STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND

THE SPACE BETWEEN:

ON THE CHALLENGES AND
CONTRADICTIONS OF A BLENDED
VIEW OF THE LIFE COURSE

Richard A. Settersten, Jr. and Lynn Gannon

The field of life course studies has at its core two propositions for which
there is an inherent tension: one emphasizing that the life course is the
product of social forces (broadly construed as ‘‘social structure’’), and the
other emphasizing individual capacities and effort (broadly construed as
‘‘human agency’’). A wide array of perspectives on structure and agency can
be found in the literature. At one extreme are models of structure without
agency. More common in the discipline of sociology and in European
scholarship, these models take the life course to be largely constrained, if not
determined, by the characteristics of and processes in social settings, and by
the locations of individuals within those settings. Politically, these models
can be viewed as problematic, at least if they are carried too far, because
they ‘‘externalize’’ blame and leave little or no room for personal respon-
sibility.
At the other extreme are models of agency without structure. More com-
mon in the discipline of psychology and in North American scholarship,

Towards an Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Life Course

Advances in Life Course Research, Volume 10, 35–55
Copyright r 2005 by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1040-2608/doi:10.1016/S1040-2608(05)10001-X
35
36 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

these models take the life course to be largely fostered, if not determined by,
individual decisions and actions. Life, as the adage goes, is largely what one
makes of it. While few of these latter models take the life course to be
completely devoid of social obstacles and barriers, these models often
downplay the effects of social forces and assume that good planning and
hard work go a long way in overcoming barriers. In the political sphere,
these models can be dangerous, at least if they are carried to an extreme,
because they blame people for negative outcomes and suggest that individ-
uals need not be extended support from the state because their problems and
circumstances are their own doing.
In both cases, these models have led to the question ‘‘What matters more,
structure or agency?’’ and to discussions of agency versus structure. While
these two prevalent perspectives offer different and important lenses for
understanding human development, a third and underdeveloped set of
models instead seem necessary to advance interdisciplinary life course re-
search. These are blended models of agency within structure, which explicitly
seek to understand how individuals set goals, take action, and create mean-
ings within – and often despite – the parameters of social settings, and even
how individuals may change those parameters through their own actions.
These models bridge over-structured and under-structured views of the life
course by asking how the characteristics of and processes in social settings
interact with the characteristics, capacities, and actions of individuals to
jointly affect life trajectories and outcomes. They involve incorporating in-
teractions with a wide range of social settings both near to and far from
individuals – from proximal settings of everyday life such as families, peer
groups and friendships, neighborhoods, schools, or work organizations, to
more distal settings such as the labor market, the state and its policies, and
historical events and periods of social change.
Modes of agency within structure bring significant challenges because
they demand that boundaries between disciplines be crossed, especially be-
tween life-span psychology and life course sociology; that the concepts and
measures of ‘‘structure’’ and ‘‘agency’’ be clarified; and that more sophis-
ticated theories and methods be developed to frame and analyze them.
Models of agency within structure also demand a critical evaluation of the
unique nature and effects of structure–agency dynamics within and across
distinct life periods. The tensions between structure and agency need not be
resolved as much as capitalized upon to build new social theories and re-
search on specific life periods and on the life course as a whole.
Finally, there is mounting and conflicting evidence that the life course has
become both more standardized (with regularity in life course patterns being
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 37

driven by the increased ‘‘institutionalization’’ through norms, laws, and

social policies) and de-standardized (or ‘‘individualized,’’ with variability in
life course experiences being driven by greater freedom to ‘‘live a life of one’s
own’’). The chapter ends with some thoughts on how these contradictions
may be explained by more explicitly tending to structure–agency dynamics.

STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND THE SPACE BETWEEN

Structure

The concept of social structure is difficult to grasp and make precise. The
things indexed by the notion of social structure are recognized as the central
sociological contribution to the study of lives, yet there is little agreement
about what exactly structure is (see also Alwin, 1995). Indeed, sociologists
not only find it difficult to define structure adequately, but they often cannot
do so without using the word ‘‘structure’’ or a variant of it (see also Sewell,
1992). Conventional approaches treat structure as a powerful set of stable
top-down forces that impinge upon individuals and cannot be (easily) al-
tered. As an example, consider Alwin’s (1995, p. 218) definition of social
structure as a set of ‘‘opportunities and constraints within networks of roles,
relationships, and communication patterns, which are relatively patterned
and persisting (emphasis added). These opportunities and constraints may,
at one extreme, refer to ‘‘large, organic institutional structures, such as
bureaucracies, which structure and orient human activities,’’ or they may, at
the other extreme, refer to a set of ‘‘dyadic norms negotiated between two
individuals for the purposes of social exchange.’’ This definition of social
structure is typical in that it emphasizes stability, but it is unusual in that it
acknowledges both constraints and opportunities, and both macro- and
micro forces.
The emphasis on stability, however, has led to the neglect of dynamic
aspects of structure. Few approaches have emphasized the fact that people
have the ability to change structures (that is, that the relationship between
people and structures is reciprocal) and that both social structures and
human lives and the connection between them, are dynamic (an important
exception to this trend has been the age stratification framework long ad-
vocated by Riley and colleagues; e.g., Riley & Riley, 1999). On the surface,
the notion of ‘‘dynamic’’ structures seems to negate the very concept of
structure, which has stability at its core. But in a fast-paced world of rapid
social change, it may be transformations in social structure, and the po-
38 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

tentially disruptive effects they have on human lives, that pose new chal-
lenges for growing up and growing older today.
Sociologists of ‘‘social stratification’’ have emphasized the fact that the
social structure of a society can be described through key dimensions of
social organization: age (or cohort), race (or ethnicity), sex (or gender), and
social class (education, occupation, income, or some combination thereof).
Some of these are ‘‘ascribed’’ statuses into which individuals are born or
over which individuals have little control. Others are ‘‘achieved’’ statuses
that are largely the result of performance, effort, or things over which in-
dividuals presumably have some control. Much social thought related to
stratification has often been tied to the question of who gets what in society.
In most complex societies, certain individuals and groups hold dispropor-
tionate shares of social resources (e.g., property, power, prestige), and so-
ciologists have traditionally been interested in how and why the distribution
of resources varies as a function of the dimensions noted above.
Similarly, both life course sociology and life-span psychology continue to
be dominated by what Bronfenbrenner (1988) once called ‘‘personal at-
tribute,’’ ‘‘social address,’’ and ‘‘social niche’’ models. Personal attribute
models group and compare individuals based on biological or physical fea-
tures (e.g., age, sex, body type). Social address models group and compare
individuals by geographical or social group (e.g., urban or rural, social class,
race or ethnic group). While social address models focus on geographical or
social dimensions, they nonetheless often rely on personal attributes as a
means for grouping individuals. Social niche models group and compare
individuals based on intersections between multiple statuses (e.g., poor,
young, unmarried mothers versus other groups).
All of these models can be described as class-theoretical models because
they assume that the characteristics of individuals serve as important proxies
for ‘‘social structure’’ and individuals’ experiences in it, that they index some
aspect of inequality, and that the phenomena under study are somehow
explained by the categories themselves. In reality, however, these variables
provide little or no direct information about the characteristics of or proc-
esses in the social worlds that individuals inhabit, nor about the experiences
of individuals in those worlds. When investigators find significant differ-
ences between classes, they are then faced with the challenge of having to
explain these differences – and it is with respect to explanation that class-
theoretical models are not sufficient. Because these models are based on the
characteristics of individuals, they do not tap what most sociologists and
ecologically minded psychologists think about as social structure. A big and
problematic leap of faith is required when we assume that individuals who
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 39

share a set of personal characteristics also share similar social worlds and
experiences. At best, such a leap leads to suspect interpretations; at worst, it
results in misleading and false ones. This is especially true when class-
theoretical approaches are used to explore what Bronfenbrenner calls field-
theoretical questions – that is, when we want to understand the ecology of
human development.
Because ‘‘social structure’’ is such an elusive concept, it is not surprising
that its measurement and modeling are so difficult. Important strides must
be made in conceptualizing social settings, measuring their characteristics
and the processes that occur in them, and analyzing additive and multipli-
cative effects across settings. This includes attention to the proximal and
distal settings noted earlier. Of course, the more distal the environment, the
more difficult it is to describe, and the harder it is to trace the processes and
mechanisms through which it affects specific developmental outcomes. Yet
even the measurement of seemingly simple personal characteristics on which
investigators have long relied can quickly become complicated. Indeed, the
measurement of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, sex and gender,
and age and cohort are all highly controversial practices in the social sci-
ences (see Oakes & Rossi, 2003; Passel, 2001; Settersten, 1999).

