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that
petitioner has been previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the
suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage
must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be
illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be
secured.
 DONATO V. LUNA
G.R. No. L-53642
April 15, 1988

Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner
married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz
Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his
second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case of bigamy.

Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioner’s
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of
the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz
Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioner‘s consent to marriage was obtained through duress, violence
or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial
question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioner‘s
second marriage
he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only
came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and
intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second marriage.
 Consing, Jr. v. People
G.R. No. 161075
July 15, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de
la Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of de
la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz
and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount ofÂ
P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could
develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the
names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands. Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief, thereby
seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of theP41,377,851.48
on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital
initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing
and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in
Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City
filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public
document in the RTC in Makati City. Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the
Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for
deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712
in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. On November 26, 2001,
the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution s
motion for reconsideration. The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the
Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252). On May 20, 2003, the
CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTC questioned orders. On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision,
reversing itself. Consing filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion
through the second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003. Hence, this appeal by petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case

RULING:
No, Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in
G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be
suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil
case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully
applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case with
Unicapital. A perusal of Unicapital complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the
effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent
manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and
foisting to the public a spurious title." As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code. It is well
settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question
that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381,
for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his
mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal case at bar. Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil
cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus
Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold,
i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati
civil case that Unicapital had filed. As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of
Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother who should not be criminally liable for having so
acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also been
settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit: In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case).
 Pimentel v. Pimentel
G.R. No 172060
September 13, 2016

FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question.

ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

RULING:
No. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution
which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. CA that “the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court
declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.”
PERSONS AND CIVIL PERSONALITY

 PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY

QUIMIGING V. ICAO

G.R. NO. 26796

JULY 31, 1970

FACTS:

The parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations.
Defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Accordingly, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born. The trial judge dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the child is entitled to support?

RULING:

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly
of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as
yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being
ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the
institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).
 BIRTH

GELUZ V COURT OF APPEALS

2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva came to know Antonio Geluz in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot.
Villanueva became pregnant in 1950 before she was legally married to her husband. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. In
October 1953, she had herself aborted again by the defendant, as she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy showed to be inconvenient. Less than two years
later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, she was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, at the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a
two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff was at this time campaigning for his election to the provincial board in Cagayan and he
did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and
award of damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff can recover damages?

RULING:

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted
on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of
the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife,
without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot
be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse
it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
 CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V MONTANO

G.R. No. 182836

October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation

(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on
the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery. According to the
Certificate of Fetal Death, the female fetus died during labor. Continental Steel immediately
granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits and maintained that the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have
first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death
could be covered by the CBA death benefits.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. Continental Steel,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired
juridical personality. Furthermore, Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was
clear and unambiguous.
 Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during
the labor or delivery.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Continental Steel is correct in merely relying in articles 40, 41 and 42 for
the definition of death
2) Whether or not a person needs to be born before it could die?

RULING:
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at
all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.

Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies
as death.
 RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

CATALAN V. BASA
G.R. No. 159567
July 31, 2007

FACTS:

On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active
military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that
he was unfit to render military service due to his schizophrenic reaction which incapacitates him
because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce and
pointless speech. On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.

On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN
(Mercedes) one-half of the real property. The donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds. The remaining half of the property remained in Felicianos.

On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special to declare Feliciano
incompetent. On December 23, 1953, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company
as Feliciano’s guardian.

On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property to
their son Eulogio Catalan. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of
her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot
2 of the aforementioned property registered to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and
Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 to Eulogio
and Florida Catalan.

On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if
Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he
was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that
if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to
Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the
property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its
registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought
remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was valid?

RULING:
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the
person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.

A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of
the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the
allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.

By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof
that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that
time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Sufficient
proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.
 DOMINGO V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No 127540
October 17, 2001

FACTS:

Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte,
including the house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents,
the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein
petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her
closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force
and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same.

Respondents alleged that they were the owners of the subject properties through the deed of
sale executed by Paulina Rigonan and since then, they had been in continuous possession and had
introduced permanent improvements thereon; and that defendants entered the properties illegally,
and they refused to leave them.

According to defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as
well as lacking consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to
anyone. As her nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the
three lots and the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they
had been in possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for
damages against plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rigonan was competent to enter said contract?

RULING:

In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was
already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a
year when the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed
were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a
person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to
prevent the person from properly, intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she
is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time
of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and
mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these
circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the
sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price
was paid to and received by her.

The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration was
ever delivered to the vendor. Undisputedly, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of
land including the house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is null
and void ab initio.
 MENDEZONA V. OZAMIZ
G R No 143370
February 2, 2002
FACTS:

The petitioners own a parcel of land each in the Banilad Estate, Lahug, Cebu City with
almost similar areas of 3,462 square meters, 3,466 square meters and 3,468 square meters,
covered and described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 116834, 116835, and 116836
respectively, of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. The petitioners ultimately traced their titles
of ownership from a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by
Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of the sum of One Million Forty Thousand Pesos
(P1,040,000.00).

It appears that on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship,
alleging therein that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, had become disoriented and could not
recognize most of her friends; that she could no longer take care of herself nor manage her
properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Petitioners who are
nephews of Carmen Ozamiz, and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of Carmen Ozamiz, filed an
opposition to the guardianship petition. In the course of the guardianship proceeding, the
petitioners and the oppositors thereto agreed that Carmen Ozamiz needed a guardian over her
person and her properties.

Respondents opposed the petitioners claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged
that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the
said property was acquired in bad faith and without value. Respondents further alleged that at the
time of the sale Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental
faculties; and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in effect
incapacitated to contract with petitioners.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Ozamiz was incapacitated when she executed the deed of sale in 1989

RULING:

It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced
years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental
faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her
property rights, is she considered incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to show adequate
proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of
her mental faculties.

We note that the respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are nine (9)
other important documents that were, signed by Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28,
1989 which were not assailed by the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete
incapacity of Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts
assessment that it is unfair for the respondents to claim soundness of mind of
Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them. A person is
presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to continue to
exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Competency and freedom from undue influence,
shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until
the contrary is shown
 SURVIVORSHIP

JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO
GR NO L-5426
MAY 29, 1953

FACTS:

On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their children, Pilar, Concepcion,
Natividad, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the
ground floor of the German Club. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells
were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started
shooting at the people inside the building. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground
thereafter Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the building. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them but Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, and the
latter's wife, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, rushed out of the burning
structure. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later after the incident, the
German Club collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Adela Conde, and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby and stayed there until February 10, 1915. They fled toward the St. Theresa Academy in
San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately were killed by Japanese Patrols, who fired at the
refugees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 43 of
the New Civil Code applicable in the case?

RULING:
 It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total
lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under
article 33, be held to have died at the same time. The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left
open for the consideration when absolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion
is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing
decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls.
DOMICILE

 KINDS OF DOMICILE

MARCOS V. COMELEC
GR NO 119976
SEPTEMBER 18, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995. Thereafter, private respondent
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate
for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. Private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 and in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Consequently, Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" of the amended certificate.
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila. Petitioner claimed that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. In a Resolution promulgated, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the said position.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to
the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was
annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

RULING:

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even
if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or
semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in
the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. We are persuaded that the facts established by
the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY CODE

 RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

ARUEGO, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO 112193
MARCH 13, 1996

FACTS:
The late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born
Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. The respondent and Evelyn prayed for an Order praying that they be declared the
illegitimate children Jose M. Aruego, Sr. That herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and
acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs Aruego, that their share and participation in the estate
of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.

The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint,
to wit:

6. The plaintiffs father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his
children verbally among plaintiffs and their mothers family friends, as well as by myriad different
paternal ways

7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of
paternal care and affection.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case?
 2) Whether or not the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any
vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect

RULING:
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant
case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially,
of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint
in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.

The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must
be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned,
as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her
action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be
that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court,
which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction
over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of
the Philippines.
 BERNABE V. ALEJO
GR NO 140500
JANUARY 21, 2002

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly begotten a son with his secretary, herein
plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on
December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in
Fiscal Bernabes estate.

Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father
had barred the action. The trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or
recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during
the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the
childs filiation.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should
be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born
in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code

RULING:
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency x x x. Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
procedural laws. Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil
Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within
four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians
right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

MARRIAGE
 DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

Ancheta v. Ancheta
G.R. No. 145370
March 4, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On
December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children.
On January 1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the
parties executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration
of nullity of his marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was
never served the summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the
marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision
declaring the marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.

Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her,
hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is
expressly stated that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal
separation. The court just did the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law.
Our Constitution is committed to the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The motion for a new trial is granted.
 Abadilla v. Tabiliran
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716
October 25, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent
stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It
is alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the
existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with
Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.

Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited
with said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a
civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony.
Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.
 PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia Vda. De Guzman

G.R. No. 155733
January 27, 2006

Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without
descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their
respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of
her half and full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo‘s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces,
illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated
that Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural
siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children
without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis
Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa
she is barred from inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate and illegitimate families.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between
Felisa and Ramon.

Ruling:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years
cannot be doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises other evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued
to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration
under oath of Guilermo that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of
marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors
and evidence presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis
Delgado can inherit from Josefa.
 Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 83598
March, 7, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate.
They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents. Private
respondents on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such
are entitled to inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not
marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was
successfully overcome.

Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent
proof of which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private
respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that
their children were recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of
marriage because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.
 LEGAL CAPACITY

Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007

Facts:
Silverio avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in
Thailand. From then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to
have his name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling:
Silverio’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
However a change of name does not alter one‘s legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not
sanction such change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment. A person‘s sex is an essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a person‘s legalcapacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow
the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
 Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth
certificate. While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that
continued to develop and be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He
now seeks to alter his name of Jennifer to Jeff.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.

Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. The petition is granted.
 CONSENT

Republic v. Albios
G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013

Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage on December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case
for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel, and
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married
each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer the amount because the latter never
processed her petition for citizenship.
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lackin.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
Ruling:
The marriage between parties is valid. Albios claims that the marriage was made in jest
however a marriage in jest is defined as a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The parties involved in this case were fully
aware of their intentions to marry in order for Albios to acquire an American citizenship.
Although the ideal cause of marriage is that of love, other reasons like that of convenience are not
prohibited as a reason for marriage. As long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law; it shall be
declared valid. Although fraud is a ground for declaring a marriage void, this situation is not one
of the reasons allowed listed under Article 46 of the Family Code. The court refuses to allow the
individuals to use marriage for their fraudulent schemes for their convenience and also allow
them to get out of it easily due to the inconvenient situation.
 AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

Beso v. Daguman
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211
January 28, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent
Judge. They got married in judge Daguman residence, which is outside the judge Daguman
jurisdiction. After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting
her to check with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was
found out that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against
herein respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.

Ruling:
No, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to
wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The spouses are not one of the instances provided for by the provision, making judge Daguman
not authorize to solemnized the marriage due to lack of jurisdiction.
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the
court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge‘s jurisdiction covers the municipality of
Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize
the marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.
 Arañes v. Occiano
A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390
April 11, 2002

Facts:
On 17 February2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner‘s marriage to her late
groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the
strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a
nullity, petitioner‘s right to inherit the ―vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She
was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with
lack of marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?

Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act
of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. The respondent Judge
Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is
fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 MARRIAGE LICENSE

Alcantara v. Alcantara
GR No. 167746
August 28, 2007

Facts:
On December 8, 1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner)
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person ―fixerǁ‖ who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained
in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never
went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent
went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila
on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number ―7054133
is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage contract. There
is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong
for concubinage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.

Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family
Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.
Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the
parties herein. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either
of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that
do not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to
annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally,
administratively liable. The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification
of the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties
is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties
is number 7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties. The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed
a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been
duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the
license has been duly and regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect
attended the civil wedding. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 103047
September 2, 1994

Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she
was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castro‘s earnest desire to follow
her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition
seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization
of their marriage?

Ruling:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the
Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently proves that the
office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony
of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of
the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence
of the subject marriage license.
 Cariño v. Cariño
GR No. 132529
February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children.
And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23,
1992, SPO4 Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. On December
14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against the petitioner
praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the deceased and
the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that they have no record of marriage
license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who allegedly married in the
said municipality on June 20, 1969.

Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño
are valid in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil
registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the
marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the said requirement,
is undoubtedly void ab initio. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Under article 40 of Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Considering that the
two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the provisions of
articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate succession, the said
―death benefitsǁ‖ of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent, not being the legal
wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed ―death benefits were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in the present case; both
parties of the first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject―death
benefitsǁ‖ under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the
other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely,
his children.
 Sy v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22
years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their
conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before
the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of
property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a
regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992.
RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal
by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and
marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for
absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The
marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona,
Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article
80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional
character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity
is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void
ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Petition is
granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and
private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at
the time of celebration.
 Sevilla v. Cardenas
G.R. No. 167684
July 31, 2006

Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces
of the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced
to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its
Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for
lack of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005. This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?

Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in
issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
 Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of
great weight. Therefore, the instant petition is denied.
 Abbas vs. Abbas
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013

Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o‘clock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-law‘s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that
he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus
their marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA gave credence to Gloria‘s arguments, and granted her
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state
that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held
that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Syed then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of
the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license
for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot
be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio. The petition is therefore granted.
 Go Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr.
GR No. 201061
July 3, 2013

Facts:
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while
Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go.
Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a
purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case
against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to
Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

Ruling:
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally
was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the
alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the
essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
 Kho v. Republic
GR No. 187462
June 1, 2016

Facts:
In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the office of the municipal
treasurer to instruct him to arrange the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their son,
Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the two were married at 3 in the morning at a
church. Claiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a
marriage license and had not seen nor signed any papers in connection to the procurement of a
marriage license, and considering the ONE DAY difference between the time the clerk was told
to obtain the papers to the actual moment of the marriage, no marriage license could have been
validly issued, Raquel Kho filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage.
The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack of the require site marriage
license and ruled in favor of Raquel Kho. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the RTC and ruled in favor of Veronica Kho. Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the issues presented by the petitioner in the petition for review on certiorari
are factual in nature and whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to delve into these issues;
2. Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar who attests to the absence in
its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the
said office despite diligent search;
3. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the
lack of a marriage license and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the
respondent; and
4. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring
the marriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite marriage license.
Ruling:
1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual in nature. However, the rule that a question
of fact is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is not without exceptions, which are the following:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, when beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evience on which they
are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on whether there was a marriage license obtained by
petitioner and respondent are conflicting. Hence, it was proper for the Supreme Court to review
these findings.
2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino vs. Yee Carino), the Supreme Court considered
the certification issued by the local civil registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
In the present case, the petitioner was able to present a certification issued by the civil registrar
attesting that the Office of the local civil registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage
license ever issued between the parties.”
 3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack of
a marriage licence and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent
because the certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former
Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the subject
marriage license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the Family Code was not effective
yet) makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local
civil registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without a marriage license is void.
4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the
marriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite marriage license because the petitioner has
successfully overcome the presumed validity of the marriage by presenting the certification of the
civil registrar which was sufficient to prove the absence of the marriage license. In addition, the
respondent was not able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such validity.
Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and the respondent’s failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was
ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
Hence, the marriage performed is null and void. The decision of the CA was reversed and set
aside.
 MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

Republic v. Dayot
GR No. 175581
March 28, 2008

Facts:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu
of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

Ruling:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage
on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to
the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.
SC held that an action for nullifying a marriage is imprescriptible. It may be raised
anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
 Manzano v. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001

Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
―separated. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered
to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely. Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano‘s and Payao‘s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits whichwere subscribed and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ―ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The recommendation of
the Court Administrator is hereby adopted, with the modification that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20, 000.00.
 Niñal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47
of the Family Code.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of
a Marriage license?

2. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father‘s marriage void after his death?

Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license; it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In
this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife". Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment is
legitimate.
 Cosca v. Palaypayon
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
September 30, 1994

Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on
October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
(5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities. Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without
the requisite marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license. It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages
in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null
and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6)
documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred
thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported
a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor
and failed to account for the difference. Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the
clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel
Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent
Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge. Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment
of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit
the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the
complaints charged?

Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should
be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a
virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to
the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided
for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the
formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The Court hereby imposes
a FINE of P20, 000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., with a stern warning that
any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 MARRIAGE CEREMONY

Eugenio v Velez
GR No. 85140
May 17, 1990

Facts:
Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by
the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana
(who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a
burial permit. Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her
body.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

Held:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers
and sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “Persons charged
with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin;
the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
 Morigo vs. People
G.R. No. 145226
February 6, 2004

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school
year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo
was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after
an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but
left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de
Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the
Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused‘s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October
19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision
finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23,
1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void
ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision,
which then became final and executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision
on the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus
held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no
appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision
had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its
logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
 THREE-FOLD LIABILITY

Moreno v. Bernabe
A.M. No. MJT-94-963
July 14, 1995

Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage
contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She
claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. In
his comment, Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to
solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. The Respondent Judge
contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a
begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her
pregnant condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform
the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely
forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete. In its Memorandum dated January
17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for
misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate
administrative sanctions be imposed against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance
of the law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he
solemnized the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required
marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the “embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence” and to his promise to be “faithful to the law.”
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions
could never justify violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,
000.00 and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
 Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MJT-96-1088
July 19, 1996

Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo
G. Navarro filed a complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack
of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much
to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to
be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
 MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 135216
August 19, 1999

Facts:
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue
of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on
the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil. During the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased‘s estate
as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole-surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed
the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of Pedro Pilapil and against Tomasa Guison. Such decision was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals.

Issues:
a)Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob were valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage
was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. On the second issue some
considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in
open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the
accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned
was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, Pilapil‘s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that
Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably
negate the alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon
the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the
evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
 FOREIGN DIVORCE

Republic v. Iyoy
G.R. No. 152577
September 21, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged
in his Complaint that Fely‘s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision
affirming the trial court‘s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable
to the case at bar?

Ruling:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband‘s surname. Even consideringthe admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus‘s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
 Republic v. Orbecido III
G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005

Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano‘s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not Cipriano Orbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent‘s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized
as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the a fore cited evidence in his favor.
 EFFECTS

LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA 


G.R. No. 171914
July 23, 2014

Facts:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their
marriage begot seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna
and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement” whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their
conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law
office thru Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis.
After full payment, the condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-
indivisio shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in
the names of the owners, with Atty. Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new
law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium
unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His
25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz v Soledad, the second
wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties were
acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of
the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half bequeathed to
her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the
first marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both
parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage.
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding
that the Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the
first wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the
divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the
contending parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.

Issue:
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15.

Ruling:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
The Supreme Court: The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void: “From the
time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition
of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or
both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.”
No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement:
“Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event
that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
“Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.”
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning,
hence, their property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership: “In the Philippines,
marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code
clearly states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of
the Civil Code, viz: Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject
of the case, the subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage. Petition denied.
 Van Dorn v. Romillo
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated
June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. To maintain, as private respondent
does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.

 SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo
married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent‘s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo‘s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995,
the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998.

Issues:
a)Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case.
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On the second issue, the
Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo‘s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove
the validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
 ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571
August 11, 2010

Facts:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert‘s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn‘s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable; the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert‘s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert‘s. In its October 30, 2008
decision, the RTC denied Gerbert‘s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.

Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert‘s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien‘s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerbert‘s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
 Garcia-Recio v. Recio
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a
Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
as "single" and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had
ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the
quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging
to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit "A"– Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B"– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C"– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D"–
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; and (e) Exhibit “E"–
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent: (Exhibit “1”) –
Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit "S"– Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3"– Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia Certificate; and Exhibit "5"– Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between
Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the
Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is thus remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
 NO MARRIAGE LICENSE

Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995

Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991,
upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection
of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets
and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and
that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko
went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same
was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17
years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Respondent claims
that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:
 Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while
the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Article
40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. Respondent made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be
able to cohabit with a woman,who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar
examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. It is evident that
respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by
his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties
and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the judiciary.
 BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

Minoru Fujiki v. Marinay

G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

Ruling:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)There is no doubt that the
prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition
of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
 BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee

G. R. No. 183622
February 8, 2012

Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage
with petitioner herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-
Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases
were subsequently consolidated. On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a
criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted
petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. The CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said: It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws. Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine
the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration
over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
 BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

Quita v Court of Appeals

G.R No. 124862
December 22, 1998

Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May
18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a
final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died
leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC
expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it
was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.No dispute exists as to the right of the
six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor
as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage
considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving
spouse. The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004

Facts:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April
10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes
cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence
he cannot be charged for bigamy.

Issue:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

Ruling:
Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second
marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial
declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except
for a void marriage on account of psychological incapacity—void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. The complete
nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can out
rightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.
 Jarillo v. People
G.R. No. 164435
September 29, 2009

Facts:
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
in Taguig, Rizal in 1974. Both newlywedscelebrated a second wedding, this time a church cerem
ony, in1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the union, the spouses bore a daughter. Jarillo, however,
contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy celebrated through a civil
ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church wedding
in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed acivil case for annulment against Jarillo. On the basis of the
foregoing, Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in 2000. The trial court rendered the assailed
decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. Jarillo posits,
as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still
married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage, that her
marriages to Alocillo and Uy were both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and that the
action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA
confirmed the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a civil case
against Alocillo rendered judgement declaring Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her motion for
reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the trial court as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of bigamy

Held:
 Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage
to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent second
marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to jurisdiction, was deemed valid
and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy
make any difference. As held in Tenebro, “since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance
of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”
 Weigel v. Sempio
G.R. No. L 53703
August 19, 1986

Facts:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain
Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former marriage.
Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is
null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.

Issue:
Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

Held:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to
her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of
introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs
a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded
void under the law.
 Social Security Commission v. Azote
G.R. No. 209741
April 15, 2015
Facts:
In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as
beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a
deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another
set of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as
beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She
then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no
answer. The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal wife as
Edna could not proved that Edgardo’s previous marriage was annulled or divorced.
Issue:
Whether or not Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member
Ruling:
No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e)
and (k) thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of
the latter’s SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier
marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code
was already in force. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there
was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of
her marriage to Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of
Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second
wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a
deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits
of Edgardo. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, it is required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical
and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
 EXCEPTION FOR VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE

Republic v Narceda
G.R. No. 182760
April 10, 2013

Facts:
The present case stems from a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines
praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal filed by the
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction to decide on the matter. The subject matter of the appeal was the
decision of the RTC of La Union declaring the presumptive death of respondent’s wife final and
executory. Robert P. Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage
Contract he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and
4 months old. According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and
never returned since. There was never any communication between them. He tried to look for her,
but he could not find her. Several years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union
came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already
living with a Singaporean husband. In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, respondent
filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death
and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted respondent’s Petition in a Decision dated 5 May
2005. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the foregoing Decision
to the CA. According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-founded" belief that she was
dead. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title
XI thereof. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. The OSG filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through the CA’s 29 April 2008 Resolution..
Issues:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
2. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is
dead.

