PHA - 02 - Turbine Complete

HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD
Issue Date 7.12.2017

PHA: CPP Turbine Document No. ZONE-2/UIC-4/PHA/02
Cover page Page No. Page 1 of 44
Process Hazard Analysis
Title
Turbine
CPP
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
 Cover Page
 Table of Contents
 Membership Signature Page
 Management Response to Recommendations
I. Introduction
A. Summary of Process Description and Scope of Review
B. Summary of Recommendations
C. Team Membership and Qualifications
D. Field Tour
II. Discussion
A. Process Description
B. Process Diagrams
C. List of Hazards
D. Detailed Discussion of Recommendations
E. Inherently Safer Process Considerations
F. Discussion of Items Not Resulting in Recommendations
G. Discussion of Consequence Analysis
H. Discussion of Consequences of Failure of Engineering and Administrative Controls
I. Discussion of Human Factors
J. Discussion of Facilities Siting
III. Appendices (as appropriate)
1. Charter
2. Hazards Identification Details
3. Technology Package Documentation
4. Management of Change Documents
5. Serious Incident Reports
6. List of Prior PHAs and Recommendation Status
7. Consequence Analysis
8. Human Factors
9. Facilities Siting
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10. Hazard Evaluation Methodology Documentation

11. PHA Completion Checklist
12. References
13. Additional Tasks Documentation
14. Communications Package
15. Transmittal Letter to Emergency Response Committee
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MEMBERSHIP SIGNATURE PAGE:
Process Hazards Analysis
PHA Team signatures
This report represents the consensus of the full-time PHA team. Based on the information analysed in this
study, to the best of our ability we believe this process to be safe to operate1 in its present condition.
Nishant Somwanshi ---------------------------

(PHA Team Leader) Date
Prashant Gaur ---------------------------

(PHA Team Member) Date
Ahatram Siddiqui ---------------------------

B L Chouhan ---------------------------
Dr. Vikas Tiwari ---------------------------

Rajesh Jain ---------------------------

Rahul paliwal ---------------------------

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Process Description
Turbine & its auxiliaries consist of Turbine, Lube oil system, Feed water circuit with HP
extraction, Condensate water Cycle with LP extraction and Auxiliaries Steam in the Circuit
for Equipments based on the principle of Heat Exchangers
The overview of the complete process is mentioned below with its hazards:
Turbine is HHP because we are operating at 92Kg/cm2 pressure & temperature range of
535-545 deg C(superheated steam).This may cause release of high energy.This equipment is
a high speed rotatating machine which rotate at 3000 RPM which can fail and relase
mechanical parts and it has potential of major incidents. Any kind of this failure may result
in death or major irreversible effects, significant property damage
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Turbine oil System is a HHP because whenever turbine is at barring speed i.e 240 RPM the
jacking oil is responsible for lifting of complete TG shafts and we are operating at
140Kg/cm2 and temperature of 40-45 deg C.The lube oil system is used for lubrication of TG
bearing operating at pressure of 8 Kg/cm2 and at a temperature of 40-45 deg C and any
failure in this circuit may release to fire in lube oil system.The failure of this may led to
release of high potential energy of oil which can cause major irreversible effects, significant
property damage.
Feed Water Cycle is HHP because we are operating at 160kg/cm2 pressure & temprature
range 120-237. This may cause release off high energy. In this
process we have rotating equipments such as BFP which can fail and release mechanical
parts and it has potential of major incidents. Also due to changeover of BFP pumps, failure
of feed water circuit may happen releasing the potential dangerous saturated steam or hot
and high pressure water as hazardous energy.
The Feed water circuit is accompanied by High Pressure Heaters in its circuit with H.P
Extraction from the turbine. Any kind of this failure may result in death or major irreversible
effects, significant property damage.
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Condensate Water Cycle is HHP because we are operating at 18kg/cm2 pressure &
temprature range 45-132 deg C. This may cause release off high energy. In this process we
have rotating equipments such as CEP(Condensate extraction pump) which can fail and
release mechanical parts and it has potential of major incidents. Also due to changeover of
CEP pumps, failure of Condensate water circuit may happen releasing the potential
dangerous saturated steam or hot and high pressure water as hazardous energy. The
Condensate water circuit is accompanied by Low Pressure Heaters in its circuit to De-aerator
along with Feed storage tank with L.P & De-aerator Extraction from the turbine Any kind of
this failure may result in death or major irreversible effects, significant property damage.
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List Of hazards Identified
Chemical:
Dust Skin or Cancer

MSDS Corrosive to
Chemical Flammable Explosio Toxicity Reactive Eye agent or
No. human body
n irritant Mutagen
VERY
HAZARDOUS IN CORRO
SLIGHTL CASE OF SKIN SIVE
NON 0 HMIS (U.S.A.)
Y CONTACT TO
FLAMMABL , 2 NATIONAL
EXPLOSI CORROSIVE& EYES &
Tri sodium CAS#:760 E ORAL (LD50 ) FIRE
VE IN .SEVERE SKIN. NA
phosphate 1-54-9 - 4150MG/KG PROTECTION
PRESEN OVER- SKIN
ASSOCIATION
CE OF EXPOSURE CONTA
(U.S.A.)
HEAT. CAN RESULT IN CT
UNCONSCIOUS (IRRITA
NESS OR DETH NT,PER
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

MEATO
R) EYE
CONTA
CT(IRRI
TANT
SKIN
ORAL (LD50)
CONTA
- 1450 MG/KG
0 HMIS CT
TOXIC TO
CORROSIVE TO (U.S.A.) 0 , (IRRITA
LUNGS,
NA SKIN – LIQUID NATIONAL NT,PER
CAS#:110 MUCOUS CARCINOG
Morpholine Flammable MAY PRODUCE FIRE MEATO
-91-8 MEMBRANES ENIC
TISSUE PROTECTION R)
&FREQUENT
DAMAGE ASSOCIATIO EYECO
ATTACKS OF
N (U.S.A.) NTACT(
BRONCHIAL
IRRITA
INFECTION.
NT)
HAZAR
DOUS
IN
VERY
CASE
HAZARDOUS IN
OF
CASE OF SKIN
2 HMIS SKIN
HIGHLY CONTACT
(U.S.A.) 3, CONTA
EXPLOSI VAPOUR CORROSIVE&
NATIONAL CT (
CAS#:302 VE IN (LC50): 570 PRODUCE CARCINOG
Hydrazine Flammable FIRE IRRITA
-01-2 PRESEN PPM 4 BURNS ENIC
PROTECTION NT,CO
CE OF HOURS .SEVERE
ASSOCIATIO RROSI
METALS . OVER-
N ( U.S.A. ) VE)
EXPOSURE
EYE
CAN RESULT IN
CONTA
DETH
CT
(IRRITA
NT)
SKIN
INHALATION IRRITA
HEAT
CAN CAUSE NT .
PRODUC
DIZZINESS, PROLO
E
HEADACHE & NGED
VAPOUR
NAUSEA, CONTA
NA S & CAN ORAL (LD50 ) NA
DEPRESSES CT CAN CARCINOG
HSD oil Flammable CAUSE -
CENTRAL RESUL ENIC
VIOLENT 7500MG/KG,
NERVOUS T SKIN
RUPTUR
SYATEM AND DRYIN
OF
HAS AN G &
CONTAIN
ANAESTHETIC DERMA
ERS .
EFFECT TITIS .
EYE
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

