Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Circle
2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
POLITICAL
LAW
Supreme Court decisions penned by Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
2
Facts:
On 2003, then Ambassador Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to DFA proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement bet USA and RP. The RP, represented
by then DFA Sec. Ople, agreed with the US proposals. Such Agreement provides that
current or former government officials or employees or military personnel of one
party present in the territory of the other shall not be surrendered to any international
tribunal, absent the express consent of the first party, and unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council. Bayan Muna imputes grave abuse of
discretion to respondents and prays that the Agreement be struck down as
unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly.
2. Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for
concurrence, contravenes the Rome Statute and other treaties.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, as expressed in Art II of the 1987
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-
governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. Hence, the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement in the exchange note is a
recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among
nations.
2. No. An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great
respect. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus,
absent any clear contravention of the law, the courts should exercise utmost caution in
declaring any executive agreement invalid.
3
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Facts:
Pursuant to RA No. 7227, the BCDA opened for disposition and
development its Bonifacio South Property. SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted
to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the development of the lot which
was accepted by the BCDA. However, the BCDA clarified that its act
should not be construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture
agreement with SMLI but only constitutes an authorization to conduct
detailed negotiations with SMLI and iron out the terms and conditions of
the agreement. Afterwards, a Certification was issued by the BCDA and
signed by both parties. BCDA prepared for the conduct of a Competitive
Challenge. In furtherance thereof, the agency issued Terms of Reference.
Consequently, SMLI was required to post a proposal security in the
amount of PhP 187 million, following the prescribed procedure outlined in
the TOR and the NEDA JV Guidelines. Instead of proceeding with the
Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded with SMLI stating that it
will welcome any “voluntary and unconditional proposal” to improve the
original offer. In turn, SMLI increased the total secured payments with an
upfront payment. Without responding to SMLI’s new proposal, the BCDA
sent a memorandum to the OP categorically recommending the
termination of the Competitive Challenge. Alarmed by this development,
SMLI urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge as
agreed upon. However, the BCDA terminated the Competitive Challenge
altogether.
Issue:
Whether or not the BCDA gravely abused its discretion in terminating the
Competitive Challenge.
Ruling:
Yes. SMLI has the right to a completed competitive challenge pursuant to
the NEDA JV Guidelines and the Certification issued by the BCDA. The
reservation clause adverted to by the respondent cannot, in any way,
prejudice said right. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of the
President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall
be promulgated in EOs. Through Section 5 of EO 109, Section 8 of EO
109-A and now Section 8 of EO 423, the President effectively delegated
her inherent executive power to issue rules and regulations on
procurement to her subordinate executive officials, her alter egos.
4
Facts:
The petitioner, Gobenciong, was preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman after an investigation made upon a complaint filed against
him by respondent Dela Pena. The petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner having been denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
now contends that the Ombudsman does not have the power to
investigate, prosecute and discipline public officers. Hence, RA 6770 is
unconstitutional as it constitutes an undue delegation of power.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
authority, is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. RA 6770 provisos granting investigative, prosecutorial and
disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman are not unconstitutional. The
espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. It is the
1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by
Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary
powers to the Ombudsman. he Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of
the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to
enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however, left it to
Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own
action. And so it was that RA 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec.
15(1) thereof, the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of cases [of which
he has primary jurisdiction.
5
Ruling:
1. No. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape
their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less
would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and
may be compelled by mandamus. The MMDAs duty in this regard is
spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA
which states that Solid waste disposal and management which include
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include
the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities
and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. The MMDAs duty in the area of
solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.
LEGISLATURE
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY(PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Facts:
SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and PDEA from
enforcing paragraphs (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that it is
constitutionally infirm because it imposes an additional qualification for a
senator- mandatory drug testing. Pimentel Jr. and Atty. Laserna Jr. also
seek the nullification of said law, including the COMELEC Res. No. 6486
which implements the former.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Res. No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator.
Ruling:
Yes. It is unconstitutional because it is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect.
Thus, COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition
to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in
the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
7
PD 961 and PD 1468 which both provide that the CCSF and CDIF shall not
be construed as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general
funds of the government. The intention is for the said funds to belong to
coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Issue:
Whether or not the PD’s issued are unconstitutional for declaring the
funds which the PCA is authorized to collect or as part of the funds of the
government.