Ruling:
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding
is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit: By express provision of law, the
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should
be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. When the
OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result,
the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled.
Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently,
petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this.
 Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053
March 17, 1993
Facts:
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique a petition for the
declaration of the presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the
Family Code. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case. During
trial, Nolasco testified that he was seaman and that he had first met Parker, a British subject, in a
bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Parker
lived with Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to Nolasco’s hometown of San
Jose, Antique in 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On January 1982, Nolasco married
Parker in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage celebration, Nolasco obtained another
employment as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime in 1983, while
working overseas, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that Parker had left
Antique. Nolasco claimed he asked permission to leave the ship and return home to look for his
wife. He testified that his efforts to look for her whenever their ship docked in England were
fruitless, that the letters he sent to Parker’s address in England were all returned to him, and that
their friends received no news from Parker. He testified that he had no knowledge of her family
background even after the marriage and did not report the disappearance to the authorities. The
petition was granted by lower court and was also affirmed by the appellate court. As such, the
republic appealed to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
The respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that
his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead. In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts
is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to
her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent
had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had
lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
477 SCRA 277

Facts:
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late
in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for
her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’
house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s
house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help
from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and
during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s
disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the
disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife.

Issue:
Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed
his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the
Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to
corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility
had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's
father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities
and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
RTC.
 Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.111717
October 24,1994

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February
6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velascobeing dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living
since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito)
born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita
had been living since 1958. There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage when,
because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her
case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan. In
1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband,
Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner’s daughter, Nanette,
stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976. On
April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were
staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale
and Transfer.Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in
his name, Aurelio was described as single. On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of
sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by
virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on
January 11, 1985. On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to
petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery
and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.In answer
petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in question
using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that
the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita’s consent and that
she was a purchaser in good faith.
Issues:

1. Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid.
2.Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid.

Ruling:
1. The burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage falls
under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to dischargethis
burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers to the
subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting
spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in
this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because
apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to
Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and wife for five
years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
2. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal
partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
first place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner’s ownership is evidenced
by a deed of absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. Indeed, the
property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with
petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent
Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew
Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single.
As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio’s child by a woman not
his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was
not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio
was married to Luisita.
 Manuel v. Philippines
G.R No.165842
November 29, 2005

Facts:
On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a
second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City. It so
appeared in the marriage contract that Manuel was “single”.
Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved before the second marriage. Tina Gandalera-Manuel did
not know the existence of the first marriage of the respondent to Rubylus Gana. On July 28,
1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby.
On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio to visit her and he proposed assuring her that he was single. Starting 1999, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He
stopped giving financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been
previously married.
Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that
his marriage was invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the court to seek for
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard
from her for more than 20 years.
On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy under
Article 349 of the RPC, and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten
(10) months, as minimum to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private
complainant, Tina Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by way of moral damages, plus costs of
suit. Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the
RPC, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He posited that the RTC
should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.
 On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification to indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
coreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and affirmation in all
other respect, as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family
Code should apply.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s
first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no
judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code;
and
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
P200,000 as moral damages as it had no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:
1. No. The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his
acquittal for bigamy is misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent
for seven years, is created by law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However,
Article 41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death,
provides that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding
paragraph), the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Court for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
2. No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine, and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals, and the interest, and
general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Even considerations of
public policy would not prevent her from recovery as held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.
 Calisterio v. Calisterio
G.R. No. 136467
April 6, 2000

Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in
April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604, 750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The
latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be
the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being
allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her
after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

Issue:
Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the
declaration of presumptive death.

Ruling:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958
where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took
effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only
to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive
death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of
the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore
she has a right can claim portion of the estate
 Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061
October 8, 2014

Facts:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo),
had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage
on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he
and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten
married on June 18, 1980. After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy
and sell business. Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. She allegedly applied in
an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and
was never heard from again. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.He
went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him
any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial
Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she
was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. Celerina claimed that she never
resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go
to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had
been absent for 12 years. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of
Ricardo's petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage entered into by Ricardo Santos is valid.

Ruling:
No, the subsequent marriage entered into by Ricardo Santos is not valid.
A bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are
present:
1)The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2)The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3)There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4)There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
However, a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages
contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered
bigamous and void.Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
The party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action
to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
 Republic v. Granada
G.R. No. 187512
June 13, 2012

Facts:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in
1993. In May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication
from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked
the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting,
Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On
February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10
March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert
earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

Issue:
Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal.

Ruling:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the
RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
.
 Republic v. Cantor

G.R. No. 184621
December 10, 2013

Facts:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a
violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a
diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her
petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.


Issue:
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article 41
of the Family Code?

Ruling:

Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on
the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in determining
the same. Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends
could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerry’s name in
the patient’s directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively
look for her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional or
planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling,
the declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of
factual basis.
 Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061
October 8, 2014

Facts:
Leouel and Julia were married on September 20, 1986. They were first married before the
MTC in Iloilo. Shortly, they married in a church. They lived with Julia’s parents. Soon, she gave
birth to their first child. Some disagreements the couple had was the issue of living independently
from Julia’s parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for USA to work as a nurse. Julia, via
phone call, promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
of AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint
for voiding their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Julia’s failure to return home or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated

Ruling:
No. Justice Sempio-Diy opined that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The case at bar can ,in no measure at all, come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
 Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva
G.R. No. 210929
July 29, 2015

Facts:
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.In 1992, Edna
worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia
City, Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their
conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts.Thereafter, Edna took a leave
from work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law
and common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence.
She also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.
On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petitionto declare Romeo presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone
witness. In its October 8, 2009 Order,the RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well-
founded belief of Romeo's death.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision granting the petition of Edna
to have her husband be declared presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
Yes, Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead.In this case, Edna failed. The well-founded belief in the absentee's
death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion
of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period
required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
 Republic v Sarenogon

G.R. No. 199194
February 10, 2016
Facts:
Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife
Netchie. He testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month
only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.
For 3 months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her
whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned
home after his contract expired, then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her
whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that
his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Jose’s testimony was corroborated
by his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie
lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for
separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s
location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough
for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its
misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that
Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the
RTC.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper recourse to question the RTC ruling
2. Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively dead

Ruling:
 1. Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the RTC’s
decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death.
Under Article 247 of the Family Code, the RTC’s decision on a petition pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to
entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment. However, an aggrieved party may
file a certiorari under Rule 65 to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Such petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to SC via a
petition for review under Rule 45.

2. NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be

shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the
present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the
mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such
absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by
making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded
to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not
even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own
pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of
his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or
from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda
failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
 MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLESS 40, 52 AND 53, FC

Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818
September 17, 1993

Facts:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela
Paz. He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in
Saudi Arabia, for support and subsistence. Delia only found out about the prior marriage when
Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Roberto and separation of property.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

Ruling:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for the said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A
person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latter’s'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the
previous one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such,
it “shall be protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment
declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not
the marriage is void.
 Castillo v. Castillo
G.R. No. 189607
April 18, 2016

Facts:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Lea opposed the
Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had
not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which
the solemnizing officer belonged.On 3 January 2002, she filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Branch 260 rendered its Decisiondeclaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null
and void ab initio. Renato countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was
valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous
marriage was valid and subsisting.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Lea and Renato is valid.

Ruling:
Yes, the Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in
view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage
license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's
first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is
valid.
 Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995
Facts:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. Complainant alleged that he has two children
with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed
that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva
Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request
of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in
Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he
married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was
governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.



Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
 Marrabella-Bobis v. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000

Facts:

October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified
or terminated. On January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis.
Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. On February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed
bigamy. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage. After petitioner sued for
bigamy, it’s just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.



Issue:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

Ruling:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Its two essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case
is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 Ty v. CA
G.R. No. 127406
November 27, 2000

Facts:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil
ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977.
Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of
the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The
decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to
have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration
of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the
petitioner and of her children.

Issue:
Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

Ruling:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife
who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition
for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal
or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover,
Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting
and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2
children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119190
January 16, 1997
Facts:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an
effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went
with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March
1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese
General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations
that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination
and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

Issue:
Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.
Held:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
 Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 112019
January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel and Julia were married on September 20, 1986. They were first married before the
MTC in Iloilo. Shortly, they married in a church. They lived with Julia’s parents. Soon, she gave
birth to their first child. Some disagreements the couple had was the issue of living independently
from Julia’s parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for USA to work as a nurse. Julia, via
phone call, promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
of AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint
for voiding their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
1. WON Julia’s failure to return home or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated.
2. Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code. 


Ruling:
1. No. Justice Sempio-Diy opined that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
 the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The case at bar
can ,in no measure at all, come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. 


2. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. 

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied. 

 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.126010
December 8, 1999
Facts:
Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was
Marcio’s teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later
on became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the
family as her husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their
marriage went okay. But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra- marital relation with
another student who was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He
promised to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and child. After some time, he
returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened when he got employed
to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of
1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner
averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who
was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never
affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations

Ruling:
The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological
incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time of their
marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the “borderline between a responsible
person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Yambao v. Republic
G.R. No. 184063
January 24. 2011


Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December
21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood,
petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be
declared null and void due to her husband‘s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and
recrimination because of the respondent‘s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family
business, refusal to change children‘s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her
Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and
sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who
concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9,
2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court‘s Decision; hence, this petition for review
before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner‘s evidence establishes the respondent‘s

psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations,
this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled
under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested
mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes
unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged
according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the
performance of marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as: (a) true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality.
All marriages go through ―bickerings, quarrels and recriminationǁ‖ǁ‖ and rough patches. In
this case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner‘s exacting standards but they
have gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood ―without any
major parenting problemsǁ‖ǁ‖. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically
abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity
 Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557
February 12, 2014

Facts:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del
Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their
courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their
conjugal abode and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another man.
Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding that
both parties suffered from “utter emotional immaturity”.


Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological
incapacity?



Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated
with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not
explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-
rooted and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The
petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.
 GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997

Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina
at the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert
Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of ―immaturity
and irresponsibilityǁ‖. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers
on
whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was
never honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the
petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making
Roridel the sole breadwinner. On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In
February 1986, Roridel moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo
abandoned Roridel and left Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could
no longer live together ashusband and wife because of Roridel‘s strange behavior and insistence
to leave his group of friends eve after their marriage, Roridel‘s refusal to perform some of her
marital duties like cooking meals,and Roridel‘s failure to run the household and handle their
finances. On May, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the
marriage void. The Court of Appealsaffirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court‘s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not ―opposing and conflicting personalitiesǁ‖ is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological
incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological
incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
 BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130087
September 24, 2003

Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married
at Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City
and begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family,
was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day.
During a family crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a
child, the petitioner would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her
pregnancy, she would insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal
dwelling. The husband would eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become
estranged from each other. On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona. On July 21, 1995, respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition
fails to state a cause of action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to
state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status. On
September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution of the
Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge Rosalina L.
Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion forreconsideration on the ground
that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint‘s failure to state acause of action, the trial
court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge Pison, a perusal of
the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violatedrespondent‘s right, thus
resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner‘s claim
that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second
petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court‘s decision that the allegations
in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true
as well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in
failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and
status.

Ruling:
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in
violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of
AbsoluteNullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert
opinions need not be alleged, to wit:SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages – x x x. (d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.No.
The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis pendentia
since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he
subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissalorder
was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal ―without prejudice.

 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004

Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave
birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays
with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend
that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

Issue:
Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

Ruling:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
 Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically
incapacitated.
 Tongol v. Tongol
G.R. No. 157610
October 19, 2007

Facts:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol
were married. From their marriage they begot four children. On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations. In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas‘marriage
was objected by the latter’s family. The continuous interference of Filipinas‘parents, their
attempts to break up their union and their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy
one. Because of the influence of Filipinas‘ parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When
Orlando started a junk shop business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from
his wife. Eventually, his junk shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando
to embark on a new business venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became
interested and began to interfere with the operation of the business; however, the employees of
the company were aloof. She also resented that her husband was getting along with the
employees and, as a result, was the subject of their frequent and continued quarrels. She even
suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his business to his relatives. The continued fighting
persisted and affected their children. Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage
was, indeed, fruitless; however, this was the fault of Orlando‘s psychological incapacity. In 1990,
Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas
filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional
Trial Court. Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister‘s, his employee‘s, and Dr.
Cecilia Villegas‘ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the
respondent only consisted of her testimony. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court‘s decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just difficulty, refusal or neglect.
Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there
was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological
incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support for
the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouse‘s obligation to the spouse
but also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in the
rearing and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the
respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that,
indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations
of marriage.

 Marcos v. Marcos
G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was
on September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage
held at the Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila.
They were both military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in
1987 and started a business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to
put up a trading and construction company. Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the petitioner‘s
urges on respondent to be gainfully employed to convince their children that their father, as the
breadwinner, is the head of the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson‘s failure to
provide for his family, he began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex
with his already weary wife. The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on October 16, 1994
when she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted
physical harm on her and her mother. The following day, Brenda and her children sought refuge
at her sister‘s house. On October19, 1994, she was diagnosed with contusions from the bitter
quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be psychologically incapacitated. The
Court of Appeals negated the Regional TrialCourt‘s ruling.

Issues:
1. Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the
declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
 No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be medically or
clinically identifiedǁ‖. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party‘s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.
No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity.
The evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological
incapacity. The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent‘s loss of employment for a period of
more than six years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be
traced to this certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, the condition was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is again
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
 Te v. Te
G.R. No. 161793
February 13, 2009

Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to
court Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst
towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward
eventually
gave in to Rowena‘s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He
provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After
Edward proceeded to his parents‘home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him
that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle‘s place. On
April 23, 1996, Rowena‘s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years old and
she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle‘s place but he Edward was being treated like a
prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena‘s uncle
and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996,
Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward‘s persistence that they live
together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with
Rowena on the ground of psychological incapacity. On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City
Prosecutor submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings
of the clinical psychologist of psychological incapacity of Edward (dependent personality
disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court
declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the
Trial Court‘s decision on the ground that the clinical psychologist did not examine the respondent
and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
given the petitioner‘s totality of evidence.

Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward‘s dependent personality
disorder and Rowena‘s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial
Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses‘ deportment. With Edward‘s affliction of dependent
personality disorder,he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions,
tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on
his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak
of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. Rowena’s affliction with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into
account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and
void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.
 Azcueta v. Republic
GR No. 180668
May 26, 2009

Facts:
Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred
that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look
for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was
Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental.
Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from
Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his
parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed.
When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or
abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they
could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would
follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated
Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given
by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who
examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused,
responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta,
the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder
characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions
and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder
was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the family
considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, was always out of the house. She added that the
problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage.
She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities
of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained
in his personality. She, thus, concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and responsibilities.

Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City
Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was
based solely on the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged
psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and
incurable. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his
marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his
Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological
incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the
respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What
matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s
close relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle
of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there
is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn there from by her expert
witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition,
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with
more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and
clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February
2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the
start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal
sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality
Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and
a by-product of his upbringing and family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to
render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion
that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to
embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a
child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High
Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed
with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his
mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was
almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause for
Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently
make decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who
cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The
court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of
disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
 Agraviador v. Agraviador
G.R. No. 170729
December 8, 2010

Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at
a beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau
of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner‘s family was
apprehensive because of the nature of the respondent‘s work and that she came from a broken
family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial
Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was
carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning
and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair
with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him
bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed
that Erlinda refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became ―very closeǁ‖ to a male
tenant in their house, discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room several
times. Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was
Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their
marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin.
She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died. The
Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties. On November
20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified true copy of
their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which
found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate Court,
however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court‘s decision on the grounds that the
psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave and
permanent.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The petitioner‘s testimony established ―difficultyǁ‖, ―refusalǁ‖, and ―neglectǁ‖.
However, itdid not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.Moreover, Dr. Patac‘s psychological report only enumerated the respondent‘s
behavioral defects butfailed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological
incapacity:(1)The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff; (2)The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be a. Medically or clinically identified, b. Alleged in
the complaint,c.Sufficiently proven by experts, and d.Clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical. (3)The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebrationǁ‖ of the marriage. (4)Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5)Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8)The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In Marcos
v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce
expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs.
Suazo. the Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used asa strict
criteria or ―straightjacketǁ‖.
 Marable v. Marable
G.R. No. 178741
January 17, 2011

Facts:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still
classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they
happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner
courted the respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love,
time and attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two
eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This
was followed by a church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from several schools because of juvenile
misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace, love and
affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna eventually found out about the affair.
These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted,
and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the conjugal home; gave up all
properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor family
and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and
strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void in his
relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The Regional
Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals reversed the
said decision.

Issue:
 Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayag‘s psychological report merely made a general conclusion
that the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina
Doctrine. Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant,
rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act responsibly
during the marriage by working hard to provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner
also tried to make it appear that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged in
extra-marital affairs when, actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his marriage. He was also
shown to have learned from his extra-marital affairs and has immediately terminated them.
In short, petitioner‘s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearing does
not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. That not being the
case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,""refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
 Aurelio v. Aurelio
G.R. No. 175367
June 6, 2011

Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon
Aurelio were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment
revealed that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as
seen from her quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay
her needs. On the part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he
suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of
drive to discern the plight of his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife,
arrogance and insensitivity toward his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible,
and incurable. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003,
the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsiderationand found that respondent‘s petition for declaration
for nullity of marriage complied with theMolina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend
upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional Trial
Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. On October 6, 2005, Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with
the standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in
the Molina Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness,
and (c) non-compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family
backgrounds, as determined by a competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition
establishes that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the
Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition for
dismissal is denied.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012

Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March
16, 1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were
not blessed with children due to Catalina‘s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April
6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that
Catalina‘s psychological incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his
consent; engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take
care of their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their
conjugal home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L.
Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not
curable. These manifested through her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated
to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but
prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
No. First, Catalina‘s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore,
was not established. Eduardo‘s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes‘ neuro-psychiatric
evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr.
Reyes merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and
childishnesscould no longer be treated due to Catalina‘s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly,
Dr. Reyes hadonly one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which
would have beenachieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo‘s statements but also
with interviews byother persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening
disabling factor which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital
functions. In this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or standards to
dispute psychological incapacity.
 Kalaw v. Fernandez
GR No. 166357
January 14, 2015

Facts:
In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena
Fernandez be annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC, after
hearing the expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court. In September
2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed a motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be reversed.

Ruling:
Yes. Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight. The SC ruled that it
misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the SC reviewed the case in September 2011.
The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence
because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while
they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due
importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper for the SC to brush aside the opinions
tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their
conclusions were solely based on the Tyrone’s version of the events. The conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits,
and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s
factual premises. Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff
spouse
 The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36 carries the burden to prove the nullity
of the marriage, however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also establish the
psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent raised the matter in her/his
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof.
Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if
psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and
void.
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and Elena
testified that although their parents have differences, both took good care of them. However, upon
closer look at the testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena was too addicted to
mahjong that she would even bring her children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent
and would last from early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her
children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but
also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave
and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal
and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development.
 Viñas v. Viñas
G.R. No. 208790
January 21, 2015

Facts:
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got
married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The
infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the
infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition
was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet. On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure,
extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the
house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even when she was
pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential household chores of
cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and
behavior during their whirlwind courtship. Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through
the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary
Graceway back in college. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s
relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other.
Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and
Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On appeal before
the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed
suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital
obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder.
Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements anent
the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations
and conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright
incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the
grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this
does not translate into a psychological illness. On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein
assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary
Grace as valid and subsisting.

Issue:
Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace.

Ruling:
No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist
or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito,
and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some
psychological illness. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,""refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. Further,
considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater
burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is
wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s
traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they
got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and
well[-]educated person” in Mary Grace. We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions
about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only
one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of
witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the
Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented
provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
 Republic v. Romero
G.R. No. 209253
February 24, 2016

Facts:
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San
Juan City and were blessed with two (2) children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973
and 1975,7 respectively. The couple first met in Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia
and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis developed a closeness
with Olivia's family, especially with the latter's parents who tried to play matchmakers for Reghis
and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivia's parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they
became sweethearts.Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and
provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their
relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude
would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused to end
their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter's dormitory overnight. Reghis
declined and, instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female
dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them
the previous night, Olivia's parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get
married. Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still
unprepared. However, Olivia's parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and
would support them until they are financially able. As Olivia's parents had treated him with
nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.
The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights
and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her
condescending attitude towards him. They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a
job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and focused on supporting his
parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to complain
that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways.
 On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC of Quezon City, citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations. In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but
out of the desire to please the latter's parents who were kind and accommodating to him. Reghis
further maintained that he was not prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at the
time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his studies and finding employment to support his
parents and siblings.He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with a certain Eddie Garcia (Mr.
Garcia) but he (Reghis) has no ill-feelings towards Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have been
separated for a long time.Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a
clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report16 dated April 28, 1998
and testified that Reghis suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD).
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null
and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. The CA affirmed the findings of the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not there was psychological incapacity to render the marriage between Reghis
and Olivia null and void ab initio.

Ruling:
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties.Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify
a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a)
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
The Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioners, Reghis' testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations
which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his
part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for
fourteen(14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Paranaque City.
Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that
he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them.49 That he married Olivia not out
of love, but out of reverence for the latter's parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically
incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Republic v. Cesar Encelan
G.R. No. 170022
January 9, 2013

Facts:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita on August 25, 1979 and the union bore two children,
Marica and Manny. Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar
learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. After such action of Lolita, Cesar and
Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against
Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of
the family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to
Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The Office of the Solicitor
General then filed the present petition.



Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.


Ruling:
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court have constantly stressed out that psychological
incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e.,
the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition
of the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological
incapacity. In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.
 OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Mendoza v. Republic
G.R. No. 157649
November 12, 2012

Facts:
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married on Arabella’s eighth month of pregnancy in
civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991. They lived together but depended on their
parents for financial support. When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994,
he spent his first salary celebrating with his friends. Afte such, September of the same year,
Arabelle found out of Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida. Communication between them
became rare and they started sleeping in separate rooms. Dominic eventually got fired from his
job because of he ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was charged with
estafa. Petitioner also found out that he swindled many of his clients some of them threatening
her and their family. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because
petitioner asked him for “time and space to think things over.” A month later, she refused his
attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. Subsequently, she and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the
nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity which
are gravity, antecedence and incurability, were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological
incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s
personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage
or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. CA reversed the decision of
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not psychological incapacity of Dominic was established
Ruling:
The RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his
actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically
or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty
and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share
or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with
family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted
psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not
equate with psychological incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal
offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only
for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
 Republic v. Galang
G.R. No. 168335
June 6, 2011

Facts:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga and had one child.
Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed at home. In August 1999, Nestor filed
with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36
of the Family Code alleging that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from
“mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely
serious” and “appears to be incurable.”
The case was set for trial. Nestor alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast
because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care;
and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. He added that Juvy
stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing Nestor’s father’s
pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and “kuwaho” three (3)
times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that
their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a
psychological test on Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following
findings: Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-
matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major
irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to
endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to
unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions
caused by his wife’s behavior. The Regional Trial Court nullified the parties’ relying on the
Santos Case on January 22, 2001. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in
toto.