IRRITA
NT.
Potential Hazardous situations

For easy identification of the inherent hazards, the main units in the furnace and boiler sections are
classified as unit operations and/or processes. Boilers generate steam by combusting a fuel and
using the resulting heat to convert water to steam. Though coal is the main fuel for the boiler, at the
time of start-up, High Speed Diesel (HSD) is used.
For easy identification of the inherent hazards, the main units in the boiler section are classified as
unit operations and/or processes and listed in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1 List of major equipment and possible hazardous situations

Sl No. Unit Main Hazardous Situation
1 Steam pipelines Burns/ injury due to contact with hot pipe/steam from ruptured pipes
2 Feed water pipes Burns/ injury from contact with hot water spraying from ruptured pipe
Process Potential Energy Sources: If we bifurcate it in different potential energy sources then
following will be the required fields where these hazards will come.
 Chemical:
o Toxicity: Moderately Toxic
 Thermal:
o High temperature steam
o High temperature Water
o High pressure steam
o High pressure water
 Pressure/Volume:
o Available water volume of 170 m3 of 105 kg/cm2
o Available of volume of 1375 m3 hot flue gas
 Position Potential:
o 4 nos of coal bunker having 225 tons of capacity of each bunker
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 Kinetic:
o Turbine
o Generator
Special Hazards:
 Corrosion of shell & other metallic components resulting in component failure
 Failure of FSSS logic leading to furnace explosion
 Failure of the safety release valve leading to explosion of boiler.
 Process line supports, valves ,Platform rusted
 All LCS switches of nearby drives partially corroded.
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Consequence Analysis:
The operation of the 2 x 80 MW power plant is controlled through a DCS. The DCS features
dedicated controller for each system (boilers, turbines, etc.) in redundant mode for fail safe
operation.
All process data available to the controller are linked to operator unit console. This human-machine
interface enables the operator to monitor alarms and observe the trends. All protection interlocks
and operation modes are configured through console and downloaded to respective controllers.
In spite of the effective process control systems integrated with this operation, many of the
hazardous situations listed above could be realized and cause damage and injury to personnel.
Hence the consequence of these hazards are discussed below under the following headings.
a) Hazards in Turbine
b) Hazards in Generator
c) Failures of high pressure feed water pipe
3.1 Hazards in Turbines

The 3000 rpm turbine for 80 MW is a condensing type and directly coupled to the generator suitable
for indoor installation.
As turbines convert steam into mechanical energy, hazards associated with turbines will mainly be
mechanical in nature.
The turbine is provided with a separate and dedicated protection system viz., Emergency Trip
System (ETS), Turbo Supervisory & Protection System. ETS is operated through PLC which receives
and analyzes all the signals from turbine. The signals received to the system are
 Speed
 Vibration
 Lube oil pressure
 Displacement
 Generator protection
 Bearing temperature
 Expansion
 Governor failure
When critical alarm conditions are met the ETS gives the command to close MOV and extraction
valves, which shut down the operation of the turbine.
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The power plant has strengthened the safety aspect compared to earlier technologies. The steam
supply to turbine has been provided with double block and bleed valves to prevent steam leaks to
the turbine, thereby preventing fouling, pitting and corrosion.
Hazards in turbines arise due to major deviations in turbine operation and during maintenance.
The main causes of these deviations and the consequences are given in Table 3.2
Table 3.2 Factors that could cause major hazards in turbines

Sl Deviation/ Cause Consequence
No Item of Failure
1 Loss of lubrication  Oil pump failure  Excessive temperatures and
 Oil filter plugging due to dirt in the pounding from vibration
oil  Turbine bearing failure and damage
 Block in the oil supply.
2 Poor quality of steam  When the steam quality decreases  Wear of turbine blades
to the point that steam condensate Due to water droplets impinging causing
exists in the turbine. erosion of the blades
3 Fouling/ pitting/ Most corrosion/ erosion problems come  Pitting
corrosion from damage that takes place when the Caused by steam condensation inside the
turbine is not running. turbine, and salt from the boiler water
that could collect on the surfaces.
4 Design fault Assembly errors Excessive wear or failure of turbine parts
and the loss of the use of the turbine
5 Over-speeding  Loss of over speed shutdown  Catastrophic failure of the machine.
systems Destructive over-speeding results from
 Deposits may cause the stem of loss of load
both the governor and the trip valve
to stick when there is a loss of load.
6 Vibrations  Due to nonalignment, unbalancing  Loss of efficiency
or failure of probes
 Could lead to strain on the machine
7 Low or high frequency  Due to failure or malfunctioning of  Loss of efficiency
of turbines electronic speed governor
3.1.1 Hazards of the Turbogenerator Oil System

Large quantities of oil are used for lubrication of both turbine and generator. This requires extensive
piping systems and high pressures necessary to deliver this oil to bearings, hydraulic mechanism
coolers, etc., and the various auxiliary equipment used for instrumentation.
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The major hazard in the turbine system is mainly due to leak and fire from lubricating oil used in
turbine system. The oil system of the steam turbine units mainly consists of the lubricating oil
system, the shaft jacking gear system and the oil treatment system.
Large amounts of oil are applied under high pressure for use in the governing system. This is an
additional fire hazard as are the associated handling facilities such as heat exchangers, filters, pumps
and storage tanks.
Fuel oil or hydraulic oils from ruptured pipelines under pressure can form a fine mist and can travel a
distance and ignite on contact with a hot surface, spark or open flame. The resulting fire can cause
severe damage to equipment. The probability of ignition is high as there are several sources of
ignition such as steam pipes.
Oil fires burn with intense heat and copious amounts of smoke, which make manual fire-fighting
extremely difficult and hazardous.
3.1.2 Hazard control in the Turbogenerator Oil System