Ruling:
Yes, the mandate of PD’s are unconstitutional. The coconut levy funds
are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be
given for free to private individuals. The coco levy funds were exactions
with the end goal of developing the entire coconut industry, to hold
therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of
the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by
private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would
contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
Furthermore, Article VI, Section 29 (3) provides that all money collected
8
on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. The conversion of public funds into
private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these PDs.
Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468
are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the
Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares
purchased by means of the coconut levy fund a special fund of the
government to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. In
simplified form, it is written as follows:
PRESIDENCY
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY
RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010, Velasco, J.
The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law.
Facts:
Lourdes Rubrico, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan,
was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron (AISS, for short), and brought to and detained at, the
air base without charges. But even after her release, the harassment
continued that led to the filing of criminal complaint for kidnapping and
arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of
authority and grave misconduct. However, in the said case nothing
happened.
10
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual
respondents including President Gloria Macapgal-Arroyo to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners
and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance
of gender of the offended party. The CA, however, dismissed the petition
and dropped President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversible error in dismissing the
petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent.
Ruling:
No. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. The President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The
Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her
incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and
there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions.
JUDICIARY
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED)
VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, 178193, 180705 February 11, 2010,
Velasco, J.
The Court is not empowered to review and go into the wisdom of the
policy decision or choices of PCGG and other executive agencies of the
government absent any grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) filed a motion
for the conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A" and "B"
common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name
of Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies
(hereunder referred to as SMC Common Shares), into 753,848,312 SMC
Series 1 Preferred Shares. Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor
11
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5,
the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the
interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want
12
seeks to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin
it from compelling petitioners to appear before it. In a manifestation with
urgent plea for a TRO, Romero raised, among others, that when Senator
Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter
spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, none of which were related to the subject of
the inquiry. Petitioners claim that the subject matter of the investigation
is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee’s inquiry is sub
judice.
Ruling:
No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court,
or obstructing the administration of justice. In this case, the subject
matter of the senate inquiry is no longer sub judice for the reason that
the Court has denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of its
decision filed by Chavez. Even assuming that Chavez is still pending final
adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance would not bar the
continuance of the committee investigation. Suffice it to state that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative
action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative
purpose. (See Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704, October 17, 2006)
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ROQUE VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188456 September 10, 2009, Velasco, J.
The COMELEC shall be responsible for the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
Facts:
The enactment of Republic Act No. 8436 in 1997 authorized the adoption
of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and
local elections and onwards. In 2007, RA 9369 was passed authorizing
anew the Comelec to use an AES. Petitioners claim that the conclusion of
the automation contract constitutes an abdication on the part of
Comelec of the constitutional mandate that the Comelec shall be
responsible for the enforcement and administration of “all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall.” (Section 2, Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution)
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation
contract abandons the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC shall be
responsible for election law enforcement.
Ruling:
No. The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the
goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to
the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related
equipment, both hardware and software, and the technical services
pertaining to their operation. As lessees of the goods and the back-up
equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide assistance
with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the
end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and
whoever it deputizes.
Moreover, the RFP (Request for Proposal or otherwise known as Terms of
Reference), which forms an integral part of the automation contract, has
put all prospective bidders on notice of Comelecs intent to automate and
to accept bids that would meet several needs, among which is a
complete solutions provider which can provide effective overall
nationwide project management service under COMELEC supervision and
control, to ensure effective and successful implementation of the
[automation] Project.
15
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Dennis A. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo
A. Villar
G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
16
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution does not prohibit
promotional appointment as long as the Commissioner has not served
his full term of seven years, and the appointment shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the Commissioner’s term.
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven years starting February
2, 2004 to February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, she
appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as a third member of COA for a term
of seven years starting from February 2, 2004, to February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the
fourth year of Villar as commissioner, the latter was designated acting
chairman of the COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008 Villar was appointed and nominated as
Chairman of the COA. The Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve chairman for the unexpired portion of his
term as commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Herein petitioner opposes
Villar’s appointment saying that such appointment is invalid under Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. He said that reappointment of
any kind within the COA be it for the same position (Commissioner to
Commissioner) or for an upgraded position (Commissioner to Chairman)
is a prohibited appointment and therefore a nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not Villar’s appointment is invalid under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)
of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
No, Villar’s appointment is not prohibited under the Constitution. The
Constitutional provision provides: The Chairman and Commissioners [on
Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other
commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the
commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further
qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the
appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment
to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the
aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the
17
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ERNESTO R. VEGA
G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting
the three-term threshold.