Issue:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
The acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the
law requires. The Court stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a
disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed
to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in
nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly
failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from
the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy
would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-
sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. To be sure, evidence
from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her
marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologists
report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply
stressed Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological
incapacity.
 We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological
tests whichshe administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological conditio
n. We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the
marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the
marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition,
specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to
comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the
particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability
of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that
her mental incapacity appears incorrigible are insufficient to prove that her mental condition
could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake
The Psychologists Testimony failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and
incurability. In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love
and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that
Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded
conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
 Ochosa v. Alano
G.R. No. 167459
January 26, 2011

Facts:
Jose married Bona in Basilan in 1973, they have an adopted daughter, Ramona. During
the marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippines as a member of the AFP.
After awhile, Bona had illicit relations with other men whenever Jose was assigned in various
parts of the country. She was even caught by a security aide having sex with Jose’s driver, when
Jose confronted Bona about it; the latter admitted her relationship with said driver. Jose filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Bona’s psychological incapacity
to fulfil the essential obligations of marriage. Jose and his two military aides testified on Bona’s
infidelity.
A psychiatrist testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that
Bona was suffering from histrionic personality disorder and that her personality was that she had
an excessive emotion and attention seeking behavior and therefore could not develop sympathy in
feelings and had difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. She further testified that whenever
Jose was gone, her extramarital affairs was her way of seeking attention and emotions from other
persons and that said disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler
and womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. The Solicitor-General opposed the
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Bona is deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligation

Ruling:
It is apparent from the testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had no manifest
desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the
most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their
conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly
away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of
Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any
doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with
Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage. The Court stressed time and again
that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010

Facts:
Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman in 1972. Petitioner
enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age
who were restricted by a university student’s budget. Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished
university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had
dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation. They lived with Ramon’s parents
and they were supported by them. They had a child which made their financial difficulties worse.
All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of
the family. To make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for
removal of a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the
newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was
wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend counseling sessions but nothing has
changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital
affair. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Ramon Reyes is psychological incapacitated

Ruling:
In the case at bar even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Article
68 of the Family Code provides: The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behaviour manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. In fine, given the factual milieu of the
present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the
time of his marriage to the petitioner.
 Toring v. Toring 

G.R. No. 165321
August 3, 2010


Facts:
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978. They begot three children:
Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson. On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after
their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at
the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his
marriage to Teresita null and void. At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage
contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia
R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or
opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her. Ricardo opined
that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who
mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties
of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and
uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most
painfully unmindful of him. He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and
that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.

Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita marriage void due
to psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely
established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking
care of their familys finances a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the psychological
incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. The Court reiterate that irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be
due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
 Ligeralde v. Patalinghug
G.R. No. 168796
April 15, 2010

Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children.
Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a
negative marital behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her
infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations. In
the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of
their children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after, May was back again to her old ways. This was
demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found.
He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. With
Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On October
22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were
based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore, issued
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction

Ruling:
The Court agrees with the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal. The petition
has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In
sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or
whimsical exercise of power.
The Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the
assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical,
arbitrary or capricious in its findings.
 Suazo v. Suazo
G.R. No. 164493
March 10, 2010

Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged
and they were married on March 3, 1986.They had stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and
worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work
and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often
resulted because of Jocelyns efforts. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito
thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36
of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Court find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. The Court so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns
presented evidence. Unfortunately, the Court find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn
merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and
the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage.
 The CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous. The ruling in Tuasonr ecognizing the finality of the factual findings of the
trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with us) does
not therefore apply in this case. The find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36
and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.
 Aspillaga v. Aspillaga
G.R. No. 170925
October 26, 2009

Facts:

Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines. Rodolfo courted her and
five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese
culture, literature and language. In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and
Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was
tumultuous. He described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of
his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and
made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless,
suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latters filing against him a criminal
case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7,
1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:

The Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological
disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient
to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. The Court must emphasize that said
disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital
covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Even assuming
their acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which will prevent them from undertaking the basic obligations of
marriage in the future. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only
incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity as understood juristically.

As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest
themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
 Alcazar v. Alcazar
G.R. No. 174451
October 13, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila,
but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or
by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a
year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent
was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in
the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).

Issue:
Whether or not, as defined by the and jurisprudence, respondent is psychological
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
 The Court caught its attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to
her former counsels mistake or gross ignorance. But even said reason cannot save petitioners
Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Although this rule is not a hard and
fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and
inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients substantive rights, petitioner failed to
convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
 Najera v. Najera
G.R. NO. 164817
July 3, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but
respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A).They were married on
January 31, 1988. They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage,
and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following facts: He did
not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. While
employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support. As a
seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when
he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her
of having an affair with another man. He was always drunk. Respondent left the family home,
taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner. Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship
while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in
regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year
are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
 Paras v. Paras
G.R. No. 147824
August 2, 2007

Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, that he is psychologically incapacitated
to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he
dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived
with a concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children;
and (d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

Issue:
Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case and whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part
of Justo.

Ruling:
The Court finds that even if we assume Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to support his
family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators
that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are
insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the
"gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’,
such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that
such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from
undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
 Zamora v. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 141917
February 7, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. In 1972,
private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the Philippines
for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City until
1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as
provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position, he alleged that his wife
was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not
borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by
living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their
marriage they lived together for not more than three years.
On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She
portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would
from time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her
husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He
allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them.

Issue:
Whether or not there can be a declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
It is true that the case of Santos v. CA did not specifically mention that the presentation of
expert opinion is a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity referred to under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Even in the subsequent case of Republic v. Court of Appeals (also known as the
Molina case), wherein the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
the aforementioned article, examination of the person by a physician in order for the former to be
declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not considered a requirement. What is
important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris
G.R. No. 162368
July 17, 2006

Facts:

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris.
The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove
infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001
where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage.

Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
The chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant
contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or
that those are incurable. Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed
that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a
manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady.
 Antonio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800
March 10, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage
to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, to wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. (3) She misrepresented
herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.(4) She claimed to be a
singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); (5)
She represented herself as a person of greater means. (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies
over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could
no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.

Issue:
Whether or not her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological
incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
Ruling:
The Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a
case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical
or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently
convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment
was warranted. All told, the Court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco
G.R. No. 158896
October 27, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on
27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they
could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they
named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited
an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high
position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that
her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since
childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be
attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.

Issue:
Whether or not the findings that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated is
proven

Ruling:
 The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. In the case at bar,
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and
obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature, and her inability to endear
herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, the Court have been
allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a
married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently
falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
 Villalon v. Villalon
G.R. No. 167206
November 18, 2005

Facts:

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic
refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal
married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations
of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any
spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship
and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be
declared null and void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is
the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to
their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he
engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations.
 The Court agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the
incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. The Court is not convinced that
petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as he wants the court to believe. As stated by
respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart
could be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the same
woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been
going on for six years.
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and
has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt
that he was no longer part of respondents life and that the latter did not need or want him.
Respondents uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioners
discontentment with the marital relationship.
 Buenaventura v. Buenaventura
G.R. No. 127358
March 31, 2005

Facts:

The case involves a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her
answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it refused to set
respondents motion for increase support for the parties son for hearing.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set
of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced
in this case.
 Dedel v. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 151867
January 29, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in
the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28,
1966. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a
Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz,
a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

The Court likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively
lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
 Republic v. Dagdag
G.R. No. 109975
February 9, 2001

Facts:

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag,
20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Erlinda and
Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of
their in-laws. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation.
He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again.
During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and
would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she
refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and
that was the last they heard from him. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for
some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic,
and a fugitive from justice.

Ruling:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
 Pesca v. Pesca
G.R. No. 136921
April 17, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while
on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got
married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still
a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going
vessel barely a month after the marriage.

It started in 1988, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an
emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent
would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.

Ruling:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it.
 ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

Bolos v. Bolos
G.R. No. 186400
October 20, 2010

Facts:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family CodeAfter trial on the
merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006. In an
order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to
file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final
and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Danilo filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The CA
granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

Issue:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

Ruling:
 The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Court finds Itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages." The Court rule
without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is
justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll
the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the
circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of
this Court.
 Mallion v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 141528
October 31, 2006

Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise
known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the
merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11. After the decision in Civil
Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his
marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss dated August
13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.

Issue:
Whether or not the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential
requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the
marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code?

Ruling:
Petitioner forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the
key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s
marriage. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either
by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor.
Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial
relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all
matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same
controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is
barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.
 Leonor v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112597
April 2, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Virginia A. Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr.,
in San Carlos City on March 13, 1960. The spouses were separated for a substantial part of their
married life. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond abroad. This
induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony.
Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. On February 14, 1991, the lower Cantonal Civil
Court of Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation
of the matrimonial partnership. Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines,
Justice of the Peace Mabini Katalbas, failed to send a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City for registration. Hence, on July 11, 1991, Virginia applied for the
late registration of her marriage.
On appeal to the higher Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his
marriage in the Philippines. On May 22, 1992, Mauricio, represented by his brother Teodoro
Leonor, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage. On December 14,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and
fictitious.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Court err in holding that petitioner should have appealed
from the trial courts decision instead of filing a petition for certiorari

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals has already done its duty by declaring that the lower court gravely
abused its discretion or acted without jurisdiction in refusing to give due course to petitioners
appeal. Hence, it ordered said court to allow the appeal. Once appeal is perfected, the merits of
the case, i.e. the validity/nullity of the trial courts decision, would then be resolved by said Court.
Understandably, the Court of Appeals has limited itself to ruling upon the procedural question
lodged before it. It cannot be seriously faulted for opting to navigate within the narrow banks of
the placid waters of certiorari. For in doing so, it was strictly following established legal doctrines
and precedents. If the Court, as the head and guardian of the judicial branch, must continuously
merit the force of public trust and confidence - which ultimately is the real source of its sovereign
power, possessing neither the purse nor the sword - and if it must decisively discharge its sacred
duty as the last sanctuary of the oppressed and the weak, it must, in appropriate cases like the one
before us, pro-actively provide weary litigants with immediate legal and equitable relief, free
from the delays and legalistic contortions that oftentimes result from applying purely formal and
procedural approaches to judicial dispensations.
 Yu v. Reyes-Carpio
G.R. No. 189207
June, 15, 2011

Facts:
On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on the
declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage. On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents Motion,
claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. Petitioner,
therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved.

Issue:
Whether or nor the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the assailed
orders issued by the trial court and dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

Ruling:

Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been exercised
with grave abuse of discretion(1) the Orders of the RTC deferring the presentation of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations; and (2) the appellate courts Decision of upholding the
Orderswere patent and gross that would warrant striking down through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.

At the very least, petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the RTC Orders and the
CA Decision were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. This, however, has
not been shown in the petition. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are
alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders.
 Juliano-Llave v Republic
G.R. No. 169766
March 30, 2011

Facts:

Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May
27, 1993 in Cotabato Cityand, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge
at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil
status was indicated as ‘divorced.’ Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that: The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having
been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.

Issue:
Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared
void ab initio.

Ruling:
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration
of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the
filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse
from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage. Her marriage covered by the
Family Code of the Philippines, Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the
exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and
Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
 Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli
GR No. 173614
September 28, 2007

Facts:

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and

Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. On 26 August 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. Six months later, or
on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was
entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner
and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon
the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of
Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.

Issue:

Whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
Ruling:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the
language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage. Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a
quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
 Nial v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47
of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers
marriage void after his death

Ruling:

"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in
any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts."
 Carlos v. Sandoval
GR No. 179922
December 16, 2008

Facts:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City.Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died
intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad
and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877
and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties
submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise,
the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the
first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage in controversy.

Ruling:

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo,

then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest.For although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate, or even an adopted child excludes the collateral relatives
from inheriting from the decedent. Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is
strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven
by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos,
the deceased brother of petitioner.
 Ablaza v. Republic
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010

Facts:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any
issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration
of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Ruling:

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the
law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of
the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
 Minoru Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved. Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).

Issue:
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.

Ruling:
 Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the
prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to
sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
 Maquilan v. Maquilan
G.R No. 155409
June 8, 2007

Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son.However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual
affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against
private respondent and the latters paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her
paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum
penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium
ofprision correccional as maximum penalty. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3
of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:
The purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is
to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the
Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per
se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the findings of the CA. It is
clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar
G.R. No. 139676
March 31, 2006

Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in
Dagupan City. Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy,
and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on
the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations. According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and
abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation on the case to determine whether or not there exists collusion between the
contending parties On December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba submitted his
Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed between the contending parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity respondent in the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code

Ruling:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial
level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation that no collusion existed between the
contending parties and the brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, no
pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication
or suppression of evidence. Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is
completely insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin
G.R. No. 137590
March 26, 2001
Facts:

On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent
Philipp T. Sin (hereafter Philipp), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in
San Miguel, Manila.On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Philipp. Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the State did not participate in the proceedings.

Ruling:

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed (underscoring ours).

In the cases referred to in the preceeding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. It can be argued that since the lower court
dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not
come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the
case not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the
manifestation filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading,
motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
 Tuason v. Court Of Appeals
GR No 116607
April 10, 1996

Facts:

In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were
married on June 3, 1972 and from this union that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was
already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which
became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one
of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to
file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was
apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been
rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and
cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife;
that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even
refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept
donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift
and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets and
incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions,
without private respondents consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed
because of petitioners refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage,
private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from
further dissipation.

Issue:

Whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case.

Ruling:
 In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by
private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings
and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.
 Corpus v. Ochotorena
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861
July 30, 2004

Facts:

On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed
against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband and incumbent
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the
respondents court. On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately
issued Summons to Mrs. Macias. However, the Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the
reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to
serve summons by publication. The respondent granted the motion in his Order dated March 7,
2001, with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after
notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local weekly
newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001 issue.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge.

Ruling:

The Court rules that the respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he
completely ignored the pertinent rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast
with law and jurisprudence. When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to know it
or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
 Pacete v Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994

Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting
and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30
April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named
Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of
such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast
property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names
of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in
Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time
to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518.

Ruling
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be
made to depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43
Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this
policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may
indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that
an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
 Sevilla Castro v. Castro
GR No. 140484
January 28, 2007

Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by private respondent Lamberto R. Castro against
petitioner Isabelita S. Castro on July 1, 1998. Summons, along with a copy of the petition for
annulment, was allegedly received by petitioners nephew on her behalf at her residence. For
failure of petitioner to file an answer, the RTC ordered the state prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and to submit to the court a report thereon.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied her
appeal, and maintained the assailed decision.

Ruling:
The trial courts decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was
entered on October 29, 1999. For this reason and on account of private respondents death
on January 14, 2004, the judgment is binding on both parties. Section 24 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
provides:

Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate
Court. (b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the
judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the
settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
 Valdes v. RTC and Valdes
G.R. No. 122749
July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In
1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage
null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage. In an Order, the trial court made the
following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all
their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the
properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership
found in the Civil Code shall apply."


Issue:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Ruling:
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and
52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses.
 Dino v Dino
G.R No. 178044,
January 19, 2011
Facts:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an
action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity
under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.


Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code

Held:
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Since the property
relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
 VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930
November 26, 1970

Facts:

Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that
defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to
Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his; and that ―the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on
the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail
even before it had hardly commenced. Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was
solemnized between them constituted fraud in obtaining her consent, she prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage

Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husband‘s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of
the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that ―no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
 Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101
April 25, 1941

Facts:

On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they
came engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they
got married. However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth
to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he
agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor
of Luida.

Issue:

Whether or not the annulment for Godofredo Buccat‘s marriage be granted on the grounds
that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Ruling:
Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof
that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was
unlikely that Godofredo, a first year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida‘s
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married. Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court‘s decision.
 Almelor v. RTC Branch 254
G.R. No. 179620
August 26, 2008

Facts:
Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married
on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners,
an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida
filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public
eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in his
private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children
was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark
contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her
husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The
man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point,
Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to
prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face.
She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by
antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered
that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court
nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA
denied the appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to
fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

Ruling:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se. evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it
against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the
complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
 Villanueva v. Hon. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 132955
October 27, 2006

Facts:

Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in Criminal Cases entitled,
People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and
Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila. It appears
that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties among
them IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public
document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor‘s Office. The charges against Respondent
Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr. was in
fact an aggrieved party

Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that
it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken
from an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva
could have sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its
confirmation letter when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be
dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.
 Macarrubo v. Macarrubo
A.C. No. 6148
February 27, 2004
Facts:

Florence Teves Macarrubo by herself and on behalf of her two children, fileda verified
complaint. for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbowith the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 00-734-A, alleging that respondent deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. Detailing
the circumstances surrounding respondents complained act, complainant averred that he started
courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted
marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar.
Detailing the circumstances surrounding respondents complained act, complainant averred that he
started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually
contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J.
Bolivar.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T.
Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any
regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. Complainant
submitted documentary evidence consisting of the marriage contract between respondent and
Helen Esparza and that between her and respondent, and photographs of their and of captured
moments in their life as a couple and a family.

Issue:
Whether or not Florence Teves Macarrubo should be disbarred.

Ruling:
In both his marriages to his first wife and to complainant, respondent claimed that he was
made to enter into the marital union against his will. That claim is an affront to the intelligence of
the members of this Court to distinguish fact from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to
believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter into any marriage. One
incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones credulity.
And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T. Constantino which is again the subject of
another annulment case. It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case, he would again
put blame on his third wife in order to send the marriage to oblivion.
Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then
leaving them behind by the mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The
impact of respondents conduct is incalculable upon his ex-wives as well as the children he had by
them, their lives having been dislocated beyond recall.Respondents assertion that he has not
failed to support his children by complainant is not totally supported by the evidence on record.
He may have secured educational plans for them and doled out some sums of money in the past,
but it appears that he has failed to provide them regular, monthly support. In fact, he admitted that
even before he left complainants residence in 1995, he was only giving intermittent support to his
children with her.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development
of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening
of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral
character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,, outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
 Alcazar v. Alcazar
G.R. No. 174451
October 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of
respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live
with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23
October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with
petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent
never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed
petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised
why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in
the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he
never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There
was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not, as defined by the law and jurisprudence, respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete
act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or
of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the
parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or
disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act.

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner.Petitioner even admitted during
her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and
before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents
part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners
Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132955
October, 27, 2006
Facts:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got

married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant
prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned
that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her answer with
compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month
after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.

Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent

Ruling:
Appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant
only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage,
such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the
validity of his marriage must be upheld.
 Jimenez v. Canizares
G.R. No. L-12790
August 31, 1960

Facts:

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City,
upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a
male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two
nights and one day after they had been married.

Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without
doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient
to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
 LEGAL SEPARATION

Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206
October 23, 2006
Facts:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed
a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code. Lucita alleged that
since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical violence like
slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several
different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim.
Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified
about her injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

Ruling:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control
of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical
violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct
were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain
from pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years
and the companionship of her husband and children The assessment of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit
and label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr.
Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are
not tainted with bias. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said provision
 Gaudionco v. Penaranda
GR No. 72984
November 27, 1987
Facts:
Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for
legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal
complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

Issue:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the
criminal case for concubinage.

Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise
from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to
live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from
the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. Furthermore, the
support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted
at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
 Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals
G.R No.82606
December 18, 1992

Facts:
Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint
against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for
support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for
support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the
decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of
property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement
was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her
and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently.
She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

Issue:
Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation
of conjugal property.

Ruling:
For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties
and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her
demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until
1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property. Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court
ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike.
The division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the
said conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of
the persons.
 Arroyo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 96602
November 19, 1991
Facts:
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife)
and Arroyo (petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife,
based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The
husband filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented"
to his wife's infidelity.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on
his credibility

Ruling:
Petitioner Neri also contends that Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance and the compromise
agreement operate as a pardon meriting a new trial. The Court notes that the cases of People v.
Camara (supra) and Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra) were the very same cases
which petitioner Arroyo cited in G.R. No. 96602 which the Court has already held to be
inapplicable in the present case.
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 344. ... — The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if
they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. While
there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted
prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, 21 nevertheless, for either
consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. 22 In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November
1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial
court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guiltybeyond
reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri's manifestation is both dated and signed after issuance of our
Resolution in G.R. No. 96602 on 24 April 1991.
 Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033
December28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on
August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived
with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came
to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about
July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a
local college. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her.
All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy
Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the
house of the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the
plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept
together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he
received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation
of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground
for dismissal of the action.

Ruling:
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree with the
trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful,
deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil
Code. The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty
party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the
injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this
presumption may be rebutted by evidence.
 People v. Zapata
G.R No. L-3047
May 16, 1951
Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife,
and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse
during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint,
Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married woman (criminal case No. 426). The
defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto
mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband
filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15
March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case
No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of
the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial
court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the other
sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal to quash the second complaint for adultery be granted

Ruling:
The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no
longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second
complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have
carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon
would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts
committed after the pardon was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to
subsequent adulterous acts.
 De Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553
February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the
end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having
illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention
of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955,
a petition for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the plaintiff constitute condonation.

Ruling:
The Court do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her
home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas
and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search
for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
 Matubis v. Praxedes
G.R No. L-11766
October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur.
For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944,
agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On
April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement : (a) That both of us relinquish
our right over the other as legal husband and wife, (b) That both without any interference by any
of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or
suit arising from our separation, (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from
my husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for
anything from my wife and (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the
time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal
separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on
September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child who was recorded as the child of said
defendant. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and
wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.

Issue:
Whether or not there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.

Ruling:
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph
6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The
law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of
the court's sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). Plaintiff's counsel even agrees
that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal
should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and
defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital bond
having been affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code" (appellants brief, pp.
7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the evidence.
 People v. Schneckenburger
G.R. No. 48183
November 10, 1941
Facts:
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured
a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico.
On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice
of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in
the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint
herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in
the conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one day
of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of
double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the
dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure and without
deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the
merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not there is consent on the part of both parties to commit an illicit acts

Ruling:
As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent"
must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its
commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent
consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her
dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the
wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy,
if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or
does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to
bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
 People v. Sensano
G.R. No. 37720
March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one
child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of
Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything
for the support of herself and their son. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge
against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one
day of arresto mayor. After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She
thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her
husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the
president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife it he would take care her back.
He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, abandoned her
for the second time. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924,
did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband.

