G.R. No.

200169 January 28, 2015

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner.
vs.
EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 30, 2006 Decision2 and December
20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the
August 17, 1999 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case
No. 96-9591 and denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and
without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two
parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles).6
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City (Bacolod RTC) a civil
case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-9591 and assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint7 alleged that petitioner is
the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the
subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen
the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries
of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for
the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent opposed; and
that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing owner’s duplicate
copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be
ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of
heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former;
that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had
no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son. To
prove filiation, he presented the following documents, among others:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit "C" and submarkings), wherein it is stated
that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated that Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957 (Exhibit
 "G"), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his
employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that
petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October 29, 1954
(Exhibit "L"), indicating that petitioner is his son;
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit "M"), where it is declared that
the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a BMMC supervisor introducing
petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the effect
that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were "all destroyed by nature," hence no
true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit
"Q").9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and
Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar
confirmed petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and
that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home
built on one of the subject properties. On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she
is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son – herein petitioner – who
was born at BMMC; that after the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim
ownership of the subject properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole
child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted, imprisoned, and later on paroled;
and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with his family.10
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher; that she does not know
petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not
related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while
the latter was under medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital
and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an
affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s
estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push through because when
petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the agreed price.11
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old,
who stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the
sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she
knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar
spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano.12
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit
"2")announcing among others that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to
Alfredo’s estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff
herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a certificate
of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar
(Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and that she is the
sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by
consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action to be
considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages prayed
for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, the appeal
essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172 of the
Family Code,15 an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the documentary
evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses
and the sole heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the
records covering the period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed
as shown by Exhibits "Q" to "Q-3"; for this reason, he presented the foregoing documentary evidence
to prove his relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to, among others,
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G"), arguing that the same was made under oath and thus
sufficient under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar
spouses. Finally, petitioner questioned the trial court’s reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s
affidavit (Exhibit "2") attesting that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole heir to the
estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been discarded by the trial court in a previous Order
dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:
Except for defendant’s Exhibit "2", all other Exhibits, Exhibits "1", "3", "4" and "5", together with their
submarkings, are all admitted in evidence.17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court’s August 17, 1999
Decision, pronouncing thus:
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased spouses
Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The Elementary School Permanent Record of
plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in
the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
"Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence of filiation."
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, WE
hold thatit cannot be considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
"A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries
made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount
thereof."
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the parents of the former are
Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that a
marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is
a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") and the
Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit "L"), allegedly tend to establish that
plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing
the surname of his alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family surname certainly does not establish
pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar are concerned,
WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to
the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a public instrument and the latter bears the signature
of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to show filiation based on
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter that must
be resolved according to the requirements of the law. All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to
hurdle the "high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one’s legitimate
filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby negating
his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of
mandatory injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right that has
been violated. Neither had he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the same. Aside from the
fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so that he has
not sustained any damage by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from him, there is no clear
testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result thereof. Well entrenched in law
and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral damages is expressly allowed by law in
instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The impugned
Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a December 20, 2011 Resolution, the CA held
its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which raises
the following issues:
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC Branch 49, Bacolod City, and
the Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed reversible error [in] not taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1
acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the
petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family]
Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to the application of Article
172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section
23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating to public document which is substantial enough to merit
consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall future litigation.21
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and praying
that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to surrender the owner’s duplicates of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS
Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a
declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latter’s son; this recognition
should be accorded more weight than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares
that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of court action. He adds that in
contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is the "highest form
of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon" him as
the son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and
cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code;23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory
injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in order.
Respondent’s Arguments
In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the pronouncements of the CA,
adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by
the appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that –
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents.1âwphi1 The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,
of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner –
who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar28 and before their respective deaths29 – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue
of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G")
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172
of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering
the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated
the introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
"G") – to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express
recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such
due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court
has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting
the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in
resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."30 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy of his Certificate of
Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy
thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other
documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit "Q") contained
just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in
Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the country, a
copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot
collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that -Article 26331
refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's
child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents
are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of
Jose at all.32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is as well
heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and
T-(15462) 1070.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.[1] In case of assault on his rights by those who
take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-
minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and
a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.[2] After
their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City.[3] Almost a year later, on
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991,
Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.[5] He
alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one
Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive
and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights.[9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision
INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation
rights between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.[10] She argued that there was
nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child.[11]
She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte,
her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion as
Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and made
the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something they
should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as he
is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot give.
Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be
better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court
granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos surname
(Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate and should
therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.[13]
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of the child
policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
hours once a week.[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers surname motu