Facts:
For 4 successive regular elections, Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the
Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one
Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010 elections where
Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in
seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the 3-
consecutive term limit rule. COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of
Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC to
unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised. RTC
declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he has
already served 3 consecutive terms. COMELEC’s 2nd division and en
banc affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive
terms.
Ruling:
No. As stressed in Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the
principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms
and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. An
elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a
fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have
sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the
prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption
usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third.
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further granting the PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway
and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX.
Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993,
the Government Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a
joint venture agreement (JVA) with private entities without going into
public bidding. In 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities
executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic
and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical
JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas. Several
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the
South Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon
Expressway Projects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate
the toll facility/system.
RULING:
Yes. The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or
entity with authority to operate the toll facility/system. By explicit
provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant administrative
franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12, Section
11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of
authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as
follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino
citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of
franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive
or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an
explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may
validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate
legislation, to issue 159883 franchises of certain public utilities to some
administrative agencies.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY(PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
20
To impose a mandatory drug test on the accused would violate his right
to privacy and right to self-incrimination.
Facts:
SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and PDEA from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground
that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee
deemed undesirable. And for a 3rd, a person's constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
Pimentel Jr. and Atty. Laserna Jr. also seek the nullification of said law,
including the COMELEC Res. No. 6486 which implements the former.
Issue:
Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), and (f)of Sec. 36, RA 9165 is
unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause,
thus constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:
No, paragraphs (c) and (d) is constitutional. The drug test prescribed
under Sec. 36(c) and (d), for secondary and tertiary level students and
public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicion less arrangement. The primary legislative intent is not criminal
prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this
random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals.
Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and
well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have
the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory. In the case at bar, the SC is of the view and
so holds that the paragraph (c) and (d) are constitutional. Indeed, it is
within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it
is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Yes, paragraphs (f) is unconstitutional. SC finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion
less." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
21
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III
of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced
to incriminate themselves.
DUE PROCESS
GONZALO S. GO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS and OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 172027 July 29, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J.
Vested rights can only be deprived through due process of law.
FACTS:
Gonzalo Go Jr. was promoted to the position of Chief Hearing Officer
(Chief, Legal Division), with a salary rate of PhP 151,800 per annum. The
promotion was to the position of Attorney VI, Salary Grade (SG)-26.
However, Department of Budget and Management (DBM), informed the
then DOTC Secretary of the erroneous classification in the Position
Allocation List of the DBM of two positions in his department, one of
which is in the LTFRB (formerly BOT). Go wrote the DBM to question the
summary demotion or downgrading of his salary grade from SG-26 to
SG-25. The DBM reminded Go that based on the departments’ standards
and criteria formulated, the division chief of bureau-level agencies, like
the LTFRB, is allocable to Attorney V, SG-25. Following the denial of his
MR, Go appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP dismissed
Go's appeal. His petition was also denied by the CA via Rule 43 on
procedural grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether the reallocation of rank resulting in the downgrading of position
and diminution of salary was valid.
RULING:
No. Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments
of his position as Attorney VI, SG-26. And being an incumbent to that
position, he has, at the very least, an equitable right to receive the
corresponding salary and emoluments attached thereto. The summary
demotion to a lower salary grade, with the corresponding decrease in
salary and emoluments after he has occupied his current rank and
position, goes against his right to continue enjoying the benefits
22
accorded the position and which his predecessors must have been
receiving. His right thereto has ripened into a vested right, of which he
could be deprived only by due process of law, but which we believe he
was denied through the summary reallocation. With the view we take of
this case, Go was neither apprised nor given the opportunity to contest
the reallocation before its summary implementation.
EQUAL PROTECTION
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et al.
G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056 December 21, 2009, Velasco,
Jr., J.
Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Facts:
There were twenty-four (24) cityhood bills that were not acted upon in
the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was signed into
law amending Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)
increasing the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city
from P20M average annual income to P100M locally generated income.
During the 13th Congress, sixteen (16) out of the 24 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, their individual cityhood bills. Each of
the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the
municipality covered from the P100M income requirement imposed by
RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by Congress and eventually
lapsed into law. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
Petitioners sought to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for
violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal-protection clause. It is contended that the grant of exemption
from the P100M income requirement to only the 16 municipalities is
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the sixteen (16) cityhood laws are valid and
constitutional. Ruling:
Yes. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws
subject of contention, the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the
LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP100 million
income criterion. .
The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing
and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It
recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,
necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a
23
Ruling:
No. Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control
information about themselves. Considering that the default setting for
Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in
24
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, STC did not violate the minors’
right to privacy, as it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the
pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted.
They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information
as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access
to the said posts.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA,
in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW
AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO
SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and
ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents. G.R. No. 164785, March 15,
2010, Velasco
Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to
the status of religious speech.
Facts:
26
Eliseo Soriano made the following remarks in his program, Ang Dating
Daan: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga
Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.
EMINENT DOMAIN
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO
ARNAIZ, and CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
CEBU;
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) v.
RICARDO L. INOCIAN, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-
Fact of OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, et. al.
G.R. No. 168770 & G.R. No. 168812, February 9, 2011, Velasco,
Jr., J.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires.
Facts:
The following are two (2) consolidated cases whereby the respective
owners and successors-in-interest. They pray for the reconveyance of
their respective properties subjected to expropriation in favor of the
government for the expansion of Lahug Airport for public use. Their claim
for reconveyance is based on the alleged promise of the National Airport
Corporation (NAC), Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority’s (MCIAA)
predecessor agency, that should the Lahug Airport expansion project do
not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport, they are assured the right to
repurchase their land.
When the Lahug Airport was closed and transferred its operations with
MCIAA, the latter refused to honor the said agreement. Hence, Ouanos
and Inocians filed their respective complaints against the latter. MCIAA
averred that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the
alleged verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can
reacquire their landholdings is already barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ouanos and Inocians have the right to repurchase
their properties pursuant to the verbal agreement with the government’s
negotiating team assuring them of its reacquisition should the public
purpose for which the properties were used ceases.
Ruling:
Yes. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always
conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a
necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
28
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just
compensation received.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the
reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos
and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the
Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus
legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run
from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. They
must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred
in sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services
in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private
owners, were benefited thereby.
The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and
with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a
deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good which is public
use and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without
these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful,
immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and
condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as
well.
Program). This was opposed by the Alyansa, which argued for the
revocation of the SDO, and pegged the just compensation at 1989 (the
time when the Stock Distribution Program was approved).
Issue:
Whether or not the SDO should remain revoked, and just compensation
pegged at 1989.
Ruling:
Yes. Just compensation should be pegged at 1989. Just compensation for
the property should be based at the time it was taken from the owner
and appropriated by the PARC. The “time of taking” does not only mean
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use of his property, or
when the title was issued to the Republic or the beneficiaries. “Taking”
also occurs when agricultural lands voluntarily offered by a landowner
are approved for CARP coverage through SDOs. The approval by the
PARC of the SDO takes place over the notice of coverage ordinarily
issued for compulsory acquisition, and is considered as the operative act
to determine the time of “taking”.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL
G.R. No. 171101, 05 July 2011, En Banc, Velasco Jr., J.
The non-impairment protection is applicable only to laws that derogate
prior acts of contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing
the intention of the parties.
Facts:
The original farm worker beneficiaries (FWB) chose to become
stockholders of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) by reason of the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 93% of the
FWBs agreed to the Stock Distribution Option Agreement which became
the basis of the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) approved by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC). In their agreement the
parties agree among others that 33.296% of the outstanding capital
stock of HLI that has to be distributed to the FWBs under the SDP. Also
that HLI shall within a reasonable time subdivide and allocate among the
qualified family-beneficiaries. The FWBs through their representatives
31
sought to have the agreement revoked alleging that HLI did not perform
their obligations as required under the agreement. The PARC adopted the
resolution of the DAR and revoked the agreement between the FWB and
HLI.
Issue:
Whether or not PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP and
whether such revocation violate the non-impairment of contract clause.
Ruling:
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to
approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner
belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also
has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. Such
power or authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of
necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute
is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. To deny PARC such
revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP,
because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the
corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority
to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual
relations between and among parties is deemed read into the contract
and its implementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of the
non-impairment guarantee. There is no impingement of the impairment
clause, the non-impairment protection being applicable only to laws that
derogate prior acts of contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties. Impairment obtains if a subsequent
law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existing
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Necessarily,
the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in effect
at the time of the contract execution.
MIAA and Gana appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) but it was
denied on the ground that EO 301 refer only to contracts for the
purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment, and do not refer to other
contracts, such as lease of equipment, and that in the same vein,
supplies in Sec. 1(e) of EO 301 only include materials and equipment and
not service contracts, which are included in the general rule of Sec. 1.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not MIAA in the context of this case, can be barred from
entering into negotiated contracts after the expiration of the service
contracts of OMSI and TCSI.