Issue:
Whether or not Mariano impliedly gave consent Ursula to commit adultery

Ruling:
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he
signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence
in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations
existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding.
 Agueda Benedicto De La Rama v. Esteban De La Rama
G.R. No.1056
December 8, 1903

FACTS:
On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo entered a final
judgment in this case, decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the husband's adultery,
as well as the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid share of the property belonging
to the conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as an allowance for their support
since the date on which the action was instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court should affirm the judgment of the Court of First Instance in its
entirely.
RULING:
The action of this court upon those four assignment of error relating to adultery was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by the decision of that court there were
definitely disposed of. The other assignment of error relate to that part of the decision of the
Court of First Instance with treats of the division of the conjugal property, the allowance of
alimony, and the order of the court below that the case be referred to the fiscal for criminal
proceedings against the defendant. As has been said, these assignments of error were not
considered by this court in view of the result which it reached upon the other assignments. Nor
were they discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
 Jose De Ocampo v. Serafina Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553
February 23, 1960
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the
end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having
illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention
of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955,
a petition for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a collusion in the case at bar

RULING:
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to
bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. The offense of adultery
had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the
adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband
requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it. (Williams vs. Williams, [N. Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs.
Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S. W. [2d] 688.).
 William Brown v. Juanita Yambao
G.R.No. L-10699
October 18, 1957
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment
camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby
girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment;
that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The
complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children
issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for
their remedy as might be just and equitable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
RULING:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already
barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he
learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article
102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1) year
from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after
the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
 Jose De Ocampo v. Serafina Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553
February 23, 1960
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the
end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having
illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention
of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955,
a petition for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confession of judgment merely prohibits a decree of separation.
RULING:
Even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession
of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the
decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the actionipso facto, any defendant who
opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. The mere
circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her
husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer
the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the
dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which
implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
 Elena Contreras v. Cesar Macaraig
G.R. No. L-29138
May 29, 1970
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of
Quiapo. In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant
was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned
to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her
desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received
rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmariñas St., she
was so happy that defendant again return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more
desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and
drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would
only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a month. On December
14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant did not
interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the
City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report
was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Peñaranda that he believed that there was no
collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in
this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should
be counted.

RULING:
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only
time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part
of December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed decision, the following happened — In the
early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on España
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home,
assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no
longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
The Court conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding
paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave
Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation
to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal
period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
 ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

Banez v. Banez
G.R. No. 132592
January 23, 2002

Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case
No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the
payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from
petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a
Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park
Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
The petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on
October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging
petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents ideal
share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty.
Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys fees chargeable against the
aforecited 5%.
In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two
motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.
On November 22, 1996, the trial court denied Aidas motion for moral and exemplary damages
and litigation expenses but gave due course to the execution pending appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.

Ruling:
There is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent
would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. Petitioner did not refute respondents
allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the
United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a
bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would
make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.
Similarly, The Court was not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel
was properly granted. The Court sees no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of
Appeals concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was
already on appeal.
 Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R. L-30977
January 31, 1972
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against EufemioEufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that
the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May
1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, MacarioLapuz.

Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
 Araneta v. Concepion
G.R. No. L-9667
July 31, 1956

Facts:
The main action was brought by Petitioner against his wife, one of the Respondent herein,
for legal separation on the ground of adultery. After the issues were joined Defendant therein
filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of
P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport, to enjoin Plaintiff from
ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the
fees of her attorney in the action. The petition is supported by her affidavit. Plaintiff opposed the
petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Defendant had abandoned the
children; alleging that conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as
alleged by Defendant; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and
contesting her right to attorney’s fees. Plaintiff prayed that as the petition for custody and support
cannot be determined without evidence, the parties be required to submit their respective
evidence. He also contended that Defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she
had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to
educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love,
respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them. As to the claim for support,
Plaintiff claims that there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to support because of her
infidelity and that she was able to support herself. Affidavits and documents were submitted both
in support and against the omnibus petition.
The Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to
Defendant and a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a
house and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Petitioner
filed the present petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the
Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.
Issue:
Is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code mandatory for the refusal of
the Plaintiff`s evidence?

Ruling:
This provision of the code is mandatory. This case cannot be tried within the period of six
months from the filing of the complaint. The court understands that the introduction of any
evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibited. The law, up to the last
minute, exerts efforts at preserving the family and the home from utter ruin. Interpreting the
intent of said article, the court understands that every step it should take within the period of six
months above stated should be taken toward reconciling the parties. Admitting evidence now will
make reconciliation difficult if not impossible. In this case the court should act as if nothing yet
had happened. The children must be given for custody to him or her who by family custom and
tradition is the custodian of the children. The court should ignore that Defendant had committed
any act of adultery or the Plaintiff, any act of cruelty to his wife. The status quo of the family
must be restored as much as possible. In this country, unlike perhaps in any other country of the
globe, a family or a home is a petite corporation. The father is the administrator who earns the
family funds, dictates rules in the home for all to follow, and protects all members of his family.
The mother keeps home, keeps children in her company and custody, and keeps the treasure of
that family. In a typical Filipino family, the wife prepares home budget and makes little
investment without the knowledge of her husband. A husband who holds the purse is un-Filipino.
He is shunned in Filipino community. The court therefore, in taking action on petition No. 1
should be guided by the above considerations.
 Samosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr.,
G.R. No. L-34132
July 29, 1972

Facts:
Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed an action for legal separation based on the ground
of concubinageon the part of respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a
writ of preliminarymandatory injunction for the return to her of her paraphernal and exclusive
property. The hearing on themotion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion
for preliminary injunction wereheard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become
even more dim. Respondent judgeVamonte thereafter granted the motion of respondent Ramos to
suspend the hearing of the petition for awrit of mandatory preliminary injunction.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for
legalseparation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise
preclude the courtfrom acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an
ancillary remedy to such asuit

Ruling:
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It
must let the partiesalone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then
some plausibility for the viewof the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for
preliminary mandatory injunction is not to beacted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a
failure to abide by the literal language of such codalprovision. . That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power toassert itself is discernible from what is
set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of thepetition for legal separation,
the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and managetheir respective
property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court
deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case theadministrator
shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the
income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."
There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be leftunresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may
even be appointed for themanagement of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the courtsuffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties
may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction shouldnot be ignored by the lower court. There is
all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,considering that the husband whom
she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would inthe meanwhile continue in
the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, anassertion that was not
specifically denied by him.
 Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53388
March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well
as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22,
1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to
be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is
to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action
for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim,
the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.”
 Sabalones v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106169
February 14, 1994

Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his
successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent
RemediosGaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen
years.Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot located at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership.
He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and
that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and
medical treatment.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six
children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal
property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also
informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate
family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview,
Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation
of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery.
She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the
Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.\
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his
retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the
spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well
that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and
wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated.

Ruling:
The Court agrees with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's
administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also
above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the administrator.
 Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115640
March 15, 1995
Facts:
Reynaldo Espiritu and TeresitaMasanding began to maintain a common law relationship
of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named
Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got
married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the
Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in
1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain
custody of the children.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated
from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian
for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was
rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her
mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit
well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which
their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and
personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
 Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R. L-30977
January 31, 1972
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against EufemioEufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that
the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May
1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, MacarioLapuz.

Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant
 Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L 18008
October 30, 1962
Facts:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the
spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally
uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden
name EliseaLaperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be
no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.
 Siochi v. Gozon
G.R. 169900
March 18, 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land. The property is situated in Malabon,
Metro Manila and is registered in the name of “Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira
Gozon(Elvira).”On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the RTC of Cavite City a petition for
legal separation against herhusband Alfredo. On Jan 2, 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lispendens,
which was thenannotated on TCT no. 5357.While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an agreement to buy and sell (agreement)
involving the property for the price of P18 million.However, despite repeated demands from
Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with the stipulationsprovided in the agreement. After paying the
P5 million earnest money as partial payment of thepurchase price, Mario took possession of the
property. On September 6, 1993, the agreement wasannotated on TCT no. 5357.Meanwhile, on
29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision in the legal separation case, whichgranted the
same. The RTC ordered among others that, the conjugal partnership of gains of the spousesis
hereby declared dissolved and liquidated. As regards the property, it held that it is deemed
conjugalproperty.
Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred
Gozon. Lateron, Alfredo through an SPA executed by his daughter Winifred, sold the property to
IDRI and the latterpaid the purchase price in full. A new TCT was issued by the Register of
Deeds in favor of IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages,
annulmentof donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or
temporaryrestraining order.RTC: Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell
between Mario and Alfredo and declaredvoidhe sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-
Dimensional.CA: Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because
(1) it was entered intowithout the consent of Elvira,
Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by
the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal property, being the sole administrator of the
same withoutobtaining the consent of Elvira?

Ruling:
Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done without the consent of Elvira, the
sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elvira’s conduct showed her
acquiescence to the sale.
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124
of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which
require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its
entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred
in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards
Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal property
as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation)
in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty
spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
“Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal
partnershipproperty but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as
regards this point, the CA erred.
 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

Pelayo v. Lauron
G.R. No. L-4089
January 12, 1909
Facts:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of
the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him
was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this,
the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum
of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-in-law
had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the
house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical
assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.

Ruling:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by
law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of
fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly
determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations
to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code.
Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the
defendant’s daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services
of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the compliance
therewith is unavoidable.
 Go v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114791
May 29, 1997
Facts:
In 1981, HermogenesOng and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film
their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy
Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the
said wedding video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial
court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral
damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because as per
the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days
after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only
made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.

Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

Ruling:
Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after
the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding;
the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the
sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in
our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be
reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages
in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that
the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles
2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is
valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or
engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only
Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to
pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.
 Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo
G.R. No. 17014
August 11, 1921

Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City.
They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores
went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed
that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in
turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other
fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute
order or permanent mandatory injunction.

Ruling:
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of
property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and
Scotland have done this with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient
cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.
 Ilusorio v. Bildner,Ilusorio
G.R. No. 139789
May 21, 2000

Facts:
PotencianoIlusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with ErlindaIlusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten
6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

Ruling:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the
grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal
or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the
capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of
his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife
to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is
at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is
a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
 Goitia v. Campos Rueda
G.R. No. 11263
November 2, 1916

Facts:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint
against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to
perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since
Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by
virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed
motion for review.

Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

Ruling:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act
of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.



Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors
of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2
petitions-in-intervention.



A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right
to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal
protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.



It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.



It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.



While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue
that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state
interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech.



In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management
perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their
own discretion and judgment.



The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.



Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.



On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for
a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.



The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote.

Issue:
 Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however,
the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the
law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition
that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough
room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what
it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be
said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
 Valino v. Adriano
G.R. No. 182894
April 22, 2014

Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The
couple had 5 children and 1 adopted child, also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage
did turn sour and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued to support his wife and
children.
Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his
immediate family, including respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to
bury Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the
death and requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but Valino still
buried the body.

Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum
and that the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded
to the US on vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned,Valino had been introducing
her as his wife for the past 20 years.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of
Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the
remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article
199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the
surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her
husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting
marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year
separation in fact.]

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano) are entitled
to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

Ruling:
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes
that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for
the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-
property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes
them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final
resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive
the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this
right may recover the corpse from third persons.
 PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.

G.R. No. 164201
December 10, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren
was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty
of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and
damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

Ruling:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the
partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121
of the Family Code have been covered.
 DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS

Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael

GR No. 146683
November 22, 2001
Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife ZosimaMontallana became the registered owners of Lot
No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboangadel Norte in
January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of
the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him
after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and CirilaArcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store
inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, ErlindaTabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could
enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.
She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who
was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The
latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and
lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to
Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was
made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. AttyLacaya notarized
the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor
was valid.

Ruling:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of “CirilaComille” such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand
her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of
men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.
 Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771
March 31, 1971

Facts:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena
donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix
Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the
Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was
made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply
cohabitating.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

Ruling:
It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations
between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and
improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.The court, however, said that the
lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that
the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship
between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
 Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company
G.R. No. 12707
August 10, 1918

Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as
a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines.
The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the
Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering
some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value
disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an
estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the
cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated
that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under
the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

Ruling:
Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr.
Harding to his wife. The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a
warranty. The evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that
the cost of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and
then thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00.
Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the
automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued
policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.
 ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 143286
April 14, 2004

Facts:
On 13 October 1988, EusebiaRetuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her
husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject
properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the
legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful
wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their
marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which
he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of
hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the
properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only
person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she
could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son
is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of EusebiaNatuya.
Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial court’s
decision
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Procopio are conjugal

Ruling:
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on
the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in
1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December
1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date
of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
 Tan v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120594
June 10, 1997

Facts:
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers,
Celestino and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the
complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with improvements
thereon situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of
Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the
extent of one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the
action for accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963, the brothers together with
other siblings put up a business which they registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was
engaged in the sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are entitled to the
fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business, so that, an accounting of the assets and
liabilities of the partnership, as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper in
the premises.
On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed their answer alleging that an accounting is not
feasible because the company had long been dissolved by the partners on September 30, 1982 on
account of financial losses and that whatever was due to each partner was already given him. It
was further alleged that Alfonso mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager
and, as a consequence thereof, incurred advances and indebtedness from the partnership in the
amount of P130,000.00. Finally, private respondents asserted that Alfonsos one-third (1/3) share
of the subject property was mortgaged by him to his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in order to secure a
loan he obtained from her.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss contending
that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim
whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned. He prayed that the
case be dismissed. The trial court, in its Order dated July 4, 1990, denied Alfonsos motion but
recognized his reluctance to prosecute.
EteriaTeves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U. Tan but they were now living
separately by virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court on August 31, 1977; that during their marriage, they bought a residential lot
consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46249and that the
funds used in the construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan she and her
husband secured, although it was her husband and mother-in-law who drew the loan.

Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses, on their part, tried to establish the following: (a)
that the family business, Bel Air Auto Supply Company, was dissolved on September 25, 1982 on
account of mismanagement brought about by Alfonsos incompetence; (b) that Alfonso had no
more claim against the family business because he borrowed heavily on his equity in the family
business and from his brothers and sisters; (c) that the subject property was inherited by them
from their mother, Trinidad Uy; (d) that Alfonso borrowed money from their sister, Lolita, and as
a consequence thereof, mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her; (e) that Alfonso failed
to pay said loan; and (f) that the house on the lot in question was constructed using funds from a
loan contracted by their mother from the Social Security System (SSS). No documentary
evidence, however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation that the property
was inherited from their mother.
As above-stated, a Decision dated July 12, 1991 was rendered after trial finding that the 906-
square meter lot with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through
installments and so it should be partitioned equally among them and their respective wives.
Consequently, since the lot was acquired during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the
former could not be deprived of her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal property
of the spouses. However, with respect to the business dealing in auto spare parts, the same had
been dissolved due to losses.
On September 19, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
contending that the 906-square meter lot, together with other properties, was actually inherited by
the Tan brothers and their sisters from their mother who died intestate on December 15, 1968 but
said lot was adjudicated to the three (3) brothers in a notarized "Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs and Adjudication of Properties" executed by the heirs on September 8, 1969, xerox copy of
which was attached to the motion.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs which was the basis of private respondents' claim that they inherited the lot
in question from their mother was not presented as part of their evidence during the trial.
Aggrieved by the ruling, private respondents, the spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the
spouses Maximo and Teresita Tan, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn,
reversed and set aside the said judgment. Respondent court ruled that although the subject
property was acquired during the marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established
by the Tan brothers that the same was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.

Issue:
Whether or not the 1/3 portion of land is entitled to Tan or to conjugal partnership of
gains.

Ruling:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. It is not necessary, to prove that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. So that when an immovable was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is
considered as conjugal property. In fact, even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.
Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear, categorical, and convincing evidence
that the property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the
parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and
EteriaTeves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother,
Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso
U. Tan, married to EteriaTeves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario DyKuchin and Maximo U.
Tan, single, under TCT No. 46249. It is clear from TCT No. 46249 that the title was entered on
January 9, 1970 and a transfer from TCT No. 38759, when the latter covered the 906-square
meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late Trinidad Uy to her children when she
died intestate and which property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the
Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties. While this document was not
admitted as evidence because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents' motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, the source of the property can be reasonably
and materially inferred from TCT No. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is
subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court for a period of two
(2) years, from January 9, 1979 against the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy."] Such imposition
on property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived of their lawful
participation of the estate of the decedent. The presence of the imposition in TCT No. 46249,
which was carried over from its predecessor TCT No. 38759 presupposes the existence of
summary settlement of an estate from where the property was derived, that of private
respondents' deceased mother. There can be no doubt then, that although acquired during
Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as Alfonso's
own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil Code.
 Ching v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124642
February 23, 2004
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial
court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to
attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans.
Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment
allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her
and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the
source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when
invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in
this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not
contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.44

Issue:
Whether or not 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the
loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching

Ruling:
The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-
husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired
the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account
of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners
was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the
conjugal partnership.
 Matthews v. Taylor
G.R. No. 164584
June 22, 2009

Facts:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old
Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M.
Martin a lot (Boracay property). The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow
Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of
GinnaCelestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn
ran away with Kim Philippsen.
On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain,
sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with
an annual rental of P12,000.00.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without Benjamin’s consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his
funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with
the fact that he was Joselyn’shusband, any transaction involving said property required his
consent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife
without the consent of her British husband is valid
Ruling:
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right
to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent
the provision by trying to own lands through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale
of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s
claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that
it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/
community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing,
he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
 In re Muller v. Muller
G.R. No. 149615
August 29, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
 Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:
Respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the
property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law
bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

Navarro vs. Escobido

G.R. No. 153788
November 27, 2009
Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because
no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before
the complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows
the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to
law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may
recover from the applicant in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to
make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
 Imani v. Metropolitan Bank
G.R. No. 187023
November 17, 2010

Facts:
Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-
sureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
incurs, but not exceeding 6 Million php. CPDTI incurred an indebtednessaround 164,000 php to
which it defaulted in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by Imani and
filed to consolidate the title to its name.
Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC
annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

Ruling:
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to
apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage.Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a conditionsine qua nonto the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name ofEvangelinaDazo-
Imani married to SinaImaniis no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner
utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.Thus,
it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis
 De La Pena v. Avila
G.R. No. 187490
Feb. 8, 2012
Facts:
Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to AntegonoDela Pena, obtained a loan from Aguila
Sons and Co. As a security for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina. However, Antonia also
executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of Gemma Avila over the same property because of
Antonia’s failure to pay her obligation from Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged the same
property to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a loan from the bank.
Antonia, together with her son Alvin John, filed against Gemma praying for the annulment of the
said deed of sale. She claims that the said property was conjugal property and was sold without
the consent of his husband who already died by that time. She also invokes the presumption of
Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia and upheld
the presumption of conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not the said property that was sold is part of the Conjugal Partnership

Ruling:
The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies only for the
property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the
DelaPenas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the
Marriage between Antonia and Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the
actual acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.
Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of, “Antonia Dela Pena,
married to Antegonodela Pena,” such is merely a description of the civil status of the wife and
cannot mean that the husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the inconclusiveness of
the said description is that it is possible that the property was acquired when she was single but
only registered when she got married.
 Titan Construction Corporation v. David
G.R. No. 169548
March 15, 2010

Facts:

Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25,
1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City,
which was registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Manuel A. David and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer
communicated with each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to
Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Saledated April 24,
1995, and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 130129 in the
name of Titan.
Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor Annulment of Contract and
Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale
executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void.
He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property be
reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value
because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4, 1995 signed by Manuel
which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Titan thus prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
In his unverified Reply, Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature
purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the
property.
Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was granted by
the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaintimpleading
Martha as a co-defendant in the proceedings. However, despite personal service of summons
upon Martha, she failed to file an Answer. Thus, she was declared in default. Trial then ensued.

Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Code should be followed as the law in force in the time of the
marriage.

Ruling:
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that [a]ll property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

We are not persuaded by Titans arguments that the property was Marthas exclusive property
because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could
not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that
Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. In
consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Here, we find that Titan failed to
overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of
the conjugal partnership.
 Tan v. Andrade
G.R. No. 171904
August 7, 2013

Facts:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of land situated in
Cebu City, which she mortgaged to and were subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu. When
the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who
agreed to redeem the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son,
Proceso Andrade, Jr., evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, Proceso, Jr. executed a
Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in
consideration of P50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry
Andrade, one of Rosario's sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned
Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of
Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for
the sum of P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership
over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosario's children, namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, Glory,
Miriam Rose, Joseph, JasminBlaza, and Charity A. Santiago, filed a complaint for reconveyance
and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged that the transaction between Rosario
and Bobby was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage which was entered into to
secure Rosario's indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject properties
were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr., the subject properties were
conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In
this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with
Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name. Bobby contended that the subject
properties were solely owned by Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name and that he had validly
acquired the same upon Proceso, Jr.'s failure to exercise his option to buy back the subject
properties. The RTC ruled for Bobby. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the properties were exclusive properties of Rosario
Ruling:
Pertinent to the resolution of this issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party
invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired
during the marriage.
 Ayala Investments and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 118305
February 12, 1998
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing
of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused
the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction
sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being
the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

Issue:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
“for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.

Ruling:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given
to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should
not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation
of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil
Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off
of the loan itself.
 Dewara v. Lamela
G.R. No. 179010
April 11, 2011

Facts:
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner ElenitaMagallanesDewara (Elenita) were
married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital
relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California,
United States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita,hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch IV, Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay
civil indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos
(P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages. On
appeal, the RTC[6] affirmed the decision of the MTCC and it became final and executory.
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent
StenileAlvero, to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of
One Thousand Four Hundred Forty (1,440) square meters (sq m), under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married
to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod City, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of
Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently sold
the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than
Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy
the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in
a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in
the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent
spouses.
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of
the lot in the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in California. Thus, Elenita,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and
for damages against respondent spouses and ex-officio sheriff StenileAlvero before the RTC of
Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because
the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for
the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she
received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the annulment of the sale and the annulment
of the issuance of the new TCT in the name of respondent spouses.
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of
petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during
her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at
the time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved
in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any
objection pending the levy on execution of the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.

Ruling:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of
the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between
the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The
lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.

There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during
their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they
did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question. The presumption
that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and
convincing evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio
G.R. No. 157537
September 7, 2011

Facts:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later,
Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his
father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently,
Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent
Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but
Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property.
The contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior
liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void
pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the
Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the
vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the
vendors were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

Ruling:
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the
conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary
co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in
the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the
conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial
decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a
co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred,
making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra,
expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is
“without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.”
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the division of the common property as if it continued
to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of
any portion that might not be validly sold to her.
 Ros v. Philippine National Bank
G.R. No. 170166
April 6, 2011

Facts:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and EstrellaAguete filed a complaint for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB,
Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803.

The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag
City. The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan
of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan,
plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land – Lot No. 9161
of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one
(1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the
name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee EstrellaAguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by
her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint
was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the
property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and
that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists
that it was plaintiffs-appellees’ own acts of comission/connivance that bar them from recovering
the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving weight to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, and in reversing and setting aside such findings and conclusions
without stating specific contrary evidence.

Ruling:
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s
marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was
acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he
mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974. PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as
evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the
other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies affixing her
signature to the mortgage and loan documents.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express
or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the
Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the
same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract.
Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the
present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her
consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
 Siochi v. Gozon
G.R. 169900
March 18, 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land. The property is situated in Malabon,
Metro Manila and is registered in the name of “Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira
Gozon(Elvira).”On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the RTC of Cavite City a petition for
legal separation against herhusband Alfredo. On Jan 2, 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lispendens,
which was thenannotated on TCT no. 5357.While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an agreement to buy and sell (agreement)
involving the property for the price of P18 million.However, despite repeated demands from
Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with the stipulationsprovided in the agreement. After paying the
P5 million earnest money as partial payment of thepurchase price, Mario took possession of the
property. On September 6, 1993, the agreement wasannotated on TCT no. 5357.Meanwhile, on
29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision in the legal separation case, whichgranted the
same. The RTC ordered among others that, the conjugal partnership of gains of the spousesis
hereby declared dissolved and liquidated. As regards the property, it held that it is deemed
conjugalproperty.
Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred
Gozon. Lateron, Alfredo through an SPA executed by his daughter Winifred, sold the property to
IDRI and the latterpaid the purchase price in full. A new TCT was issued by the Register of
Deeds in favor of IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages,
annulmentof donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or
temporaryrestraining order.RTC: Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell
between Mario and Alfredo and declaredvoidhe sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-
Dimensional.CA: Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because
(1) it was entered intowithout the consent of Elvira,
Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by
the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal property, being the sole administrator of the
same withoutobtaining the consent of Elvira?