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court.
She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues
involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved
the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son
of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was
married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee
[Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who
had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao
when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under
the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario
Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is
right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose
Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis
(even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to
destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born
a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the appellant
have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook
the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate
status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law
and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A
child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained
the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs,
who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.[26] Impugning the legitimacy
of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[27] Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility
of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child.[31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy
impossible.[32] This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces
and they were never together during the period of conception.[33] Or, the husband was in prison during
the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison
regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are
only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically
impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer[35] to the petition for annulment of marriage[36]
that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual
relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario
but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child
cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance
where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that
nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity
to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.[37] A mother has no right to disavow a
child because maternity is never uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question
Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.[39] The proscription is in consonance
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children.[40]
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in
the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and
agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the
child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to
allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which
the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise,
the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in
this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not
consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.[43] Although a
record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy
of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of marriage is sought to be established.[45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested
collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the
presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.[46] As prima
facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It
is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties.[47] Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the
legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his
father and mother, full support and full inheritance.[48] On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound
to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only
from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart.[49]
Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a
bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy
presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons
who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer
supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent
child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost
fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to
write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.[50] A persons
surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to
child.[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such
parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.[52] Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 163362 July 8, 2015
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO
ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY
ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA,
and NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO, Petitioners,
vs.
ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTESUNJACO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on January 15, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, in Dumaguete City (RTC)2 dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for being without merit.
Antecedents
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage
produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas).3 In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan
(Florencia),4 but their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an
extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran
(Anacleto) on July 13, 19515 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia.6 In 1972,
Anacleto married Elenette Sunjaco.7
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in
1981.8
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan.9 Joaquina had four
siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado.10 Nemesio had six
children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to
Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;11 and (6) Felicisima.12 During the pendency
of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his spouse,
Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas
Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a
complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette.13 Named as unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia
and Veronica Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were the following: ( 1) Lot No. 4100, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379; (2) Lot No. 4054, covered by OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6065; ( 4) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
20470; (5) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 11-028-A; (6) Lot No. 709 covered by OCT
No. OV-7784; (7) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-217; (9) Lot No. 5234 covered by OCT No. 3489-A; and (10)
Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax Declaration No. 8-201.14 The parties later stipulated that the first eight of
the subject properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the last two had been the
paraphemal properties of Joaquina.15
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were
inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse
could not inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the
usufructuary;"16 that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by
his wife, Florencia, and the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded
by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and Florencia, the
former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether
he was the spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during
Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto
claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by
Joaquina; that the will was void for not having been executed according to the formalities of the law,
and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator did not
acknowledge the will, which was not submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the
properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return of the properties, the defendants
persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the
defendants from further violating their rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be
ordered to reconvey the properties, and to pay ₱20,000.00 as actual damages, ₱20,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees.17
In their answer,18 the defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto was expressly
recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that
Anacleto thus had the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still too
young when Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother,
Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's
possession of the properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her since his
birth; that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and continued until Joaquina' s death in
1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that
granting for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were already
lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the
properties, and his ownership and possession should not be disturbed.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, In ,000.00 "as initial expenses as costs of this litigation which will increase as the case
progresses"19 and Pl0,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their Answer20 to the complaint, stating that
they were not interested in pursuing any claim of ownership in the properties; that assuming that they
were entitled, they were abandoning their rights, interests, title and participation in the properties; and
that they be excluded from further court processes.
Judgment of the RTC
On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing thusly:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and the
counterclaim for lack of merit.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate son of
Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214
of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3 ), which proved that Nicolas had
himself caused the registration of Anacleto' s birth by providing the details thereof and indicating that
he was the father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column
"Remarks" in the register of births, which was the space provided for the name of the informant; that
because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the entry in the register of births, the entry
became conclusive with respect to the facts contained therein; that Anacleto' s claim of recognition was
bolstered by his baptismal certificate (Exhibit F), in which was indicated that his parents were Nicolas
Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that also presented was a picture taken during the wake of Nicolas
(Exhibit 5) showing the young Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas' wife, Florencia;
that in addition, the school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6) showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian
during his grade school years; that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina who gave consent to his
marriage because he was then still a minor (Exhibit 8); and that Joaquina executed her will in 1978
(Exhibit 9), bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet to be probated. As the
case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that Articles 172,22 17323 and
17524 of the Family Code allowed Anacleto to establish his filiation during his lifetime through the
record of his birth appearing in the civil register. It further ruled that because there were no legitimate
children of Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to inherit, the rule on the separation of the legitimate
from the illegitimate family was rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to
possess the subject properties upon having established that he was the acknowledged illegitimate son of
Nicolas. Consequently, it also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient basis.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.25
Decision of the CA
On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision,26 affirming the judgment of the RTC in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was an acknowledged illegitimate
son of Nicolas. It agreed that the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental
showed that Nicolas was the father of Anacleto, and that the former had supplied the information on the
latter's birth. It declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence;
that the baptismal certificate of Anacleto and the picture taken during the wake of Nicolas further
showed that Anacleto had been acknowledged by Nicolas; that based on the Articles 172, 173 and 175
of the Family Code, the law applicable at the time of the filing of the case, Anacleto's filiation was
established by the record of his birth appearing in the civil register; and that Anacleto possessed rights
in the subject properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that after Raymundo died in 1939, his
wife, Joaquina, and his son, Nicolas, inherited his properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954, he was
survived by Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his legitimate wife), and Anacleto (his illegitimate son);
that Joaquina was entitled to one-half of Nicolas' estate, and the remaining half should be divided
between Florencia and Anacleto; that in 1960, when Florencia died without issue, the share she had
inherited from Nicolas was inherited by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; and that when
Joaquina died in 1981, she was survived by her sibling Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa,27 Josefina,
Gliceria and Felicisima; her nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her illegitimate grandson, Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting their rights in the properties by
estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had executed her last will and testament on April 19, 1978, whereby
she bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that the properties were thus transmitted to Anacleto upon
her death in 1981; that the plaintiffs filed their complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it
would be unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on their rights for a long
time; and that the plaintiffs could probably pursue their claim in the appropriate intestate or testate
proceedings.
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration,28 but the CA denied their motion on March 24,
2004.
Issues
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners,29 implore the Court to nullify the assailed rulings of the
CA, and to determine once and for all the following issues:
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran x x x; and
(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.30
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas' illegitimate son; that inasmuch
as Anacleto was born to Francisca during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, Anacleto
could only be the spurious child of Nicolas; that there was no law for the acknowledgment of a
spurious child; that even if Anacleto would be given the benefit of the doubt and be considered a
natural child, Article 278 of the Civil Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing;" that the appearance of
the father's name in the certificate of birth alone, without his actual intervention, was insufficient to
prove paternity; that the mere certificate by the civil registrar that the father himself registered the
child, without the father's signature, was not proof of the father's voluntary acknowledgment; that the
baptismal certificate was insufficient proof of paternity; and that if there was ground for Anacleto's
recognition, the period to claim recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed the subject properties to him by
last will and testament. They assail the validity and due execution of the will, which was not submitted
for probate; that the joint affidavit allegedly executed in favor of Anacleto by Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica Limpahan, with Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in
the subject properties in favor of Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of the affidavit was
doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent with Anacleto' s stance that he had inherited the
properties in his own right.
In turn, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate
child because Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners'
allegation of prescription lacked basis inasmuch as Anacleto was not seeking compulsory recognition;
and that Anacleto had already been voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject properties is properly
characterized as an accion reivindicatoria. According to Caneza v. Bautista,31 an "[a}ccion
reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the }us fruendi brought
in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession." In essence, the petitioners
seek to put an end to Anacleto's possession of the properties on the basis of their being the rightful heirs
considering that Anacleto, being the spurious child of Nicolas, held no successional rights in the estate
of Nicolas.
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by preponderance of evidence
pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs. In that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of
evidence in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.,32 thusly:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he
must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of that of his opponent. (Bold underscoring for emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the provisions of the Family
Code33 should apply because the petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC
during the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, the classification of children is
limited to either legitimate or illegitimate.34 Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article
175 of the Family Code, to wit:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established in accordance with Articles 172 and 173 of the
Family Code, which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged
Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of
the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that Nicolas had himself caused
the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing
in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the
certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros
Oriental, the column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space
provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the
putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth
certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.35
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in determining his filiation. We have
already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals36 that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal
certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence, we attach no probative value to the
baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the R TC and the CA to the picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms
of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At
best, the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with
Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed
out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.37 that:
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will
not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage
and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with
others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto
in his grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C),
which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary
value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for,
as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado,38 the recognition "must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a
voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the
paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence notwithstanding,
Anacleto 's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the showing
that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the respective rights of the parties in
relation to the specific properties subject of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to
Raymundo, while the remaining two had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the governing law on
succession. Under Article 807 thereof,39 Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the
legitimate son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal title to Raymundo's estate upon
his death. In accordance with Article 834 thereof,40 Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of
Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available
for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in effect.41 Under Article
1000 thereof,42 the heirs entitled to inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia
(his surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners
of the properties comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance with
Article 107843 of the Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the first eight of the
subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo Anacleto became a co-owner of said
properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.44 Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a
pro indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died
in 1981, her hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the estate of
Nicolas. Inasmuch as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant,
illegitimate child or spouse, Article 100345 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives
should inherit her entire estate.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law from inheriting from the estate
of Joaquina.1âwphi1 To start with, Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation
of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina.46 Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in
the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,47 the right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly,
Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and testament,
i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel48 that in order that a will may take effect,
"it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the
will is mandatory." It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that the records are silent
as to whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had been allowed by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged this fact in their complaint, and the respondents did not controvert
the allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of Joaquina had been duly
approved by the competent court, we hold that it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain
the CA' s ruling to the effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and that
the properties had been transmitted to him upon her death.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones entitled to inherit
from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish that the estates of
Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been respectively settled with finality through the appropriate
testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course. Unless there was a proper and valid
partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions
of their estates, because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:49
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion
of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding,
a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of
a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part
or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the
co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been
previously partitioned, the Court concludes and holds that none of the parties herein can lay claim over
any of the disputed specific properties. The petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they were the
rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the
dismissal of the petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003 by the Court of
Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24, 2012
Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.3 Out
of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick
(on October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually
turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling
that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if
they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the
court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s] prayer for
recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues
the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name
of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live
Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in
their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the
persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’ minor children
Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in
the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to
Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre Lewis
Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
 e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of the
country, without the written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of ₱30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother
over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the
Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall
hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City are
DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the children out
upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s recognition of his
children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed
any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did
Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the
paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of
parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it,
she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched
as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate
children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of
the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname
as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for
the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to
mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondent’s
position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may"
is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again,
rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In
Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the
surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is
no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact,
in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed
the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule
regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate
minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his identity, his
status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure,
these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the
right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the
Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his
mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was
ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended
petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the
reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s surname upon
his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
document.