Ruling:
Yes. We cannot agree with the contention of MIAA and Gana that the
exceptions to the public bidding rule in Sec. 1 of EO 301 cover both
contracts for public services and for supplies, material, and equipment.
Their reliance on Sec. 1(e) of EO 301 for the award of a service contract
for janitorial and maintenance services without public bidding is
misplaced.
33
This Court explained the rationale behind EO 301, upholding the general
rule that contracts shall not be entered into or renewed without public
bidding, thus:
Executive Order No. 301 explicitly permits negotiated contracts in
particular identified instances. In its preamble, it adverted to the then
existing set-up of a centralized administrative system . . . for
reviewing and approving negotiated contracts . . ., and to the
unsatisfactory character thereof in that such centralized
administrative system is not at all facilitative particularly in
emergency situations, characterized as it is by red tape and too
much delay in the processing and final approval of the required
transaction or activity; hence, the need to decentralize the
processing and final approval of negotiated contracts . . . It then
laid down, in its Section 1, guidelines for negotiated contracts
thenceforth to be followed. While affirming the general policy that
contracts shall not be entered into or renewed without public
bidding.
CITIZENSHIP
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006, Velasco, Jr., J.
The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are (1) Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
(2) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Facts:
When he was seven years old, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa acquired
American citizenship when his father became a naturalized American
citizen. When he arrived in the Philippines in 1995, he was admitted as a
“balikbayan”. Thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of
the BID. The Consul General of the US Embassy requested the
deportation of Tabasa on the ground that a standing warrant for several
charges has been issued against him and that his passport has been
revoked. Tabasa filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA. As
ordered, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA. However, Tabasa filed
a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship
by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171, and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained
by the respondent Bureau. The CA denied Tabasa’s petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship
under RA 8171 and thus cannot be summarily deported for his being an
undocumented alien.
Ruling:
34
No. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the
following: a.) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens; and b.) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
US, without completing the clearance required for her retirement. OCA
recommended that Siwa be adjudged liable for gross neglect of duty, for
her failure to submit the TSNs, despite an administrative circular
providing that "all stenographers are required to transcribe all
stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of the case
not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken.”
Issue:
Whether or not Siwa is liable for gross neglect of duty from failure to
submit the TSNs.
Ruling:
Yes. In Absin v. Montalla, which is on all fours applicable in this case, the
Court held:
The failure to submit the TSNs within the period prescribed under
Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross
neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by
dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule
IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
ELECTION LAW
ROQUE VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188456 September 10, 2009, Velasco, J.
The legislative intent in RA 8436 is for the May 2010 electoral exercise to
be fully automated, regardless of whether or not pilot testing was run in
the 2007 polls.
Facts:
The enactment of Republic Act No. 8436 in 1997 authorized the adoption
of an Automated Election System (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and
local elections and onwards. However, the following elections were not
able to adopt the AES. In 2007, RA 9369 was passed authorizing anew
the Comelec to use an AES. Pursuant to the law, Comelec Special Bids
and Awards Committee (SBAC) caused the publication in different
newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid for the
procurement of goods and services to be used in the automation project.
36
Among the submitted bids, only the joint venture of TIM and Smartmatic
was declared as the single complying calculated bid. Petitioners question
the validity and seek to nullify the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation
automation contract contending Comelec did not conduct any pilot
testing of the PCOS machines in violation of RA 8436 as amended by RA
8369.
Issue:
Whether or not pilot testing of the PCOS machines is necessary for the
2010 electoral exercise to be fully automated.
Ruling:
NO. Sec. 6 of the amended RA 8436, as couched, therefore, unmistakably
conveys the idea of unconditional full automation in the 2010 elections.
A construal making pilot testing of the AES a prerequisite or condition
sine qua non to putting the system in operation in the 2010 elections is
tantamount to reading into said section something beyond the clear
intention of Congress, as expressed in the provision itself.
The provisions of the clearly conveys that the [AES] to be used in the
2010 elections need not have been used in the 2007 elections, and that
the demonstration of its capability need not be in a previous Philippine
election. Demonstration of the success and capability of the PCOS may
be in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction. As determined by the
Comelec, the PCOS system had been successfully deployed in previous
electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada; and
New York, USA, albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system
provider. But then, RA 9369 does not call for the winning bidder of the
2010 automation project and the deploying entity/provider in the foreign
electoral exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law
incidentally require that the system be first used in an archipelagic
country or with a topography or a voting population similar to or
approximating that of the Philippines.
(1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected
in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the
ballots have been preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity
of tampering and suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution;
(2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved in such a manner is on the protestant;
(3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must
be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that
mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept
inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of
achieving that end;
(4) It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with
the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of
proving actual tampering or likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee; and
(5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of COMELEC that the
integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as
shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election returns. In the
same case, the Court referred to various provisions in the Omnibus
Election Code providing for the safe-keeping and preservation of the
ballots, more specifically Secs. 160, 217, 219, and 220 of the Code.
In the case at bar, Respondent Co cannot simply rely on the alleged
absence of evidence of reports of untoward incidents, and from there
immediately conclude that the ballots have been preserved. What he
should have presented are concrete pieces of evidence, independent of
38
the revision proceedings that will tend to show that the ballots counted
during the revision proceedings were the very same ones counted by the
BETs during the elections, and the very same ones cast by the public.
Without presenting to the court any evidence outside of the proceedings,
respondent Co as protestant may simply claim that the ballot boxes
themselves are the proof that they were properly preserved.
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division
and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has
been consequent transfers of the case between the two. Strictly
speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely
and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions. The
additional term "special," in this case, merely indicates that the
commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary
capacity or via substitution.
The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that
were assigned to it before the substitution was made. This jurisdiction
was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First Division
since this only entailed a change in the Division’s composition of
magistrates. Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If
anything, it was only petitioner’s naivety that misled him into
interpreting the designation of the division as a "special" one, meaning it
is distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also mistaken in claiming
that the jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division
from the Special First Division by ruling on the motion to quash since the
First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.
Ruling:
YES. As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was
proclaimed winner of the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May
15, 2013 as what erroneously appears on the printed COCP. Payumo’s
reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be
sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP
becomes necessary only for purposes of transmitting the results to the
next level of canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning candidates,
insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have
been lowered are concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more
controlling.
The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a
candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded
by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be
counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually applied in
consonance with the intent rule which stems from the principle that in
the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry
into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with
reasonable certainty.
The MBOC ruled in favor of Vicencio and excluded the seven election
returns adverted to. Petitioner Hipe filed a notice of appeal arguing that
the written petition to exclude the election returns was filed out of time,
and that the grounds used to exclude the questioned returns were not
proper for a pre-proclamation controversy, were not supported by
credible evidence, and were beyond the jurisdiction of the MBOC. The
Second Division of COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being filed out of
time. Petitioner Hipe filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny petitioner Hipes Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dismissing petitioner
Hipes appeal for being filed out of time.
Ruling:
No. Even if the Court would entertain petitioner Hipe’s appeal from the
decision of the MBOC on the questioned election returns, the Court still
rules in favor of respondent Vicencio. The COMELEC, after a judicious
evaluation of the documents on record, upheld the findings of the MBOC
to exclude the subject election returns on the basis of the affidavits of
the members of the Board of Election Inspectors. What exactly these
documents and evidence are upon which the COMELEC based its
resolution, and how they have been appreciated in respect of their
sufficiency, are beyond this Courts scrutiny. The rule that factual findings
of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except
when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to
place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.
44
PUBLIC CORPORATION
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(LBP)
G.R. No. 169913, June 08, 2011, J. Velasco, Jr.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 2264,
amending the Local Government Code.
Facts:
Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria were the owners of a parcel of agricultural
land. When Hilaria died, the administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses filed an action for reversion of title against Deleste in
1963. While the case was pending in 1972, PD 27 was issued which
mandates that agricultural lands be awarded to farmers. Certificates of
Land Transfers was then awarded in favor of the private respondent-
farmers. In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313,
reclassifying the subject property as residential. Because of this, the
heirs of Deleste filed with DARAB a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents' CLTs. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
declared the CLTs as void in view of the subsequent reclassification of the
subject property into a residential land, and the violation of petitioners'
constitutional right to due process of law. Conversely, DARAB reversed
the ruling of PARAD on the ground that the city ordinance has not been
approved by the HLURB.
Issue:
Whether LGUs have the power to classify lands and whether petitioners’
right to due process was violated.
Ruling:
YES. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to
reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA
2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city
councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. In this
case, since the subject property had been reclassified as
residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance No.
1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an "agricultural land,”
and is therefore outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
CONVERSION
AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR
V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
J.V. BAUTISTA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 204371, April 22, 2014, Velasco Jr., J.
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the
province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly
stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into
an Highly Urbanized City. Hence, all the qualified registered voters of
47
an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified
registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in
the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the
NEA Boards powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof
of bad faith. The fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating all the
49