Ruling:
Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done without the consent of Elvira, the
sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other
spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elvira’s conduct showed her
acquiescence to the sale.
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124
of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which
require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its
entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred
in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards
Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal property
as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation)
in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty
spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
“Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal
partnershipproperty but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as
regards this point, the CA erred.
 Aggabao v. Palaruan
G.R. No. 165803
September 1, 2010

Facts:
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Parañaque
to the petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of
the property and showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of
the 2 lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991
executed by Dionisio authorizing Elena to sell the property. The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as
earnest money for which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money which
stipulated that the peitioners would pay an additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4,
1991; P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991 once
Elena turned over the property.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the broker, went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered that one of the lots
had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the
full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan was effected through and SPA executed
by Dionisio in favor of Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of an existing
mortgage in favor of Los Baños Rural Bank, with the same SPA with a court order authorizing
Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan.
The petitioners and the broker next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at the Los
Baños Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had asked for the court
order because the lot involved was conjugal property.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment
on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which
then released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who
executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was
then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned
over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. In due time, the
petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of
Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio
authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991
with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca.
They recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate
owner’s copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be
P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan
declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the
petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they
had already fully paid to Elena.
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No.
91-1005 entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v.
Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity of
the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma.Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for
specific performance with damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for
trial and judgment in the RTC.
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed
of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the
respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband DionisioParulan, Jr.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:
 Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?

Ruling:
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the CivilCode, not Article 124 of the Family
Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal
property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the
administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his
brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio
ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil
Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between
husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the
Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may
apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court
rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of
the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out
that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would
not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein,
however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3,
1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of
the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the
authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed
from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an
agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article
1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to
the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the
property.
Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the
March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the
Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court
order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified. On the
other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners
and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the
other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offers.
 Fuentes v. Roca
G.R. No. 178902
April 21, 2010

Facts:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his
mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses
through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete
the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down
payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the
land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty.
Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the
signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed
January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and
possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was
void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere
forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale
on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony
of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action
has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed
since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property
without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10
years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was
well within the prescriptive period.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed.

Ruling:
Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done
in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal
Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal
property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the
family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the
argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that
prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed
such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a
sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Pascual
G.R. No. 163744
February 29, 2008

Facts:
FlorenciaNevalga and Nicholson Pascual were married in 1985. During the union, they
acquired a lot with a three door apartment standing thereon. Their marriage were annulled in
1994 and they went on their separate ways without liquidating their properties.
In 1997, Florencia mortgaged the aforesaid property as a security for the loan she obtained with
spouses Oliveros. Petitioner foreclosed the mortgage, had the property auctioned and acquired it
as the successful bidder. Nicholson filed an action to annul the mortgage alleging that the subject
property is still a conjugal property and it was executed without his consent
RTC ruled that mortgage is invalid. The said lot is a conjugal property, the same having been
acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. (Art 116 NCC)
Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the
RTC concluded that the disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without
Nicholson’s consent.CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson
Pascual and FlorenciaNevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the
spouses.

Ruling:
While the declared nullity of marriage severe marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist
as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. In this pre-
liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the
former spouses. Thus, applying the provision to the present case, the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
 Quiao v. Quiao
G.R. No. 183622
July 4, 2012

Facts:
BrigidoQuiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They
had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they
produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for
cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the
three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article
129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court.
By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
“Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET
PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property
relations.
Ruling:
 Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of
martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the
conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry.
The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
 COMPLETE/ ABSOLUTE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY

Yao v. Parello
G.R. No. 153828
October 23, 2003

Facts:
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for
the satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its
managers, which included PablitoVillarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the
deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and the
property was scheduled for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition
alleging that the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her
husband. The trial court granted the petition and exempted the subject property from execution.
Hence, the scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for
intervention, but the same was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not lower Court grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
intervention on the ground that the same was filed late.

Ruling:
Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said
provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On
the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene,
he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, in this case Petitioner filed his motion way beyond the
period set forth in the rules.
 PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

Ocampo v. Ocampo
G.R. No. 198908
August 3, 2015

Facts:
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia SyOcampo (Virginia ) filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with DeogracioOcampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity. The decision
became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage. On March 31, 1999,
the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties,
and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said
properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing
ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13,
2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains
by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

Ruling:
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code.
 Barrido v. Nonato
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011

Facts:
Leonardo and Marrieta`s marriage was dissolved by reason of psychologyical incapacity
in 1996, hence Leonardo filed a complaint for partition over their property consisting of a house
and lot, since according to him, there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership. In her
defense, Marrieta claimed that the property had been sold to their children Joseph Raymond and
Joseph Leo. She also moved for dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MTCC Bacolod City, the action for partition being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Per decision of the MTCC, it ruled in favour of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being
the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. It also awarded
moral damages in favour of Marrieta. Leonardo appealed the ruling to the RTC, which reversed
the MTCC ruling and ordered the partition of the property, hence Marrieta appealed the RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The appellate court denied Marietta`s
appeal, ruling that since the assessed value of the property is only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within
the MTCC jurisdiction. Though the RTC applied Art. 129 instead of Art.147 thereof, it still
correctly ordered the partition of the property. Marrieta elevated her case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Barrido`s contention would affect the sale of the real property.

Ruling:
Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real
actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas
PambansaBilang 129 provides:
Section 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit TrialCourts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x xx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No.
7691). Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which
certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila
to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
 Dino v. Dino
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011

Facts:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an
action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity
under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code

Ruling:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-
ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.
 Maxey v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 178044
May 11, 1984

Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 but were only
married in a “military fashion.” However, they had a church wedding in 1919. The properties in
dispute were acquired in 1911 and 1912.
In 1919, Regina died. Melbourne remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia (using a power of
attorney) sold the properties to private respondents spouses Macayra. Julia is of the belief that
said properties were exclusive to Melbourne.
Petitioners are children of Melbourne and Regina. They seek the annulment of the above sale and
recovery of possession. They allege that such properties were conjugal properties of their parents’
marriage as they were bought with their joint effort and capital.

Issue:
Whether or not the properties in question were conjugal or exclusive to Melbourne.

Ruling:
The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of the Civil Code because it could not be
applied retroactively in prejudice of vested rights.But even if Art. 144did apply, the CA is of the
view that the property could not have been acquired by the spouses’ joint efforts because this
pertains to monetary contributions and Regina was a mere housewife. SC rules otherwise. It
applies Art. 144 retroactively because no vested rights of Melbourne were impaired because there
exists a concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share of the properties in question. The
disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne and the estate of his late wife Regina
when they were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would be unjust to require a woman who is a
wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage to abandon
her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or
engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. It does not matter that she
made no monetary contribution, for the "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must
include not only the earnings of a woman but also her contribution to the family's material and
spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce
resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional
duties of a housewife.
But given that the properties were owned in common by the spouses, Julia’s sale over
Melbourne’s share is valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land to
private respondents while the latter should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of
the properties.
 Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132529
February 2, 2001

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had
two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children
in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage
between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous
marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

Ruling:
SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to
the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession,
the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the
legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if
she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased'
to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
 Valdes v. RTC and Valdes
G.R. No. 122749
July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion,
the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.
 Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127358
March 31, 2005

Facts:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.The RTC in its decision,
declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered
the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular
support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s
motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Ruling:
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not
apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and
the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the
co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included
or involved in said distribution.
 Gonzales v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 159521
December 16, 2005

Facts:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four
children were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties,
and Erlinda managed their pizza business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the
time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked
hard for its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and
claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and
Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the
CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

Ruling:
SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The
marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later
affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article
147 of the Family Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to
marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. Article 147 creates a
presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired
through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It
further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
 Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr
G.R. No. 152716
October 23, 2003

Facts:
In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence
and lived with him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG
Condominium on installment. They got married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The properties
were divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children. The custody of
children was awarded to Elna, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer
ownership of Suite 204 LCG Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive
property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of
the Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded
Elna of the previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204.
Elnafiled special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in
its Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.

Ruling:
SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno
and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article
147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under
Article 36. All these elements are present in the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the common properties of
Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable marriages and to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Family Code.
 Salas v. Eden VillenaAguil
G.R. No. 202370
September 23, 2013
Facts:
On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden
VillenaAguila (Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan
Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have
no conjugal properties whatsoever." In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff
narrated that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the
petition.
On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and
Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, if any."
On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion9 stating that she discovered: (a)
two 200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b)
a 108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT
No. 243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The registered owner of the Discovered
Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on
21 September 2007. However, Salas’ notice of hearing was returned unserved with the remark,
"RTS Refused To Receive."
On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance requesting for an
Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed
and no conjugal property was involved.
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguila’s manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel
and the state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007
someone informed her of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the
information and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify,
Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas’ common-law wife.
On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation alleging that there is no
conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguila’s petition. According to Salas, Aguila’s
statement was a judicial admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed
that Aguila waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties
he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements located in
Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas;
P. Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2)
cash amounting to P200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota
Tamaraw FX(collectively,"Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal
properties were deemed partitioned.

Issue:
Whether or not he Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision ordering
the partition of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon
City and as well as the property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and
respondent.

Ruling:
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a
division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-
ownership. Thus, the settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by
a preponderance of evidence. Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila’s petition stating that they had
no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage.
However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and
acquisition of the Waived Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly
registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence,
this Court cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal,
Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and
improvement) listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008.
 Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132529
February 2, 2001

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had
two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children
in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage
between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous
marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

Ruling:
SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to
the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession,
the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the
legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if
she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased'
to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
 Tumlos v. Fernandez
GR No. 137650
April 12, 2000

Facts:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against
Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to
occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that
Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month
which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the
premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

Issue:
Whether or notGuillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

Ruling:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property.
The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence
presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited
with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot
be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is
under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in
contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has
no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not
proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
 Francisco vs. Master Iron Works
GR. No. 151967
February 16, 2005

Facts:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on
January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina
acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared
that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and
that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property
for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a
General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter
filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then
issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged
property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the
trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as
her paraphernal property.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her
personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed
of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article
148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be
applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had
any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage,
Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed
money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-
ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was
affirmed.
 Joaquin v. Reyes
G.R. No. 154645
July 13, 2004

Facts:
Lourdes P. Reyes was the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12,
1981.Respondents Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. were the legitimate children of
respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes;That 4 years before his death,
Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino and such relationship
bore children
Before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and
Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on September 30, 1980,
received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315,011.79; that
respondent wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.On July 12, 1979, a Deed
of Sale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes Parañaque, Metro Manila was
executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of petitioner Milagros B.
Joaquino. The funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the
deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as petitioner Joaquin
was without the means to pay for the same; Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property in order to pay the balance of the purchase
price; It was petitioner’s submission that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed
property, because they were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children.

Issue:
Whether or not the ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioner’s
children was correct.

Ruling:
 The Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was
for the recovery of property.
Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. In
Agapay v. Palang, the Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir
to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case,
was for the recovery of property.
 Saguid v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150611
July 10, 2003

Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she
met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end
up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

Issue:
Whether or not there are actual contributions from the parties

Ruling:
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because
the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter.
Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is
required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties.
Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of
their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
 Juaniza v. Jose
GR. No. L-50127-28
March 30, 1979

Facts:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in
the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro
but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and
wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of
the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be
reconsidered.

Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.

Ruling:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not
incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful
wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the
damages caused by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages
arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.
 Adriano v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124118
March 27, 2000

Facts:
The testator, Lucio Adriano, also known as Ambrocio Adriano, married Gliceria Dorado
on October 29, 1933. Out of their lawful marriage, they had three children, namely, Celestina,
Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio and
Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968. Also in
1942 or even earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa, with whom he had eight children:
Marino, Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida, all surnamed
Adriano. All his children by Vicenta Villa are the named petitioners in the instant case, with the
exception of Jose Vergel, who died before the inception of the proceedings.
On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. Lucio
and Vicenta and their children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until the spouses separated in 1972.
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and
assigning, among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second
marriages as devisees and legatees therein. Among the properties bequeathed in the will were a
45,000 square meter lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and equipment situated
thereon located in Candelaria, Quezon and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT")
No. T-56553 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon, which was disposed of in the following
manner: (1) to private respondents, Lucio's children by his first wife, 10,000 square meters of the
disputed property, including the warehouse, rice mill, and equipment situated thereon; (2) to
Vicenta and petitioners, his children by his second marriage, the remaining 35,000 square meters;
and (3) to private respondents, the residential house also within the same property.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted
in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981
before the RTC of Lucena City. The probate case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4442. After
due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta, the RTC allowed the probate of the will
and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner-executrix Celestina Adriano in an
Order dated August 22, 1983. On November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed said Order to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the probate of the will. Vicenta died on July
2, 1985.
On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the
RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 88-115. In the complaint, plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage
of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and
wife and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and administration
in Spec. Proc. No. 4442. Plaintiffs claimed that the properties bequeathed in Lucio's will are
undivided "civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and Vicenta Villa", and
thus, the will sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes
of the rightful share or properties of Vicenta.
It is also not disputed that the contested properties in Civil Case No. 88-115 and Spec. Proc. No.
4442 were also the subject of a complaint filed sometime in 1980 by Vicenta against Lucio,
docketed with the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Lucena City, Branch II as Civil Case
No. 7534, wherein Vicenta sought the provisional partition or separation of the properties
pendente lite. The case was dismissed on January 28, 1991 without prejudice, for lack of interest.
Spec. Proc. No. 4442 and Civil Case No. 88-115 were consolidated and jointly heard by the RTC.
The trial court favored the evidence of private respondents, which indicated that the purchase
money for the contested properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership that
he entered into in 1947, or during the subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria. The trial court
further found that Lucio's initial capital infusion of P15,000.00 in the business partnership was in
fact obtained from the conjugal fund of his first marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not it was erroneous of respondent court not to have upheld the co-ownership
of Vicenta to 1/2 of said property, and to have declared the entire property as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of Lucio and Gliceria.
Ruling:
The Court sees no reason to reverse respondent court. Petitioners' insistence that a co-
ownership of properties existed between Lucio and Vicenta during their period of cohabitation
before their marriage in 1968 is without lawful basis considering that Lucio's marriage with
Gliceria was then subsisting. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the
man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in
any way be incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while
Lucio's marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Thus, it was ruled in Pisuea vs.
Heirs of PetraUnating and AquilinoVillar that the prima facie presumption that properties
acquired during the marriage are conjugal cannot prevail over a court's specific finding reached in
adversarial proceedings to the contrary.
As found by both the trial court and respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to
overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have also
presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation that the property was in fact purchased
by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his first marriage. This factual finding, which is
clearly borne out by the evidence on record, is binding and conclusive upon us and will not be
disturbed.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity would
dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be
allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts,petitioners in the instant case
have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually contributed to the acquisition of the
property in question.
 YasuoIwasawa v. Gangan
G.R.No. 204169
September 11, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as “single” and “has never married
before.” Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to
the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed.
Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about
it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond MaglonzoArambulo and that their
marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is a bigamous one.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous

Ruling:
The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits
directly prove the following facts: ( 1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20,
1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time
with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3)
that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent's
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and ( 4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still
valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
 Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061
July 3, 2013
Facts:
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married AzucenaAlegre. In 1982, while
Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go.
Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a
purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as
non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

Ruling:
The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
 Ventura, Jr. v. Abuda
G.R. No. 202932
October 23, 2013

Facts:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980.
Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior
marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a
son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she
married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and
Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.
Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960.
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492
State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was
thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres." Edilberto also claimed that
starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located at 903 and
905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, PaulinoAbuda (Paulino). According to Edilberto: when Esteban was diagnosed with
colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline.
Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan
Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php
200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase
price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale.
Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before
the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because
Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that
because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and
void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties
purchased by Esteban and respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage celebrated was bigamous.

Ruling:
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment
was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for
the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s
alleged monetary contributions.
THE FAMILY
 THE FAMILY

Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 109068
January 10, 1994
Facts:
Pedro G. Hernando and Gaudencio Guerrero are the parties in the complaint before the
lower court. On pre-trial of the case, Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr. noted the relationship between the
parties, they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law. The Judge gave Guerrero
five (5) days to file his motion and amended complaint to allege that the parties were very close
relatives, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were exerted but failed. The Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the Order however, respondent
Judge denied the motion for reconsideration and warned unless the complaint was amended
within five (5) days the case would be dismissed. On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having
expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case.

Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in
Art. 151 of the Family Code requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit
between them may be instituted and maintained.

Ruling:
No. The enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not
comprehend "sisters-in-law". The "sisters-in-law" or "brothers-in-law" are not included under
Art. 151 of the Family Code as members of the same family. Consequently, the lower court erred
in ruling that Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the
filing of a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the
complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action.
 Ining v. Vega
G.R. No. 174727
August 12, 2013
Facts:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of
land inKalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings
RomanaRoldan and GregoriaRoldanIning, who are now both deceased. Romana was survived by
her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, Leonardo R. Vega. Leonardo is survived by his
wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and
Lenard Vega. Gregoria, was survived by her six children. The petitioners on the case except for
Ramon Tresvalles and Roberto Tajonera are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan
for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In
their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action
against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr.
who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired the same
from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, declared lot to be
common property of the heirs of GregoriaRoldanIning, and concluded that Leon never sold the
property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr.; hence, the
subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. The CA declared
1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of RomanaRoldan
and the other 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of
GregoriaRoldanIning.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucimo Sr. has the right to perform acts which characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership in the subject property.
Held:
 No. He is not a co-owner of the property. He is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely
Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. Under the Family Code,
family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity. One who
is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a
co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the
co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely
against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
 Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805
March 23, 2015


Facts:
Adriano M. Tambuyat and WenifredaBalcom-Tambuyat were married on September 16,
1965.During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700-square
meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought
on November 17, 1991. The deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as
vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed of sale was Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat. When
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject property was issued, however, it was made
under the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.”
On the other hand, Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco. They were married on
October 15, 1975, and Nolasco was alive, and his marriage to petitioner subsisted and was never
annulled.
On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate. On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for
Cancellation of TCT T-145321 in Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
She alleged that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; that TCT T-145321 was erroneously
registered and made in the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.
BANGUIS.” On May 26, 2003, the Malolos RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Wenifreda
“Winnie” BalcomTambuyat.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in the cancellation of questioned entry in TCT No.
T-145321 in clear violation of Article 148 of the Family Code providing the sharing of properties
acquired by persons united in a defective marriages.

Ruling:
 The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse
of Adriano. Documentary evidence such as the parties’ respective marriage contracts together
with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union indicates that
Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco and both marriages
were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the
certificate of title. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to
each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently,
Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and
privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
The provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
 Hiyas v Acuna
August 31, 2006
G.R. NO. 154132
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint
against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria
Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he
did not secure any loan from Hiyas, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its
favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that
benefited from the loan.
On May 17, 2001, Hiyas Savings filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Moreno
failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code. On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued an
order denying the Motion to Dismiss.

Issue:
Whether a compromise is required in suits between husband and wife when other parties
who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit.

Ruling:
No. Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the
law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.
The Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the
provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under
Article 150 of the Family Code.The Court ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the
same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a
member of that same family.
 Hontiveros v Regional Trial Court
G.R. No. 125465
June 29, 1999

Facts:

On December 3, 1990, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and TeodoraAyson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 25. The complaint involved a parcel of land located in the town of Jamindan,
Province of Capiz. Augusto and Maria Hontiveros claimed that they were deprived of income
from the land consisted of rentals from tenants. On November 23, 1995, the complaint was
denied for it failed to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made,
considering that Augusto Hontiveros and Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers.

Issue:

Whether or not earnest efforts toward a compromise should be made prior to the filing as
required by Article 151 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The Article 151 of the Family Code requires earnest efforts toward a compromise among
members of the family prior to the filing of the complaint. On the case at bar, the inclusion of
Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the
Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband
and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full
or half-blood.

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this
jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto
Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151 of the
Family Code.
 Vda. De Manalo v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129242

January 16, 2001

Facts:
TroadioManalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children.
On February 14, 1992, TroadioManalo died and left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name Manalo’s Machine
Shop. On November 26, 1992, eight (8) of the surviving children filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of TroadioManalo, and for
the appointment Romeo Manalo as administrator.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila. On February 11, 1993 the trial court issued an
order declaring the whole world in default, and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners on
March 16, 1993. However, the order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon
motion of opposition.

Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

Held:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding,
the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary
civil actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of
the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision
be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be
emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in
fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
 Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 134787
November 15, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are siblings, born to
spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor,
Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition" covering
properties they inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband,
Andres Guerrero filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner
Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Pending the case’s resolution, the sibling heirs executed another document, denominated
Deed of Partition. It indicated that the share of the Consuelo was adjudicated to Nicanor who,
however, was obligated to pay Consuelo a sum of money. Thus, Consuelo and Andres Guerrero
filed another complaint against petitioner for the recovery of her share under new Deed of
Partition. The cases were consolidated and was ruled in favor of the Consuelo. In time, Nicanor
went to the IAC, now CA, where it affirmed the CFI decision but reduced the award of moral
damages. For some reason, however, the Guerreros did not pursue execution of the judgment.
Six years after, Consuelo and Andres Guerrero filed a complaint for revival of the
decision rendered by the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint, however during
reconsideration, it reversed itself and ruled in favor of the Consuelo and Andres Guerrero. The
CA dismissed the appeal, hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16
of the Rules of Court has no application to the case.

Ruling:
 It does not apply, the petition is dismissed. A lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a
settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same
family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family
must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to
Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code. Otherwise, the
complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Admittedly, the
complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on
that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary
averments of a defective complaint.
Petitioner Nicanor cannot plausibly look to Article 222 of the Civil Code to effectively
dismiss the case. It cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the rationale of said provision is
to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be spawned by litigation between and among
the members. The case, however, being merely an action for revival of judgment of a dormant
decision rendered in an original action, can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222
of the Code.
 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-23102
April 24, 1967

Facts:
Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953. They
lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United
States to further his studies and practice his profession. Ceciliowithout justifiable cause
deliberately abandoned and neglected Luisa and despite her repeated demands, Ceciliohas failed
and refused provide for the maintenance and support of Luisa, who is alleged to be pregnant,
sickly and without any source of revenue, while Cecilio is employed in a hospital in the United
States in 1955. Luisa filed a complaint against his husband Cecilio Mendoza.
On 3 July 1961, Ceciliofiled a motion to dismiss, predicated on the complaint's failure to
state a cause of action, because it contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made before the filing of the suit.

Issue:
Whether or not earnest efforts toward a compromise should be made prior to the filing of
the complaint.