The main safety features of the lubricating oil system consists of DC emergency oil pump, overflow
valve, oil cooler, switching valve, non-return valve, oil purification system & stand by lube oil filter
and monitoring instrument.
A fire-resistant oil system is normally used to provide power supply to the actuating mechanism of
servomotor.
3.2 Hazards in Generators & Electrical Systems
3.2.1 Preamble
In contrast to turbines, generators and electrical equipment tend to have fewer and less severe
problems, due in part to construction, and inclusion of relays and controls
The generator converts mechanical energy into electrical energy and therefore hazards related to
electrical fire can be expected. Electrical hazards for the generators, transformers, switchyard and
related operations and associated units are given in this section.
3.2.2 Summary of Potential hazards

The hazards identified in generators, transformers and electrical room are described below.
3.2.3 Potential hazards in generators

1. The generator uses air for cooling of its windings, as it produces less resistance to the
turning of the rotor and thereby reduces the chances of insulation failure and fire.
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2. Fires can occur in generators due to insulation1 failures caused by faults in generator
windings leading to short circuit.
3. Fires can also occur if spilled lube oil comes into contact with hot surface and ignites.
However the system is provided with two oil-cooled bearings at a distance from the stator
chambers so the chances of oil ingress is unlikely
3.2.4 Hazards in Transformers and power distribution units

Power generated at the generator is transmitted to the transformer and then to the switchyard for
distribution. Generator transformers step up and step down the voltage.
Hazards associated with electricity in generators and transformers have led to fires and explosions. A
number of accidents have occurred in switchgear and other equipment mainly because of failures of
circuit breakers, insulators, fuses, bus bars etc. and because of poor maintenance.
The incidents that have occurred in transformers are due to open arcing, flashover above oil level,
insulator failure, overloading, failure of air-cooling system, lightning, etc, as described below.
1. Failure of epoxy due to overheating & possibility of fire

2. Fire can occur because of a fault at the interconnection of the HV duct/ LV of the
transformer or a fault at the transformer bushing or an internal fault.
3. Fire in oil-insulated transformers occurs because of breakdown of insulation caused by
overload, switching or lightning surges, gradual deterioration, low oil level, moisture or acid
in oil or failure of an insulated bushing.
4. Arcing that follows an electrical breakdown can burn or vaporize the oil, creating pressure
sufficient to rupture or force off the shell cover.
5. Fire hazards are more prevalent in circuit breakers, which are immersed in SF6 to contain
arcing, but failure of windings, earth faults in loose terminal connections have provided
sources of ignition for flammable oils.
6. The current transformer is subjected to high voltage peaks that generate hysteresis and
eddy currents and can cause overheating and subsequent fire.
Hazard Control Measures
The following measures have been provided
1. Fast electronic protection scheme to isolate faulty circuit/ equipment protection during
overloading, over current and earth fault
2. Temperature of stator windings is monitored
1
F- class insulation is used with maximum temperature 150°C
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3. Temperature of inlet and outlet air is monitored
4. An automatic fire fighting system with release of CO2 in the event of fire has been provided.
5. Water sprinklers points provided for generators (manually operated )
6. Portable thermo graphic camera for hot spot detection
7. Static excitation system with fast response
3.2.5 Hazards at Electrical rooms

Cable gallery rooms, MCC (switch gear rooms), DCS Control rooms and battery rooms are the main
electrical rooms at power stations, and they need to be protected from fire as these are usually
manned locations.
The locations of these manned areas are very critical to the ability of the plant to continue control
room operations in the event of a fire.
 The cable gallery room is below the control room, as part of the "control stack." These cable
rooms are critical to the operation of the plant.
 Switchgear rooms (MCC) are located directly under the cable spreading rooms as part of the
control stack
 Battery rooms provide power to drive DC motors, supply inverters with the input needed for
emergency AC supplies in uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems, control power for
switchgear and for emergency lighting.
The main hazards include cable fires that have the potential to spread to adjacent locations
Hazard Control Measures
Cable fires are prevented by fire retardant coating and sealing provided to incoming and outgoing
cables. The wall/floor openings for cable passages are sealed and cables selected are FRLS type
which is fire resistant and low smoke emitting. There are water spraying systems along the deluge
wall. Other safety features include fitting of smoke detectors and presence of manual fire call point.
3.3 Failures of high pressure feed water pipe:

Studies on the past failures of feed water pipes have noted several factors that affect the rate of
erosion/ corrosion in piping. These factors include fluid velocity, material composition, temperature,
low water pH, low dissolved oxygen content, etc.
The flow path through elbows, bends, tees, orifices, welds, valves and backing rings creates
turbulence in flow that, with fluid velocity, has the potential to react with the protective oxide layer
of carbon steel piping, contributing to the erosion/ corrosion process.
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The probability of occurrence depends on the probability of rupture of the pipeline. Generic failure
data is available for various pipe sizes.
Hazards from rupture of feed water pipes
The rupture of feed water pipes due to wall thinning creates the potential for serious burns, massive
property damage and power outages in electrical power generation plants.
The chances are less as the quality of water is tested at every hour and records are maintained.
Failures of high pressure/Temperature steam pipe:

Studies on the past failures of steam pipes have noted several factors that affect the rate of erosion/
corrosion in piping. These factors include fluid velocity, material composition, temperature, low
water pH, low dissolved oxygen content, etc.
The flow path through elbows, bends, tees, orifices, welds, valves and backing rings creates
turbulence in flow that, with fluid velocity, has the potential to react with the protective oxide layer
of carbon steel piping, contributing to the erosion/ corrosion process.
The probability of occurrence depends on the probability of rupture of the pipeline. Generic failure
data is available for various pipe sizes.
Hazards from rupture of Steam pipes
The rupture of Steam pipes due to wall thinning creates the potential for serious burns, massive
property damage and power outages in electrical power generation plants.
The chances are less as the quality of water is tested at every hour and records are maintained.
For consequence analysis, the team agreed on take up a worst case scenario of Furnace explosion.
With the help of ALOHA software the impact of Furnace explosion is analysed
SITE DATA:
Location: CHITTAURGARH, INDIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.50 (enclosed office)
Time: March 11, 2016 0956 hours ST (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
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Chemical Name: H2O Molecular Weight: 18.00 g/mol

Ambient Boiling Point: 100.0° C
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.022 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 21,901 ppm or 2.19%
ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)

Wind: 10 miles/hour from ESE at 40 meters
Ground Roughness: open country Cloud Cover: 0 tenths
Air Temperature: 30° C Stability Class: B
No Inversion Height Relative Humidity: 5%
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Non-flammable gas is escaping from pipe
Pipe Diameter: 10 inches Pipe Length: 70 meters
Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite source
Pipe Roughness: smooth Hole Area: 78.5 sq in
Pipe Press: 95 atmospheres Pipe Temperature: 570° C
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 16,100 kilograms/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 966,643 kilograms
THREAT ZONE:
Model Run: Gaussian
Red : 50 meters --- (530 grams/(cu m))
Orange: 54 meters --- (460 grams/(cu m))
Yellow: 58 meters --- (400 grams/(cu m))
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Findings
The purpose of this Consequence Analysis is threefold.
 It provides a conservative range of anticipated effects from the operation.