Agency

Matters of agency are as complicated as matters of structure. While the

‘‘structure–agency’’ debate has long been central to the discipline of soci-
ology, the ‘‘structure’’ side has been emphasized more than the ‘‘agency’’
side – except perhaps at the boundary between sociological social psychol-
ogy and psychological social psychology. In psychology, in contrast, the
bundle of concepts associated with the notion of agency is recognized as one
of its central contributions to the study of lives. Despite this, there is little
agreement about what exactly agency is, how it matters theoretically, or how
it should be measured. A wide range of concepts – such as ‘‘self-efficacy,’’
‘‘self-determination,’’ ‘‘locus of control,’’ ‘‘effort,’’ ‘‘mindfulness,’’ ‘‘re-
sourcefulness,’’ ‘‘mastery,’’ and ‘‘autonomy’’ – is often used to index, or
used interchangeably with, ‘‘agency.’’
New depictions of individuals as active and self-aware are especially the
result of a growing ‘‘constructivist’’ view of human development, in which
individuals are seen as the primary architects of their own lives – making
their own decisions, creating their own opportunities, and generating their
own meanings. This reflects a growing recognition of the need to integrate
40 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

action perspectives in the field of human development, a trend which is also

mirrored in the discipline of sociology (Giele, 2002). These views, for ex-
ample, have transformed old views of children and childhood, in which the
self was treated as something given, and have instead promoted new views
of the self as something created and reflexive (e.g., James, Jenks, & Prout,
1998).
Constructivist views are equally important for understanding adulthood.
Activities of self-regulation and intentional self-development typically be-
come more differentiated and concrete in the transition to adulthood, as
independence and autonomy gain in importance and as personal goals and
‘‘identity projects’’ are expected to become clearer (Brandtstädter, 1998).
Personal goals and identity projects also undergo a process of continual
revision and readjustment throughout adult life, including advanced old age
(e.g., Freund & Smith, 1999). They are not only shaped by the input of
important others, but are dependent on the plans of other intimates (e.g.,
spouse or partner, children) with whom one’s life is interwoven (that is, lives
must be jointly negotiated and coordinated). They are also shaped by a
larger system of cultural norms, as representations of the ‘‘normal’’ or ‘‘ex-
pectable’’ life course are incorporated into and presumably guide personal
plans. Cultural scripts for life in modern societies seem unclear, and whether
these scripts actually affect personal plans seems even less certain (Settersten,
2003). The pervasive focus on personal control and agency in developmental
science corresponds with the growing emphasis on internal motivation,
planning, decision-making, and open and flexible pathways in societies
(Diewald, 2001).
An important agency-based concept in sociology has been Clausen’s
(1993) notion of ‘‘planful competence.’’ Clausen envisioned the life course as
largely the result of personal choice, and positive trajectories as largely the
result of planful competence. Clausen argued that planful competence is
characterized by three things: dependability, intellectual involvement, and
self-confidence. Based on Q-sort methods, Clausen’s measurement of these
components has been the source of some debate. But as a concept, planful
competence is simple and intuitive: It means knowing your strengths, lim-
itations, and interests, and knowing what options are available and how to
take advantage of them. It means being able to assess the actions and feel-
ings of others, and to take these into account when interacting with others.
Most importantly, it means having goals and the self-confidence to carry
them out, coupled with a high degree of flexibility and openness to new
experiences.
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 41

Clausen’s work is important theoretically because it yields interesting in-

sights, especially when combined with recent theorizing on cumulative ad-
vantage and disadvantage over the life course (e.g., Dannefer, 2003).
Clausen suggested that planful competence can be discerned by the ado-
lescent years (but that it develops naturally as adults mature), and that it has
powerful effects on subsequent life. Adolescents who are planfully compe-
tent make good decisions and have successes early in life, the benefits of
which cumulate and lead to further good decisions and successes over the
life course.
If planful competence is a skill that is at least partially learned, interesting
interventions might be designed to help instill it in children and young
adults. This also raises the question of whether it is ever too late to acquire
planful competence, for even individuals in midlife or old age might have
much to gain from it, despite their limited time horizons. Of course, even the
most planfully competent individuals may not be able to act on opportu-
nities if they do not have the social resources to express these competencies
or if other social barriers prevent them from doing so. This is a reminder
that forms of agency are constrained by both barriers in the social world and
personal resources and capacities. Models of agency are, in part, models of
rationality. They take humans to be capable of computing probabilities and
joint distributions, and to have substantial knowledge of their environ-
ments. But these models must be ‘‘faithful to the actual cognitive capacities
of human beings’’ – to real limits in ‘‘knowledge, attention, memory, and
other resources’’ (Gigerenzer, 2003, p. 425).
Attention to agency is important because the life course is to some extent
a personal construction. But the life course also entails selective social
processes that sift and sort people into and out of various settings, and open
or close opportunities depending on the characteristics of people and the
contexts that surround them. These settings and opportunities are not en-
tirely their own doing but are systematically allocated by social forces re-
lated to race, sex, age, socio-economic status, and other factors. It is for this
reason that joint models of agency and structure, to which we now turn,
represent such important ventures for future scholarship.

Agency within Structure

Advances in life course research require greater attention to the joint impact
of social structure and human agency. Models of agency within structure
consider how individuals actively create their own lives and maximize their
42 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

own development within parameters set by their social worlds (some of

which may constrain them, and some of which may enable them), and how
individuals interact with and make proactive attempts to alter those worlds.
These models require a stronger partnership between life-span psychology
and lifecourse sociology (see Diewald, 2001; Mayer, 2003; Settersten,
2005a). Sociologists, for example, have often lost sight of the person and
overlooked the roles of personality traits and characteristics, motivations,
and action as life course determinants. From the vantage point of sociology,
however, psychological factors are often viewed as being outside its realm,
given that the purpose of sociology is often understood to be the explana-
tion of the social by the social, a tradition dating back to Durkheim (1895/
1964). Or, if psychological factors are viewed as relevant, they are not taken
to have independent causal significance if they are partially created through
social processes.
Psychologists, by contrast, have often neglected the powerful social and
historical forces that promote or limit development. Given the emphasis on
matters of agency in psychology, a working assumption would seem to be
that individuals are capable of altering structures, or at least are reciprocally
affected by them. Yet modern psychology has focused on family and
interpersonal relationships to the exclusion of more distal settings. In
addition, perceptions, beliefs, and goals are often viewed as separate and
independent from structural opportunities and constraints, which they are
not, for social forces may already be present in psychological states, as noted
above.
The life course is the result of social institutions, culture, and history and
the result of decision-making, action, control, and personality (Diewald,
2001). New models of the life course must capture a more complete range of
these factors. The latter factors, however, traditionally the domain of psy-
chology, will become increasingly important as the strength of institutions
and norms weakens, and as individuals have greater latitude to select or
develop their own life scripts. This freedom results in both new possibilities
and risks, as the experimental nature of ‘‘do-it-yourself’’ biographies makes
them more fragile (Beck, 2000). When individuals choose or find themselves
on pathways that are not widely shared by others or reinforced in institu-
tions or policies, they may lose important sources of support and struggle
with institutional barriers built on more dominant models.
Research in life course sociology and life-span psychology is more com-
patible than it seems at the first sight. Indeed, the more fine-grained work of
life-span psychology, which seeks to unearth the quality and quantity of
‘‘intra-individual plasticity,’’ can offer an empirical base to reinforce
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 43

sociological research by decomposing macro patterns into their more prox-

imal and micro-genetic causes (Settersten, 2005a). Together, the two fields
offer tremendous potentials for moving bodies of knowledge from one dis-
cipline to another, and for providing mutually supportive explanations from
different levels of aggregation and with different views on causality. The
concepts of structure and agency, and the dynamics between them, can be
more actively combined in the design and execution of collaborative inter-
disciplinary work (see also Sibeon, 1999).
Several models offer excellent starting points for improving knowledge of
agency–structure dynamics, especially if they are developed in more contex-
tual ways. For example, the ‘‘developmental regulation’’ models of Heck-
hausen (2003) give extensive attention to the selective and compensatory
control strategies of individuals, but relatively limited attention, at least em-
pirically, to larger socio-structural forces that constrain or enable develop-
mental potential. Great possibilities also exist in extending the models of
‘‘selective optimization and compensation’’ of Baltes and colleagues (for ap-
plications to intellectual functioning, see Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger,
1999), and those of ‘‘assimilative’’ and ‘‘accommodative’’ coping developed
by Brandtstädter (e.g., Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2003), to better incor-
porate socio-structural forces.
Modes of agency within structure cannot be general, but must be under-
stood within particular domains of functioning and particular environ-
ments. They must also consider agency not only as an individual
phenomenon, but as a collective one – as when many individuals who dare
to make innovative life decisions end up creating new options for others, or
when entire groups of people acting in concert attempt to forge new patterns
through social change and collective movements. These models must also
explore how the nature and balance of agency and structure may change
within and between individuals as they move through different periods of
life. This includes a need to assess individuals’ subjective understandings of
their own capacities and resources, as well as those that exist in the settings
around them, for these understandings affect how life is interpreted and
projected forward. It is important to note, however, that life periods them-
selves are important elements of social structure. They are a constant part of
societies (though their boundaries and content may change); they are widely
recognized and have shared meanings; they are reflected and reinforced in
law, policies, and institutions; and they are given practical forms in everyday
life. We now briefly explore concerns related to agency and structure in
three periods: childhood and adolescence; early adulthood through midlife;
and old age.
44 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND

SPECIFIC LIFE PERIODS
Childhood and Adolescence

Four immediate social settings have been central to understanding the de-
velopment of children and adolescents: families, schools, neighborhoods,
and peer groups and friends (for a review, see Cook, Herman, Phillips, &
Settersten, 2002). This literature also contains debates about the relative
importance of these four settings on child development, the changing
strength and nature of their influence as children become adolescents (es-
pecially what the growing influence of peers and friends, and the emergence
of romantic relationships and sexual awakening, mean for the other set-
tings), and their additive and multiplicative effects. Given the significance of
these four settings and the natural links between them, research on this
period of life has examined person-context interactions more than any other
period. Family characteristics and processes are probably best articulated,
followed by schools, neighborhoods, and peer groups.
Much of the focus has been on the negative forms of these settings – the
problems that ‘‘bad’’ neighborhoods, schools, peer groups, or families pose
for development, and how these settings may be improved to promote pos-
itive outcomes (or at least minimize negative ones). The interesting question
becomes how and why some kids in bad environments manage to do well,
despite these disadvantages, while many others do not (e.g., Furstenberg,
Cook, Eccles, Elder, & Sameroff, 1999). There has been much less attention
to the equally interesting flip-side of these dynamics: how and why some
kids in good environments do not do well, despite their advantages.
Given the emphasis on settings of poor quality, views of ‘‘structure’’ often
carry negative connotations, while those of ‘‘agency’’ carry positive ones.
Here, the agency of children and adolescents, often in combination with that
of adults, is seen as being critical to overcoming the challenges of these
environments – and the lack of agency, in contrast, is seen as devastating.
For example, it is popular belief that success in school, ensured through
hard work and effort, is the key to a better life. In reality, of course, success
in school is more complicated than this. Hard work and effort alone are
often not enough to guarantee success, especially in poor schools and if
coupled with other settings of poor quality. Nevertheless, a core component
of agency in any of these settings relates to how well children are able to
activate whatever resources exist in their environments. This includes build-
ing positive relationships with adults in those settings who have the ability to
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 45

take action on behalf the child, or who can protect or promote a child who
might be at risk in some way.
The renegotiation of family relationships as children become adolescents
and young adults is also an important aspect of agency during this period.
Indeed, typical ‘‘acting out’’ in the family or other settings may even be
considered an exertion of agency against structure. Many adolescents also
begin to develop attachments to the world of work through part-
employment and volunteer activities, and become politically and civically
aware. These, too, offer important opportunities to actively develop and
express one’s self.
Of course, agency can also be self-destructive. For example, when parent-
ing strategies are too permissive, when neighborhoods have too little social
cohesion, or when schools are disorganized, children may have too much
autonomy – which can lead to negative outcomes. There is therefore a tricky
balance between structure and agency in promoting positive outcomes for
children and adolescents. The literature suggests the strong influence of
structural forces during this period, expressed through these four settings,
which are created and controlled by adults.
The presence and power of these settings takes place against, and must be
responsive to, the child’s growing need for independence and autonomy.
Much literature, especially in North America, leaves one with the impres-
sion that children and adolescents, as dependents, are not yet capable of
making their own decisions. The emerging field of childhood studies in
Europe is altering this view. This field has been heavily influenced by the
United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child. It takes
seriously the notion that children are competent social actors who can – and
should be granted opportunities to – participate in decisions that affect
them, define the directions and processes of their own development, and
participate in the social world (e.g., James, Jenks, & Prout, 1998). This field
has produced innovative studies of how children inhabit and negotiate social
settings, including a range of both public and private spaces with varying
levels of adult control and supervision, and with varying levels of direct
involvement of children in designing and creating those spaces (see, for
example, Philo, 2000).

Early Adulthood through Midlife

Dramatic changes in transitions to adulthood have given rise to a host of

questions about whether current generations of young people are more
46 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

dependent on parents, less interested in growing up, and more wary of

making commitments and taking action for themselves and with others. As
movement into adulthood has become more prolonged and complex, par-
ents are now providing extensive support to children well into their 30 s
(Settersten, Furstenberg, & Rumbaut, 2005). The types and levels of in-
vestments needed to launch even well-positioned young people only exac-
erbate the needs of vulnerable populations who have little or no family
support to back them (Foster & Gifford, 2005; Schoeni & Ross, 2005).
Despite the often extraordinary actions required of families to see their
children into adulthood today, young people nonetheless express an under-
standing that they are responsible for their life directions, and that ulti-
mately their own determination and efforts are necessary to achieve their
goals (Furstenberg, Kennedy, McLoyd, Rumbaut, & Settersten, 2004).
While young people today may reach legal adulthood at the age of 18 or 21,
at least in most Western societies, they are often not adults psychologically,
socially, or economically, until much later. A brand new challenge to un-
derstanding this period is how individuals develop a sense of autonomy
amidst increasingly long periods of dependence on others, without strong or
clear scripts to guide them, and when the institutions are based on models of
early adulthood that no longer reflect the realities of the modern world.
Modes of political expression also emerge as concerns during the early
adult years, especially as legal rights of adulthood and responsibilities of
citizenship are granted (Settersten, 2005b). There is convergent evidence that
young adults who wrestle with social issues and participate in civic matters
are more likely to be engaged citizens throughout life (Flanagan, 2004).
With these shifts come new experiences with collective agency, especially
through youth movements, which often coalesce around challenging the
status quo and the power to ‘‘make history.’’ Unlike children, adults can
more easily mobilize and advocate on their own behalf. In the most extreme
of social movements – revolutions – ‘‘structure’’ is something not to be
reshaped but to be toppled (e.g., Blechler, 2000).
The growing autonomy of youth begins an emphasis on both the ability
and need to set developmental goals, harness one’s resources, and exert
control over the environment. Attention to these processes have propelled
agency-related matters to center stage in literature on adult development, as
they are necessary for the successful performance and management of mul-
tiple adult roles. With longer and more certain lives, experiences are po-
tentially more predictable and controllable, and careful planning may be
increasingly necessary in a world with seemingly unlimited opportunities
and time. As suggested in the previous section, adults not only strive for
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 47

agency in their own lives, but they also hold positions and take actions that
directly affect the agency of others, especially children. Recent research,
however, has stressed the significant need to understand the ecology of
adulthood – how adults shape and are themselves shaped by the social
spaces in which they exist (for illustrations, see Gecas, 2003; Settersten &
Owens, 2002). New theories and research in these directions are necessary to
compensate for the heavy emphasis on individual capacities and resources in
research on adult development and aging.
In midlife, individuals must confront many new challenges, including
changes or stressors related to physical health, memory, personality, emo-
tional development, adaptation and resilience, work and retirement, and
family relationships (for overviews, see Lachman, 2001). These challenges,
like those of old age, bring new concerns about how to maintain forms
or levels of agency in the face of growing personal constraints, whether real
or anticipated. Yet some of this literature has also emphasized the new
potentials of midlife and the chance to reclaim aspects of the self that were
lost or put aside in early adulthood or to develop the self in whole new ways.

Old Age

Like earlier periods of adulthood, scholarship on old age continues to em-

phasize agency through planning, goal-setting, decision-making, even
through the end of life. What is unique to old age is that these matters
are now assumed to be heavily conditioned by losses in physical, cognitive,
psychological, and social capacities, and by increased dependence on others.
The changing configuration of capacities in old age constrains the degree to
which old people have or can express agency. Indeed, maintaining control
over one’s life is understood to be a (if not the) central task of old age, and
fears about losing control preoccupy many old people. Many of the dom-
inant models in life-span psychology noted earlier (e.g., Baltes, Heckhausen,
Brandtstädter, and their colleagues) have guided this literature. In the light
of reduced capacities and a limited time horizon, opportunities for action –
and those selectively chosen – become especially meaningful to old people
(see also Lang & Carstensen, 2002).
The strong emphasis on individual capacities and characteristics in old
age has resulted in a surprisingly acontextual view of this period – what
Hagestad and Dannefer (2001) call the ‘‘microfication’’ of gerontology –
with the exceptions of the vast bodies of literature on health care environ-
ments, transitions to assisted living or nursing homes, giving and receiving
48 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

care, and old age policies (for overviews, see Binstock & George, 2001). In
these cases, agency is a significant concern as old people interface with the
family, institutions, and the state, and as they jointly walk the blurry and
shifting line between dependence and independence. End-of-life issues also
result in a widespread interest in spirituality and religion in old age. In some
cases, this may signal the relinquishment of one’s own control over life and
the placement of control in another entity, or it may signal a shift away from
the self and toward generative actions and ideas meant to improve the lives
of others or humanity.
Gerontology has in the last few decades seriously challenged the belief
that old age is a bleak dark period of great losses. Apart from the areas
noted above, gerontologists seem committed to promoting positive images
of old people and combating negative stereotypes about aging and old age,
especially in promoting models of ‘‘successful’’ aging (e.g., Rowe & Kahn,
1998). These models have helped produce portraits of active elders enrolled
in school, involved in neighborhoods, productive at work, engaged in pol-
itics, and enjoying leisure. All of these spheres offer important opportunities
for expressing agency, especially for those who have health and wealth. The
lengthening period of old age, like that of early adulthood, should prompt
interest in how old people forge pathways through the final decades of life
without strong or clear scripts to guide them, how they navigate institutions
that have no or outdated scaffolding to support them, and how they manage
to retain a sense of autonomy against potentially long periods of dependence
on others.
We must also ask whether we do ourselves and old people a disservice
when we downplay the very real hardships encountered in old age. There is
no document parallel to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,
mentioned earlier, that enforces special rights for old people. But like chil-
dren, many old people around the world do have special concerns related to
independence, participation, care, self-fulfillment, and dignity, all of which
were recently outlined in the United Nations (1999) Principles for Older
Persons as part of the International Year of Older Persons.
Finally, there is growing empirical support for the notion that the ‘‘ar-
chitecture’’ of the life span becomes increasingly ‘‘incomplete,’’ and that the
relative influence of biology and culture changes, over the course of
adulthood, with cultural influences diminishing and biological influences
increasing over time (Baltes, 1997; Li, 2003). The intersections between
socio-cultural and bio-genetic forces in different life periods offer many
possibilities for exploring structure–agency dynamics, especially during
childhood and old age (see Settersten, 2005c). In this section, we have briefly
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 49

considered some of the ways in which the nature and relative balance of
agency and structure may differ across particular life periods. We now turn
to a few observations on the life course as a whole.

STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND

THE LARGER LIFE COURSE

There is mounting and conflicting evidence that the life course has become
both more standardized (with regularity in life course patterns being driven
by the increased ‘‘institutionalization’’ brought about by norms, laws, and
social policies) and de-standardized (or ‘‘individualized,’’ with variability in
life course experiences being driven by the greater choices and control in-
dividuals have over their lives). Much contemporary life course research
emphasizes the latter, with widespread belief that a wide range of macro-
and micro-level factors in the last few decades have resulted in life courses
that are less conventional, patterned, and predictable, and more risky in
private and public spheres alike (Mayer, 2004). This seems especially true of
American research, but it is also increasingly true of Western European
research.
Forms of individual agency are assumed to be central to the emergence of
pluralistic life courses. Extending Prout (2005), this diversity is ‘‘locally
constructed’’ through repeated interactions between the self and others in
immediate environments. The fragility of everyday life in the modern world
demands that individuals focus constantly on maintaining and repairing
themselves and social relationships. Only rarely do individuals realize that
the contour of their lives and nature of their experiences may be shared by
many others, wrapped up in larger patterns produced by resources and
constraints of settings well beyond their immediate environments – what
Mills (1959) called the ‘‘sociological imagination.’’ Even individual agency,
as the centerpiece of these models, is often glossed over and taken to be an
essential characteristic that requires no explanation.
The standardization thesis, which suggests the opposite, rests especially
on the strength of welfare states and social policies to regulate particular
transitions (e.g., marriage) or the structure and content of life periods. This
thesis has mostly been based on Western European research, though inter-
national findings are highly variable and heavily conditioned by the type of
welfare-state ‘‘regime’’ and its benefits (for an overview, see Esping-
Andersen, 2002; Mayer, 2001). For example, at one extreme are ‘‘Liberal
50 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

Market States,’’ such as the United States or United Kingdom, which pro-
vide only temporary and limited support under specific circumstances. At
the other extreme are ‘‘Scandinavian Social Democratic Welfare States,’’
which provide high degrees of social protection and support across life. In
between are ‘‘Continental Conservative Welfare States’’ such as Germany,
and ‘‘Southern European Welfare States’’ such as Italy.
These views pay special attention to the significance of the state, as a
distal force, in determining the structure and content of the life course.
Again extending Prout (2005), these views are short-sighted because they
take nations and welfare-state regimes to be ‘‘stable and bounded entities.’’
Descriptions of welfare state regimes are important in that these regimes are
frames for understanding how the life course is organized in particular so-
cieties, and are helpful for explaining cross-national variability in life course
patterns. But they reveal little about the dynamic nature of boundaries
within and between societies, or of exchanges across these boundaries. More
importantly, these regimes ‘‘homogenize’’ forms of the life course within
societies because they describe life course patterns more than they explain
how the patterns are produced or maintained. They assume that large-scale
patterns ‘‘trickle down’’ and explain the action of individual and collective
agents, or the options from among which they must choose, rather than seek
to understand how individual and collective activities ‘‘percolate up’’ to
explain large-scale patterns. Evidence of standardization or institutionali-
zation should also not be interpreted to mean that the decisions and actions
of individuals do not matter. Indeed, one could argue that whatever deci-
sions and actions individuals are able to make or take will become even
more precious under conditions of standardization or institutionalization.
The evidence for the two theses also differs depending on whether the
historical view is narrow or wide, and on the phenomena of interest. For
example, while the timing of many American life course transitions became
more uniform over the course of the twentieth century, especially mid-
century, their sequencing simultaneously became more diverse. This is es-
pecially true of transitions typically associated with entry into adulthood
(Shanahan, 2000). Yet for American women – and contrary to contemporary
discussions of the emergence of ‘‘non-traditional’’ family patterns – the
timing and sequencing of family transitions has been high, since at least the
early decades of the twentieth century (Wu & Li, 2005).
This also serves as a reminder that views of institutionalization must span
and be differentiated across multiple domains. Krüger and Levy’s (2001)
distinctions between three types of ‘‘institutional framing’’ will yield fresh
insights into points of positive and negative synergy between institutions,
Structure, Agency, and the Space Between 51

and into the ‘‘not so visible nexus’’ between men and women. Sequential
institutionalization structures particular life periods and prompts movement
from one period to another. The traditional, but dissolving, lock-step
organization of men’s lives – with education early in life, continuous em-
ployment in the middle, and retirement at the end – symbolizes this type of
institutionalization. Simultaneous institutionalization refers to the attach-
ment of individuals to multiple organizational forms within particular pe-
riods. Popular discussions of the difficulties of balancing work and family
demands speak to the complexities of simultaneous institutionalization
during the early and middle adult years. Adjacent institutionalization relates
to the constraints that other institutions bring for managing work and
family life, such as those posed by schools, public administration, trans-
portation services, or businesses. Krüger and Levy also remind us that much
institutionalization of the life course is not intended or direct, but rather
unintended and secondary. These dimensions of institutionalization also
warrant greater attention in life course research.
The tension between standardization and de-standardization need not be
resolved, with one thesis winning out over the other, as much as actively
seized to more creatively theorize the life course. Indeed, the evidence for
each thesis need not be incompatible and can be simultaneously true, de-
pending on the level of analysis and the target domain or phenomenon
under study. Joint attention to these matters – to the tensions between
structure and agency, to evidence for standardization or de-standardization,
and to the possible connections between them – will advance interdiscipli-
nary research. The most obvious connections to be explored are how (a)
structural factors produce standardization and uniformity (at least for sub-
groups exposed to common forces), and (b) forms of agency produce
de-standardization and variability. But consideration should also be given
to the ‘‘off-diagonals’’ – to how (c) forms of agency might produce stand-
ardization and uniformity (such as when cohort differences in attitudes and
values prompt new and widespread decisions about marriage or parenting),
and (d) forms of structure might produce de-standardization and variability
(such as when disorganization in, or poorly coordinated connections be-
tween, educational institutions and the labor market results in disjointed or
incoherent experiences).
Models of agency within structure, described earlier, are central to un-
derstanding how the life course is partly the result of active and free choices,
partly created within a fixed set of possibilities and partly imposed from
outside – all of which come with consequences, some good and some bad,
for individuals, depending on how far their paths stray from others or
52 RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR. AND LYNN GANNON

deviate from those assumed in social institutions and policies. These models
will demand clearer definitions and more precise measurement of ‘‘agency’’
and ‘‘structure,’’ their characteristics and processes, and their sources and
determinants.
A central challenge here is that the lives of individuals and successive
cohorts have changed rapidly, but the assumptions that underlie social
institutions and policies are often based on outdated models of life (see also
Settersten, 2005b). These mismatches may bring serious risks for the func-
tioning of individuals and societies, and there is significant need to re-
architect social institutions and policies so that they better meet the changing
needs and realities of individuals and societies. New commitments must si-
multaneously improve and make more flexible the institutions through which
individuals move (including endorsing or permitting a wider range of paths),
as well as improve and make more flexible the connections between them.
New commitments must also strengthen the skills and resources of individ-
uals so that they can better navigate the life course, for these capacities are
vital to ensuring positive outcomes amidst the rapid social dramatic change
and great uncertainty of the contemporary world.

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