Ruling:
No. The case at bar involved a claim for future support and support in arrearsthat under
Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is
outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the New Civil Code. The possibility of
compromise on the latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future
support, to which Article 222 cannot apply. Since no valid compromise is possible on these
issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be superfluous.
FAMILY HOME
 FAMILY HOME

Trinidad Ramos v. Pangilinan

G.R. No. 185920
July 20, 2010

Facts:
Danilo Pangilinan filed a complaint in 2003 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric,
Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company
to pay the respondents’ with aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30 representing the back-wages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and
executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in
Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Pangilinan argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the company’s business address as borne by the company’s
letterhead. The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company
appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Order.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what
law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242
governs extrajudicial constitution.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption
is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with
consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil
Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra
judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot
apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
 Arriola v. Arriola
G.R. No. 177703
January 28, 2008
Facts:
John Nabor C. Arriola filed a Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
254, Las Pias City against Vilma G. Arriolaand Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition
of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola . Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first
wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second
wife, petitioner Vilma. On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition
of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola.
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land, respondent sought
its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. The public auction sale was
scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the
auction the house standing on the subject land.This prompted respondent to file motion praying
that petitioners be declared in contempt. On August 30, 2005, the RTC denied the motion.
On January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a family home.

Ruling:
Yes, the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The
Family Codethe subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love,
security and unity by imposing restrictions on its partition such as: (1) the heirs cannot extra-
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing
therein; and (2) the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court
finds compelling reasons . On the case, there was no compelling reason has been alleged by the
parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggested by the parties.
Moreover, the Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not
just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it
stands. Thus, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands is deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the
moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
 Medequillo v. Breva
G.R. No. 86355
May 31, 1990

Facts:

On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals setting the
liability of Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay. The judgment having become final and
executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. On July 7,
1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at PoblacionMalalag, Davao del
Sur containing an area of 600 square meters and a parcel of agricultural land located at
DalagbongBulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares.

A motion to quash was filed by Jose Modequillo alleging that the residential land is where
the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of the case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is
not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part
of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153. On August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by Modequillo and it was denied for lack of merit on
September 2, 1988.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

Held:

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code.
 The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153
shall have a retroactive effect that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability
which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This
does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights Modequillo may have on the land.
 Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060
November 27, 2008
Facts:
Albino Josef was the defendant in a case for collection of sum of money filed by Otelio
Santos, who claimed that Josef failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from
Santos on 1994. The Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, found Josef liable to
Santos in the amount of P404,836.50 with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from January 9,
1995 until full payment.
On February 17, 2003, Santos moved for issuance of a writ of execution. In an Order
dated July 16, 2003, the trial court granted the motion. A writ of execution was issued on August
20, 2003 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, personal properties subject of
the writ of execution were auctioned off. A real property located at Marikina City was sold on
October 28, 2003 by way of public auction. Santos emerged as the winning bidder.
On November 5, 2003,Josef filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the personal and real properties. Josef claimed
that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the real property
was his family home; thus, exempt from execution.

Issue:
Whether or not the sheriff erroneously attached, levied and sold on execution the real property
because it is a family home.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated,
which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with
the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases. The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of
family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the
sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a
shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that
binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of
the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution,
and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given
effect, the lower court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of
petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction.
Despite petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the lower court did not make an effort to
determine the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or
whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
 Kelly, Jr. v Planters Products, Inc.
G.R. No. 172263
July 9, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment
from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite
demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 57. The RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution.
Sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property located in Naga City.
After being belatedly informed of the sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley
(Doris) filed a motion to dissolve in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the property was
their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure to
comply with the three-day notice requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that
is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
 The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or
after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material
men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
 Gomez v. Sta. Ines
G.R. No. 132537
October 14, 2005

Facts:
On 17 June 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo
filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines
alleging that they are the children of the deceased Purificaciondela Cruz who entrusted rice land
in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an
accounting of the produce of said rice lands while underthe management of Marietta and for the
return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of theproperty. The Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of the TCT and pay
damages. A writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, a parcel of land located in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, with an area of 432 square meters registered in the name of
Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by FlavianoBalgos, Jr., then Provincial Sheriff of
Nueva Vizcaya, to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a
public auction on 25 August 1992 to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder. The sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on 17 September 1992.
Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with theirchildren, filed a complaint for the
annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on theground that said house and lot sold
during the public auction is their family residence; thus, exempt from execution under Article 155
of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the houseand lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon
and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property can be sold provided that it is a family home.

Ruling:
 Yes. The Court ruled that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family homeshall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debtsincurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the houseand lot
was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is notdeemed
constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is
deemed constituted as the family home only upon theeffectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in1986 to for acts committed as early as
1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was constituted as the family home
in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within theexception provided for in Article 155 of
the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
 MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97898
August 11, 1997
Facts:
Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-
meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property was located
in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On March 17, 1986, E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against FloranteManacop and F.F. Manacop Construction Co.,
Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of
P3,359,218.45. Manacop and his company entered into a compromise agreement with E & L
Merchantile, Inc., the salient portion of provides that Manacop and his company will undertake to
pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as
their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment
approving the compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in
good faith. On July 15, 1986, E & L Merchantile, Inc filed a motion for execution which the
lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff
levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the
judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction. On August 1, 1989, Manacop and his
company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from
continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged
that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was no showing that they had the
means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected.

Issue:
Whether the final decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the
Family Code.

Ruling:
 Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that under the Family Code, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need
to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also
provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
In the case at bar, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home
by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year
after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by
Manacop. Since the debt involved was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued
prior to August 3, 1988, Manacop cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family
Code.
 TANEO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108532
March 9, 1999

Facts:
As a result of a judgment in a case for recovery of property in favor of AbdonGilig, two
(2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one
was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area
of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis
Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the
AbdonGilig as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a
final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and
conveying said properties to the AbdonGilig.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare
the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land. In their complaint, it was alleged that
petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and NarcisaValaceras. Upon their death, they
left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering
that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable
and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the
land. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance in favor of
the AbdonGilig over the subject property including their family home that was extra judicially
constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private
respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting
a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
Ruling:
 The Court ruled that the applicable law in the present case is the Civil Code where
registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides
certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment. The court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question, erected on the land of PlutarcoVacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment
against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was
incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged
family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article
243 (2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful
considering that constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The lower court
found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneo’s owned but on the land of one
PlutarcoVacalares. By the very definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house
where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated, it is understood that the
house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.
 Fortaleza v. Lapitan
G.R. No. 178288
August 15, 2012

Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and
AmparoLapitan in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security,
spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their
residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna.
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and
penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before
the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale
was set on May 9, 2001. Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders with
the bid amount of P2.5 million. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses
Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition
for the issuance of writ of possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City. On September
16, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial
duty of the court. Spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA, however, the appellate court
dismissed the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were bared on their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding a redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the
amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is a family
home.

Held:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.However, Article
155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured
by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt
that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage
over the subject property. Assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was
sold at the public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption.
 Oliva-De Mesa v. Acero
G.R. No. 185064
January 16, 2012

Facts:
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. in the
amount of P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the property. As payment, Araceli
issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. However, the
check was dishonored for reason of account closed. On April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the
Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22
against the spouses. On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decisionacquitting the petitioners
but ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of P100,000.00 with legal interest from date of
demand until fully paid.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte
levied upon the property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public auction and
Claudio was the highest bidder.
Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the spouses De Mesa
and JuanitoOliva for a monthly rent of P5,500.00. On March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale over
the property was issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan issued TCT No. T-221755 in Claudio’s favor.Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses
Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan,
Bulacan against the spouses De Mesa. On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a decision ordering
the spouses De Mesa to vacate the property.

Issue:
Whether the subject property is exempt from execution.

Held:
 The family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However,
this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the
property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
It is a well-settled rule that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property
is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
The Court held that the petitioners’ omission to assert their right within a reasonable time
gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the
exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s
duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
 KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN

DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127578
February 15, 1999

Facts:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the
legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here)
is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to
provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.

petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required
to provide support for him. On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through
counsel, sent in a manifestation. By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case.

"Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for the defendant, that
counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection that this case be withdrawn
provided that the defendant will withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be
dismissed with prejudice."

On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against
Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. In said case, the complainant manifested that because of the
defendants judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it was futile
and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect, admitted the lack of filiation
between him and the minor child, which admission binds the complainant, and since the
obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation between the child
and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner
maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said
manifestation bars the present action for support, especially so because the order of the trial court
explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.

Issue:

Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support.

Held:

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article
301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:

Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third
person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. xxx

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is
not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving
up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to
attain the former, cannot be renounced.

In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested
that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied
his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of
filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that
such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and
bars any and all future complaint for support.
The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it
would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the
vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent,
the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondents
mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the
dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It
violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship
that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

"The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support
is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause."

"Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future
support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in
IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648, 1956 Ed.). "
 Fernandez v. Fernandez

G.R. No. 143256

August 28, 2001

Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners
of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey
building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration. It is undisputed that Generosa gave
birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic.
In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the
death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant.
Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician.
He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled.

On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo
Fernandez and an estate. On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves. On the same day,
Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's
son.

After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their
father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio.

The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by unmitigated greed,
deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees) of the
deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance,
taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de Venecia
aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in causing
the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts.

ruling of the trial court

defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the
spouses.Because of the following reasons:

(1) he only reached high school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of
Dr. Fernandez

(2) he failed to present any birth certificate

(3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected people such as
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the
geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child.

(4) the certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no
available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez

(5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his
son was doubtful considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original copy

(6) that Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available
records of baptism with the parish.

The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed of absolute sale were prepared and
executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the documents
null and void.

Ruling of Court of Appeals

It found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a
child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights to back pay under RA
897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant has the right to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses
Fernandez.

Ruling:

appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the
spouses openly and continuously until they died Open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually
attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents.

However, it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession
of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child
to compel recognition by his assumed parent.

Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant presented a baptismal
certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza. Stating therein that appellant is a child of the late
spouses having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934. Baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.

It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal
certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman issued a certification on October 16,
1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged.
Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures
do not constitute proof of filiation. In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August
31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.

Petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr.
Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa. De Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void. Pursuant to Art. 1105
of the New Civil Code which states:

"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person."
 LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Aguilar v. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169

January 28, 2015

Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in
their estate are two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title and of the Registries
of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod.

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTCa civil case for mandatory
injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. The alleged that petitioner is the only
son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject
titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the
same.respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and
kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that
since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the
conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and
sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but
entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

Petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son. To prove
filiation, he presented the following documents:

1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
 2. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS)Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;

3. His Individual Income Tax Return

4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employmentindicating that petitioner is his son;

5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan, where it is declared that the

Aguilar spouses are his parents; and Letter of the BMMC Secretary introducing petitioner
as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.

Respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher; that she does not know
petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is
not related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner. Respondent likewise offered the testimony
of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera) that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that
she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose
nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses

Ruling of the RTC, is that no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is
either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of
live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the
deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of
Candelaria S. Aguilars he expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and
that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a
son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria
Aguilar.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals, in the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that
he has a clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. "Student record or other writing not
signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence of filiation. That a baptismal certificate, a
private document is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income
tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount that the Highest
Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not
competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.

Issue:

Whether or not SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation
and relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code (3) in conjunction with Section 19 and
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

Ruling:

The Court grants the Petition. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
it must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of
Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. Pursuant to Art. 54.
"Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
 Concepcion v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123450

August 31, 2005

Facts:
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December
29, 1989. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on
December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Ma.
Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when
she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She
held him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She argued that there was nothing in the
law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further
maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in granting visitation rights to Gerardo.

Ruling:
 We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and
the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein,
we cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:

The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/
her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children
for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of
the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code
is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. The
law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.

In the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals the presumption of legitimacy does
not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1) (b). Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper
case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
 Angeles v. Maglaya
G.R. No. 153798

September 2, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Franciscos estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged
having married Francisco on August 7, 1948. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be
the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only
child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage,
legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of
Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf. Respondent also offered in evidence her
birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital,
Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word
Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate?

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado.

Ruling:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove
the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. For, save for respondents gratuitous
assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents
marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. In all, no evidence whatsoever was
presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when
and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons
present, and like significant details.

Petitioner, however, contends, that [respondents] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she
is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married. The Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted.
Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who
certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record
of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the
fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth
certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition,
must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Also
respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her
student and government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is
her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving
respondents hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or
the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.
 Jao v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-49162

July 28, 1987

Facts:

On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother
and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support against private
respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test
which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of
the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, indicated that Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.

Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to appreciate the
result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should
have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.

Issue:

Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity.

Ruling:

In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given weight to the
findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of
the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the
result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the
non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented
showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for
the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact.

For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement
that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
— that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of
the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father
are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
 Babiera v. Catotal

G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

Facts:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as Presentacion) filed a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as Teofista) in the Civil
Registry of Iligan City.

Presentacion asserted 'that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that
on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/
recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera
appear as the mother by forging her signature. that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own
eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted
by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries:

a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not;

b) The signature of Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the
informant;

c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO,
her mother being single;

d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child
And it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956
because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old;

b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born;

c) Eugenio was already 65 years old

Ruling of the Court of Appeals it ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the
time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed
birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant
medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different
from her other signatures.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA failed to hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is
superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.

Ruling:

While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of
the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were
already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.

Second, there is no evidence of Hermogenas pregnancy, such as medical records and

doctors prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to
attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed
birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at
such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age
necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital. The most significant piece
of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give
birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenios.
 Liyao v Tanhoti-Liyao
G.R. No. 138961

March 7, 2002

Facts:
On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia,
filedan action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William
Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao.

The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.

The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams’s untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children
from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

Ruling:

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an
insult to his memory.

It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled
that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate
of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown,
the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed
to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo
has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of
this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother,
Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of
the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties
and within the period limited by law.
 De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon
G.R. No. 142877

October 2, 2001

Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.

Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving
behind considerable assets, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory
and Accounting" of the Dizon estate.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does
not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in
Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
Juan G. Dizon.
Ruling:

The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only
the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been
first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
 Geronimo v Santos
G.R. No. 197099

September 28, 2015

Facts:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of
possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her
father.

She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the
parcel of land and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that
lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating
to themselves the property in question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were
able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.

She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land
transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.

Defendants disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for
Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff because they had never lived or sojourned in
the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave
during the period of her service.

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of
respondent and the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
instead of the birth certificate itself. According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate
itself.

Issue:

Whether or not the secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action.

Ruling:

The Court grant the petition. Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent
offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and
the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on
secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under
Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and
proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession.

Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175,
should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child.
Stated in the case of Tison v. Court of Appeal, [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The rationale for these rules has been explained in this
wise:

"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.Thus, The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or
as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose."
 Tijing v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125901

March 8, 2001
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes
Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private
respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait
until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.When
Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith
proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelitas maid told
Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She
returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another
place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed
unmoved by her pleas for assistance.Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not
imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made
her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled
and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their
serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband
of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time
in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time
after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a
brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita
refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely,
Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in
the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She
supported her testimony with her clinical records.The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared
that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as
the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against
the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.

Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave
birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in
Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband,
Angel Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that
the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not John Thomas Lopez is actually the missing son of Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

Ruling:

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.
 First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips,
she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.
Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she
gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or
discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children
after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for
fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of
the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause
the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register
the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days
after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false
because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
 ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Cabatania v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124814

October 21, 2004

Facts:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born
on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a
maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at
the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their
sexual encounter. The sexu. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent
her home. But petitioner instead brought her towhere he rented a house for her. On September 9,
1982,, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar
planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at
home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the
afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she
was told to look for another job. According to petitioner, they spent the night in San Carlos City
and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her
about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the
following day. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by
Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they
had sex.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application of article 283 of the civil code on the
compulsory recognition and award of support in favor of respondent-appellee Camelo Regodos

Ruling:

Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary
recognition.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the
appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition
that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy. The petition is hereby granted.
 Eceta v. Eceta
G.R. No. 157037

May 20, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926.
During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several
properties, among which is the disputed property.Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and
Vicente as his compulsory heirs.

In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate
daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and
illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.

In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a casefor “Partition and Accounting with Damages" against
Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-
owner of the Cubao property. Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus
belonged to her exclusively.

Issue:

a. Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent
evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her
alleged father Vicente Eceta.

b. Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her granddaughter is enough to
prove respondent’s filiation with Vicente Eceta, the only son of petitioner.

Ruling:

Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for
partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente
Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and
admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s
granddaughter.

Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have
acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The Court find no necessity to discuss the other
issues submitted.
 Rivero v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141273

May 17, 2005

Facts:

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of
his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995.

During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the business name
Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's mother) in 1991,
assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her college education would be financed
and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and assurances of his
love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito,
Sr. then provided her with a residential house and lot located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where
they cohabited and resided; he also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5,
1995, "Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr.," the plaintiff, was born, the product of the amorous
relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley and
their son financial and moral support.

It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their
father. as such, there was a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate to preserve
his (Benedick's) rights over the same before its partition.

In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in behalf
of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship and
that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge or information; the
allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father was, likewise,
specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiff's action was for a claim against the estate
of their father, which should be filed in an action for the settlement of the estate of their deceased
parents.

The plaintiff, through counsel, filed a "Compromise Agreement". On December 13, 1996, the
trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for
partition and distribution of the latter's estate

Ruling:

The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and
Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as
the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and
Mary Jane is null and void; as such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also without force
and effect. It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of her deceased father –that the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman
hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.

Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be
made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
 People v. Bayani
G.R. No. 120894

October 3, 1996

Facts:

The complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed in the
following manner:

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1992, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Moreno Bayani, by means of force and
intimidation with the point [sic] of a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against her will.

The accused not only admitted having sexual intercourse with the complainant on the 28th
day of June 1992; he asserted, in the main, that the complainant was his mistress and that the
further acts of sexual intercourse after the said date were with her consent. As to the
complainant's motive to falsely testify against him, the accused claimed that she harbored hatred
against him because he did not stand up for her pregnancy and that she lost a boyfriend;
moreover, the accused was not able to give the amount of P5,000,00 in December 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be made to support his illegitimate child with the
complainant

Ruling:

The Court addresses the Solicitor General's recommendation that the accused should be
made to support his illegitimate child with the complainant, in conformity with Article 345(3) of
the Revised Penal Code. While it has been held that recognition of offspring of rape cannot be
ordered in the absence of evidence, in this instance, however, before both the trial court and this
Court, the accused expressly admitted paternity of the complainant's child thus giving rise to the
obligation to provide support, i.e., "But this ploy of hers boomeranged because she not only lost
her boyfriend but also Bayani who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love, if she would
not see anymore her boyfriend." With this judicial admission twice recited, the accused has
indisputably admitted his paternity of the complainant's child.

Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the
mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family
Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the
offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore,
under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only
be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case
then, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,
with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount and terms
thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
 People v Manahan
G.R. No. 128157

September 29, 1999

Facts:

Manuel Manahan alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the
court a quo. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50, 000.00 as moral damages, pay the
costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion.

Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon
opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of
her. She tried to shout but the accused covered her mouth. He then forcibly spread her legs. He
lifted her skirt, removed her panty and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her. After satisfying his lust, the accused warned the victim not to
report the incident to anyone and threatened her that should she squeal he would kill her and her
family. Thereafter, he left her. She was terribly afraid and shaken and could do nothing but cry
until dawn. Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her parents in
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. Meanwhile, on 2
October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar.

Issue:

WON THE ACCUSED IS INDEMNIFY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF THE

CHILD

Ruling:

On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a
quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall
also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in
doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v.
Guerrero, "the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we
sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

The portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a married man, to acknowledge
the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
 Alberto v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86639

June 2, 1994

Facts:

When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a
child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. In the instant case, we have,
therefore, affirmed the decision of the probate court declaring petitioner as having acquired the
status of a natural child of the deceased Juan M. Alberto and, as such, entitled to participate in the
latter's estate.

On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to
one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as
her surname in all her school records and correspondences.

On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun, died
intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate, after
the publication of notices, she was appointed as the administratrix of the estate. On September
15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open
the proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as
such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.

Issue:

May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the
deceased’s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her
claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?

Ruling:

We rule in the affirmative.

In the probate court, the following have been established:

1) That prior to Juan M. Alberto's marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein private respondent, Juan M.
Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of herein petitioner, were sweethearts;

2) That as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived and gave birth to herein
petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953;

3) That petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school records and Juan M. Alberto was
known to be her father;

4) That through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was given to Aurora Reniva;

5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, the youngest sister of
Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first meeting between petitioner and Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC
and during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and
two telephone numbers;

6) That Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in her school, International
School, if not for his untimely death on September 18, 1967;

7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of Juan M. Alberto’s
death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way for her as she was a
daughter of Juan M. Alberto;

8) That after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother, Saturnina Alberto
introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latter’s sister;

9) That the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece and introduced her to
their children as the eldest daughter of Juan M. Alberto;

10) That the children of Juan M. Alberto’s siblings regarded her as their cousin;

11) That petitioner was known by Juan M. Alberto’s friends as his daughter;

12) That Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner and remarked that those
were the grades of his daughter.
 Letters presented by Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto do not prove that Juan M.
Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated was that Aurora
Reniva was having a difficult time raising a child by her own self and therefore, she was seeking
the assistance of Juan M. Alberto.
 Nepomuceno v. Lopez

G.R. No. 181258

March 18, 2010

Facts:

Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez
(Araceli), filed a Complaintfor recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno
(petitioner).

Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital
affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of
Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated
himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1, 500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month beginning August 15, 1999.

Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel
prayed that petitioner be ordered to:

(1) Recognize her as his child,

(2) Give her support and

(3) Give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.

Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and
that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the
National People’s Army. On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered
petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support

Issue:
 Whether or not the absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not
entitled to support from the putative parent.

Ruling:

The above quoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels
filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) Vis--vis Article 175 of
the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the
child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial
agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an
acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate
of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the
same.

At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide
financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The petition
is GRANTED.
 Cruz v. Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422

August 7, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.

On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land. Sometime in the

year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners learned
that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
transferred its title to their names.

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and
private responfor Annulment of Title and Damages was filed by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer,
they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents

To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa,Anselmo,and the late Socorrowere presented. In the case of Mercedes who
was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to
1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

The trial court rendered a judgment dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to
prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth
certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioner’s inaction for a long period
of time amounts to laches. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to
recover their share of the subject property because of laches.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal

Ruling:

The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal.

Article 172 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

In the present case, the were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable
documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification

Issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to
the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were
all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
 Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners
enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of
Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove
filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child.

In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof
to refute the petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal.

The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children
of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
 Perla v. Baring

G.R. No. 172471

November 12, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively
respondents), filed for support against Antonio. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and
Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation,
Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he
abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio
be ordered to support Randy.

Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy.
Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his common-
law wife nor was she treated as such.

On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy. She presented Randy’s Certificate
of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child.
Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. Next to
take the witness stand was Randy who at that time was just 15 years old. Randy claimed that he
knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as his father. When Randy asked him for
support, Antonio promised that he would support him.

Ruling of the Trial Court, the RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief
sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the
15-year old Randy testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals is that the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision is affirmed.

Issue:
 Whether the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy.