 The Risk Assessment provides a preliminary evaluation of potential risk.
 This Risk Assessment provides an initial basis for the development of emergency response
planning.
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Given these objectives, the analysis summarized within this Risk Assessment is intentionally
conservative (i.e., overestimates risk). Team’s expectation is that the flyover frequencies and volumes
presented in this analysis are not likely to occur, but are provided as a conservative framework to
ensure decisions are based on knowledge of the potential range of effects, as well as allowing to
prepare for the worst-case scenarios in emergency response preparations.
In the event, a portion of the released materials would enter the surrounding and disperse both
vertically and horizontally in the atmosphere. The extent of dispersal would depend on a number of
factors, including speed and success of emergency containment and clean-up, size and rate of release,
topography of the release site.
The following extremely conservative assumptions were developed to over-estimate potential spill
effects for planning purposes.
1. Complete, instantaneous release occurred;

2. The entire volume of a spill was released directly into a atmosphere;
A 1-hour release period for the entire spill volume was assumed in order to maximize the product
concentration. Although the assumptions used are highly conservative and, thus, overestimate potential
release of dust, the analysis indicates the need for rapid notification of managers so that any potentially
affected could be closed.
The impact of the incident resulted as below,
CA 1. The workers “Porta cabin” (labour canteen) is near to the unloading station and there
will be a probability of multiple fatalities up to 10 numbers
CA 2. The routine working area is near to the unloading station where approximately a team
of 3-4 members were engaged on maintenance and/or engaged for housekeeping
activities, there will be a probability of 3-8 numbers of major injury.
CA 3. There will be dusty atmosphere with the concentration of around 1000 ppm of dust,
leads to zero visibility up to 1.2 kms of area which may lead to Accidental impact and
reason for major injuries to the nearby people.
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In summary, this consequence analysis shows that the predicted frequency of incidents is very low, the
probability of a large spill occurring is very low, and, consequently, risk of environmental impacts is
minimal. Compliance with regulations, and Emergency Response Plan, as well as adherence to safety
procedures will help to ensure long-term environmentally responsible and safe operation.
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Hazard Evaluation
The PHA team conducts a systematic and comprehensive study of the process to:
 Identify all of the ways that each hazardous event can occur
 Identify significant existing lines of defences against these events
 Characterize the integrity of each significant line of defences.
The “what if “methodology is a powerful process hazards evaluation technique that results in
 Comprehensive identification of a broad range of hazardous incidents
 Consensus by a wide range of disciplines on the recommended path to safely controlling hazardous
incidents
The “what if” approach combines the strengths of a ªwhat ifº review and a checklist review into one methodology
that effectively avoids the weaknesses of using either methodology by itself. The finished product of a “what if”
process hazards evaluation is an understanding by the organization of the potential hazardous incidents
associated with a given process, the lines of defence in place, the consequences of breaching the lines of
defence, and the controls needed to ensure safe operation.
The PHA team selected the “what if” methodology for the hazard evaluation in the process.
WHAT IF
Session/ RISK
Consequence SEVE LIKELY Recommend Rem
node/ What-if Hazards Safeguards RANK
s RITY - HOOD ations arks
system ING
Hot well Make up

Makeup line Fall of the pipe lines . Hanger Support 2 2 4
circuit hammering
SOP of CEP &

heater charging
Condensate 1. Fall Of Pipe line
Major Injury Periodic Hanger
line 2. Release of Hot 2 2 4
Burns Support
Hammering water
inspection
PPE's
Condensate
Circuit Safety valve
inspection
Low Safety Valves,
Release of Hot during
pressure Major Injury DCS
water/Steam/Metal 3 2 6 overhauling
Heater Burns interlock,Hydro
parts Periodic
blasting test
testing of
safety valve
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QCNRV
Extraction
inspection to
line
be done in
Hammering Burn, Seroius Hanger Support,
Release of Steam 2 2 4 overhauling
of Low injury SOP,Insulation
in case
pressure
hammering
heater
observed.
SMP of PM &
Condensate overhauling of
Equipment
Extraction CEP,DCS
Failure of bearings, damage,
Pump lub Interlock & online 2 2 4
Fire Hazard Rupture Disc
oil system monitoring with
blown off
fails alarm, Stand by
pump
online monitoring
CEP Motor
Equipment of Winding
winding Fire hazard 2 2 4
damage temperature in
failure
DCS,PM schedule
OEM
Burn
Gasket recommended
Release of Hot water Injury,plant 2 3 6
Failure gasket,SMP to be
may stop
followed
Condensate
Equipment
System
Release of hot water damage, SOP 3 2 6
protection
Major injury
bypassed
Release of steam/hot Peroidic
No of springs in
Condensor water, Serious injury Visual
parallel,SMP for 3 2 6
spring fails damage/cracks in or fatality inspection of
flood test
structure spring
Morpholine
Skin irritant, Slip
dosing tank Minor Injury Local Monitoring 2 2 4
trip,Environment
leakage
Hydrazene
Skin irritant, Slip
dosing tank Minor Injury Local Monitoring 2 2 4
trip,Environment
leakage
Feed water Release of Hot
Fatality,major Safety Valves,
storage water/steam/metal 3 1 3
injury,burns DCS interlock
tank burst parts
Protection to
Automatic be provide on
Equipment SMP,DCS
recirculatio Release of Hot water 3 1 3 very high
failure intrerlock
n valve fail dischare pr.
Of BFP
SMP,PM in
BFP Gear Equipment
hot oil spilage SAP,DCS 3 1 3
box failure damage
Interlock
Feed water SMP,PM in
Lube oil Equipment
Circuit Fire Hazard, SAP,DCS 2 2 4
system fail damage
Interlock
Balance complete
SMP,online
leak off line Release of Hot water Equipment 3 1 3
monitoring
leakage damage
Protection
BFP MOT
Slip trip happen,Fire Equipment stop for OPU
tank over local monitoring 2 1 2
hazard,Environment damaged to be
flow
provided
Feed water 1. Fall Of Pipe line
, Burn,serious Hanger Support,
Line 2. Release of Hot 2 2 4
injury SOP
hammering water
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Safety valve
inspection
High Safety Valves,
Release of Hot during
pressure Major Injury DCS
water/Steam/Metal 3 2 6 overhauling
heater Burns interlock,Hydro
parts Periodic
blasting test
testing of
safety valve
QCNRV
Extraction
inspection to
line
be done in
Hammering Fall of pipe, Relase of Hanger Support,
2 2 4 overhauling
of High Steam SOP
in case
pressure
hammering
heater
observed.
Mulizifire
protection
testing
Feasiblity to
be check for
OVEF start
on basis of
Fatal injury,
MOT pr.
Fire in Burn Mulzifire
Sand Bucket
Main oil Fire,tank blast Injury,Equip protection,DCS 4 2 8
to placed near
tank ment damage, protection,OVEF
MOT.
plant stop
Dry Powder
extinguisher
Size to be
calculated on
Fire Load &
placed near
MOT.
Insulation
Cladding
Joint to Seal
Oil
through
Leakage in Burn, Serious Protection in
Appriopiate
Turbine Turbine Fire,slip trip hazard Injury,Equip DCS,local 3 2 6
adhesive
lube oil ment Damage monitoring
high
system
Temperature
Valve Head
to Cover
Insulation
Oil Cladding
Leakage in Joint to Seal
High through
Burn, Serious
Pressure Appriopiate
Fire,slip trip hazard Injury,Equip local monitoring 3 3 9
Hydraulic adhesive
ment Damage
Oil (HPBP high
Valve & Temperature
OSU line) Valve Head
to Cover
Plate installed &
segregated from Feasiblity
Burn injury,
Leakage in the hot portion of check for Fire
Fire, Equipment Complete
oil system turbine, local retardant oil
Failure, Slip trip equipment 4 3 12
of Turbine monoitoring, use as for
hazard failure,plant
Governing Scondary governing
stop
contimation system.
placed
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