7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the
surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

xxxx

7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
 7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname
of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the
Surname of the Father].

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten
instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.

7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly
notarized.

xxxx

Rule 8. Effects of Recognition

8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of
Births.

xxxx

8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth
or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document
or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:

"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname)
pursuant to RA 9255."

The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall
not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or AUSF
shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the
Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from
(original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In
MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by
a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the
construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and
authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial
bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as
it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s
recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by
which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and
fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they
do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper
inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is
necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall
hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children
out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the
sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre
 Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO,"
represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-
year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino
and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. 1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie,
who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office
of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of
Live Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father 3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed,
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino. 4 Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged
his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE

TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA
STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR
FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO.
MY FATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME
IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.

xxxx

AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH

OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD
FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME
GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,
Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the ‘Family
Code of the Philippines’"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the
father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use the
surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and the
child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission
of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint 9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled
to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s
name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity
in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was
declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law
relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had
acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit
"A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief.12 Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino,
also testified, corroborating Jenie’s declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as
the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of
R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an
illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly
signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same
does not contain any express recognition of paternity.1avvphi1
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue
of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION
OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255,
WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S SURNAME. 15 (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that
the private handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be
signed by him. They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is
sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the
admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-
quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique’s handwritten
Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the child’s paternity.17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent’s position, as
affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy
but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is
necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This
provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O.
No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of
Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of
the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements
in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH
EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and
the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to
be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To
be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be
the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by
the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good
father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together
with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are
sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography
have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several
months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to
the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting
the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving
questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.23 (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner
minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter
it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED
to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname
of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births.
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor VERNA AIZA
POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution 2
dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The appellate court had
affirmed with modification the Judgment3 dated January 4, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly
support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as well as moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes,
sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then
called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner’s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office starting on
September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle,
Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town
planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother’s Place"
where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon
Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions were
nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran
and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she
hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as
casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for
barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions
of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led
her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he
told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could
appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she
kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she
feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In a
handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
My darling Chris,

Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no regret, because I love
you and you love me.