Ruling:

Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the applicable provision on illegitimate
filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of Randy’s birth certificate and baptismal
certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and
nothing more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature.

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio
since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."

"To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot
be attributed to pure charity.1âwphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only
the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously."

Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good
proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of
the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity.

Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support
him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To
emphasize, "[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for
this ground to exist." Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other
acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.
 Tijing v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125901

March 8, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes
Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private
respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an
urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita
to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of
Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing
laundry.When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there.
Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to
come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover that Angelita
had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to
the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.Although estranged from her
husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their
youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida
and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.Four years
later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly
the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy,
Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son
Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to
her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas
Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely,
Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in
the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She
supported her testimony with her clinical records.The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared
that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as
the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against
the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.

Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she
gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban
in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband,
Angel Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989 the trial court concluded
that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of
John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida
showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not John Thomas Lopez is actually the missing son of Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

Ruling:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
testfor identification and parentage testing.
The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.
 Augustin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 162571
June 15, 2005

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite. In their complaint,
respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999.
Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by
Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested
to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret
lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with
(Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she
proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-
and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned
out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of
even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means
to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring
potential customers to the car aircon repair shop here she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that
Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the
United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling
people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their
last intimacy was sometime in 1998. Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community
tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were
falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married
and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. He also moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a
forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by
the putative father.

Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

Ruling:
Petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of
proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no
merit. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing.

Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the

admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered
from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the
rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well
as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12
and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
 The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits
of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect
time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is
a valid means of determining paternity.
 Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220
June 15, 2005
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where
she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular
Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.

Issue:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our
judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit

Ruling:
 The petition has no merit before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem
it appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall
consider the requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity
and filiation.
This Court’s rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of
paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of
the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures[ are
sufficient to establish filiation. Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner
to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejoand Yatarto illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as
evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz
and Daubert-Kumhogo into the weight of the evidence.
 People v. Vallejo

G.R. No. 144656

May 9, 2002

Facts:

On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her
neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor,
helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child
wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of
Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he
was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told
the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested
for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes
were submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the
NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from
Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were
bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s
Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA
profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when
trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the
cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
(including his clothing – which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene – though
not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo
was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.
Issue:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case.

The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and
for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s
body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched
with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.32 the test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then
be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
 Estate of Ong v. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713

December 17, 2007

Facts:

The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne
Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court
formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong
with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority.
Rogelio died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA
justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable
and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute."



Issue: 

Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.



Ruling:

Yes. The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence
allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating
from the person's body, ie.Blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, and even
inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would

be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
 Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710
June 6, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.
He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile,
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient
in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for
filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse
failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.

Issue:

Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

Ruling:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case
is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The
DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider
as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude
a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however,
that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally
order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The
same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
 Guy v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006

Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a.
Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled
without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss
alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release
of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and
all liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion
ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have
validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-
forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.

Ruling:
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
 during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based
upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of
evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be
impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This
Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a
full-blown trial.
 Marquino v Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72078
June 27, 1994

Facts:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of
Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly
of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of
an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she
died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in
holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action
already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish
such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

Issue:

Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs

Ruling:
The Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never
be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in
an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
 Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor
G.R. No. 174680
March 24, 2008

Facts:
Antonia Perla filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against the respondent for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262 and asked for financial
support.
She alleged that respondent is the father of her child. The man, however, made a denial of
the claim of his being the father of the child and that the signature appearing in the child
Certificate of Live Birth is not his signature. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
there is no prior judgment establishing the filiation of the child hence, there is no basis to order
support.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC made error in judgment in dismissing the case and in requiring
the petitioner to first prove filiation before support is granted

Ruling:
No, the RTC made no error in so doing. Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain
support for her child. The object of RA 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and
safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a
protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the
wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she
may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved.
 The proper remedies therefore are Action for Compulsory Recognition to Establish
Filiation. Afterwards, she can demand support and Action for Support, where one of the issues is
filiation To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. (Art. 195, Family Code). The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a
judicial action for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights
but their filiation must be duly proved.
 Grande v. Antonio

G.R. No. 206248

February 18, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period
of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by
respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval
of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/
Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

Issue:
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the
application of Art. 176 of the Family Code

Ruling:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or
her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children.
But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.
Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no
legal basis.
 Dela Cruz v. Gracia
G.R. No. 177728
July 31, 2009
Facts:
For several months in 2005, petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but 2 months before she gave birth, Dominique died.
When Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s
surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which
she submitted the an unsigned autobiography of Dominique acknowledging paternity of the
unborn child.
On November 11, 2005, the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name “because he was born
out of wedlock 

and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child” Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/ registration
of name against respondent before the RegionalTrial Court of Antipolo City. The trial court held
that even if Dominique was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does
not contain any express recognition of paternity.

Issue:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor
Christian dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a “private handwritten
instrument” within the contemplation of article 176 of the family code

Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the
putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of
the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature. Petition is
granted. Special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned
by him, and substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. 



Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount consideration” in resolving
questions affecting him.
 Briones v. Miguel
G.R. No. 156343
October 18, 2004

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to
include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on
March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o‘clock in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his
Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor
child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away.

Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child.
He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and
during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such
that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as
the biological father -- should have custody.
 According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she
cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in
Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister
temporary custody over the minor. At present, however, the child is already with his mother in
Japan, where he is studying, thus rendering petitioner‘s argument moot. While the Petition for
Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion
for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of
the minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the
Motion for lack of merit. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity
 Republic v. Abadilla
G.R. No. 133054
January 28, 1999

Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname ―Abadillaǁ‖ and the name of their father was entered as ―Hersonǁ‖ Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children‘s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor
children, Emerson and Rafael, filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates. The petition
was granted. The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office
of the Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it
allowed the deletion of the ―date and place of marriage of parentsǁ‖ from the birth certificates of
minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors
‘surname from ―Abadilla to ―Celestino.

Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.

Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino
 Verceles v. Posada
GR. No. 159785
April 27, 2007

Facts:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would
have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects. On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went
to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same
day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the
progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted
the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor. Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door,
led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and
would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development
coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime
in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared
she was pregnant

Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner
was proven.

Ruling:
 The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s
Filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no
evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
 People v Glabo
G.R. No. 129248
December 7, 2001
Facts:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and
her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his
house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore,
accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away
from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she
was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie
down. He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made
push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant‘s brute strength. She shouted
for help, but there were no neighbors nearby. Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run
back to the house for shelter. She went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above
the ground. While underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She
looked up through the bamboo floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both
were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant‘s penis as he stood up and
raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However,
the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was
her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila
to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court

Issue:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.

Ruling:
 Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as
the law itself provides for the child‘s status.ǁ‖ Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.
 Tonog v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002

Facts:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and
her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his
house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore,
accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away
from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she
was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie
down. He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made
push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant‘s brute strength. She shouted
for help, but there were no neighbors nearby. Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run
back to the house for shelter. She went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above
the ground. While underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She
looked up through the bamboo floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both
were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant‘s penis as he stood up and
raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However,
the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was
her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila
to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court

Issue:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.

Ruling:
 Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as
the law itself provides for the child‘s status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code
 Mossesgeld v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111455
December 23, 1998

Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating that the child‘s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge
at the hospital refused to place the presumed father‘s surname as the child‘s surname in the
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration. Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer
in charge of the local civil registrar‘s office, rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil
Registrar General‘s Circular No. 4, which provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code,
illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon
inquiring about the status of the status of the registration of his child, Calasan was furnished with
a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General denying the registration of the certificate of live
birth on the grounds that it is contrary to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus
with the Pasig RTC to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his
illegitimate son using his surname. His petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration
and a motion to for leave to amend the petition to substitute the child‘s mother as the petitioner.
His motion to be granted, but motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC‘s decision

Issue:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register the
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father‘s surname where the latter
admitted paternity.
Ruling:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of
their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in their
record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been
acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support inconformity
with the provisions of the Family Code.
 Silva v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114742
July 17, 1997

Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow
Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company
on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva
often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children

Issue:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.

Ruling:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva
(the father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority
from immigrating to Holland with her two children
 David v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995

Facts:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married,
and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually
followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar‘s
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie‘s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal
family. Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family
to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had
enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and
ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of
suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition

Issue:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie

Ruling:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary
support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar,
was married to another woman other than his mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is
under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
have custody of him. And because she has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no
distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the
custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that Villar has
recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
 De Santos v. Angeles
G.R. No. 105619
December 12, 1995

Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their
relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow
doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to
Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his
de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia
died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981,
Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00. On May 15,
1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in
connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that
the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner
decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter
alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private
respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to
Sofia's death in 1967
The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de
Santos. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since
only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her
half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.

Ruling:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of
parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have
been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural
child."

435
 Abadilla v. Tagbiliran
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716
October 25, 1995

Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the
grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With
respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on
deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla
be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was
neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had
begotten her 3 children.

Issue:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

Ruling:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural. Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation: 1) The rationale
of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years
after the birth of the child.
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent
and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife
died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay,
attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the
Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate
and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
 ADOPTED CHILDREN

Republic v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100835

October 26, 1993

Facts:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married
Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the
petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.

On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not can the spouses adopt the minors?

Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91,
Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt
when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now
expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When
one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife
jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code
 Republic v. Toledano

G.R. No. 94147

June 8, 1994

Facts:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of
adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,
1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a
widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her
son. The RTC granted the petition

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.

Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included
in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185
requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 18.
 Republic v. Alarcon

G.R. No. 95551

March 20, 1997

Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages
13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of
the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They
have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to
the adoption. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending
that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general
rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens. Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and,
therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he
does not fall under any of the three afore quoted exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not
married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the
petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not
provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his
or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may
jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint
adoption and making it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid

Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other." None of the above exceptions applies to
Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and
sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption
 In Re: Petitions for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim

G.R. Nos. 168992-93

May 21, 2009

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen,
Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word ―shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being
 In Re: Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim

G.R. Nos. 168992-93

May 21, 2009

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen,
Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word ―shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being
 Landingin v. Republic

G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former‘s brother, and Amelia
Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2
children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being
supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, and she voluntarily consented. However,
petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptee‘s biological mother

Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of
the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover,
abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption
 Cang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105308

September 25, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple‘s relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband‘s alleged extramarital
affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged
illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal Separation with alimony pendente lite with the
then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the
joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to ―live separately and apart
or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued
the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie,
reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times and placesǁ‖ to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. Upon learning of the
petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition
thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were ―too meagerǁ‖ compared to
theirs, he could not ―in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody
over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished
custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them?

Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word ―abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of ―putting under a ban. The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one‘s
rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports ―any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t
abandoned them. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory
 Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362.

July 18, 1997

Facts:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on
the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and
recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when
the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD
in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have
any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there
was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption

Issue:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social
welfare officer of the court

Ruling:
 No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such
petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after
such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure,
was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges,
particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts
hearing adoption cases: (1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru
its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases
already filed; (2) To strictly comply with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree.
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall
coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the
preparation and submittal of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and
social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that
respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have
been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption
proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was
observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in
jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption,
after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an
unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal
terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a
matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in
the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to actaccordingly, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this
Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen,
Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and
Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED
for violating Circular No. 12
 Republic v. Hernandez
GR No. 117209
February 9, 1996

Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to
Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to
his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the
change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition
for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and
rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform to that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the
adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and
since this would involve a substantial change of one‘s legal name, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites
therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of
causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against
the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of
action in a single petition

Issue:
 Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or
proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption

Ruling:
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee‘s surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident
in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one‘s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name
being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial law system.
 Republiv v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103695
March 15, 1996

Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime
B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old,
who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed
with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: a)
Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes; b.)
Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and c) That the surname of the
child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name this was mistakenly
registered as ―MIDAEL be corrected to ―MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground
for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption
because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of
"Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case
involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a
separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as
well as for the Government and the Courts."

Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the
minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court,
correctly did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both
the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied
with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor,
is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons
 In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005

Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother‘s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother‘s
surname, and that her surname―Garciaǁ‖ be changed to ―Catindig his surname
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the
Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner‘s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
 Teotico v. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965

Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix
Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before
the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all
parties concerned
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister
of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of
the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional
ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void
with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession

Issue:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding

Ruling:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
 Bartolome v Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531
November 12, 2014

Facts:
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he
was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to your claim because you are no
longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO
COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child
shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D.
626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of
the deceased and not herein appellant.A

Issue:
Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered
secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the
ECP?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court also noted that three years after the adoption decree, Cornelio died
while John was still a minor. John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant
factor because under such circumstance, parental authority must be deemed to have reverted back
to the biological parent. Adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by virtue of adoption—who was then left to care for the adopted minor child if the
adopter passed away?

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not
entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit
from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by
the following rules:

When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted
concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents
or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters; when only collateral blood relatives of the
adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply. The Supreme
Court thus ordered the ECC to release the benefits to petitioner Bartolome.
 Geronimo v. Santos

G.R. No. 197099

September 28, 2015

Facts:

On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of
possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her
father.

She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the
parcel of land and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that
lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating
to themselves the property in question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were
able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.

She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land
transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.

Defendants disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for
Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff because they had never lived or sojourned in
the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave
during the period of her service.

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of
respondent and the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
instead of the birth certificate itself. According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate
itself.

Issue:

Whether or nt the secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action.

Ruling:

In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that

she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal
certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records.
She also testified that she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.

By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents had been
unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez- Badua’s supposed father were able to rebut all
of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-
Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after
ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36 of great
significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement: the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption,
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child,and
even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which
is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the
statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent
Angelina and her codefendantsin SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, inview
of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, arebereft of any such evidence.
 Lahom v. Sibulo

G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and
pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his
death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by
petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued
using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records
with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo
originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with
his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo
That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household
helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or
four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg
ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a
love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.
That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by
their desire for some material benefits from petitioner
That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil
Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection
towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"

Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?

Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
SUPPORT

 CONCEPT

Lim-Lua v. Lua
G.R. No. 175279
June 5, 2013

Facts:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support
pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing,RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family
Code, stating that support is demandable from the timeplaintiff needed the said support but is
payable only from the date of judicial demand,and thus also granted support pendente lite of
P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months that lapsed). Respondent filed an MFR asserting
that petitioner is not entitled tospousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself
a separate dwellingfrom their children and respondent has continued to support the family for
their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to
the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable andbeyond the intendment
of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The MFR was denied. His
second MFR also having been denied,respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court said that
the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel
expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well,
and thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total supportin
arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted thelack of
contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in deducting said amount from the current total support in
arrears.

Ruling:
The Court declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. As a matter of law, the
amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of
the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to
pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on
account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not have
allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite.

 ACTUAL NEED VS. CAPACITY TO PAY

Lam v. Chua
G.R. No. 131286
March 18, 2004

Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and
Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul
Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity
of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to
go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the
conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was
forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the
separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been
separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her,
subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be
declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support

Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.
 WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

Briones v. Miguel
G.R. No. 156343
October 18, 2004

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to
include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas
Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before
this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o‘clock
in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his
Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor
child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away.

Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child.
He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and
during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such
that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as
the biological father -- should have custody. According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the
country. When she is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is
that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated
May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor. At present, however, the
child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying thus rendering petitioner‘s
argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed
on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein that
respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and
her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit. Having been born outside a
valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.
 Quimiguing v. Icao
G.R. No. L-26795
July 31, 1970

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant
and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month,
damages and attorney‘s fees.
The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of
cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a
result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that ―no amendment
was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of actionǁ‖.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen‘s complaint.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that ―a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations
and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742. Lower court‘s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the
order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this
constitutes a clear violation of Carmen‘s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for
the damage caused. Wherefore, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case
be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao.



 Francisco v. Zandueta
G.R. No. 43794
August 9, 1935

Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario
Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case,
alleging that he is the latter‘s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied
the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his
baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio‘s birth. Despite the denial of paternity
however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly
pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for
certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in compromise,
agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during the pendency of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his
status as petitioner‘s son.

Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner‘s counsel really agreed to have him pay
the pension during the case‘s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case
of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can
be derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad
litem, his civil status as the petitioner‘s son. As such, no right of support can be given because the
very civil status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in question. It held that ―(t)here is
no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in
the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter
case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption,
there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be
confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.ǁ‖ Additionally, the
respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein
private respondent‘s absence of aforementioned status.
 Santero v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-61700
September 14, 1987

Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children
with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had
four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to
their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died. During the pendency of the administration proceedings
with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance
(allegedly without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes
tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the
administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were
no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel
are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said
expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed
another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito,
all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a
sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of
their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite. Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended
order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or
explanation as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in her
clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children were included for
support and the three children were then of age should have been included since all her children
have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of
the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners.
Issues:
1. Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
2. Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?

Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be
regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the
New Civil Code. Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was
just to follow the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners
and private respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
 Gotardo v. Buling
G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012

Facts:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support
460endent lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the
petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties‘ failure to amicably settle the
dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued. The respondent
testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed
that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the
petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. The respondent responded by filing a complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for
breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the
case. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did
not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24,
1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer
the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support
460endent lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week
of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months)
when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the
case, the RTC, on the respondent‘s motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support,
retroactive from March 1995.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.
Ruling:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one‘s
filiation may be a ―baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name
has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It
may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
 Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic
G.R. No. 189516
June 8, 2016

Facts:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias
(Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000,
Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with
Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly
support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit, stating:
“That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the Office of the
Provost Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection with a complaint affidavit submitted to said
Office by my wife Mrs. Edna M. Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits
from the AFP; That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated
among my wife and five (5) children; That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing
to enter into Agreement with my wife covering the same…”

On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived
50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of
Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. The agreement was
honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines]
suddenly decided not to honor the agreement” between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate
family.

In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment. In another letter15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP
PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias'
pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate court.”

Issue:
Whether or not Edna and their children are entitled to support from Colonel Otamias’
pension.

Ruling:
Yes, under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is practically
equivalent to the "right to life." The "right to life" always takes precedence over "property rights."
The "right to support/life" is also a substantive right which always takes precedence over
technicalities/procedural rules.
The right to receive support is provided under the Family Code. Article 194 of the Family
Code defines support as follows:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
Also, when Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his
right to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
 WHEN DEMANDABLE

Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644
August 28, 2006

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner
left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea‘s
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea‘s) mother and then with her brother Noel
Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea‘s
mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a
period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.

Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents,
Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay
support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand
having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to
complete his point:Article 203 – the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time
the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid
except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. To petitioner, his obligation to pay
under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since
only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.
 WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 163209
October 30, 2009

Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward‘s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano
Lim (Mariano). Edward‘s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. On 14 October 1990,
Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors),
after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua
Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and
her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to
provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.

Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much– they limit
their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority,
petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children‘s minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter‘s offspring ends with them.
 Verceles v. Posada
G.R. No. 159785
April 27, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor
of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner‘s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor‘s office
starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to
attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel. On November 11, 1986, at
around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from “My Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was
being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their
companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions were nowhere.
After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and
closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she
hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went
on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance
projects.

Issue:
Whether or not there is proof of filiation.

Ruling:
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are
as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. The letters, one of which is quoted above, are
private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s filiation under Article
172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the
dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, is convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna
Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child. Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence
presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled
is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. the other, was indeed quite
pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of
thoughtfulness and concern for one another‘s well-being. The photographs presented by
petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of
these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled
at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could
not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have
disowned them. Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina.
 Mangonon v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125041
June 30, 2006

Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February
1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon
City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the
annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner,
she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as
private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica
and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was
admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said
universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education
because of the following: i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US
$22,000/year, broken down as follows: Tuition Fees US$13,000.00 Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00 Yearly Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00 Total US$ 22,000.00 Or a
total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina.

Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support
Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the
second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another‘s well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them. Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this
principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred
by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has
the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.
 De Guzman v. Perez
G.R. No. 156013
July 25, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying
law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent
became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner‘s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987. Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another
woman with whom he begot two children. Petitioner sent money for Robby‘s schooling only
twice — the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill,
petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the child‘s hospitalization and
medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial
support for his son. In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby‘s needs,
private respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years.
It was only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him
to school. However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to
provide for her and Robby‘s needs. The child‘s continued education thus became uncertain.

Issue:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his
station in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect

Ruling:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does
not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the
neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education
which the family‘s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent‘s faithful
compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioner‘s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to
shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge
against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. – (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of
child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum
period. The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child‘s
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code." The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime
(known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.



 Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic
G.R. No. 189516
June 8, 2016

Facts:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias
(Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000,
Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with
Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly
support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an
Affidavit, stating:
“That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the Office of the
Provost Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection with a complaint affidavit submitted to said
Office by my wife Mrs. Edna M. Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits
from the AFP; That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated
among my wife and five (5) children; That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing
to enter into Agreement with my wife covering the same…”

On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived
50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of
Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. The agreement was
honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines]
suddenly decided not to honor the agreement” between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate
family.

In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment. In another letter15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP
PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias'
pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate court.”

Issue:
Who must pay support in this case?

Ruling:
Under Article 195 of the Family Code, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.

Thus, the non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the action for
support was proper, considering that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not the
persons obliged to give support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest. Nor was
the AFP PGMC a necessary party because complete relief could be obtained even without
impleading the AFP PGMC.
 RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY

Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644
August 28, 2006

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born onDecember 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner
left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea‘s
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea‘s) mother and then with her brother Noel
Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea‘s
mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a
period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. It
appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for
support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to
give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Lea‘s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years
and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward‘s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to
help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St.
Paul’s College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters,
filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as
amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred
that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable
lands, has not provided them support since 1976.
They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward‘s failure and neglect, their mother had, from
time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had
received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00to P600,000.00. In his Answer,
Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained,
however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his
neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed financial
constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the
complaint. As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and
Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and
other conditions set forth in the court‘s corresponding order of May 13, 1996. The RTC rende
red on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In
that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their
defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years,
of support in arrears. In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
the appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Article
207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The
provision reads: When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy
individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. Mention may
also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and
Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching
himself at the expense of another. Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss
in his duty to provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At
bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it
is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to
right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioner‘s daughters.
 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118671
January 29, 1996

Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs: (a.)
Edmond Ruiz– only son; (b.) Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter; (c.) Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator bequeathed to
his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among
Ruiz and respondents. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate
and approval of the deceased‘s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.
Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters
was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the
Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the
one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay
the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of
P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court admitted the
will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the
filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as
executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. Prayed for release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent
payments be given to the 3 granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted
the motion of Montes due to Edmond‘s lack of opposition. Probate Court ordered the release of
the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. CA sustained
probate court‘s order.

Issues:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of
the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren b) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirs c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Ruling:
No. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. In settlement
of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: a. after all the
debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
c.Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained
 d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the
estate: If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions
as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance; at the
time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles
only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law
e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated:
- The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner
before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for
release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of
the said court.
- Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
- The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of
the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall
proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.