DCS Interlock &

hard wire
Burn,Fatality,
Super heated Steam, protection,ESV
Turbine roll Complete
rotating blades, Near trial,SMP & 5 1 4
out equipment
by property damaged overhauling,
damaged
Online
monitoring, CBM
Complete SMP, Authorised
Turbine
equipment permission,
protection Equipment may fail 4 1 4
failure,serious exceptional list of
bypassed
injury signal,
Insulation/ PPE/ strict
steam
continuous compliance to
leakage Death/ major
burning inspection & 3 3 9 all safe
through injury
replacement of all guards
pipes/ vlvs
gasket joint available
thermography
with an
specified
insulation interval &
Burning minor injury Local monitoring 2 3 6
damages damaged
insulation to
attended
immediately
thermography
with an
high
Insulation/ PPE/ specified
pressure/hi
continuous interval &
gh major injury/
burning inspection & 4 2 8 strict
temperature death
replacement of all compliance to
water
gasket joint all safe
leakage
guards
available
Oil
TBN PMI
Leakage
Slip Trip, DCS Protection, Check Sheet
from
Burn Online to be revised
manual Fire 3 3 9
Injury,Equip Monitoring, Local For ensure
Barring
ment Damage monitoring opening to be
Opening at
close
Full rpm
Generator
Short Equipment Protection
Generator Circuit in Fire Failure,Plant System, CO2 3 2 6
Winding stop, Flooding System,
Online Monitoring
Battery Online H2
Bank Acid Fumes, Burns Major Injury monitoring,PMI,S 2 3 6
Leakage MP
Acid
Spillage
during
TG Building Fumes, Burns Major Injury PMI,SMP 2 3 6
Filling in
Battery
Solution
EOT Beam Crushing,Fall of Heavy Fatal,Major

Load Test 4 1 4
collapse Material Injury
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

Schedule
electrical PMI
& annual
testing in SAP
Prepare
mechanical
PMI of EOT
crane &
schedule it in
Load Test,PMI,
EOT Hoist Crushing,Fall of Heavy Fatal,Major SAP
Limit Switch,Load 4 4 16
Failure Material Injury Prepare SOP
Switch
for Operation
& Testing of
EOT
Provide
interlock to
avoid
multiple
operation of
EOT at a time
TG elevator Position to be
Fatal ,Major
Car Brake Major Injury Load Test,PMI 3 2 6 displayed in
Injury
Fail case (to be
TG Elevator confirm from
Fatal ,Major authentic
car Rope Major Injury Load Test,PMI 3 2 6
Injury Authority)
Fail
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

Human Factors - checklist
The human element is common to every aspect of a process safety management system.
Accordingly, human error can be a significant factor in process safety incidents. This
checklist provides questions intended to promote team discussion on human factors. It is
not intended to cover every situation in every element of PSM; rather, it is provided to
stimulate study teams to identify and eliminate error-likely situations in those areas most
usually covered during the course of a process hazards analysis. Other areas are more
appropriately the province of PSM audit teams.
PHA teams should look for trends in need of improvement. Some examples are provided
for certain questions. These examples are not meant to limit discussion but to help clarify
the intent of the question. This checklist was developed primarily from the 1993 Maydown
Works list and the 1994 CCPS list.
1 Management systems
Management sets the tone for the importance of human factors in day-to-day operations by
establishing and administering policies that demonstrate commitment to eliminating error-
likely situations. This is typically best done by establishing clear expectations around
accountability, providing resources, promoting understanding of human factors, and, most
importantly, establishing a blame-free atmosphere. Concerns identified in connection with
the questions below are potentially symptomatic of problems in the area of management
systems.
1. Are differences between the actual worker practices and the written policies and
procedures tolerated? Do verbal, informal (e.g., “black book”), or unwritten practices
exist that supersede written procedures?
NO
2. Is the work environment, including, for example, general housekeeping and
congestion, maintained in an acceptable manner, or is there a pattern of tolerance until
conditions become unbearable? Is there a deteriorating trend evident?
NO
3. Are incidents identified (e.g., any “stories” of events in the night without formal
investigation)? Where an investigation is done, does the report drive to root cause (not
superficial or symptomatic)? Is follow-up completed?
Yes
4. Are the various elements of process safety management audited? How well is the
business responding to recommendations made?
Audit is UP.
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

5. Are safety rules understood by all? Are personnel held accountable to them? Have
personnel been fully apprised of safety priorities and disciplinary practices for failure to
follow procedures?
Yes
6. Is there an effective means to detect and correct substance abuse?
Yes
7. Is there an effective means to detect and correct situations when a person’s physical
abilities or mental capability are not compatible with the requirements of the task?
Physical abilities are being checked by medical officers & mental abilities are being
checked under on job training & skill mappings.
8. Does the organization have an effective means to provide relief to individuals who feel
their performance may be compromised by excessive fatigue?
There is no such provision to provide relief to individuals.
9. Does the area have a means to identify situations where error is likely to occur? How
promptly does the organization respond if one is found?
Yes
10. Do workers have clear, documented criteria for shutting down a unit or discontinuing
an activity, so that the fear of being “second guessed” does not interfere with decision
making?
Yes
11. Is the personnel turnover rate maintained at a tolerable level? Is there a policy to
manage personnel change?
Yes but MOC personal is not started yet
2 Procedures
Lack of clear, well-written procedures significantly increases the risk of human error. The
following questions are intended to help a PHA team think about the completeness and
quality of procedures that may have a significant impact on process safety.
1. Are there procedures available for the tasks involved, including, for example, start-up,
shutdown, idle, normal operation, and emergency situations?
Yes
2. Has the area identified major emergency situations? Do procedures exist to mitigate
the event, coordinate with site responders, and minimize personnel and property
impact? Are they available and understood?
Yes
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

3. Are the procedures clear and complete? Are they written in consistent terminology
compatible with the comprehension level of the user?
Yes
4. Are the procedures kept up-to-date? Are they routinely checked, compared with user
actions, and revised as appropriate?
Yes
5. Are the users of the procedures included in the review and development process?
SOP revision with field operator
6. Do the manuals have the most recent revision level of the procedures? Are the
procedures maintained as controlled documents where unauthorized copies are
prevented?
NO, its not started in a systematic manner
7. Are the procedures easily and quickly accessible? Are they properly indexed?
Yes
8. Are checklists used for critical or complex tasks? Are the checklists consistent with
instructions within the procedure manual?
Yes
9. If colored pages are used for certain sections of the procedure, is the color code
consistent and understood by the users? Is the color code discernible by individuals
who may be colorblind?
No color coding available
10. Do the procedures tell “why” as opposed to just “what” to do? Are warnings, cautions,
or explanations of hazards included within the procedures?
Only operation hazards included. System hazards or location hazards not included.
11. Are there any “procedure traps” (i.e., are actions described in the proper sequence, for
example, providing an explanatory warning before, rather than after, the requested
action step)?
No
12. If different recipes or configurations are used on the same equipment, do the
procedures clearly state when and how to apply the instructions? Are there checks to
ensure the correct procedure is being applied for the recipe and or configuration?
No
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

13. Are troubleshooting, upset response, or emergency procedures realistic in terms of the
time allowable to diagnose and correct a problem? (That is, can the situation get out of
control before an effective response can be mounted?)
Situation will get out of hand if boiler explosion happens. Need to relook on ERP w.r.t.
all major hazard involved in the boiler process.
14. Are there so many outstanding variance documents (e.g., test authorizations,
temporary procedures) that individuals cannot keep track of them all?
No
15. How good is the quality of communication when changes to operating procedures are
made?
Excellent
3 Training
Good training goes beyond simply following and practicing the procedures. It incorporates
an understanding of the reasons for the procedures, as well as a knowledge of the
consequences of deviations from the procedures.
1. Do personnel understand:
a. The potential hazards of the process? yes
b. What the lines of defense are against them? Yes
c. What the key safety devices, interlocks, mitigation equipment, and administrative
controls are? Yes
d. Why these controls exist and how they are supposed to work? Yes
2. Are personnel entering an area trained on both generic and area-specific safety rules
and critical emergency response procedures?
Yes, all training passport has been provided w.r.t. their training
3. Is training given in the use of all job-specific emergency equipment?
Yes
4. Are recovery procedures (for use in the event of an operating error) included as part of
the overall training program?
Yes
5. Are operating teams trained together in the transfer of information and responsibility?
Yes
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

6. Are infrequently used but important skills and knowledge included in refresher training?
Yes
7. Does training include troubleshooting skills?
Yes
8. Are the operators trained to recognize when an emergency situation exists? Are
realistic drills conducted to test organization response to such events?
Yes
9. Do the training requirements (or skill demonstrations) for a job accurately reflect the
requirements for both routine and nonroutine operations?
Yes
10. Have people been assigned to jobs based upon a demonstration of required skills?
Yes
11. Is there an effective monitoring or mentoring program for operators undergoing on-the-
job training?
Yes
12. Are critical maintenance procedures identified, understandable, and accurate?
Yes
4 Task design and organization

Proper design of tasks and clear understanding of accountability can do a great deal to
reduce the risk of error-likely situations.
1. Are operators’ job descriptions well defined (e.g., do overlaps or gaps in responsibility
exist, having the potential to result in important tasks being left undone due to
confusion regarding responsibility)?
Yes
2. Are there parts of the process where split/shared ownership can lead to a lack of
accountability?
No
3. Where several different tasks are assigned to one person, can these run unattended
for a limited time so that attention can be given to any single one?
No
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

4. Are mental and physical workloads reasonable (i.e., at a level that can be maintained
without undue strain for hours)? If high stress levels can occur, are they limited to short
periods with sufficient recuperation time in between?
Yes
5. Does the job environment involve long hours of continuous mental or physical
inactivity, or social isolation (e.g., lack of help if needed, urge to wander off to seek
company/assistance, dulling of senses by long periods of uneventful vigil)?
No
6. For “systems” that require constant monitoring (e.g., a panel board, DCS, standby for
vessel entry, heat permit work), is there an enforced policy to ensure coverage of the
system at all times it is in operation?
Yes
7. Are any high-speed, high-accuracy, or highly repetitive tasks done manually? Does this
make an error more likely? Are the consequences acceptable?
Doing bottom hopper & SH manual pocking, & its consequences are also not
acceptable.
8. For manual ingredient preparation tasks (e.g., for charging a reactor), is there a means
to prevent adding the wrong amount or multiple charges?
Yes
9. For manual ingredient preparation tasks, are ingredient scales and metering devices
controlled (i.e., verified for accuracy on a set frequency)?
Yes
10. Are there aids to help personnel find their place in an operating sequence if the
sequence has been interrupted? What are the consequences of confusion?
Yes
5 Ergonomics
Attention to the operating environment, as well as the human-machine and human-systems
interfaces, are of significant importance in the prevention of error-likely situations.
1. Are critical equipment controls (e.g., shutdown switches, valves) placed in such a way
that they can be reached successfully in an emergency? (For example, does one have
to wade through the spill or a fire to reach the emergency stop?)
Yes
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

2. Does successful use of emergency equipment require physical skills or training beyond
the capability of some of the people likely to respond?
No
3. Have environmental conditions (temperature, illumination, weather) been considered in
the design of the facility? Has their impact relative to successful activation of critical or
emergency equipment been assessed?
Yes
4. Do any tasks require the prolonged wearing of excessive or burdensome personal
protective equipment, such that it may interfere with an individual’s ability to safely
complete an operation in an adequate amount of time, either due to physical
constraints or interference with the ability to stay mentally focused?
Yes, Proper rest for interval should be provide
5. Would area congestion play a role in tasks where speed is of the essence (e.g.,
emergency access to shutdown devices, evacuation routes, etc.)?
No
6. Is enough space provided around equipment to perform the desired maintenance
tasks? (For example, is it difficult to tighten one bolt on a particular flange because the
surrounding area is too congested?)
No
7. Are proper tools provided to complete the required task? (For example, in one area,
flammable vapor leaks from a high-pressure heat exchanger were common because
no one was strong enough to properly torque the head bolts. Procurement of a
hydraulic bolt tensioner eliminated the problem.)
Yes
8. Is it easy to work at or move past control panels without accidentally altering settings?
(For example, are there cover plates over emergency shutdown buttons? If so, make
sure the cover plates don’t restrict access in case of emergency.)
Yes
9. Does the layout of different but similar-looking equipment lend itself to
misidentification? (Two examples are working on unit “A” instead of “B” and hooking a
tank truck unload line to the wrong station.)
No
10. Are such things as key piping, valves, vessels, and field warning lights labeled clearly
and unambiguously? Is it clear who is responsible for maintaining the labeling?
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

No, Tagging, color coding, Flow direction not available

11. Is there background noise or any other distracting/disruptive factor(s)? Does hearing
protection prevent proper communication?
Yes, Ear phones to be provided.
12. Have employees made modifications to existing systems that may be symptoms of
design failures? (For example, a piece of cardboard covers a video screen to cut down
on the lighting glare, or tape is placed over a nuisance alarm horn.)
No
6 Control systems
1. Are there nuisance alarms that distract workers or make it likely an important alarm is
ignored?
Yes, all nuisance alarms to be identified & removed.
2. Are the control schemes properly documented and understood by the users?
Yes
3. Is the control system labeling terminology consistent and compatible with the
comprehension level of the user? (For example, does “0% valve loading” always mean
the valve is closed?)
Yes
4. Are such things as alarms, warning lights, and horns consistent in appearance (or
sound) in various areas of the process?
Yes
5. Are such things as critical controls and overrides likely to be confused with ordinary
ones? (Hint: Look at the arrangement and proximity of controls.)
No
6. In an emergency, can operator overload occur from many alarms sounding
simultaneously? If so, is there a way to prioritize the most important?
No
7. In an emergency, is activation of countermeasures simple or complex? Bear in mind
that in a state of crisis, a complicated response plan is not likely to be executed
successfully.
Simple
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

8. Are the designs of any controls counter-intuitive or do they violate populational

stereotypes?
No
Note: A population stereotype is a behavior pattern ingrained in a group of people;
for example, expecting a valve to close when turned clockwise.
9. Are there area process control/alarm color or sound conventions used that run counter
to conventions used elsewhere on the site?
No
Note: This may be a significant issue for workers migrating into or out of the area.
11. Are the criteria clear and unambiguous for taking over manual control from automatic?
Is it understood when a system can be placed into automatic or supervisory control?
Yes
12. Is all the relevant information required to effectively run the process under routine and
upset conditions supplied?
Yes
13. Can instrument (or video display terminal) lag/update time be slow enough to create a
potential for operator overcontrol?
No
14. Is there an effective means to detect instrument failure? What errors might be likely if
key instruments give false readings?
Yes
15. Can the indicators (e.g., strip chart pens, dials, video displays) become stuck in
position, thereby failing to indicate the true process value?
No
16. Are there underlying assumptions in control system design that might become invalid
under process upset conditions (e.g., a false level signal because fluid density
changed)?
No
17. Is the user always informed if a control setting or screen has been changed?
Yes
18. Are changes in control settings effectively limited to trained personnel?
Yes
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

19. Are systems designed to avoid overly sensitive controls? In other words, is there a
reasonable range of control movement? (For example, error would be likely if
attempting to regulate flow at 50 GPM with a control knob that changed flow 1000
GPM for each half-turn.)
Yes
20. Are instruments calibrated or checked regularly?
Yes
21. Do instrument checks verify the entire instrument loop? (For example, drive the signal
from the field transmitter rather than drive the signal into a pressure switch that
activates an alarm within the CCR.)
Yes
22. Are instrument malfunctions promptly repaired? Is there evidence of chronic use of
interlock/alarm bypasses?
Yes
23. Are automatic interlock bypasses or alarm inhibits designed into the control system? If
so, what controls are in place to avoid abuse?
Yes
24. For panel board and field instrument controls:
a. Are the controls clear, not cluttered? Are labels maintained? Yes
b. Color coded as needed? Color coded consistently? (Is colorblindness an issue?)
No color coding
c. Is similar layout used on similar equipment? (Is there enough distinction to avoid
confusion between units?) Yes
d. Are controls and displays readable quickly and without strain? Yes
e. Are there distinguishable alarm tones/signals? Yes
25. For video interfaces:
a. Is there a redundant means of accessing the information should the screen fail?
b. When it is possible to access multiple screens from the same control panel, could
an adjustment be made while looking at the wrong screen? Are there similar
screens for different (but identical-looking) units?
c. Can the user quickly tell if the screen has stopped updating information?
d. Does the user tend to get tunnel vision?
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

e. Does the user have time to determine the source of the alarm, or will the alarm
scroll off the screen too quickly?
f. Is screen design too “busy” (i.e., too much information)?
g. Are there a sufficient number of video displays to show enough of the process
simultaneously?
Not such system is available in the present system.
26. For programmable electronic systems (PESs):
a. Are there proper checks and balances to prevent computer programming errors?
b. Is there a procedure to introduce and follow-up after installation of vendor-supplied
software or new software revisions?
c. Are the controls adequate to ensure software modifications are made only by
qualified and competent individuals?
d. If safety interlocks are included in the PES, are redundant and different logic
schemes employed (reference DuPont Engineering Standard DX3S)?
e. If older manual (or lower order semiautomatic) control systems are maintained as
a backup to the primary system, is operator refresher training and skill
demonstration on the use of the older equipment/controls done?
f. Are software safety interlocks well-documented, including a written description of
how they work?
g. Can the PES fail in a way that generates random output signals? How would such
a condition become known to an operator? Is there a recovery procedure?
h. How is the system protected against data entry error?
Not such system is available in the present system.

HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

Facility Siting Checklist

I. Siting Considerations
1. Describe the worst credible event that should be considered in the unit (usually the same as the one
considered for Consequence Analysis). What is the emergency response for this event?
Oil Leakage in Turbine lube oil system

Emergency response plan available: Not mentioned separately for the event
2. What are the potential effects that this event will have within this unit?
Plant production and availability
Major/minor injury
Emission
3. What are the potential effects that this event will have on other units within the complex (what is the
potential domino effects)?
Plant production and availability
Equipment damage
4. What are the potential effects that this event will have on off-site property and populations? What is the
potential off-site impact of the domino effects?
Emission
pollution
Chaos
Company reputation will go down
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

II. Intra-Unit Spacing
5. Is there adequate spacing within the unit for normal operating and maintenance requirements?
Yes, it is as per design
6. Does the spacing within the unit allow for safe evacuation of personnel working within the unit in the
event of emergency?
Yes
7. Are the control room and any other process support buildings (like maintenance shelter, workshop etc)
which are normally populated located a safe distance from a high hazard unit?
No,
8. Is the unit laid out to minimize the piping requirements?

