CASE DIGEST: PARAS VS COMELEC

PARAS v COMELEC Commented [RM1]: Elected brgy chair of Pula (Danilo E.

Paras) was filed a petition for recall as punong brgy,
G.R. No. 123169 COMELEC set for a recall then he filed a motion for
injunction (RTC) so they issued a TRO upon summary
hearing it was lifted so recall election was scheduled on
Facts: 1/13/96. Petitioner argued “no recall shall take place
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October within one (1) year from the date of the official's
1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the preceding a regular local election" (SK) election was
petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. set on the first Monday of May 1996.
To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the (SEC. 74b local govt. law RA 7160)
RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996,
rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The
petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place
within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the
Local Government Code.

Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal
that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of
a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.

Paras v. COMELEC Case Digest

Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall
election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall
take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first
Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be
considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The
spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase
“regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never
be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.

Paras v. Comelec (Resolution) GR 123169,

4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49) En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during
the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14
October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the
25% requirement provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995,
but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction
(Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and
required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited
Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Court in which case
considered the SK election as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a
recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to
its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot
countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election.
The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render
inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent
of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled
by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic, as
the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned were seven months away. Thus,
the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was
made permanent.

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF,
with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the
trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval.2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of
the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the
COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter
filed a reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner
cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the
SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from
the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of
a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election
will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election
which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute.5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code,
specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section
3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in
this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the
next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than
a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent
of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled
by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section
74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned
is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular
local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as
distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the
President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities,
Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and
members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
 xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those
who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered
voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote
is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local
Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular
election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be
considered a regular election (whether national or local).

Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully
recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective
officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make him "an
elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of
the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article
V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the
SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local
Government Code.