The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
 SUPPORT DURING THE PROCEEDINGS
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
OR LEGAL SEPARATION

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
G.R. No. L-48219
February 28, 1979

Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on
June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt,
wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her
driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support
pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support
on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-
Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for
reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the
pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The
judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari
in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband
appeal to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

Ruling:
Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will
not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the
pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the
case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the
period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the
accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and
because it wasn‘t excessive.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY 

 CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Silva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114742
July 17, 1997

Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children,
namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and
Suzanne had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends.
The legal conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation
rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights
to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no
case should Silva take the children out without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an
appeal from the RTC‘s decision to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten
married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC.
The CA, stated that as alleged by Suzanne, Silva‘s womanizing would have a negative influenc
e on the children.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
2. Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.

Ruling:
 The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon
City RTC‘s decision favoring Silva‘s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne‘s written
permission. The Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his
illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children. The Court clarified: ―Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and
legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents;
neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither
the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the
well-being of the child. The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child
(Art. 176 of the Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate
children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their
children. This right is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this
right for him. Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his
visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise
of her parental authority from immigrating to Holland with her two children. The right to
visitation and the duty to pay child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father
of the illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation, then there will be
no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father must file a petition asking the court to
settle the terms and conditions.

 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said
Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
- The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
- The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
- The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
- The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
- The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
- The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
- The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
- The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

Issue:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy).

Ruling:
Yes, Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State
to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage
and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and
violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)
(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective
surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor
child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

 TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

Facts: In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where
she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents. Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In
March 1992, the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In
May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the
judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In
1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court issued a
resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of
Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution. Edgar, thus, filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon
motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the custody of
Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is
entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin
Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second,
Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.

Issue: Whether or not Dinah Tonog, the mother is entitled to the temporary custody of the child
pending the guardianship proceeding.

Ruling: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision.
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of
the Family Code provides that ―[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.ǁ‖ It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As
explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother hasseen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule
has to be for ―compelling reasonsǁ‖ for the good of the child. For these reasons, even a mother
may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for ―compelling
reasons.ǁ‖ Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference,
but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding
the child‘s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody
may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. In the case at bar, we are being asked
to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings
for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been
made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the
said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a
mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari,
we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties‘ respective
merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as
the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori,
her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the
custody over her person. For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the
subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final
judgment of the trial court.
 VANCIL vs. BELMES
G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001

Facts: Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-
law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent. On August 13, 1987,
Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had
already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27,
1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where
they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia
was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen. On October 12, 1988,
the trial court rejected and denied Helen‘s motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

Ruling: Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code
provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father‘s decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor
Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. "Of considerable
importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‗the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,‘ a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of
the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." Bonifacia contends that she is
more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia‘s claim to be the guardian of said minor can
only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family
Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx." Bonifacia, as the surviving
grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor‘s
guardian, Helen‘s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that
Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie
several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding. Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone
else who may not also qualify as a guardian. There is nothing in the law which requires the
courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact
that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find
much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are
not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement;
the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who
are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
 BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY
G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001

Facts: Respondent Fouzi, 31 years of age and Sabrina, 20 years old were married on February
3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four (4)
months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion
was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of their union,
they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on
September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their
marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom
he later divorced. After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati
City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more
than two years. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother
in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he
got an order from the court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at
De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City . On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children
baptized as Christians and their names changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago
Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on
various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would
wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic
law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a
fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school,
the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they
would ride the jeepney in going home from school. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the
parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner
filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were
Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion. The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No.
1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this case because the spouses were not yet
divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The
Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and financially to look
after the best interest of his minor children.

Issue: Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a
Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of
Islam in the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children.

Ruling: The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any
parent are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children, and [2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
parents. The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to
Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-
Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the
Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is
the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the
ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211
of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the
parents are not divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and
reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate children.
 SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997

Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the
couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely
Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while
Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the
custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later,
Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US
with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child
was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.
The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of
custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child.

Ruling: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father and
mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her
minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. Thus, Teresita does not have the
right to the custody of the child.
 SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996

Facts: Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in
Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was
brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner
did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not
be discharged as a result. Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was
only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully
detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily
dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in
Caloocan. Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who
claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of
petitioner‘s complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the
child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named
Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn‘t entirely
sure that it was Arabella. On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong‘s favor and
ordered the respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the
following issues raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-
vis the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed
petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be
under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child‘s welfare be the
paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody. The RTC decision was
reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella.

Ruling: Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. ―The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient. To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the
basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that ―except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty.

In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where ―the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.ǁ‖
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we
have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child. The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case
will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right
of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the
petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in
the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent. Petition is dismissed.
 GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the
CA which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor
daughter Simone. Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted
to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came
to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin‘s permission for her to
bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to
Boracay. Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce
Simone in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes
of their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody
in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below.

Ruling: The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother‘s unfitness.
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor
child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother‘s
custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby awarded to the mother, petitioner
Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
______________________________________________________________________________
 PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005

Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year
old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school
when she left him. The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife
failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not
care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child.
Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian
relations. The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded
the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: ―Art 213. In case of separation of parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take
into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.ǁ‖ No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise, this Court has held that
when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: ―Art
363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reason for such measure.
 SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents
herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers,
visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents
contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely
spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a
"Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8,
1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel
Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the
Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the
trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to
award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under
Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when
both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been
successfully shown by private respondents.

Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

Ruling: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of
a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of
the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to
remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only
child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him
custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being
a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who
are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy
from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
 DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children,
all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed
into an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to
them. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles
City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie
were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.In
the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with
his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.

Ruling: Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule
102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as
the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason
separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
For example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the
proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter
be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to
marry a man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the
child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is
entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.
213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Although the question of support
is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact
that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for
payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under
Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle
thereto." In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the
mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over
him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent).
\
 ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the
United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of
giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo
and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by
his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her
family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children
be granted.

Ruling: Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the
custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values
against the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent
with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit
person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been
affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
 PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996

Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a
registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally
gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice
and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist
visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.
After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a
five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind
to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they
had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she
changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after
winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II‘s first birthday,
the couple was no longer
on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husband‘s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where
he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest,
the couple failed to reconcile. Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her.
The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by
Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s order and held that granting custody to
the boy‘s father would be for the child‘s best interest and welfare.

Issue: Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

Ruling: Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also
contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
―SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife
are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care,
custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of
moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefor. The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of
age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word ―shallǁ‖ in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6
of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. The general rule that a child
under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the basic need
of a child for his mother‘s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the
court‘s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has long been
settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of
the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child provides: ―In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. In the case, financial capacity is not a
determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means.
Nerissa‘s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her
son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are
still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also,
delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract
from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture,
children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Ray‘s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic,
works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the
love and care that a mother gives to his child.
 DACASIN VS. DACASIN
GR. NO. 168785 FEBRUARY 05, 2010

Facts: Herald, an American, and Sharon, a Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994.
They were blessed with one daughter, Stephanie who wasborn on September 21, 1995. In June
1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent the sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On January 28, 2002, both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie.
In 2004,Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over
Stephanie contrary to their agreement. The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking
cognizance over thesuit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce
itsdivorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie torespondent; (2) the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the“nationality rule” prevailing in this
jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is voidfor contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil
Code prohibitingcompromise agreements on jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit
andenforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.

Ruling: The trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of
power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction for
the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its Judgment for Dissolution.
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of
the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the
Illinois court’s so called “retained jurisdiction.
 LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R.No. 70890 September 18, 1992

Facts: On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single
gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The
respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter‘s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing
the complaint of Julie Ann‘s parents.

Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent
Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Ruling: Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility
in monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by
means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly
checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
 TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a
civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings
before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto
had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed
petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.

Issues:
a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant petition.

b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal
had been filed out of time.
Ruling: Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit
or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental
authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Parental liability is a natural or logical
consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident,
parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. ―Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code.
 AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON
G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011

Facts: This case is about the private school‘s liability for the outside catechist‘s act of shoving a
student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and
not move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis‘ grade three
religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him.
Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and
went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs
several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate‘s seat. She also made the
child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria
Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin
and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons
also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the Intons
sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney‘s fees, for the hurt
that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria‘s personal claims
but ruled in Jose Luis‘ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney‘s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They
elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin.

Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for
the damages awarded to Jose Luis.

Ruling: No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers
to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin‘s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school‘s grade
three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in
public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin‘s teaching methods. The Intons had
not refuted the school directress‘ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of
taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records,
certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came
from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a
classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her.
 ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010

Facts: While inside the premises of St. Joseph‘s College, the class where respondent Miranda
belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings
under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the
adviser is Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without
having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of
the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held
by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson‘s eye and the
different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson‘s eyes were
chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his wound had not
completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery. Upon learning of the incident and
because of the need for finances, [Jayson‘s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back
home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November
23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Jason and his parents
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to the
petitioner‘s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each
one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.

Ruling: Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason‘s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct
of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The
defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will
not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in
the supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the
maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous
experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees
because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take
affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety
reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide
protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary‘s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary‘s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along
with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by
James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the
jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against
James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary‘s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary‘s Academy is liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.

Ruling: The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of
negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. Hence,
with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not
the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
 AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

Facts: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and
deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending
all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon
and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was
later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved.

Issue: Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the
death of Alfredo Amadora.

Ruling: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo
singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old
academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with
the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters
or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are
not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there‘s no showing that he was
negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules
and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn‘t
present can‘t be considered against him because he wasn‘t required to report on that day. Classes
had already ceased.
 SALVOSA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
GR. No. L-70458 October 5,1998

Facts: Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon.
Salvosa being the (Executive Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of
the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the school‘s ROTC Unit.
As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He
received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an
employee (officer) of the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of
BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
under Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

Ruling: Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of
such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands,
to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180 — 'so
long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that
the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are
at attendance in the school , including recess time." In line with the case of Palisoc , a student not
"at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is embraced
in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by
its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. Upon the
foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
 PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Facts: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the school‘s academic community, while in
the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit
against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of
action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

Ruling: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of
a tort even when there obtains a contract. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily
follow that PSBA is absolved form liability. When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student
with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills
to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while
in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death. Petition denied.
NAMES AND SURNAMES

 USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN

Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

G.R. No. 1629202
March 5, 2010

Facts:
While her marriage with Francisco R. Rallonza was still subsisting, Maria Virginia V.
Remo applied to renew her passport which was about to expire on October 27, 2000. With her
renewal application is the request to revert to her maiden name. When her request was eventually
denied, she brought her request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign
Affairs also denied her request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use
her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married
name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the
implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and
death of the husband.
The Office of the President also affirmed the Secretary’s ruling when Remo’s case was
brought to it. The CA likewise also affirmed the ruling. Consequently, Remo filed a petition for
review before the Supreme Court. She argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996)
conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife
to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court.

Issue:
 Whether or not Remo can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage

Ruling:
No. Indeed, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides, and as settled in the case of Yasin vs.
Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court, a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to
use her husband’s surname upon marriage. This means that she is free to either use her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. This is so because when a woman marries, she
only changes her civil status and not her name. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. It
does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. The Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) actually allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first
time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, if a woman chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in
her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still
do so. The DFA will never prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 which are; 1) death of husband, 2) divorce, 3) annulment, or 4) nullity of
marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she cannot resume her maiden name in
the renewed passport.
 Yasin v. Judge Shari’a District Court
G.R. No. 94986
February 23, 1995

Facts:
Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name” on May 5, 1990. The respondent court ordered amendments to
the petition because it was lacking in form and substance in accordance with Rule 103, Rules of
Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly
indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been
known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition
filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use
of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another
woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the
petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden
name and surname.

Issue:
Whether or not a woman is required to file a petition for change of name and comply with
the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of court when she desires to resume her maiden
name in the case of annulment, divorce under the Code of Muslim Laws, and her husband is
married again to another woman

Ruling:
NO. When a woman marries, she does not need to apply and/or seek judicial authority to
use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding
her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right under Article 370
of the Civil Code. Similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case of death of the
husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.
When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil
status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband
after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage,
after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not
obligatory except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before
the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so
as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce
from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
 USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

In re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005

Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the
Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower
court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father

Ruling:
Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.
 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
 In re Julian Lin Wang
G.R. No. 159966
March 30, 2005

Facts:
When Julian was born on February 20, 1998 in Cebu City, his parents were not yet
married to each other. When they eventually got married on September 22, 1998,they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Julian’s parents planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister
who was born in Singapore, his mother decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court
seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought
in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because
of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not
carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a
person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said
that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there
is no reason why this right should be taken from Julian considering that he was still a minor. It is
only when he reaches majority could he decide whether to change his name by dropping his
middle name.

Issue:
Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname
Ruling:
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged
by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his
mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle
name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the present case, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of
his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
 In re Change of Name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
G.R. No. L-51201
May 29, 1980

Facts:
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital. On June 15, 1952, she was registered at the local Civil Registrar’s Office
as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. She was baptized with the same name at the St.
Anthony de Padua Church in Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte. She lived and was taken cared of by her aunt and uncle, Mr. and Mrs.
Hector Alfon in Mandaluyong for twenty-three years. Her scholastic records from elementary to
college showed that she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. The petitioner also exercised her right of
suffrage under the same name and she has not committed any felony or misdemeanor. The
petitioner filed a verified petition on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed
from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The court partially granted
her petition changing her first name but not her surname. The court contested that the evidence
presented does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her
surname to Alfon. To allow her to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother’s surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: “Legitimate
and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.”
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle
who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for
change of name.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in construing article 364 of the Civil Code with regard to the
intent of the words in the provision
Ruling:
The word “principally” in the codal provision of article 364 of the Civil Code is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child
should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, it
has been shown that the evidences show that there is ample justification to grant fully her
petition, which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground to
avoid confusion. The court modified the previous ruling and allowed the petitioner to change not
only her first name but also her surname.
 USE OF DIFFERENT NAME

People v. Estrada
G.R. No. 164368
April 2, 2009

Facts:
An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against President Estrada
on April 4, 2001, Another information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In
the said information, the president allegedly took advantage of his position by concealing the ill-
gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President of the Republic
of the Philippines by representing himself as “Jose Velarde” in several transactions. He used the
said alias, which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Testimonies and
documentary evidences were presented to prove the allegation of the Informations for plunder,
illegal use of alias, and perjury.
After the prosecution rested in all three cases, the defense, moved to be allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its joint Resolution, the Sandiganbayn only granted the
defense leave to file demurrers in illegal use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that
the prosecution failed to present ample evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of
alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142

Ruling:
 In order to be held liable for a violation of C.A. No. 142, the user of the alias must have
held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. This means that
the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. The presence of other individuals when
Estrada signed as Jose Velarde does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known
henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose
Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that other people were inside the same
room at that time. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as Jose
Velarde related to the opening of a trust account, it cannot be claimed that there was already a
public use of alias when some other individuals witnessed the signing.
 Ursua v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112170
April 10, 1996

Facts:
Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty in 1989. In the course of his case,
his lawyer asked him to get a copy of the complaint filed against him from the Office of the
Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, was unavailable at that time.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez and told the latter that he feels
uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he himself is the respondent in the said
case. Perez then told him than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal
his true identity. Hence when Ursua was already at the Office of the Ombudsman, he signed the
logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he likewise signed
the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in
fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. He
was eventually sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended,
otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.

Issue:
Whether or not Ursua’s conviction is proper

Ruling:
No. Ursua should be acquitted.
C.A. No. 142 provides that a person is not allowed to use a name or an alias other than his
registered name or that which he was baptized. According to this law, what is illegal is the
habitually and public use of an alias without any authorization by a competent authority. In
Ursua’s case, he merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once and was not used in a business
transaction. Moreover, the use of the said name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and
even if he used a different name, he was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of
the Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his
identity because the complaint is a public record open to the public. This means that the evils
sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other
than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of
Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No.
142. Hence, said law need not be applied.

CIVIL REGISTER

 CLERICAL ERROR

Yasuo Iwasawa v. Gangan

G.R. No. 204169
September 11, 2013

Facts:
Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, met Felisa Gangan sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Felisa introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before."
Since then, the two became close to each other, and got married later that year on November 28,
2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.

In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife become depressed. He confronted her about it. To his
shock, Felisa confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away.

Iwasawa discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that
their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. Iwasawa filed a petition for the declaration of his
marriage to Felisa as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on
Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of
documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO): (1) His and Felisa’s
marriage certificate; (2) Felisa and Arambulo’s marriage certificate; (3) Arambulo’s death
certificate; and (4) certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office.

The RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Felisa’s prior existing valid marriage
to another man. It held that it was only Iwasawa who testified about said marriage. The RTC
ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony is unreliable because he is a complete stranger to the marriage
certificate between Felisa and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate.

Iwasawa filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order
dated October 16, 2012. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and
due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.

Held:
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Iwasawa are all public
documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall
be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that Iwasawa did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify
on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in
the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor
the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
 Baldos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 170645
July 9, 2010

Facts:
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on October 30, 1948. However, his
birth was not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on
February 11, 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and
Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of
live birth.

On March 8, 1995, Nieves Baldos filed for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldo’s
birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son.

On August 16, 1999, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. There is no doubt that
Reynaldo is Nieves’ son. Her reason for disowning him is obvious; he did not live up to her
expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for her and Reynaldo. But while
Reynaldo may have done an act that caused Nieves to rue she gave him life, such acts however,
are not justifications of what she prays from this Court.

An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a reason to strip a
person of one’s filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance though. The documents adduced
on record are the best evidence of the parties’ relationship.

Undeterred, Nieves appealed to the Court of Appeals. She insisted that the late registration of
Reynaldo’s birth was contrary to Presidential Decree No. 651 (P.D. No. 651).
The appellate court held that P.D. No. 651 did not proscribe the late registration of births of
persons born before 1 January 1974. The Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of the
decree was to encourage registration of births as well as deaths.

Nieves Baldos died on 17 May 1999. Her lawyer filed a motion for substitution six years later or
on 20 October 2005. Bartolome’s brothers, Francisco Baldos and Martin Baldos, substituted for
Nieves.

Issue:
Whether or not the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid.

Held:
Presidential Decree No. 766 amended P.D. No. 651 by extending the period of registration
up to 31 December 1975. P.D. No. 651, as amended, provided for special registration within a
specified period to address the problem of under-registration of births as well as deaths. It
allowed, without fine or fee of any kind, the late registration of births and deaths occurring within
the period starting from 1 January 1974 up to the date when the decree became effective.

Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside of the
coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo’s birth falls under Act
No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As
a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D.
No. 651, as amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards. Considering that the late
registration of Reynaldo’s birth took place in 1985, National Census Statistics Office (NCSO)
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this
case.

Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of the local civil
registrar within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made beyond the reglementary
period is considered delayed. The local civil registrar, upon receiving an application for delayed
registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending
application for delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the registration and the local
civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be registered, he should register the
same.

Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have
gone through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on 8 March
1995, after the lapse of ten long years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application
for delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should
have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves
herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application
for delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the facts
stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we are
more inclined to stand by the former.

Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making
up the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of
the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the
presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live
birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity. Petitioners
miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly denied for lack
of merit the petition to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth.
 AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
G.R. No. 189476
February 2, 2011

Facts:
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng.
Claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. Respondent submitted proof that his
mother Anna Dominique has no record of marriage from NSO, and that he had been using
“Coseteng” as his surname since childhood.
Respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency
requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.
The trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry for date and place of marriage of parties in respondent’s Certificate of
live Birth
2. Correct the entry "Magpayo" to "Coseteng";
3. Delete the entry "Coseteng" in the space for Middle Name; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for father.
The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial
court.
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondent’s parents from his birth certificate changes his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate.
The Republic adds that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the deletion of
respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in
respondent’s birth certificate.
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites
the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing
in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice
of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no
oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.
Issue:
WON a person can effect a change of name under Rule 103.

Held:
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (change of name) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous
to, recognized grounds, however. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
 Lee v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118387
October 11, 2001

Facts:
The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng. The petitioners are children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody
K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee,
Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate petitions
for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of the petitioners—Marcelo
Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and
Emma Lee.
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma Lee, before RTC Manila assigned to
respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before
the RTC of Kalookan and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent
records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok
Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is
allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that they are the legitimate children of
spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China.
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but
immediately became his mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to
petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to
each of the petitioners, their father, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by
making it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
 Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took care of the petitioners. They all
lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was
well, therefore, before private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by
their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children,
including those of petitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of the former’s death that was to
be published in the newspapers.
The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an investigation. After investigation,
the NBI prepared a report that the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners made it appear
that the latter were legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/
or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule
108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of
petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.
Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss for failure of the petitioners to
appear at the hearing of the said motion.
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order stating that the petitioners have
complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders failed and
they appealed to the CA. The CA, however, found no merit in their arguments and dismissed their
petition.

Issue:
WON resorting to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper.

Held:
 Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the
petitioners’ records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons
it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as
shown in their birth records.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually
actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children. There
is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
 In Re: Change of Name of Julian Wang
G.R. No. 159966
March 30, 2005

Facts:
Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-
Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the
child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a
sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court
seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name
sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore
because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother is not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a
person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said
that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there
is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When
he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.

Issue:
WON the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held:
 To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply
seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the
middle name altogether.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect
the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody
can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that
middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name
of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
 Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007

Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to
have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. He further
alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the
Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision, holding that there is no law allowing
the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

Issue:
WON Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

Held:
A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware
of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
 Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008

Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During
her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her
ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breasts, nor menstruation. Subsequently,
she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those
afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her
Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to
Jeff.

Issue:
WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

Held:
The Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is
the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. Intersexuality applies to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex
may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render
judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that
evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
 Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City
G.R. No. 181174
December 4, 2009

Facts:
Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza were married on Jan. 4, 1978. They had three children
namely Josef, Janelle and Gian. However Pablo died on April 2002 in a vehicular accident in
Indonesia. During his wake, the respondent Lucille introduced her son Patrick as Pablo’s child.
Naturally, Ma. Cristina inquired as to the veracity of Lucille’s claim. She acquired a copy
of Patrick’s birth certificate from the Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City. It reflects that the child
was born on Jan. 1, 1996 but was registered late a year after. It has an annotation wherein Pablo
acknowledged the child as his, and that the child was legitimated by a subsequent marriage of his
parents on April 1998.
Because of her findings, she filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick with RTC of Himamaylan Negros Occidental. Her contention is that Patrick could not
have been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Lucille and Pablo because such is bigamous
(their marriage was subsisting at that time). She prayed for the correction of Patrick’s
legitimation, acknowledgment of the father, and use of Braza as last name. She also asked that
Patrick be submitted to DNA testing and to declare Lucille and Pablo’s marriage as bigamous.
Respondent filed MTD alleging that a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court
does not have jurisdiction to annul her marriage, impugn legitimacy and order DNA testing
because the court is not acting as a family court. These should be ventilated in an ordinary action.
RTC granted MTD. Petitioners filed an MR but were denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy of
respondent’s child in a petition to correct entries in local civil register.

Held:
 In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or
a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a
DNA test.
 Republic v. Lugsanay
G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013

Facts:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged
that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her
school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and
passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child
considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear
the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries to effect the
corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However, the National
Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
The RTC found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for
hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government
nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one
and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the
correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known since
childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to
avoid confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. Hence, the present petition
on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Issue:
WON the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.

Held:
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil
register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching.