Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 126–132

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Operations Research Letters

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/orl

Union negotiations: Complement-associated games

Yan-An Hwang ∗ , Rahma Julia, Radhiah Ismail
Department of Applied Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien 974, Taiwan

article info abstract

Article history: Hamiache (2001) introduced the notion of associated consistency based on the idea of ‘‘individual
Received 12 December 2016 negotiations’’. In this article, ‘‘union negotiations’’ instead of ‘‘individual negotiations’’, we introduce a
Received in revised form new type of associated consistency based on the idea of ‘‘union negotiations’’. Using the above types of
28 December 2016
associated consistency, we provide a new characterization of the equal allocation of non-separable costs
Accepted 12 January 2017
Available online 25 January 2017
(EANSC) value. We also prove that this approach cannot be applied to the Shapley value.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Complement-associated game
Equal allocation of non-separable costs
Shapley value

1. Introduction
Hamiache [3] is the first to introduce the notion of an associated
game. In the present article, we continue to develop the notion of
an associated game. To define an associated game, Hamiache [3]
(see our Definition 1) and Hwang [6] (see our Definition 2) assume
that a coalition considers the players outside the coalition as
isolated elements. That is, for the players outside a coalition,
Hamiache [3] and Hwang [6] adopt the ‘‘individual negotiations’’
to renegotiate with the coalition. Such an associated game, we
name the ‘‘individual-associated game’’ in this article. Instead of
considering the players outside a coalition as individual players
that have no relations with each other, we consider the players
outside a coalition as a single coalition, the complement of the
coalition. That is, each coalition only renegotiates with the whole
of its complement. This means that, for the players outside a
coalition, we adopt the ‘‘union negotiations’’ to renegotiate with
the coalition. Such an associated game, we name the ‘‘complement-
associated game’’. The two different approaches of negotiations
have their own merits. However, with the development of society,
the negotiations, especially with regard to the content of the high-
tech aspects, often need to attend all kinds of experts to address
the special problems encountered in the negotiations. Everyone
has different expertise to deal with different projects. This usually
occurs between large enterprises and governments. For example,
the treaty between the multinational, or buy the latest equipment
and so on, relying only on his own power is difficult to deal
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: yahwang@mail.ndhu.edu.tw (Y.-A. Hwang),
rahma_julia@yahoo.com (R. Julia), radhiah_is@yahoo.co.id (R. Ismail).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.003
0167-6377/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
with complex knowledge. This is one of the merits of the union
negotiations.
Associated consistency (AC) states that a solution is invariant to
a certain associated game. Picking a game and applying iteratively
this associated game, one obtains an infinite sequence of games.
By associated consistency, the solution remains unchanged along
this sequence. If, moreover, this sequence converges to a limit
game, and if the solution is continuous on the space of games,
then the limit of the solutions computed along this sequence is
equal to the solution of the limit game. Hamiache [3] constructs
an associated game (we name the Sh-individual-associated game
in this article), and shows two facts: (a) the Shapley value is
invariant with respect to the Sh-individual-associated game; and
(b) the induced sequence of the Sh-individual-associated games
converges to an additive game where the individual worth of each
player is therefore equal to his Shapley value in the first game
of this sequence. So, the Shapley value is characterized through
AC (with respect to the Sh-individual-associated game), continuity
(satisfied by the Shapley value since it is linear) and the additive
game property.
Hwang [6] modifies the definition of Hamiache’s associated
game [3] in order to characterize the EANSC value. He shows two
facts: (a) the EANSC value is invariant with respect to this new
associated game (we name the E-individual-associated game in
this article); and (b) the induced sequence of the E-individual-
associated games converges to a game which is the sum of a
constant game and an additive game. Combining (a), associated
consistency (with respect to the E-individual-associated game),
continuity and (b), one obtains that the solution of any game is the
solution of a constant game plus an additive game. Then, applying
efficiency, translation covariance and anonymity, one proves that
 Y.-A. Hwang et al. / Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 126–132 127

the solution is uniquely determined and coincides with the EANSC 3. Associated games
value.
In this article, ‘‘union negotiations’’ instead of ‘‘individual Hamiache [3] introduces the notion of the ‘‘associated game’’ to
negotiations’’, an alternative definition of the associated game is investigate the Shapley value. Hwang [6] modifies the definition
constructed. Two different but closely related associated games of Hamiache’s associated game [3] to see that such a modification
yields a deeper understanding of the difference between the
are studied, we name the E-complement-associated game and
Shapley value and the EANSC value. The two different definitions
the Sh-complement-associated game. We continue to develop
of associated games are given as follows:
Hamiache [3] and Hwang’s [6] works. The article is divided in
two parts. First, we show that the EANSC value is invariant to the Definition 1 (Hamiache [3]). Let (N , v) be a game in GN , the Sh-
E-complement-associated game. We also prove that each sequence individual-associated game (N , vλ,
∗
Sh,I ) is defined by specifying, for
of the E-complement-associated games converges to the same all S ⊆ N,
limit game as the limit game found in Hwang [6]. Therefore, 
the EANSC value is again characterized by associated consistency
vλ,
∗
Sh,I (S ) = v(S ) + λ [v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S ) − v({j})].
j∈N \S
(with respect to the E-complement-associated game), continuity,
efficiency, translation covariance and anonymity. In the second
part of the article, we show that the Shapley value is invariant with Definition 2 (Hwang [6]). Let (N , v) be a game in GN , the E-
respect to the Sh-complement-associated game. Also the induced individual-associated game (N , vλ,
∗
E ,I ) is defined by
sequence of the Sh-complement-associated games converges to
0,

a constant-sum game. However, we show that the Shapley value   if S = ∅
v( S) + λ [v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S )

is ‘‘not’’ the only one to satisfy efficiency, translation covariance, vλ,E ,I (S ) =
∗
(1)
j∈N \S
anonymity, continuity and associated consistency (with respect to 
− SC j (N , v)],

the Sh-complement-associated game). o.w.

A common interpretation of the two associated games from

2. Definitions and notations
The notations S ⊂ T and S ⊆ T mean that S is a proper subset of
T and S is a subset of T , respectively. We use the lowercase letter s
to denote the number of elements in a set S. Let U be a non-empty
and finite set of players. A coalition is a non-empty subset of U.
A game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair (N , v) where
N is a coalition and v is a mapping such that v : 2N −→ R and
v(∅) =  0. A game (N , v) is an additive game if for all S ⊆ N,
v(S ) = i∈S v({i}). A game (N , v) is a constant game if for all
S ⊆ N with S ̸= ∅, v(S ) = c where c ∈ R. A game (N , v) is a
constant-sum game if for all S ⊆ N, v(N ) = v(S ) + v(N \ S ). We
denote by GN the set of all TU games in which the set of players
is N. A solution on GN is a function σ which associates with each
game (N , v) ∈ GN an element σ (N , v) of RN .
For all games (N , v) and all players j in N, the term SC j (N , v) and
the term NSC (N , v) mean the separable cost and the non-separable
cost, respectively, where
SC j (N , v) = v(N ) − v(N \ {j});
 In the process of re-evaluating worth, Hamiache [3] and
NSC (N , v) = v(N ) − SC k (N , v).
k∈N
The EANSC value refers to all players should share the non-
separable cost equally (see [9,11]). Formally, the EANSC value, E , is
a solution function on GN , and it associates with each game (N , v)
and all players j in N the value,
1 the coalition. Such an associated game, we name ‘‘complement-
Ej (N , v) = SC j (N , v) + [NSC (N , v)].
n
Note that the EANSC value of a game (N , v) is independent of v(S )
for s < n − 1.
The following definition of the Shapley value [10] was
introduced by Harsanyi [5, page 203, equation (4.1)]. The definition
is equivalent to the one given by Shapley [10, page 311, equation
(11)]. The Shapley value, is a solution function on GN , and it
associates with each game (N , v) and all players j in N the value,
 (s − 1)!(n − s)!
Shj (N , v) = [v(S ) − v(N \ S )].
n!
S ⊆N ;j∈S
Hamiache [3] is as follows: Let us assume, as in Myerson [7],
that a communication structure exists, and here all bilateral
meetings between players are allowed. Using this device the
proposed associated game is a modification of Hamiache [2], which
was justified by a double assumption, a myopic vision of the
environment and a ‘‘divide and rule’’ behavior of the coalitions.
To be coherent with the myopic approach, a coalition S ignores
the links existing between players in N \ S. As a consequence,
coalition S considers itself at the center of a star-like graph, which
is equivalent to saying that coalition S considers players in N \ S
as isolated elements. Assume each player j in N \ S can get the
marginal contribution, v({j}) − v(∅) (in Hamiache [3]) or SC j (N , v)
(in Hwang [6]), of player j to coalition N. Following the ‘‘divide
and rule’’ behavior, coalition S may believe that the appropriation
of at least a part of the surplus [v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S ) − v({j})] (in
Hamiache [3]) or [v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S ) − SC j (N , v)] (in Hwang [6]),
generated by its cooperation with each one of the isolated players
j ∈ N \ S, is within reach. Thus coalition S may evaluate its own
new worth, vλ, ∗
Sh,I (S ) (or vλ,E ,I (S )), as the sum of its worth in the
∗
original game, v(S ), and of a given percentage λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, of all
the possible previous surpluses.
Hwang [6] assume that each coalition S considers players in N \ S
as isolated elements. That is, for the players outside a coalition,
Hamiache [3] and Hwang [6] adopt the ‘‘individual negotiations’’
to renegotiate with the coalition. Here we introduce an alternative
situation of re-evaluating worth. Each coalition only renegotiates
with the whole of its complement. That is, for the players outside a
coalition, we adopt the ‘‘union negotiations’’ to renegotiate with
associated game’’. Two different versions of the complement-
associated game are defined as follows:
Definition 3. Let (N , v) be a game in GN , the E-complement-
associated game (N , vλ,
∗
E ,C ) is defined by
0, if S = ∅
 

  
v(S ) + λ v S ∪ (N \ S ) − v(S )


vλ,
∗
E ,C (S ) =  (2)


 −  SC (N , v) ,

 j o.w.

j∈N \S
128 Y.-A. Hwang et al. / Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 126–132

In fact, if S ̸= ∅ then The main purpose is to determine the coefficients of the game
 representation (6) of the m-repeated E-individual-associated game
vλ,
∗
E ,C (S ) = (1 − λ)v(S ) + λv(N ) − λ SC j (N , v). (N , vλ,E ,I ). Hwang [6] shows that the coefficients γm (T ) and βm (j)
(3) m∗ S S
j∈N \S satisfy the specified recursive relationships (see Lemmas 1 and 2
in Hwang [6]). Also, in Corollary 1 of Hwang’s [6] work, he
Remark 1. The E-complement-associated game (N , vλ, ∗
E ,C ) is a shows two facts: (a) the coefficients γmS (T ) and βm S
(j) satisfy the
game and regardless of the role of λ, it holds both vλ, ∗
E ,C (N ) = v(N ) desired convergence result; and (b) the sequence {(N , vλ, m∗
E ,I )}m=0
∞

and vλ,∗
E ,C (N \{j}) = v(N \{j}) for j ∈ N, and hence, SC j (N , vλ,E ,C ) =
∗
converges and that the limit game is the sum of an inessential game
SC j (N , v) for all j ∈ N. Moreover, E (N , vλ,∗
E ,C ) = E (N , v). and a constant game.
Replacing vλ, ∗
E ,I by vλ,E ,C in Hwang’s work, we will show the
∗

Definition 4. Let (N , v) be a game in GN , the Sh-complement- same results in this section.

associated game (N , vλ,
∗
Sh,C ) is defined by specifying, for all S ⊆ N,
For simplification, if no confusion arises, vλ∗ instead of vλ, ∗
E ,C in
    this section. For each game (N , v) in GN , we define the sequence of
vλ,
∗
Sh,C (S ) = v(S ) + λ v S ∪ (N \ S ) − v(S ) − v(N \ S ) . (4) E-complement-associated games, {(N , vλm∗ )}∞ m=0 , where vλ = v ,
0∗

vλ1∗ = vλ∗ , and vλ(m+1)∗ = (vλm∗ )∗λ . Since vλ∗ (N ) = v(N ) and
In fact, for all S ⊆ N, SC j (N , vλ∗ ) = SC j (N , v) for all j ∈ N, by Eq. (3), it is not difficult to
vλ, see that for all S ⊆ N with S ̸= ∅, the term vλm∗ (S ) can be expressed
Sh,C (S ) = (1 − λ)v(S ) + λv(N ) − λv(N \ S ).
∗
(5)
as a linear combination of v(S ), v(N ) and j∈N \S SC j (N , v), that is

Remark 2. The Sh-complement-associated game (N , vλ, ∗

Sh,C ) is a

vλm∗ (S ) = γm v(S ) + αm v(N ) + βm SC j (N , v), (7)
game and regardless of the role of λ, it holds vλ,Sh,C (N ) = v(N ).
∗
j∈N \S
Besides, by Eq. (5), it is easy to see that
where γm ∈ R, αm ∈ R, and βm ∈ R.
vλ,
∗
Sh,C (S ) − vλ,Sh,C (N \ S ) = v(S ) − v(N \ S ).
∗
Similarly, the main purpose is to determine the coefficients
of the game representation (7) of the m-repeated E-complement-
Hence, by the definition of the Shapley value, Sh(N , vλ,
∗
Sh,C ) = associated game (N , vλm∗ ). The following two lemmas concern the
Sh(N , v).
determination of the (m + 1)-repeated E-complement-associated
(m+1)∗
Remark 3. The interpretation of the associated games in Defini- game (N , vλ ).
tions 1–4 is that a coalition S claims for part of the surplus. But the
surplus may be negative. We make a remark on the conditions that Lemma 1. Concerning the representation (7) of the m-repeated
preclude this from happening. First, we recall some definitions. A E-complement-associated game (N , vλm∗ ), the coefficients γm , αm , and
game (N , v) is a superadditive game if for all S , T ⊆ N satisfy βm satisfy the following recursive relationships:
S ∩ T = ∅, v(S ) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ). A game (N , v) is a con-
γm+1 = (1 − λ)γm , where γ0 = 1, (8)
vex (or supermodular) game if for all S , T ⊆ N, v(S ) + v(T ) ≤
v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ). A game (N , v) is a concave (or submodular) αm+1 = (1 − λ)αm + λ, where α0 = 0, (9)
game if for all S , T ⊆ N, v(S ) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ). Note βm+1 = (1 − λ)βm − λ, where β0 = 0. (10)
that it can be shown (see, e.g., Section V.1 of (Driessen [1])) that the
convexity of v is equivalent to v(S ∪{i})−v(S ) ≤ v(T ∪{i})−v(T ), Proof. Let S ⊆ N and S ̸= ∅. On the one hand, by applying Eq. (7)
for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i} and for all i ∈ N. For concave games, the to m + 1, we have
inequalities are reversed. That is, the concavity of v is equivalent to
vλ(m+1)∗ (S ) = γm+1 v(S ) + αm+1 v(N ) + βm+1

v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ) ≥ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ), for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i} and for SC j (N , v).
all i ∈ N. Convexity trivially implies superadditivity. Moreover, it j∈N \S
is not difficult to derive the following fact, we omit the proof. The
On the other hand, by the inductive approach and a few
surplus in Definitions 1 and 4 is non-negative when the game is
calculations yield the following chain of equalities:
superadditive (in particular, it is convexity), while for Definitions 2
and 3 a sufficient condition is concavity. This is the opposite of the vλ(m+1)∗ (S )
two cases.
= (vλm∗ )∗λ (S )

4. The limit game: E-complement-associated game = (1 − λ)vλm∗ (S ) + λv(N ) − λ SC j (N , v)
j∈N \S
Hwang [6] introduces a sequence of the E-individual-associated
games as follows: For each game (N , v) in GN , the sequence of
(by Eq. (3), vλm∗ (N ) = v(N ) and SC j (N , vλm∗ ) = SC j (N , v))
the E-individual-associated games, {(N , vλ,E ,I )}m=0 , is defined by
m∗ ∞
 

(m+1)∗ = (1 − λ) γm v(S ) + αm v(N ) + βm SC j (N , v)
vλ,
0∗
E ,I = v , vλ,E ,I = vλ,E ,I , and vλ,E ,I
1∗ ∗
= (vλ,m∗
E ,I )λ,E ,I . Since
∗
j∈N \S
SC j (N , vλ,E ,I ) = SC j (N , v) for all j ∈ N, this implies that for all
∗

∅ ̸= S ⊆ N, + λv(N ) − λ SC j (N , v) (by Eq. (7))
(m+1)∗ j∈N \S

vλ, E ,I (S ) = vλ, m∗
E ,I (S ) + λ
m∗
[vλ, E ,I (S ∪ {j}) − vλ,E ,I (S )
m∗

j∈N \S
= (1 − λ)γm v(S ) + (1 − λ)αm v(N )
 
− SC j (N , v)]. + (1 − λ)βm SC j (N , v) + λv(N ) − λ SC j (N , v)
j∈N \S j∈N \S
Hence the term vλ, m∗
E ,I (S ) can be expressed as a linear combination
of v(T ) and SC j (N , v) for all T ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, that is = (1 − λ)γm v(S ) + [(1 − λ)αm + λ]v(N )

  + [(1 − λ)βm − λ] SC j (N , v).
vλ,
m∗
E ,I (S ) = γmS (T )v(T ) + βmS (j)SC j (N , v) (6)
j∈N \S
T j
T ⊆N j∈N \S
The comparison of the obtained coefficients of both approaches
where γmS (T ) ∈ IR, βm
S
(j) ∈ IR and γmS (∅) = 0. yields the three recursive relationships Eqs. (8)–(10). 
 Y.-A. Hwang et al. / Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 126–132
Lemma 2. 1. The solution of the recursive formula γm+1 = (1 − λ)
γm is given by γm = (1 − λ)m for all m ≥ 1, where γ0 = 1. Clearly
for all 0 < λ ≤ 1, the sequence {γm }∞
m=0 converges to 0.
2. The solution of the recursive formula αm+1 = (1 − λ)αm + λ is
given by αm = [1 −(1 −λ)m ] for all m ≥ 1, where α0 = 0. Clearly
for all 0 < λ ≤ 1, the sequence {αm }∞
m=0 converges to 1.
3. The solution of the recursive formula βm+1 = (1 − λ)βm − λ is
given by βm = [(1 −λ)m − 1] for all m ≥ 1, where β0 = 0. Clearly
for all 0 < λ ≤ 1, the sequence {βm }∞
m=0 converges to −1.
Proof. By the inductive approach, it is easy to derive these results;
hence, we omit it. 
Corollary 1. Let 0 < λ ≤ 1, then the sequence of m-repeated
E-complement-associated games {(N , vλm∗ )}∞
m=0 converges to the
limit game (N , v) given by
 σ (N , v) = σ (N , v) due to CONT and AC of σ . Since (N , u) is an
v(S ) = v(N ) − SC j (N , v) for all S ⊆ N, S ̸= ∅, equivalently,
j∈N \S

v(S ) = SC j (N , v) + NSC (N , v).
j∈S
5. Axiomatization of the EANSC value
Hwang [6] shows that the EANSC value is the unique solu-
tion satisfying efficiency, anonymity and translation covariance,
associated consistency (with respect to the E-individual-associated
game) and continuity. In Section 3, we introduce a new associated
game, the E-complement-associated game. Also, in Section 4, we
prove that each sequence of the E-complement-associated games
converges to the same limit game as the limit game found in
Hwang [6]. In this section, we will show that the EANSC value
is again characterized by associated consistency (with respect to
the E-complement-associated game), continuity, efficiency, trans-
lation covariance and anonymity.
Let us first introduce these axioms.
Axiom 1. Efficiency (EFF): For all games (N , v) in GN ,
 of the EANSC value.
σj (N , v) = v(N ).
j∈N
Axiom 2. Anonymity (AN): For all games (N , v) in GN and all
permutations π on N, σj (N , v) = σπ j (N , π v) for all j in N, where
(N , π v) is defined by π v(π S ) = v(S ) for all S ⊆ N.
Axiom 3. Translation Covariance (TC): For all games (N , v) in GN
and for all x ∈ IRN , σ (N , v) + x =σ (N , v + x), where (N , v + x) is
defined by (v + x)(S ) = v(S ) + i∈S xi for all S ⊆ N.
Axiom 4. Continuity (CONT): For all convergent sequences
k=1 the limit of which is game (N , v), we have
{(N , vk )}∞
lim σ (N , vk ) = σ (N , v).
k→∞
Axiom 5. Associated Consistency (AC): For all games (N , v)
and its E-complement-associated game (N , vλ,
∗
E ,C ), σ (N , v) =
σ (N , vλ,
∗
E ,C ).
This axiom says that a solution gives the same payments to
players in the original game as it does to players of the associated
game. If a solution violates AC, then players might not respect the
original compromise but revise the payoff distribution. This means
that AC is a requirement of the ‘‘stability’’.
Clearly, by Remark 1, the EANSC value satisfies AC.
129
Theorem 1. There is a unique solution on GN satisfying EFF, AN, TC,
AC for 0 < λ ≤ 1, and CONT, it is the EANSC value.
Proof. The proof is an analogy of Hwang’s Theorem 1. For
completeness, we still provide the proof.
It is known that the EANSC value satisfies EFF, AN, TC and CONT.
By Remark 1, we see that the EANSC value satisfies AC.
To verify the uniqueness, let σ be a solution on GN satisfying
EFF, AN, TC, AC for 0 < λ ≤ 1, and CONT. Let (N , v) be a game
 G . Define the two TU games (N , u) and (N , w)  by u(S ) =
N
in
j∈S SC j (N , v) and w( S ) = NSC (N , v) = v( N ) − j∈N SC j (N , v)
for all S ⊆ N , S ̸= ∅. Let the game (N , v) be given by their sum, i.e.,
v(S ) = u(S ) + w(S ) for all S ⊆ N , S ̸= ∅. As shown in Corollary 1,
the game (N , v) is the limit of the convergent sequence of m-
repeated associated games {(N , vλ, m∗
E ,C )}m=0 , and hence, it holds
∞
inessential game, TC of σ (applied to v = u + w ) implies that
σj (N , v) = SC j (N , v) + σj (N , w) for all j ∈ N. Since (N , w) is a
w(N )
constant game, AN and EFF of σ imply that σj (N , w) =
n
for all
j ∈ N. In summary, we conclude that for all j ∈ N
w(N )
σj (N , v) = σj (N , v) = SC j (N , v) +
n
NSC (N , v)
= SC j (N , v) +
n
= Ej (N , v). 
Remark 4. This article belongs to the growing literature on
associated consistency (AC). Two interesting facts: (a) Hwang [6]
shows that the EANSC value is characterized by stability with
respect to ‘‘individual negotiations’’, whereas we show that
the EANSC value is characterized by stability with respect to
‘‘union negotiations’’. This means that the EANSC value can be
characterized by using two different stability, hence, it becomes
a more ‘‘robust’’ compromise; (b) the introduction of the ‘‘union
negotiations’’ greatly simplifies the proof of the characterization
6. Independence of the axioms
The purpose of this section is to show that each of the
five axioms used in Theorem 1 is logically independent of the
remaining axioms.
There are five examples to be presented. In each example, the
axiom in parentheses is the one violated by the solution proposed.
Example 1 (EFF). Let σ be the solution on GN defined by σj (N , v) =
SC j (N , v) for all j ∈ N, where (N , v) ∈ GN . It is obvious that σ
satisfies AN , TC , AC and CONT , but it violates EFF .
Example 2 (AN). Fix i ∈ N and let σ be the solution on GN defined
by σj (N , v) = SC j (N , v) for all j ∈ N , j ̸= i, and σi (N , v) =
SC i (N , v) + NSC (N , v), where (N , v) ∈ GN . Then it is obvious that
σ satisfies EFF , TC , AC and CONT , but it violates AN.
Example 3 (TC). Let σ be the solution on GN defined by σj (N , v) =
v(N )
n
for all j ∈ N, where (N , v) ∈ GN . It is obvious that σ satisfies
EFF , AN , AC and CONT , but it violates TC .
Example 4 (AC). The Shapley value is the solution on GN that
satisfies EFF , AN , TC and CONT , but it violates AC .
130 Y.-A. Hwang et al. / Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 126–132

Example 5 (CONT). Let G0 ⊂ GN be defined by vλ,

m∗
Sh,C (S ) can be expressed as a linear combination of v(S ), v(N )
and v(N \ S ), that is,
G0 = {(N , w) ∈ GN | w(N ) = w(N \ {j}) for all j ∈ N }.
vλ,
m∗
Sh,C (S ) = γm v(S ) + αm v(N ) + βm v(N \ S ), (11)
We will construct a solution on GN satisfying EFF , AN , TC and AC
by first defining a solution σ 0 on G0 satisfying EFF , AN and AC , then where γm ∈ R, αm ∈ R and βm ∈ R.
in order to satisfy TC , we define the extended solution σ of σ 0 on Similarly, the main purpose is to determine the coefficients of
GN by σ (N , v) = σ 0 (N , v − xv ) + xv where xvj = SC j (N , v) for all the game representation (11) of the m-repeated Sh-complement-
j ∈ N. associated game (N , vλ,
m∗
Sh,C ). The following two lemmas concern
To construct a solution on G0 satisfying EFF , AN and AC , let us the determination of the (m + 1)-repeated Sh-complement-
focus on the sign (plus or minus) of tj (N , w) for each j ∈ N and (m+1)∗
associated game (N , vλ,Sh,C ).
(N , w) ∈ G0 , where
tj (N , w) = w(N ) − w({j}). Lemma 3. Concerning the representation (11) of the m-repeated Sh-
complement-associated game (N , vλ, Sh,C ), the coefficients γm , αm and
m∗
Let pw denote the cardinality of the set {j : tj (N , w) ≥ 0} and we βm satisfy the following recursive relationships:
w(N )
define the solution σ 0 on G0 by σj0 (N , w) = n
for each j ∈ N if
pw = 0; otherwise, γm+1 = (1 − 2λ)γm + λ, where γ0 = 1 (12)
αm+1 = (1 − 2λ)αm + λ, where α0 = 0 (13)
 w(N )

if tj (N , w) ≥ 0
σ (N , w) =
j
0
pw βm+1 = (1 − 2λ)βm − λ, where β0 = 0. (14)
0 o.w.

In particular, γm = βm + 1 for all m ≥ 0.
It is trivial that σ is a solution on G0 satisfying EFF and AN. If we
0
Proof. Let S ⊆ N. On the one hand, by applying Eq. (11) to m + 1,
can show that tj (N , w) and tj (N , wλ,
∗
E ,C ) have the same sign (plus we have
or minus) for each j ∈ N, then σ 0 satisfies AC on G0 , hence the (m+1)∗
extended solution σ of σ 0 on GN satisfying the desired axioms but
vλ,Sh,C (S ) = γm+1 v(S ) + αm+1 v(N ) + βm+1 v(N \ S ).

it violates CONT . On the other hand, by the inductive approach and a few
It remains to prove that for every (N , w) ∈ G0 , tj (N , w) and calculations yield the following chain of equalities:
tj (N , wλ,
∗
E ,C ) have the same sign for each j ∈ N. Let (N , w) ∈ G0 , (m+1)∗
for each j ∈ N, we have vλ,Sh,C (S )

tj (N , wλ, = (vλ,
m∗
Sh,C )λ (S )
∗
E ,C ) = wλ,E ,C (N ) − wλ,E ,C ({j})
∗ ∗ ∗
 = (1 − λ)vλ,
m∗
Sh,C (S ) + λv(N ) − λvλ,Sh,C (N \ S )
m∗
= w(N ) − w({j}) + λ[w(N ) − w({j})
  (by Eq. (5) and vλ,Sh,C (N ) = v(N ))
m∗

− SC k (N , w)] = (1 − λ)[γm v(S ) + αm v(N ) + βm v(N \ S )] + λv(N )

k∈N \{j} − λ[γm v(N \ S ) + αm v(N ) + βm v(S )] (by Eq. (11))
= w(N ) − w({j}) + λ[w(N ) − w({j})]
 
= [(1 − λ)γm − λβm ]v(S ) + [(1 − λ)αm + λ − λαm ]v(N )
(by SC k (N , w) = 0) + [(1 − λ)βm − λγm ]v(N \ S )
= w(N ) − w({j}) − λ[w(N ) − w({j})] = [(1 − λ)γm − λβm ]v(S ) + [(1 − 2λ)αm + λ]v(N )
= (1 − λ)[w(N ) − w({j})] + [(1 − λ)βm − λγm ]v(N \ S ). (15)
= (1 − λ)tj (N , w).
The comparison of the obtained coefficients of both approaches
So, if 0 < λ < 1 then tj (N , w) and tj (N , wλ,
∗
E ,C ) have the same sign yields Eq. (13) and the following two recursive relationships:
for each j ∈ N.
γm+1 = [(1 − λ)γm − λβm ], (16)

7. The limit game: Sh-complement-associated game βm+1 = [(1 − λ)βm − λγm ]. (17)

By Eqs. (16) and (17), we have

Hamiache [3] introduces a sequence of the Sh-individual-
associated games as follows: For each game (N , v) in GN , the se- γm+1 − βm+1 = γm − βm . (18)
quence of the Sh-individual-associated games, {(N , vλ,
m∗
Sh,I )}m=0 , is
∞
(m+1)∗ Combining Eq. (18) with γ0 = 1 and β0 = 0, we have γm = βm + 1.
defined by vλ,
0∗
Sh,I = v , vλ,Sh,I = vλ,Sh,I , and vλ,Sh,I
1∗ ∗
= (vλ,m∗
Sh,I )λ,Sh,I .
∗
Next, in Eq. (15), we replace βm by (γm − 1) in the coefficient of
Also, Hamiache [3] shows that the sequence of m-repeated Sh- v(S ) and γm by (βm + 1) in the coefficient of v(N \ S ), respectively.
individual-associated games {(N , vλ, m∗
Sh,I )}m=0 converges and that
∞
Then we have
the limit game is an inessential game. Replacing vλ, ∗
Sh,I by vλ,Sh,C in
∗
(m+1)∗
Hamiache’s work, we will show that the sequence of m-repeated vλ,Sh,C (S ) = [(1 − 2λ)γm + λ]v(S ) + [(1 − 2λ)αm + λ]v(N )
Sh-complement-associated games {(N , vλ, Sh,C )}m=0 also converges
m∗ ∞
+ [(1 − 2λ)βm − λ]v(N \ S ).
but the limit game is a constant-sum game.
Recall Eq. (5), for all S ⊆ N, To compare the obtained coefficients between both approaches
once again, we obtain the desired recursive relationships, Eqs. (12)
vλ,
∗
Sh,C (S ) = (1 − λ)v(S ) + λv(N ) − λv(N \ S ). and (14). 
For each game (N , v) in GN , we define the sequence of Sh-
complement-associated games, {(N , vλ, Lemma 4. 1. The solution of the recursive formula γm+1 = (1 −
Sh,C )}m=0 , where vλ,Sh,C =
m∗ ∞ 0∗
(1−2λ)m +1
(m+1)∗ 2λ)γm +λ is given by γm = for all m ≥ 1, where γ0 = 1.
v, v 1∗
=
λ,Sh,C vλ,
∗
Sh,C ,
and = (vvλ,Sh,C) Since m∗ ∗
λ,Sh,C λ .= vλ,
∗
Sh,C (N )
2

v(N ), by Eq. (5), it is easy to see that for all S ⊆ N, the term Clearly for all 0 < λ < 1, the sequence {γm }∞ 1
m=0 converges to 2 .
 Y.-A. Hwang et al. / Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 126–132 131

2. The solution of the recursive formula αm+1 = (1 − 2λ)αm + λ is Proof. The proof is by way of an example of a solution σ that
1−(1−2λ)m
given by αm = 2
for all m ≥ 1, where α0 = 0. Clearly for satisfies the five axioms but differs from the Shapley value: For all
games (N , v) and all players j in N, the term PSC j (N , v) and the
all 0 < λ < 1, the sequence {αm }∞ 1
m=0 converges to 2 .
term PNSC (N , v) mean the pseudo-separable cost and the pseudo-
3. The solution of the recursive formula βm+1 = (1 − 2λ)βm − λ is
(1−2λ)m −1 non-separable cost, respectively, where
given by βm = 2
for all m ≥ 1, where β0 = 0. Clearly for
all 0 < λ < 1, the sequence {βm }∞ 1 1 1
m=0 converges to − 2 . PSC j (N , v) = [v({j})] + [v(N ) − v(N \ {j})];
2 2
Proof. By the inductive approach, it is easy to derive these results;
hence, we omit it.  PNSC (N , v) = v(N ) − PSC k (N , v).
k∈N

Corollary 2. Let 0 < λ < 1, then the sequence of m-repeated Let σ be the solution on GN defined by for all (N , v) ∈ GN and for
Sh-complement-associated games {(N , vλ, Sh,C )}m=0 converges to the
m∗ ∞
all j ∈ N,
limit game (N , v) given by for all S ⊆ N,
1
1 σj (N , v) = PSC j (N , v) + [PNSC (N , v)].
v(S ) = [v(S ) + v(N ) − v(N \ S )]. n
2
Note that if n > 3 then σ (N , v) ̸= Sh(N , v).
This implies that (N , v) is a constant-sum game. It is obvious that σ satisfies EFF , AN , TC and CONT . It remains
(N , vλ, to show that σ satisfies AC-Sh. Clearly, for all (N , v) ∈ GN and for
Sh,C ) instead of (N , vλ,E ,C ) in the axiom AC, we introduce
∗ ∗

the axiom of associated consistency with respect to the Sh- all j ∈ N,

complement-associated game. PSC j (N , vλ,
∗
Sh,C )
1 1
Sh,C ({j})] + Sh,C (N ) − vλ,Sh,C (N \ {j})]
Axiom 6. Associated Consistency w.r.t. the Sh-complement-asso- = ∗
[vλ, ∗
[vλ, ∗
ciated game (AC-Sh): For all games (N , v) and its Sh-complement- 2 2
associated game (N , vλ,
∗
Sh,C ), σ (N , v) = σ (N , vλ,Sh,C ).
∗ 1
= [(1 − λ)v({j}) + λv(N ) − λv(N \ {j})]
2
In Remark 2, we see Sh(N , vλ, ∗
Sh,C ) = Sh(N , v). That is, the 1
Shapley value satisfies AC-Sh. This raises the question whether the + [v(N ) − (1 − λ)v(N \ {j}) − λv(N ) + λv({j})]
Shapley value could also be characterized by EFF, AN, TC, CONT and 2
AC-Sh. The answer is negative if the number of players is more than (by Eq. (5) and vλ,
∗
Sh,C (N ) = v(N ))
three. We will show two facts: 1 1
= [v({j})] + [v(N ) − v(N \ {j})]
(a) if n ≤ 3, then the Shapley value is the only one to satisfy EFF, 2 2
AN, TC, AC-Sh for 0 < λ ≤ 1, and CONT; = PSC j (N , v). (19)
(b) if n > 3, then the Shapley value is ‘‘not’’ the only one to satisfy
EFF, AN, TC, AC-Sh for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and CONT. Combining Eq. (19) with vλ, ∗
Sh,C (N ) = v(N ), we have PNSC (N , v) =
PNSC (N , vλ,Sh,C ); hence, σ (N , v)
∗
= σ (N , vλ,∗
Sh,C ). That is, σ
Theorem 2. If n ≤ 3, then the Shapley value is the only one to satisfy satisfies AC-Sh. 
EFF, AN, TC, AC-Sh for 0 < λ ≤ 1, and CONT.
8. Final remark
Proof. It is known that the Shapley value satisfies EFF, AN, TC and
CONT. By Remark 2, we see that the Shapley value satisfies AC-Sh. The Owen value [8] is an extension of the Shapley value for
To verify the uniqueness, two cases could be distinguished: cooperative games in which players are involved in a priori unions.
Case 1: if n ≤ 2: These unions are formally represented by a partition of the set of
It is well-known that the Shapley value is the only one to satisfy players called a coalition structure. Hamiache [4] introduced two
EFF, AN, and TC. associated games to study the Owen value. The construction of
Case 2: if n = 3: the two associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in
Let σ be a solution on GN satisfying EFF, AN, TC, CONT and AC- an aggressive manner towards players who are not members of
Sh. Let (N , v) be a game and 0 < λ < 1, then by Corollary 2, we the same unions and in a friendly manner towards players that do
see that the sequence of m-repeated Sh-complement-associated belong to their unions.
games {(N , vλ, Sh,C )}m=0 converges to the constant-sum game
m∗ ∞
In this paper, we modify the definition of Hamiache’s associated
(N , v). Let x = v({i}) i∈N in RN . Consider the translation game
 
game [3] to study the Shapley value in the framework of traditional
(N , v − x) of (N , v), we have that for all i, j, k ∈ N with i ̸= j ̸= k, games. Intuitively, one would want to know whether we can
modify the definition of Hamiache’s associated games [4] to
• (v − x) ({i}) = (v − x) ({j}) = (v − x) ({k}) = 0;
study the Owen value in the framework of games with coalition
• (v − x) ({i, j}) = (v − x) ({i, k}) = (v − x) ({j, k}) = v (N ) −
structures. We consider such an extension as a challenging and
v ({k}) − v ({i}) − v({j}) (by v is a constant-sum game);
interesting enterprise, and we plan to propose one extension in a
• (v − x) (N ) = v (N ) − v ({k}) − v ({i}) − v({j}).
subsequent work.
This implies that (v − x) is a symmetric game. Hence, by EFF and
(v−x)(N )
AN of σ , we have that for all i ∈ N, σi (N , v − x) = n
. By TC of References
σ , σi (N , v) = σi (N , v − x) + xi = σi (N , v − x) + v({i}) for all i ∈ N.
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