Let us rejoice a common responsibility – you and I shall take care of it and let him/her see
the light of this beautiful world.

We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.

Just relax and be happy, if true.

With all my love,

Ninoy

2/4/874

Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably because of
their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioner’s penmanship which she claims
she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters 5 sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in his
letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures 6 petitioner gave her of his youth and as
a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and ₱2,000
pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review course or
look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her another ₱2,000 for her
delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and
brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987,7 she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissa’s mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissa’s story. She said they learned of their daughter’s
pregnancy through her husband’s cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed by
her daughter’s pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC,
Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and
against the [petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of ₱2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23,
1987 as he was proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor as shown by the
exhibits and testimonies of the [respondents];
2. to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. to pay the sum of ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification, specifying
the party to whom the damages was awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with modification by ordering [petitioner]
Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of ₱2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada from her birth on September 23,
1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of ₱15,000.00 as moral damages and
[P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca Posada the sum of ₱15,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:
I.

WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT

VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?

II.

WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?

 III.

WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE
OF APPELLANT’S PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE COLLATERAL
TO THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11

In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in
an action for damages with support pendente lite; (2) whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada
as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not respondents are entitled to
damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has
not been duly established or proved in the proceedings; that the award for damages and attorney’s fees
has no basis; and that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it was
respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his consent. He
further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere
expressions of concern and advice.12 As to the award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could not
have suffered moral damages because she was in pari delicto, being a willing participant in the
"consensual carnal act" between them.13 In support of his argument that the issue on filiation should
have been resolved in a separate action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales14 where
we held that the legitimacy of a child which is controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.15
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain that the Court of Appeals committed no
error in its decision. They reiterate that Clarissa’s clear narration of the circumstances on "how she was
deflowered" by petitioner, the love letters and pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating
testimony of Clarissa’s mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no countervailing evidence, are
preponderant evidence of paternity. They cited the case of De Jesus v. Syquia16 where we held that a
conceived child can be acknowledged because this is an act favorable to the child.17 They also argue
that damages should be awarded because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his sexual
advances.18
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On this score, we find petitioner’s
stance unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string of cases
we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a
pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. 19 In determining
the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the
relief sought, that are controlling.20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages coupled
with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa’s averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a
job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her
demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held
that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.21
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are declarations that lead nowhere but to the
conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of
the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph as a
youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all
written by one and the same person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love
letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which
establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of
evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing,
and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own.
His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.23
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 24of the Civil Code
which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because
Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that
entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents Constantino
and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorney’s fees in consonance with Article 2208 (2) 25 and (11)26 of the
New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated August 27, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
G.R. No. 197099
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner,
vs.
KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively,
which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8.
Both courts a quo ruled that the subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and
void, and ordered herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio), who was previously joined
by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo (Emiliano) as codefendant, to vacate the one-half portion
of the subject 6,542-square meter property and surrender its possession to respondent Karen Santos. In
a Resolution4 dated November 28, 2011, this Court ordered the deletion of the name of Emiliano from
the title of the instant petition_ as co-petitioner, viz.:
x x x The Court resolves:
xxxx
(2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo, petitioner vs. Karen
Santos, respondent," considering the sworn statement of Eugenio San Juan Geronimo that he does not
know whether his brother is still alive and that his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x x5
The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court in its assailed
Decision, viz.:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the
defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with
the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of land located at San Jose,
Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was
passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of
spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that
consequently[,] they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of
the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole
heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and
Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or
sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any
maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The
defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of
Rufino’s father Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716
with the defendants’ mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years
old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she
executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino’s estate entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman
Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiff’s mother Caridad waived all her rights to
Rufino’s share and in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985,
guardianship proceedings appeared to have been instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by
Caridad in which it was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her late
husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and estate of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the real estate taxes on the
property, but in 2000, the defendants took possession of the land and had the tax declaration transferred
to them. This compelled her to file the present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and legal
heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when Rufino’s wife could not bear a child, the couple
decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13
years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents’ household. Believing that in the
absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they
executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate. It had irregular features,
such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word and
figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box
intended for the informant’s signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of the DECS in Bulacan
brought the plaintiff's service record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show
that she did not have any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent that the plaintiff did not
file any maternity leave during her service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it
reflects the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she availed of. Upon inquiry by the
court, he clarified that the leaves were reflected but the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiff’s
birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an
alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of the alterations, he considered
the document questionable.6
On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman dated March 9, 2000 executed in
favor of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as null and void;
2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject property in the names of
Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;
3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo to
vacate the ½ portion of the subject property and to surrender the possession to the plaintiff;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of [P]30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir – being the legitimate child – of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondent’s
filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. The RTC
dismissed the claim of petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to have been tampered, specifically
on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. The trial
court held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to explain how the erasures were done. Petitioner
also failed to prove that the alterations were due to the fault of respondent or another person who was
responsible for the act. In the absence of such contrary evidence, the RTC relied on the prima facie
presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as a public document.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the
filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The RTC considered the following overt acts of the deceased spouses as acts of recognition that
respondent is their legitimate child: they sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made
respondent a beneficiary of her burial benefits from the Government Service Insurance System; and,
Caridad filed a petition for guardianship of respondent after the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly,
the trial court held that to be allowed to impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should
have brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. Since petitioner
failed to file such action, the trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the ownership and
possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial settlement executed by petitioner and
his brother was therefore declared not valid and binding as respondent is Rufino’s only compulsory
heir.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and the
offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth
certificate itself.
According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned if it was legally
permissible for petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and
Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of possession that she herself filed
against petitioner and his then co-defendant.
Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
giving the putative father and his heirs the right to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child, are not present in the instant case. She further asserted that the Family Code contemplates a
direct action, thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or collaterally in this suit.
In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held that under Article 170, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date
the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was
recorded in the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to
respondent on a specific date. It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case, Exhibit
14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act No. 3753, the declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or in default thereof, that declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of birth in the civil register. The
document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either the parent of the
plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth
certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the
floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated
as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate.
Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her
representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.8
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a public or private document
that respondent is the legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the appellate court – similar
to the trial court – relied on Article 172 of the Family Code which allows the introduction and
admission of secondary evidence to prove one’s legitimate filiation via open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child. The CA agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her
legitimate filiation, viz.:
We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff
was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and
sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of
the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and
was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino;
and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the
basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino and Caridad has been
open and continuous. x x x The conclusion follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property left by
Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the defendants, which consists of a one-half share in Lot 1716.9
Petitioners moved for reconsideration10 but the motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated
May 24, 2011. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
INTRODUCTION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND RENDERED JUDGMENT BASED
THEREON NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF
BIRTH CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN RESPONDENT’S LEGITIMATE FILIATION.11
On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove one’s filiation is admissible only if
there is no primary evidence, i.e, a record of birth or an authentic admission in writing.12 Petitioner
asserts that herein respondent’s birth certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence
enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of both courts a quo that the document
is not the one "envisioned by law" should have barred the introduction of secondary evidence.
Petitioner expounds this proposition, viz.:
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not [the] one envisioned by law
finds support in numerous cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity,
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and
the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person. Where the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same. x x x
x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth originally written in ball pen
was erased and the date April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the informant
also originally written in ball pen was erased and the name E. Dano was superimposed using also a
pentel pen; there is no signature as to who received it from the office of the registry. Worst, respondent
Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she introduced in evidence [Exhibit A] a
mere Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, which
highlighted more suspicions of its existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption that if such
evidence is presented, it would be adverse to her claim. True to the suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was
introduced by the petitioner and testified on by no less than the NSO representative, Mr. Arturo Reyes,
and confirmed that there were alterations which renders the birth certificate questionable.
Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity, the courts a quo
should have stopped there, ruled that respondent Karen is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate.13
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he does not have personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate
filiation.14
While petitioner admits that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular issue,"15 he nonetheless
raises the said issue as an error since the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner argues that in so affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation
of respondent is strictly personal to respondent’s alleged father and his heirs under Articles 170 and 171
of the Family Code,16 thereby denying petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and
status of the plaintiff."17 Petitioner argues, viz.:
x x x [T]he lower court’s reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is totally misplaced, with
due respect. It should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and
filiation of the Family Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child, and the father [or, in proper cases,
his heirs] denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the
child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely that respondent Karen is not a
legitimate child of, but that she is not a child of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x18
We grant the petition.
Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in evidence is questionable, the
trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate
children, viz.:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article
172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of
filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of
document and recovery of possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175,
should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The
rationale behind this procedural prescription is stated in the case of Tison v. Court of Appeals,19 viz.:
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest
of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn
the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and
can no longer be questioned.1âwphi1 The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must
necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily
available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none – even his heirs – can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory."20
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions
where the legitimacy – or illegitimacy – of a child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case
at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim
that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What
petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all.
He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of defense that
respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of