Yes
9. Are firewalls, blast-wall, etc. provided where needed to protect personnel and equipment from high
hazard equipment within the unit?
Not Available
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

III. Inter-Unit Spacing
10. Are units of high risk separated, wherever possible, from each other by units having mild, low, or
medium risk?
Yes
11. Are units located appropriate distances (100 ft-250ft) from identified ignition sources such as furnaces,
electrical switchgear, flare stacks, etc.?
No
12. Are units handling highly toxic materials located at a suitable distance (use distance estimate of toxic
concentration from Consequence Analysis) from all buildings containing appreciable concentrations of
personnel and also with regard to similar areas outside of the complex?
No
13. Are units having a high vapor cloud explosion potential located away (use distance estimate of blast
overpressure from Consequence Analysis) from the site boundary and away from on-site areas of
populations?
No
14. Are units having a high vapor cloud explosion potential located away from major plant traffic routes? Is
traffic through such units controlled using gates, etc.?
NA
15. Are major pipe ways and process areas located or protected such that they are at a minimal risk from
transport accidents arising from the regular movement of vehicles?
Yes
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

16. Are storage areas separated from loading/unloading areas, major plant traffic routes, and process
areas?
Yes
IV. Access
17. Are units having a moderate or high fire risk provided with road access for emergency vehicles from at
least two locations?
Yes
18. Is a secondary safe-haven area accessible from the unit, in case the primary area is blocked off? Is
more than one escape route available to all personnel working in a area during emergency?
Yes
V. Mitigation
19. Are areas that are normally populated (control rooms, amenity buildings, workshops, laboratories, etc.)
located adjacent to mild or low risk units? Are they provided with the appropriate protection against fire,
explosion or toxic gas release (like SCBA/ escape packs, gas masks, fire suits etc)?
Yes
20. Are adequate gas and fire detectors provided to allow for prompt emergency response?
Yes provided, but not working
21. Are emergency shutdown/ isolation adequate to prevent/reduce a catastrophic event?

Yes
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

22. Are hydrocarbons and firewater drained away from the process area? How are these areas protected
from becoming a potential source for spreading of the fire?
Yes
23. Is the provided mitigation adequate given the inherent hazards and siting considerations?
No separate mitigation is provided
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

PHA RESOLUATION SHEET:
PHA Recommendations Resolution Sheet

Zone: 2 PHA of Turbine
Unit: CPP Top 3 risks are highlighted in yellow colour
Correctiv
e Action
Risk
S Accepted/ Proposed/ Respon Target Statu
(between Recommendation Rejected
N Reason sibility Date s
RPN 8-20)
for
Rejection
1.Safety valve inspection during
Low
overhauling (to be incorporated
pressure 31 March com
1 Heater
in SAP) Accepted S.Rao
2.Periodic spring testing of safety
2017 p
blasting
valve
ARV
mechanica
l Design
Automatic not
Protection to be provide on very
2 recirculation
high dischare pr. Of BFP
Rejected allowed
valve fail for
Discharage
Pressure
High
1.Safety valve inspection during
High
overhauling (to be incorporated
pressure 31 March com
3 heater
in SAP) Accepted S.Rao
2.Periodic spring testing of safety 2017 p
blasting
valve
1.Mulizifire protection testing
2.Feasiblity to be check for
OVEF start on basis of MOT pr. Vipin
Fire in Main 3.Sand Bucket to placed near 31 October comp
4 oil tank
Accepted VP
MOT. 2017 leted
4.Dry Powder extinguisher Size Singh
to be calculated on Fire Load &
placed near MOT.
Oil Leakage Insulation Cladding Joint to Seal
in Turbine through Appropriate adhesive MD 31 March com
5 lube oil
Accepted
high Temperature Valve Head to Parvez 2017 p
system Cover
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

Oil Leakage
in High
Insulation Cladding Joint to Seal
Pressure
through Appropriate adhesive MD 31 March com
6 Hydraulic Accepted
Oil (HPBP
high Temperature Valve Head to Parvez 2017 p
Cover
Valve &
OSU line)
thermography with an specified D S lee
insulation com
7 damages
interval & damaged insulation to Accepted Md 30-06 2017
attended immediately
p
parvez
high
pressure/high thermography with an specified D S lee
Com
8 temperature interval & strict compliance to Accepted Md 30-06 2017
water all safe guards available
p
parvez
leakage
Oil Leakage
from manual TBN PMI Check Sheet to be
NP Com
9 Barring revised For ensure opening to be Accepted 31-Jan-17
Opening at close (SMP to be updated)
singh p
Full rpm
1.Schedule electrical PMI &
annual testing in SAP
2.Prepare mechanical PMI of Ajay
EOT crane & schedule it in SAP
EOT Hoist Meena 30 Oct
10 Failure
Prepare SOP for Operation & Accepted
Testing of EOT
Amit 2018
3.Provide interlock to avoid Joshi
multiple operation of EOT at a
time

PHA - 02 - Turbine Complete

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HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD

Issue Date 7.12.2017

Cover page Page No. Page 1 of 44

Process Hazard Analysis

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III. Appendices (as appropriate)

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10. Hazard Evaluation Methodology Documentation

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MEMBERSHIP SIGNATURE PAGE:

Process Hazards Analysis

PHA Team signatures

Nishant Somwanshi ---------------------------

Prashant Gaur ---------------------------

Ahatram Siddiqui ---------------------------

Dr. Vikas Tiwari ---------------------------

Rajesh Jain ---------------------------

Rahul paliwal ---------------------------

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List Of hazards Identified

Dust Skin or Cancer

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Potential Hazardous situations

Table 3.1 List of major equipment and possible hazardous situations

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3.1 Hazards in Turbines

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Table 3.2 Factors that could cause major hazards in turbines

3.1.1 Hazards of the Turbogenerator Oil System

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3.1.2 Hazard control in the Turbogenerator Oil System

3.2 Hazards in Generators & Electrical Systems

3.2.2 Summary of Potential hazards

3.2.3 Potential hazards in generators

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Cover page Page No. Page 15 of 44

3.2.4 Hazards in Transformers and power distribution units

1. Failure of epoxy due to overheating & possibility of fire

Hazard Control Measures

The following measures have been provided

2. Temperature of stator windings is monitored

Issue Date 7.12.2017

Cover page Page No. Page 16 of 44

3. Temperature of inlet and outlet air is monitored

5. Water sprinklers points provided for generators (manually operated )