the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial
court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent – even if such proof
is similar to the evidence admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant
case not being a direct action to prove one’s filiation. In the following cases, the courts a quo and this
Court did not bar the introduction of secondary evidence in actions which involve allegations that the
opposing party is not the child of a particular couple – even if such evidence is similar to the kind of
proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein deceased spouses Vicente Benitez
(Vicente) and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel
departed in 1982, while Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990, Vicente’s sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio)
and nephew (Feodor Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance of
letters of administration of his estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that
Vicente was "survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x x."22 They further argued that one "Marissa
Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir [of Vicente]."23 Marissa opposed the
petition and proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa submitted the following
evidence, viz.:
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter.24
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the spouses Vicente
and Isabel failed to beget a child during their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was
36 years old, was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77
years old at the time of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the biological child
of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.25
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court reversed the RTC’s ruling
holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this
Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological
or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench
is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our
ruling in Cabatbat- Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not
welltaken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this
is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's
child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."26
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago27 originated from a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership and possession before the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not
the daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property
pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death. Respondents
sought to prove that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate
which did not itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case of Sayson v. Court of
Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code),28 petitioner argued
that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning a
child’s legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership and possession of property. We ruled in this
case that petitioner’s reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced and respondents may
impugn the petitioner’s filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the
ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of
different parents, not Jose and his wife."29 Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and
filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations
where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to
be the child at all of a particular couple.31
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is
not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose,
but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
x x x32
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the
proof admissible under Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of the evidence on
record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad.
While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of facts,33 this rule admits of the
following exceptions where findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5)
When the findings of fact areconflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6)
Whenthe Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of thecase and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
103 Phil. 401[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those ofthe trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]);
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).34
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a legitimate
child and sole heir of the deceasedspouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of
facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was tampered
specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant.
Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of the informant –
Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court
still relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for
failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of
respondent. It thus ruled that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The
appellate court did not agree with this finding and instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does
not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate
the relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either the
parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot
be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño,
the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be
treated as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The final judgment
mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an
order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the
mother of the plaintiff.35
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her filiation by
showing that she has enjoyed that open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of
the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to
bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition
fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the
GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person
and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the
legal heirs of the deceased.36
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that the
irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant
made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the
NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are
alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate.
These irregularities and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of
respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth
certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant regarding
the birth of respondent, remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the Department of
Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave during
the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service
Record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a
certification from Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not
file any maternity leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also
offered to prove that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the marriage of
the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40
years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad’s delivery, and while it may have been
possible for her to have given birth at her own home, this could have been proven by medical or
non-medical records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo
does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the
deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative
parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her
education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied
for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva37 which incisively discussed its parallelisms and
contrasts with the case of Benitez- Badua v. Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence of a similar
set of circumstances – which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at
bar – does not establish that one is a child of the putativeparents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is
instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was the
sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income
tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government Service Insurance System of
the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had been
reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents had been unable to
beget children, the siblings of Benitez- Badua’s supposed father were able to rebut all of the
documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-Badua was
that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years of
marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.(emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interestedparties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857
should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The
records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez- Badua that are simply too compelling to
ignore. First, both Benitez-Baduaand respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence
offiliation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relativelyadvanced in age. Third, both
claimed to have been born after their allegedparents had lived together childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between BenitezBadua and this case which ineluctably
support the conclusion thatrespondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate
oradopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian,was not only 36 years old but
44 years old, and on the verge of menopauseat the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who
had been marriedto Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childlesswith
Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established that
respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she
cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the
extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.39
In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a quo and rule that the
confluence of the circumstances and the proof presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that
respondent is a child of the deceased spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of
Document and Recovery of Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED.